Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of these reforms, particularly in your assignments as Deputy Commander, U. S. Central Command, and Deputy Commander, United Nations Command/U. S. Forces Korea.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Yes, I think that after 19 years, there are are areas that could be modified.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

I think there are 3 areas that could be improved.

- First, we may need to increase the number of jobs that are considered ‘joint’. I’ve had several jobs since Goldwater-Nichols that involved extensive real-world joint operations, yet they were not considered ‘joint’ by the personnel system. Due to the significant changes in the way our forces deploy and operate, I believe we may need to take a comprehensive look at which jobs deserve joint duty credit, and give credit where due, unconstrained by quotas.
- Second, we need to provide joint credit for those individuals serving in joint combat positions for less than the current 22 month minimum requirement.
- Finally, in a larger sense, Congress should consider including other US Government agencies in the joint training and deployment readiness process so that appropriate representatives of USG agencies are trained to better integrate Service, defense agency, and interagency capabilities to more effectively implement an integrated national strategy.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command/Supreme Allied Commander Transformation?
The Unified Command Plan focuses the command on two main missions: 1) providing conventional forces trained to operate in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment, and 2) transforming the US military’s forces to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command serves as the chief advocate for jointness and interoperability to champion the joint warfighting requirements of the other combatant commanders. As such, he is responsible for five major areas:

- First, he is functionally responsible for leading joint concept development and experimentation (CDE) and coordinating the CDE efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies to support joint interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities. The Commander of USJFCOM is also tasked with leading the development, exploration, and integration of new joint warfighting concepts and serving as the DoD Executive Agent for joint warfighting experimentation.
- Second, he serves as the lead Joint Force Integrator, responsible for recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to integrate Service, defense agency, interagency and multinational capabilities.
- Third, he serves as the lead agent for Joint Force Training. This effort is focused at the operational level with an emphasis on Joint Task Force Commanders and their staffs and the ability of US forces to operate as part of a joint and multinational force. Additionally, USJFCOM is responsible for leading the development of a distributed joint training architecture and developing joint training standards.
- Fourth, he leads the collaborative development of joint readiness standards for Joint Task Force Headquarters staffs, functional component headquarters staffs, and headquarters designated as potential joint headquarters or portion thereof, for recommendation to the Chairman.
- Fifth, he serves as the Primary Joint Force Provider. In this role, USJFCOM has combatant command over a large portion of the conventional forces of the U.S. Armed Forces and provides them as trained and ready joint-capable forces to the other Combatant Commanders when directed by the Secretary of Defense.

In addition to these UCP assigned missions, US Joint Forces Command has been assigned as the Executive Agent within the Department of Defense for the following mission areas:

- Joint Urban Operations
- Personnel Recovery
- Joint Deployment Process Owner
- Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct
- Joint Experimentation

The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) is responsible to the Military Committee for overall recommendations on transformation. He leads transformation of NATO military structures, capabilities and doctrines, including those for the defense against terrorism in order to improve the military effectiveness and interoperability of the Alliance. He cooperates
with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on integrating and synchronizing transformation efforts with operational activities and elements. He also promotes improvements to the capabilities of NATO forces made available by nations, especially for Combined Joint Task Forces and NATO Response Force Operations. Specifically, SACT:

- Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the NATO Defense Planning Process, including the development of the Defense requirements review.
- Develops Strategic Commander Force proposals within the Force Planning Process and conducts Strategic Commander assessment of national contributions to the NATO force structure in coordination with national military authorities.
- Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the development of NATO Joint and Combined concepts, policy and doctrine, as well as Partnership for Peace military concepts in cooperation with SACEUR.
- Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the development of future Communications Information Systems strategy, concepts, capabilities and architecture.
- Leads, for military matters in NATO, partnership for Peace and other non-NATO joint individual education and training, and associated policy.
- Assists SACEUR in the education and training of functional commands and staff elements that plan for and conduct operations with multinational and joint forces over the full range of Alliance military missions.

If confirmed, I will devote my efforts to accomplishing these JFCOM and ACT responsibilities.

**Background and Experience**

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I have benefited from a broad range of assignments during my nearly 36 years in uniform, from tactical to operational command. From my first assignment flying close air support and search and rescue missions in Vietnam, through assignments in NATO and Korea, to my current position as Deputy Commander, US Central Command, I have had considerable experience in joint and coalition operations in actual combat or near combat situations. I was also privileged to command two fighter wings and a numbered Air Force, as well as the NATO School, Air War College, and the Air Force Doctrine Center. Throughout all these experiences, I was fortunate to work for, and with, incredible people at every level and tried to learn everything I could in each assignment. I have also had the opportunity to work with senior coalition leaders and coalition forces in a variety of missions - all helping to prepare me for this assignment.

**Relationships**

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional
practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command/Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, to the following:

**The Secretary of Defense**

_The Commander, US Joint Forces Command performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and is directly responsible to him to carry out its assigned missions._

**The Under Secretaries of Defense**

_Title 10, US Code, and current Department of Defense directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DoD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to the commanders and the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff._

**The Assistant Secretaries of Defense**

_With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, Intelligence Oversight, and for Networks & Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that described above for the Under Secretaries._

**The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

_The Chairman is established by Title 10 as the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman serves as an advisor and is not, according to law, in the operational chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary to each combatant commander. The President directs communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This keeps the Chairman fully involved and allows the Chairman to execute his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the Chairman is to speak for the Combatant Commanders, especially on operational requirements. If confirmed_
as Commander, USJFCOM, I will keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which I am personally accountable.

**Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)**

SACEUR is one of two co-equal Strategic Commanders within NATO’s command structure. As NATO’s other Strategic Commander, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation supports SACEUR in the education and training of functional commands and staff elements that plan for and conduct operations, with multinational and joint forces, over the full range of Alliance military missions authorized by the North Atlantic Council/Defense Planning Committee. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) also conducts and evaluates training and exercises of forces and headquarters, in coordination with and on behalf of SACEUR. Lastly, ACT supports SACEUR in joint analysis, evaluations and assessments of NATO-led operations and forces, including NATO Response Force certification.

**North Atlantic Council/Defense Planning Committee/The NATO Chiefs of Defense and Defense Ministers/The Military Committee of NATO**

As one of two co-equal Strategic Commanders within NATO’s command structure, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation provides military advice to the Military Committee, North Atlantic Council and Defense Planning Committee on matters pertaining to transformation, as required. The Commander may make recommendations directly to the Military Committee, the International Military Staff, national Chiefs of Defense, Defense Ministers and Heads of State and Government on transformational matters affecting the capability improvement, interoperability, efficiency, and sustainability of forces designated for NATO.

**The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned to the combatant commands. The Commander, US Joint Forces Command coordinates closely with the secretaries to ensure the requirements to organize, train, and equip forces assigned to USJFCOM are met. Close coordination with each Service Secretary is required to ensure that there is no infringement upon the lawful responsibilities held by a Service Secretary.

**The Chiefs of Staff of the Services**

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure preparedness of his assigned forces without the full cooperation and support of the Service Chiefs. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide
The experience and judgment of the Service Chiefs provide an invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed as Commander, USJFCOM, I will continue the close bond between the command, the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the US Coast Guard in order to fully utilize their service capabilities, and to effectively employ those capabilities as required to execute the missions of US Joint Forces Command.

The combatant commanders

In general, JFCOM is a supporting command – its job is to make the other combatant commands more successful. If confirmed, I will continue the close relationships with other combatant commanders to increase the effectiveness we’ve created, and continue to build mutual support. The joint capabilities required by combatant commanders to perform their missions – today and in the future - forms a large basis of JFCOM’s mission. Today’s security environment dictates that JFCOM work very closely with the other combatant commanders to execute our national military strategy.

The commanders of each of the Service's training and doctrine commands

Tasked by the UCP as the executive agent for joint warfighting experimentation, a strong relationship exists between JFCOM and the Services’ training and doctrine commands. Admiral Giambastiani established close working relationships with these organizations and their commanders via a monthly Component Commanders meeting, and if confirmed, I will continue these relationships.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges and problems confronting the Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command/Supreme Allied Commander Transformation?

I see 3 overarching challenges for the Commander, US Joint Forces Command

- First, we must provide trained and ready joint forces to the combatant commanders to fight not only the Global War On Terrorism, but other possible contingencies as well, should and when they arise. Also, we must be capable of generating forces to respond to major disasters if directed to do so. Joint Forces Command plays a major role in providing conventional forces and capabilities to combatant commanders. JFCOM also supports the joint training and readiness needs of those forces. Providing sufficient numbers of mission-ready, joint-trained and equipped forces for the missions assigned to the geographic combatant commanders will continue to be a challenge.
• Second, we must continue transforming our joint force for the future while prosecuting current campaigns. Although challenging, it is important to balance the needs of the combatant commanders for current operations with the need to modernize and modularize Joint and Service forces to increase their capability to meet the security challenges of the 21st Century.

• Third, we need to ensure the requirements and acquisition processes can rapidly provide solutions to meet combatant commanders’ short term joint needs. We need to improve our ability to quickly implement solutions to joint lessons learned and integrate promising concepts and technologies without significantly disrupting existing programs within the execution years.

If confirmed as Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, I anticipate that my main challenge will be delivering timely transformational products to Allied Command Operations and the Allied Nations which improve and transform our military forces while advancing a clear understanding throughout the Alliance of military transformation and ACT’s role in the process.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing them?

If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs and Defense Agencies to ensure that we continue to develop and implement joint sourcing solutions to allow the combatant commanders to coherently prosecute their missions. I will also continue to ensure we use concept development, experimentation and Operational Analysis/Lessons Learned from experiments, exercises and on-going operations to guide transformation and improve global sourcing and the preparation of joint forces and capabilities for employment. I will work in partnership with the Services, COCOMs, Agencies, Industry, Academia, and partner nations to leverage intellectual energy and collective resources. I will make recommendations and plans regarding the appropriate capabilities, policies and resources needed to continue to transform the Armed Forces to meet current and future security challenges. I will use Congressionally-granted Limited Acquisition Authority, if continued past FY06, and work closely with the Chairman and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to resource timely solutions to the combatant commanders’ emergent joint needs.

On the NATO side, if confirmed, I will work with the Military Committee, the North Atlantic Council, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Allied Nations to continue the transformation of NATO’s military. Utilizing the considerable capabilities of Allied Command Transformation’s headquarters, Joint Warfare Center, Joint Force Training Center, and Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center, as well as working with NATO’s Agencies, educational establishments and the Allied Nations’ Centers of Excellence, I will strive to continue the development of the capabilities, policies and resources needed to meet NATO’s current and future security challenges.
Additionally, I will carry forward, to both the political and military leaders of the Alliance and its Nations, the NATO transformation message in an effort to facilitate a clear understanding of the need for transformation, the responsibilities of those leading the process and the methods by which we intend to accomplish the task.

**Joint Officer Management**

Pursuant to section 531 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, the Secretary of Defense is required to develop a strategic plan for joint officer management and joint professional military education that would link future requirements for active and reserve military personnel who are trained and educated in joint matters to the resources required to develop those officers in terms of manpower, formal education, practical experience, and other requirements.

What do you consider to be the primary strengths and weaknesses of the current requirements for joint professional military education with respect to qualification as a joint specialty officer?

The strength of the current system is that it produces officers with a solid level of education, training, and joint staff experience to be certified as joint specialty experts. However, there are three main areas that we need to improve: providing credit for all relevant joint operational experience – especially in operational Joint Task Force headquarters, developing a system to track this cumulative experience across the officer corps, and finally I think we need to ensure the officer corps produces the right kinds of officers who achieve their Joint Specialty Officer certification early enough in their career so that we have a large enough pool of joint service officers to fill the requirements at all levels.

In assessing the performance of officers in joint command, what is your personal view of the operational value and importance of officers achieving qualification as joint specialty officers?

There is significant operational value and importance in officers achieving qualification as joint specialty officers prior to assuming joint command. The focus should be on producing leaders who are fully qualified, inherently joint officers, critical thinkers, and most importantly, skilled war fighters and operators. Achieving the qualification of joint specialty officers is critical to supporting current and anticipated joint mission requirements.

What changes, if any, would you recommend in the development, education, management, assignment, and qualifying processes for officers in a transformed and fully joint U. S. military?
In my opinion, there are three components to developing a Joint Specialty Officer: education, training, and experience. While the education and training components are reasonably well developed, the services do not always provide their best and brightest to serve on operational Joint Task Force Headquarters, and even when we do, we don’t have a system to track officers with this joint operational experience. This problem is further compounded since we currently do not always provide joint credit for officers conducting joint combat operations for less than 22 months in a combat zone. This real-world joint operational experience – the most valuable kind of joint experience in my view - reinforces education and training with practical application of learned skills, thus more fully preparing officers to lead and manage in the joint environment. The joint manpower exchange program as currently being implemented has great potential for advancing jointness across the force. We are making great headway in this area but need to continue the effort.

The previous Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command, has expressed the view that a necessary next step in joint officer management is creating a system to track operational joint experience and to more easily provide joint duty credit for those officers who serve on an operational Joint Task Force.

Do you agree with this view and, if so, how would you recommend achieving it?

I wholeheartedly agree with ADM Giambastiani’s position in regard to the value of joint operational experience and ensuring we track and fold it into the joint officer management process. Real-world joint operational experience is the most valuable kind of joint experience as it reinforces education and training with practical application of learned skills, thus more fully preparing officers to command in the joint environment. Joint Specialty Officers with joint education, training and experience are critical to successful joint operations today and in the future.

There are three parts to tracking joint operational credit in the real world joint environment. First we need to establish criteria which define joint operational credit. Second we need to apply these criteria and identify key positions on the Joint Task Force Headquarters and other appropriate joint operational assignments and not be unnecessarily constrained by ceilings on the number of joint qualified officers. Finally, the human resource systems need to document this joint operational credit in a consistent manner across the officer corps so it is readily available in the joint specialty officer management process. I believe tracking both joint operational duty and joint credit for the total force to be one of the key steps we need to undertake in transforming the officer corps and producing leaders who are fully qualified, inherently joint officers.
We also need to ensure our best officers go to these positions and that they are promoted at a rate consistent with the importance of their joint responsibilities.

Training of Senior Leaders in Joint Operations

U. S. Joint Forces Command has taken several initiatives to train senior leaders to operate in joint environments. CAPSTONE and PINNACLE are intensive courses that provide general and flag officers with an understanding of their role as joint task force commanders. KEYSTONE provides senior enlisted leaders with an understanding of their role in joint operations.

Based on your experience as Deputy Commander, U. S. Central Command, are senior leaders receiving the training they need to succeed in the joint warfighting environment?

Yes. Joint training today, as well as leader development programs such as PINNACLE, CAPSTONE and KEYSTONE, challenge and better prepare our leaders to think, act, and operate effectively in today’s challenging security environment. These programs are continually updated based on observed best practices and they link in actual JTF commanders in the field for question and answer sessions. The joint mission rehearsal program is also providing outstanding operational level training for commanders and their staffs prior to deployment. We have been very pleased with the training the senior leaders of CENTCOM’s Joint Task Forces have received.

What recommendations for change in senior leader training, if any, do you have?

Overall, I am quite pleased with the senior leader training program. It achieves a good balance of academics, exercise, senior mentors and in-country right seat rides prior to mission transfer. While Interagency and multinational participation is included, it could be expanded and the earlier we engage our officers and senior NCOs the better.

In your opinion, is KEYSTONE as robust and professionally developing as CAPSTONE and PINNACLE? If not, what recommendations would you make to improve the course?

Currently, the KEYSTONE Joint Operations Module(JOM) hosted by Joint Forces Command is as robust and professionally developing as the JOM for CAPSTONE and PINNACLE. KEYSTONE provides senior enlisted leaders with training to serve on the staffs of joint commands. However, KEYSTONE is just beginning to transition to a full program under the direction of National Defense University as conducted for CAPSTONE and PINNACLE. The KEYSTONE program is valuable and as we move forward, I anticipate it will
continually be shaped to meet the needs of commanders. In that respect, the graduates are being used well—nearly every regional combatant command senior enlisted leader has been through the course, the new JCS Command Sergeant Major is a graduate, and many of the key warfighting commands such as MNF-I, CFC-A, and MNC-I all have command senior enlisted leaders who are graduates of KEYSTONE. In fact, CFC-A has designated Keystone as a prerequisite course for those selected for assignment as the Command Senior Enlisted Leader. This speaks quite well for the program and its graduates. Keystone has matured over its three iterations. A major milestone is formalization of Enlisted Professional Military Education Program, of which Keystone will serve as the graduate level course.

Joint Tactical Training

While progress has been made in the ability of the Services to plan and operate at the strategic level, there continue to be shortfalls in joint training and in the conduct of joint operations at the tactical level.

Based on your service in U. S. Forces Korea and U. S. Central Command, what do you consider to be the operational and tactical areas most in need of better joint capability, training and procedures?

Because of the different levels of engagement by the Services in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), we are utilizing Air Force and Naval personnel in many non-traditional areas such as truck drivers and prison guards. We need to anticipate and train to these capabilities as early as possible in the deployment process. Also, as we deal more and more with stability and reconstruction organizations such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Provincial Support Teams, we must ensure they have the right training for their unique jobset as well as in processes to protect themselves and to conduct combat operations should they come under attack.

One way to increase our ability to conduct this sort of training is through the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) which achieved Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in October of last year. JNTC for the first time offers the department the ability to integrate live, virtual, and constructive capabilities in a more realistic battle space environment at reduced cost and greater effectiveness. JNTC offers great opportunity to improve and advance joint intel, joint fires, joint command and control, joint ISR, joint logistics, interagency, and multinational operations. These areas and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) are key areas to focus on.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve the ability of tactical level units from each of the Services to train together and to require the
Services, in fulfilling their statutory obligation to organize and train, to ensure joint tactical training takes place?

The individual services understand that we must train jointly and have been leaning forward not only in joint training but also ensuring their training programs reflect the environment of real world operations. The Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) provides that real-world integrating environment that promotes Jointness through integration vice deconfliction. If confirmed, I would continue to use JNTC to incentivize the services by enabling them to conduct joint training from home station, or in some cases while deployed, and allowing them to focus at the tactical level as well as the operational level. I would also encourage the Services to include this type of joint training as early as possible in young officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO’s) careers.

Joint Training JFCOM

Three years ago, this Committee directed the Department of Defense to develop standards to rationalize the requirements for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) facilities within and across the services, and to report on those requirements. This effort has progressed very slowly, and the Department has informed us that such standards will not be in place in time to apply them to any projects requested in the fiscal year 2007 budget that will be presented to Congress next year.

If confirmed, what steps would you plan to take, and what role do you envision for JFCOM, to develop standards and priorities for joint urban training across DOD, to include the requirements for and location of facilities needed to support this training?

DOD has made great improvements in our joint urban training over the past few years. If confirmed, I would ensure JFCOM continues to work with the Joint Staff and the Services to develop standards and priorities for joint urban training and facilities as quickly as possible.

Do you believe this program should be part of the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) effort, or that it should be separate?

At the moment, I believe there is greater utility in establishing a Service-based program that JFCOM certifies, monitors, and supports, but this is an issue that I would like to examine more if confirmed.

Do you believe any changes in title 10 responsibilities are necessary in order to provide the joint training capability needed to deal with the complex challenges of current and future missions?
It is certainly possible that some changes to title 10 responsibilities may become necessary; however, through the ongoing deployment of a joint national training capability, we have made significant and steady progress in many areas. This progress is the result of many thousands of conversations everyday within and between the myriad of Service organizations, the COM staffs, OSD, the Joint Staff and all of our various multinational, agency, industry and academic partnerships. Eventually some Title 10 adjustments may serve to make our outcomes more efficient, but I don’t believe it can make them inherently effective unless the people in the process understand and are committed in very personal ways. In essence, the cultural change is as important as the policy change. And that cultural change is happening more and more every day.

Close Air Support JFCOM

A GAO report of May 2003 entitled "Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces," found that the Services have had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic, standardized close air support (CAS) necessary to prepare them for joint operations. GAO found that progress has been slow on many of the CAS issues because the Services have been unable to agree on joint solutions and that U.S. troops are forced to conduct last-minute training or to create ad hoc procedures on the battlefield.

From the perspective of the combatant commander, what progress has been made and what problems persist, in ensuring successful CAS mission execution?

Fortunately we continue to make progress in this important area. For example, the Services have recently agreed to standardized training procedures for joint terminal air controllers and we created the Joint Fires Interoperability and Integration Team out of two other commands to focus on the integration of joint fires at tactical level. We have also made progress in standardizing more and more equipment. For example, one of the major CAS shortfalls identified during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was the lack of target location and ranging devices for the terminal attack controllers on the ground. Based on this shortfall and prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Services purchased and fielded many laser range finders and GPS systems for the terminal attack controllers on the ground. This significantly increased the target coordinate accuracy and allowed CAS platforms to accurately deliver their ordnance where the ground commander needed it.

Additionally, the accessibility of Unmanned Air System information to the terminal attack controller has also brought about significant improvement to CAS employment. The ability to get a “bird’s eye” view of the target area similar to what the aircrew is seeing significantly reduces the time required to
pass the correct target to the aircrew. These technological improvements in the hands of trained Controllers continue to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of CAS assets in support of the ground commander.

While we have made significant progress, more needs to be done for both US forces and coalition partners in enhancing equipment interoperability, improving the effectiveness of simulations for terminal air controller qualification and currency training, and alignment of qualified air controllers at the appropriate level in tactical ground units.

**What steps has the Department and U. S. Joint Forces Command taken to respond to the recommendations of the GAO with respect to CAS training?**

JFCOM chairs the Joint CAS Executive Steering Committee which has made huge strides toward standardizing the training and certification of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACS) and Forward Air Controllers (Airborne) (FAC(A)), both within DoD and with our allies. JFCOM created the Joint Fires Interoperability and Integration Team out of two other commands to focus on the integration of joint fires at tactical level.

JFCOM is also heavily involved in establishing interoperable equipment requirements for Joint Fires. JFCOM is also collaborating with the Services and USSOCOM to develop a Joint equipment solution for the terminal attack controllers—the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS) —a light-weight, man-portable target location and designation system integrated with a targeting effects coordination system (estimate FY10-12 fielding).

In the near-term, JFCOM has provided CENTCOM with the ability to pass airborne imagery to ground units (using RAIDER-Rapid Attack Information Dissemination Execution Relay) as well as to better plan and target CAS using a Digital Precision Strike Suite (DPSS) of equipment. This DPSS capability has been used by Special Operations Forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. During the last large engagement in Fallujah (NOV/DEC 04), DPSS was used to support the majority (90%) of all USMC/Naval Special Warfare CAS missions including both JDAM and LGB drops.

With advances in technology, simulation now offers realistic and affordable alternatives for Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) training. While simulation will never fully replace live training events, it will potentially relieve a portion of the cost associated with initial and follow-on training requirements for our units and personnel and ultimately allow us to train more efficiently across DoD.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to solve this problem?
If confirmed I would continue to push for USJFCOM to be designated the Department of Defense lead for Joint Close Air Support, which would increase USJFCOM’s ability to influence joint solutions and capability improvements for the warfighter. Additionally, working with our Coalition partners to gain acceptance of our Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) and Forward Air Controller—Airborne (FAC(A)) qualification and certification standards will be one of my top priorities. My executive agent for most of these initiatives would be the Joint Fires Interoperability and Integration Team, which is already working with all the Services and many of our multinational partners to raise the bar on JCAS capability and performance.

**Joint Requirements Oversight Council**

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has the responsibility to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements to meet the national military strategy and alternatives to any acquisition programs that have been identified.

**How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the Department’s acquisition process?**

In my view, we must “operationalize” the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and acquisition processes to respond with agility when immediate and pressing needs are presented and validated. Currently, the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is designed to impact mid- to far-term capabilities and funding (3 years and beyond). The process has less flexibility to quickly respond to emerging requirements within the PPBE process in the near-term budget years (1-2 years).

A variety of ad hoc measures have been used to address this challenge. Congress has helped by providing new authorities such as Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA). One near-term solution is to dedicate appropriate resources – tied to Limited Acquisition Authority - in order to have funds available to ensure Combatant Commanders are able to quickly acquire joint warfighting capabilities. In the long-term, the JCIDS process needs to change to fall more in line with the demands and pace of today’s operations. Additionally, the JROC issues memoranda directing JFCOM and other combatant commands to undertake actions on behalf of the joint force, but often provides limited funding to initiate the action or sustain it beyond its first year or two. As an example, I understand that JFCOM has nearly $100M worth of unfunded requirements in FY 06, all of which were directed by external mandates, some of which came from the JROC. I am aware that the Joint Staff is working on a way to link plans and requirements to resources. If confirmed, I look forward to seeing how that applies to a functional combatant command like JFCOM and to helping to develop a systemic way to address these concerns in the future.
Joint Requirements

Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command, is responsible for advocating for the interests of combatant commanders in the overall defense requirements and acquisition process.

From your perspective as the Deputy Commander, U. S. Central Command, has U. S. Joint Forces Command effectively represented the requirements and needs of combatant commanders to the JROC and the military services?

Yes, in my experience at CENTCOM, USJFCOM was very effective in representing CENTCOM’s needs to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the military services. For example; JFCOM collected and analyzed lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq. These lessons were compared to the Integrated Priority Lists and Joint Quarterly Readiness Reports submitted by the Combatant Commanders. This comparison was then used to develop recommended approaches for resolution which were submitted to the Joint Staff and JROC. All of these recommendations were endorsed by the JROC. A problem, however, in my opinion is that many of these joint solutions are still not adequately funded. If confirmed, I look forward to continue working with all those involved to make the system even more responsive to Combatant Commander needs – to include possible JFCOM representation on the JROC.

In your view, are combatant commanders capable of identifying critical joint warfighting requirements and quickly acquiring needed capabilities?

Combatant Commanders are very effective in identifying joint warfighting requirements and capability gaps. However, their ability to quickly acquire needed capabilities has proven less than optimal. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council process is designed to impact mid- to far-term capabilities and funding (3 years and beyond). The process has less flexibility to respond to emerging requirements within the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process in the near-term budget years (1-2 years). Currently, there are limited pools of funding available to address this systemic problem. Therefore, Combatant Commanders still have difficulty rapidly acquiring some capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring ways to improve the ability to quickly acquire capabilities needed by the Combatant Commanders.

What suggestions, if any, do you have for improving the requirements and acquisition process to ensure that combatant commanders are able to quickly acquire needed joint warfighting capabilities?
In my view, we must “operationalize” the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and acquisition processes to respond with agility when immediate and pressing needs are presented and validated. As I mentioned above, the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is designed to impact mid- to far-term capabilities and funding (3 years and beyond). The process has less flexibility to quickly respond to emerging requirements within the PPBE process in the near-term budget years (1-2 years).

A variety of ad hoc measures have been used to address this challenge. Congress has helped by providing new authorities such as Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA) which has proven to be of great value. One near-term solution is to extend this authority and dedicate appropriate resources in order to have funds available to quickly acquire joint warfighting capabilities for the Combatant Commanders. In the long-term, the JCIDS process needs to adapt to more effectively meet the demands and pace of today’s operations. If confirmed, I look forward to helping to develop a systemic way to address these concerns.

If confirmed, what role do you believe you should play in the JROC deliberations?

I believe the Combatant Commanders need to have an effective voice in the resource decisions of joint requirements. If confirmed, I look forward to investigating the option of including JFCOM representation as a voting member on the JROC.

Transformation

By serving as the Department’s "transformation laboratory," U.S. Joint Forces Command enhances the combatant commands' capabilities as outlined in the Department’s Unified Command Plan.

Do you believe U. S. Joint Forces Command should play a larger role in transformation and setting transformation policy? If so, how?

USJFCOM’s role and influence in transformation continues to grow through constantly expanding interaction with the Services, Joint Staff and OSD in the joint experimentation, joint training, joint integration, and joint force providing responsibilities as assigned by the UCP. Our transformation role includes both interactions within the existing DOD developmental processes and the ability to act as a coordinator of Service, COCOM, and Agency efforts. Transformation policy clearly rests with the Department. However, JFCOM is afforded substantial and sufficient opportunity to inform policy makers and to shape the mechanisms that execute transformation policy.
In your view, what effects-based capabilities that have been fielded are truly transformational?

There are two core aspects of effects-based capabilities currently in the field that are truly transformational. The first, and more mature of the two, is the systemic analysis capability. Designed to view the adversary and overall operational environment as interrelated systems, this capability focuses information on them in terms of nodal analysis and the impact that action(s) X, Y, or Z may have on the adversary’s critical nodes. In essence targets are not viewed as such, but rather their importance to the adversary’s behavior. Thus military targets may be bypassed or neutralized (not destroyed) if their presence has little to no importance while political, social, or economic targets may be deemed more critical. The systemic approach provides decision makers with a critical view of the operational environment and an unprecedented capability to understand how planned actions will impact the situation. The systemic analysis process has been fielded to all US regional combatant commands and is also in use with coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and with the Combined Forces Command in Korea.

The second truly transformational capability is the effects-based assessment (EBA) methodology. EBA is the “heart” of the EBO concept, and provides commanders with an effects-based understanding of operational progress as well as effects-based recommendations for future operational decision making. It transforms the traditional nature of campaign assessment into one that enables all operational echelons to understand the effects-based intent of their actions and to report the outcomes of such actions in a way that links directly to the command decision making process. As with the systemic analysis capability, the EBA methodology is currently being used by a wide range of US and multinational organizations around the world.

What effects-based capabilities currently under development do you consider to be truly transformational and deserving of support within the Department and Congress?

While true that both the systemic analysis and EBA methodology are widely fielded, both are still somewhat under development. Continued support of these two critical effects-based capabilities is directly linked to the future value of EBO.

Few would argue that the introduction of unmanned aerial systems was not an important transformational achievement. Each Service is developing a wide range of unmanned aerial system capabilities, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is responsible for ensuring these capabilities
support the Department’s overarching goals of fielding transformational capabilities, establishing joint standards, and controlling costs.

In your view, what role should U.S. Joint Forces Command play in supporting the Department, including the services and Defense agencies, in achieving successful systematic migration of mission capabilities to this new class of military tools?

As lead in the Joint Battle Management Command and Control Board of Directors and a partner in the UAV Center of Excellence, JFCOM, I believe, is playing a role in ensuring joint interoperability requirements are being integrated into the design of the UASs themselves and the payloads they carry. This ensures they are fully capable of being seamlessly integrated and fully joint capable in the joint battlespace. JFCOM certainly has unique capabilities that could be further applied to this issue if given appropriate authority.

U.S. Joint Forces Command has a responsibility to improve combatant commander unmanned aerial system effectiveness through improved joint service collaboration. Currently, the Air Force is fielding the Predator unmanned aerial system, and Army has recently signed a contract for the system development and demonstration of the Warrior unmanned aerial system. Both systems have a hunter-killer mission, are produced by the same contractor, and are very similar in design and capability.

What was U.S. Joint Forces Command's role, if any, in effecting joint service collaboration for these two systems or in determining whether there could be overlap between the Army and Air Force requirements?

Based on my understanding at this juncture, I believe USJFCOM’s authorities and responsibilities in the development and approval of the joint requirements for both Warrior and Predator must be expanded to ensure we do not duplicate capabilities due to the lack of clearly understood Combatant Command requirements and insufficient Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the employment of systems we already have on hand. The creation of a Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center of Excellence located at Creech AFB in Nevada is one example of how the joint force has taken steps to ensure unwarranted duplication of effort does not occur.

What joint warfighter capabilities, if any, does the Warrior system provide?

I am not familiar enough with exact capabilities of the Warrior system to answer that question. The important issue with any new UAV system is to make sure that the acquisition process is properly followed so that the system is ‘born joint’. In CENTCOM, when UAVs were acquired outside the normal process, it
sometimes led directly to problems with spectrum management and incompatible systems. The new UAV Joint Center of Excellence will hopefully help ensure these problems are worked out before new systems come into theater.

**Combat Identification Systems**

The Committee is concerned that urgent joint warfighting requirements, including combat identification systems, are not always conceived, developed, and fielded in the most expeditious manner possible. Longstanding operational requirements include a joint blue force tracking capability; a joint interoperable air, sea, and ground combat identification system; and a joint simulations and modeling capability for evaluating joint warfighting concepts development.

What progress has been made, and what challenges exist, to fielding effective friendly forces tracking capabilities?

Fielding effective capabilities in this area has been centered on achieving service and coalition interoperability of these various tracking capabilities. We’ve made significant progress in getting all the Services to agree to a strategy for a single blue force tracking (BFT) capability with key capabilities from each Service merging in FY 08-09. Of note, the Army and Marine Corps will begin merging their systems this fiscal year. An Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) showed it was possible to display data from multiple BFT systems on a single common operational picture and a further development is being fielded to CENTCOM which sends ground BFT data to attack aircraft.

Of great significance, JFCOM, in partnership with Allied Command Transformation (ACT), just completed the last of three demonstrations that were part of a nine nation Coalition Combat Identification (CCID) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). This event evaluated a number of ground-to-ground and air-to-ground technologies including Radio Frequency Tags and interoperable NATO standard Battlefield Target Identification Devices. The results will be available in March 2006 in the form of a Joint Military Utility Assessment that will inform US and coalition acquisition and fielding decisions for Combat Identification.

Challenges remain in ensuring all Services and Agencies examine the full range of both materiel and non-materiel solutions. Moving BFT information across multi-security levels and back and forth to coalition partners is also an important issue that requires constant attention. Additionally, determining the correct doctrinal relationship between Combat Identification and Situational Awareness is a high priority. Finally, building effective
JFCOM-led organizations that are supported across the DoD will pay real dividends, as these CID and BFT challenges are long term issues.

What additional acquisition authority, if any, does U.S. Joint Forces Command require to rapidly address such joint warfighting challenges?

USJFCOM requires that Limited Acquisition Authority be extended when it expires at the end of FY06. This authority should be accompanied with adequate resources to accelerate fielding of capabilities to the Commanders in the field. Additionally, the law should allow use of O&M funding to support and sustain the operation of the LAA project for that period of time before the Services can revise their POMs to incorporate the new, or additions to existing, programs.

Joint Forces Command Limited Acquisition Authority

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 provided Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command, with the authority to develop and acquire equipment for battle management command, control, communications, and intelligence and other equipment determined to be necessary for facilitating the use of joint forces in military operations and enhancing the interoperability of equipment used by the various components of joint forces. This authority limits spending to $10 million for research and development and $50 million for procurement.

What is your assessment of the benefits of this limited acquisition authority?

Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA), granted to the Secretary of Defense, has proven to be an exceptionally useful and flexible tool for U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in support of other Combatant Commands, however, no funds were allocated to JFCOM to support LAA. Based on warfighting shortfalls validated by Combatant Commanders, LAA has allowed JFCOM to field mature technologies or improved capability to the warfighters in the regional Combatant Commands more rapidly than the normal DoD process for responding to unanticipated urgent needs.

Since 2004 USJFCOM’s implementation of LAA in support of Combatant Commands has been used to fund/provide several improvements to the Joint Warfighter:

- The Joint Precision Air Drop System 2000 pound capability allows precision delivery of logistic support to forces in remote operating areas or behind enemy lines. Expected delivery – accelerated from a planned delivery of FY09 to Nov 2005.
- The Change Detection Work Station (CDWS) is a capability to map and detect Improvised Explosive Devices along troop/convoy routes. CDWS deployed to U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND in January 2005 and has already detected several IEDs before they were able to cause damage or injury.
The Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and Control Capability (JTF CDR EC2) is an information technology solution that provides connectivity to a Commander while remotely located from the headquarters element. Four of these systems were delivered to CENTCOM/EUCOM Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in Fiscal Year 04 and a fifth was delivered to CJTF-76 late last year. It has also been deployed to support Katrina and is currently deployed in support of the humanitarian operation in Pakistan.

Joint Translator/Forwarder/Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness/Rapid Attack Info Dissemination Execution Relay combines several capabilities critical to the data link integration, blue force tracking and attack of time sensitive targets.
  
  - Joint Translator Forward is a universal translator/data forwarder for converting our existing disparate data sources and links.
  - Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness provides the ability to pull different Blue Force Tracking devices together and display them in one Common Operating Picture. This capability is in Iraq today with Multinational Force West (MNF-W) and is being tested to support XVIII Airborne Corps as we speak.
  - Rapid Attack Info Dissemination Execution Relay (RAIDER) provides Time Sensitive Target attack data/authorization to multiple aircraft en route to targets. Currently, CENTCOM is using the capability in non-traditional ISR missions in direct support of ground operations, passing imagery to ground forces.

Command and Control On The Move –provides very large bandwidth access to Intelligence & Command and Control systems while on the move. The initial capability was delivered to V Corps in JUL 05 and is currently deployed to Pakistan to support the humanitarian effort.

USJFCOM is also evaluating additional capabilities for fielding under Limited Acquisition Authority.

- Simultaneous, two-way voice translation between American English and Arabic dialects.
- Public Key Infrastructure/Interoperability Express- a method to provide secure, but UNCLASSIFIED information between US and Coalition partners in the Combatant Commands.
- Theater Battle Operations Net Centric Environment (TBONE) - a means to readily develop and disseminate air tasking orders to all participating units.
- Multi-level-secure Information Infrastructure(MI2)-provides information sharing within and across multi-level security information domains.

Do you believe this authority should be extended beyond September 30, 2006? If so, what changes, if any, would you recommend to improve the authority?
Yes. I strongly believe that extension of Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA) beyond Fiscal Year 06 will continue to provide needed capabilities to the Regional Combatant Commanders; especially in Command and Control functions, Communications, Intelligence, Operations, and Interoperability. I strongly urge Congress to extend the authority.

Limited Acquisition Authority can be improved by adding appropriated funding commensurate to the authority and by allowing the use of Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds for sustainment of LAA-acquired capabilities until transition to an existing program of record, absorption of the sustainment into the recipient’s O&M budget, or termination of the requirement for each specific capability.

While Limited Acquisition Authority projects are bringing some much-needed improvements to the joint warfighter, the LAA is not without significant challenges. Finding adequate resources to support LAA projects is often more challenging than defining, developing or fielding the capability. While these authorities have provided opportunities to partner with Services and Defense Agencies to field these tools, developing funding agreements takes time, slowing the development and delivery of capabilities to the troops – the very problem that LAA was designed to address.

The ability to sustain/maintain these projects during transition to programs of record also continues to present challenges. LAA does not allow the use of O&M under the statute. Thus, we can research, develop, and acquire a capability but not sustain it through transition to a Service program of record or until project termination. If the Limited Acquisition Authority were to expire as scheduled on 30 September 2006, we would lose an excellent - and rapidly improving - method to accelerate delivery of “urgent need” capabilities to the operational Commanders.

Do you believe similar acquisition authority should be extended to other combatant commands, and, if so, which commands and why?

I would like to reserve judgment on extension of this authority to other Combatant Commands pending consultation with the Combatant Commanders and pending further experience from Joint Forces Command with Limited Acquisition Authority. As a supporting command, JFCOM has Department-wide unique organizational structures, functional experts and laboratories to represent the Combatant Commanders’ requirements and to develop, advance, and deploy technologies. Potential considerations of providing LAA authority to multiple Combatant Commanders include the possibility of a requirement for other COCOMs to develop internal organizations, functional experts, and laboratories to advance LAA initiatives, and multiple COCOMs developing similar/redundant capabilities at the same time.

Defense Science and Technology Programs
The Department’s Science and Technology (S&T) programs are designed to support defense transformation goals and objectives. These programs should ensure that warfighters -- now and in the future -- have superior and affordable technology to support their missions and to give them revolutionary war-winning capabilities.

Do you believe there is an adequate investment in innovative defense science to develop the capabilities the Department will need in 2020?

In my current capacity, I do not have enough visibility into this issue to provide an informed answer. If you desire I will look into this and come back to the committee if confirmed.

Do you believe the Department's investment strategy for S&T programs is correctly balanced between near-term and long-term needs?

In my capacity as Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, I have not been involved in the department’s overall investment strategy for science and technology. I would like to reserve judgment until I have time to study this issue. If confirmed, I will be happy to readdress this issue with the committee in the future.

Technology Transition

The Department's efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.

What are your views on the success of the Department's technology transition programs in spiraling emerging technologies into use to confront evolving threats and to meet warfighter needs?

In addition to LAA, USJFCOM is achieving success in several different approaches to spiral development and delivery of emerging capabilities.

- **USJFCOM’s Joint Futures Lab (JFL)** is achieving success through a process that takes prototypes from problem identification to fielding in three to six months. Much of this work is done by integrating emerging technologies into existing infrastructures and legacy capabilities. This prototyping approach enables detailed testing of capabilities in both real-world and laboratory environments such as combatant command exercises, Service war games, and ongoing operations. An example of this process is the recent prototype effort to support Multinational Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) with an open standards, open source portal for cross-domain collaboration and document management. This is allowing the coalition members to rapidly share information from planning through mission execution.
• USJFCOM was also recently delegated Technology Transfer Authority by the Secretary of Defense. This allows the command to share technology with academia and industry for the purpose of research and development. USJFCOM is using this authority to speed the research and development process, which helps to rapidly integrate and field new technologies.

• Finally, Technologies are also transferred to war fighters through USJFCOM’s Joint Systems Integration Command and the Joint Advanced Training Technology Laboratory. These activities provide venues for quickly evaluating and integrating new capabilities throughout the Joint and Component training and acquisition communities.

In addition to USJFCOM success, DoD has also had success with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) developmental efforts, Service Labs, and Service System Commands. While these organizations are making significant progress in rapidly providing capabilities to the Joint Warfighter, like LAA, these programs have difficulty transitioning their deliverables to Programs of Record.

What more can be done to transition critical technologies quickly to warfighters?

There are several actions which can accelerate delivery of critical technologies to the warfighter. First is the availability of adequate funding to develop, field, and sustain new technologies until they become a Program of Record. We also need to accelerate the certification and accreditation process, encourage development using open source products and open standards, and increase our efforts to create partnerships with academia and industry. Additionally, it is necessary to update export control policies to rapidly field new technologies to our emerging global partners.

End Strength of Active Duty Forces

What level of active-duty personnel (by service) do you believe is required for current and anticipated missions?

I think this question will be more completely answered by the QDR Study. I would like to reserve judgment until that study is completed.

How do you assess the progress made to date by the services in reducing the numbers of military personnel performing support functions through hiring of contractors or substitution of civilian employees?

I don’t have visibility on this issue across all the services and combatant commands at this time. That said, from a warfighter’s perspective, there are still some issues to wrestle with in the use of contractors/civilian employees in lieu of military personnel in operational theaters and there is particular concern with trying to use
contractors/civilian employees for certain billets requiring skill sets not possessed or readily available in the civilian sector. We need to ensure that we only replace those support functions which are appropriate and will not lead to a loss of combat capability.

Reliance on Reserve Component

The men and women of the Reserve component have performed superbly in meeting the diverse challenges of the global war on terrorism and have been greatly relied upon in Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. The roles and missions that should be assigned to the Reserve forces is a matter of ongoing study.

What missions do you consider appropriate for permanent assignment to the Reserve component?

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is currently examining the roles and missions of the Services and their Reserve Components. This assessment will produce recommendations regarding which capabilities should reside in the Active and Reserve Components. These recommendations will also address how those capabilities should be apportioned and resourced between the components. In addition to the QDR, each Service is conducting their own assessment to balance the capabilities between respective components. I would like to reserve final judgment on this question until after having the opportunity to review the results of these assessments. Having said that, putting all or significant portions of any critical warfighting capability in the reserve component is problematic for a 'long war’ scenario.

What should the focus of U. S. Joint Forces Command be in ensuring that Reserve forces are trained and ready to participate effectively in joint operations?

Joint Forces Command and the Services should train Reserve Forces in the same manner that they train Active Duty forces. As experience over the last four years clearly demonstrates, our Reserve forces operate with our Active Duty forces as an integral part of joint operations. Therefore, the training for Reserve forces should prepare them to seamlessly participate effectively in joint operations. Currently, Joint Forces Command conducts Mission Rehearsal Exercises for Reserve units in exactly the same manner as they do for the Active Duty – and this should continue. This is also true with our senior leader training courses (CAPSTONE, KEYSTONE, and PINNACLE) and all aspects of joint training that occurs at Joint Forces Command.

The Department’s Training Transformation Implementation Plan of June 10, 2003, provides that the Department’s training program will benefit both the active and reserve components.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Reserve and the National Guard benefit from the Joint National Training Capability, a key component of the Training Transformation Implementation Plan?
Joint Forces Command trains the reserve forces in exactly the same manner that they train our active duty forces – from senior leader courses such as CAPSTONE and KEYSTONE to mission rehearsal exercises. They are also actively engaged with the leaders of the reserve components to ensure they have the fidelity and range architecture to integrate fully into the Joint National Training Capability.

The Training Transformation Implementation Plan identifies the National Guard Bureau as participating in the development of several capability components. These include initiatives to improve training simulations and training range infrastructure, create a mission rehearsal and joint training capability, and develop a robust joint training research and development program. Under an active Memorandum of Understanding, JFCOM and the National Guard Bureau have pledged to work toward maximizing interoperability and commonality of both training infrastructure and capabilities. Near term efforts include an FY 06 plan to connect GuardNet, the National Guard’s national network for distributed education and training, with the Joint Training and Experimentation Network (JTEN). This will enable the Guard to access the entire array of joint training tools such as the live, virtual, constructive training environment. Additionally, in January 2006, JFCOM will become the Office of Primary Responsibility for the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC). JKDDC and JNTC are two of the three major initiatives that make up DoD’s Training Transformation effort. As part of that action, JFCOM will ramp up the development and distribution of joint training courseware, redoubling our efforts to engage the National Guard in developing education products that will serve the joint training requirements of both the National Guard and active duty forces.

Schlesinger Panel Findings on Detention Operations

In August 2004, the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations, chaired by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, concluded that “CJTF-7 was never fully resourced to meet the size and complexity of its mission.” The Schlesinger Panel found that the Joint Staff, U. S. CENTCOM, and CJTF-7 took “too long” to formally approve the Joint Manning Document (JMD) specifying the personnel requirements for CJTF-7 headquarters. This left CJTF-7 headquarters at times with only about one-third the personnel authorized under the JMD.

In your view, did U. S. CENTCOM and the Joint Staff take too long to ensure that CJTF-7 had the staff and resources it needed to carry out its mission, including the oversight of detention operations at Abu Ghraib?

I assumed my duties as Deputy Commander at US Central Command in late October 2003. As such, I had no personal involvement in the original sourcing decisions for the stand up of CJTF-7 which I understand occurred in May 2003. The Schlesinger Panel reported that the Joint Manning Document (JMD) for CJTF-7 was not finally approved until December.
2003. Assuming those facts are correct, I agree that six months to validate the CJTF-7 JMD was too long. However, it is also likely true that mission and force requirements were adjusted during the period, and JMD requirements might therefore have been adjusted as well.

The Schlesinger Panel also found that: “Once it became clear in the summer of 2003 that there was a major insurgency growing in Iraq, with the potential for capturing a large number of enemy combatants, senior leaders should have moved to meet the need for additional military police forces.” The Schlesinger Panel criticized U. S. CENTCOM and JCS for failing to consider options for increasing the number of forces committed to the detention/interrogation operations in Iraq (including reallocating in-theater Army assets, transferring operational control other Service military police units in theater, or mobilizing and deploying additional forces from the continental United States).

Do you agree with the Schlesinger Panel’s opinion that “more robust options should have been considered sooner”?

The 800th MP Brigade's purpose was to fulfill the mission for which it was assigned. Brigade leadership was expected to fulfill its mission by adapting and utilizing soldiers trained to accomplish those mission requirements. As MG Taguba reported, the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade did a poor job of allocating resources. In addition, that Commander also did not train her soldiers in confinement operations after it became clear that her mission changed. Adapting to a changing mission is expected of commanders, especially senior commanders. In addition, staffing decisions at that time were, in large part, dictated by limitations in specific MP resources available, a fact the Army has recognized and is taking action to correct (see Schlesinger Panel Report, p. 17).

What is your understanding of the actions taken by senior leaders in U. S. CENTCOM to address JTF-7's requirements for detainee operations?

I assume the time period in question is the summer of 2003. As I stated earlier, I assumed duties as Deputy Commander in October 2003 so I have no firsthand knowledge of any actions taken. I understand, however, that LTG Sanchez has testified previously before this committee that he took corrective action to include an August 2003 request for a comprehensive assessment of all detention operations in Iraq that was conducted by MG Ryder, the then Provost Marshall of the Army. I believe that Gen Abizaid also testified before this committee that he sent the CENTCOM Inspector General to Iraq in August 2003 to assess detention operations in the Iraq Theater of operations.

Do you believe that these actions were adequate?

Given the context in which they occurred, yes, I believe these actions were adequate. In hindsight, it is clear that putting more resources against the problem could have helped the overall detainee situation.

Stability and Support Operations
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and support operations in planning and guidance in order to achieve the goal of full integration across all Departmental activities.

What is your assessment of the Department’s current emphasis on planning for post-conflict scenarios?

The Department has invested considerable emphasis on post-conflict planning in the past few years. Of the four Joint Operating Concepts (JOC) approved by the Secretary of Defense and signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one is dedicated exclusively to Stability Operations. I believe the most critical step in improving our post-conflict planning is the establishment and integration with a counterpart civilian planning capability in an inter-agency forum. Along these lines, I strongly support the establishment and the strengthening of the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the Department of State. The Department of Defense has assisted S/CRS in building their own planning processes as well as integrating them into the Defense Department’s deliberate and crisis planning processes. These efforts, in Washington as well as with the Combattant Commanders, have worked to integrate stabilization and reconstruction operations into our operational plans and theater exercises. U.S. Joint Forces Command, in particular, has fostered a personal relationship with Ambassador Pascual and has provided expertise to S/CRS, partnering with S/CRS concept development and experimentation events to develop their planning capacity and help elaborate their operational concepts. Similarly, Ambassador Pascual has contributed immensely to the work at U.S. Joint Forces Command. This type of relationship should serve as a model for the DoD’s work with all government agencies in an effort to improve its planning for post-conflict scenarios.

The department is developing a directive concerning stability operations which will help integrate stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations into our overall campaign planning efforts. The ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review, in which S/CRS is participating, is just one way we are reassessing our requirements to ensure we have the right mix of forces for the right missions, including security, stability, reconstruction and transition operations.

What role should the Joint Staff play in implementing new directives in the areas of post-conflict planning and stability and support operations?

As with most endeavors, the Joint Staff’s primary role is to help the Chairman perform his assigned duties. Although it is statutorily restricted from directive authority over the Services and COCOMs, the Joint Staff is nevertheless uniquely positioned to provide to both of those bodies national level guidance in their creation of joint doctrine
and plans. Planning for stability and reconstruction operations demands a particularly high level of US government interagency coordination. By virtue of its habitual interactions in the Washington, DC community, the Joint Staff (particularly within J-5) can define, open and reinforce staff-level lines of communication between COCOM planners and their appropriate US government interagency partners. The Joint Staff should help facilitate coordination between governmental agencies, such as the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), the Services, and the Combatant Commanders and their staffs.

**In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between the Department and other federal agencies in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?**

Security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations require the coherent application of diplomatic, information, military and economic elements of national power. Clearly, the military has a role to play in conjunction with partners inside the U.S. government as well as Allies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. The proper relationship between the Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal agencies in planning and executing these operations vary with conditions on the ground. Several principles need to be considered and should be applied when able. First, the Command and Control arrangements need to be clear and understood by all parties. Second, the pragmatic application of the supported and supporting commander concept and the Lead Federal Agency concept can be very helpful and appropriate in this area. Finally, any relationship between DoD and other federal agencies will require leaders who understand the capabilities each agency can bring to bear. For this reason, U.S. Joint Forces Command has incorporated interagency topics and participants – as both fellows and presenters – in the vast majority of wargames and exercises as well as in CAPSTONE, PINNACLE, and KEYSTONE courses designed to prepare flag and general officers to lead Joint Task Forces in the execution of security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations.

**What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?**

U.S. Joint Forces Command has undertaken a robust and dynamic lessons-learned mission to actively work on the lessons – at the joint operational level – from our ongoing operations. This has resulted in an extremely rich set of insights, observations and analyses. JFCOM has provided many of these products to Congress in previous testimony and briefings to Congressional staff members. I believe detailed briefings such as these would be useful to provide the necessary context and detail which these issues require.

Joint Forces Command has learned several key lessons about security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations. First, in these types of environments, the time between acquiring intelligence and conducting operations must be as close as possible. Agile operations require actionable intelligence – and the best way to achieve that is through human intelligence collection (HUMINT). Second, there is enormous value in the
ability to maintain persistent surveillance over desired areas. Our current capabilities only allow us to maintain surveillance for finite periods of time over limited areas. Persistent surveillance allows us to better track changes in the environment and to track high-value targets. Third, the value of detailed, adaptive and collaborative planning is essential. Our successes were enabled by detailed planning; our shortcomings usually occurred in areas where planning efforts or expertise was lacking. Fourth, our military commanders need money they can immediately spend —as much as or more than they need bullets and guns — as a key tool to jump start reconstruction efforts. Fifth, we need to ensure the right balance of capabilities (such as Civil Affairs units) between Active and Reserve Components because their immediate engagement and long-term sustainment are critical. Sixth, collaborating with Allies is essential and requires considerable effort. Seventh, our ability to communicate with the civilian population – the center of gravity in these operations – needs to be enabled with linguists, communications, media, and an effective strategic communications capability. Eighth, the need for integrated interagency planning and execution requires an effective Joint Inter Agency Coordination Group. These are some of the many lessons we have learned, and are acting on, in our execution of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. I would offer more detailed briefings as requested by Congress.

**Joint Experimentation Budget**

The Services cumulatively spend about $500 million per year on experimentation. The U.S. Joint Forces Command budget for joint experimentation for fiscal year 2006 is approximately $109 million.

Are these amounts for joint experimentation adequate to ensure the effective integration and interoperability of our future forces?

*JFCOM has had multiple successes with their experimentation program that are being used by joint war fighters. However, given the global, rapidly changing asymmetrical threat and the speed at which we are finding ourselves required to identify and provide solutions to the field, these resources may need to be increased. If confirmed I would like to assess the adequacy of funding and provide that answer back to you.*

What is the appropriate role for U. S. Joint Forces Command in determining how the respective services should invest their experimentation dollars?

*The UCP assigns USJFCOM the responsibility to lead joint concept development and experimentation (CDE) and coordinate the CDE efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies to support joint interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities. The Commander of USJFCOM is also tasked with leading the development, exploration, and integration of new joint warfighting concepts and serving as the DoD Executive Agent for joint warfighting experimentation. This does not necessarily require strict JFCOM control of how Services invest their experimentation dollar, but does*
require a clear communication of the planned activities of Service experimentation and the ability to develop a common vision of the course of experimentation with the CJCS and Joint Chiefs. Services can then exercise their appropriate fiscal authorities under Title 10, guided by that common vision of the course of experimentation.

**NATO Transformation**

NATO officials have acknowledged that transformation means changing NATO thinking, organization, and culture by adopting new structures, improving training methods, adopting doctrine and educating leaders. The NATO Response Force has been identified as a key element in NATO's transformation progress.

**What role is the NATO Rapid Response Force playing in facilitating modernization and transformation of NATO forces?**

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is NATO’s primary vehicle for transformation, paving the way for transformed NATO forces in all 26 NATO nations. Besides establishing itself a highly credible force for real-world expeditionary military operations across the full spectrum of military operations, it is NATO’s operational test-bed for transformation. The rotation of NRF forces will facilitate modernization and transformation of all NATO forces throughout the Alliance. The NRF is the vehicle by which NATO military forces will exercise all aspects of joint and multinational interoperability to include doctrinal and cultural change. Lastly, the NRF will also facilitate experimentation efforts aimed at providing improved capabilities to the warfighters.

**When will the NATO Response Force achieve full operational capability?**

The NRF will achieve Full Operational Capability not later than 30 Oct 2006.

**What success has Supreme Allied Commander Transformation achieved in bringing about transformational change to NATO forces and, if confirmed, what would be your most significant challenges in this role?**

The Alliance has achieved remarkable success towards its goal of military transformation. Specifically,

- **Working with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Allied Command Transformation (ACT) delivered the Bi-Strategic Commander’s Strategic Vision which describes how NATO should conduct operations in the future and the concomitant required Alliance future military capabilities. The first document of its kind in NATO.**
- **Working with United States Joint Forces Command, ACT has greatly expanded NATO’s concept, development and experimentation efforts which are critical to furthering the development of transformational capabilities.**
• ACT has issued the most comprehensive Defense Requirements Review to date and, at their request, ACT has reviewed the national Defense Plans and Reform efforts of several Alliance nations.

• ACT’s Joint Warfare Centre has improved NATO mission performance through Joint Task Force Headquarters Training for all NATO-led International Security Assistance Force Headquarters and all NATO Response Force Headquarters.

• ACT has responded to emerging operational demands such as NATO’s Training Mission in Iraq by providing key support to Allied Command Operations.

• Through concept development, defense planning and capability development efforts, operational level battle staff training and a broad array of complementary efforts, ACT is establishing itself as the hub of military transformation in the Alliance.

If I assume the role as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, I anticipate that my main challenges will be 1) delivering timely transformational products to Allied Command Operations and the Allied Nations that improve and transform our military forces, 2) advancing a clear understanding throughout the Alliance of military transformation and ACT’s role in the process; and 3) working with the Allied Nations to adopt and fund transformation requirements.
Responses to WMD Threats and Natural Disasters in the United States. Deficiencies in the responses of federal, state, and local agencies to Hurricane Katrina have generated debate about the appropriate role for military forces in responding to national crises.

What do you see as the appropriate role for Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command; Commander, U. S. Northern Command; and the Governors and Adjutant Generals of each state and territory in responding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats within the United States?

Even though an event occurs within the United States, U.S. Joint Forces Command retains its supporting role to U.S. Northern Command as the Joint Force Provider, Joint Force Integrator, and Joint Force Trainer. As such, U.S. Joint Forces Command has a responsibility to be able to provide properly organized, trained and equipped Joint forces to U.S. Northern Command to deal with any level of WMD event within the United States.

U.S. Northern Command, as the geographic Combatant Commander for North America (minus Hawaii), is responsible for the effective employment of forces provided by U.S. Joint Forces Command. This should include all pre-event exercises, planning, and organization of any Joint Task Force Headquarters that the provided forces would fall in on.

In a WMD event, the Governors and the Adjutant Generals exercise their responsibilities to provide the logical connection between local first responders and outside Federal responders. For a large area, complex event, they coordinate the response of the local incident and area commanders and coordinate other States involved. Prior to an event, they have a responsibility to ensure local plans are nested within larger State plans which are in turn compatible with Federal plans, and seek opportunities to validate these plans through rigorous exercises. After an event occurs, they have the critical responsibility of providing the initial assessment of the situation and timely recommendations for the employment of Federal support.

What is the appropriate role and response for active-duty military forces in responding to natural and manmade disasters not involving WMD threats within the United States?

Military forces bring extensive planning and process skills as well as robust communications capabilities that can be invaluable in helping jump-start a domestic humanitarian assistance/disaster relief effort. The active-duty military possesses unique capabilities and the ability to surge them quickly on short notice to an affected disaster area. Providing these capabilities when directed by appropriate civilian authorities within applicable laws and policy is the appropriate role for the active-duty military forces. The specific role of active-duty military forces and the trigger to employ them should be based on the severity of the event and the assessed impact on American citizens, not what caused it.
Hurricane Katrina has demonstrated the importance of joint and interagency training in preparation for support disaster operations.

In your view, how could U. S. Joint Forces Command influence joint and interagency training to enable better coordination for natural disasters operations?

As the Joint Force Trainer, U.S. Joint Forces Command is responsible for conducting two exercises per regional Combatant Commander per year, plus all Mission Rehearsal Exercises for deploying Joint Task Force Headquarters. While these exercises have been primarily Joint in the past, there is already a robust Interagency component to most of them.

In the light of the events of Katrina, if confirmed, I will direct U.S. Joint Forces Command to seek increased Interagency participation in these exercises, from the Local, State and Federal levels. Additionally, U.S. Joint Forces Command can bring to bear the full capabilities of military modeling and simulation to provide an unparalleled realistic training environment on a scale which normally would not be available to other interagency players in Homeland Defense.

Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams

What role do you believe U. S. Joint Forces Command should play in the training, assessment of readiness, and employment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams?

Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams are a National Guard Asset. As such, they are trained as all other National Guard units with the assistance of the Training Support Divisions. Through this process, 32 of 55 Civil Support Teams have already been certified. If the review of the Katrina response dictates a greater role for U.S. Joint Forces Command in this process, then the components of Joint Forces Command, in conjunction with Joint Forces Special Operations Command, should take the lead in developing doctrine for and training of WMD-Civil Support Teams. This would be consistent with the manner in which U.S. Joint Forces Command provides similarly trained Civil Affairs Teams for Iraq and Afghanistan.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Yes

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power? 

Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command/Supreme Allied Commander Transformation? 

Yes

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Yes