Defense Reforms

More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

Answer: Yes, I support the full implementation of these reforms.

What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

Answer: I am not aware of any reason to believe that the reforms have not been substantially implemented. I believe that they have strengthened civilian control of the military, improved the quality of military advice given to the President and Secretary of Defense, and improved the Department’s ability to execute its missions.

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

Answer: I believe that the most important aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms are the nation’s increased emphasis on military “jointness,” the formulation of top-down defense strategy and plans, and the vesting of important responsibility and authority in the Combatant Commanders.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing a clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Do you agree with these goals?
Answer: Yes, I support the goals of the Congress in enacting the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

Recently, there have been articles that indicate an interest within the Department of Defense in modifying Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national strategy.

Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

Answer: I understand that the Department of Defense is currently examining roles and missions issues in the Quadrennial Defense Review, including expanding the benefits derived from Goldwater-Nichols to interagency applications of “jointness.” If confirmed, I will study any promising reforms suggested in that effort. The Department will need to consult closely with Congress, especially this Committee, on any potential modifications of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms.

Duties

Section 134 of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans, and in reviewing such plans. Additionally, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary shall have responsibility for supervising and directing activities of the Department of Defense relating to export controls.

Department of Defense Directive 5111.1 reiterates these duties and specifically notes that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under current regulations and practices?

Answer: If confirmed, I will perform the duties set forth in Title 10 and the Department of Defense Directive. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the
integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. In particular, Section 134(b) of Title 10, United States Code, prescribes the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as follows:

(b)(1) The Under Secretary shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

(2) The Under Secretary shall assist the Secretary of Defense—
   (A) in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans; and
   (B) in reviewing such plans.

(3) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary shall have responsibility for supervising and directing activities of the Department of Defense relating to export controls.

(4) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall have overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities of the Department of Defense for combating terrorism.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that Secretary Rumsfeld would prescribe for you?

Answer: I believe that, if I am confirmed, Secretary Rumsfeld would look to me to discharge the duties assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy by statute and regulation, especially assistance and advice on the development and implementation of national security and defense policy. Those duties would include oversight of DoD policy and plans, DoD relations with foreign governments and international organizations, and DoD participation in intra-governmental processes with other agencies.

How do you see the civilian role, as opposed to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

Answer: I believe the civilian role is to establish, in broad outlines, the overall defense strategy and to set out the objectives and major assumptions on which contingency planning is based. From the briefings I have received, I understand that the USD(P)’s office initiates this process on behalf of the Secretary through the Contingency Planning Guidance. Following the guidance in this document, which the President approves, combatant commanders develop operation plans for prescribed scenarios. As they are being developed, the current Secretary himself conducts in-process reviews with the responsible combatant commander. If I am confirmed, my role as USD(P) would be to follow the development of this body of plans and assist the Secretary in a formal review of the plans, which are submitted for his approval.
Contingency Planning

One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is specifically directed to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing such plans.

In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of contingency planning?

Answer: I am not in a position yet to make such a judgment, but I am told and read that Secretary Rumsfeld has done much in the past four years to advance OSD’s role in overseeing the Contingency Planning process. I understand that the Secretary and USD(P) play central roles in directing the development and review of contingency plans, and the Secretary retains final approval authority for the plans. My impression is that the USD(P) staff enjoys good working relations with the Joint Staff and combatant command planning staffs. I believe that these kinds of relationships facilitate effective oversight. I have also been informed that the Secretary’s and the Chairman’s staffs have worked together to speed up Departmental contingency planning and make it more responsive to the needs of the President and the Secretary -- especially in terms of providing them more options in time of crisis.

What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of contingency planning?

Answer: If confirmed, I will have the opportunity to gain a detailed understanding of OSD’s oversight processes and how they might be improved. My current impression, however, is that there is no reason to believe that effective civilian control and oversight are lacking.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

Answer: Our Nation is at war. Strategic victory in the Global War on Terrorism is our greatest challenge. Moreover, our Nation is confronted by a broader array of security challenges than those we faced in the past. In addition to the continued threat of traditional military challenges posed by nation states, the United States faces a range of
non-traditional challenges from nations and non-state actors, of which the terrorism that we have seen in the past years is the most salient example. We live in an era that is marked by strategic uncertainty. Accordingly, I believe that the Department of Defense must be flexible and agile, anticipating change, influencing its direction, and adapting our strategy and capabilities as appropriate.

The Department’s recently published National Defense Strategy:

- Positions us better to handle strategic uncertainty;
- Recognizes the value of measures aimed at resolving problems before they become crises and crises before they become wars; and
- Emphasizes the importance of building partnership capacity to address common threats.

I believe that identifying and pursuing approaches and mechanisms that help both international and interagency partners build their security capacity should be a primary focus of the Policy organization, and it is something to which, if confirmed, I would intend to devote a great deal of effort.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

*Answer:  If confirmed, my immediate emphasis will be to participate in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which specifically addresses the Department’s capability for managing both traditional as well as new challenges to U.S. interests. In addition, I would continue implementing the re-alignment of U.S. global defense posture. Given my past experience, I would put special emphasis on the need to work with allies and partners to develop a common understanding of threats and the appropriate approaches to address these challenges in concert.*

**Future of NATO**

Over the past several years, NATO has experienced a time of both great change and stress. NATO has enlarged with the addition of seven new members from Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and NATO has taken on an ambitious out of area mission in Afghanistan as well as a training mission in Iraq.

What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for NATO over the next five years?
Answer: At its Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO launched a set of initiatives central to ongoing transformation efforts that have changed the Alliance’s strategic mindset concerning threats, roles, and capabilities. NATO leaders:

- Established the NATO Response Force (NRF), designed as a brigade-size, rapidly deployable joint/combined force.

- Streamlined the NATO Command Structure to operate more efficiently and effectively. Twenty original headquarters were reduced to 11, and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was created to drive Allied transformation.

- Launched the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) through which Allies pledged to make specific capability improvements in their military forces.

In 2003, NATO’s Secretary General focused the Alliance on shortcomings in the “usability” of Allied military forces—i.e., the lack of sufficient forces that are deployable and sustainable on operations outside NATO territory. Since then, NATO has developed “Usability Targets” for Allied land forces. At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO leaders agreed to maintain at least 40 percent of land forces prepared and equipped for deployed operations, and at least 8 percent deployed or on standby on an indefinite basis.

A key challenge will be to complete the Alliance transition from stationary forces to more mobile, deployable, and sustainable forces (Allies need to do more, especially in providing the key supporting enablers that expeditionary forces require, including airlift and combat support). Another challenge is to convince Allies to offer in sufficient numbers the forces that they do have to fill the requirements of NRF rotations and ongoing Alliance operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Another major challenge is to develop a cooperative relationship with the European Union, as it develops its European Security and Defense Policy, which preserves NATO as the primary instrument of transatlantic security and does not diminish the Alliance’s military effectiveness.

Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the next five years?

Answer: At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit Allied leaders said the door to NATO membership remains open, but there is no timetable for another round of enlargement. Three NATO aspirants (Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia) are now participating in the Membership Action Plan. Ukraine and Georgia have also expressed interest in joining the Alliance. At the April 2005 Foreign Ministerial in Vilnius, Allies invited Ukraine to begin an intensified dialogue on membership issues. Each NATO aspirant will be judged on its individual merits and progress in implementing political, economic, and military reforms.
**European Security and Defense Policy**

A challenge facing the United States and NATO in the months and years ahead is the European Union’s (EU) implementation of its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), that is, an EU capability to conduct military operations in response to international crises in cases where “NATO as a whole is not engaged.” Many in the Congress have expressed concern that ESDP could emerge as a competitor, rather than a complement, to the NATO Alliance.

Do you share these concerns? What steps do you believe that the United States and NATO must take to ensure that ESDP is implemented in a way that strengthens the Alliance?

**Answer:** I believe the NATO-EU relationship should be cooperative, not competitive, and should avoid duplication. There should be no weakening of the transatlantic link. The U.S. supports an EU Security and Defense Policy that provides more capability – for NATO, as well as for EU operations where NATO chooses not to engage. Key to achieving these goals is to employ the 2003 NATO-EU “Berlin-Plus” agreements, which set out cooperation arrangements between the two organizations. Those arrangements have been used in the EU operation in Bosnia, and in efforts to develop capabilities such as the NATO Response Force and the EU Battlegroups. The U.S. has been very active in promoting this cooperation, and I believe it should continue to be.

**EU Arms Embargo**

The prospect of the European Union (EU) lifting its embargo on arms sales to China has generated considerable concern in the Congress. Many believe that it would be detrimental to U.S. national security interests were China to have access to more and better defense-related systems and technologies.

**What is your view of this matter?**

**Answer:** I would be opposed to any EU effort to lift its arms embargo on China. It would send the wrong signal to China at a time when its rhetoric over Taiwan is escalating. It would endorse China’s poor record on human rights. Finally, lifting the embargo could facilitate China’s military modernization, increasing the threat to U.S. forces in the event of conflict over Taiwan.
Do you believe the United States should engage in a dialogue with the EU regarding how to strengthen, not relax, controls on exports of militarily sensitive items to China?

Answer: I believe that a strategic dialogue between the United States and the EU on security matters in East Asia would be a useful and important way to develop a common strategic picture of what it takes to maintain peace and stability in the region. This dialogue would help to reinforce the need for EU restraint on the transfer of sensitive military and dual-use technology to China.

Iraqi Security Forces

The U.S. Government has embarked on a strategy of training, equipping, and mentoring Iraqi Security Forces as the most effective way to establish meaningful security in Iraq, end the persistent insurgency, and reduce the requirement for significant numbers of U.S. and coalition forces.

How would you assess the current readiness and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces?

Answer: As Ambassador to Turkey, I was not in a position to evaluate the Iraqi Security Forces. From the information I have seen, however, I would say that the readiness and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces vary from unit to unit but are generally improving. Iraqi units are operating alongside U.S. units in greater numbers, and some of them are operating independently with sole responsibility for their operating area. For example, Iraqi units have assumed primary responsibility for their operating areas in some parts of Baghdad and Mosul.

What criteria should be used to provide a realistic measure of the readiness and capabilities of these forces?

Answer: I defer to our military experts in these matters to propose the best measures of readiness and capability. Our military uses various criteria to measure readiness and capability for our own forces, and that experience would seem relevant and useful in assessing the Iraqis.

What period of time do you feel will be required to prepare the Iraqi Security Forces to be able to assume principal responsibility for the security of their nation from both internal and external threats?
Answer: The President, the Secretary of Defense, and our commanders in the field have all stressed that we are operating in accordance with a conditions-based plan to transfer security responsibility to the Iraqis. I cannot make any informed estimate concerning when Iraqis might assume principal responsibility for security in Iraq, but I can say that the U.S. should operate based on conditions on the ground, not based on an arbitrary time-line.

What is the appropriate role for other nations — coalition partners, neighboring Muslim nations, NATO, and the larger international community — in assisting the training, equipping, and progress of the Iraqi Security Forces?

Answer: Members of the international community have stepped forward and are participating in two multi-national training efforts: the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I). These organizations are helping train Iraqi military and police personnel in Iraq and in Jordan. There are also smaller, coordinated, bi-lateral efforts to provide particular specialty training to Iraqi security personnel, for example, police forensics.

QDR

The Secretary has promulgated terms of reference for the next Quadrennial Defense Review and work on this review is underway. Under Secretary Feith is taking a leading role in this important effort.

If confirmed, would you step directly into the role that Mr. Feith is playing in the QDR when you succeed him?

Answer: Exactly what role I might play would be a decision for the Secretary. I have not yet discussed it with him. If confirmed, however, I plan to be an active participant in the QDR process.

What is your view of the terms of reference that have been established?

Answer: I have not yet been briefed on the QDR terms of reference, which are an internal, pre-decisional document. If confirmed, I intend to familiarize myself quickly with the terms of reference.

In your view, what assumptions about acceptable risk and resource constraints should be included in the QDR process?
Answer: *In my view, the Department's assumptions on acceptable risk and resource constraints should be based on the new National Defense Strategy and be consistent with legislation establishing the QDR. Making realistic judgments about acceptable levels of risk is one of the hardest tasks the Secretary faces.*

**Stability and Support Operations**

Recent experience in Iraq has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-conflict situations. We understand that Secretary Rumsfeld has decided to elevate the stability and support operations mission in Department planning and guidance so that it is fully integrated across all DoD activities.

**Do you support this effort?**

Answer: *Our experiences since the end of the Cold War in Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq highlight the importance of preparing for stability operations. Proper preparation involves numerous parts of DoD and, also, other USG Departments and Agencies, all of which have potentially important capabilities to bring to bear. The Department of State, where I have served for twenty-five years, has undertaken a major initiative in this regard, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, headed by my colleague Carlos Pascual. I understand that this new office has enjoyed the Department of Defense’s full support. If confirmed, I would favor continuing that support, and I look forward to supporting Secretary Rumsfeld’s ongoing efforts to transform the Department and ensure DoD is properly linked with larger USG stabilization and reconstruction efforts.*

**If confirmed, what would be your role in implementing any new directives in the area of post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations?**

Answer: *If confirmed as Under Secretary for Policy, my role would be to help ensure that DoD guidance to the Military Departments, Combatant Commands, and Defense Agencies sets forth the broad direction they will need to move in to develop the capabilities required to conduct successful stability operations in the future. In addition, I would play a role in working with other Departments and Agencies to develop common objectives and pathways to increase the efficacy of USG stabilization efforts, of which DoD is a participant. Ultimately, if confirmed, I would be responsible for providing policy advice to the Secretary of Defense on stability operations -- ensuring he has the requisite information and options to make informed decisions and to advise the President.*
In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DoD and other departments of government in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post conflict environment?

Answer: The U.S. Government as a whole has a responsibility to plan and conduct stability operations using the core competencies of various Departments and Agencies in an integrated manner, including working with our Allies and friends.

An integrated approach to post-major combat operations begins with training and planning before potential conflicts. The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is working closely with DoD to bring together military and civilian planners, develop operational concepts for civil-military operations in the field, and provide interagency training, educational and exercise opportunities that will build relationships before future contingencies.

There will be times when DoD may well be the lead agency in an operation due to the large deployment of U.S. forces. At other times, the military would properly play a lesser role -- supporting civilian agencies such as the State Department and USAID. Whether DoD or other Departments or Agencies have the leading role in a stabilization mission, a key need often will be to build up the indigenous civilian and security capacities, which will facilitate the timely transition to self-rule and withdrawal of international military and civilian personnel.

What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq?

Answer: The USG has learned a great deal over the past fifteen years about the requirements of post-major combat environments. Fighting may shift from major combat operations to irregular warfare. “Post-conflict” calm may sometimes only come with a combination of: 1) building indigenous security forces; 2) jump-starting economic activity; and 3) facilitating local governance.

We also face a shortage of international peacekeepers. This is one of the reasons that President Bush launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which seeks to increase global peacekeeping capacity over the next five years through increased training, exercises, and deployment assistance to partner countries.

We also need strategies to encourage and enable other countries to fight alongside or instead of us. As a government, we should be thinking through how we can best build up the governance capacities of countries that are in danger of spreading instability regionally or providing a safe haven for terrorist or criminal networks.
Although I can’t speak to specific studies the Department may have conducted concerning post-conflict operations in Iraq, I will, if confirmed, seek to ensure that we draw maximum insight from our recent experience.

**Engagement Policy**

One of the central pillars of our recent national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises, CINC exercises, humanitarian demining operations, and similar activities were used to achieve this goal.

If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military?

*Answer: Yes.*

Do you believe that these activities contribute to U.S. national security?

*Answer: Security cooperation activities have contributed to our security in the past, are beneficial today in the Global War on Terrorism, and will most certainly continue to be a cornerstone of U.S. national security. This Nation has learned time and again that building partnership capacity is essential to address common security challenges successfully.*

Would you assure the Committee that there would be adequate civilian oversight of these activities?

*Answer: Yes.*

**Proliferation Security Initiative**

In May 2003, the President announced the Proliferation Security Initiative, a global effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide.

What is the role of the Department of Defense in the Proliferation Security Initiative?
Answer: PSI is a Presidential initiative that is being developed and implemented by a number of U.S. Government agencies. The Department of Defense is part of the interagency team, coordinated by the National Security Council staff. DoD’s priority is ensuring that our military can support interdiction operations when necessary.

In addition, the Department of Defense leads U.S. participation in the PSI Operational Experts Group – an expanding multinational network of military, law enforcement, intelligence, and legal experts that has been meeting periodically to develop operational concepts, organize interdiction exercises, share information about national legal authorities, and pursue cooperation with key industries. More than forty countries have participated in one or more of the PSI interdiction exercises designed to improve national capabilities and participants’ ability to operate together.

Is there dedicated funding in the DoD budget the Proliferation Security Initiative? If not, do you believe that the Initiative should have a dedicated DoD budget line?

Answer: I understand that there is no PSI line item in the DoD budget. If confirmed, I will consult with the combatant commanders and the DoD Comptroller to determine whether creating such a budget line would be beneficial.

Counternarcotics Program for Afghanistan

The cultivation of poppies and trafficking of opium has reached alarming proportions in Afghanistan. Some estimate that over 50% of Afghanistan’s gross national product is associated with the illegal opium trade and that Afghanistan is at risk of failing as a nation state. Initial coalition strategies for discouraging and disrupting the opium trade have not been effective. In fiscal year 2005, the U.S. will provide more than $750 million in funding and assistance to address opium production and trafficking in Afghanistan, including $257 million in Defense spending.

In your view, what strategy would be most effective in reducing opium production and trafficking in Afghanistan?

Answer: The growing drug production and trafficking problem in Afghanistan is a complex issue. Not knowing the details of the current plan, I am unable to say how one might improve it. I do believe that we should ensure that we apply the necessary resources to build Afghan political and economic institutions capable of withstanding the narcotics – as well as other – threats.
What should the role of the U.S. military forces be in the counterdrug program in Afghanistan?

Answer: I believe that, in general, the U.S. military should be in a supporting role in counterdrug programs. With respect to Afghanistan, it seems to me that we would want the Afghan security forces to be the ones to interact directly with the local population. I believe, however, that U.S. military forces can provide support to Afghan law enforcement activities with respect to specialized types of assistance that might be required.

What is the appropriate role for coalition nations and the larger international community in effectively addressing the counterdrug challenge in Afghanistan and the surrounding region?

Answer: Several of our coalition partners have assumed lead nation roles related to the counterdrug challenge. For example, the United Kingdom has the overall lead for counternarcotics, and Germany assumed the lead for police training. With the help of Congress, this administration has increased U.S. support to counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. Our coalition partners and the larger international community must also increase their support. Additionally, I can see a larger role for NATO supporting the Afghan counterdrug policies and initiatives, especially considering that some European allies in particular are affected heavily by the narcotics traffic involving Afghanistan.

DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program

The CTR program has several key objectives that include (1) eliminating strategic nuclear weapons; (2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear weapons and fissile material; (3) eliminating and preventing the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and capabilities; and (4) encouraging military reductions and reforms to reduce proliferation threats.

Do you support the CTR program? If so, how, in your view, has the CTR program benefited U.S. national security?

Answer: I support CTR. CTR is one of the programs that addresses poorly guarded WMD, related infrastructure, and delivery systems at their sources -- primarily in the former Soviet states. CTR is part of the administration's "toolbox" of options for combating the threat of WMD proliferation.
Question: Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in Russia, e.g., the State Department and the Department of Energy?

Answer: From what I have been able to observe, I believe the program is well coordinated among the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy.

Question: Do you support expansion of the CTR program and, if so, in what geographic areas or areas of work? Please explain.

Answer: I would support initiatives for CTR to conduct activities outside the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in special circumstances. The threat posed by residual WMD materials and capabilities is not confined to one region.

Question: How much more needs to be done to reduce the proliferation threat from the residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union?

Answer: Even though many “traditional” CTR projects are well past the half-way point, much remains to be done with respect to both threat reduction work (such as mobile missiles) and newly emphasized areas of work (such as biological weapons proliferation prevention).

Question: Are Russia and the former Soviet Union countries making a significant contribution to efforts to reduce the proliferation threats they inherited?

Answer: I believe that, overall, the best contribution a CTR partner can make is to smooth the mechanics of doing dangerous work in that partner’s territory that benefits the entire world. I am informed that there may be room for Russia to increase its contribution by improved facilitation of CTR’s work. We appreciate the sensitive locations of some CTR projects in Russia, as well as the caution needed when working with WMD. But Russia can be very secretive when it comes to issues related to national security, and I am aware of the complexities and difficulties of working with the Russian bureaucracy and security services to conduct the day-to-day business of WMD elimination and security.

Question: What needs to be done to enable agreement between Russia and the United States on access and liability issues that continue to hamper progress on some CTR programs?
Answer: The current Government-to-Government Agreement (“CTR Umbrella Agreement”) expires in June 2006. It provides needed liability protections for CTR activities, exemption of CTR assistance from import duties and taxes, as well as other important protections. The United States is working hard to resolve issues relating to non-proliferation programs with Russia in ways that would facilitate renewal of the CTR Umbrella Agreement before it expires. I believe it is in Russia’s long-term interest to be more forthcoming regarding the agreements covering all non-proliferation programs.

Chemical Weapons Convention

There are significant problems with the management and implementation of the DoD chemical weapons demilitarization program. Congress has become increasingly concerned that the Department does not appear to be on track to eliminate its chemical weapons in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention timelines.

What steps is the Department taking to ensure that the U.S. remains in compliance with its Treaty obligations for chemical weapons destruction?

Answer: Although this is under the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I understand that the Department of Defense is assessing possible alternatives that may contribute to improving the overall pace of U.S. destruction efforts and the specific timing of when we meet our chemical weapons destruction obligations. The potential impact on meeting the final destruction deadline of April 2012 will not be known until the assessments are completed.

Do you agree that the United States should make every effort to meet its treaty commitments, including its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention?

Answer: Yes. I understand that that the Department of Defense has met all the CWC commitments to date.

Can you assure the Committee that, if confirmed, you will focus your personal attention on this matter?

Answer: Yes.

At her confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Rice expressed the Administration's strong support for the U.N. Convention on the Law of Sea and stated that she would work with the Senate leadership to bring the Convention to a floor vote during this Congress. The Department of Defense has been a strong advocate of the Convention, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark, testified in favor of its ratification at a SASC hearing last year.


Answer: Yes. The Convention supports navigational rights critical to military operations. These rights are essential to the formulation and implementation of our national security strategy.

Do you believe this Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States?

Answer: Yes

Ballistic Missile Defense

Program Budget Decision 763 (December 2004) directed the Missile Defense Agency to reduce funding for the missile defense program by $5 billion dollars in years FY06-11. The restructured program seeks a balance between near-term fielding and long-term development.

Do you believe the ballistic missile defense program places enough emphasis on the near-term fielding of ballistic missile defense capabilities for the protection of the United States and its deployed forces?

Answer: It is my understanding that by the end of 2004, the Department had fielded the key elements of an initial system to shoot down a long-range missile headed toward the United States. At the same time, I know that systems intended to protect our deployed forces are in the field. In fact, the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 was used successfully in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

National Security Presidential Directive-23, which outlines the nation’s missile defense policy, makes clear that we must continue a robust research and development
effort even once our initial capabilities are in place. I agree with this approach. I have
not had the opportunity to examine in detail the Missile Defense Agency’s plan to
balance near-term fielding with long-term development, but if I am confirmed, I will work
to ensure that MDA’s plans are consistent with the approach directed by the President
and outlined in NSPD-23.

The objective of the missile defense program is to provide ballistic missile
defense against all ranges of missiles, in all phases of flight, to protect the U.S.
homeland, U.S. forces forward deployed, allies and friends.

How do you believe the Department should prioritize its ballistic missile
defense policies, programs and efforts so that they address the most pressing
threats first, while remaining affordable?

Answer: I agree that the Department ought to balance its missile defense efforts to meet
the most pressing threats first, and that the missile defense program should remain
affordable. At the same time, I think that any discussion of whether this program is
affordable should take into account the potential cost to the nation of suffering a ballistic
missile attack, especially if that missile were armed with a nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapon. I have not had the opportunity to examine in detail either the
intelligence community’s threat assessments or the Missile Defense Agency’s
development plan and am unable at this time to provide a considered answer on how to
set priorities. It is my understanding that the long-range missile defense capabilities we
are in the process of fielding are intended to address the most urgent threats, specifically
the North Korean threat, and I agree with that approach. I do not believe it would be
prudent, however, to focus our missile defense program so narrowly on the near-term
threat that we find ourselves unable to deal with threats in the future. If I am confirmed,
I will have the opportunity to consider in more detail how that balance ought to be
maintained.

Sec. 234 of the FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act directed the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, to develop criteria for operationally realistic testing of fieldable
prototypes developed under the ballistic missile defense system, and to test each
block capability using those criteria. The Missile Defense Agency has submitted an
Integrated Master Test Plan, approved by the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation that establishes criteria for operationally realistic testing and outlines an
aggressive ground and flight test schedule through the end of fiscal year 2006.

Do you agree with the need to ensure operationally realistic testing of the
ballistic missile defense system? Are you confident that the testing plan
prepared by MDA will demonstrate the operational capability of the system, as appropriate to the technological maturity of each block capability to be fielded?

Answer: While I understand that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy does not have direct responsibility for testing programs, I believe that, as with any new and complex system, we ought to conduct operationally realistic testing of our missile defense program as soon as is appropriate. Although I have not had the opportunity to review the Missile Defense Agency’s testing plan, I understand that the Director of MDA works closely with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to ensure that our test program is as robust and operationally realistic as possible. If confirmed, I will do what I can to ensure that this continues to be so. But I would not favor withholding a totally new capability that could save large numbers of American lives, while waiting for a complete testing regime.

Reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P))

At the beginning of the Bush Administration, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld undertook a major reorganization of the OUSD(P).

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the current organization of the OUSD(P)?

Answer: I have not had an opportunity to study any organizational changes that may be under consideration or that may be needed within the OUSD(P). It would therefore be premature for me to offer an opinion at this time. If confirmed, however, I will study with an open mind any organizational changes that appear worthy of consideration and will, if appropriate, make corresponding recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. In that event I would look forward to consulting with this Committee on any proposed changes.

Overseas Basing Plans

With the President’s release of the Integrated Global Posture Strategy in September 2004, a series of military installations around the world were identified as having an “enduring presence.” These bases and sites will support both the permanent presence of U.S. military personnel and units rotating for training. The Department of Defense is now in the process of negotiating formal agreements with
host nations to establish the status of forces, basing arrangements, and terms for burden-sharing. Many of these agreements will result in a substantial investment of funds for new construction of facilities and infrastructure to support U.S. operations, either to be funded by the host nation or by the United States.

To ensure a wise use of tax-payer dollars, what types of host nation agreements should be completed by the Department of Defense before authorization for funds are requested for military construction projects and infrastructure repairs in the annual President’s budget or supplemental appropriations?

Answer: As a general policy, I believe we should seek agreements that include, among other things, provisions for status protections and access to and use of host country facilities, as well as acquisition and cross-servicing agreements before deploying forces on a regular basis to a host country. It is important, however, that once these agreements are in place, we are in a position to implement our presence plans expeditiously. In some cases, this could require DoD to request funds prior to the conclusion of negotiations.

Does the Department of Defense plan to establish installation development master plans that will capture all facility requirements, total estimated investment, and anticipated funding sources before requesting authorization for funding in the annual President’s budget or supplemental appropriations?

Answer: I understand that the Department submitted to Congress comprehensive overseas master plans in March of this year and intends to update them each year. If confirmed, I would work with Under Secretary Krieg and the Congress to ensure our plans support Department and Administration strategic objectives.

What is the DOD goal to establish burden-sharing arrangements with host nations in order to minimize the impact to DOD budgets?

Answer: I understand that the Department of Defense’s policy is that, to the extent it is able, a host nation should contribute to the cost of stationing a U.S. presence in its country. The Department has longstanding arrangements of this sort with many allies, such as Japan, Korea, and Germany, which together host the vast majority of our overseas infrastructure. The goal of maximizing host countries’ contributions is one of the key elements in DoD’s negotiating approach for future access, facilities, and infrastructure.
U.S. Force Structure in Southwest Asia

As part of the Integrated Global Posture Strategy, the Department of Defense recently released a master plan for the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) that proposes to establish numerous forward operating sites with the permanent presence of thousands of U.S. military personnel in various countries throughout the Gulf and Southwest Asia. However, in subsequent meetings with various representatives of CENTCOM and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, there seems to be some disagreement on the number of U.S. military personnel that will be stationed and rotated out of the AOR.

If confirmed, how would you work to resolve these types of policy differences in opinion between a combatant Commander and your office?

Answer: I am not aware of any specific disagreement on these matters; if confirmed, however, I will work to ensure close coordination between senior civilian and military officials on such issues.

What are the future challenges for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to implement the Administration’s Integrated Global Posture Strategy?

Answer: As with any major initiative, I can envision that a notable challenge with respect to Global Defense Posture is ensuring that our changes -- from conception to consultation and negotiation to implementation -- continue to be synchronized across the U.S. Government. In addition, I believe we must retain the flexibility to adapt our defense posture to changes in the strategic landscape, including seeking new partnership opportunities.

U.S. Force Structure in Turkey

A recent newspaper article quoted Turkey's ambassador to the United States as saying, “The Turkish authorities are now considering how Incirlik facilities would continue to be made available to the USA,” said O. Faruk Logoglu, “We think that there will be an agreement…soon.”

What, in your view, is the future for Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey, and specifically our ability to station combat aircraft there?

Answer: See answer next under.
If the U.S. is not able to conduct a full spectrum of training and operations from Incirlik AFB, what should be the decision on the future of the air base?

Answer: First, one must recognize that Incirlik Air Base is a Turkish military facility. As such, all decisions regarding its use, both now and in the future, will be made by the Turkish government. For fifty years, the U.S. has been fortunate to have access to this excellent facility, and we are grateful that Turkey has continued to authorize such access. Ambassador Logoglu’s comment was specifically about use of Incirlik for logistics missions.

In late April, the Turkish government responded favorably to our request to use the base at Incirlik as a cargo hub for military and commercial aircraft operating to and from Iraq and Afghanistan. This new arrangement allows up to six U.S. C-17s and 150 personnel, on a temporary and rotational basis, to use Incirlik as a hub to transport non-lethal supplies to these two countries.

Regarding future stationing of U.S. combat aircraft at Incirlik, the U.S. has not made such a request to the Turkish government. This point was clearly articulated by Under Secretary Feith during his visit to Turkey this past February. Incirlik remains a valuable facility. Discussions are now underway for possible training opportunities that would benefit both countries.

Chinese Military

What do you believe are the objectives of the Chinese military modernization program?

Answer: Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization appears to involve broad transformation across the military establishment, including equipment, organization, doctrine, training, and personnel. From what I have read, the near-term focus of PLA modernization appears to be oriented on building capabilities to prevent moves towards permanent separation by Taiwan, or to erode Taiwan’s will to resist, paving the way for a negotiated settlement of the cross-Strait dispute on Beijing’s terms. A second set of objectives, no less important, is to develop the capabilities to deter, delay, or degrade potential third-party intervention in any conflict, particularly a conflict over Taiwan.

What do you believe are the Chinese political-military objectives regarding Taiwan, the Asia-Pacific region, and globally?
Answer: China seeks to accomplish political unification with Taiwan. It would prefer to do so peacefully, allowing economic integration eventually to absorb Taiwan, but is developing military capabilities that would allow China to impose a non-peaceful resolution. Within the Asia-Pacific region, China appears to be positioning itself to compete with the United States, Japan, and India for political and economic access and influence. Globally, China’s engagement is structured to support its increasing demands for critical resources, secure lines of communication, and access to technology to sustain economic growth and development. We are witnessing elements of this strategy in China’s relationships with Sudan, Iran, and Venezuela.

How do you believe the United States should respond to the Chinese military modernization program?

Answer: We should continue to monitor closely China’s military modernization, while continuing to push Beijing for greater transparency and openness. At the same time, and in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States should continue its policies of maintaining our capabilities to resist Chinese use of force or coercion against Taiwan and of providing Taiwan such assistance as required to maintain a self-defense capability.

Overall, our strategy should be designed to preserve peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. Rather than focusing on single countries, whether they be North Korea, China, or any other country, our strategy should be flexible and supported by continued transformation of the U.S. military.

Key to this transformation are maintaining a global presence, and strengthening our alliances and partnerships in the region and the world. In describing U.S. defense transformation, President Bush said, “we will ensure that we place the right capabilities in the most appropriate locations to best address the new security environment.”

Our current military-to-military relations with the Chinese have been described by defense officials as “modest.”

Do you believe that we should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

Answer: I believe our military-to-military relationship with China should be based on reciprocity. The success of our military relationship with China cannot be measured by the quantity of exchanges alone. We should seek interactions that improve the quality of exchanges in order to build trust and transparency, and to ensure that the Chinese military, at various levels, understands U.S. military capabilities and political resolve.
In addition, uncertainty about China’s future should be taken into account when planning our defense exchanges. I believe it is important that we maintain our interaction, but we should be realistic about what to expect from our exchanges with the Chinese military.

Treatment of Detainees

The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2005 sets out that it is U.S. policy “to ensure that no detainee shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.”

What is your understanding of the responsibility of the Department of Defense to ensure that the Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States that prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody are adhered to by those elements of DoD that are involved in detention and interrogation operations?

Answer: If confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I believe that it would be my duty to ensure that DoD policy is consistent with legal requirements set forth in the Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States.

Furthermore, I believe that the Department has an obligation to investigate all credible claims of maltreatment or abuse of detainees, and, as appropriate, to hold accountable personnel who commit these acts.

What is your understanding of the role and responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on this issue?

Answer: Detainee operations are a critical mission of the Department. It is my understanding that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as the Secretary’s principal advisor on the development of policy for detainee operations. If confirmed:

- I would work with the DoD General Counsel to ensure the Department’s policies on detainee operations remain consistent with all the obligations set forth in the Constitution, applicable laws, and treaty obligations of the United States.
• I would ensure that my staff continued to work closely with all elements of the Department and other departments and agencies to develop policy regarding detainee operations and to assist the Department in planning for future DoD detention operations, including continuing operations in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq;

• I would closely coordinate with the Combatant Commanders to ensure commanders in the field and at DoD detention facilities have all necessary guidance for mission success;

• I would continue the department’s robust dialogue with the ICRC, which serves our mutual interests in improving detention operations.

• I would ensure that my staff and I continue to keep members of the Committee informed of the status of detainee operations.

**Nuclear Posture Review**

The committee understands that the Defense Department intends to review nuclear forces as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) now underway.

Would such a review of nuclear forces as part of the QDR take the form of an update to the Nuclear Posture Review issued in 2001?

Answer: At this point, I am not familiar with the details of the QDR that is currently underway, but I expect that the QDR would deal with some issues associated with implementing the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), rather than changing the basic NPR strategy.

Would you expect such an effort to include a review of the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile and a review of the number and type of nuclear weapons delivery platforms?

Answer: Again, I am not familiar with the details of the QDR at this point. I understand that the Department of Defense reviews the size and composition of the stockpile periodically. The President has stated he wants to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons to the lowest level consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies. I understand that the Nuclear Posture Review has resulted in force posture and stockpile reductions to carry out the President’s guidance. I also understand that the NPR directed periodic reviews to be conducted to assess progress on planned reductions and recommend adjustments if necessary.
Defense Science Board Study

The Defense Science Board recently established a Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities to assess the current plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile and make recommendations for ensuring the future reliability, safety, security, and relevance of the nuclear weapons stockpile for the 21st century. The study on these issues to be issued by the task force is sponsored jointly by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.

If confirmed, what input would you expect to have into this study?

Answer: There are both technical and policy issues associated with such a review of the future U.S. nuclear stockpile. I would expect that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy would be consulted regarding planning assumptions for, and interim results of, this study. If confirmed, I intend to become familiar with these important issues and work constructively with the appropriate offices to help ensure the continued reliability, safety and security of our nuclear stockpile.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Answer: Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Answer: Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Answer: Yes.