Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, USAF
Nominee for Appointment to the Grade of General and for the Position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

1. **Defense Reforms**

   More than 15 years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms.

   A. Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

      Answer. Yes. I support these reforms. I have been personally working to implement these reforms in every position I have held since they were passed in 1986 because of the efficiency and effectiveness they engender.

   B. What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

      Answer. My experience has been that defense reforms under Goldwater-Nichols have been broadly accepted and institutionalized. They have been the underpinning of much of our success in joint war fighting over the past decade.

   C. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

      Answer. The provisions of Goldwater-Nichols have contributed to the success of our armed forces in many areas. My personal view, however, is that the personnel provisions of Title IV have done more than any other aspects of the law to create a true culture of jointness.

      Moreover, as I said in my testimony to the House Intelligence Committee last August, I think that the personnel provisions of the Act are more transferable to the Intelligence Community than any other aspects of the law.

      The essence of jointness is to consider the whole over the parts and to dampen demands for individual control in favor of collaboration and cooperation. The underlying principle of Goldwater-Nichols holds true for the IC: the rejection of the idea that “If I don’t own it or control it, I can’t count on it.”

   D. The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in Section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the
accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Do you agree with these goals?

Answer: Yes.

E. In your view, are the goals of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 fully consistent with the goals of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act? Please explain.

Answer: The goals of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 are consistent with the goals of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that reorganized the Department of Defense to increase cooperation and jointness among the services.

The authorities given to the Director of National Intelligence will allow the DNI to manage the IC in ways that will increase interoperability among the elements of the Intelligence Community. A more effective Intelligence Community cannot help but better support the combined operations of the American armed forces.

For example, the DNI is to prescribe, in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of the Intelligence Community, and the heads of their respective departments, personnel policies and programs applicable to the IC including standards for education, training, recruitment, and retention. At the heart of this is building a Community ethos of cooperation and collaboration—the IC equivalent of jointness.

The Act also directs the DNI to prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of IC personnel through various IC elements during the course of their careers to facilitate the widest possible understanding of intelligence requirements, methods, users, and capabilities.

The law authorizes the DNI to give special incentives for personnel to get IC-wide perspectives by working in the Office of the DNI or in other positions in support of the DNI’s IC management functions; I strongly support these initiatives.

2. Duties

A. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence?

Answer: The formal answer is that the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act (IR&TPA) of 2004 specifies certain duties and functions of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. These include assisting the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director. Further, the law specifies that the PDDNI is to act for, and exercise the powers of, the DNI during the absence or disability of the DNI or during a vacancy in the position of the DNI.

If confirmed, the DNI and I would work out the details of my job description within the formal framework. No decisions have yet been made, but it would be reasonable to assume that the DNI would want me to help him ensure that the Intelligence Community runs as smoothly as possible.

I should also point out that the IR&TPA notes the sense of Congress that either the DNI or his principal deputy should be a serving military officer or someone with an appreciation of military intelligence activities and requirements. If confirmed, one of my key responsibilities will be to provide the DNI with insight into the needs of America’s combat forces.

I also expect that my experience in the production of intelligence and my knowledge of intelligence sources, tasking, analysis and distribution as well as of budgetary issues, laws and military organizations should complement the DNI’s experience as an intelligence consumer.

B. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer: Over the course of my career, I have had extensive experience in managing and leading the military personnel that have been under my command. As the Director of the National Security Agency, I have also had a large number of civilian employees under my direction.

In my current position as DIRNSA, we transformed NSA into a modern agency that operates effectively and efficiently in the digital age. I am especially proud that we have improve many aspects of NSA’s mission including transforming the SIGINT process to get pertinent SIGINT information out to warfighters and to NSA’s other customers in a timely fashion.

With regard to my responsibility to provide the DNI with insight into the intelligence needs of DoD, I believe my experience in leading the National Security Agency through the campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war on terrorism has given me a robust appreciation of DoD requirements in wartime.

In my position as DIRNSA I have also had extensive experience contending with the IC’s dispersion of authority. While responsible for the Nation’s entire cryptologic architecture, I directly controlled just over a third of the Nation’s cryptologic spending
and was obliged to influence the remainder through an often cumbersome system of staff coordination. The current legislation takes significant steps in better aligning responsibility with authority.

My experience also includes dealing with issues of some political sensitivity. For example, while Deputy Chief of Staff, United Nations Command and U.S. Forces Korea, I routinely led the military delegation charged with negotiating with North Korean generals.

C. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence?

Answer. If confirmed, there are a variety of actions I would need to take to enhance my ability to perform as PDDNI. I would need to listen to the advice and counsel of individuals with unique experiences to share. I have already made a concerted effort to reach out to such people, both inside and outside of government. For example, I have listened to insightful advice from the SECDEF, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, other DoD officials, former DCIs, Attorneys General, members of the National Security Council, other White House officials, leaders of industry, prominent academics, and friends whose advice I value. All have been highly supportive.

I particularly would need to familiarize myself with aspects of the IC beyond the immediate confines of DoD and NSA—issues like the linkages between law enforcement and intelligence or between foreign and domestic intelligence.

D. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Director of National Intelligence will prescribe for you?

Answer. In the months ahead we have to set up an office, build an organization, hire the right kind of people from inside and outside the government, and establish new ways of doing business for the Intelligence Community. As with all Deputies, however, I would assume much of my time would be taken up with “other duties as assigned.” That is right and proper and I will use my best efforts to complete whatever tasks the DNI assigns me.

3. Relationships

In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following:

A. The Secretary of Defense.

B. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

C. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
D. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration.

E. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

F. The Director for Intelligence, J-2, the Joint Staff.

G. The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence Directors.

H. The Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies.

Answer. In the broadest possible terms, I will seek if confirmed to work with each individual listed in a cooperative spirit for the good of the Nation. Much has been written about potential bureaucratic roadblocks to effective cooperation. We have all heard the warnings, particularly from the WMD Commission, about how bureaucracies are loathe to change and how organizations may want to keep a death grip on what they perceive as “their turf.”

That said, I personally know the individuals listed and know that each has the best interests of the country at heart. I look forward to working with each of them in my new capacity, if confirmed, because I believe they understand that a successful DNI means a successful IC, which means a safer Nation. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 gives us an opportunity to improve the overall performance of U.S. intelligence for all consumers.

Many of the Defense officials noted above will be, as they have been in the past, at a key intersection of American national security policy and combat operations. They support both the Department of Defense and national needs. Some of the discussion and press commentary over this past year seems to suggest that this is somehow a new or troublesome development. This is not new and has not been new since 1952 when President Truman established NSA as the first “national” intelligence component housed within DoD. The “difficulties” associated with this arrangement are not so much circumstances to be solved as conditions to be managed in the national interest. At their best, agencies such as NSA are at the cornerstone of a “culture of collaboration” since their placement makes collaboration essential to their success.

More specifically, as the role of the DNI is established and DoD continues to develop the role of the USD(I), it is important that we explore ways in which the latter can play an important role in helping both the Secretary of Defense and the DNI to develop greater integration within those IC elements located within DoD.

In that light, I would like to echo remarks Ambassador Negroponte made in his confirmation hearing. He noted that the Act gives him the authority to deal directly with heads of IC entities in certain areas and that he intended to exercise this authority. I share Ambassador Negroponte’s views because, as I told the Senate Intelligence
Committee, I believe it is critically important to the success of the DNI that he have robust authority over the big, national collection entities like the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and CIA’s Directorate of Operations.

As noted above, as a military officer (and if confirmed) I would bring to this job a perspective much sought by Congress. I would also note, however, that the IR&TPA states that a commissioned officer, during his term as DNI or PDDNI, shall not be subject to supervision or control by the Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the Department of Defense. This is a carry-over from the National Security Act of 1947, and it makes good sense to do so in order to ensure the independence of the incumbent.

4. Major Challenges and Problems

A. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence?

Answer. If confirmed, I see three major challenges that immediately will confront me as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence: establishing the organization of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, staffing that organization with the best qualified people, and beginning to address significant issues for the DNI and the Intelligence Community.

B. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. With respect to establishing the organization of Office of the DNI (ODNI), a number of options exist. If confirmed, the DNI and I will weigh those options and decide which structure will best meet the needs of the DNI and the goals of the IR&TPA.

Today, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management and those acting as the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, and the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production perform important Community functions, which the DNI may want to continue in some form under the DNI structure. For instance, it may be desirable to have one person in charge of management issues that cut across the IC. This could include developing and determining the budget for the National Intelligence Program.

The law also gives the DNI important responsibilities for tasking intelligence collection, which the DNI may want reflected in the ODNI structure.

Similarly, the law obligates the DNI to ensure analytic integrity and objectivity obligations that should be considered as the DNI designs the ODNI.
With respect to staffing the ODNI, if confirmed, I would recommend to the DNI that the overriding consideration when selecting personnel should be doing what is best for the country. The law makes the DNI responsible for ensuring that this happens, and I support his authority. I would recommend to the DNI that he look for people who have the qualities needed to carry the Intelligence Community into the 21st Century.

- This would include people who are dedicated to protecting the country. Intelligence work is a high calling and often requires sacrifices by individuals and their families. The IC needs people who are willing to put national needs above personal needs and serve the country by being its first line of defense.
- It would also include people who are proven leaders. I have often said that the strength of NSA is its people; NSA goes down the elevators when our people go home at night. Finding the right individuals with the skills to lead the workforces of the various IC elements is critical to successfully facing the challenges confronting the IC and the Nation.
- I would also advise the DNI to choose people who are committed to working cooperatively across the IC while fulfilling the mission of their host agency or department. This will take a special kind of talent. Individuals chosen to lead the IC must be keenly focused on the IC mission and work together to further the national interests of the United States.
- Ambassador Negroponte values diversity as an important goal in managing large organizations, and I support him in that.

C. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence?

Answer. I see the most serious problem in the performance of the functions of the PDDNI as creating within the IC a culture of collaboration. One of my goals as PDDNI will be to build a collaborative environment where cooperative analysis becomes the norm, resulting in one intelligence discipline being made stronger by another, and each prompting useful activity by still a third.

If confirmed, I would propose to the DNI that every member of the IC be given an urgent responsibility to understand his or her role within the larger Community, and to carry it out as assigned. For example, while I would want DIA analysts to have access to NGA-generated imagery in order to inform their finished reporting, I would want, even more, DIA analysts to have access to the NGA expert who is responsible for having collected the information in the first place, has been collecting such information for 30 years, and can provide insights concerning the information that would not occur to a non-expert.

We have to stress this kind of culture at every opportunity. It needs to be apparent in personnel appointments. It needs to be central in all of our professional education and training. And it needs to be reinforced with a passionate commitment that
the DNI leads all of the Community.

D. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I would take management actions as soon as possible to ensure that the Intelligence Community operates like a true “information enterprise.” We need to find ways to enable the IC to provide relevant information at the appropriate stage of its development and in a form usable to those who have the mission, capability, and expertise to act on it. There ought to be no artificial barriers set up—or maintained--that deny significant information to an entity that requires it. Access to meaningful information in a form that is useful and responsive to the needs of the user is a key component of the information enterprise, and is absolutely vital to our success.

The IC has made progress in building close partnerships between and among intelligence agencies. Some of the collaborative relationships are relatively new; others have functioned effectively and efficiently for years. If confirmed, I would recommend to the DNI that we must act even more assertively and comprehensively; we need to build on our success to make cooperative relationships more lasting in their duration, more inclusive across the IC in their breadth, and more profound in their depth.

We would, of course, have to be specific with regard to timelines and metrics. In the absence of these, some of our efforts in the past to promote information availability and access have been received as guidelines rather than as determinative policy.

5. Priorities

A. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence?

Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend to the DNI several broad priorities. One priority, as discussed above, would be to establish the organization of the Office of the DNI and to staff it with the right people.

Another recommendation would be to issue clear DNI guidance on a variety of issues to the IC. I would recommend that the DNI’s guidance be clear, short, and authoritative, and not the product of endless staffing or a lengthy search for absolute consensus. Consensus is rarely bold and it is often wrong.

Yet another priority would be to monitor the activities of the IC—in short, to improve our performance. The IR&TPA is quite clear in this regard. Among other things, the DNI is to: ensure the effective execution of the budget; monitor the implementation of that budget by the heads of the elements of the IC; establish objectives, priorities, and guidance for the IC to ensure timely and effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of national intelligence; and ensure compliance
with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

6. Information Sharing

A consistent finding of almost all studies, investigations, and commissions evaluating the performance of the Intelligence Community with regard to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and pre-war intelligence regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs have concluded that there are impediments to the rapid and efficient sharing of information between elements of the Intelligence Community.

A. In your view, what are the institutional and cultural impediments to the effective sharing of information between elements of the Intelligence Community?

Answer. I see at least five broad categories of impediments to information sharing today: (1) technology, (2) law, (3) policy, (4) culture, and (5) impediments that grow out of enduring urban myths.

The technological impediments can be overcome. In short, we have wired ourselves north-south, i.e. within each of our disciplines. We have far less wiring east-west, i.e. between disciplines. But this can be overcome and massive efforts to do so are already underway.

The legal impediments to information sharing have traditionally grown out of a concern for the privacy of U.S. persons. Intelligence agencies are responsible for ensuring that information to, from, or about U.S. persons is “minimized” in accordance with procedures approved by the Attorney General. Such procedures protect the legitimate privacy interests of U.S. persons against unconstitutional actions by the U.S. Government. When information about U.S. persons is collected as a result of the interception of the communications of a foreign entity, the identity of the U.S. person is not included in an intelligence report unless that identity is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or to assess its importance. We are working very hard (and much progress has already been made) to maximize the sharing of information while continuing to protect privacy rights.

Policy issues also play a role in impeding the flow of information. The quintessential issue in this category is concern about the protection of sources and methods. Such concerns are legitimate, and at NSA we have experienced the loss of some lucrative sources of information when the communications methods we were exploiting became publicly known. That said, in my personal experience I have never seen “sources and methods” concerns sufficient to prevent the flow of intelligence to those who have a genuine need for it and we need to accelerate our training efforts to ensure that this is consistently the case. Again, we have made great strides in the past three years but this is an area that demands constant attention.
In addition, cultural issues can result in impediments to information sharing. Turf wars and the desire to overemphasize the “ownership” of data (i.e., knowledge is power) do indeed play a role—sometimes—in the erection of barriers to information sharing. These are, in my experience, much less common than the press would have us believe, and thankfully have become even more rare since the 2001 attacks on the United States. Nonetheless, our tolerance for this attitude must be zero.

Finally, I am occasionally struck by the number of so-called impediments to information sharing that result not from any conscious decision by one or more agencies in the IC, but instead from simple misunderstandings. We need to continue to educate IC members of the actual limitations so that they fully understand the rules.

**B. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to ensure that critical intelligence information is fully shared within the Intelligence Community? How would you ensure that sensitive sources and methods of collection are fully protected?**

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would recommend to Ambassador Negroponte that he make clear to all parts of the IC that he has access to all IC data and should set the standard by which that data may be accessed by those that need it. Information access is no longer a question for individual IC members, it is expected throughout the IC.

**7. Communications and Information Networks**

The Intelligence Community depends, in large part, on communications architectures and information networks established and managed by the Department of Defense.

**A. How would you ensure that the “C3” functions, including information technology management, multi-level security, interoperability, and cybersecurity policy are fully coordinated between the Department of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence?**

**Answer.** This is a critical issue for DoD and the Intelligence Community to resolve. Intelligence agencies need interoperable communications with each other and DoD agencies need to be able to get relevant information to combatant commanders. These objectives, though different, are not mutually exclusive. I expect to work closely with the DoD to ensure that the IC and DoD develop information systems architectures and information security policies that promote secure and timely information access. In addition, the establishment of the Information Sharing Environment mandated by Executive Order 13356 and the IR&TPA represents a positive step in promoting assured information access across different communities of interest.
8. National Counter-terrorism Center

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center was established three years ago to facilitate the fusion of information about terrorist threats from various intelligence and law enforcement agencies. In accordance with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the TTIC has evolved into the National Counter-terrorism Center (NCTC).

A. What role do you envision for the Department of Defense in relation to the NCTC, including the provision of military and civilian personnel from DOD as members of the NCTC staff?

Answer. Success in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) demands the effective use of all national instruments. As the organization charged with strategic operational planning and threat warning, the NCTC will only succeed if there is a full partnership with the Department of Defense that leverages the depth and expertise of elements of DoD, including DoD assignees to the NCTC. DoD brings to the NCTC strength in planning, experience in the GWOT battlefield and analytic engagement with targets of interest.

B. In your view, what has changed within defense intelligence agencies, and within the other elements of the Intelligence Community since 9/11 to enable them to better share information amongst themselves, within the larger Intelligence Community, and with appropriate law enforcement agencies?

Answer. The intelligence and operations environment necessary to confront a distributed networked threat like terrorism has challenged the Intelligence Community to reevaluate notions of what constitutes effective collaboration and sharing.

We have greatly enriched the broad understanding that we have significant interdependencies upon one another. This learning, and realizing the power of leveraging what we have learned, has done much to spur action towards establishing relationships, connectivity and effecting policy changes that further enable this capability.

I believe a bridge we still need to cross is closing what gaps remain between the flow of information between our IC and State and Local officials. We need to set and implement appropriate relationships that provide first responders the kind of actionable information we have been successful in delivering to the fight overseas.

C. In your view, what additional changes, if any, are needed to improve the function of the NCTC and its coordination with the defense intelligence agencies and the broader Intelligence Community?

Answer. I believe authorities stemming from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 will provide opportunities to strengthen the strong foundation Interim Director Brennan has established.
Ongoing work to build NCTC’s strategic operational planning role is a good example of where NCTC is taking on the task of marrying operational planning with threat assessments in a fully collaborative environment. This is an area where DoD elements, in particular, have a considerable amount of experience and I expect they will play a key role in that process.

9. Homeland Defense

In recent years, with the establishment of the positions of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the Department of Defense has been fundamentally reorganized to better address the critical homeland defense mission.

A. In your view, what challenges lie ahead in integrating the intelligence capabilities of the Department of Defense with those of the Department of Homeland Security and other associated federal, state and local agencies?

Answer. The inclusion of “homeland security” within the national security framework of the United States is the most significant shift in American security thinking in decades. We need to ensure that we think through what it means to operate in a homeland security environment, one that does not lend itself to the facile distinction between “domestic” security issues and more traditional “international” security issues. My personal view is that this issue represents the immediate intellectual “heavy lifting” for the DNI.

The challenge of creating a consistent threat information stream from Federal players to state and local counterparts must be addressed. I expect that the Office of the DNI will play a significant role in fostering these relationships.

B. In your view, does the Department of Defense’s existing requirements process adequately support the establishment of intelligence requirements for homeland security and missions?

Answer. I am very familiar with the requirement’s process used by NORTHCOM; it is consistent with other parts of the DoD requirements system. Although I have spoken to Secretary Chertoff and his staff about DHS intelligence needs, I am not yet as familiar as I need to be and look forward to learning more about those needs.

10. Transformation

Secretary Rumsfeld has established transformation of the Armed Forces to meet 21st Century threats as one of his highest priorities.

A. What is the role of intelligence in the overall defense transformation process?
Answer. One of the key tenets of Secretary Rumsfeld’s transformation initiatives is information dominance. The protection of our information and its networks and the seamless transfer of information throughout our military forces enable us to act upon our adversaries before they act upon us.

B. Specifically for the defense intelligence community, what does transformation mean?

Answer. As a military officer I am fully aware that – in a doctrinal sense – we have opted for precision over mass. Said differently, we have decided that we can operate smarter and better by creating the effects of mass through precision targeting. We will defeat our enemies because the impact of destroying a critical target in a discrete, or focused, way maximizes our effectiveness and maximizes the disruptive effects on the enemy.

But precision weapons are never more precise than the intelligence that enables them. We need intelligence worthy of the precise weaponry that we have and are creating.

This shouldn’t be surprising. The way a nation makes war is as indicative of its culture as the way it writes poetry or creates music. We are an information-based society. America’s military is an information based combat force; hence, the absolute criticality of precise, timely and relevant intelligence for our battlefield forces.

C. In your view, what transformational capabilities does our Intelligence Community require?

Answer. Transformation in the Intelligence Community requires both a technological and a cultural change.

Culturally, we need to combine like efforts while at the same time encouraging analytical differences. To do this, the DNI will need to gain visibility into all intelligence related activities but also know what management approach to emphasize for each of the IC’s individual parts: a firmer hand to gain economies of scale when it comes to collection but perhaps a lighter hand when it comes to nurturing a variety of analytical approaches.

Technology must be harnessed to deal with what will become even more acute information overload in the future. We need to present information in the “language” of the receiver and in such a way as to facilitate decision making.
D. If confirmed, how would you ensure that defense transformation and the larger Intelligence Community transformation are mutually supportive and complementary?

Answer. Many efforts are already underway within the Intelligence Community to transform and improve processes. Step one will be to use the enhanced authorities of the DNI to get our arms around all disparate efforts. We need to combine like efforts and eliminate duplication where appropriate. We need to identify best practices and eliminate the inefficient. Most of all, we need to set a direction with clear, unambiguous guidance and use the tools that the law gives us to ensure our efforts are synchronized.

11. Defense Intelligence

The defense intelligence structure has evolved over the years, most recently with the creation of the Defense Human Intelligence Service in 1996, the establishment of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), now the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, in 1997, and the establishment of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in 2002.

A. In your view, is the current organizational structure of defense intelligence the best structure to support military and national intelligence needs?

Answer. The organizational structure of defense intelligence is complex. The USD(I) already has several efforts underway to improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of defense intelligence. The creation of Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs), for example, is a clear recognition that intelligence—by its nature—is inherently operational. The creation of intelligence campaign plans is another effort that will rationalize and clearly articulate DoD intelligence needs. Similarly, the increased authorities of Commander STRATCOM in global ISR promise to bring greater order and flexibility into this important area.

I would therefore be very reluctant to conclude that any current structure is the “best.” It will be important, though, to harmonize changes planned or underway in DoD’s tactical activities with the changes the DNI may make at the national level.

B. If not, what changes would you recommend to the current structure?

Answer. Although I have no specific recommendations to make, I would stress that this structure is clearly something that should not be static, but should evolve over time in response to changing circumstances and needs. All of our activities are simply elements of larger strategies and policies. As the operational environment evolves, we need to ensure that our institutional arrangements emerge accordingly.
C. In your view, what role should the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence play in order to best serve the needs of the Department of Defense, as well as the Director of National Intelligence?

Answer. My personal sense is that to the degree that Defense can package up the tactical intelligence activities of the military departments and present them in a unified, integrated, coherent way to the DNI, that would be a real virtue and something that would be very welcome. Under the best of circumstances, the USD(I) should be a key agent of the SECDEF and a key ally of the DNI.

12. Acquisition Authority

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 establishes significant acquisition authority for the Director of National Intelligence, and provides that the Director of National Intelligence shall exercise exclusive milestone decision authority over Intelligence Community acquisition programs; except that with respect to Department of Defense intelligence programs, the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence will jointly exercise this authority.

A. What challenges, if any, do you see associated with the exercise of joint milestone decision authority by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence?

Answer. If confirmed, we will need to work out procedures that will allow us to exercise this joint authority in a way that does not create undue burdens in paperwork or time.

B. What organizational structures will the Director of National Intelligence need to establish to ensure comprehensive and professional oversight of complex acquisition programs?

Answer. If confirmed, I will recommend to the DNI that he create a robust acquisition office to carry out the responsibilities identified in the law. Once the above referenced joint MDA process is defined, the DNI will need a staff to ensure proper practices and oversight.

C. In your view, should milestone decision authority within the Intelligence Community be centralized within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or delegated to the heads of the respective elements of the Intelligence Community?

Answer. Under the IR&TPA, milestone decision authority rests exclusively with the DNI, except with respect to DoD programs. An analysis of specific practices, and the possible need or desirability to delegate any such authorities, will have to be reviewed after the DNI has been confirmed.
13. Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities and Joint Military Intelligence Programs

The Department of Defense currently funds important military intelligence programs through the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) and Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) accounts. The Director of National Intelligence will have significant budget authority in the formulation of National Intelligence Program budget recommendations made by elements of the Intelligence Community, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission also recommended that the Secretary of Defense retain principal authority for the formulation of TIARA and JMIP programs. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 provides for the Director of National Intelligence to participate in the formulation of TIARA and JMIP budget submissions.

A. In your view, what role should the Director of National Intelligence play in the development of military intelligence budget recommendations submitted by the military Services and the Department of Defense?

Answer. If confirmed, I will recommend to the DNI that his office play a robust and constructive role in the formulation of the JMIP and TIARA programs budgets.

This will be very important. Much of the discussion in the press and elsewhere over the past year has implied that there exists a clear distinction between “tactical” and “national” intelligence. This is at best wrong headed and it is potentially dangerous. One can still suggest that some users are more “national” users of intelligence, while others can still be described as “tactical” but the intelligence itself is likely to be part of a seamless whole, riding on a common network and applied simultaneously by various users pursuing a range of objectives.

B. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the various components of the intelligence budget meet the needs of battlefield commanders, as well as the needs of the President and other national decision makers?

Answer. Support to the warfighter is a principal objective of the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will recommend to the DNI that we regularly consult with DoD and combatant commanders to identify both their current and future requirements. These needs will then be communicated through budgetary guidance to the intelligence components for preparation and development of the annual NIP budget submission.

14. Human Intelligence

The Secretary of Defense has indicated that he would like to have enhanced human intelligence capabilities within the Department of Defense.
A. Do you support the goals of the Secretary of Defense in enhancing the human intelligence capabilities of the Department of Defense?

Answer. Yes.

B. What aspects, if any, of enhancing Defense human intelligence that would cause you concern as the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence?

Answer. This is largely an issue of coordination and deconfliction. HUMINT collection efforts between DoD and CIA must be coordinated and deconflicted for efficiency and to prevent unintended consequences. We do not want, for example, the HUMINT operations of one organization to interrupt or reveal the HUMINT operations of another. We must also ensure that all HUMINT operations are conducted in a manner consistent with US law and policy.

C. What steps do you believe need to be taken to ensure that the goals and overall mission of defense human intelligence are consistent with the overall human intelligence goals of the Intelligence Community?

Answer. One of the statutory responsibilities of the DNI is to ensure effective use of intelligence resources. If confirmed, I would recommend to the DNI that he issue consistent guidance across the IC about maximizing the use of HUMINT resources.

D. In your view, what changes or additional capabilities, if any, are needed in the Department’s human intelligence organization?

Answer. As a SIGINTer and head of NSA, I am not fully prepared to address detailed changes needed by DoD’s HUMINT organizations at this time. As a general matter, however, I would stress the need for language skills and area expertise as essential building blocks for any HUMINT activities.

At various times, some have suggested that the human intelligence efforts of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency should be consolidated.

E. Do you believe the Defense Human Intelligence capabilities should be consolidated or integrated into the Central Intelligence Agency?

Answer. I understand that this is an issue discussed in the WMD Report and I look forward to considering it in more detail, if confirmed.
15. Military Personnel Training and Assignment

The Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 gives the Director of National Intelligence significant authority over the assignment, extensions and transfers, and the proposed training of uniformed personnel serving within the Intelligence Community.

A. In your view, what procedures should be established to ensure that military personnel assigned to the Intelligence Community are managed so as to ensure that they develop the intelligence skills required to support both military and national intelligence requirements?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to use my experience at NSA to help inform the judgment of the ODNI on this issue. Specifically, NSA is well practiced in working with a military workforce that is more junior, less experienced and more transient than its civilian counterpart in the Agency. I viewed this is a condition to be managed rather than a problem to be solved. Accepting that the demands of uniformed service made the above conditions almost inevitable, we worked on the positive aspects that our military workforce brought to the enterprise—youth, energy, new ideas, deployability, recent education—rather than these more negative attributes.

I would also suggest that the greatest return on HR policy investment for the DNI would be with the Community’s civilian workforce that does not yet enjoy the advantages of tech schools, leadership training, professional military education, mentoring and a rigorous promotion system that are already routine for our military personnel.

I would also add that many of these military programs should serve as models for how we develop our civilian workforce within the IC.

B. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that assignment, transfer, and extension policies for military personnel detailed to the Intelligence Community are consistent with the assignment and professional development policies of the parent military service?

Answer. It is to the mutual advantage of DoD and the DNI to routinely review how the military services recruit, train, and develop intelligence professionals. It would be inefficient and counter-productive for all concerned if time and efforts were spent giving a service member the skills to prosecute an intelligence target, only to have that person transferred to a new assignment before any of us could reap the value of that development. I believe it especially important that we examine ways that service members can be promoted or otherwise recognized for their excellence as intelligence professionals.
16. Evaluation of Intelligence Support

In your capacity as Director of the National Security Agency and as Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, you gained insights into the process by which the Intelligence Community provides intelligence support to the combatant commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense.

A. Based on this experience, how would you rate the job the Intelligence Community is doing in supporting the combatant commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense and what improvements, if any, would you recommend?

Answer. Let me address this from what I am very familiar with, SIGINT. SIGINT has gotten overwhelmingly positive reviews in prosecuting the counterterrorism mission over the last 3 years. As the target evolves, we have constantly evaluated and adjusted our efforts to ensure continued success in protecting the homeland and defeating our adversaries. We have created a more expeditionary force, moving forward into the war fighters' environment to operationalize intelligence to the maximum degree.

B. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, what steps would you take to ensure that support to the warfighter is a priority of the overall Intelligence Community and the Director of National Intelligence?

Answer. I am unable to imagine circumstances in which support to American combat forces would not enjoy the same priority it does today. That said, if the need were ever to arise, I would rely on my experience at NSA to reinforce the priority that American forces should enjoy. In short, we are critical to the fight and every bit as much a part of the operational team as air, armor or infantry.

17. Requirement for Senior Military Officers on the Staffs of the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

A position currently exists within the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) staff for an Associate Director for Military Support, specifically to coordinate Intelligence Community support to the military and military support to the DCI.

A. Do you believe that a similar position should be established within the staff of the Director of National Intelligence?

Answer. While there have been no decisions regarding the structure of the ODNI, it is clear to me that that the needs of the Department of Defense and of American military forces are a priority and that the DNI will have to craft an organizational structure to support those needs.
B. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for a senior military officer on the staff of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Answer. I would, of course, defer to the DCIA and Secretary of Defense on this issue. My personal experience, however, indicates that the ADCI for Military Support was a very valued member of the CIA team and an important spokesman for the needs of the Department of Defense.

18. Lessons Learned

You have served in a variety of both operational and intelligence positions within the Air Force and within the Department of Defense during your military career.

A. What are the most important lessons you have learned regarding tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence during your tenure in senior leadership positions within the Department of Defense and within the Intelligence Community?

Answer. One of the most important lessons I have learned through observation over the course of my career is the rapid pace at which the distinctions between national and tactical intelligence have disappeared. In fact, in my six years as Director, National Security Agency, I have never had to choose between a “national” and a “tactical” effort. In today’s environment, those two terms have eroded to non-recognition. I have had to make many choices based on resources, but never were the challenges tactical versus national.

With the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, NSA was designated a Combat Support Agency for those activities it provides in support of operational commanders. We take this role very, very seriously and provide actionable, near-real-time intelligence and information system risk management support to operational commanders.

19. Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

A. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Answer. Yes.

B. Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked before this Committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.

C. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be as forthcoming as possible in giving this Committee my views, consistent with my responsibilities under the Constitution and laws as an executive branch official.

D. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided in a timely manner to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Answer. Yes.