QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

Defense Reforms

You previously have answered the Committee’s advance policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in connection with your nomination to be Secretary of the Navy.

**Question.** Have your views on the importance, feasibility, and implementation of these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your last confirmation hearing on September 23, 2003?

**Answer.** My views are unchanged regarding the emphasis in the Goldwater-Nichols Act on jointness and the establishment of unified and specified combatant commanders. The effectiveness of joint operations has been clearly demonstrated in OIF and OEF, and I strongly support continued and increased efforts to improve the jointness of our military forces. However, the acquisition reforms of Goldwater-Nichols were designed for a different world and need to be re-examined in light of a new environment with far fewer prime contractors, far fewer new starts, fewer production items and a need for speed and agility in acquisition.

**Question.** Do you see the need for modifications of Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions based on your experience as Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

**Answer.** The acquisition reforms of Goldwater-Nichols were designed for a different world and need to be re-examined in light of a new environment with far fewer new starts, fewer production items and a need for speed and agility in acquisition. In my judgment, we need to examine the entire spectrum of defense acquisition to include the authority and responsibility for establishing requirements, procurement processes themselves and the aligning of authority and responsibility.
Relationships

Question. What do you see as the relationship between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense
Answer. Almost without exception, the Deputy and the Secretary share the same authorities and responsibilities. However, we will each emphasize different areas. My role, should I be confirmed as DEPSECDEF, will be more of a classic Chief Operating Officer responsible for the operation of DOD and implementation of national defense policy and strategy. This will include financial management, personnel policies, acquisition management and integrity, oversight of Military Departments’ roles, BRAC, Quadrennial Defense Review management, legislative affairs, public affairs and the like. At the same time, SECDEF’s and DEPSECDEF’s area of emphasis will necessarily overlap to ensure consistency of leadership and direction.

The Under Secretaries of Defense
Answer. I will ensure that the priorities of the Secretary are implemented and that issues of significant importance are brought to his attention with sufficient analysis and recommendations for his action. My relationships with the Under Secretaries of Defense will derive from my role as Chief Operating Officer. My management style is to form integrated project teams to work in a collaborative process to ensure that issues are fully considered, decisions weighed, accepted and implemented by each member of the management team.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Answer. As Chief Operating Officer, my relationship with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASDs) that report to me will be similar to that of the Under Secretaries. For ASDs that report through Under Secretaries, I will rely on the Under Secretaries to manage their areas of responsibility.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Answer. As the principal military advisor to the President and to the National Security Council and to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman has a unique military role. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman and the Vice Chairman to ensure that their issues are addressed and to ensure that all essential matters are fully coordinated with them.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments
Answer. As the current Secretary of the Navy, I appreciate the role of the Secretaries in implementing the policies of the President and the Secretary of Defense. To ensure that the Secretaries are fully coordinated and operating in unison with each other and with the SECDEF’s office, I plan to reinvigorate the Senior Executive Council consisting of the Secretaries and the USD (AT&L).
The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

**Answer.** Regarding the Service Chiefs, I will work to see that they are fully cognizant of appropriate policies and initiatives of the Secretary’s office and also ensure that appropriate actions from the Secretary’s office and with the Service Chiefs are fully coordinated with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The National Intelligence Director (NID) and the Deputy NID

**Answer.** It is premature to define precisely the relationship with Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Most likely, the interface with the DNI will usually be handled directly by the Secretary of Defense and the interface with the Deputy DNI will usually be handled by the USD(I). My expectation is that I will be fully cognizant of these discussions and issues but not as an area of primary emphasis.

The Service Acquisition Executives

**Answer.** I expect to be actively participating in setting the acquisition policies and the major acquisitions of the Service Acquisition Executives. However, most of their activities will be handled with me through the relevant Military Department Secretary or the USD (AT&L). My objective will be to ensure that we have the appropriate policies and procedures in place such that all acquisitions meet all rules and regulations of the Federal Government, are conducted to the highest ethical standards and meet the needs of the Military Departments and are timely and affordable.

The Inspector General

**Answer.** I expect to encourage the Inspector General to carry out his or her duties as prescribed in the Inspector General Act and will make sure that there are no impediments to that accomplishment. The most valuable contribution of an Inspector General, while preserving his independence, is to suggest constructive solutions of any problems or issues identified.

The General Counsel

**Answer:** I expect to seek advice and counsel from the Department’s Chief Legal Officer on all relevant matters.

The Service Judge Advocates General

**Answer:** Judge Advocates General of the Military Departments and the Military Department General Counsels are critical components of their respective Departments’ legal infrastructure. The Military Department Judge Advocates General and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant perform functions in their respective organizations that are essential to the proper operation of their Service and Departments as a whole. Their unique expertise and experience contribute significantly to the proper functioning of the services, the military departments, and the Department of Defense.
Qualifications and Duties

Section 132 of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that Secretary Rumsfeld will prescribe to you?

Answer. Assuming I am confirmed, I expect to serve as a traditional deputy and alter ego of the Secretary. However, my expectation is that the Secretary of Defense will function as the Chief Executive Officer and the Deputy will function as the Chief Operating Officer. As such, the Deputy will be responsible to implement the Secretary of Defense’s priorities, better integrate functional management of DOD to align authority and responsibility and accountability within DOD, manage BRAC to conclusion, manage financial and personnel policies and procedures, implement DOD-wide metrics as a management tool, meet the President’s Management agenda, respond to the Government Accountability Office critiques and suggestions, and the like. While the Secretary and the Deputy emphasize different aspects of DOD, they will inherently overlap due to their joint overall responsibility and to ensure uniformity of leadership and direction.

Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. Deputy Secretary of Defense will be my 4th confirmed position in the Federal Government if my nomination is acted upon favorably by the Senate. My experience to date as the 72nd Secretary of the Navy, the 1st Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security and the 73rd Secretary of the Navy has provided me broad experience in dealing with matters within DOD, across Federal agencies, with the Congress, with industry, and with a large number of foreign governments. My corporate experience includes president of a number of large companies with hands-on management and technical leadership for a broad range of domestic and international programs. I have also served on a City Council and have participated in a wide range of local and national boards and committees. That said, the Department of Defense is astonishingly broad in scope and complexity and will be a profound challenge for even the most experienced executive.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Answer. In my judgment, no one is fully qualified to perform the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense without first serving some time in that position. As such, it is important for the Deputy Secretary to be very open to constructive inputs and opinions.
and to be sure that important issues are fully vetted prior to decision. Additionally, without presuming confirmation, I have been receiving many briefings to understand better the full breadth of DOD responsibilities and have also received views and opinions from many members of Congress. My objective will be to utilize my experience and expertise while also expanding my knowledge and understanding and valuing the advice and counsel of other DOD, government and corporate executives.
Major Challenges

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Deputy Secretary of Defense?

**Answer.** As noted in the recently released National Defense Strategy, we live in a time of confrontational challenges and strategic uncertainties. Our Nation is confronted by fundamentally different challenges than those faced by the American defense establishment in the Cold War and in previous eras. The major challenge confronting the Secretary and the Deputy, along with our Nation, is to influence events before threats become more dangerous and less manageable. Our goal is to defeat today’s threats and to prepare the DOD to meet the threats and uncertainties of the 21st century.

**Question.** If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

**Answer.** If confirmed, my immediate emphasis will be to manage the Quadrennial Defense Review that will specifically address traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive capabilities and methods that threaten U.S. interests. For the longer term, I will work with Secretary Rumsfeld to implement the National Defense Strategy.
Quadrennial Defense Review

Congress recently received the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. These are the overarching strategies that will guide the conduct of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in which, if confirmed, you will play a major role. There has been a major shift in recent years in the way the Defense Department establishes its military requirements, with a focus on capabilities rather than a threat-based approach.

**Question.** Do you envision the results of the QDR addressing not only required capabilities, but the force structure needed to ensure those capabilities are available at the times and places necessary?

**Answer.** The QDR will address not just required capabilities, but the force structure needed to ensure those capabilities are available at the times and places they are necessary.

This QDR will consider the proper mix of military capabilities the nation needs. Given today’s complex and uncertain security environment, these challenges involve not only the traditional threats from nation-states that we’ve faced throughout the past century, but also a new set of post 9-11 national security challenges. These include irregular threats of unstable environments, catastrophic threats of devastating attacks on the homeland, and disruptive threats of new asymmetric military technologies getting into the hands of our adversaries before we’ve developed adequate defenses.

Based on a determination of this capability mix needed to meet these traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive national security challenges, the QDR will suggest a force sizing construct that appropriately accounts for the contribution of our interagency partners and international allies, as well as our own forces.

**As part of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process, you were designated to lead a panel that would examine aspects of the United States Code that might have to be changed to allow the Department to implement proposed changes to the U.S. military.**

**Question.** What areas of the U. S. Code, in your view, require examination as a part of the QDR process, in order to implement necessary changes?

**Answer.** The panel is looking at a very broad range of authorities that DOD needs to accomplish its mission. In addition to applicable statutes, directives and policies, the panel is also looking at international and interagency agreements. An additional focus is to ensure the existing authorities are properly aligned with the responsible entities within DOD to speed and streamline mission accomplishment.
**Question.** Who do you anticipate will head this panel if you are confirmed?

**Answer.** My expectation is that the Department will name another senior DOD official and that I will replace Secretary Wolfowitz as the co-lead of the Capabilities Panel along with General Pace as the other co-lead.

**Question.** If you are confirmed, what role do you expect to play in the QDR?

**Answer.** My expectation is that I will replace Secretary Wolfowitz as the co-lead of the Capabilities Panel along with General Pace as the other co-lead. I also expect to manage the QDR process for Secretary Rumsfeld.

We understand that the Department may plan for senior officials currently leading integrated product teams responsible for developing options for the on-going Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to continue serving in those roles even if they leave the Department.

**Question.** What role, if any, do you believe is appropriate for former DOD officials to play in the QDR?

**Answer.** QDR ‘05 seeks a greater degree of inclusion than past QDRs. Consultation, input, and sometimes participation, is being sought from Defense Boards, interagency partners, Congress, key allies, industry, and knowledgeable individuals – all of which are composed of membership from outside the department.
Science and Technology Funding and Priorities

The Department’s Science and Technology (S&T) programs are designed to support defense transformation goals and objectives. These programs should ensure development of the latest, most technologically advanced devices, capabilities, equipment and protection solutions for the current and future warfighter. The Defense Science Board and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review recommended a general funding target of 3 percent of the total Defense Department budget for the S&T program, a goal which has been endorsed by the Secretary of Defense and other Department officials. However, the proposed DOD budget for fiscal year 2006 for S&T falls short of this goal.

**Question.** What, in your view, is the role and value of S&T programs in meeting the Department’s transformation goals and in confronting traditional and asymmetric threats?

**Answer.** Science and technology, when integrated with new operational concepts and organizational constructs, are critical elements of transformation. Leveraging technology is the key to ensuring a decisive U.S. advantage across the range of military operations, from asymmetric threats to major combat operations. The results of past S&T investments are used to win today, and DOD is keeping the pipeline full to win tomorrow.

**Question.** If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding funding targets and priorities for the Department’s long-term S&T research efforts?

**Answer.** The Department pursues an integrated and comprehensive S&T program, from basic research through manufacturing technology. Long term S&T is our “seed corn.” DOD programs emphasize integrating basic research with applied science and technology, and promoting the effective and expeditious transition of discovery and invention into real-world applications. Moreover, “transition” has become of utmost importance, as the success of S&T is not measured simply by the basic science it supports, but also by the active and successful transition of that science to supporting America’s Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines. If confirmed, I will support a balanced program of DOD investment in basic research, applied research and advanced development across the spectrum of military needs.

**Question.** Do you believe there is an adequate investment in basic research to develop the capabilities the Department of Defense will need in 2020?

**Answer.** At this time, the Department’s basic research program is balanced and appears adequate to support the needs of the warfighter in 2020. However, the results of the 2005 QDR could emphasize new areas of S&T and also affect the level of S&T investment.
Technology Transition

The Department’s efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition of new technology into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms. The Department’s fiscal year 2006 budget request proposes increases across a spectrum of technology transition programs.

Question: What are your views on the success of the Department’s technology transition programs in spiraling emerging technologies into systems?

Answer. The Department of the Navy has been fairly successful in spiraling emerging technologies into systems. Budget submittals routinely include improvement changes for our ships, airplanes and other systems. That said, it is still a time-consuming and difficult process to upgrade many existing weapon systems. For that reason, the Department of the Navy took a new approach with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The LCS is a multi-purpose ship based on a modular design concept wherein the ship itself uses modular design/construction approaches, and the weapon systems are being designed to be of a roll-on/roll-off modular construction. This allows easier reconfiguration, quicker and less expensive upgrades with new technology. With the rapid pace of technological change and the military’s reliance on technological advantage, it’s evident that DOD will need to improve continuously its processes for technology insertion into systems.

Question. What challenges to transition do you see within the Department?

Answer. Rapid transition of technologies to the warfighter has been a continuing difficult issue for the Department of Defense. The problems encountered in the past have dealt with the inherently long budgeting cycles of DOD and the challenges in providing adequate support when systems are fielded quickly. Some modest successes in quick reaction programs to speed new technologies to warfighters have been achieved, specifically to counter improvised explosive devices (IED’s), provide personnel protection and meet other urgent needs. However, this is an area that will require continued attention and improvement and, if confirmed as Deputy Secretary, will receive my personal attention.

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?

Answer. One of the challenges I will face, if confirmed, is to provide flexibility for just-in-time application of funds in a highly constrained and competitive funding process. Recent years have seen many situations in which rapidly evolving threats create needs and/or rapidly evolving technologies create opportunities that move faster than our normal planning and budget processes were designed to accommodate. Notably, we have had some significant successes in quick reaction programs that speed new
technologies to warfighters to counter IEDs, provide personnel protection, improve communications and intelligence capabilities, and meet other urgent needs. I am also pleased to report that we have been successful across the spectrum of transition programs, including those that resolve risks and qualify new technologies for insertion into programs of record – programs such as Small Business Innovative Research, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations, Defense Acquisition Challenge Program and several other DOD and Military Department technology transition initiatives.

If confirmed, I will work to continue to build the trust in the Department’s technology transition programs that will go hand in hand with our requests for increased funding flexibility.
Chemical Weapons Convention

The Department does not appear to be on track to eliminate its chemical weapons in accordance with the timelines established by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Question. What steps is the Department taking to ensure that the U.S. remains in compliance with its treaty obligations for chemical weapons destruction?

Answer. My understanding is that if the Chemical Demilitarization Program continues on its current path, the United States will not meet the Convention’s extended 100% destruction deadline of April 29, 2012. Accordingly, the Department requested that alternative approaches be developed to evaluate whether the deadline can be met using a different approach.
Post-Conflict and Stability Operations

The Secretary of Defense is currently considering a new directive on post-conflict and stability operations.

Question. What changes, if any, do you believe the conventional and special operations forces need to make to better plan for, and be better trained and equipped for, post-conflict and stability operations?

Answer. With regard to my personal observations, the Department should:

- Continue to build on ongoing stability operations initiatives within the U.S. Government and clarify roles and responsibilities within DOD;
- Incorporate stability operations into all phases of military planning, training and exercises and into professional military education;
- Set up a management structure and reporting requirements to ensure that stability operations capabilities are developed in an integrated manner;
- Create a comprehensive joint doctrine for stability operations;
- Increase involvement of other USG Departments and Agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector into DOD military planning, training and exercises;
- Develop a concept for working with civilian-military teams based on the Provisional Reconstruction Team model used in Afghanistan.

Question. What changes, if any do you believe are needed to ensure that U.S. forces can operate effectively in coordination with foreign forces in such operations?

Answer. Based on my experience as Secretary of the Navy, we have been reasonably successful in working interoperability with navies throughout the world. We meet regularly with the Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) from other countries (for example, in 2003, 55 CNOs at the Naval War College at Newport and the Southern Hemisphere CNOs in San Diego) and regularly have staff-to-staff interfaces. Additionally, the Navy has many joint exercises and operates with other naval forces – in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, for example - and in other key areas throughout the world. I believe that the other U.S. Military Departments have similar regular contact with their counterparts throughout the world. In my judgment, high levels of interface, joint exercises and compatible equipment have been effective in making sure that U.S. and foreign forces can operate together. It is, therefore, important that DOD have broad flexibility in training with and equipping foreign forces.
Special Operations Forces

Question. Given the current and projected operational and personnel tempo for special operations forces, what changes, if any, do you think are needed in the size of these forces?

Answer. The Quadrennial Defense review will consider Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities to meet the four challenge areas – traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive.

The appropriate mix of capabilities needed to meet all these missions will be a primary focus of QDR ’05. Once able to determine the right mix of capabilities across the total force, then DOD will be positioned to determine what is the appropriate force planning construct from which to size the force while keeping current operational and future risk within a moderate and acceptable range.

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that the immediate demands for direct action in counter-terrorism missions do not undermine our ability to conduct an appropriate number and quality of special operations foreign training missions?

Answer. I do not have significant direct experience in this area except for the relationship of the U.S. Marines with the SOF and the interface of the U.S. Marines with other international Marine forces. However, I would be pleased to work with the Congress on this important issue, if confirmed.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

*Question.* Do you support the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program?

*Answer:* Yes. CTR is an important program that addresses highly dangerous WMD, related infrastructure and delivery systems at their sources – primarily in the former Soviet states.

*Question.* Do you envision a need to expand the CTR program either geographically or programmatically?

*Answer:* Section 1308 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 provided authority for CTR to conduct activities outside the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in special circumstances. CTR’s first use of this authority is to eliminate poorly guarded chemical weapons in Albania. This new authority recognizes that the WMD threat is not confined to one region, although we do not expect significant expansion of CTR activities outside the FSU. The Administration may request a modification of Section 1308 to make the authority more flexible.

*Question.* If so, what goals do you believe would be achieved by the expansion of the CTR program?

*Answer:* Wherever CTR activities occur, the goals should always be to address the threat of WMD, related infrastructure or delivery systems.
Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities

The Defense Science Board recently established a Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities to examine options for the nuclear weapons stockpile.

*Question.* If confirmed, what role do you expect to play on these issues? Do you expect to have any input to the DSB study?

*Answer.* The Defense Science Board is an advisory body to provide independent advice to senior DOD leadership. The study to which you refer was requested by the Secretary of Defense as a part of a broader review of the status of the process of the transformation of US military capabilities. Upon receipt of their findings and recommendations, however, the Department will take them under consideration and determine a proper course of action after a detailed assessment of the issue.
Executive Agent for Space

**Question.** Do you believe that the Under Secretary of the Air Force should retain responsibility as Executive Agent for Space? Why or why not?

**Answer.** I have no preconceived notion regarding the role of the Under Secretary of the Air Force as Executive Agent for Space. I understand that the former Under Secretary of the Air Force has expressed important views on this. Those views will be considered.
Delivery of Legal Services

As the Secretary of the Navy, you have observed the working relationship between the Navy General Counsel, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps in providing legal counsel and services within the Department.

Question. What are your views about the responsibility of the Judge Advocates General of the Services and the Staff Judge Advocate for the Commandant to provide independent legal advice to the service chiefs, particularly in the area of military justice and operational law? and

Question. What are your views about the responsibility of staff judge advocates within the Services, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands, to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?

Answer. The Judge Advocates General of the Military Departments and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant, like their civilian counterparts, and their staffs provide invaluable service to the Department of Defense. Senior leaders within the Department of Defense are best served by lawyers at all levels who provide objective and candid legal advice that faithfully reflects the law. I am aware that Congress addressed the roles of uniformed lawyers in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. Congress also mandated the relationships between the legal elements of the Military Departments. The panel has been selected and is beginning this important task. I assure you that, if confirmed, I will carefully consider the panel’s recommendations.
Transformation

Secretary Rumsfeld has established transformation of the Armed Forces to meet 21st Century threats as one of the Department’s highest priorities and has stated that only weapons systems that are truly transformational should be acquired.

Question. How would you assess the level of risk to each of the Services of foregoing or curtailing current acquisition programs in favor of future transformation?

Answer. For 229 years, a strength of the U.S. military has been its ability to adapt and change. As the rate of change of technology continues to accelerate, it will be even more important that the U.S. military keep pace. Recognizing this need, the Department established an integrated risk framework for decision making which was first articulated in QDR ’01.

Question: Can we afford this risk considering the current level of global threats?

Answer. Some enemies of the United States have also kept pace with technological change and are quick to take advantage. The greater institutional risk for DOD is over reliance on traditional platforms and delaying the advent of new technologies and systems.
Ballistic Missile Defense

The fielding of initial elements of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system has begun as part of the ballistic missile defense test bed and for use in an emergency. In accordance with section 234 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, the system has not yet been subject to the operational test and evaluation process applicable to other major weapon systems.

*Question.* What role do you believe independent operational test and evaluation should play in ensuring that the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system will work in an operationally effective manner?

*Answer.* DOD is committed to conducting operationally realistic testing of our missile defense program. Our test program has become more robust and realistic over time. I expect that this trend will continue.

I also understand that in November 2004 the Director of OT&E (DOT&E) approved the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA’s) Integrated Master Test Program and that he will continue to work closely with MDA to ensure an increasingly operationally realistic test program.

*Question.* What steps do you believe should be taken to ensure that Ground-Based Interceptors will work in an operationally effective manner?

*Answer.* The ground-based interceptors are designed to be operationally effective and the testing to date has demonstrated the basic hit to kill functionality. The recent test failures indicated a need for more component qualification testing and a more robust approach to quality control. Steps have been taken by the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to address these shortfalls. DOD expects a return to a robust flight program will occur this year to demonstrate the interceptor’s effectiveness with operationally realistic tests agreed upon by the DOT&E.

The Ballistic Missile Defense System is being developed and fielded by the Missile Defense Agency using Research, Development, Test and Engineering funds.

*Question.* At what point do you believe that elements of the system should transition to the military departments and procurement funds?

*Answer:* My personal experience as Secretary of the Navy is that systems should transition to the military departments and utilize procurement funds when the design is
stable, tested and ready for production. Until that time, systems should remain in RDT&E where greater flexibility is available to make necessary and appropriate changes to the design.

Question. Do you believe that the Department should be developing scientific plans for this transition now?

Answer. Each of the individual missile defense program elements is in a different stage of its development; consequently, some are much more mature than others.

I support close collaboration between the Missile Defense Agency and the Military Departments so the Department can understand the costs, logistics and other implications of transitioning missile defense capabilities to better prepare for transition.
Shipbuilding Industrial Base

In a recent letter to several Senators regarding the Navy’s intent to change the acquisition strategy for the DD(X) program, you minimized the value to the Navy of avoiding a sole source relationship with a single shipyard for building major surface combatants.

**Question.** Was avoiding a sole source relationship considered in the Navy’s decision for adopting a new DD(X) strategy?

A. Competition is a key component of any strategy to control costs. The effects on the future ability to hold competitions for follow-on surface combatants were factored into the Navy’s decision-making process. However, it is not certain that the acquisition strategy for the DD(X) class will force a sole-source environment for all future surface combatant work. A given shipyard could compete on other work, either commercial or military, and yards that have not built surface combatants in the past may choose to enter that line of work.

**Question.** What are your views on this issue?

**Answer.** The decision to review the DD(X) acquisition strategy was necessitated due to the number of DD(X) destroyers to be procured between Fiscal Years 2007 and 2011. This DD(X) procurement profile represents a build rate of one ship per year versus the two to three ships per year previously programmed. The Navy’s assessment of the impact of the decline in the number of DD(X) hulls in the Future Years Defense Plan upon the surface combatant industrial base indicates that the remaining workload is not sufficient to support two shipyards in a cost-effective level of operation. Building DD(X) in two shipyards at the lower build rate is significantly more costly because the overhead burden is spread across a reduced business base.

The revised DD(X) acquisition strategy is intended to reduce ship unit cost by concentrating the workload associated with the lower build rate at a single shipyard. Navy analysis indicates that sufficient production capacity exists in either surface combatant shipyard to support a build rate of up to two DD(X) destroyers per year. The Navy expects to save in excess of $1 billion over the FYDP by avoiding the premium required to maintain a second shipyard building DD(X).

**Question.** Have the Navy and the Department of Defense already arrived at a conclusion as to how many DD(X) vessels to build before having conducted the QDR analysis?

A. The CNO has spoken of a range of total combat ships. In the case of DD(X), the draft
30-year shipbuilding plan calls for 8 to 12 DD(X)’s. Clearly, while the QDR will guide future shipbuilding rates, the Navy’s analysis does not predict procuring more than 2 per year.
Low Density / High Demand Forces

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you address the challenges of the Army and Air Force in manning low density/high demand units and officer and enlisted career specialties?

**Answer.** I have not focused previously on the specific challenges of the Army and the Air Force in low density/high demand units. My experience with the Navy and Marine Corps has shown that an effective way to address the issue is to create incentives for people to pursue understaffed specialties. With Navy end strength declining, we have created opportunities for Sailors to transfer into other less populated ratings. A typical indirect benefit of such rate transfers to the Sailor is greater promotion potential. While this is proving to be an effective short-term solution, changing our recruiting, training and assignment processes will be key to ensuring we have the right numbers and skill mix that we need for the future. This is an issue that requires constant close monitoring and adjustment as necessary.

Related to this issue, the Navy has recently undertaken initiatives to better support joint requirements to relieve stress on Army forces. Specific examples include the training of Navy Masters-at-Arms to replace soldiers in detainee operations and the upcoming deployment of Navy helicopters for air ambulance and medium lift missions in Iraq. Should I be confirmed, I will work with the leadership of the Military Departments to develop specific actions to address this concern.
Readiness Deficiencies

In response to the Committee’s advance policy questions in connection with your previous confirmation hearing, you indicated that the Navy had made good progress in meeting readiness deficiencies.

*Question.* What do you view as the major readiness challenges that need to be addressed in each of the Services, and, if confirmed, how would you approach these issues?

*Answer.* My experience as Secretary of the Navy is that readiness is a direct function of Operation and Maintenance (O&M) dollars available. Under-funding O&M adversely affects readiness. On the other hand, over-funding O&M does not necessarily provide improvement. Therefore, a balance needs to be struck in the O&M account. However, it is critically important that O&M adequately fund training, spares, depot maintenance, fuel, equipment and the like.

Section 482 of title 10, United States Code, requires the Department to submit a quarterly readiness report to Congress. The Department is nearly a year behind in providing this information, and has failed to provide the required reports for the last three quarters of calendar year 2004.

*Question.* If confirmed, would you place a priority on ensuring that the Department timely submits the reports required by law under section 482, title 10, United States Code?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will seek timely submissions of the quarterly readiness reports to Congress.
Army and Marine Corps Recruiting and Retention

The Army, Army Reserves, Army National Guard, and the Marine Corps have experienced shortfalls in achieving recruiting goals. Many concerns have been raised about the ability of the ground forces to recruit effectively during wartime.

*Question.* How would you evaluate the status of the Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and the Marine Corps in recruiting and retaining high caliber personnel?

*Answer.* At this time, I am only qualified to discuss the U.S. Marine Corps regarding recruiting and retention of high-caliber personnel. The Marine Corps continues to meet its recruiting missions, having shipped 13,738 new recruits against an accession mission of 13,477, 102 percent. The Marine Corps did miss the new contract mission in January, February and March. The Marine Corps is on track to meet yearly recruiting goals, however, this recent experience is an indicator of increased recruiting difficulties. On the other hand, retention is higher than planned, and retention among deployed forces is higher than among forces that are not deployed. In the aggregate, the Marines do not have a recruiting/retention problem of high-caliber personnel, but are taking steps to improve recruiting with particular emphasis on improving communications with parents of potential recruits. I realize the importance of looking at this problem in depth for all the services.

*Question.* What initiatives would you propose? If confirmed, to further improve the attractiveness of active and reserve component service?

*Answer.* My sense is that we should present the U.S. military as a way for young men and women to serve their country and to protect freedom and liberty for future generations while also utilizing the enhanced enlistment and re-enlistment incentives provided by the Congress.
Army End Strength

The task of establishing the appropriate size of the active-duty Army and budgeting for projected increases in end strength have presented challenging issues for the Department and Congress. These issues have been compounded by uncertainties associated with recruiting for an All Volunteer Force.

Question. What recommendations do you have, if any, for changes in the size of the Army’s active force or in the manner in which planning and budgeting for this force takes place.

Answer. Although I am not familiar with the specifics of Army end strength, the Secretary of Defense has directed that an extensive review of the total force size be undertaken as part of the FY ’05 QDR.

The Department of Defense has relied on supplemental appropriations to fund increases in end strength and permanent changes in force structure, known as “modularity” in the Army and “Force Structure Review Group” for the Marine Corps.

Question. Do you believe it is sound budgetary and management practice to fund these costs through supplemental appropriations rather than through the Department’s annual budget submissions? Please explain.

Answer. The annual budget funds daily and predictable requirements of the DOD while the supplemental funds less predictable requirements like the cost of war and other contingencies. War funding is directly related to the pace of operations and the situation on the ground. It is not practical to fund a war this dynamic far in advance.
Investment in Infrastructure

Witnesses appearing before the Committee in recent years have testified that the military services under-invest in their facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-investment in military installations have led to increasing backlogs of facility maintenance needs, created substandard living and working conditions.

Question. Based on your private sector experience, do you believe the Department of Defense is investing enough in its infrastructure?

Answer. During my tenure as Secretary of the Navy, I have seen continuing, significant progress in solving long-standing housing and other facilities concerns, both within the Department of the Navy and across the Department of Defense, by embracing private sector practices and capabilities. Housing is an excellent example. First pioneered by the Department of the Navy, and with the strong support of the Congress, all the Military Departments have now moved aggressively to solve their longstanding family housing needs through the use of private sector capital using public/private ventures. The Department of the Navy has secured almost $3 billion in private sector investment from $300 million of Navy investment in 15 housing privatization projects. The Department of the Navy is now pursuing applying privatization benefits to solve bachelor housing concerns. Moreover, in the area of facilities management, DOD has implemented facilities sustainment and recapitalization metrics based on private sector benchmarks.
Applicability of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)

Last year the Army started using emergency authorities to buy temporary buildings to station the first of the new so-called “modular” brigades. The Army provided a series of information papers to this committee on July 28, 2004, stating that, with respect to these ten new brigades, “Permanent stationing for all units will be fully addressed through the BRAC 2005 process.” However, the Army has subsequently qualified this language and removed the direct reference to BRAC. Last September when DOD submitted its “Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture” report to Congress, Under Secretary of Defense Feith stated in the introduction to that report that “the Defense Department will incorporate its projected overseas posture changes into the BRAC 2005 process.” In testimony before the Committee this year, the Navy has taken the position that some decisions related to the basing of aircraft carriers will be made as part of the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process while others will not.

Question. How does the Department of Defense intend to address these basing issues? Will these basing decisions be subject to the review of the base closure commission, or will they be presented to Congress using the normal authorization and appropriation process?

Answer. The 2005 base realignment and closure process will permit the Department to assess comprehensively its infrastructure assets and to rationalize those assets with the Department’s force structure and mission needs. All military installations in the United States, its territories, and possessions are being assessed within this process. The Global Defense Posture review resulted in a number of decisions that will reposition some U.S. military forces currently permanently stationed abroad to domestic installations in the United States. In those cases, the BRAC process has been informed by those decisions.
National Security Personnel System

Since March of 2004, you have served as the Department’s senior official directing implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS).

Question. What are your views of the challenges faced by the Department in implementing the NSPS?

Answer. NSPS is a mission-driven, performance-based system to motivate, recognize and reward excellence which will result in an overall improvement to mission effectiveness and enhanced national security. It is also a significant change, and change is always stressful even when beneficial to employees and to the Nation. Accordingly, the largest challenge to implementing NSPS is managing the change processes. It will require training in both soft skills and in training employees and all members of the management organization in the implementation processes and procedures. It is vitally important that personnel be appropriately trained to implement NSPS fairly across DOD.

Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in the Department’s implementation of these far-reaching reforms?

Answer. I expect to remain fully engaged in the NSPS design and implementation and continue as the Department’s Senior Executive for NSPS. The Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) and the Program Executive Officer (PEO) will continue to report directly to me, at least until publication of the Final NSPS Regulations and until the first phase of NSPS is implemented. When direct leadership is transitioned, I will continue in an active oversight role.

Question. Do you believe that the long term research and development mission of the defense laboratories and technical centers and the unique recruiting and retention needs of those laboratories and technical centers warrant a specialized personnel system tailored to their unique mission?

Answer. Based on progress to date in defining NSPS, I believe that the new NSPS system will be sufficiently flexible and adaptable to apply eventually across DOD, including laboratories and technical centers. The labor relations sections will apply across DOD after publication of the Final Regulations, but the Human Resources (HR) system will not apply for laboratories and technical centers until at least 2008. The law requires that the NSPS system be certified as superior to the existing laboratories and technical centers personnel system, and my expectation is that that certification will be obtained and that the conversion date for the HR system will occur in 2008.
Unified Medical Command

Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz directed the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to develop a plan for a unified medical command in the DOD.

*Question*. What are your views on the advantages and disadvantages of a unified command structure for military medical programs? and

*Question*. If confirmed, how would you assess the impact of a new structure in support of joint war fighting capabilities and the delivery of quality health care to family members and retirees?

*Answer*. While there appear to be many operational and economic benefits to a unified medical command in DOD, this is not an area that I have personally examined. However, since it appears to offer considerable benefit, it will receive my attention as the Deputy, if confirmed.
Sexual Assault

Question. The Department has made significant progress in establishing policies relating to the prevention of sexual assault and improved services for its victims. If confirmed, what policy would you establish to ensure accountability of commanding officers and all senior officials in the Department of Defense for performance of their responsibilities with respect to the prevention and identification of crimes of sexual assault?

Answer. DOD established a policy this winter that set high standards. If confirmed, I will hold people accountable and responsible for their actions to uphold these standards.
Detainee Abuse

Question. Do you believe that the Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in DOD custody?

Answer. For me, it is unequivocal that persons held in DOD custody will be treated humanely and certainly will not be tortured. Violations to this policy cannot be tolerated. More importantly, this has been the consistent policy of the President and the Secretary.
Military to Civilian Conversion

Under your leadership as Secretary, the Navy developed an aggressive plan to eliminate thousands of medical billets from the active and reserve components.

Question. What guidance did you give regarding the end state of Navy medicine that caused these reductions?

Answer. The guidance was to ensure operational and other missions that required military personnel would not be adversely affected by any Navy Medical personnel conversions. Guidance also stressed that access to health care services should also not be affected.

Question. Did that guidance include a business case analysis to assess the cost and feasibility of converting military medical and dental positions to civilians?

Answer. Yes. Because the majority of Navy Medical Department personnel are required for (and assigned to) support missions or platforms that support operations (i.e., Fleet Hospitals, hospital ships), the guidance provided included two significant decision points. First, were medical personnel required for a valid operational mission? If the answer was yes, those billets were not part of the military-civilian conversion. If the answer was no, then a business case analysis was performed to see if those billets could reasonably be converted. If the business case analysis supported that the personnel could reasonably be obtained by hiring from the civilian sector, then the Navy moved to convert the billets from military to civilian. If the business case analysis did not show benefit to the government, the Department of the Navy did not move to convert.

Question. Were the needs of the Army and Air Force taken into consideration before eliminating Navy medical assets?

Answer. Yes, the Navy consulted with the Army and Air Force about military billets it converted.

Question. If confirmed, you would inherit plans for military to civilian conversions across all the military departments. How would you assess these plans, particularly in terms of actual cost savings for the Department?

Answer. Pending other input, I would assess plans across the Department the same way as they were assessed across the Department of the Navy; namely, based on operational need and business case analysis.
Management Issues

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is intended to provide managers with a disciplined approach – developing a strategic plan, establishing annual goals, measuring performance, and reporting on the results – for improving the performance and internal management of an organization.

Question. What are your views on this law and your experience with it?

Answer. GPRA and similar legislative initiatives have had a positive impact on the Department. As a businessman, I fully appreciate the benefits that clear plans, goals, expectations, and results can bring to an organization. For me, as Secretary of the Navy, the issuance of annual goals has been a critical joint endeavor with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Progress to these goals is measured monthly, and yearly results published throughout the Department of the Navy. The tenets of GPRA have been reinforced through the President’s Management Agenda, which I energetically support and will continue to do so if confirmed.

Question. Are you familiar with the strategic plan, annual performance plans, annual accountability report, and financial statements of the Department of Defense?

Answer. Yes. As Secretary of the Navy, I have been responsible for direct input to the Annual Defense Report, which serves as the Department’s performance plan. The Department of the Navy works closely with the staff of the Secretary of Defense on the performance information in that plan and in the annual accountability report, and also provides financial statements.

Question. What do you consider to be the most important priorities and challenges facing DOD as it strives to achieve these management goals?

Answer. Clearly, the Department’s first priority must be to provide the men and women of our armed forces the training, equipment, and support necessary for them to do their jobs, while ensuring security for their families. The foundation of this effort is an effective and agile management system.

What changes, if any, do you feel might be necessary in these plans?

Answer. It is important for the Department to link strategy, goals and individual objectives with a feedback system of metrics to measure performance to goals. In this regard, the NSPS system will be most helpful. NSPS’ pay-for-performance will require definitive and measurable goals for every person in DOD. Accordingly, when fully
implemented, the pay-for-performance system will link the Secretary of Defense’s goals to the individual performance of each employee and at all locations. Since each employee’s objectives need to be measurable for pay-for-performance determination, a performance feedback system will be inherent in the process.

**Question.** How would you determine whether the Department has in place the key information management processes required by law, including a detailed architecture, an investment control process, and appropriate information security plans?

**Answer.** The Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) was recently established as the management mechanism for the Department to provide direction and oversight of architectures, investments, security and measures of effectiveness to support business processes. The Deputy chairs this Committee and, therefore, if confirmed, I will be directly responsible for these plans and implementations. This management structure will also ensure that DOD business systems comply with applicable laws such as the Clinger-Cohen Act.

**Question.** If confirmed, what role do you envision you will play in managing or providing oversight over these processes?

**Answer.** In addition to managing the Department’s processes and procedures, as the COO and as Chairman of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, I will continue full implementation of the President’s Management Agenda to fully support the Administration’s goals of more effective and efficient government.

GAO has consistently stated that cultural resistance to change and the lack of sustained leadership are two key underlying causes of DOD’s inability to resolve its long-standing financial and business management problems.

**Question.** Do you believe the Department needs to have a single leader with sufficient authority and span of control to bring together all of the functional areas of the Department and be accountable for the success of the Department’s management reform efforts?

**Question.** If so, how do you believe this function ought to be performed?

Answer. During my tenure as Secretary of the Navy, this topic has been the subject of considerable discussion and debate within DOD and with the Government Accountability Office. If confirmed, this question will be examined in depth under my cognizance as Deputy. It would be premature to speculate on the outcome of these efforts, except to state that it is vitally important that the Department have a coherent management process to set goals and objectives, measure performance and respond rapidly to changing world
events. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of DOD, I would continue to work directly with the Congress, the GAO, independent advisory boards and the leadership team of DOD to address this issue.

The DOD workforce has undergone significant downsizing in the past several years, and with the current labor market, it is becoming increasingly difficult to attract and retain talent.

Question. How would you work to attract and retain individuals with the experience, education, and skills needed throughout the Department of Defense?

Answer. Agile military forces on the front lines need an agile civilian workforce behind the lines. The Congress was highly supportive of DOD in passing the NSPS provisions in the 2003 NDAA. NSPS will improve the effectiveness of the Department through a modern civilian personnel system that will improve the way DOD hires and assigns, compensates and rewards employees. This modern, flexible, and agile human resource system will be responsive to the national security environment, while preserving employee protections and benefits, as well as the core values of the civil service. Pay for performance is expected to be an important factor in hiring and retaining top performers.

GAO has consistently taken the position that strategic human capital management must be the centerpiece of any serious effort to transform the workforce of a government agency. Last June, GAO reported that “DOD and [its] components do not have comprehensive strategic workforce plans to guide their human capital efforts.” In particular, GAO found that DOD had consistently failed to analyze the gaps between critical skills and competencies in the current workforce and those that will be needed in the future.

Question. Do you believe that strategic human capital management must be a centerpiece of any successful effort to address the Department’s management problems?

Answer. Our human capital is the most valuable resource within the Department of Defense. To recruit and retain top-caliber personnel, it is essential that the department have a strategic human capital management approach. DOD human capital strategic plan does identify gaps in competencies and skills. It needs to ensure that these gaps in competencies and skills are continuously updated to reflect new missions and technologies of the Department. Personally, I view human capital as vitally important to the Department and, if confirmed, will ensure that DOD planning is comprehensive and timely.

Question: If confirmed, what role, if any do you expect to play in ensuring that the Department addresses deficiencies in its human capital planning?
Final

**Answer.** If confirmed, my role as COO will include ensuring that the Department’s strategic planning and metrics are adequate to safeguard against deficiencies and promote the effective use of human capital.
Four years ago, DOD promised to establish a new business enterprise architecture and transition plan to transform its business operations. GAO has reported that DOD still does not have a comprehensive architecture and transition plan and that the way that DOD makes business systems investment decisions remain largely unchanged.

**Question.** Do you believe that a comprehensive business systems architecture and transition plan is the key to reform in this area?

**Answer.** Yes. The Department needs a systems architecture, and is building one that clearly delineates between the DOD level enterprise systems and the component level systems. Just like any large corporation that consists of multiple operating divisions, the best business systems architecture for an organization of DOD’s size is one in which clear standards and report elements are defined so that the subsidiary organizations can comply with those requirements. With this architecture in place, the transition plan will guide migration from legacy systems to a transformed end state.

**Question.** If so, what role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in ensuring that the Department develops and implements such an architecture and transition plan?

**Answer.** If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, I will be the Chairman of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee and will oversee business transformation efforts including the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP).

Four years ago, senior DOD officials took the position that the Department’s financial problems had to be attacked at the root, by developing and fielding new systems. Over the past two years, however, the Department has turned in the direction of a new goal of having auditable financial statements by as soon as Fiscal Year 2007, even though the military services won’t have new business management systems in place until 2012 at the earliest. To this end, the Department has proposed to increase its audit spending by more than a billion dollars over the FYDP.

**Question.** Do you believe that it is reasonable for the Department to try to get auditable financial statements before it has effective business systems in place, or is such an effort likely to result in large expenditures on audits without producing sustainable results?

**Answer.** That is not a reasonable approach, and it is not the approach the Department is taking. The Department understands the time involved in delivering new systems, and also recognizes the responsibility to be a good steward of taxpayer dollars. For this
reason, DOD is continuing to improve financial management practices to achieve a sustainable audit capability.
Acquisition Policy

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the development and implementation of acquisition policy for the Department of Defense?

Answer. I plan to work closely with USD (AT&L) to better align DOD acquisition policies to the world environment that exists today. When Goldwater-Nichols was enacted, the Nation was in the Cold War, acquiring large quantities of defense materials with many new starts and a large and diverse industrial base. DOD is now at low rates of production with few new starts, a downsized industrial base and the vital need to respond quickly to operational needs.

Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to improve the management and efficiency of its spending on contract support services?

Answer. DOD now spends more on services than on equipment. It is, therefore, essential that the Department ensure that services are acquired strategically and efficiently.

Question: What steps do you believe the Department should take to improve the management and efficiency of its major defense acquisition programs?

Answer. A business practices / processes IPT has been established as part of the QDR to examine the structure of the defense acquisition programs, to improve acquisition performance and streamline the acquisition of goals and services for the warfighter. I will strive to ensure that other management initiatives are coordinated with the QDR.

The Department has chosen to rely increasingly on so-called “incremental” or “phased” acquisition approaches in its defense acquisition programs.

Question: What is your assessment of the benefits and drawbacks, if any of incremental and phased acquisition strategies?

Answer: The use of an “incremental” or “phased” approach to deliver advanced capabilities to the warfighter as expeditiously as possible is appropriate for some programs. The principal benefit of such an approach is speed of delivery of new technologies or capabilities. This is an increasingly important factor as technologies mature more rapidly than ever before, and we are engaged in a war with an adaptable enemy who has shown an ability to exploit new technologies. A challenge with such an approach is ensuring the adequacy of processes to properly match desired capabilities with the maturing of the new technologies and the availability of budget resources to finance acquisitions. I do not, however, endorse “incremental” funding as a means to increase production. Great caution needs to be applied to “incremental” funding to assure that the out-year financial obligations that result can be funded within the DOD
Question: What steps do you believe the Department should take to ensure accountability for cost, schedule and performance when it pursues incremental and phased acquisition strategies?

Answer: Accountability for costs, schedule and performance should be applied the same for phased acquisitions as for any other acquisition.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has testified that “any further reductions [in the defense acquisition workforce] will adversely impact our ability to successfully execute a growing workload” and “Now more than ever, I believe we need to increase the size of the acquisition workforce to handle the growing workload, especially as requirements increase in the coming years.”

Question: What are your views on this issue?

Answer: The acquisition process has become too complex, cumbersome and slow. Larger organizations do not always provide more effective oversight and accountability. The issue of how to better structure and resource the acquisition functions of the Department of Defense to support wartime operations is under review as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review. This effort should provide the Secretary with recommendations to make the acquisition processes more effective and more attuned to the current acquisition environment.
In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

**Question.** Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

**Answer.** Yes.