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# CONTENTS

## WITNESSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Zeyno Baran, Director, International Security and Energy Programs,</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nixon Center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henri J. Barkey, Ph.D., Department Chair, Department of International</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations, Lehigh University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D., Director, Turkish Research Program, The</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Institute for Near East Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Honorable Mark Parris (former American Ambassador to Turkey),</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Public Policy Advisor, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &amp;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkowitz, P.C.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter/Statement</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from the State</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepared statement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State of</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida: Prepared statement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Zeyno Baran: Prepared statement</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henri J. Barkey, Ph.D.: Prepared statement</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D.: Prepared statement</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Honorable Mark Parris: Prepared statement</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE STATE OF U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 11, 2005,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Today the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats is holding a hearing on recent developments in the relationship between Turkey and the United States.

Few relationships over the past century have been as critical and at the same time mutually beneficial as our relationship with Turkey. It is a strong friendship that was essential to the United States throughout the Cold War and provided support for a stable ally in an unstable region. It is a relationship that is entering a new stage, a stage in which the seemingly unbreakable bond between the two countries has begun to show evidence of cracks.

I am deeply concerned about the marked cooling in the Turkish-United States relationship in recent years. A key development in our relationship was, of course, the decision of Turkey's Parliament, led by the Islamic-based Justice and Development Party (AKP), to refuse U.S. military permission to attack Iraq from its territory in 2003. At the same time, Turkish public opinion has shifted sharply in a negative direction toward the United States and our military. A recent survey of the European attitudes conducted by the German Marshall Fund found that, of the 10 nations surveyed, the Turks had the most negative views toward the United States. A rising number of anti-American publications in the Turkish press and anti-American statements from select Turkish administration figures have only heightened United States concerns.

At the same time, the United States and Turkey share many views and interests on the world stage. Most importantly, Turkey is a stalwart ally in the war on terrorism, Turkish peacekeepers have served in many parts of the world in support of American policies, and Turkey currently commands the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The United States also continues to support Turkish membership in the European Union (EU) and we welcome the recent EU decision to begin negotiations on Turkish membership.

In light of their proposed entrance into the EU and their key partnership in NATO, there are three issues of primary focus on
the United States in relation to Turkey. The first is the ongoing situation in Cyprus. I congratulate the Turkish Cypriots on the recent election victory of President Mehmet Ali Talat and echo the State Department’s recent statement in reaffirming President Talat’s commitment to a comprehensive solution and reunification of the island.

The second issue is the stance of Turkey on the Armenian question. I look forward to hearing the panelists’ views regarding the proposal of Prime Minister Erdogan to create a joint Armenian-Turkish commission to review further the historic dispute of the tragic events between 1915 and 1923. Furthermore, I encourage both governments to work toward establishing full diplomatic relations and reopening their common border. Only through dialogue and courage on both sides can relationships between these two nations be normalized and the wounds begin to heal.

Finally, there is an issue of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Developments in Iraq and the issue of the status of Kurds within the new Iraqi Federal Government loom large over Turkey’s internal situation and its external politics, and is in an area of potential dispute between the United States and Turkey.

In order to keep informed on this very important issue, we look to our panel of experts to provide us with the latest developments in this critical relationship and their analysis of what the immediate future holds.

Before we turn to the panel, I would yield to my good friend from Florida, the Ranking Member, Mr. Wexler.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS

Today, the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats is holding a hearing on recent developments in the relationship between Turkey and the United States. Few relationships over the past century have been as critical and at the same time mutually beneficial as our relationship with Turkey. It is a strong friendship that was essential to the United States throughout the Cold War and provided support for a stable ally in an unstable region. And it is a relationship that is entering a new stage, a stage in which the seemingly unbreakable bond between our two countries has begun to show evidence of cracks.

I am deeply concerned about the marked cooling in Turkish-US relations in recent years. A key development in our relationship was of course the decision of Turkey’s Parliament, led by the Islamic-based Justice and Development (AK) Party, to refuse the US military permission to attack Iraq from its territory in 2003. At the same time, Turkish public opinion has shifted sharply in a negative direction towards the United States and our military. A recent survey of European attitudes conducted by the German Marshall Fund found that, of the ten nations surveyed, the Turks had the most negative views towards the United States. A rising number of anti-American publications in the Turkish press and anti-American statements from select Turkish administration figures have only heightened US concerns.

At the same time, the U.S. and Turkey share many views and interests on the world stage. Most importantly, Turkey is a stalwart ally in the war on terrorism, Turkish peacekeepers have served in many parts of the world in support of American policies, and Turkey currently commands the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The United States also continues to support Turkish membership in the European Union and we welcome the recent EU decision to begin negotiations on Turkish membership.

In light of their proposed entrance into the EU and their key partnership in NATO, there are three issues of primary focus for the United States in relation to Turkey. The first is the ongoing situation in Cyprus. I congratulate the Turkish Cypriots on the recent election victory of President Mehmet Ali Talat and echo the
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In order to keep informed on this very important issue, we look to our panel of experts to provide us with the latest developments in this critical relationship and their analysis of what the immediate future holds.

I will now turn to Mr. Wexler for any opening statement he may wish to make.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first want to thank you for holding today's hearing. This is extremely important. You have gathered a sophisticated and distinguished panel and I thank each of them for joining with us. I would like to associate myself with your excellent remarks.

Mr. Chairman, I have developed a great passion for the Turkish people and enormous respect for the American-Turkish relationship, which I know you share. Yesterday, I had the opportunity of meeting with a number of Turkish citizens who had the opportunity of meeting with our Administration and discussed the current affairs. They indicated that the tension between the United States and Turkey is obvious, in terms of the attitudes within the Department of State and the Defense Department and it seems that we, the United States of America, still hold much tension and apprehension regarding the Turkish Parliament’s decision to not avail our military of a northern front in Iraq.

I share great disappointment over that decision by the Turkish Parliament. I visited Turkey twice during that period to try to make the argument of why I believed it was in Turkey's interest to provide that front for our military. It seems to me, however, that if we are going to be the advocate for democracy and the beacon of freedom we hope and pray that we will be, that when a democracy exercises that great freedom, even if we don't agree with the result, at least we ought to respect it and be able to move forward in a positive way.

The great passion that our Administration still feels, apparently, compelled to express regarding the Turkish Parliament’s rejection of an American front—why don’t we display that same passion in thanking the Turks for, not on one occasion but on two occasions, leading the Security Forces in Afghanistan? Where is the big applause in the Administration for the Turkish offer of 10,000 peacekeeping troops to Iraq? We couldn’t take them up on it because of the sensitivities regarding the Kurdish population. Was there another country, other than Great Britain, that offered that many troops to assist ours? Not to my knowledge.

When Prime Minister Erdogan came to Washington, I believe for his last official visit, he was in the Capitol with a number of our Members. He promised, with respect to Cyprus, to stay one step ahead of the Greeks. It was an extraordinary promise.
I don’t think anybody in the room thought he would keep it, but he did. What Turkey did with respect to Cyprus was nothing short of miraculous. Turkey in essence turned around the equation, which resulted in the Turkish Cypriots passing the Annan Plan. Of course, the other side, unfortunately, did not.

There are legitimate criticisms of Turkey. I have them. I think it is unfortunate, in some ways inexplicable, that the Prime Minister of Turkey would refer to Israel’s relationship at the time and their defense of its citizens as “state terrorism.” Turkey ought to know better. I understand the passions that people have regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, when the United States is making great in-roads and pressuring Syria to end its state-sponsored terrorism, and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia can see fit to support American policy, and the President of Egypt can see fit to support American policy, Turkey at times seems to be singing a different tune. That is unacceptable.

It is unacceptable that our Ambassador in Ankara takes weeks, months, whatever it is to get an appointment with Prime Minister Erdogan. It is equally unacceptable that we, the greatest Nation on earth and the world’s single superpower, feel compelled to return the favor and then not give appointments in return. This reminds me of a problem my 8-year-old daughter was having in her second grade class, not a problem that befits two extraordinary countries.

It seems to me that it would benefit both the American and the Turkish people at this point to move forward, to remember why it is that our great friendship and coalition occurred in the first place. What joins us as allies is far greater than what separates us. Respect our differences and respect the fact that Turkey is now a fully evolved democracy. Prime Minister Erdogan respects and must answer to his public opinion, as does our President and our Congress. There is no greater friend in that region to the United States than Turkey when it comes to defending the values of freedom. The same reasons that we have looked toward Turkey to help us in Afghanistan and Iraq are still in existence today.

Mr. Chairman, I can’t thank you enough for calling this hearing and I look very much forward to hearing the witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Thank you for holding today’s hearing on US-Turkish relations. I want to thank all of the distinguished members of this panel for testifying today.

Mr. Chairman, we are at an historic crossroad in US-Turkish relations. This strategic partnership which has endured and prospered for over fifty years from the Cold War to Afghanistan has been weakened by diplomatic gaffes, policy divergences over Iraq, Syria and other regional issues and anti-Americanism leading to growing mistrust and strain between Washington and Ankara. Also what was once considered the bedrock of the relationship the defense partnership is no longer the glue holding the partnership together following the Turkish Parliament’s vote on March 1, 2003 against opening US Northern Front on Turkish soil and American detention and humiliation of Turkish Troops at Sulaymaniya on July 4, 2003.

Despite serious strains in relations, strong US-Turkish cooperation remains in the best interests of both nations for the foreseeable future and steps must be taken to repair the relationship—ensuring that the February strategic partnership declaration of Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Gul is more than just empty rhetoric.

Moving forward, the United States must address Turkish fears about our policies in Iraq including the potential for an independent Kurdish, maltreatment of Iraqi
Turkmen, the future of Kirkuk as well as the continued presence of PKK terrorist. I am confident the Bush Administration shares my view that territorial integrity of Iraq must remain intact and that all Iraqis regardless of ethnicity or religion must be respected and remain part of the political process. Regarding the PKK, I urge the Administration to follow through on Secretary Rice’s recent pledge to Foreign Minister Gul to “rid the region of terrorism, including terrorism that might take place from the territory of Iraq.”

Ankara in turn must address deepening concerns about rising anti-Americanism in Turkey. While I understand that an overwhelming number of Turks opposed the war in Iraq, I am deeply concerned about the long-term impact of anti-Americanism on the relationship. It is not enough for Turkish officials to pronounce the importance of bilateral relations abroad we must see a greater AKP government response to anti-Americanism on the ground. Additionally, while it has never been prevalent in Turkey, Prime Minister Erdoğan must enforce his nation’s zero tolerance policy as it relates to combating anti-Semitism and educating the public about hate-filled propaganda such as “Mein Kampf.”

Mr. Chairman, although bilateral problems have occurred over the past two years, US-Turkish relationship remains a critical component to security, stability and reform in Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans. In this regard, Prime Minister Erdoğan and the Turkish military should be praised for their central role in Afghanistan—who Ankara has again taken the leadership role of the International Security Assistance Force. Additionally, US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan would have been crippled without the use of Turkey’s Incirlik airbase where thousands of flights ferrying supplies, soldiers and other materials have landed following September 11.

Prime Minister Erdoğan’s upcoming visit to Washington is a perfect opportunity to renew US-Turkish relation and reinvigorate historic cooperation that mutually benefits both countries. While the US-Turkish relationship remains strong in a number of areas from counter-terrorism to energy to rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan—difficulties over the past two years have forced both Washington and Ankara to rebuild this critical strategic partnership based on new realities rather than false assumptions. It is time for both countries to move beyond finger pointing and mutual recriminations and remember why this relationship has benefited both countries for over five decades.

Mr. Gallegly. Thank you, Rob.

At this point, I would like to introduce our witnesses for today’s hearing. Our first witness is Zeyno Baran, who is the Director of International Security and Energy Programs at The Nixon Center. Prior to joining The Nixon Center in January 2003, Ms. Baran was Director of the Caucasus Project at the Center of Strategic and International Studies. She has also appeared on a number of Turkish television networks, as well as on CNN and she is widely quoted for her expertise on Turkey.

Our second witness is Henri Barkey, who is the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor and International Relations Department Chair at Lehigh University. He served as a member of the U.S. State Department Office of Policy Planning from 1998 to 2000, working primarily on issues related to the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean and intelligence. Dr. Barkey has also written numerous books and articles and is regularly consulted by major networks and other international mainstream news outlets for his expertise in Turkish affairs.

Our third witness is Soner Cagaptay, who is the Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Director of The Washington Institute’s Turkish Research Program. A historian by training, Dr. Cagaptay wrote his doctoral dissertation at Yale University on Turkish nationalism. Dr. Cagaptay frequently writes commentary in major international print media and appears regularly on Fox News, CNN, NPR, Voice of America, Al-Jazeera, BBC, CNN-Turk and al-Hurra.
Our final witness is Mark Parris, who is a Senior Foreign Policy Advisor at the Washington Law Firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman and Caldwell. Mr. Parris was the United States Ambassador to Turkey from 1997 to 2000. He also served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Israel and Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. During the Clinton Administration, Ambassador Parris was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Near East and South Asia at the National Security Council.

I appreciate having you all here today and with that, we will start with you, Ms. Baran.

STATEMENT OF MS. ZEYNO BARAN, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ENERGY PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER

Ms. Baran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am submitting my full testimony for the record and will summarize my statement. As the first speaker, I will give a broad overview of the bilateral relations today.

The last 3 years have constituted perhaps the most troubled period in the history of United States-Turkish partnership, which dates to the end of World War II. Recently, however, misunderstandings and diplomatic missteps on both sides have caused some to question the enduring nature of this partnership. Many Turks point to the threats posed by the PKK terrorist group, whose members have taken sanctuary in American-supported northern Iraq.

For their part, many Americans argue that Turkey did not do its part to ensure the success of the U.S.-led military alliance against Saddam Hussein. These disagreements, along with other issues, have led to an unprecedented degree of tension in this critical relationship that is in the interest of neither side. Therefore, I am honored to testify today before you on this important issue and to help put this tumultuous recent period into a broader context.

To start, I would like to reassert that the United States-Turkey relationship is an indispensable partnership for both sides. I truly hope that this hearing will provide an opportunity to restore a positive outlook for bilateral relations. Turkey has proven to be a staunch ally of the United States as an important frontline state, both before and after the Cold War. The United States has, in turn, been Turkey's closest ally. The question then is: What made people on both sides of the Atlantic question the importance and even the survivability of this partnership?

I believe the most important explanation lies in the nature of a partnership that was constructed within a Cold War framework and that continued into the undefined period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the mid-1990s, many people began to question whether the partnership would retain its strategic significance in light of an expected decline in NATO's importance. Though Turkey reasserted its place on the United States strategic agenda with the advent of plans for the East-West Energy Corridor, throughout the 1990s the Turkish side continued to note with displeasure that bilateral relations remained too closely tied.
to military cooperation, with not enough emphasis placed on economic cooperation that would deepen the partnership.

Following the events of September 11, there was a historic chance to articulate a clear vision for this undefined partnership. An overwhelming majority of Turks were deeply saddened by the attacks. Furthermore, they believed that the common experience of having suffered significant losses from terrorism would draw Turkey and the United States even closer.

Unfortunately, this vision has not materialized to date. It has failed to do so for two main reasons. First, during the Iraq war and its aftermath, there was a misalignment of interests. Second and equally importantly, Turkey and the United States failed to find a common language in which to promote the moderate Islamic values and traditions necessary as an alternative to the radical Islamist ideology.

The legacy of the diplomatic train wreck of 2003 is well-known today. I highlight key points in my testimony and my colleagues will probably discuss them as well. I do want to mention, however, Turkish decisionmakers made one critical miscalculation that in the end if they did not allow the United States to open a northern front against Iraq, they would be able to stop the war. When they were not able to do so and had little influence in post-Saddam Iraq developments, they were deeply humiliated.

As I mentioned in a recent testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Turkey oscillates between feelings of insecurity about its waning influence in global politics and a sense of strategic indispensability. Turkish leaders, on the one hand, are proud to be at the crossroads of many civilizations and cultures and want to be major geopolitical players—at least, they want to have an impact in their immediate neighborhood. On the other hand, they get bogged down on ethnic and religious issues, such as the Kurdish or Turkmen concerns in Iraq and thus are often perceived as unhelpful.

In addition to problems stemming from the Iraq war, there are perhaps more fundamental issues standing in the way of repairing bilateral relations: That of moderate Islam. Following 9/11, when America searched for Muslim allies, Turkey stood as the most obvious and most promising one. For the United States, promoting Turkey as a country with moderate Islamic traditions made perfect sense.

Indeed, I believe that on this basis a truly meaningful United States-Turkish partnership can be built, one that would position Turkey once again as a frontline state in a new existential struggle. If this role is explained correctly, I am certain that a majority of Turks would agree. However, incidences in which senior United States officials have misspoken, with one labeling Turkey an Islamic Republic, have brought out the worst fears among Turks and many genuinely believe that the United States wants to experiment with creating a moderate Islamic Republic of Turkey and therefore, are strongly opposed to any U.S. initiatives that highlight Islamic elements in Turkey.

Let me sum up my points and make some brief suggestions. During a recent trip 2 weeks ago, I heard from representatives of the government, military, and civil society that they want to move be-
Beyond the Iraq war and its attendant mutual suspicions in order to discuss the formation of a new, healthier partnership. While some still deny there are problems in the relations, others have finally recognized that the negative mood, vis-a-vis America, could easily spiral out of control and not only hurt the Turkish economy, but also Turkey’s prospects with the EU. With this widespread recognition, there is renewed interest in the engagement with the United States. This is good news, as I believe the ball is indeed in the Turkish court.

Despite the intention to repair bilateral relations, however, the Turkish Government cannot make lasting progress until the open wound of the PKK issue is healed. Of course, if Turkey did cooperate, there would not be a PKK problem there today, the Turkish military more or less had a green light from the American side to deal with this threat. Yet, if United States-Turkey relations are going to be repaired, these mistakes need to be left with the historians. The United States, together with the Iraqi and the Turkish Governments, needs to come up with a solution to the PKK problem that is acceptable to all sides.

The United States also needs to crystallize its vision and plan for engaging moderate Muslims, including in Turkey. Ideally, this should be done in close cooperation with Turkey, so that the United States does not inadvertently worsen matters. For their part, the Turkish leadership and influential opinion makers need to be more responsible and lead their people, rather than themselves being led by populism. If they believe in the United States-Turkish partnership, they need to nurture this partnership and defend it.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Baran follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. ZEYNO BARAN, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ENERGY PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today. The last three years have constituted perhaps the most troubled period in the history of the US-Turkish partnership, which dates to the end of World War II. Faced with the existential threat of world communism, the United States government announced in the Truman Doctrine that it would be its policy “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Turkey responded to this American commitment, which was backed by serious and sustained military and economic assistance, by sending troops to Korea, and by housing alliance nuclear weapons on its soil.

Recently, however, misunderstandings and diplomatic missteps on both sides have caused some to question the enduring nature of this partnership. Many Turks point out that they are still faced with “subjugation by armed minorities,” specifically the PKK terrorist group, whose members have taken sanctuary in American-supported northern Iraq. For their part, many Americans argue that Turkey did not do its part to ensure the success of the US-led military alliance against Saddam Hussein. These disagreements, along with other issues, have led to an unprecedented degree of tension in this critical relationship that is in the interest of neither side.

I am honored to testify today before you on this important issue and to help put this tumultuous recent period into a broader context. To start, I would like to reassert that the US-Turkey relationship is an indispensable partnership for both sides—and I truly hope that this hearing will provide an opportunity to restore a positive outlook for bilateral relations.

Turkey has proven to be a staunch ally of the United States as an important frontline state both before and after the Cold War. Turkish soldiers fought together with Americans in Korea, and have provided peacekeeping support in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Though its role is perhaps overlooked today, NATO ally Turkey was a key supporter of the first Gulf War, even though its decision to do so resulted in serious harm to the Turkish economy. Turkey also helped Kurds...
Throughout this process, Turkish decision-makers made one critical miscalculation: instead of strategic discussions, months of tactical squabbles took place. This squabble continued even after the pre-war period, with bureaucratic quibbles on both sides. Instead of articulating a coherent vision for a war without Saddam Hussein, Turkey chose to go through the motions of negotiations. While they recognized that a military campaign in Iraq was fraught with uncertainty, they were aware that Hussein was a criminal who had committed horrible acts. Yet, they hoped that the anti-terror campaign would make the US further appreciate the uniqueness of Turkish democracy and secularism in the context of its troubled neighborhood.

Unfortunately, this vision has not materialized to date. It has failed to do so for two critical reasons. First, there was during the Iraq war and its aftermath a misalignment of interests. Second, and equally importantly, Turkey and the United States failed to find a common language in which to promote the moderate Islamic values and traditions necessary as an alternative to the radical Islamist ideology. The legacy of the diplomatic train wreck of 2003 is well-known by now. The American side took Turkish support of the war against Iraq for granted, and did not send a cabinet secretary to obtain their assistance. American officials chose instead to listen only to those who promised a yes vote from the Turkish parliament, and ignored the warning signs of impending rejection. A majority of Turks simply did not want to be associated with a war next door, especially when neither the Americans nor their own government could make a solid case for the war itself—and when neither side could articulate a coherent vision for an Iraq without Saddam Hussein. While Turks were aware that Hussein was a criminal who had committed horrible acts, they recognized that a military campaign in Iraq was fraught with uncertainty.

With a new and inexperienced government in office that clashed with the traditional Turkish establishment, Turks were too disorganized to spell out their real opposition to the war. They instead chose to go through the motions of negotiations, with the result of the pre-war period taken up by bureaucratic squabbles on both sides. Instead of strategic discussions, months of tactical squabbles took place. Throughout this process, Turkish decision-makers made one critical miscalculation:
that in the end, if they did not allow the US to open a northern front against Iraq, they would be able to stop the war.

None of the Turkish government officials, civil society representatives or business leaders with whom I spoke, even as recently as two weeks ago, had truly believed that the rewards promised by the Bush administration to Turkey in exchange for full cooperation in the Iraq war—financial contributions and a decision-making role equivalent to that played by the United Kingdom—would ever manifest themselves. In light of the difficulties experienced in Iraq after Saddam’s fall—from initial lootings to attacks on mosques, to the continuing insurgency and the Abu Ghraib incidents—a majority of Turks continue to believe their government did the right thing by staying out of this complex situation. They never believed that their views for post-war Iraq would have been given due consideration by the Americans and the British; furthermore, recognizing their country’s difficult past with their Arab and Middle Eastern neighbors, Turks did not want to become once more a lightning rod for criticism. Instead, after the Turkish parliament’s no vote, Turkey’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Middle Easterners and the Europeans has increased to an unprecedented level.

However, this decision cost Turkey the support of its key domestic ally: the US military. The mistrust resulting from the decision has even led to incidents of American soldiers taking their Turkish counterparts into custody in northern Iraq. Lingering feelings of wariness seem also to be behind the military’s failure thus far to fulfill the Bush administration’s promise to confront the large PKK presence in northern Iraq. This may be one of the most acutely difficult issues existing between the US and Turkey today. In a recent trip to Turkey, when I asked whether there is one single thing the US can do to turn around the anti-Americanism in the country, the unequivocal answer was that America must contend with the PKK threat in Iraq. A senior Turkish government official frankly wondered whether the US thought it to be in the spirit of partnership to work with Turkey in capturing terrorists who target America, but not to even touch those who target America’s partners? Many Turks hear the phrase “war on terror” and think “war on terror facing only America” As you can imagine, for the Turkish military, there is no more sensitive issue than that of the PKK, and now the Turkish military has lost its confidence in its counterpart as well.

Consequently, Turks tend to respond to President Bush’s calls for freedom and democracy, as clearly expressed in his second inaugural address and in his recent visit to Tbilisi, with skepticism and suspicion. They fear that, in the name of these two important principles, the US may attack Iran and Syria. They thus fail to recognize the nature of the historic, locally-produced change now underway in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and even Lebanon. To Turks concerned with the revival of the PKK in Iraq, the American pro-democracy agenda means instability along their borders—changes that occur without their involvement.

As I mentioned in recent testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Turkey oscillates between feelings of insecurity about its waning influence in global politics and a sense of strategic indispensability. Turkish leaders on the one hand are proud to be at the crossroads of many civilizations and cultures and want to be major geopolitical players—or at least, they want to have an impact in their immediate neighborhood. On the other hand, they get bogged down on ethnic and religious issues, such as the Kurdish or Turkmen concerns in Iraq, and thus are often perceived as unhelpful.

In addition to problems stemming from the Iraq war, there is a perhaps more fundamental issue standing in the way of repairing bilateral relations: that of moderate Islam. Turkey is a majority Muslim country, but since the foundation of the modern Turkish republic in 1923, it has set aside its religious identity in favor of one that is both democratic and secular. In their aspiration to enter the EU, many Turks want to be judged solely on technical criteria, leaving their Islamic identity out of the equation. In a country that chose as the blueprint for its republic the strict French model of laicité, many elites associate religiosity with backwardness, and secularism (both private and public) with modernity and progress. Yet, not all Turks share these associations; many believe that the French model has outlived its usefulness, and is unable to fulfill the spiritual needs of the Turkish people. These people want to be welcomed by the EU and the US as at once democratic, secular, Western, and Muslim—and, as such, to be recognized as an inspiration to the rest of the Islamic world. For decades, the battles between the extremes of these two camps—between staunch secularists and religious fundamentalists—have raged on.
wards, at times even ending in military coups, as the Turkish armed forces have long seen themselves as the guardians of republican secularism.

Now, following 9/11, when America searched for Muslim allies, Turkey stood out as the most obvious and most promising one. For the United States, promoting Turkey as a country with “moderate Islamic” traditions made perfect sense. Indeed, I believe that on this basis, a truly meaningful US-Turkish strategic partnership can be built, one that would position Turkey once again as a frontline state in a new existential struggle. If this role is explained correctly, I am certain that a majority of Turks would agree.

However, incidences in which senior US officials have misspoken (with one labeling Turkey an “Islamic republic”) have brought out the worst fears among Turks. Many genuinely believe that the US wants to “experiment” with creating a “moderate Islamic republic of Turkey” and therefore are strongly opposed to any US initiatives that highlight Islamic elements in Turkey. The administration’s previous full embrace of the current Turkish prime minister, who has an Islamist past, certainly did not help assuage the concerns of the secularists in Turkey.

Yet, this is in my opinion the most important area for the future of the partnership. It is also the most delicate one. The US attempts thus far to win Muslim hearts and minds have not, to say the least, been a great success. Many in Turkey still remember year after year asking the US for help with preventing the spread of Wahhabi influence out of Turkey; until recently, however, the US did not consider this hate-filled ideology to be a threat. These Turkish thinkers fear that the US may again support a particular Islamic ideology in order to defeat the likes of Al Qaeda. In addition, due to what they see as America’s lack of understanding of Islamic civilization and of issues important to contemporary Muslims of today, they fear that the US will only make matters worse. When I hear that the United States may lend its support to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, a group with a very radical ideology, I wonder as well.

Let me sum up my points and make some brief suggestions. Today there are problems in US-Turkish relations, but these have not as of yet turned into a deep anti-Americanism on the Turkish side. As this hearing demonstrates, there is also clear recognition of the importance of this relationship on the American side. During my recent trip, I heard from representatives of the Turkish government, the military, and civil society that they want to move beyond the Iraq war and its attendant mutual suspicions in order to discuss the formation of a new, healthier partnership. While some still deny there are problems in the relations, others have finally recognized that the negative mood vis-à-vis America could easily spiral out of control, and not only hurt Turkish economy but also Turkey’s prospects with the EU. With this widespread recognition, there is a renewed interest in engagement with the United States.

This is good news, since the ball is indeed in the Turkish court. I would like to underline that the American side did not hold a grudge against Turkey following its refusal to allow US troops to transit Turkey and into Iraq in March 2003—even though this was the most important request the US has ever made of Turkey. In its continuing goodwill, less than two weeks after the no vote in the Turkish parliament, the Bush Administration, with your support in the House, even decided to allocate $1 billion to Turkey to assist its economy in case of negative effects of the war. I believe the mood in the US started to change only over the last year, following some very unhelpful remarks Turkish government officials and intellectuals made about the US.

Despite the intention to repair bilateral relations, however, the Turkish government cannot make lasting progress until the open wound of the PKK issue is healed. Of course, if Turkey did cooperate in Iraq, there would not be a PKK problem there today—the Turkish military more or less had a green light from the American side to deal with this threat. However, Turkish decision makers failed to foresee the longer-term implications of their non-cooperation, and are deeply humiliated both by their inability to stop the US from attacking Iraq, and even more so, by their irrelevance in the post-Saddam developments. Yet, if US-Turkey relations are going to be repaired, these mistakes need to be left with the historians, and the US, together with the Iraqi and Turkish governments, needs to come up with a solution to the PKK problem that is acceptable to all sides.

The US also needs to crystallize its vision and plan for engaging moderate Muslims, including in Turkey. Ideally, this should be done in close cooperation with Turkey, so that the US does not inadvertently worsen matters. For their part, the Turkish leadership and influential opinion makers need to be more responsible and lead their people, rather than themselves being led by populism. If they believe in the US-Turkish partnership, they need to nurture this partnership and defend it.
One often hears of the great potential Turkey has, and I believe in this potential. Yet, I fear that the insecurities and sense of indispensability felt by many Turks are preventing this potential from being fully realized. The post-9/11 world is finally starting to take shape, and despite many mistakes, the US is emerging as the unquestionable leader of the free and democratic world. Having Turkey on its side would be very important for the US to fully succeed in this mission, and I hope with the efforts of the House, American political leaders and policy makers will redouble their efforts to reach out to Turkey. Having the US on its side is crucial for Turkey, and I hope Turkish political leaders and policy makers will make a genuine attempt at putting this relationship back on track.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Ms. Baran.

One of the things that we will do is, for the record without objection, make your entire testimony, along with all the other witnesses, a part of the record of the hearing in their entirety. Dr. Barkey.

STATEMENT OF HENRI J. BARKEY, PH.D., DEPARTMENT CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, LEHIGH UNIVERSITY

Mr. BARKEY. Thank you Congressman and thank you Members of the Committee for inviting me. Like Zeyno, I also prepared a statement which I would like to introduce into the record, with your indulgence.

I will start with essentially two contradictory comments and then explain them. First is, I actually think that the current malaise in United States-Turkish relations is temporary in nature. Assuming nothing really extraordinary or major happens in Iraq in the next couple of years, I think we will return to the status quo in relations between the two countries which was before Iraq. That said, I also do believe that anti-Americanism in Turkey is actually much deeper than we think it is. So the kind of relationship we will have with Turkey is going to be one which is correct, which is good, but nonetheless still problematic over the long term.

If you allow me, I will try to explain this by first putting on my professorial hat and then try to explain where I think Turkey is coming from and then make certain suggestions. First of all, Turkey is going through a crisis of confidence. It is going through what one could call a nationalist moment. It is ironic that it would go through such a crisis at a time when it actually did achieve the most impossible thing it could, which is to get a date from the Europeans to start the negotiation process this coming October.

That said, why is it that Turkey is going through this crisis? Well, there are the confluence of, if you want, three factors. At the root of all of this is Iraq. What the Iraq war did was to upend all of Turkish national security conceptions and interests. For the Turks, the most important issue in Iraq is not Saddam Hussein or oil, it is the Kurds. Because of Turkey’s own Kurdish problem at home, the fear of the contagion effect of what could happen in Iraq and the demonstration effect on their own Kurds is what scares them.

It is more than the PKK issue, because whichever way you look at it, Iraq is going to end up with some kind of a Federal arrangement in which the Kurds are going to have a robust autonomy. If things go even worse than that, Iraq may split up and you can be sure that the Kurds will try to have their own independent state. This is a nightmare scenario for the Turks and it is on this issue
that the whole crisis of confidence is anchored, but I will come back to that.

The second issue is the EU. The EU was a great success, but at the same time for many people in Turkey, the EU is a poisoned chalice. It is a poisoned chalice, because the kind of reforms that the EU requires the Turks to undertake in the next 15 years are the kind of reforms that will undermine some of the privileges and some of the structures of the state, which many people react to. Among the changes that the EU will require—and you can be sure what will also happen—is that the Kurds in Turkey are going to push for more rights.

Now with Iraq on the one hand and with the European Union on the other, you have this confluence of these two events, which will scare the Turkish establishment further.

Thirdly, there is a serious crisis between, shall we say, the Turkish establishment and the current government. The establishment doesn’t trust the government and the government doesn’t trust the establishment. So you have this issue as well, which makes life even more complicated in Turkey. What happens as a result is that the Iraq issue and success in Iraq, defined by the establishment as preventing the creation of a Kurdish state or a robust Federal arrangement in Iraq has become the litmus test through which the Turkish Government is going to be tested.

What I would like to then focus on is: What is it that we can do? The truth is, Turkey and the United States have had a long relationship, know how to talk to each other, but in this particular instant with respect to Iraq, one of the things that hasn’t happened is a serious dialogue.

What do I mean by that? Both the United States and Turkey actually want the same thing in Iraq. They want a democratic Iraq. They want an Iraq that is prosperous. They want an Iraq that is united and they want ultimately an Iraq that will emerge maybe as a counterweight to Iran. So on this, we agree. There is absolutely no daylight.

The internal arrangements within Iraq is what is problematic. Going back to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who promised the Kurds in Iraq when she negotiated a deal between the two rival factions in Northern Iraq that they would have a Federal arrangement, going back to that period, there has been a disagreement over how to do all the internal boundaries in Iraq. But more importantly, while we agree on what we want in Iraq, what we haven’t done and where there is an enormous disagreement is over the contingencies.

What the Turks are afraid of—and to be fair to them, looking at what is going on in Iraq today, if you are a Turk, you will be worried—is that one day Iraq is going to crumble. That the American project in Iraq may fail.

What we haven’t been able to talk to the Turks about is: What do we do if that contingency happens? The Turks are convinced that we are there to create a Kurdish State. They suspect our motives. We have told them for many, many years that we want a unified Iraq. Nonetheless, there is no dialogue on this issue and this is where we need to start. We need to have a frank dialogue. It may not be at the official level. It is not going to be between
President Bush and Prime Minister Erdogan when he comes into town. It is very clear that both sides will have to face up to some unpleasant facts.

The Turks have to face up to the Kurdish issue. We also have to think about what will happen in case we fail, but it is very difficult, obviously, to do this at the official level. We need to start the process somewhere else.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barkey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRI J. BARKEY, PH.D., DEPARTMENT CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, LEHIGH UNIVERSITY

That something has gone terribly wrong in the important U.S.-Turkish relationship since the beginning of the Iraq War should not come as a surprise to most casual observers of current political events. A slew of articles on this side of the Atlantic have questioned the future of this relationship. I will not dwell much on how vital this relationship is to the United States in this audience. The more important question is how deep and long-lasting will this rupture is likely to be and what are its causes and remedies.

Let me start the discussion with two contradictory statements. First is that the current malaise in U.S.-Turkish relations is temporary in nature. Within a year or so from now—provided no unexpected and dramatic event occurs in Iraq—it is likely that these relations will return to their pre-Iraq war status. This said, however, it is also important to note that anti-Americanism in Turkey, as I will demonstrate below, is deeply rooted and different groups and institutions each have their own interests in articulating an anti-U.S. discourse. The war in Iraq, though this is not the only reason, has rekindled and exacerbated these feelings. A return to the status quo ante in U.S.-Turkish relations means, therefore, that while we will see a marked decline in the anti-American rhetoric in Turkey, the mistrust of the U.S. and its policies will remain unabated though relegated to below the surface.

Turkey, Iraq and the United States

The recent manifestations of anti-Americanism in Turkey at both the public and official levels cannot be attributed solely to current U.S. policies and actions. Turkey is in the grips of what one can call a “nationalist moment.” This is the result of a deep crisis of confidence and anxiety over developments it cannot control or influence. It is ironic that after having achieved what seemed to be the impossible, getting the European Union to commit to a date to begin accession negotiations, Turkey is mired in this kind of crisis.

At the root of Turkey's angst is the issue of Iraq and specifically the Kurds. The war in Iraq has completely upended Turkey's fundamental security interests in Iraq. Because Turkey has yet to come to grips with its Kurdish question, the emergence of Iraqi Kurds as serious contenders in Iraq, the fear of potential developments and their consequences in Turkey have unnerved Turks of all stripes. The Turkish-American relationship was built on a security platform and the Iraq war has put into question this essential understanding.

The U.S. and Turkey have similar visions for the kind of Iraq they would like to see emerge: they both hope for a democratic, unified and prosperous Iraq capable of both controlling its own diverse population and emerge as a source of stability in the region, perhaps even as a future counterweight to Iran.

On the other hand, what divides the United States and Turkey most of all is the lack of accord over future contingencies in Iraq, especially in the event of a U.S. failure in that country. The inability of the U.S. and the successive Iraqi governments to stem the violence in Iraq together with signs that Iraq may one day fail apart has led to the questioning of U.S. motives and plans. Turkish worries center primarily on the possible emergence of an Iraqi Kurdish entity, federal or independent. Turks also believe that their decision to deny the U.S. a second front against Saddam Hussein has privileged the Iraqi Kurds at their expense in American eyes and, therefore, the U.S. would be hard pressed to deny the Kurds what they want in the future. Some Turks are also convinced that the U.S. is out to punish them for their rejection of basing for the 4th ID.

There is a real possibility that Iraqi Kurds will end up with a robust federal, if not confederal arrangement, within Iraq. This will provide them with not just complete cultural autonomy and the recognition of Kurdish as the second official language in Iraq, but also with all kinds of political rights based on ethnicity. Ankara
is afraid of the contagion or demonstration effect any Kurdish gains in Iraq would have on their own Kurdish population. This is why Ankara has strenuously resisted the creation of an ethnic-based Iraqi federation that especially privileges the Kurds by incorporating the oil-rich city of Kirkuk within their boundaries. Furthermore, Ankara has championed the rights of the Turkish-speaking Turkmen minority as a wedge against the Kurds in Iraq. Their Turkmen allies, the Iraqi Turkmen Front, however, have done very poorly in the January elections.

What terrifies Ankara even more is that the current violence and unrest in Iraq will end up in a division of Iraq, possibly along sectarian and ethnic lines thereby giving rise to an independent Kurdish state. Amid these potential monumental developments for its perceived national security interests, Turkey sees that it has been shut out of the consultation process and has little if any role to play or influence to yield in its neighbor Iraq.

It is the timing of the Iraq war with the beginning of the European Union negotiations which has proven to be an explosive mix. As the Turkish government deftly maneuvered the country to finally get a date from the Europeans, it is perceived as having had to make “concessions” to the EU regarding human rights, democratization and minority rights. Even though many of the constitutional changes along these lines have yet to be implemented, the fact remains that Turkish Kurds are likely to use the EU negotiation process to improve their cultural and perhaps even political conditions in Turkey. This goes to the heart of the Turkey’s conception of its national identity: there can be no minority, certainly no minority of this size, with such potentially disruptive demands.

Ankara and the Turkish public in general do not think that it has been rewarded either for the domestic “concessions” or the ones it has made regarding Cyprus. On Cyprus, the government in Ankara engineered a complete reversal in policy, got the Turkish Cypriots to resoundingly endorse the Annan plan, the reunification of the island and joining Europe despite the vociferous opposition of hardliners in both northern Cyprus and Turkey. The absence of any movement by either the U.S. or the Europeans to reduce the isolation of Turkish Cypriots in light of Greek Cypriot’s equally resounding vote against a solution on the island has put both the Turkish government and all who favored such a solution on the defensive. Similarly, the debate in Europe, especially in France, on the new European Constitution that has made opposition to Turkish accession to the EU a central theme, has further damaged Turkish self-confidence and belief that they would get a fair hearing in Europe.

Complicating the picture in Turkey further is the uneasy relationship between the current Turkish government led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Turkey’s establishment that views both with great suspicion. Given its Islamist origins, the AKP is suspected of having a hidden Islamist agenda. The AKP’s success in Europe, despite Turkey’s previously avowedly secular leaders’ failures in this regard, is perceived as a subtle attempt to move Turkey away from its Ataturkist principles under the guise of European membership. For the Turkish political establishment and AKP’s detractors, success in Iraq—defined as preventing the emergence of a robust Kurdish entity—has become a litmus test of the government’s nationalist bona fides. The centrality of Iraq, the Kurdish question and unease with which Turks view Iraqi developments have also been influenced by symbolic yet unfortunate events. The most important is the July 4, 2003 incident when U.S. troops raided an Iraqi Turkmen Front and Turkish Special Forces office in the Kurdish town of Suleymaniyah. Tipped that the occupants of that compound were on the verge of initiating an assassination attempt, U.S. soldiers unceremoniously dispatched the Turkish troops to Baghdad with hoods on their heads—a treatment reserved for captured al-Qaeda terrorists. This event and the resulting political storm in Turkey were very damaging to the U.S. image in Turkey. No Turkish interlocutor will forget to remind his or her American counterparts of this event. This is despite the fact that within a year of the incident, in a sign that some officers had run amok, the Turkish military high command either cashiered out or allowed three generals in direct command of the Special Forces to retire.

U.S.-Turkish Relations a balance sheet

At the onset of my testimony I argued that while the current malaise will soon be replaced by a return to the status quo ante, in other words that relations would improve but that Turkish suspicions of the U.S. would remain. I base this argument on the fact that while Turkey may not appear be as critical to U.S. interests as in the past—Turkey was part of the two containment exercises of the U.S. since World War II, first the containment of the USSR and later that of Saddam Hussein—there is no question that it remains a vital component of Washington’s agenda in the Middle East. Stability in Turkey has always been a linchpin of both Democratic and Re-
It took a determined speech by the Turkish General Staff Chief Hilmi Ozkok in late 2002 to encourage people to challenge his leadership in the Republican People's Party, if their political interests. In his case, he opened himself to ridicule by letting it be known that agreeing relations with the U.S. is a price worth paying if it serves his immediate political interests.

The U.S.-Turkish relationship came at the end of the 1990s. The Clinton administration had engineered the delivery on a silver platter of the fugitive Turkish Kurdish terrorist leader Ocalan, the most reviled and wanted man in Turkey who had spent almost 20 years in Damascus and Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon. Clinton made a historic journey to Turkey following the earthquake that devastated many towns in Western Turkey. He addressed the Turkish Parliament and despite some frank talk he was received as a real hero. No U.S. president had ever received such a welcome in Turkey (one ought to note that not many had visited Turkey either—itself an interesting point).

All this goodwill dissipated soon thereafter with the September 11 tragedy. It turns out that the goodwill on the Turkish side was not institutionally anchored especially in a society where almost everyone shares a sense of vulnerability. The secularists, the Islamists, the military, the center-left and center-right not too mention the nationalist extremists on both ends of the spectrum, all have their reasons to fear outside forces. In this sense, mistrust of the U.S. is not unique. However, given the importance of the American role in the post Cold War world and the long-standing nature of relations with Turkey, it is singularly problematic.

Turkish Islamists and fellow travelers so to say who had appreciated Washington's principled stand on issues regarding democratization and had been as pro-American one could fathom them to be, were the first to broke with the U.S. after September 11. For some it was too difficult to accept that Muslims had committed such a horrible act of political violence. Hence it must have been a plot; a U.S. plot, a Zionist one, a joint CIS-Mossad operation? For others it was the attack on Afghanistan that broke the camel's back. The attack was after all by a non-Muslim country on a Muslim one. In any event, a military operation against Saddam Hussein appeared to be imminent and with that it was clear that another Muslim country would be subject to "punishment" by Washington. Hence, the Islamists reverted back to their previous anti-Americanism that tended to blame everything on the U.S. and its Israeli ally. With the return to these explanations, the world also was more comfortable.

For the ruling Justice and Development Party, which has deep roots in Turkey's Islamist political movement, events in Iraq were deeply disturbing; like many people around the world the pictures coming from Abu Gharib prison proved to be incendiary. They too reverted to past practices of blaming the U.S. Yet, the same party almost succeeded in getting a resolution allowing the basing of U.S. troops on Turkish soil for a second front in the Iraq passed through Parliament.

For the secular politicians who had benefited from the Ocalan return, such as former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, the U.S. was a never a trusted friend. Ecevit before becoming prime minister in the late 1990s had continuously spewed conspiracy theories regarding U.S. intentions in Turkey and specifically in southeastern Turkey where most of Turkey's Kurds reside. Once in power he curtailed his diatribes against the United States. However, having dismally lost in the last parliamentary elections, he has returned to his old themes of blaming the U.S. for just about everything. These include the dispatching of a World Bank Vice President, Kemal Dervis, in 2001 to destroy his coalition government never mind the fact that Dervis went to Turkey as economy minister following the worst economic crisis in modern Turkish history at the request of Ecevit. Similarly, fully cognizant of the Islamist political movement, events in Iraq were deeply disturbing; like many people around the world the pictures coming from Abu Gharib prison proved to be incendiary. They too reverted to past practices of blaming the U.S. Yet, the same party almost succeeded in getting a resolution allowing the basing of U.S. troops on Turkish soil for a second front in the Iraq passed through Parliament.

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April to articulate a coherent statement on relations with America. Earlier this
year, one of the most senior Turkish generals, Hursit Tolon, openly accused the U.S.
and Iraqi Kurds of complicity in the murder of 5 Turkish security personnel en
route to Baghdad from Turkey when Iraqi insurgents ambushed them. In a country
where the military is the most revered institution, Tolon’s words were taken as fact.
Tolon reflects the anxiety within the Turkish officer corps for whom the potential
emergence of a Kurdish state constitutes a threat to the very nature of Turkish
state and its regime the military has vowed to protect. The inability of the Wash-
ington to devote resources as it promised to fighting the PKK, the Turkish Kurdish
insurgent group holed up in the mountains in northern Iraq, has not helped Amer-
ican credibility with the powerful military either. It is not perhaps surprising to see
columnists close to Turkish officers talk, as they did in these last few weeks, of a
psychological war being conducted by the U.S. against Turkey.

What we have seen in recent weeks and months in terms of negative, downright
prejudicial Turkish press reporting on the US, the Iraqi war, and by extension Jews
and the Jewish role in America is a reflection of the general unease with which the
Turks are approaching the future. Many Turks see the EU, which was supposed to
provide the new anchor for Turkish reforms and further integration with the West,
as a poisoned chalice precisely because it proscribes changes that will force the rad-
ical transformation of the Turkish political space. Inevitably, this would entail the
articulation of dissident voices and demands—primarily, although not exclusively,
Kurdish ones—which they fear will undermine the unity of the republic.

Where do we go from here?

Since Iraq and specifically northern Iraq is what is at the root of our difficulties
with Turkey, it is imperative that we take the bull by the horn and start addressing
the issues squarely and honestly. Turks and Americans have to engage in a dialogue
that helps clarify the potential scenarios and contingencies in Iraq. Eventually both
the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Kurds have to be pulled into this discussion that
must necessarily begin quietly and away from prying eyes. Iraqi Kurds also have
a stake in having a good relationship with Ankara and the election of the Kurdish
leader Jalal Talabani to the Presidency of Iraq provides an important opportunity.

Not only does he represent a Kurdish willingness to be part of Iraq and not secede—
Turkey’s nightmare scenario—but he has always been a strong advocate of relations
with Turkey because the latter represents Iraq’s and the Iraqi Kurds’ most direct
link to the West. In that, Iraq’s Kurds are ironically Turkey’s and the West’s most
formidable ally: they are neither Arab nationalists nor are they prone to fundamen-
talist tendencies. Hence, they represent a moderating influence on any future Iraqi
government. Engaging in a dialogue as soon as possible will not only help the two
sides narrow their differences but also help assuage Turkish worries and insecu-

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Dr. Barkey.

Dr. Cagaptay.

STATEMENT OF SONER CAGAPTAY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, TURK-
ISH RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you for try-
ing so hard to get the exact pronunciation of my very hard to pro-
nounce last name. I have to admit that even in Turkey I often get
questions about the exact spelling of it. So make no mistake, it is
a tough one. It is usually not a big problem to pronounce people’s
last names but I often get questions. People say, “Is there really
a P in your last name?” I think you have done a great job, you
came very close.

Thank you once again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Com-
mittee for having invited me today to discuss United States-Turk-
ish relations. It is definitely an honor to be here before this pres-
tigious body today.

I am going to go quickly into my summarized remarks. What I
would like to do today is to discuss three issues in order to come
up with some suggestions on improving United States-Turkish re-
The issues I am going to discuss include Turkey's importance for the United States, the United States-Turkish ties within the context of the ripple effects of the Iraq war and Turkey's EU prospects.

Turkey is important for the United States because it straddles two vital regions for U.S. policymakers—The Middle East and Central Eurasia—that is an energy rich area with a large Muslim population, stretching from the Black Sea to Central Asia to the north. Given the country's location, as well as post-September 11 United States priorities toward these regions, Turkey bears utmost importance for Washington. But what is interesting is—as has been indicated by a number of opinion polls, including a BBC survey which was interestingly publicized on February 5, the exact date when Secretary Rice was in Ankara to build bridges with the Turks—most Turks seem to take issue with United States foreign policy, especially the Iraq war.

Mr. Chairman, if I were to name one most important, unintended victim of the Iraq war I would say that is the United States-Turkish relationship. The war seems to have angered most Turks. The biggest constituents in the country, nationalists on the left and on the right, are upset with the war because it has increased Iraqi Kurds' political leverage and terrorist PKK presence in northern Iraq has escaped United States occupation untouched.

Other groups in the country are also upset with the war. The liberals see the war in the European fashion as “illegal,” and Islamists, including those people in the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), and conservatives look at the war as an attack on a fellow Muslim nation and therefore abhor it. In short, it can be stated that a very large part of the Turkish population has been upset as a result of the Iraq war and events in its aftermath. But the question is: While Turkey is still an important country for the United States in the Middle East and in Eurasia and given this public diplomacy challenge we face in Turkey, what can the United States do to win the Turks over?

I think, Mr. Chairman, the issue here is, as a result of the Iraq war, the United States has lost the most powerful and largest constituency in Turkey; that is the nationalists. In this regard, the Kurdish issue is a major factor and it is here that the United States can make in-roads if it wants to repair relations with Turkey. The quickest way of doing this is by addressing the issue that most excites the nationalist majority in Turkey, and that is the PKK, a group that is on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. The PKK has around 5,000 terrorists in Northern Iraq. I would say that if the United States showed its commitment to Turkey in the fight against the PKK, a Turkish majority would quickly be swayed in favor of America.

What can be done against the PKK? There are many ways of action, but clearly we have to look at the nature of this group to decide which one to choose. This is a highly hierarchical group, composed of what I would call “tactical brains” and “fighter drones.” If Washington worked with Turkey to eliminate the group’s leadership, the PKK would be paralyzed, as it was in 1998 when Turkey captured its leader, Ocalan, with support from the United States, after which the organization was so crippled that it declared a uni-
lateral cease-fire and pulled itself out of Turkey. But such action carries, some people would argue, political risks for the United States, as it is dependent on the Iraqi Kurds.

In the meantime, I would suggest the United States has another politically risk-free option and that is in Cyprus. The fate of Turkish Cyprus is very important, because it holds the key to Turkey’s EU membership. Turkish Cypriots showed a spirit of compromise in the April, 2004 U.N. referendum by voting in favor of the plan to unify the island, but the plan unfortunately died because of the fact that it was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriots. Most Turks now feel that this constructive attitude of the Turkish Cypriots has gone unrewarded and the problem remains and is clearly an impediment ahead of Turkey’s EU accession.

Today we have an interesting development. Washington, Ankara, Turkish Cypriots and the EU are all on the same page regarding Cyprus, aiming at bi-zonal federation. If the United States stepped in at this stage to push toward this goal by offering trade opportunities, cultural contacts and tourism, easing the economic and humanitarian sanctions northern Cyprus has endured, it would not only clear a major hurdle out of Turkey’s EU accession, but also improve its image in Turkey.

Clearly, there is a lot the United States can do, but the question is: What can Turkey do? In this regard, I would say that lately Ankara has been taking the right steps.

Since the AKP’s rise to power in November, 2002, one of the questions that most analysts have been asking is whether a government formed by a party with an Islamic pedigree would erode the two qualities that make Turkey unique, that is its secularism and its democracy. We have seen over the past 2 years that Turkey’s democracy and secular regime are both very strong, but a third quality that makes Turkey unique, namely the country’s ability to have normal relations with the Western World, seems to have eroded over the past couple of years, whether it is the deterioration in United States-Turkish ties, or the rapprochement between Turkey and Syria and enhanced dialogue between Turkey and Iran.

Lately though, I would say Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has come forth with a much needed clear vision on the United States-Turkish relationship in the public realm, where it is most needed, taking ownership of the relationship. On April 27, for example, he said that, “The Turkish nation is aware of the fact that the two countries need each other today and tomorrow.” If we were to see more willingness from the AKP in the public realm to take the initiative in bilateral ties, that would be very positive. What is promising in this regard is that Turkey’s secular elite have already stepped in to emphasize the need for improving the relationship with the United States.

Briefly, Mr. Chairman, allow me to look at Ankara’s EU accession and the impact of that on United States-Turkish relations before I wrap up.

We may all have many different opinions on Turkey’s EU accession and they may all make sense. The bottom line is that this is a very positive process which will anchor Turkey into a Western club. If Ankara’s EU accession were derailed with the EU snubbing
Turkey, we could see a massive backlash against the EU. The Turks, being fiery nationalists, will be offended by the way the EU was treating them.

If Turkish-EU relations suffered a setback today, at a time when Turkish-United States relations are not at their best, it would be the first time ever that Turkey would have bad relations with both the United States and Europe. I would say this is a grave scenario in which Turkey is alienated from the entire Western World, and it ought to be prevented. Whatever our views on transatlantic relations, better Ankara closer to Washington or Paris than to Tehran.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, allow me to elaborate on the United States-Turkish relationship to say that both the United States and Turkey need each other. Turkey needs the United States, whether it is the Eurasian energy corridor or toward its EU accession prospects.

Washington needs Ankara as well. Clearly we have seen over the past couple of years that America can act without Turkey in the Middle East, but recent events, such as the request to expand the use of Incirlik Air Base, show that things are easier when Turkey is on board.

There are many other areas from Central Eurasia, to Turkish-Israeli partnership, to the war on terror, that continue to bolster the Turkish-American relationship. The question is: When to act to bridge the gap between Washington and Ankara? It seems to be the right time now.

For the past few years, Turkey has focused all its energy on the EU accession, hoping to get a date for accession talks. Now that Ankara has a date and the Europeans are introducing extra requirements for Turkey to satisfy before moving ahead, the tone of the Turkish-EU relationship is no more one of euphoria, but rather one of business as usual with ups and downs.

I had suggested back in October that this would happen and when it did, the United States would have a window of opportunity to get Turkey’s attention, whether in Cyprus or in Iraq. Some people would say United States priorities in Iraq leave little room to take Turkey’s sensitivities into consideration. I would say since the United States-Turkish relationship crashed in Iraq in the first place it can be rebuilt in Iraq. Others would object and say, “Why the rush?” I would answer, quoting a friend of mine who is a senior State Department official, by saying, “Would it not be ironic if we won Iraq, but lost Turkey?”

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagaptay follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SONER CAGAPTAY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, TURKISH RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

Mr. Chairman, thank you for having invited me today to discuss U.S.-Turkish relations. It is an honor to testify before this prestigious body.

We have a number of issues to discuss. I would like to focus on three of these topics, namely:

• Turkey’s importance for the U.S;
• U.S.-Turkish ties within the context of the ripple effects of the Iraq War;
• and Turkey’s European Union (EU) prospects in order to draw suggestions on the U.S.-Turkish relationship.
Why is Turkey still important?

Turkey straddles two regions of chief importance to the U.S. The Middle East to the south, and Central Eurasia—an energy rich area with a large Muslim population, stretching from the Black Sea to the Caucasus and Central Asia—to the north. Given its location and because of post-September 11 U.S. priorities towards these regions, Turkey bears utmost importance for U.S. policymakers.

Legacy of the Iraq War

Yet, as has hinted by some recent opinion polls such as a BBC survey, which was publicized on February 5, interestingly when Secretary Rice was in Ankara to build bridges, most Turks seem to take issue with U.S. foreign policy especially the Iraq War. Mr. Chairman, if I were to name one single unintended victim of the Iraq War, that would be the U.S.-Turkish relations. This war seems to have angered most Turks. Nationalists both on the right and the left, the majority constituency in the country, are upset with the U.S. because they see that the war has helped enhance the Kurdish political let Irans in Iraq, while the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) presence in northern Iraq has escaped U.S. occupation untouched. Other groups, such as liberals who are prominent in the media and the academe, as well as Islamists and conservatives, including those in the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) resent the war too. The liberals see it as “illegal occupation,” while the Islamists abhor the war as an “attack on fellow Muslims.” In short, the Iraq War has created an atmosphere of distrust towards U.S. foreign policy in Turkey among policy makers and common people alike. In this regard, the AKP government has always done a good job in tempering such resentments, though; lately the AKP seems to be more sensitive on this issue.

While Turkey bears utmost importance for the U.S. in Central Eurasia and the Middle East, given the abovementioned public diplomacy challenges, how can Washington win the Turks over?

Mr. Chairman, the issue is that as a result of the Iraq War, the U.S. appears to have lost the confidence of the largest and most powerful constituency in Turkish politics, the nationalists. In this regard, the Kurdish issue is the major factor, and it is here that the U.S. can make inroads if it wants to repair relations with Turkey.

Short to mid-term policies:

PKK: The quickest way of achieving this goal is by addressing the issue that most excites the nationalist majority in Turkey, namely the PKK, a group on the State Department’s List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The PKK has around 5,000 terrorists in northern Iraq. If the U.S. showed its commitment in the fight against the PKK, a Turkish majority would quickly be swayed back in favor of America. What can be done against the PKK? This is a hierarchical organization composed of tactical brains and fighter drones. If Washington worked with Turkey to eliminate the group’s leadership, the PKK would be paralyzed, as it was after Turkey captured its leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1998 when the organization was so crippled it declared a unilateral ceasefire and pulled out of Turkey.

But such action carries a political risk for the U.S., dependant as it is on the Iraqi Kurds. While action against the PKK is the most effective way of swaying Turkish public opinion, it demands a relatively stable Iraq, which appears to be still some way down the line. In this regard, another issue is overcoming Centcom reservations regarding a crack down against the PKK. In the meantime, the US, however, has another, politically risk-free option.

Cyprus: The fate of Turkish Cyprus is very important to Turkey, as it appears to hold the key to Turkey’s EU membership. Turkish Cypriots showed a spirit of compromise during the April 2004 vote on the UN plan which aimed to unify the island. However, although Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan, Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected it. Most Turks now feel the constructive attitude of the Turkish Cypriots has gone unrewarded. Today, Washington, Ankara, Turkish Cypriots, and the EU are all on the same page regarding Cyprus, aiming a bi-zonal federation. If the U.S. stepped in to push towards this goal, by offering trade opportunities, cultural contacts, and tourism, easing the economic and humanitarian sanctions Northern Cyprus has endured, it would not only reward the Turkish Cypriots for their constructive position on the UN referendum, and clear a major hurdle ahead of Turkey’s EU accession, but also improve its image in Turkey.

Long-term policies: When the U.S.-Turkish relations faced a crisis in 2003, the deterioration in the relationship was compounded by the fact that bilateral military and political ties were not supported by strong economic relations. The two countries now need to focus on legislation to bolster economic ties, including steps such as revisiting the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) issue as well as increasing U.S.
Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey to ensure that the next time the relationship faces a crisis, a powerful business lobby will step in for damage control, something that did not happen in 2003.

Mr. Chairman, before we get there, however, there is a looming problem in the short-term: Iraq-related problems further weakening the ties. In this regard, I see a potential danger:

If the PKK stepped up its violent campaign against Turkey, launching sensational attacks on urban targets—such a strategy seems to be already in the making: last week, Turkish police arrested a suicide bomber who was on her way from southeastern Turkey to Istanbul with four pounds of plastic explosives? this would dampen the bilateral ties further. Most Turks would see the fact that the PKK has recently deployed from Northern Iraq into Turkey as proof that lack of action against this group in Iraq has allowed it to hurt Turkey again.

The Turkish side: While there is a lot the U.S. can do to improve ties, there are also ways Ankara can step up to the plate. In due course, Ankara will determine what these steps are. But, first, Turkey may find it useful to decide, if in the future, it will cash in its strategic importance with the U.S., something it has not done so well recently.

Mr. Chairman, I see a choice for Turkey: if the AKP shied away from taking the initiative in U.S.-Turkish relations especially in the public eye, Turkey would remain a country with unused and therefore not so valuable strategic importance. On the other hand, if Ankara were to take ownership of U.S.-Turkish relationship and cooperate with Washington in its neighborhood, Turkey could once again be a valuable ally.

In this regard, I would say Ankara is already taking the right steps. Since the AKP's rise to power in November 2002, most analysts have been wondering whether government formed by a party with an Islamist pedigree would erode the two qualities that make Turkey unique, namely the country's democracy and secular regime. We have found out that Turkish democracy and secularism are both very strong. Yet, a third quality that makes Turkey unique, namely the country's ability to conduct normal, healthy relations with the Western world, seems to have been eroded over the past two years. This is where I would say, the AKP has moved stones, whether it is the deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations, or rapprochement between Turkey and Syria and the enhanced Turkish-Iranian dialogue.

Lately though, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has come forth with a much needed clear vision on U.S.-Turkish relations. On April 27, he said: “the Turkish nation is aware of the fact that the two countries need each other today and tomorrow.” Refuting the latest claims of Turkish opposition to the U.S., he added: “on the contrary, Turkish people appreciate U.S. support for the EU, and against terrorism. Continued friendly efforts from the U.S. will contribute to the development of U.S.-Turkish relations.”

Erdogan also stressed that, “Turkey-US cooperation should continue with regard to Iraq, solution of Arab-Israeli conflict, Caucasus, stability in Central Asia, reform efforts in the Middle East, reconstruction of Afghanistan, fight with terrorism and energy security.”

If we were to see more willingness to take the initiative in bilateral ties that would be very positive. What is promising in this regard is that Turkey's secular elite have already taken the initiative in emphasizing the need for improving the ties with the U.S.

EU membership

Mr. Chairman, allow me to briefly discuss the impact of Turkey’s EU prospects on U.S.-Turkish relations.

We all hear different opinions on Turkey’s EU accession. The bottom-line is that this is a positive process since it will anchor Turkey into a Western club. If Ankara’s EU accession were derailed with the EU snubbing Turkey, we could see a massive backlash against the EU in Turkey; the Turks being fiery nationalists would be offended by the way the EU was treating them. If Turkish-EU relations suffered a setback today, when U.S.-Turkish relations are not at their best, this would mean that for the first time, Turkey would have weak relations with both Europe and America. This grave scenario in which Turkey is alienated from the Western world ought to be prevented. Whatever our views on transatlantic relations, better Ankara close to Paris than to Tehran.

Conclusion:

Mr. Chairman, as I finish, allow me to elaborate on the future of U.S.-Turkish relations. As a regional power, Turkey needs the United States to safeguard its global interests, such as the Eurasian energy corridor or towards EU accession.
For instance, once Turkey begins accession negotiations with the EU in October, Brussels will be making tough demands from Ankara. At this time, good relations with Washington will be a valuable asset for Turkey: to the extent that Ankara demonstrates the strength of its alternative partnerships, it will be able to ask the EU to be flexible in its expectations vis-à-vis Turkey.

If Ankara indeed needs Washington, does Washington need Ankara, as well? Yes. Here are some reasons: although America can act in the Middle East without Turkey, recent events—such as the request to expand U.S. use of the Incirlik airbase in southern Turkey—show that such moves are easier when Ankara is on board.

The U.S. needs Turkey outside the Middle East, such as in Central Eurasia, a volatile region with the world's second largest oil reserves. Turkey's ties with the countries of Central Eurasia make Ankara a desirable partner for Washington in facing the challenges awaiting this region.

There are many other issues on which Washington and Ankara could continue cooperation, ranging from the Turkish-Israeli partnership to the War on Terror. The question then is, can anything be done to bridge the gap between Washington and Ankara? The first step towards good relations would be cooperation in Iraq. And in this regard, it is time to act now. Fore the past few years, Turkey focused almost all its energy on the EU, hoping to get a date for accession talks. Now that Ankara has a date and the Europeans are introducing extra requirements for Turkey to satisfy before moving ahead, Turkish-EU relations are moving away from the euphoria of the past few years towards business as usual. I had suggested back in October that this would happen and when it did, the U.S. would have an opportunity window to get Turkey's attention whether in Cyprus or in Iraq.

Even then, some would suggest U.S. priorities in Iraq leave little room for taking Turkey's sensitivities into consideration there. I would say since the U.S.-Turkish relationship crashed in Iraq initially, it can be rebuilt in Iraq. Others may ask why the rush? To this, I would answer, quoting a friend of mine, a senior State Department official: "Would it not be ironic if we won Iraq but lost Turkey?"

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Dr. Cagaptay.

Ambassador Paris.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK PARRIS (FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY), SENIOR PUBLIC POLICY ADVISOR, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, P.C.

Ambassador PARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I also have a statement, which I will submit for the record.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection, it will be made a part of the record as will everyone else's.

Ambassador PARRIS. Thank you very much. As a former practitioner, I think the most useful thing that I could do would be to focus on that part of my statement which reviews five factors that I think will help the Committee fill out and develop a better understanding for how a relationship, that seemed so solidly founded just a few years ago, has gone so badly wrong recently.

The first such factor, in my view, has been throughout the period concerned, a high degree of distraction among major players. This ought not to be news. After all, the United States after September 11 was trying to do a lot of difficult things all at once.

The AKP leadership, for its part during that period, was first winning a watershed election and then setting up a government, but distraction on both sides is probably worst in the period when United States-Turkish relations were moving toward freefall in the second half of last year. President Bush and his senior advisors were obviously focusing on our elections and their aftermath. Prime Minister Erdogan and his team were making a final push to get a starting date for EU membership talks. Both of these were existential political challenges and during this period, United States-
Turkish relations were simply not on the screen of top leaders in either Washington or Ankara. It was thus left to the bureaucracies on both sides to manage as best they could. Unfortunately and despite heroic efforts from people like our Ambassador Eric Edelman in Ankara and the Turkish Ambassador here, Faruk Logoglu, the bureaucracies were not up to the task.

At this level, too, distraction was a factor. American officials in the agencies that might have been able to respond to Turkey’s concerns on Iraq had their hands full warding off disaster from one day to the next. Requests that may have seemed entirely legitimate in Ankara, like opening a new border gate with Iraq, seemed like irritating complications in Baghdad’s Green Zone or at CENTCOM headquarters. But at least as important a factor as distraction, at this level, was a second structural issue. It was not that United States and Turkish representatives were not communicating during this period, but too often the people talking to one another were not the right people.

Part of the reason for that relates to the United States practice of putting Turkey, for bureaucratic purposes, in the European Bureau of the State Department or in EUCOM and the limited ability of those institutions over the past couple of years to address issues in Iraq. Part of it was the well-documented inability of our State Department and Defense Departments to work from the same script during this period. Part of it was a tendency, particularly on the Turkish side, but mirrored to some degree on the American, to use unofficial channels that were unable, at the end of the day, to deliver.

Whatever the causes, the result was confusion and growing frustration among those on both sides with responsibility for managing relations and a corresponding decline in both mutual confidence and readiness to go the extra mile. Contributing to the structural problem was a third and broader factor, a contraction on both sides in the number of official and unofficial stakeholders in the relationship.

In contrast to the late 1990s, when a wide and growing array of United States agencies were eager to expand their programs to Turkey, official bilateral contacts narrowed sharply after 2000. Even well-established institutions, like our Joint Economic Commission, simply stopped meeting. Meanwhile, the 2001 Turkish economic crisis and unresolved commercial issues dimmed American business enthusiasm for Turkey at a time when Turkey’s own bureaucratic and economic focus was naturally gravitating toward Europe. This left the bilateral relationship focused on tough and divisive issues, like Iraq, without the natural shock absorbers provided by a broader, cooperative agenda.

A fourth factor that needs to be cited is the reality that Turkey’s foreign policy priorities, under the AKP, diverge in significant ways from those of its predecessors. Since coming to office, the current government has pursued what it refers to as greater strategic depth through a policy that is self-consciously more multi-faceted, in their words, than in the past. This has meant, in practice, an effort to deepen relations with all of Turkey’s immediate neighbors, including some like Iran and Syria, out of favor with the Bush Ad-
administration. It has also meant reaching out to non-traditional partners, like China, Russia, South Africa or Latin America.

The ultimate objective of this shift in emphasis is not altogether clear, at least to me, but one consequence has been a de-emphasis in Ankara of traditional relationships, such as those with the United States and Israel. It is worth noting that a year ago observers in both United States and Turkey were speculating that the Bush Administration’s developing interest in finding ways to promote reform in the Muslim world might create a new context for coordinated United States-Turkish diplomacy there. In practice, it hasn’t worked out that way. Instead, while both Ankara and Washington appear to believe that Turkey’s Muslim majority or identity gives it an exceptionalist role in its surrounding region and the greater Middle East, it has proved difficult, as Zeyno Baran noted, to turn that notion into a basis for joint action.

A final factor I would like to mention is one that will be familiar to all the Members of the Committee; local politics. As in most other countries, the Bush Administration has had an image problem in Turkey from the day it became clear the President was going to war in Iraq. That image problem grew worse in 2004 as the security situation in Iraq deteriorated, as Turkish concerns were not met and, frankly, as it appeared to many in Turkey, that John Kerry might be the next President.

Under the circumstances and focusing on his EU end game, Prime Minister Erdogan and his advisors, rightly or wrongly, may have seen little percentage in using political capital to stem the tide of anti-Americanism picking up steam last fall. If you add it up, Mr. Chairman, I think these factors give a better sense of what has happened in the relationship. What conclusions should we draw from them?

A first lesson is that this relationship, even less than most, does not run on auto pilot. Turkey’s importance to the United States is different in many ways than during the Cold War or the 1990s. The same can be said of America’s importance to Turkey, but, as Congressman Wexler noted, there is still far more that unites us than divides us. Under almost any imaginable circumstances, the two countries will find it easier and more fruitful to work together than at cross purposes. What the last 2 years has shown, however, is that if George Bush and Recep Tayyip Erdogan don’t make working together a priority, their bureaucracies will find other priorities.

The good news is that both sides seemed to have figured this out. It was heartening that Condoleezza Rice, on her first trip abroad, came to Ankara. Colin Powell did not on his first trip as Secretary of State 4 years before. For his part, Prime Minister Erdogan has recently taken steps, including a very important address last month to his parliamentary group, that emphasized his strong personal commitment to a United States-Turkish relationship. So perhaps both sides’ “first teams” have finally taken the field. That is a necessary—but not sufficient—condition to getting it right in the next half.

A second lesson we should have learned is that words alone are not enough to keep this relationship on track, even when they come from the first string. At the end of the day, bilateral relations will
be good when leaders on both sides can point to something concrete that the other has done for it lately. The Prime Minister’s recent actions, including approving a long pending U.S. request for expanded access to Incirlik Air Base and the award to Lockheed Martin of a major new defense contract are certainly welcome in that regard. He and others in Turkey will now look to the United States to follow through on commitments we have made on issues like the PKK in Iraq or easing the economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots.

A final lesson is that both sides need, as an urgent priority, to expand the substance of the relationship beyond problematic issues like Iraq. Again, my experience is that this doesn’t happen unless top leaders on both sides insist on it. America and Turkey today need to have an honest, concrete discussion by people with the requisite authority of our respective priorities in the region and the world.

Where our interests coincide, we need to develop joint action plans and to make serious people responsible for implementing them. Where our interests are not entirely in sync, we need to find ways to deconflict. We need to get as many official agencies as possible involved on both sides. We need to actively encourage the development of ties between our business and NGO communities. We need, in short, an agreed, comprehensive formal bilateral agenda and the sooner the better.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Parris follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK PARRIS (FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY), SENIOR PUBLIC POLICY ADVISOR, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, P.C.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear again before this Committee.

It is no secret to anyone in this room that these have not been the best of times for U.S.-Turkish relations. Time will tell whether they are the worst. But there is no question that in recent years, and particularly in recent months, something seems seriously to have gone wrong in our bilateral relations with Turkey. I commend the leadership of this Committee for taking the initiative to shine some light on that phenomenon.

For it must be said that discussion in this country of recent strains in U.S.-Turkish relations has thus far generated more heat than light. Too often, the issue has been posed in terms of “Who lost Turkey?” A rather stark conventional wisdom has evolved to describe what has occurred. In simplest terms, it goes something like this:

• On March 1, 2003, after a series of mistakes by both sides, Turkey let the U.S. down when its Parliament failed to authorize U.S. forces to attack Iraq from Turkish soil.
• In the months thereafter, and particularly in late 2004, lurid Turkish media coverage of events in Iraq, abetted for their own purposes by nationalist and other political elements there, fueled an unprecedented upsurge of anti-American sentiment.
• The AKP government under Prime Minister Erdogan proved unwilling or unable to confront the rising anti-American tide, which became tinged with anti-Semitism, and coincided with apparent Turkish overtures to problematic countries like Iran and Syria.
• Anti-Americanism ultimately reached a point where it became an issue between the two governments, and began to draw criticism of Turkey from traditional supporters here.
• Stunned by the U.S. reaction, Ankara in recent weeks began to take steps to get things back on track.
As in most such cases, the conventional wisdom is not so much wrong as inadequate. It gives a better sense of “what” has happened than “why.” It doesn’t give due weight to countervailing, positive things that were happening during the same period. It leads too easily to a conclusion that key actors on both sides were either incompetent or devious. But, most important, it fails to tell us what needs to change if we are to do better in the future.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to review five factors that may give a more complete picture of a how a relationship that seemed so solidly founded just a few years ago seems so swiftly and dramatically to have come unglued.

(1) Distraction

The first such factor has been, throughout the period concerned, a high degree of distraction among major players. I am convinced that no one in a position of responsibility on either side wanted—or wants—U.S.-Turkish relations to get worse. Those involved were in the main neither incompetent nor devious. What they were, unquestionably, was distracted.

This shouldn’t be a news. After all, the United States post 9/11 was trying to do a lot of difficult things all at once; the AKP leadership during the same period was first winning a watershed election and then setting up a government. But distraction on both sides was probably worst in the period when U.S.-Turkish relations were moving toward free fall during the second half of last year. President Bush and his senior advisors were focused on Presidential elections and their aftermath. Prime Minister Erdogan and his team were making the final push to get a starting date for EU membership talks. Both were existential political challenges. During this period, U.S.-Turkish relations were simply not on the screen of top leaders in Washington or Ankara.

It was thus left to the bureaucracies on both sides to manage as best they could. Unfortunately, and despite heroic efforts by people like Eric Edelman in Ankara and Faruk Logoglu here, the bureaucracies were not up to the task. At this level, too, distraction was a factor. American officials in the agencies that might have been able to respond to Turkey’s core concerns on Iraq had their hands full warding off disaster from one day to the next. Requests that seemed entirely legitimate in Ankara, e.g., opening a new border gate with Iraq, seemed like irritating complications in Baghdad’s Green Zone or CENTCOM headquarters.

(2) Structural Dysfunction

But at least as important a factor as distraction at this level was a second, structural issue. It was not that U.S. and Turkish representatives were not communicating during this period. Too often, however, the people talking to one another were not the right people. Part of the reason for that problem relates to the U.S. practice of putting Turkey for bureaucratic purposes in the European Bureau of the State Department or EUCOM, and of the limited ability of those institutions to address issues in Iraq. Part of it was the well-documented inability of our State and Defense Departments to work from the same script. Part of it was a tendency, particularly on the Turkish side, but mirrored to some degree on the American, to use unofficial channels unable, at the end of the day, to deliver. Whatever the causes, the result was confusion and growing frustration among those on both sides with responsibility for managing relations, and a corresponding decline in both mutual confidence and readiness to go the extra mile.

(3) Shrinking Constituencies

Contributing to the structural problem was a third and broader factor: a contraction on both sides in the number of official and unofficial stakeholders in the relationship. In contrast to the late nineties, when a wide and growing array of U.S. agencies were eager to expand their programs to Turkey, official bilateral contacts narrowed after 2000. Even well established institutions like the Joint Economic Commission simply stopped meeting. Meanwhile the 2001 Turkish economic crisis and unresolved commercial issues dimmed American business enthusiasm for Turkey at a time when Turkey’s own bureaucratic and economic focus was naturally gravitating toward Europe. This left the bilateral relationship focused on tough, divisive issues like Iraq, without the natural shock-absorbers provided by a broader, cooperative agenda.

(4) Divergent Diplomacy

A fourth factor that needs to be cited is the reality that Turkey’s foreign policy priorities under the AKP diverge in significant ways from those of its predecessors. Since coming to office, the current government has pursued what it refers to as greater “strategic depth” through a foreign policy that is self-consciously more “multi-faceted” than in the past. This has meant in practice an effort to deepen rela-
tions with all Turkey’s immediate neighbors, including some, like Iran and Syria, out of favor with the Bush Administration. It has also meant reaching out to non-traditional partners like China, Russia, South Africa, or Latin America. The ultimate objective of this shift in emphasis is not altogether clear, at least to me. But one consequence has been a de facto de-emphasis in Ankara of traditional relationships such as those with the U.S. and Israel.

It is worth noting that, a year ago, observers in both the U.S. and Turkey were speculating that the Bush Administration’s developing interest in finding ways to promote reform in the Muslim world might create a new context for coordinated U.S.-Turkish diplomacy there. It hasn’t worked out that way. Instead, while both Ankara and Washington appear to believe that Turkey’s Muslim identity gives it an exceptionalist role in its surrounding region and the greater Middle East, it has proved difficult to turn that notion into a basis for joint action.

(5) Local Politics

The final factor I would like to mention is one that will be familiar to the members of this Committee: local politics. As in many other countries, the Bush Administration has had an image problem in Turkey from the day it became clear the President was going to war in Iraq. That image problem grew worse in 2004 as the security situation in Iraq deteriorated, as Turkish concerns there were not addressed, and, frankly, as it appeared to many in Turkey that John Kerry might be the next President. Under the circumstances, and focusing on his EU end game, Prime Minister Erdogan and his advisors—rightly or wrongly—may have seen little percentage in using political capital to stem the tide of anti-Americanism picking up steam last fall.

Add it up, Mr. Chairman, and I think the factors of distraction, structural impediments to communication, shrinking constituencies, diverging diplomatic emphases, and local politics make it easier to understand the strains we have seen in U.S.-Turkish relations of late.

What lessons should we draw from this. And where do we go from here?

A first lesson is that this relationship—even less than most—doesn’t run on autopilot. Turkey’s importance to the U.S. is different in many ways than during the Cold War or the nineties. The same can be said of America’s importance to Turkey. But there is still far more that unites us than divides us. Under almost any imaginable circumstances, the two countries will find it easier and more fruitful to work together than at cross purposes. What the last two years have shown, however, is that if George Bush and Recip Taip Erdogan don’t make working together a priority, their bureaucracies will find other priorities.

The good news is that both sides seem to have figured this out. It was heartening that Condoleeza Rice on her first trip abroad came to Ankara: Colin Powell conspicuously did not stop in Turkey on his initial outing four years before. For his part, Prime Minister Erdogan has recently taken steps, including a very important address last month to his parliamentary group, that have emphasized his personal commitment to a strong U.S.-Turkish relationship. So perhaps both sides’ first string has finally taken the field.

That is a necessary but not sufficient condition to getting it right in the next half. For a second lesson we should have learned is that words alone are not enough to keep this relationship on track, even when they come from the first string. George Bush, after all, made a very good speech about U.S.-Turkish relations in Istanbul last June—to no apparent effect whatsoever.

At the end of the day, bilateral relations will be good when leaders on each side can point to something concrete the other has done for it lately. The Prime Minister’s recent actions, including approving a long-pending U.S. request for expanded access to Incirlik airbase and the award to Lockheed Martin of a major new defense contract are certainly welcome in that regard. He and others in Turkey will now look to the United States to follow through on commitments we have made on issues like the PKK in Iraq or easing the economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots. If the President gives the word, creative minds will find the means.

A final lesson is that both sides need as an urgent priority to expand the substance of the relationship beyond problematic issues like Iraq. Again, my experience is that this doesn’t happen unless top leaders on both sides insist on it. America and Turkey today need to have an honest, concrete discussion, by people with the requisite authority, of our respective priorities in the region and in the world. Where our interests coincide, we need to develop joint action plans and to make serious people responsible for implementing them. Where our interests are not entirely in sync, we need to find ways to de-conflict. We need to get as many official agencies on both sides involved as possible, and we need actively to encourage the develop-
ment of ties between our business and NGO communities. We need, in short, an agreed, comprehensive, formal bilateral agenda. And the sooner the better.

I draw these conclusions, Mr. Chairman, knowing that they involve some hard work for both sides. But the events of the last year or so have amply demonstrated the consequences of doing less.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Ambassador Parris.

I would like to start with Dr. Cagaptay, if I might. How would you expect Turkey to react to the possible “Kurdification” of Kirkuk in Iraq? How would you assess Turkomen representation in the Iraqi Government on the national and local levels? What, would you say, can the transitional Iraqi Government do to reassure Turkey about the Turkomen?

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This brings us to a very important issue that some other panelists have touched upon earlier, possible flashpoints in Iraq that could cause a further deterioration in the United States-Turkish relationship and I think you outlined one of the scenarios, the Kurdification of Kirkuk. Your own question stated that Kirkuk is a multi-ethnic city of many different groups, including not only Kurds but also large communities of Turkmen, Arabs and Christians.

I think the importance of Kirkuk, as nice a city as it is, is that it sits on 40 percent of Iraq’s oil. So whoever controls Kirkuk gets to be the ninth largest oil producer in the world, ahead of Libya. That means a nice amount of wealth in Kirkuk. The future of the wealth is important and I would say a power-sharing agreement that would involve not only the Kurds, but the other inhabitants of the city—Turkmens, Christians and Arabs—would be agreeable. Anything else that would isolate the other three communities from a power-sharing agreement and even endanger them physically, I think, would not be received very well. If, for example, the Turkmen in Kirkuk, a very large historic community, came in harm's way, that would cause a deterioration in Turkey's perception of developments in northern Iraq, as well as Turkey’s growing support for the process of Iraq’s reconstruction.

I think we have seen that Turkey is coming to a comfort level in terms of Iraq’s rebuilding as a new country with institutions of representative government, as well as some sort of a federal arrangement. The question is whether or not Iraqi Kurds would be willing, in this regard, to let go an agenda of exclusive control over Kirkuk, and instead adopt a power-sharing arrangement.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Dr. Barkey, same question.

Mr. BARKEY. If you look at the statements made by the new Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, before he became President and since, you find that he, of all people, really understands the issue of Kirkuk and he has suggested and proposed a solution to Kirkuk, which would take into account some of these difficulties, and he talks about the Brussels example. In other words, having a federation or a confederation in Iraq, Kirkuk would have a special status. I don’t think the Kurds expect that they will get all of the oil in Kirkuk. There are emotional attachments to having Kirkuk within the wrong, shall we say Federal state, but the fact of the matter is everybody understands that the oil will be controlled by the central government and it will be shared, just as the oil in the south.

Coming to Turkmen representation, one of the unfortunate things that did happen in northern Iraq is that the Turkish Gov-
ernment and the Turkish military did push for the Iraqi-Turkmen front, created the Iraqi-Turkmen front and in the end this is a group that actually created that famous incident on July 4, 2003, which led to the arrest of a number of Turkish special forces members and Turkmen representatives. This is a group that can best be described as ethnic entrepreneurs. They are trying to create something for themselves and they have done very poorly in the elections and in general in the January 30th elections in Iraq. That essentially has been a wake-up call for the Turkish Government, which the Turkish Government has to some extent distanced itself from the Iraqi-Turkmen front.

These people are, unfortunately, troublemakers and to the extent that in the past the Turkish Government and the Turkish military have associated themselves with the Iraqi-Turkmen front, it has been a problem for us. One of, I think, the important signs of the future and one of the good signs is precisely the distancing between the Turkish Government from the Iraqi-Turkmen front.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Dr. Barkey.

Ms. Baran, recently Italian Foreign Minister Fini, whose government supports Turkey's membership in the EU, stated that after all the positive changes that Turkey has made in terms of human rights, a "no" from Europe could possibly push Turkey in the direction of a greater religious fundamentalism.

Do you share that concern if Europe rejects Turkey's entrance into the EU?

Ms. BARAN. Well, I do share the concern that if there is a "no" from the EU, it will lead to a whole set of negative developments in Turkey. I would say an increase of religious radicalism would be one of them.

As other speakers have mentioned, there is an increase of nationalism and sometimes we see the ugly face of ultranationalism. This is a result of some of the tensions that the EU process has unleashed regarding Turkey's concerns about ethnic and religious issues. At the same time, the prospect of joining the EU has, for the last 40 years, been the main drive for Turkey to undertake some very painful reforms.

The Turkish people and the leadership have been saying that it is ultimately worth it if Turkey can get into the EU. But, if Turkey weakens the role of the military, weakens some of the institutions that have kept Turkey as a secular democratic republic, and then at the end does not get into the EU, then I think Turkey will be faced with a very, very difficult situation. I am not talking about the government in charge. The radicals and fundamentalists that are on the sidelines today would try to take advantage of a "no" vote from the EU and push forward the clash of civilizations argument.

In short, if there is a "no" from the EU, then it would lead to nationalists increasing their anger and, as Soner mentioned, it would lead to anti-Americanism, anti-Europe and anti-Westernism, and that could certainly lead to increased religious radicalism.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Ms. Baran.

Rob Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just would like to reiterate what, I think, were very polite remarks by Ambassador Parris regarding the efforts of Ambassador Edelman and Ambassador Logoglu, as well as our previous Ambassador, Ambassador Pearson, and the previous Turkish Ambassador to America, Baki Ilkin. Those four gentlemen have made Herculean efforts to keep this relationship strong.

I would like to ask the panel to delve a little bit deeper into the sense of anti-Americanism. I wonder if a group of American special forces or a group of American Marines were ever handcuffed and hooded by a NATO ally whether American public opinion would ever recover. I doubt it would, for good reason. There would be incredible outrage, rightfully so.

Our American military officials in Turkey and in the region have good reason to be disappointed, upset and frustrated with the response times of their Turkish counterparts. When I have visited Turkey, on a number of occasions, there has been great frustration in terms of specific points in the operations of Iraq with what they perceive to be a lack of respectful response in terms of the urgency of American needs. But yet, on our side, there seemed to often be a lack of appreciation for the consequences of American actions that, in the context of public opinion, were far greater than the actions we were complaining of.

In the context of anti-Americanism; if I understand the panel, in essence the collective recommendation, there are two substantive ways in which the United States working with Turkey, but essentially the United States, could reverse the sense of anti-Americanism. One, a much more aggressive approach to the PKK and two, a relaxation of the economic boycott or an increased economic activity with Turkish Cyprus.

It seems to me that in regard to the PKK, there are many factors that go well beyond the American-Turkish relationship that will either inhibit or enable the United States and the consequences of successfully doing that are far more difficult, in terms of casualties and in terms of military operations. It would seem—although politically extremely sensitive, albeit I don’t quite appreciate it at this point in that the Turkish Cypriots have passed the Annan Plan as we and the world asked—that it would be a lot more likely that America could aggressively pursue a new path in Turkish Cyprus and, if I understand the panel correctly, would go a long way to relaxing the anti-Americanism sentiment in Turkey.

What steps would you suggest specifically that are truly doable in the next 6 months to a year, that the United States could implement in the context of Cyprus? Something that would both be meaningful on Cyprus and have the added benefit of having a significant enough impact on Turkey, so as to give Prime Minister Erdogan and those who are responsible for Turkish policy the ability to say, as I think one of you mentioned, this is what the United States has done for us lately?

Ambassador, please.

Ambassador PARRIS. I think that the specifics are less important than doing almost anything. The proof of that was a development which took place several months ago when a group of what were described as “American businessmen” in Ankara made a trip to the island. Most of them, in fact, were Turks, although many of them
represented American companies. This was viewed in Ankara as a major symbolic gesture by the United States to Turkey.

Mr. WEXLER. Just so you are aware, a group of Members of Congress, I believe over the Memorial Day break, are considering making such an effort. Might that have such a positive impact?

Ambassador PARRIS. Exactly. It reinforces my point. I happened to be in Ankara at the time when the story of anti-Americanism and an American response, as generated by Robert Pollock's article in the Wall Street Journal, was at its perhaps hottest. This relatively minor step had an enormously disproportionate impact on Turkish perceptions of America and Americans.

I think anything that Congress can do to lend momentum and substance to an effort that I know the Administration has been trying to make ever since the referendum failed last spring, as a result of the Greek vote, it would be added value. It would be positive. I have to believe that the fact that the Administration has not done more is a function of having run up against some difficult and intractable legal and other considerations. I also have to believe, as someone who worked in that bureaucracy for 30 years, that creative people can find ways to do significant things, if the President makes clear that this is a priority.

I would like to take minor issue, Congressman, with your point about the PKK. I believe that it is the case that unless Prime Minister Erdogan is in a position in the relatively near future to be able to point to something, almost anything—again we are dealing with symbolics here as much as anything—to show that the United States is doing something concrete to back up its words, that there is no place in post-Saddam Iraq for the PKK, he is going to continue to be left naked as people in his country say, “What have the Americans done for us in concrete terms?” Cyprus will help, but this is an issue, as several of my colleagues on this panel have emphasized, which is at the core of our current difficulties and has done more than any other to poison the atmosphere. I think you really have to deal with this in some way.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. If I can just step in very briefly. Congressman, I think you touched on three issues; the anti-American resentment in Turkey, the PKK and Cyprus. I would like to elaborate on the first very briefly and then make some suggestions on Cyprus as per your question.

Regarding resentment in Turkey toward the United States, the bad news is that it is widespread. The good news is that it is not deep-rooted. So that means it is reversible and if the right policy steps are taken, it wouldn’t be very surprising to see Turkish public opinion swayed in favor of the United States very fast, in a short amount of time.

If you look at Turkey’s relationship with the Western World in general, this is the sort of pattern you see; for example, if you look back to the late 1990s. In 1997 when the European Union dismissed Turkey’s membership, simply telling Turkey, “Do not ever visit Brussels,” very high levels of anti-European sentiments were built up. Yet, such feelings disappeared almost overnight when the EU rectified itself in 1999, accepting Turkey for candidacy.

So, I think, if the U.S. were to act on some of its earlier promises regarding the PKK, that would have a tremendous affect on Turk-
ish public opinion, vis-a-vis the United States. I agree with you that action against the PKK is a complicated case. It merits consensus from many parties, including the Iraqi Kurds.

To go back to the earlier question on northern Iraq; to the extent the Iraqi Kurds can be convinced to distinguish themselves from PKK terrorism, they would be able to win Turkey’s confidence. I think to the extent that they can distinguish between themselves and PKK’s terrorism, they will be able to prove to the United States, the rest of Iraq, and the world that they are capable of mature and responsible government. That is where I think the argument toward the Iraqi Kurds is important, because after all, the PKK enjoys safe haven in the areas of northern Iraq, controlled by the two Kurdish parties, PUK and KDP. It is important to bring them on board. I think that the arguments to bring them on board are already there.

The issue of Cyprus, in terms of its complexity, is more easily achievable than any sort of public diplomacy moves to win Turkish public opinion over. This is simply because there is consensus here, as I outlined earlier, between Ankara, Washington and the European Union. Turkey, Turkish Cyprus and Washington are all on the same page, all pushing for the same goal. In this regard, whatever steps can be taken will ease off the economic and humanitarian isolation of Turkish Cypriots, but also more importantly, convince the hardline nationalist Greek Cypriot leadership that they are about to lose the northern half of the island forever. This will bring the Greek Cypriots to the bargaining table at the end of the day and nothing else.

So herein lies the importance of direct trade links, direct cultural links, direct links of tourism and investment between the United States and northern Cyprus. Otherwise, if the sentiment of the nationalist Greek Cypriot leadership is, “We can wait, we have waited 30 years, we can wait another 30 years and we will just have the whole island,” they will never come back to the table.

The question is: How do you bring them back to the table? If you can convince them that by establishing direct links with the northern part of the island, the world is giving them messages that they lose the northern part of the island forever, that the island will never be unified, this is the only way we can bring the two sides on the island back to the negotiation table.

Mr. McCOTTER. Thank you.

Mr. BARKEY. Congressman, I will disagree with my colleagues on the panel here a little bit and that is to say that when you look at anti-Americans in Turkey, let us remember 1999. In 1999, we delivered Ocalan, the PKK leader, on a silver platter to the Turks. Mark Parris was at the time an Ambassador in Ankara.

The person who benefitted the most from that was then interim Prime Minister, Mr. Bulent Ecevit. Mr. Ecevit has been the most vociferous and, if you want, nastiest critic of, shall we say, legitimate political discourse in Turkey of the United States. Despite the fact that we delivered Ocalan to him, he today claims that we are out there to divide Turkey, to create a Kurdish State first in northern Iraq and then a Kurdish State in Turkey. He actually advocated that Turkey should intervene, despite our objections, mili-
tarily in northern Iraq, not necessarily to take the PKK on, but also to take the Iraqi Kurds on.

I think the issue here is a little bit more complicated than just simply the PKK, because yes, we haven’t done much with respect to the PKK. There are two reasons for that. One is the obvious one; our troops are bogged down everywhere in Iraq. Taking on the PKK, which is actually a very tough fighting force, is problematic. We will incur a lot of casualties at a time when we already have incurred casualties elsewhere in Iraq.

Second, the PKK is in Kurdish-controlled territory, but if we have problems taking on the PKK, the Iraqi Kurds are at a greater disadvantage militarily in terms of taking the PKK on, but they also don’t have an incentive. Why do you want the Iraqi Kurds to take on the PKK and expend their own blood, when the Turkish Government and the Turkish State in general has essentially treated them very badly?

They never talk about the Kurds as having any rights in Iraq. They talk about the Kurdish leadership as clan leaders, never as national leaders, which they are. Now the good news is Jalal Talabani is the President and he really does believe in a better relationship with the Turks. And the Turkmens, whether they like it or not, now have to refer to Mr. Talabani not as a clan leader, but as Mr. President, President of Iraq. You have a potential there for more development, but it is not that simple.

On to Cyprus and what we can do on Cyprus: I think the greatest impediment to any action in Cyprus is actually not us, but the EU. The EU has to move. The EU has been blocked from spending the $259 million it had allocated for northern Cyprus and most of the legal impediments that one has talked about have to do with the EU, because today Cyprus is an EU territory, both north and south, technically.

That said, I think what we need to do most is to push the EU to do something about northern Cyprus. That relationship is far more important and far more meaningful for the Turkish Cypriots than what we can do.

Ms. BARAN. Just very quickly. I think a lot has been said on Cyprus and I agree with Ambassador Parris that as long as something is done, that is going to strengthen the hands of those in Turkey who want to now move away from anti-Americanism. Yet, I do have to underline that it will be a tactical solution and not a long-term strategic one addressing something much deeper.

It really is about the long-term vision the United States has in the broader Middle East and the Black Sea regions and the support for democracy and freedom initiatives, which have not been correctly understood in Turkey. Instead, they are feared and associated with wars and with instability around Turkey. I think even if the United States helps on Cyprus, and I think it is important to help both on PKK and on Cyprus, there has to also be a much more deeper engagement, maybe at the Administration as well as the congressional level, on working with the Turks about the vision. The democracy and freedom agenda is debated in the United States as well, and when it crosses the Atlantic and comes to Turkey, it only leads to terrible speculations and concerns and, in fact, to Turkish lack of cooperation on a whole set of issues that actually
would be in Turkey's interest as well, if they understood what the vision was.

Mr. McCotter. Thank you. I have some questions. It is based on an observation. The observation is that in the past the United States and Turkey had a working relationship, because the United States view of Turkey as a secularized, relative statement, democratized area would provide a window to the Arab world and the East. Whereas, I believe that the Turks view the United States as a partner that would provide a window and an opportunity to the West.

What we are seeing in that relationship now is that with Turkey's aim to join the EU, they now have a second window potential to go into the West. With the experiment in democracy in Iraq, the United States, through Iraq and potentially Lebanon and other places, is viewing other windows into the Arab world, absent Turkey. I think that the dynamics of that relationship were essentially revealed with the decision not to allow a northern front into Iraq.

So from the American point of view, having the relationship built up to that point, it would seem to me that showed that that window to us cannot be reliably opened at any given time. So as the experiment in Iraq continues, it then causes tension, I would think, in Turkey, because to a certain extent the relationship between the United States and Turkey—if we have a relatively democratic successful, secularized Iraq—will change. Turkey's importance in that region with the United States, while not eliminated, has certainly been diminished by the addition of this new partner.

Similarly, if EU ascension is allowed for Turkey, Turkey would have a window into Europe and, as was pointed out here, the EU's view of the war in Iraq was already a consideration in much of what Turkey did. So you can see that their potential diminishment in the reliance upon the United States by Turkey—which fascinates me because it explains much of the debate regarding the chicken or the egg in terms of Turkey's decision to allow a northern front or not—because some will say that it was done to end the war, which I think was a very poor calculation and a misjudgment of this Administration's position as time has shown, and others that it was done for the EU, which at least would be a rational basis. If it was done because there was no understanding between the United States and Turkey what would happen in the Kurdish regions of Iraq, that would also make sense. If it was simply to end the war for the sake of doing that to see a Muslim nation not invaded, it would show that the anti-Americanism would be more latent and deep-seated than one would think in Turkey, because the differentiation between a Muslim state that kills its citizens at will or a Muslim state that is doing the Lord's work with its people would be lost. You can't make that kind of distinction.

So it would seem to me that much of the problem that we are facing is the nature of a transforming relationship with the additions of new partners on each side, and I don't know that you can find one single way to address that relationship, if, as the Prime Minister has pointed out, this is a mature and positive relationship. I think you would have to proceed from that premise that this is not the Cold War relationship that we had in the past. I think that we are expecting the United States, in some instances, to ac-
cept all of the blame for the breakdown in the relationship. We should look to poor decisionmaking on the part of both partners, because if the Turkish Government did not understand that their influence in the northern regions of Iraq would be diminished by not allowing us to go through and open a northern front, they were sadly mistaken.

If anyone believes that the addition of 10,000 or so Turkish troops into that region at the present time will have a stabilizing factor, I think they would also be sadly mistaken. If you are looking to engage in a constructive relationship in that area, one must recognize the mistake that was made in the calculation. It would be similar to the Ottoman Empire’s decision to join the Kaiser during World War I, I would think, that led to the Treaty of Sevres and those problems.

I think that my observation in a transitional relationship, honestly, is critical. While we can point at what the United States may or may not have done, it would be unproductive to have the Turkish Government or anyone else not admit the errors of judgment that have occurred.

Would you view this as a transitional relationship?

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that as you avidly outlined, we are definitely seeing a flux in the relationship. The basis of the relationship, as Ambassador Parris has suggested elsewhere, was the containment of Iraq in the 1990s. Now that Iraq no longer needs to be contained, the question is: What is going to be the new basis of the relationship? That would be the rebuilding of Iraq.

I think in this regard, Turkey and the United States are on the same page. They are both for a unified country, with institutions of representative government that is pro-Western and, I think, in this regard one could not emphasize more that Turkey and the United States see eye-to-eye.

The question is: Before we get to the bigger picture, what are the thorns on the way? The biggest thorn on the way is that which I have put so much emphasis on, the PKK issue, as Ambassador Parris has suggested as well.

Unless the Turkish leadership is able to provide to the Turkish public opinion deliverables, in terms of the United States-Turkish relationship and taking care of what upsets the Turks most in Iraq—the issue of the PKK presence over there—it will be very hard for us to get to the point of once again having a common policy agenda on which we are united 100 percent, as we were back in 1990s. I do agree and I am going to take issue with my friend, Henri, here, that the issue of the PKK is a very complex one, but also I think the role of the Iraqi Kurds there should not be underestimated. PKK is physically present in areas of northern Iraq, controlled by the two Iraqi Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK and it is a terrorist organization by Turkish definition, by our definition.

It is incumbent on the Iraqi Kurds to take on this organization. I am not suggesting here a direct fight against 5,000 people—the terrorists that PKK has in northern Iraq—given United States engagement in central Iraq and policy priorities over there, but there are many ways of fighting terror. You can fight the organization’s
fronts in the Western World, in the U.S., within the EU, where it recruits militants and raises funds. You don't really have to go fight the 5,000 terrorists. You can fight it by eliminating its leadership, which I think is a very effective way, given the hierarchical structure of the PKK. This tactic worked fine in 1998, literally crippling this organization for a good 5 to 6 years. Anything you do that can be presented to the Turkish public as United States commitment to Turkey's interests in the region I think will be received extremely well and be magnified by 10 as far as the Turkish public opinion is concerned in terms of a positive move toward swaying that public opinion toward the United States.

Mr. McCotter. Thank you, Dr. Cagaptay. I would like to throw one more thing out on the table. That was very helpful. When we discuss the anti-Americanism, we have talked about EU integration as being viewed by the Turkish citizenry as a positive development. Given the fact that EU integration touches upon one nation's sovereignty, as the English can show you with the pound and other instances, what makes us think that EU integration will not have the countervailing force of increasing fundamentalism, nationalism, and anti-Western thought within Turkey, should they be allowed into the EU, rather than simply anti-Americanism at the present time for whatever reason?

Has there been serious thought as to the potential street response to integration into a Westernized European Union, with all the secularism and some of the affronts to traditional Islam that that culture presents to it?

Mr. Barkey. Congressman, first of all, we need to look at the EU as a process. It is not a discreet timed event. In other words, nothing happens and then suddenly 15 years later Turkey gets admitted into the EU.

You have to look at this as the process and the process is going to be a difficult one. That is to say that the Turks have already made an enormous number of changes in the constitutional arrangements to adhere to the Copenhagen criteria, but they also have to implement them. This is where the angst with respect to the EU comes, because implementing them will bring to the surface a whole series of contradictions within Turkey. What we are seeing already now—even though the Europeans agreed to a date only a few months ago—is that, because of the Iraq war, these contradictions within Turkey are coming to the surface much, much earlier than people expected. So you have a nationalist reaction already in Turkey. It is mostly focused on the United States primarily because of Iraq, but you can be sure that it ultimately will have to do with the European Union and also Cyprus, et cetera.

If you permit me, I just want to come back to one issue, which is actually quite interesting, because we keep talking about the March 1, 2003 decision of the Turkish Parliament as a preordained decision. I think it was a monumental miscalculation on the part of the parliamentary whips. I mean, you know sometimes whips don't know how to count or maybe they are not as good as they are here, but the fact of the matter is everybody went into that parliamentary meeting that morning assuming and convinced that the decision was going to be a positive one. It was a fluke and in fact, the vote was technically positive and the news reports im-
mediately said it had been approved. Later on, the people realized that the people who voted, who abstained from voting, were counted as negatives.

So I don’t think that we should look at that decision necessarily as a categorical attempt by the government to say no. It was an accident and accidents happen and they have consequences. I would venture to say, Congressman, that in the end I think it was slightly better that they voted against, because had we opened the second front, I am sure we would have gone into Baghdad faster. We would have controlled Baghdad better. We would have had more boots on the ground, so to say, but we also would have brought in with us and behind us 10,000 Turkish troops into northern Iraq. At that point, you don’t know what would have happened with those 10,000 troops, not because they would do something, but if I was al-Qaeda or the PKK or anybody else who want to create problems, I would have taken shots at the Turkish troops, then the troops would respond and you would have a huge mess in your hands.

So it was six of one, half a dozen of another, but I also do want to register the fact that this was a mistake. It was not a pre-ordained decision. Thank you.

Mr. CAGaptop. If I can just quickly step in, in terms of the March 1 vote and its impact, I think it is time to cross the T’s and dot the I’s.

Although a northern front was not opened through Turkey, it was in the end opened up with support from Iraqi Kurds and United States troops were flown into northern Iraq through Jordan. I think that a northern front did not open up and that this made war efforts difficult, is really not a valid argument, because a northern front did exist and does exist. The second issue is what happened on March 1, here I will second Ambassador Parris’ argument, that the process was left in the hands of bureaucracies. As sophisticated as they are, in the hands of bureaucracies, not taken over by political leadership which would have guided the public opinion in a more favorable way and spin it, if you will, when needed.

Herein lies at the crux of the problems we have seen lately. This is why it is very positive that the Turkish Prime Minister has come forward publicly, taking ownership of the relationship and telling the Turkish public why the United States matters and why the United States-Turkish relationship is important. This is exactly the kind of attitude we need, I think, if you want to open a new page in the relationship. Have political leadership supported by bureaucracy, but have political leadership take the initiative in the relationship in the public realm in Turkey, where it is most needed, as well as here. I think we need it on both sides of the ocean.

To go back to your main question on the European Union, we have read much about it in the press. This issue of a nationalist backlash in Turkey against the EU process and what it may bring in Turkey. There is nothing unusual here. If you are familiar with the way EU accession works, if you look at other cases of EU accession in the 1990s in Eastern Europe, where public opinion stood before accession talks and after the accession talks, it is exactly what you would find in Turkey.
Before accession talks start, people think Europe is the second best thing since sliced bread. It is all about opportunities and benefits. Once you begin accession talks, you realize that in the beginning EU is more about sacrifices than about benefits. Groups who are going to lose more from making these sacrifices are the ones who are going to come forth with resentments. You look at figures in Poland before the accession talks, 80 to 90 percent of the people were supportive of the EU. The same thing in Turkey until last year, 90 percent of the Turks supported the EU process.

Now that Turkey is moving into the next phase where the whole process becomes real, it is no more imaginary, it is about making fundamental changes in a society. Of course, support will dwindle. Back in the late 1990s in certain countries in Eastern Europe, the countries which were negotiating for membership, support for EU accession was less than 50 percent. Turkey might well get to that point, but there is nothing to panic about. This is very normal. It has been the case in other countries in Eastern Europe. This does, however present the United States with a window of opportunity.

Turkey’s attention is no more 100 percent focused on the EU and Turkey’s obsession is no more the European Union. It is just another policy priority. It is business as usual, with ups and downs. That presents the United States with a window of opportunity if it wants to get Turkey’s attention. It is time now to act, I think.

Ms. Baran. I know you want to move to the next question, but very briefly let me remark on the transition period. I think since the end of the Cold War this has been a transitional relationship. I think regardless of who was right or whether it was a mistake, March 1 did lead to a lot of people in America to question whether Turkey is going to be as essential for the United States as it used to be, not only because of possible changes in Iraq, where you might have a secular democratic Iraq, but also because Turkey has mainly provided a military base assistance and now we see that Romania, Uzbekistan and many other countries could provide the same kind of assistance.

So from the United States perspective, Turkey may not be as essential as far as its location and its ability to cooperate on key military operations. I think, though, if we look at why U.S. Administration after Administration has supported Turkey’s entry into the EU, it is to make sure that Turkey is going to be safely anchored in the Western World, in the Western institutions. I think what we have seen is since the Erdogan Government took office and until the “yes” vote from the EU, there was a roadmap, which was in part put together by the United States, and Turkey received the EU “yes” vote with American support.

We have talked about east-west energy pipelines and the arrest of the head of PKK, and in all these key issues I would say United States support and vision was essential for Turkey. Now U.S. support for ongoing constructive engagement with the EU is going to be essential. On the issue that I have come back to repeatedly, dealing with Europe’s own radical Islamic threat. The United States and the European countries have not been able to come to a common working relationship. This is extremely important for both sides, but Europeans are not able to deal with this and Americans so far also have not had great success, but this is an area, if
proper dialogue is established, Turkey could bring the transatlantic alliance together and offer some important insights.

Mr. McCOTTER. Thank you. Mr. Wexler has some more questions, but just quickly, I think General Franks would disagree with your assessment of the military situation as it was operated.

I am still very concerned about the fundamentalist response to an integration in the Westernized EU and I think that is part of EU's question too.

Mr. Wexler?

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. I was wondering if I could change focus a tiny bit. For the better part of 500 years, Turkey has enjoyed a successful relationship with its Jewish community inside Turkey. Some people would argue Turkey's relationship with Israel from Israel's perspective may be its second most important relationship. It is groundbreaking for both Turkey and Israel, in terms of their cooperation militarily, strategically, and economically and yet of late, there has been tension.

Prime Minister Erdogan's trip to Israel; I would be curious if you could comment as to what the ramifications are of his trip. Positive? Not so positive?

If I could just offer an observation on a related topic. There is now an American group or groups which engage in important tasks of translating Turkish media and I, for one, at times, read those translations. It is important always. I welcome any American groups' commitment to holding media accountable all over the world. It would seem to me, though, that if a group is to present—as representative of the sentiment in a country—a set of translations, that either they should point out that what they are providing represents a very small portion of that nation's media or they should provide a broader range of translations so that those reading their publications would get a full picture of what in fact is occurring in Turkey.

If I could maybe start with Ambassador Parris. In your experience, is there a change in Turkey's relationship with Israel? And how should we view Prime Minister Erdogan's trip to Israel?

Ambassador PARRIS. Well Congressman, I appreciate the opportunity to answer the question. I have been to Israel a couple of times in the last year since Prime Minister Erdogan made his comments about state terrorism. I have talked to Israelis a lot about this, as well as to Turks. Since he made those remarks and since Turkey suspended—did not cancel, but suspended—the competitions in which Israeli defense firms were participating—particularly when it was impossible to schedule a meeting between Egu Ohlmert, who had been sent by Prime Minister Sharon partly to try to understand better the problem with the Prime Minister when Mr. Ohlmert was there—it has led to a questioning in Israel; the foundations of a relationship, which during the late 1990s had grown dramatically and had become very warm and very confident; and of one another as partners.

Clearly there is a difference in style. Clearly it is a different way of looking at the problem of Israel and its place in the region in Ankara, which I think would be just silly to deny, based on the evidence. That said, I think that there is enormous interest on both sides in keeping this relationship together. The Israeli side of that
is self-evident, given, as you put it, the importance of maintaining a cordial, positive relations with such a big Muslim country in its immediate neighborhood.

I take the fact that the prime minister has now gone to Israel and met with Prime Minister Sharon; that defense contracts were signed while he was there; that the defense minister stayed on for an additional 2 days; and that the trade volume of the two countries has accelerated dramatically, even during the period we are talking about, as pretty good evidence that this relationship, perhaps in contrast to ours recently, has some reasonably good shock absorbers working in it. I think the fact that he has invited Prime Minister Sharon to come suggests that we have not seen this as a sort of one-stop shopping event. I am much more confident about where this relationship is going than I was 6 or 8 months ago and I think we can all feel good about that.

Mr. WEXLER. If I may, in the broader context, what role would any of you foresee for Turkey with the new prospect of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation? Is there a particular role that you see for Turkey to play that would provide more shock absorbers, to use your language, or additional evidence of the growing relationship between the Israeli's and Turkey, and Turkey’s important role in the process?

Ambassador PARRIS. I think there has been a sense in which they have talked past one another a little bit on this issue with the Turks using words like “mediate,” both in this context and in the Syrian context. The Israelis have a history of people using that kind of terminology and are a little wary of it, but I think that they recently refined the dialogue to focus on areas where Turkey can very definitely be helpful in concrete ways. This is helping to promote the economic development of the Palestinian areas, particularly Gaza, as the Israeli’s pull out. I think that to the extent that dialogue deepens, there is ample scope for cooperation on both sides and some positive results.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. If I can just step in, I think that one of the strong pillars of the relationship, which Ambassador Parris called a “shock absorber,” is the very developed level of economic ties between the two countries, worth billions of dollars a year in terms of trade, as well as defense contracts. I think this has acted as a good shock absorber in facing the challenges of the Turkish-Israeli relationship over the past couple of years and this is where Turkey can act in terms of the peace process.

Given that we are on the verge of seeing the birth of a Palestinian State, I think if Turkey were to contribute to this process, through economic engagement as well as capacity building measures for the Palestinian State, such as establishing a secular judiciary and a secular education system, things in which Turkey is very successful, is where Turkey can come in, in a very constructive way.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Rob.

I want to thank our panel of witnesses. As you hear, the bells are going off. There never seem to be enough hours in the day to do all the things that we need to do, particularly when it relates to issues as important as this issue.
I found the testimony today to be extremely productive and I continue to look to all of you as a resource as we deal with this region of the world, because our relationship there is too important.

I thank all of you for your testimony and look forward to continuing to work with you.

The Subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the Subcommittee meeting was adjourned.]