Defense Reforms

You previously have answered the Committee’s policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in connection with your nomination to be Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your most recent confirmation hearing on July 26, 2002?

No. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was one of the two most transformational events in the Department during my military career, the other being the creation of the All Volunteer Force. Overall, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms have clearly strengthened the warfighting and operational capabilities of our Combatant Commands and our Nation. The importance of these reforms has not diminished with time.

Do you foresee the need for modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

While we have made great progress in the joint arena since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, the current world environment and the challenges we face today are radically different than those of 20 years ago. We therefore need to build on the successes of Goldwater-Nichols. One area I believe has ample room for improvement is Joint Command and Control. I feel we may need a single agency/activity focused on joint acquisition and programming that answers to the Combatant Commanders’ joint requirements and has specific Joint authority to resource these developments. I have provided this input to the Center for Strategic and International Studies “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Project” as a basis for building on the Goldwater-Nichols legacy.
Duties

What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in section 154 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the Department of Defense pertaining to functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

None at this time.

Based on your experience as Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, as it pertains to the powers and duties of combatant commanders generally, and specifically regarding section 167a and the acquisition authority of U. S. Joint Forces Command?

The section you mention deals specifically with the Congressionally-granted Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA). I support any legislation that allows us to more quickly provide the Combatant Commanders with needed capabilities – especially in areas as important as Joint Command and Control, Communications and Intelligence. This statute is due to expire in FY06. I urge Congress to extend this authority and consider tying appropriate resources to the authority in order to make it fully effective.
Relationships

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him and other such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

Additionally, in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the absence or disability ceases. These duties include serving as the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President.

As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman may submit advice or opinions to the Chairman in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council or the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman submits such opinion or advice at the same time he delivers his own.

The Vice Chairman, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may also individually or collectively, in his capacity as a military adviser, provide the Secretary of Defense advice upon the Secretary’s request.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman, or during the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to building a close and effective working relationship with the next Chairman.
The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Title 10, United States Code, and current Department of Defense (DoD) directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DoD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, Intelligence Oversight, and for Networks & Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that described above for the Under Secretaries.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.

The Chairman, or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the Combatant Commands.

Of particular interest is that since 2003, the Under Secretary of the Air Force acts as the Executive Agent for Space Program procurement, which is especially important to the Vice Chairman in the role as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Although this authority temporarily resides with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition while awaiting confirmation of a new Under Secretary of the Air Force, if confirmed, I recognize the importance of working closely with this senior official on vitally important space programs.
The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. However, this does not diminish their importance with respect to Title 10 responsibilities, and among other things, they serve two significant roles. First and foremost, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no Combatant Commander can be ensured of the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Secondly, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important role in shaping military advice and transforming our joint capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Chiefs and their Vice Chiefs to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.

The Combatant Commanders.

The Combatant Commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. By law, and to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the Combatant Commanders and is charged with overseeing their activities. He provides a vital link between the Combatant Commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense, and as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the Combatant Commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense. When the Vice Chairman is performing the Chairman’s duties in the latter’s absence, he relates to the Combatant Commanders as if he were the Chairman.
**Major Challenges and Problems**

In your view, what are the major challenges that you would face if confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

I see four overarching challenges. First, we must successfully fight the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). A concerted effort within this first challenge needs to be focused on harnessing our Nation’s vast capabilities to combat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). These “weapons of mass precision” are not only claiming the lives of our young men and women in current operations, but will likely be employed against our forces and our partners in the years to come. Second, we must continue transforming our joint force for the future while deeply engaged in an ongoing GWOT campaign and in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Third, we need to work to adapt and further align requirements and acquisition processes for the 21st century. Finally, we need to work to institutionalize a joint organize, train, and equip role in the Department of Defense.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Global War on Terror is coherently prosecuted and is appropriately resourced. I will also assist the Chairman in working with the Secretary of Defense, the Service Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders to ensure we use concept development, experimentation and lessons learned from on-going operations to transform our joint capabilities. Along these lines, I will work to improve the linkage between our requirements process and our acquisitions processes. Finally, I will work with the Services, Congress, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure all available resources are devoted towards combating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines deserve nothing less.
In your view, what progress have OSD, the Joint Staff, and U. S. Joint Forces Command made in transforming the Armed Forces?

Working together, the Department of Defense (DoD) has made significant progress in transforming how we fight and operate, how we work with partners and how we conduct the business side of national defense. I will speak to the progress in military transformation that I have the most experience with as Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command.

First of all, we have established the right authorities and resources to empower the agents of joint transformation within the Department of Defense. The President’s Unified Command Plans of 2002 and 2004, the Transformation Planning Guidance and other direction by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense have provided Joint Forces Command with the authorities necessary to help lead the U.S. military transformation endeavor. In addition, Congress has provided significant new resources that have allowed Joint Forces Command to execute these authorities rapidly and effectively.

In several key areas, significant transformation progress has been made.

- We have significantly expanded the scope of joint concept development and experimentation, working with the Services, Combatant Commanders and Allies. Every major DoD wargame since May 2003 has been run as a Joint game cosponsored by a Service and Joint Forces Command, working on a common set of issues within a common joint context. This has resulted in the further development of the “common joint context” which further informs all Joint and Service concept development work. This is the first key step in producing capabilities that are “born joint.” And has resulted in four Joint Operating Concepts: Major Combat Operations, Homeland Defense, Strategic Deterrence, and Stability Operations.
- We have created a robust, dynamic and real time Lessons Learned capability which provides immediate support for the Combatant Commanders and insights into capability gaps which need immediate action. Based on our Lessons Learned work to date, we have submitted a number of packages of change recommendations to immediately address capability shortfalls.
- We have focused Joint Training on preparing the Joint Task Force Commander and his staff to execute real world joint operations, with a special emphasis on mission rehearsal exercises for commanders preparing for command in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Additionally, we are assisting in the training of the majority of Joint Task Forces around the world and conduct staff assist visits to help current joint commanders accomplish their missions. In this effort, the establishment of the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) has been a significant milestone in training transformation which will provide increased training fidelity, efficiency and ubiquity with reduced overall training cost. A perfect example of this is the recently completed combined exercise called Joint Red Flag/Roving
Sands ’05. This exercise was comparable in size and scope to Millennium Challenge ’02. Yet what took two years of planning and approximately $250 million for Millennium Challenge ’02 was done in one year for about $25 million for Joint Red Flag/Roving Sands ’05. The JNTC program is a great example of leveraging the Services existing investments in training along commercial technology to the benefit of the joint operator.

- We have increased the training of new flag and general officers in an expanded CAPSTONE Joint Operations Module (JOM). In addition we have created new Joint Task Force Headquarters training courses for 2- and 3-star officers and senior enlisted leaders.

- We have worked to significantly improve our processes to source the capability requirements of the Combatant Commanders. Working closely with the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Staff to execute Joint Forces Command’s Primary Joint Force Provider Mission, we are developing better tools to track worldwide force availability, gaining better insight into Reserve Component readiness, mitigating stress on the force while meeting the needs of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM and experimenting with new methods of planning and executing Joint Deployments for the future.

- We have continued to work on joint interoperability, with a particular focus on Joint Command and Control. Using our Joint Battle Management Command and Control authorities as directed by Deputy Secretary of Defense, we have worked with the Services and Combatant Commands to improve all aspects of Joint Command and Control, issued a detailed Roadmap, and are executing our first program - the Deployable Joint Command and Control. We also created the Joint Systems Integration Command (JSIC).

- We have drastically increased our work with Allies, most visibly demonstrated by the growth in Foreign Liaison Officers assigned to Joint Forces Command. Just two years ago we had 11 Foreign Liaison Officers from 5 countries, and now there are 55 officers from 33 countries.

In all of our efforts at joint transformation, we are motivated by the manifest need to define and execute a “Joint Organize, Train and Equip” mission. At Joint Forces Command, we have focused this mission on organizing, training and equipping the Joint Task Force Headquarters to meet the operational needs of the Regional Combatant Commanders. This unifying theme to our many efforts has paid significant dividends in joint transformation.

Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role in transformation? If so, in what ways?

The Joint Staff plays an important role is assisting the Chairman in formulating advice on transformation.
What progress has been made in devising performance metrics for joint experimentation and transformation?

Transformation is a process – not an end-state. If we had a defined and static end-state, performance "metrics" would be an appropriate term to describe a means to measure our progress toward that end-state. Because our vision of how we want to operate in the future is constantly evolving as we learn more through experimentation, exercises and operations, we can measure only our relative performance against previous standards of collaboration and cultural adaptation. Therefore we apply what analysts call measures of performance.

In our quest to move from coordinated operations among Service forces to coherently integrated and interdependent operations among multinational Service and interagency forces, the measures of performance we've derived naturally focus on the ability to achieve collaboration and a unified effort in the planning, execution, and assessment of operations. We use experimentation to accelerate and advance the process of transformation. We create a vision of how we want to operate, derive concepts to achieve that vision, refine those concepts (and the vision) through experimentation and lessons derived from real-world operations and exercises, link the capabilities described in the concepts to the research, development, test and evaluation process, develop and acquire the capabilities. Fundamental to this transformation effort is adapting the culture of all the participants to support the vision. In all these measures of increasing collaboration and adapting cultures, we have advanced considerably in the last three years, though we still have much work to do.

If confirmed, what would be your future goals regarding transformation in the future?

The first – and overriding – goal is to continue transforming our armed forces while the Nation is at war. I believe the best time to undertake transformation is when you are engaged in challenging operations.

Along these lines, my primary goal will be to ensure that the lessons we learn in operations, experiments and concept development work are translated into rational resource and requirement decisions. Three key joint processes need to be aligned for this to happen:

- The Joint Concept Development and Experimentation process
- The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
- The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System

When we align these processes and make them as agile and responsive as possible, we will be able to translate lessons learned and operating concepts into an acquisition strategy, which is a key priority of the Department of Defense.
Joint Officer Management

Statutory standards for joint officer management and joint professional military education have increasingly been the subject of Administration proposals for change that would afford greater latitude to the Joint Staff and the services in the management of officers. Pursuant to section 531 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, the Secretary of Defense is required to develop a strategic plan for joint officer management and joint professional military education that would link future requirements for active and reserve military personnel who are trained and educated in joint matters to the resources required to develop those officers in terms of manpower, formal education, practical experience, and other requirements.

What do you consider to be the primary strengths and weaknesses of the current requirements for joint professional military education with respect to qualification as a joint specialty officer?

While the intent of the Joint Officer Management (JOM) portion of the Goldwater-Nichols Act remains valid, the process for certifying Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs) should reflect the changes in the way our military conducts joint operations. The strength of the current system is that it produces officers with a solid level of education, training, and joint staff experience to be certified as joint specialty experts. However, there are two main areas that we need to improve: providing credit for all relevant joint operational experience – especially in operational Joint Task Force headquarters – and developing a system to track this cumulative experience across the officer corps.

What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between education and experience in achieving qualification as a joint specialty officer?

In my opinion, there are three components to developing a Joint Specialty Officer: education, training, and experience. While the education and training components are reasonably well developed, we currently do not provide the appropriate joint credit for officers serving on operational Joint Task Force Headquarters. This real-world joint operational experience – the most valuable kind of joint experience in my view - reinforces education and training with practical application of learned skills, thus more fully preparing officers to lead and manage in the joint environment.
What is your personal view of the operational value and importance, in terms of performance, of officers achieving qualification as joint specialty officers?

In my view, there are two kinds of joint experience – joint staff experience and joint operational experience. Obviously both of these types of experience are relevant to qualification as joint specialty officers, but I believe nothing can replace joint operational experience. I think we need to provide joint credit for operational joint experience and develop a system to track officers with this type of experience. The value of qualified joint specialty officers has been further reinforced for me while serving as Commander, Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation.

What changes, if any, would you recommend in the development, education, management, assignment, and qualifying processes for officers in a transformed and fully joint U. S. military?

We must focus on producing leaders who are fully qualified, inherently joint officers, critical thinkers, and most importantly, skilled war fighters and operators. We have made significant process in this area, especially with our senior leaders. We have expanded the CAPSTONE training program for our new flag/general officers and we created PINNACLE and KEYSTONE to train our senior flag/general officers and enlisted personnel on how to command and operate within an operational Joint Task Force. Next step is to create a system to track operational joint experience and more easily provide joint duty credit for those officers who serve on an operational Joint Task Force.
Training of Senior Leaders in Joint Operations

U. S. Joint Forces Command has taken several initiatives to train senior leaders how to operate in joint environments. Capstone and Pinnacle are intensive courses that provide general and flag officers with an understanding of what is expected of them as joint task force commanders and what it takes to make a joint task force work effectively. Keystone provides senior enlisted leaders with an understanding of their role in joint operations.

How has Capstone changed since its inception, and what currently are its principal strengths and weaknesses?

As Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, I am only responsible for the Joint Operations Module (JOM) portion of the CAPSTONE, PINNACLE and KEYSTONE programs. As an integral part of each of these courses, Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center receives extensive feedback from each attendee and uses that to improve the content of each course. Also, each and every program course is adjusted to reflect 3 items: the current best practices in the field, recent joint lessons learned (observed), and emerging joint concepts. Overall, I am very satisfied with these three programs in training our senior leaders for joint operations.

When I attended CAPSTONE just over a decade ago, the U.S. Joint Forces Command portion was primarily an introductory program for new flag and general officers to demonstrate service-specific capabilities, focusing primarily on weapons systems. It lasted about 4 hours. Today, the Joint Warfighting Center hosts a 4-day Joint Operations Module as part of the CAPSTONE program. We have completely changed the focus to how to operate successfully in a Joint Task Force operating in an Allied, coalition and interagency environment. The emphasis is now on how to command and control a joint task force headquarters in the 21st century.

I believe the Joint Operations Module portion of CAPSTONE has four main strengths. First is the senior mentor program headed by Gary Luck, General U.S. Army (retired), whom I consider a “national treasure.” He maintains a cadre of hand-picked former 3- and 4-star officers and Ambassadors who provide exceptional mentorship to the CAPSTONE fellows in small group settings. Second, our Joint Warfighting Center brings current, practical knowledge of command and control issues at the Joint Task Force (JTF) and Functional Component level, and links in Video Teleconferences with current JTF commanders serving in operational commands. These JTF commanders always lead a frank and open discussion with the fellows that is consistently rated as one of the most helpful portions of CAPSTONE. Third, the Joint Warfighting Center does an excellent job of incorporating the results of the most current ‘lessons learned’ process into the Joint Operations Module. Finally, the personal relationships developed between the fellows themselves have consistently proven their utility during joint operations.
CAPSTONE has been improved by increasing the attendance from other government agencies. Today’s joint operations are increasingly conducted in an interagency and multinational environment, and additional interaction with individuals with these backgrounds is required.

How would you assess the training provided at Pinnacle, and what recommendations for improving this course would you offer?

As with CAPSTONE, U.S. Joint Forces Command is responsible for the Joint Operations Module portion of PINNACLE. So far, we have hosted two Joint Operations Modules at Joint Forces Command and in both courses, I spent 3 ½ of the 4 days of the Joint Operations Module with the participants. Based on my personal experience, PINNACLE is fulfilling its purpose. We knew we were missing something in preparing our flag and general officers to command a joint task force headquarters and PINNACLE has filled that gap.

Finally, and in order to continue to improve PINNACLE, we need to establish a comprehensive assessment of the program centered on feedback from former graduates approximately 1 year after they completed the training – and incorporate this feedback into the curriculum.

In your view, are the services effectively utilizing the senior enlisted personnel who attend the Keystone course, and what improvements to this course, if any, are needed?

My Command Senior Enlisted Leader, CSM Mark Ripka, U.S. Army, has been very involved with the design, implementation and conduct of the KEYSTONE program. His initial assessment of the placement of KEYSTONE graduates indicates the Services are utilizing the graduates effectively. The KEYSTONE program was designed to mirror CAPSTONE and we have held true to that goal. The senior enlisted personnel that attend KEYSTONE receive almost the identical curriculum as their CAPSTONE counterparts. Overall, I am satisfied with the progress of KEYSTONE. The only issue outstanding is to ensure that National Defense University is fully funded for the entire 10-day KEYSTONE program.
Joint Requirements Oversight Council

If confirmed as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you would be the chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has the responsibility to validate Service requirements. As the Services transformation initiatives have matured, some have been approved for system development and demonstration (SDD) even though it appears that some programs lacked the technical maturity the programs require to transition into SDD.

How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the DOD acquisition process?

I believe the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s (JROC) participation in the Defense Department acquisition process has improved, particularly as a result of the evolving changes in the JROC and acquisition processes over the past few years. In my view, however, more can be done to improve the alignment and interaction between the requirements generation and acquisition process. We can also work to make our acquisition processes more agile and responsive to emerging requirements from the Combatant Commanders.

What is your vision for the role and priorities of the JROC?

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) plays an important role in helping ensure that major programs are “born joint.” Since its inception, the JROC has driven “jointness” into military requirements generation, defense acquisition programs, and the Chairman’s programmatic advice and recommendations. In 2000, the Chairman initiated efforts to enhance JROC influence in requirements integration through development of joint operational concepts, integrating joint experimentation efforts, and adding a focus on future joint warfighting requirements – while still addressing Combatant Commander’s current priorities. A lot has been accomplished; but much more needs to be done. There needs to be a better linkage between the requirements generation and the acquisition processes. We need to work hard to turn our joint operating concepts into an acquisition strategy. And we need to be able to respond in an agile fashion to emerging requirements from our Combatant Commanders. If confirmed, I look forward to further examination of how this process can be improved, and to ensuring all statuary and reporting requirements relating to the JROC are met.

What changes, if any, would you recommend in the membership of the JROC?

I would like to reserve judgment on specific changes pending confirmation and an opportunity to further review the Joint Requirements Oversight Council organization, process and function.
Do you believe the current JROC process has been able to adjust satisfactorily to a capabilities-based, vice threat-based, approach in determining requirements?

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has taken several steps to make the JROC process focused on delivering capabilities that are strategy driven and “born-joint.” On the positive side, I can tell you from personal experience that the results of joint experimentation and joint lessons learned are beginning to influence our concepts of operations and our acquisitions, especially in the joint command and control arena. However, we need to improve the link between the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS) and the Joint Concept Development & Experimentation process. Aligning and integrated these processes will allow our collaboratively derived, capabilities-based joint operating concepts to drive our acquisition strategy. I also believe we need to do even more work to ensure the interoperability of systems in our legacy force is enhanced.

Do you believe that quantity of items required is appropriately addressed in the JROC process, so that the capability delivered by the item is present in appropriate numbers?

I do not know, but if confirmed, I will study this issue and respond.
Joint Forces Command Limited Acquisition Authority

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 provided the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) commander with the authority to develop and acquire equipment for battle management command, control, communications, and intelligence and any other equipment that JFCOM determines necessary for facilitating the use of joint forces in military operations or enhancing the interoperability of equipment used by the various components of joint forces. The authority limits spending to $10 million for research and development and $50 million for procurement, and, unless renewed, will expire on September 30, 2006.

What is your assessment of the efficacy of this limited acquisition authority for JFCOM?

Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA) has proven to be a useful and flexible tool for U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in support of other Combatant Commands. Based on warfighting shortfalls validated by Combatant Commanders, it has allowed us to field mature technologies quickly. This equipment, available in industry today, directly improves areas such as Joint Battle Management Command and Control, Intelligence, Communications, operations of joint forces, and the interoperability of joint force components. LAA allows us to get the new or improved capability to the warfighters in the regional Combatant Commands more rapidly than the normal DoD acquisition process.

Since 2004 USJFCOM’s implementation of LAA in support of Combatant Commands has been used to fund/provide several improvements to the Joint Warfighter

- The Joint Precision Air Drop System 2000 pound capability allows precision delivery of logistic support to forces in remote operating areas or behind enemy lines. Expected delivery – July 2005.
- The Change Detection Work Station (CDWS) is a capability to map and detect Improvised Explosive Devices along troop/convoy routes. CDWS deployed to U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND in January 2005.
- The Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and Control Capability (JTF CDR EC2) is an information technology solution that provides connectivity to a Commander while remotely located from the headquarters element. Four of these systems were delivered to CENTCOM/EUCOM Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in Fiscal Year 04 and a fifth is under development for delivery to CJTF-76 later this year.
- Joint Translator/Forwarder/Joint Blue Force Tracker/Rapid Attack Info Dissemination Execution Relay – Joint Translator Forward is a universal translator/data forwarder for disparate data sources/data links; Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness provides blue force system integration; Rapid Attack Info Dissemination Execution Relay provides Time Sensitive Target attack data/authorization to multiple aircraft en route targets. This capability is currently
in development under Limited Acquisition Authority for fielding in Fiscal Year 05 and Fiscal Year 06.

USJFCOM is also evaluating five additional capabilities for fielding under Limited Acquisition Authority.

- Joint Extended Collaborative Environment – would expand the ability of units and commanders to plan and remain connected en route to the mission area
- Command and Control On The Move – access to all headquarters Communications, Intelligence & Command and Control systems while on the move.
- Simultaneous, two-way voice translation between American English and Arabic dialects.
- Data Mining and Digital Translation Technology to improve the mission capability of intelligence collection from open source information.

Do you believe this authority should be extended beyond September 30, 2006? If so, what changes, if any, would you recommend to improve the authority?

Yes. I believe that extension of Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA) beyond Fiscal Year 06 will continue to provide needed capabilities to the Regional Combatant Commanders; especially in Command and Control functions, Communications, Intelligence, Operations, and Interoperability. I strongly urge Congress to extend the authority.

While Limited Acquisition Authority projects are bringing some much-needed improvements to the joint warfighter, the LAA is not without significant challenges. Finding adequate resources to support LAA projects is often more challenging than defining, developing or fielding the capability. While these authorities have provided opportunities to partner with Services and Defense Agencies to field these tools, developing funding agreements takes time, slowing the development and delivery of capabilities to the troops – the very problem that LAA was designed to address.

The ability to sustain/maintain these projects during transition to programs of record or replacement also continues to present challenges. If the Limited Acquisition Authority were to expire as scheduled on 30 September 2006, we would lose an excellent - and rapidly improving - method to provide emerging capabilities to our Combatant Commanders with no replacement program on the horizon.

Limited Acquisition Authority can be improved by adding appropriated funding commensurate to the authority and by allowing the use of Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds for sustainment of LAA-acquired capabilities until transition to an existing program of record, absorption of the sustainment into the recipient’s O&M budget, or termination of the requirement for each specific capability.
Do you believe similar acquisition authority should be extended to other combatant commands, and, if so, which commands and why?

I support any process or authority that will accelerate getting warfighting capabilities into the hands of the joint warfighter. Limited Acquisition Authority was delegated to U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as a test case to determine if DoD could, for specific joint requirements, acquire capabilities outside the normal acquisition process. In my opinion, this experiment has been a success. Our experience has shown that the current LAA statute, while narrowly defined, should be extended beyond FY06 and should also be resourced to both deliver a capability and sustain it once in place.

I would like to reserve judgment on extension of this authority to other Combatant Commands pending consultation with the Combatant Commanders and pending further experience from Joint Forces Command with Limited Acquisition Authority.
Defense Science and Technology Programs

The Department’s Science and Technology (S&T) programs are designed to support defense transformation goals and objectives. These programs should ensure that warfighters of today and tomorrow have superior and affordable technology to support their missions and to give them revolutionary war-winning capabilities.

Do you believe there is an adequate investment in innovative defense science to develop the capabilities the Department will need in 2020?

I believe so. In my capacity as Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, I have been satisfied with the investment resources at my disposal to find innovative solutions to Joint problems. I cannot speak to the Department of Defense’s investment resources, though I expect to be involved in this issue should I be confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Do you believe the Department's investment strategy for science and technology is correctly balanced between near-term and long-term needs?

In my capacity as Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, I have not been involved in the department’s overall investment strategy for science and technology. I would like to reserve judgment until I have time to study this issue.
Technology Transition

The DOD efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.

What are your views on the success of the Department's technology transition programs in spiraling emerging technologies into use to confront evolving threats and to meet warfighter needs?

The Technology Transition Initiative, Quick Reaction Fund, and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations have each had limited success. Each has provided new technology to the warfighter but generally only those programs with technologies that have Service buy-in and Service priority have transitioned into programs of record. We need to do a better job identifying the importance of technologies that contribute to the Joint Warfighter and determining how these can be better transitioned into programs of record. However on a limited basis, we have used Chairman’s Initiative Funds (CIF) to satisfy near-term technology insertions. We have also used Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA) which was delegated to Joint Forces Command as an experiment to determine if DoD could, for specific, joint requirements, acquire capabilities outside the normal acquisition process. In my opinion, this experiment has been a success.

What more can be done to transition critical technologies quickly to warfighters?

At the most general level, the acquisition system needs to be more responsive to emerging Combatant Commanders’ requirements. Some newly established programs are beginning to show promise in alleviating this problem – such as the Chairman’s Initiative Fund, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, and Limited Acquisition Authority – but there is ample room for improvement.

One possibility is to consider increasing the Chairman’s Initiative Fund (CIF) resources. Additionally, my experience with Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA) has taught me to believe that the current LAA statute, while narrowly defined, should be extended beyond FY-06 and should also be expanded to include resources to both deliver capability and sustain it once in place.

Further, the recently created Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell should be given the necessary set of waivers and exemptions from regulations that impede responsive acquisition. Most importantly, rapid acquisition processes need to be endorsed and put on a firm financial basis similar to Limited Acquisition Authority. Urgent requirements will be met much faster if they can be resourced without taking funds from existing programs. Both of these processes would
meet the most urgent requirements of the joint war fighter while guaranteeing the most efficient use of public funds.
End Strength of Active Duty Forces

In light of the manpower demands of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, what level of active-duty personnel (by service) do you believe is required for current and anticipated missions?

I have not conducted an analysis of force levels (by service). However, based on the request-for-forces (RFF) from the Regional Combatant Commanders sourced through U.S. Joint Forces Command, we have sufficient forces to meet current and anticipated missions with varying degrees of risk.

How do you assess the progress made to date by the services in finding ways to reduce the numbers of military personnel performing support functions that can better be performed by civilian employees or contractors?

The Services and Defense Agencies continue to make good progress in identifying functions requiring military skills, and those jobs that might be performed by civilian defense employees or defense contractors. Approximately 45,000 military-to-civilian conversions are planned. These conversions will free up military billets and help to reduce stress on the force.

What manpower savings can be achieved through reductions in overseas presence, application of technology, and changes in roles and missions?

I believe the department will realize significant manpower and fiscal savings as it continues to reduce overseas troop presence and transforms to a Total Force that is focused on refined missions and core competencies. These issues will be refined with the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission and further progress in Overseas Basing Initiatives. Since these reviews are still progressing, I do not have any projections on manpower savings at this point in time.
Recruiting and Retention

The ability of the Armed Forces to recruit highly qualified young men and women and to retain experienced, highly motivated commissioned and non-commissioned officers is influenced by many factors, and is critical to the success of the All Volunteer Force. While retention in all the services has remained strong, recruiting data in 2005 have shown increasing difficulty for the Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve, and Naval Reserve in meeting monthly recruiting goals.

What do you consider to be the most important elements of successful recruiting?

As a former Navy recruiter, I think the following elements are common to any successful recruiting program: tapping the reservoir of patriotism by providing the opportunity to serve the Nation; offering the chance to serve in a proud and respected profession; possessing a properly resourced cadre of highly motivated and trained recruiters; having complete access to the recruiting pool; offering a competitive compensation and benefits package; and providing the opportunity to achieve skills, education and experience.

What recommendations, if any, do you have to improve recruiting for the ground forces?

Successful recruiting is a result of finding the proper mix of successful recruiting elements. The Army and Marine Corps have good recruiting programs and dedicated recruiters performing the mission. Each of the ground force components is increasing the number of recruiters in the field; they have and are further enhancing their incentive bonuses for new recruits; they have increased their advertising budget; and, they have focused their marketing strategy not only on potential recruits but also on the influencers (parents, teachers, etc.) who play an important role in any decision to pursue a military career. These new initiatives and incentives plus increases in the number of recruiters and advertising budget will bring improved results.

What is your assessment of the value of so called "blue to green" recruiting programs which aim to facilitate transfer of sailors and airmen to the ground forces?

The “Blue to Green” program is a win/win situation. As the Navy and Air Force continue their rightsizing programs, “blue to green” not only offers the Army qualified and experienced professionals, it provides those trained and experienced service members an opportunity to continue their careers. The real value of programs like this is that we retain trained professionals, avoiding the cost of recruiting, attrition and training their reliefs. This program, although the numbers are small, is a force multiplier.
What do you consider to be the most important components in the success of all the services in retaining experienced junior officers, petty officers, and non-commissioned officers?

Our military has been successful because of its tradition of service, its strong leadership at all levels and its support by the Nation. There is also an old saying in the military that “you recruit an individual, but you retain a family.” I find this to be true. Therefore, the most important components of retaining our professional force are: (1) Feeling that the Nation values your service and your family’s sacrifice, (2) Strong leadership and mentorship, (3) Personal/professional development opportunities, (4) Opportunities to lead and grow at every level throughout their careers, and (5) Competitive compensation, benefits and incentive packages that rewards their service and provides a good quality of life for their families.

In your opinion, what impact is the current recruiting environment likely to have on our ability to sustain an all volunteer force?

We are committed to the enormous return on investment that our Nation receives through an All-Volunteer Force. The All-Volunteer Force is an order of magnitude better than the system I lived in as a young officer. We simply must continue to make the All-Volunteer Force work. Although we are currently facing short-term recruiting challenges, I believe we have the knowledge and ability to successfully manage this problem. We are aggressively addressing this issue by increasing the number of recruiters in the field, enhancing incentive programs, increasing advertising budgets, and re-focusing our marketing strategy.
Joint Requirements

With the establishment of U. S. Joint Forces Command, it was envisioned that the Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command, would represent and advocate for requirements and interests of combatant commander in the overall defense requirements and acquisition process.

Has U. S. Joint Forces Command been able to satisfactorily represent the requirements and needs of combatant commanders to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the military services?

As Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command I, and senior members of my staff have had excellent interaction with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when required, in the exercise of my responsibilities under Title 10 U.S. Code and the President’s Unified Command Plan. If confirmed, I look forward to continue working with all those involved to make the system even more responsive to near-term Combatant Commander needs.

Are combatant commanders able to identify critical joint warfighting requirements and quickly acquire needed capabilities?

The Combatant Commanders are often able to identify joint warfighting requirements and capability gaps. However, their ability to quickly acquire needed capabilities is less than optimal. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council process is designed to impact mid- to far-term capabilities and funding (3 years and beyond). The process has less flexibility to respond to emerging requirements within the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process in the near-term budget years (1-2 years). Currently, there are limited pools of funding available to address this systemic problem. Therefore, Combatant Commanders still have difficulty rapidly acquiring some capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring ways to improve the Combatant Commanders’ ability to quickly acquire needed capabilities.

What suggestions, if any, do you have for improving the requirements and acquisition process to ensure that combatant commanders are able to quickly acquire needed joint warfighting capabilities?

In my view, we must “operationalize” the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and acquisition processes to respond with agility when immediate and pressing needs are presented and validated. Currently, the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is designed to impact mid- to far-term capabilities and funding (3 years and beyond). The process has less flexibility to quickly respond to emerging requirements within the PPBE process in the near-term budget years (1-2 years).
A variety of ad hoc measures have been used to address this challenge. Congress has helped by providing new authorities such as Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA). One near-term solution is to dedicate appropriate resources – tied to Limited Acquisition Authority - in order to have funds available to ensure Combatant Commanders are able to quickly acquire joint warfighting capabilities. In the long-term, the JCIDS process needs to change to fall more in line with the demands and pace of today’s operations. If confirmed, I look forward to helping to develop a systemic way to address these concerns in the future.
Reliance on Reserve Component

The men and women of the Reserve component have performed superbly in meeting the diverse challenges of the global war on terrorism. Such a heavy use of the Reserve components, however, could have potential adverse effects on recruiting, retention, and morale of continuing mobilization of Guard and Reserve personnel.

What is your assessment of the impact of continuing Guard and Reserve deployments on the readiness and attractiveness of service in the Guard and Reserve?

The men and women of our Active and Reserve force are performing superbly in the Global War on Terrorism. However, the prolonged demand on certain capabilities resident in the Guard and Reserve is a serious concern, and we are working hard to deal with this issue. Of note, the highest retention percentages in the Reserve Components come from units that have deployed for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM -- clearly, these service members understand the importance of their service and are volunteering again to continue to serve their country. We must continue to ensure our personnel receive strong support from their civilian employers, provide support for their families, and we must also continue to closely monitor recruiting and retention.

To decrease demand on the Reserve Component, the Department has several initiatives underway which help alleviate additional burden on the Guard and Reserve including 1) rebalancing of forces, 2) modularization for a better deployment rotation base, 3) new training and certification procedures for our Army Guard and Reserves prior to mobilization to maximize their utility while minimizing their total time away from home, and 4) temporary increases in the Active Component.

An important point to re-emphasize is that the impact on the Guard and Reserve varies significantly from unit to unit and among different specialties/capabilities in the Guard and Reserve.

What missions do you consider appropriate for permanent assignment to the Reserve component?

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is currently examining the roles and missions of the Services and their Reserve Components. This assessment will produce recommendations regarding which capabilities should reside in the Active and Reserve Components. These recommendations will also address how those capabilities should be apportioned and resourced between the components. In addition to the QDR, each Service is conducting their own assessment to balance the capabilities between respective components. I would like to reserve final judgment on this question until after having the opportunity to review the results of these assessments.
Security Cooperation

One of the central pillars of our recent national security strategy has been security cooperation as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises, combatant commander exercises, humanitarian demining operations, and similar activities are used to achieve this goal.

If confirmed, would you support such continued engagement activities of the U.S. military?

Yes. I strongly support these types of engagements. As Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, I have aggressively sought to expand our interaction with Allies and partners. Foreign Liaison Officers (FLO) have grown from 11 officers representing 5 countries in 2003 to 55 Foreign Liaison Officers representing 33 countries today, with more officers and nations on the way. U.S. Joint Forces Command has a vigorous multinational concept development and experimentation program. My experience as a NATO Strategic Commander further reinforces in my mind the value of these programs. Security Cooperation activities exchanges, exercises, and operations are essential, and if confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the need to foster these international relationships to improve regional and global security while developing our defense partnerships for the future.

In your view, how do these activities contribute to U.S. national security?

U.S. Forces participating in training, exercises and education programs with our international partners develop trust and confidence within the international community. Engagements such as these also improve coalition interoperability and support transformation. Cumulatively, these actions reduce the potential for conflict and encourage other nations to participate in cooperative efforts to ensure peace and stability. My personal experience suggests that the personal relationships developed through these engagements build a level of trust and confidence between U.S. officers and their allied and coalition partners that would not exist otherwise. The ability to pick up the phone and talk to your allied or coalition partner from a position of respect and trust based on previous shared experiences is an invaluable contribution to our national security.
Stability and Support Operations

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and support operations in DOD planning and guidance in order to achieve the goal of full integration across all DOD activities.

What is your assessment of the Department’s current emphasis on planning for post-conflict scenarios?

The Department has invested considerable emphasis on post-conflict planning. Of the four Joint Operating Concepts (JOC) approved by the Secretary of Defense, one of the two primarily authored by Joint Forces Command is dedicated to Stability Operations. I believe the most critical step in improving our post-conflict planning is the establishment and integration with a counterpart civilian planning capability in an inter-agency forum. I have strongly supported the establishment and the strengthening of the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the Department of State. I know the Department of Defense has assisted S/CRS in building their own planning processes as well as integrate them into the Defense Department’s deliberate and crisis planning processes. These efforts, in Washington as well as with the Combatant Commanders, have worked to integrate stabilization and reconstruction operations into our operational plans and theater exercises. U.S. Joint Forces Command, in particular, has provided expertise to S/CRS and has partnered with it in concept development and experimentation events to develop their planning capacity and help elaborate their operational concepts.

I know the department is developing a directive concerning stability operations which will help integrate stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations into our overall campaign planning efforts. The ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review, in which S/CRS is participating, is just one way we are reassessing our requirements to ensure we have the right mix of forces for the right missions, including security, stability, reconstruction and transition operations.

What role should the Joint Staff play in implementing any new directives in the area of post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations?

The Joint Staff plays an important role on various interagency committees and working groups that develop plans and policies that impact stability and support operations. The Joint Staff should help facilitate coordination between governmental agencies, such as the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the Combatant Commanders and their staffs.
In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DOD and other federal agencies in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?

Security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations require the coherent application of diplomatic, information, military and economic power. Clearly, the military has a role to play in conjunction with partners inside the U.S. government as well as Allies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. The proper relationship between the Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal agencies in planning and executing these operations vary with conditions on the ground. Several principles need to be considered and I have found several concepts helpful in thinking through this problem. First, the Command and Control arrangements need to be clear and understood by all parties. Second, the pragmatic application of the supported and supporting commander concept and the Lead Federal Agency concept can be helpful. Finally, any relationship between DoD and other federal agencies will require leaders who understand the capabilities each agency can bring to bear. For this reason, U.S. Joint Forces Command has incorporated interagency topics and participants – as both fellows and presenters – in the CAPSTONE and PINNACLE courses designed to prepare flag and general officers to lead Joint Task Forces in the execution of security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations.

What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

U.S. Joint Forces Command has undertaken a robust and dynamic lessons learned mission to actively work on the lessons – at the joint operational level – from our ongoing operations. This has resulted in an extremely rich set of insights, observations and analyses. We have provided many of these products to Congress in previous testimony and briefings to Congressional staff members. I believe detailed briefings such as these would be useful to provide the necessary context and detail which these issues require.

Based on my experience at Joint Forces Command, we have learned several key lessons about security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations. First, the value of detailed, adaptive and collaborative planning is essential. Our successes were enabled by detailed planning; our shortcomings usually occurred in areas where planning efforts or expertise was lacking. Second, our military commanders need money they can immediately spend as much – or more – than they need bullets and guns as a key tool to jump start reconstruction efforts. Third, we need to ensure the right balance of capabilities (such as Civil Affairs units) between Active and Reserve Components because their immediate engagement and long-term sustainment are critical. Fourth, collaborating with Allies is essential and requires considerable effort. Fifth, our ability to communicate with the civilian population – the center of gravity in these operations – needs to be enabled with linguists, communications, media, and an effective strategic communications capability. These are some of the many lessons we have learned, and are acting on, in our execution of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. I would offer more detailed briefings as requested by Congress.
Delivery of Legal Services

The global war on terrorism has placed extraordinary demands upon commanders and their legal advisers to rapidly respond to complex legal issues at a time when the number of military judge advocates on active duty has been substantially reduced. Providing qualified, fully trained legal advisers to commanders of combatant commands and joint task forces presents serious challenges to DOD and the services.

What steps, if any, has U.S. Joint Forces Command taken to ensure legal advisers are available to combatant commanders and commanders of joint task forces?

As the Primary Joint Force Provider, as designated by the Secretary of Defense in his Global Force Management Guidance of 4 May 2005, U.S. Joint Forces Command is working to ensure that Joint Task Force headquarters are designed to include appropriate judge advocate support to the Joint Task Force commander; that the staff is properly trained for their mission; and that each Joint Task Force, as it is stood up, is properly manned. My Staff Judge Advocate is working with the Combatant Commands, my component commanders, the Service Judge Advocates General, and the Joint Staff to ensure this important capability is appropriately resourced.

As a matter of general practice to date, legal advisers to Combatant Commanders and to joint task forces have been provided by the services, through each service’s office of the judge advocate general. U.S. Joint Forces Command had no direct role in that process. In fact, the responsibility is assigned by law under Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to each service Judge Advocate General, and for Marines, to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Under that statute, "The assignment for duty of judge advocates of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard shall be made upon recommendation of the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which they are members. The assignment for duty of judge advocates of the Marine Corps shall be made by direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps." Under this statutory construct, assignment of judge advocates, even to joint force headquarters, remains a service responsibility.

What is your view of the need for the legal adviser to the Chairman to provide independent legal advice to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Title 10, Section 151(b), makes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. I take very seriously the responsibility of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, in the Chairman’s absence, to provide independent military advice to each of those individuals or entities. Title 10 also provides for an independently organized Joint Staff, operated under the authority, direction and control of the Chairman, to support the Chairman in fulfillment of his statutory duties. I believe it is essential that the Chairman’s Legal Counsel – manned by an experienced military judge advocate and staff - be exclusively dedicated to support the Chairman and Vice Chairman in fulfilling their statutory responsibilities.
What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocates General of the services to provide independent legal advice to the Chiefs of Staff?

The duty of the service Judge Advocates General and of the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to provide independent legal advice to the Chiefs of Staff appears to me to be established by law (Title 10, at sections 3037, 5046, 5148 and 8037) and I am in full agreement with this statutory requirement.

What is your view of the responsibility of staff judge advocates within the services and joint commands to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?

My view is that staff judge advocates should, as established by law, communicate directly with military commanders, and provide their best professional, independent judgment and advice.
NATO Transformation

In your role as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, you have acted as NATO's "forcing agent for change." In your responses to the advance policy questions forwarded by the Committee in June 2003, you stated your priorities for Allied Command Transformation, including, among others, the development of Joint Warfighting Center/Joint Training Center functionality and ensuring that the Command is properly resourced and manned. You have stated elsewhere that additional authorities are needed from NATO for you to execute your mission and achieve long term success.

What success did you achieve in meeting the goals you established for Allied Command Transformation two years ago?

While we continue to build to Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 30 June 2006, we have made significant advances in joint training, defence planning, concept development and experimentation, and strategy. We stood up the Joint Warfare Center (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway, inaugurated the Joint Force Training Center in Bydgoszcz, Poland and refocused the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon, Portugal on support to NATO operations around the world.

In the delivery of products to the Alliance, ACT has a solid record of achievement:

- With 60% manning, the JWC and its subordinate Joint Force Training Center provided joint battle staff training to NATO's Joint Forces Commands and conducted mission rehearsal exercises for the 3 successive International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters staffs, supported certification of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and provided training to key Iraqi Leaders in support of the NATO Training Mission Iraq. This has improved NATO's mission performance by training Commanders and their Staffs, enabling them to deal with situations they will actually find in today's operational environment.
- In Defence Planning, ACT developed Military Assessments for 24 nations, assessing for the first time nations' progress on transformational goals. This month we completed the Defence Requirements Review 2005, the most comprehensive ever.
- Together with Allied Command Operations (ACO), ACT delivered the Bi-Strategic Command Strategic Vision in August 2004, laying the foundation for NATO's future concepts and capabilities development. Other major conceptual goals were met with the delivery of the 'Intelligence Transformation Advice NATO' and the NATO Networked Enabled Capability (NNEC) Foundation document.
- In experimentation, ACT's program is in full stride with an array of experiments ranging from political-military level decision making to multinational and interagency engagements.
- In development of the NATO Response Force (NRF), ACT has sponsored two exercise-seminars for prospective NRF commanders where the operational challenges the NRF will face have been explored. Additionally, ACT is working with Allied Command Operations to develop training and certification standards for NRF headquarters and assigned units.
• ACT is beginning to tackle security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations. The ACT Seminar 2005, for NATO ambassadors and military representatives, was dedicated to this theme, as were symposia co-sponsored with Old Dominion University and the Royal United Services Institute. The insights from these events will inform ACT efforts to deliver improved capabilities in this area to NATO.

• ACT also established a growing number of valuable partnerships with Partner Nations, Industry, an expanding Centers-of-Excellence Network, academia, International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations. ACT has also been working closely with the U.S. Joint Forces Command to leverage their knowledge and Lessons Learned.

On the resources side, ACT's manning levels are generally on track to Full Operational Capability. While NATO has recurring funding challenges, ACT has an adequate level of funding to execute its mission, with some risk if support for unplanned contingency operations is required.

In the light of changing requirements and emerging demands over the last two years, ACT has met its goals and has established a proven track record.

What is your assessment today of the progress of NATO's transformation and of Allied Command Transformation's success in leading that effort?

In light of the military transformation efforts underway in almost all NATO nations, Alliance transformation is progressing well. Major challenges such as increasing the usability and deployability of NATO's forces are being seriously pursued. The Alliance is implementing the most significant command structure change in nearly 50 years, including two new Strategic Commands, Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation. An in-depth review of NATO Agencies is being led by the Deputy Secretary General. The Military Committee is engaged in an extensive functional review of its organization and its supporting International Military Staff. And, finally, the Secretary General has launched an overarching NATO Review, led by distinguished diplomats, to propose reforms in NATO Headquarters organizations and procedures.

Over the last two years, ACT has played a significant role in the Alliance’s military transformation. Through concept development, Defense Planning and Capability Development efforts, operational level battle staff training and a broad array of complementary efforts, ACT is establishing itself as the hub of military transformation in the Alliance. Additionally, ACT responded to emerging operational demands such as NATO Training Mission-Iraq by providing key support to Allied Command Operations. A clear demonstration of ACT’s leading role has been the request of several Nations for ACT to review their national Defence Plans and Reform efforts. These ACT reviews were very successful and much appreciated.

ACT is also now leading the effort to longer term NATO and national capability development. However, capability development is particularly challenging when most Allies are not meeting NATO’s defense spending goal of 2% of Gross Domestic Product.
With full support by NATO's Secretary-General and Allied Command Operations, these achievements have laid a solid foundation for ACT's future in leading the Alliance's military transformation effort.

What authorities and resources are lacking that you consider most necessary for NATO's transformation success?

In my Terms of Reference as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (ACT) and in the NATO documents establishing the new NATO Command Structure, Allied Command Transformation has the authorities it needs to undertake its mission of military transformation. To be fully successful, of course, ACT’s proposals need to be adopted by the Nations in the various decision-making bodies of the Alliance. As a result, ACT is contributing to the Secretary General’s NATO Review and to the Functional Review of the International Military Staff.

On the resources side, sufficient manning to achieve FOC by 30 June 2006 remains a principal concern. ACT is broadly on track in this area and we are working closely with the Nations to achieve this key milestone.

Additionally, the authority to deploy ACT Staff fully in line with the Command's mission and tasks is crucial. National caveats limiting the deployability of NATO assigned Staff Officers need to be eliminated to ensure ACT mission accomplishment.

Equally challenging is the establishment of an accurate baseline budget, necessary to fund a still developing command with new – and often unique - roles and responsibilities. ACT's resource needs have yet to solidify in the short to medium term as the organization continues to evolve with an ever-growing demand for its transformational products. In my view, funding levels to date meet about 90% of the level of ambition envisioned for ACT.

What do you view as the critical priorities for NATO transformation efforts in the future?

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is NATO's principal operational organization for military transformation. Many nations contribute significantly to this force, based on a concept agreed by all NATO nations during the Prague Summit. This new force is on the road to Full Operational Capability by Oct 2006 as a high-readiness, fully joint expeditionary force, capable of executing missions across the military spectrum. A key priority is to actually employ this new NATO capability. Only by actually employing the NRF will the Alliance be able to develop national and NATO capabilities through experimentation, Lessons Learned and real world deployment and sustainment. This will not only reenergize the NRF, but will also enhance the Alliance’s credibility and capability.
NATO Headquarters Reform is the second key enabler for continuing NATO transformation. The new NATO command structure, with two new Strategic Commands and the subordinate command structures, have undergone profound changes. Further NATO transformation requires the Alliance to streamline its political and military structures, as well as its funding, resourcing and decision-making processes. The Heads of State and Government have recognized this imperative task at the Istanbul Summit and have directed the Secretary General to undertake a wide-ranging NATO Review.
Training

In your current position as the Commander of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), you are responsible for the joint training of our military forces.

Based on your experience, do you believe that the Department of Defense has the resources and base structure needed to properly train our armed forces?

From my perspective as Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, we are in good overall shape with respect to the joint training mission. We are working towards Full Operational Capability (FOC) for our Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) in 2009, which ties all our Service ranges together so that units can train in a common joint environment while still accomplishing their Service-required training. However, building out the JNTC is a significant challenge, and we are still at the beginning stages. A major hurdle we will face over the coming years is resourcing the training centers required for emerging types of joint operations such as information operations, urban operations, and security, stability transition and reconstruction operations.

There will always be challenges with keeping training ranges and capabilities up to date. The Department has placed significant focus on encroachment over the past several years and has challenges in maintenance and modernization at many of the major training centers.

If not, what additional resources and/or base structure are needed?

Fully funding joint training as submitted in the President’s Budget for the last two years will help allow the Department of Defense to keep its training resources up to par.

Do you believe that the Department’s 2005 base closure recommendations preserve an adequate base structure to support future training needs?

Yes, however significant encroachment issues remain. While new weapons-systems capabilities will require infrastructure investment and innovative approaches to training and exercising given their performance characteristics. So, although I think training capability fared very well in BRAC, there are significant challenges ahead which would have existed even in the absence of BRAC.
Nuclear Weapons Council

If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council?

I have spent the last 3 years working with our conventional forces. However, as a former nuclear submarine commander and as a commander of a nuclear Task Force Commander with U.S. Strategic Command in the late ‘90s, I am familiar with the principles of nuclear weapons command and control, safety and security. If confirmed, I will work hard to get smarter on the Nuclear Weapons Council and its responsibilities.
Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Yes

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes