October 15, 2005

Commanding General

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Warner:

I am honored to be nominated by the President of the United States to be the next Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea.

I have enclosed my answers to your advance questions and look forward to appearing before your Committee on the 25th of October 2005.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

B. B. Bell
General, US Army
Commanding General
Advance Policy Questions for General Burwell B. Bell, III, USA
Nominee for Commander, United Nations Command/
Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Goldwater-Nichols has provided sufficient guidance to allow us to conduct our operations within a joint framework. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate our conduct of joint operations and will offer commentary if I believe new proposals are required, but I do not have any suggestions at this time.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

The Commander, United Nations Command (COM UNC), is responsible for maintaining the Armistice Agreement, as well as executing missions and functions in Korea as directed by the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, COM UNC is required to maintain the coalition embodied by the United Nations Command, enable acceptance of UNC member nation forces during contingencies, and enable access to the seven UNC bases in Japan.
The Commander, Combined Forces Command (COM CFC), has two essential missions related to the US presence in Korea: deferring hostile acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea, and, should deterrence fail, defeating an external armed attack. In this position, he is responsible for receiving strategic direction and missions from the ROK-US Military Committee; exercising OCPON over all forces provided, both ROK and US; conducting combined exercises; equipping and planning for the employment of those forces; providing intelligence; recommending requirements; researching, analyzing, and developing strategic and tactical concepts; complying with the armistice affairs directives of COM UNC; and supporting COM UNC in response to armistice violations by North Korea.

The Commander, United States Forces Korea (COM USFK), as a sub-unified commander of the US Pacific Command (US PACOM), is responsible for all duties and functions associated with Title 10, United States Code, and the Unified Command Plan. It is in this capacity that the US supports the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty and that the commander represents US PACOM. This role provides the US with the means to provide forces to COM UNC/CFC, and to support those forces with the required logistics, administration, and policy initiatives necessary to maintain readiness.

**What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?**

I have significant experience in both the joint and combined environments. Within the Korean AOR, my duties as a tank battalion operations officer, who trained and exercised with several Republic of Korea and US units, gave me significant leadership perspectives that have provided me with insights into the challenges associated with combined and joint operations on the Korean peninsula. My experiences at the National Training Center while commanding at the battalion and brigade levels have provided me the opportunity to exercise joint and combined tactical warfighting doctrine. As Executive Officer to the Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, including Desert Shield and Desert Storm, I was able to see and experience joint and combined coalition warfare planning and execution at senior operational and strategic levels. Command of the Army's III Corps provided me the opportunity to develop and extensively exercise operational plans in support of the Korean AOR which employed joint and combined warfighting operations and tactics on terrain unique to the Korean theater. In training and exercising those tactics, I was able to work side-by-side with senior Republic of Korea counterparts who imparted to me their unique and invaluable perspectives on warfighting in
defense of their homeland. As Commanding General, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, and Commander, NATO Allied Land Component Command, Heidelberg, I have gained further insights into the requirements placed upon a commander responsible for service component command responsibilities, as well as commanding a combined international headquarters, with senior leader representation from 21 different countries. The experiences I have listed here have also required me to master joint and combined reconnaissance, intelligence, infrastructure, and logistical concepts as well.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

If confirmed, I intend to conduct in-depth discussions and assessments with key personnel and analysts from relevant ROK and US government agencies and non-government specialists. Throughout my time in command, I will continue this dialogue with ROK and US leaders to improve my understanding of all aspects of the current situation within the Korean theater. This will enable me to stay abreast of the dynamic political-military environment of the Korean peninsula.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea with the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Chiefs of Staff of the Services
The other combatant commanders, especially the Commander, United States Pacific Command

The relationship with all of the officials listed above is critical to accomplishing our national and bi-national goals and objectives. We must be able to work closely with all levels of leadership, civilian and military, in both joint and combined leadership environments to ensure that a teamwork approach accomplishes the strategic goals and objectives of our national leadership. COM UNC reports directly to the US Secretary of Defense and through him to the President, while at the same time keeping COM PACOM informed of any communications with US national authorities. A bi-nationally validated ROK-US document provides further guidance on COM CFC’s unique relationship with the ROK National Command Authority and the US Secretary of Defense. COM USFK reports directly to COM PACOM on matters directly pertaining to USFK areas of responsibility.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

The major challenges include readiness, maintaining deterrence and stability, transformation, and supporting the Global War on Terrorism. Readiness of US and allied forces will be my primary near-term focus if confirmed for this position. The ROK-US alliance must be “ready to fight tonight” due to the proximity and lethality of the threat. A highly trained and ready force provides stability and mitigates risk. Sustaining readiness requires tough, realistic training; appropriate levels of manning and modern equipment; training infrastructure; and a quality of life which supports and sustains our people. I am personally committed to ensuring that readiness is at the highest level possible.

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Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

As COM UNC/CFC/USFK, I will ensure that our forces remain vigilant and well-prepared. Training and readiness will be our watchwords. If confirmed I will immediately review these elements to ensure that we are as strong and as ready as we can possibly be. I will devote myself to strengthening the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea. A strong healthy alliance can meet the challenges I discussed above. Should deterrence falter, alliance forces must be, and will be, ready to defeat North Korean aggression.

North Korea

North Korea represents one of the greatest near term threats to U.S. national security interests in Asia.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

North Korea poses a variety of threats to regional and global stability, particularly its nuclear weapons programs. It is in the vital interests of the United States and its allies to resolve the issue of a verifiable dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The fact that six parties are in serious negotiations on this issue is an indication of positive intent. Because it is a complicated issue, the solution will be equally complicated requiring time and serious effort to complete.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

North Korean ballistic missile development remains a significant threat to US forces and their allies on the peninsula. Their ballistic missile inventory includes over 500 SCUD missiles of various types that can threaten the entire peninsula, and they continue to produce and deploy No Dong missiles capable of striking Japan and our American bases there. Pyongyang is also developing multi-stage missiles capable of striking the continental United States. North Korea’s declaration earlier this year that it would no longer abide by its self-imposed
moratorium on flight testing missiles, when coupled with the actual test of a missile in May, clearly demonstrates that the North does not intend to unilaterally halt its research and development programs. Its continued proliferation of missiles and development of WMD capabilities allows North Korea to act as a destabilizing and potentially disruptive force in the region and beyond.

What is your assessment of North Korea’s conventional capabilities and readiness?

The North Korean military remains a credible threat to the security of the ROK and the stability of the region because of its size and forward deployment. North Korea maintains the world’s fourth largest army and the world’s largest special operations force. With almost three-quarters of that army arrayed south of Pyongyang, and significant numbers of artillery systems that can currently range Seoul, it seems clear that North Korea’s capabilities pose an immediate and credible threat.

What, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula?

If confirmed, I would encourage both the US and ROK governments to sustain their transformation initiatives and their ongoing combined capabilities enhancement programs. Although both nations have invested significant resources toward these initiatives and programs already, there is still room to improve qualitative capabilities, as these are the key to strengthening deterrence on the peninsula.

Republic of South Korea (ROK)

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. - ROK alliance has been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.

What is your understanding of the current U.S. security relationship with the ROK?

It is my understanding that the current US security relationship with the ROK is governed by the Mutual Defense Treaty as entered into force from November 1954. In particular, the treaty’s requirement that both the US and the ROK
maintain and develop appropriate means to deter and, if should deterrence fail, to defeat an armed external attack continues to serve as the linchpin of this relationship. It is also my understanding that both the US and the ROK remain fully committed to the treaty's provisions and the mutual defense of both nations, as demonstrated by the continued execution of combined planning, training, and exercises designed to deter and, if should deterrence fail, to defeat any external aggression against the ROK.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?

If confirmed, I will ensure that I maintain the already strong US-ROK security relationship that has continued to prove itself over the past 50 years through mutual respect and open dialogue with our ROK allies.

What is your assessment of the current climate in military to military professional relationships and interoperability at all levels between U.S. and ROK forces?

It is my understanding that the military professional relationships are one of mutual respect and regard. I witnessed this firsthand as the III Corps commander, and I have no reason to believe that this is not still the case. I would also expect that interoperability between American and ROK forces has improved over the past several years, but there are still issues that need to be resolved, as is the case with all our other allies. If confirmed, I will assess our interoperability with our Korean allies and seek to reduce, if not eliminate, any interoperability issues.

What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in ROK equipment and training of their personnel? (I have combined my answers to this question and to the question below it.)

What is your assessment of ROK current and projected military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater role in the defense of their homeland?

It is my understanding that the current ROK modernization program for its armed forces has significantly increased Korean warfighting capabilities, as it will continue to do so in the future. The Future of the Alliance Initiative, with its
successor the Security Policy initiative, set the conditions for ROK forces to assume a greater role in the defense of South Korea. The fact that the entire DMZ is guarded by ROK forces, as well as the assumption of several other CFC missions from US responsibility, is a testament to that greater role. The current ROK training program, when coupled with the numerous combined and joint training exercises currently conducted by the ROK and US forces, ensures the readiness and capabilities of the ROK military personnel.

Domestic Politics in ROK

In recent years, domestic opinion in the Republic of Korea with regard to the American presence and relations with the DPRK has increasingly split along generational lines, with younger Koreans being more skeptical of relations with the United States while the older generation is much more content with the status quo. The Commander, USFK, plays a major political role in U.S.-Korean relations.

If confirmed, how would you see your role and duties in the light of these changes in the ROK body politic?

I believe that, if confirmed, my role and duties as COM UNC/CFC/USFK will remain as described by the governing UN, ROX/US, and US documents. My requirements to maintain the armistice, deter or, should deterrence fail, defeat external aggression; and discharge all Title 10 and Unified Command Plan duties and responsibilities will remain the same throughout my tenure, despite any changes to the ROK body politic. I believe it will be important to continue any programs that GEN LaPorte has established to enable the sustainment and improvement of command-community relations.

Global Posture

In your opinion, how should the U. S. position its forces in Asia to best respond to threats in that area, support out-of-area contingencies, and maintain readiness?

US forces in the Asia-Pacific region should be stationed to provide sufficient flexibility to deploy forces to meet global contingency requirements. It is my understanding that COM PACOM continually assesses and recommends force positioning within his area of responsibility to the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, I will ensure that I fully understand the situation on the Korean peninsula and of those regional actors that influence the peninsula so that I can provide my input to COM PACOM’s assessment and recommendations.

Consolidation of U.S. Forces

The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) will consolidate the 2nd Infantry in and around Camp Humphreys, Korea. New construction of facilities and infrastructure required to support the consolidation will be carried out using funds from both the Host Nation and the United States military construction accounts. The Yongson Relocation Plan proposes to move most of the U.S. forces currently stationed at Yongson compound in Seoul to Camp Humphreys, Korea. The relocation is proposed to be funded by the Korean Government.

What is your assessment of the current status of the two consolidation plans and the timeline for completion?

It is my understanding that both the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) and the Yongson Relocation Plan (YRP) are being executed simultaneously and are progressing well. The LPP envisions consolidating 2nd Infantry Division onto four existing camps in the near-term while anticipating a relocation of the division to Camp Humphreys in 2008. The ROK has procured the majority of land required for the YRP and anticipates procuring the remainder by the end of the year. The YRP’s master plan was initiated in September of this year and should be complete by April of next year. Both plans remain on schedule.

What do you anticipate to be the total costs to be incurred by the U.S. Government to carry out the two consolidations?

I understand the total costs to the US Government to be $480 million, about 6% of the total relocation cost. Almost three-quarters of the relocation costs are borne by the ROK, with the remainder funded by private industry through financed build-to-lease investments.

If confirmed, what objectives would you establish to manage the burden-sharing of the costs related to the two consolidations?

If confirmed, my objective would be to carry out the consolidation plans without
any additional costs to the United States beyond what is already programmed.

Host Nation Burden-Sharing Programs

Two programs supported by the Republic of Korea, the Combined Defense Improvement Program (CDIP) and the Korea Host Nation Funded Construction Program (KHNCNP), provide cash and in-kind projects to satisfy U.S. military facility and infrastructure requirements.

If confirmed, what priorities would you establish for all U.S. forces on the Peninsula to make the best use of these two vital programs?

If confirmed, I would maintain the current priorities of supporting USFK transformation and quality of life initiatives as a means to enhance readiness on the peninsula. As these two programs present the majority of USFK’s total military construction program, it is imperative that they contribute to the overall readiness of USFK.

Family Housing in Korea

Recent Commanders of United States Forces in Korea have proposed a goal to increase the number of U.S. military personnel on accompanied tours, thereby increasing the number of families in Korea, while at the same time decreasing the number of combat forces by a third. This goal would require the construction of additional housing and community support facilities at all U.S. installations in Korea.

What are your views on the plans and investment strategy to provide additional family housing and community support facilities for military personnel and their families in Korea?

As I understand it, the current plans to provide additional family housing and community support facilities rely primarily upon funding provided by the Republic of Korea, with some funds resulting from the redirection to the enduring installations of already programmed Military Construction projects from closing installations. I am fully supportive of this approach and, if confirmed, will
continue to seek the highest quality of facilities for our service members and their families.

**Quality of Life**

Through recent investment in quality of life amenities, to include housing, health care and recreation, the Department has worked to achieve the goal of making Korea an “assignment of choice” for U. S. Forces.

*What do you consider to be the most essential elements supporting military life for soldiers and their families stationed in Korea and, if confirmed, what would be your goals in this regard?*

I believe the three most essential elements supporting military life in any assignment are quality living and working conditions and facilities, quality health care, and quality educational opportunities for dependent family members. If confirmed, I would strive to ensure the best possible conditions for all three, thus clearly making Korea an assignment of choice for US forces.

**Korea Assignment Incentive Pay**

Assignment incentive pay was approved in 2003 for soldiers who agreed to extend their tours of duty in Korea. Since that time, payment of an overseas cost of living allowance was also approved.

*In your opinion, is eligibility for assignment incentive pay for duty in Korea necessary and cost-effective? Please explain.*

As both GEN Schwartz, the previous commander, and GEN LaPorte, the current commander, have stated several times, making Korea an assignment of choice must be a command priority. Both commanders have done much to change the perceptions of those who were previously reluctant to serve a tour in Korea. One contributor in this process was the authorization of cost of living allowance (COLA) entitlements; another was assignment incentive pay. Given the current incentives for service members stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is only fitting that those stationed in Korea are also eligible for many similar benefits. Further, the incentive pay a service member receives for extending his or her tour is less than the costs borne by the government to move two service members (one to
Korea; one from Korea), a cost-effective result that also enables USFK to maintain trained, experienced service members on the peninsula longer. It is my understanding that the US government has saved more than $40 million as a result of this initiative.

**Sexual Assault**

In your role as Commander, U. S. Army Forces, Europe, you have implemented changes in policies and procedures relating to the prevention and response to sexual assaults and in the treatment of victims of sexual assault.

What is your assessment of the progress that the Army has made in the last two years in the promulgation of policy on sexual assault, and what do you think will be your biggest challenge in achieving the changes in programs, training and implementation if confirmed as Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea?

I believe the Army has made great strides in ensuring the promulgation of policy on sexual assault, and it is my understanding that GEN LaPorte has made it a priority to eliminate any occurrence of this crime within United States Forces Korea. If confirmed, I will maintain GEN LaPorte’s command focus upon awareness and prevention of sexual assault.

**Joint Medical Command**

The relocation of U.S. forces and families on the Korean peninsula presents challenges in the delivery of high quality health care services. The Committee has been concerned that as the relocation of families occurs, services such as same day access to care for active duty members and family health services in remote areas must be available. In view of these challenges, the Committee directed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct a study of the feasibility of establishing a joint military medical command in support of U. S. Forces Korea. Congress has not received the report required in the Senate report accompanying S. 2400, the National Defense Authorization Act for 2005.

If confirmed, how would you assess the availability of quality health care services to active duty members and their families?
If I am confirmed, I would undertake a careful and thorough review of the availability of quality health care for both service members and their families. Surveys, both electronic and manual; visits; and inputs from all stakeholders would enable me to make an assessment of the health care services available.

What lessons did you learn from a policy perspective concerning health care delivery in the European theater which might be applied to improve joint planning and coordination of health care services in Korea, including access to high quality civilian services when military resources are limited?

As the Commanding General of United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, I have the responsibility to ensure quality health care for both service members and their families. Although we currently leverage high quality civilian services in Europe when military resources are limited, the quality of care cannot be negotiated. In some circumstances, the surrounding civilian infrastructure cannot provide the level of care required by a military community, and it is in those instances when additional military resources are required to ensure that both our service members and their families receive the health services they deserve. I also learned that where families are located, we have a responsibility to ensure the best possible infant delivery and pre/post natal care.

What role could a joint medical command play in planning for health care across all the services, both in peacetime and in preparation for support of a military contingency?

In principle, I would be in favor of any medical command, joint or otherwise, that could ensure quality health care for both service members and their families in peace and in war. If confirmed, I would look forward to continuing a dialogue with this committee about how a joint medical command might best support United States Forces Korea.

Prevention of Human Trafficking

Following media reports connecting prostitution and human trafficking in Korea to U. S. military forces, Commander, U. S. Forces Korea, in 2004 instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal activities of prostitution and human trafficking. Under this policy, all USFK personnel, military and civilian, as well as
contractors and their employees, are expected to comply with prohibitions, including observance of curfews and laws regarding off-limits areas and establishments, aimed at curtailing these practices.

What effects on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking have changes in U.S. policy, as well as new criminal laws implemented by the ROK, had on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking in Korea?

It is my understanding that the changes in US policy, when coupled with the new laws passed by the ROK, have decreased the incidents of prostitution and human trafficking in Korea. Both have enabled the authorities, both civilian and military, to target activities and conditions that allow prostitution and human trafficking to take place. The current USFK strategy of awareness, identification, reduction, and continued interaction with the ROK has been a success story, and, if confirmed, I would continue to pursue this approach.

What further changes, if any, to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and military regulations are needed in your judgment to ensure maximum effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

At this time, I believe the Uniform Code of Military Justice and extant military regulations are sufficient to ensure the efficacy of the zero tolerance policy, but I would be willing to offer any recommendations to this committee should I see the need to do so.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to further enhance the effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

If confirmed, I will aggressively pursue the policies established by GEN LaPorte in response to the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s 30 January 2004 memorandum regarding combating trafficking in persons. The zero tolerance policy’s effectiveness relies entirely upon maintaining awareness and enforcing standards. It is through these functions of command that I believe I could further enhance the policy’s effectiveness.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the
Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.