STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JOHN P. ABIZAID, UNITED STATES ARMY

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON THE 2005 POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

01 MARCH 2005
# Table of Contents

I. Introduction  
II. Mission  
III. Vision  
IV. Nature of the Region and the Fight Against Extremism  
V. Iraq  
VI. Afghanistan  
VII. Horn of Africa (HOA)  
VIII. Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Other Regional Partnerships  
   a. TSC and Regional Partnerships  
   b. Pakistan  
   c. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)  
   d. Other Arabian Gulf States and Yemen  
   e. Egypt Overview  
   f. Jordan  
   g. Syria and Lebanon  
   h. Iran  
   i. Central Asian States  
IX. Joint Warfighting  
   a. Successes  
   b. Challenges  
X. Strategic Basing  
XI. Critical Mission Enablers  
   a. Sustaining a Strong Coalition  
   b. Strategic Sealift and Inter-Theater Airlift  
   c. Intelligence  
   d. Force Protection  
   e. Logistics  
   g. Communications  
   h. Personnel  
   i. Flexible Funding and Authorities  
XII. Conclusion
I. INTRODUCTION

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is in the middle of a fourth consecutive year of sustained warfare in its area of operations. The Command remains engaged in three principal activities: defeating extremist networks throughout the region, countering the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and building indigenous military capacity so that local governments can defeat terrorists and extremists on their own. Our activities span three sub-regions. To the east, Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A) oversees US and Coalition activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Central Asian States to their north. Multi-National Forces - Iraq (MNF-I) heads these efforts in Iraq. In the west, Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) directs our efforts in the states of Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, Kenya and Seychelles. Combined with CENTCOM-led programs with other regional partners, these commands employ military forces, directly and indirectly, to deny the establishment of terrorist safe havens and grow regional military capabilities. Sustained CENTCOM military pressure on extremist networks complements U.S. national programs that encourage social, economic and political reforms across the region -- programs that address the underlying factors that foster and sustain extremist ideologies.

During 2004, CENTCOM regional activities centered on several major actions. We focused on stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq. We worked to help Pakistan and Saudi Arabia help themselves combat their internal extremist threats. We provided regional military capability that deterred Syria and Iran. We patrolled key air space and waterways in the region to ensure the free flow of commerce. Simultaneously, we worked with regional governments
to deny our extremist enemies access to ungoverned spaces and safe-havens from which to plan and execute terrorist strikes.

We achieved noteworthy successes during the past year. The counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan put great pressure on al-Qaida and associated movements. Pakistan’s military operations in its western frontier areas are particularly noteworthy as they generate considerable direct pressure against extremist networks. Successful elections in Afghanistan dealt a blow to Taliban and extremist objectives. In Iraq, we learned that any uncontested enemy safe-haven, such as Fallujah, becomes a center of terrorist-inspired violence. Thus, the November offensive there eliminated a key enemy support area and restored Iraqi government control to an important city. Iraq’s elections early this year give Iraq a real opportunity to develop a constitution and electoral process that moves the country towards peace and prosperity. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, emerging security forces played key roles in defending the people’s right to vote in the face of extremist threats and violence. Indeed, throughout the region, governments and the people of the 27 nations that make up the CENTCOM area confront extremist ideology and violence.

In 2005, we must capitalize on success and deny our enemies the chance to reverse the progress made. We must help safeguard upcoming parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, and the constitutional referendum and national elections in Iraq. We must strengthen programs that build the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) into formations that can take the lead against insurgents and extremists. We must expand and enhance Afghan, Iraqi, and other regional intelligence skills and collection capabilities. We must assist Pakistan to continue its military offensive against al-Qaida and related extremists; and must assist Saudi Arabia to win its fight against its extremist factions. We must continue to deter Iran and
Syria and safeguard the free flow of oil across the region. Finally, we must deny the acquisition or transfer of WMD into the hands of extremists.

We enter 2005 with some 260,000 Coalition Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, DOD civilian employees and contractor personnel in the CENTCOM region. Coalition countries contribute more than 27,000 to this overall total, and their contributions remain indispensable. The sacrifices of our forces and their families have been great, yet there remains much to be done. We should not underestimate the challenges ahead. We operate in a volatile and dangerous region of the world where extremists battle moderates in a revolutionary struggle of ideas. With the continuing support of this Congress and sustained national resolve, our courageous young men and women will help set the conditions for moderation to defeat extremism in this vital region. Their efforts will empower the states of the region to increasingly fight and win this battle on their own.

II. MISSION

U.S. Central Command conducts joint and combined operations in our area of responsibility (AOR) to defeat adversaries, promote regional security and stability, support our allies and friends, and protect vital U.S. interests.

III. VISION

As a Unified Command, CENTCOM may operate as a Combined Command, synchronizing joint and combined forces to decisively defeat enemies within our assigned area of responsibility. CENTCOM promotes regional security and stability through a robust program of military cooperation; exercises; frequent contacts; and, when directed, military operations. We support our allies’ and friends’ efforts to build and sustain the individual and collective defense capabilities which are necessary to allow them to prosper.
free from terrorism, war, or oppression. American and Coalition presence will deter adversaries through demonstrated resolve to protect our national interests and those of our partners.

IV. NATURE OF THE REGION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST EXTREMISM

With the addition of Syria and Lebanon, the CENTCOM region now spans 6.5 million square miles and twenty-seven (27) countries including: Egypt, portions of the Levant, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan in South Asia, and the Central Asian states as far north as Kazakhstan. It incorporates a nexus of key transportation and trade routes, including the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf. It is also home to the key maritime choke points of the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. The Arabian Gulf region alone accounts for 57% the world’s crude oil reserves, 27% of the world’s oil production, and 32% of the world’s natural gas reserves. The region has more than 500 million people and at least 18 major ethnic groups. While predominantly Muslim, it is home to adherents of all of the world's major religions.

Economic, social, and political conditions vary greatly from one nation to another, with per capita incomes ranging from $200.00 to near $40,000.00. Many states in the region suffer from low economic growth, rampant unemployment and population growth rates that make economic improvement unlikely. Some governments remain hard pressed to meet popular demands for social services, for better integration into the global economy, and for more representative political participation. These underlying trends make a dangerous few in the region vulnerable to extremist ideologies and those who promote violent change.

Extremist ideologies generate the main enemy in our region. This enemy seeks to topple local governments, establish a repressive and intolerant
regional theocracy, and then extend its violence to the rest of the world. To effect such change, this enemy believes it must evict the United States and our Coalition allies from the region. Masking their true intentions with propaganda, rhetoric, and a sophisticated use of the mass media and the internet, this enemy exploits regional tensions and popular grievances. Led by al-Qaida, but encompassing a number of ideologically-linked groups such as Ansar al Islam (AI), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI), and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) among others, this extremist enemy exhibits strategic patience. It is willing to wait decades to achieve its goals.

The extremists defame the religion of Islam by glorifying suicide bombing, by the taking and beheading of hostages, and by the wanton use of explosive devices that kill innocent people in the scores. Their false jihad kills indiscriminately and runs contrary to any standard of moral conduct and behavior. The enemy’s vision of the future would create a region-wide zone that would look like Afghanistan under the Taliban. Music would be banned, women ostracized, basic liberties banished, and soccer stadiums used for public executions. The people of the region do not want the future these extremists desire. The more we talk about this enemy, the more its bankrupt ideology will become known. But more importantly, the more that regional leaders talk about and act against this enemy, the less attractive it will be. Osama bin Laden and Musab al Zarqawi cannot represent the future of Islam.

This enemy’s vision of the future is unappealing and a backward step in time. Yet, this enemy is a master at using modern communications techniques to spread its ideological message of hatred. The global internet has enabled not only propaganda, but has allowed this stateless enemy to recruit, finance, coordinate and organize terrorist activity to an unprecedented
degree. While the enemy struggles to gain safe-haven in the physical world, it has established itself a sanctuary in the virtual world. Moreover, al Qaida and associated movements certainly do not limit cell formation to the CENTCOM region. They have global reach with dangerous nodes of activity in Europe and Southeast Asia.

Working with our friends and allies in the region, and with our Coalition partners from around the globe, we participate in an important effort to kill and capture terrorists, attack their infrastructure, restrict their movement, disrupt their financial support, and deny them safe haven.

However, we also know that the underlying vulnerability of the people in the region to extremism and violence stems from causes that require non-military solutions. Interagency and international political, diplomatic, financial and social efforts are all essential to isolating extremists from their sources of strength. For example, renewed diplomatic attention to the Palestinian-Israeli Middle East Peace Process has already done much to put extremists on the defensive. This and similar non-military initiatives will not sway the small, extremist hard core, but can deprive them of the popular passions they exploit to advance their otherwise unattractive cause.

The international military effort in much of our region is synchronized in Tampa at CENTCOM’s main headquarters where, as of mid-February 2005, sixty-one (61) Coalition nations man full time liaison and coordination teams. As always, the key to destroying the terrorist networks rests in thorough intelligence gathering and analysis that results in precise law enforcement or military action against the cellular structure. While we have made great strides in our international targeting of this enemy, much work remains to be done.

The Middle East and Central Asia have a low tolerance for any large foreign military presence, no matter how well-intentioned. Thus, our forces
must be tailored for effective but not overbearing assistance. Over time, our military forces must give way to local military capacity. Ultimately, our regional partnerships, backed by smaller numbers of very capable U.S. military forces, will foster cooperative communities of moderate nations willing to provide mutual support against extremist-inspired violence and other threats to regional stability.

This region also has the potential for strategic surprise. We must guard against unexpected events and be alert to unintended consequences. Examples include a major terrorist strike against oil infrastructure, or closure of the one of the strategic sea lanes. Guarding against strategic surprise is especially critical with respect to the proliferation of WMD. Iran and Syria both have longstanding chemical weapons programs, and Iran has obvious aspirations to develop nuclear weapons. In a region already debilitated with numerous threats to regional stability, a nuclear-armed Iran increases instability and encourages further nuclear proliferation in other states. The obvious problem of WMD technology falling into the hands of terrorist groups requires considerable effort to identify proliferation risks, deter proliferation opportunities, and retain the capabilities for prompt and decisive action. Simultaneously, local government measures to effectively control borders, conduct interdiction operations, and detect proliferation of WMD related materials and technology must be assisted and strengthened.

Our ongoing maritime interdiction operations are key to protecting oil infrastructure and countering potential proliferation of WMD. These operations feature major contributions by many Coalition partners and are a critical ingredient to regional stability.
V. IRAQ

At the height of the January elections there were over 159,000 U.S. forces, over 24,500 Coalition forces, and about 136,000 trained and equipped (ISF) operating across Iraq. Sizeable air, naval and Special Operations Forces supported these forces from within Iraq and across the region. Nearly 33% of our forces in Iraq are drawn from the National Guard and Reserve components. Overseeing all operations in Iraq, Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), headquartered in Baghdad, commands the Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) which consists of six divisions and a separate brigade-size command. MNC-I oversees two U.S. Army divisions, one separate U.S. Army brigade, one U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and three Coalition multinational divisions. Coalition divisions control zones in southern and northern Iraq. Poland and the United Kingdom lead a fourteen-nation and eleven-nation effort, respectively, in the south while the Republic of Korea’s ‘Zaytun Division’ conducts operations from Irbil, in northeast Iraq. Multi-National Security Training Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) leads Coalition efforts to train and equip Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The MNSTC-I commander also serves as the commander of the NATO effort to build ISF and associated supporting structures.

For much of 2004, MNF-I maintained a capability of 17 U.S. brigades in Iraq. This number increased to 20 brigades during the December 2004 to February 2005 period to counter anticipated violence surrounding the January 30, 2005 elections. Currently, MNF-I is undergoing a major U.S. force rotation and will return to the 17 brigade baseline capability by mid-March. Incoming U.S. forces are task-organized for combating the Iraqi insurgency, and trained in the tactics, techniques and procedures developed by departing units. They will spend significant time overlapping with outgoing units to assure maximum continuity.
The Iraqi insurgency is predominantly Sunni Arab. The insurgency consists of three major elements: Former Regime Elements (FRE), indigenous religious extremists and criminal gangs, and al-Qaida-affiliated transnational terrorists. These disparate groups have varying motivations, but are unified in opposition to Coalition presence and a refusal to accept the legitimacy of the new Iraqi government. They loosely coordinate anti-Coalition attacks, but do not display centralized command and control, or a shared vision for Iraq’s future. This Sunni insurgency is limited in scope, and mainly confined to four (4) of Iraq’s eighteen (18) provinces. It is led by FRE from Saddam’s old security and intelligence Services. The FRE is loosely affiliated with junior partners from Iraq’s extremist and criminal communities and with the ideologically-driven foreign fighters who come to Iraq committed to terrorism in the name of false Jihad.

FRE dominate the insurgency and seek a return to power. They employ a campaign of mass intimidation against the Sunni population coupled with stand-off attacks against Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, governmental figures and international assistants to the Iraqi government. They predominantly attack targets in and around Sunni-majority areas with weapons such as rockets, mortars, small missiles and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). FRE collaborate with other insurgent forces, and also exploit criminal elements in Iraq to advance their aims. FRE efforts to de-legitimize Iraq’s interim government and to halt the January 2005 elections failed. This failure may open the door for political accommodation between the transitional Iraqi government and the Sunni population, putting support for the FRE in that community at risk. As Iraq’s January 2005 elections demonstrated, the wider Iraqi insurgency lacks true national support, rarely manifests itself outside of Sunni Arab areas, and focuses more on terrorizing and intimidating its own Sunni community.
Indigenous Iraqi extremists and criminal organizations also participate in the insurgency. Their numbers are limited and their motivations range from profiteering to a deep desire to evict foreign forces from Iraqi soil. Criminal elements exploit the money available to the FRE, offering Services ranging from kidnapping to stand-off attacks for compensation. Indigenous Iraqi extremists work loosely with FRE and foreign Jihadists, and include home-grown terrorist groups like Ansar al Islam and Ansar al Sunna. They are more likely to use suicide bombers and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and also conduct attacks against targets in the Iraqi Kurdish and Shia communities. They have claimed credit for suicide attacks against a Kurdish party gathering in Irbil that killed over 100 in February 2004, and for the December 2004 attack against the Coalition base in Mosul.

Finally, foreign terrorists under the banner of a false Islamic-Jihad have gravitated to Iraq to kill Coalition forces and to establish an extremist state, or at least an extremist safe-haven. Small in number, but zealous in their methods, these ideologically-driven terrorists are the most dangerous to Iraqi peace and stability over the long-haul, and are orchestrated by Jordanian expatriate Musab al Zarqawi and his followers. A longstanding adherent to the radical ideology underpinning the al-Qaida terrorist movement, Zarqawi gained formal accreditation for his Iraq terrorist network from al-Qaida’s senior leadership in late 2004. Osama bin Laden’s announcement of Zarqawi as al-Qaida’s ‘Emir’ in Iraq merely formalized a longstanding relationship, and confirmed that Zarqawi and his terrorists represent the most dangerous brand of extremism confronting the Islamic world today. Zarqawi’s al-Qaida subordinate organization conducts high profile attacks against Coalition, governmental and non-Sunni Arab targets. It kidnaps foreign and Iraqi citizens working for the new government, subjects them to torture, propaganda manipulation, and beheading.
in front of cameras. It aims to create general war between Iraqi Sunnis and Shia’s and indiscriminately targets innocent civilians throughout Iraq. It relies heavily on external financing and foreign fighters infiltrating into Iraq. Some of these foreign fighters are veterans of prior jihadist campaigns, but others come to Iraq completely untrained and destined only for the suicide missions preferred as a tactic of al-Qaida. Zarqawi’s al-Qaida offers the same dark vision for Iraq that the wider extremist movement promises for the region. This vision is rejected by the vast majority of Iraqis.

Two other potential challenges for Iraqi stability cannot be discounted. Radical Shi’a splinter groups like Muqtada Sadr’s Muqtada’s Militia (MM) could pose an armed threat to the new Iraqi government. Sadr’s extremists were defeated militarily by Coalition and Iraqi forces, and isolated politically by the Interim government and Iraqi Shi’ite leaders during 2004. However, the Muqtada’s Militia and other radicalized fringe elements remain a latent threat to Iraqi stability, and must be demobilized by the new Iraqi government to assure national stability. While the Kurdish population is a strong force for democracy and stability in the new Iraq, we are mindful that tensions over the status of Kirkuk could jeopardize internal instability and heighten Turkish concerns about long-term Kurdish goals. Therefore, we support efforts by the new Iraqi government to decide the status of Kirkuk in a fair and equitable manner.

Throughout 2004, Iraqi insurgents made extensive use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Nearly 22% of all attacks against Coalition forces involved IEDs, and they became the number one cause of Coalition casualties. MNF-I has established a team in Iraq to develop the intelligence necessary to effectively target those funding and making IEDs, as well as those who actively employ them. We are attempting to deny the enemy access to bomb-
making materials, are focusing on technologies that provide persistent surveillance along our likely routes of travel, that help neutralize undiscovered IEDs and detect them outside their intended blast zone. We are also developing new materials that can better protect our troops.

We have done much to counter insurgent reliance on IEDs and other stand-off weapons, but no place on the battlefield is immune from the effects of enemy actions. CENTCOM requires the very best efforts of the national science and technology community to generate effective counters to IED’s and other threats to our troops. As always, our best success against enemy activity comes in the form of focused, precisely targeted offensive actions designed to destroy enemy fighters and organizational structures.

We have made progress in detainee operations throughout the past year. We expanded senior leader oversight in Iraq and across the theater, intensified training and validation of personnel involved with detainee operations, and conducted frequent inspection visits to assure that proper procedures were fully implemented. Now, we must get the key states of the region to take responsibility for the arrest, detention, trial and incarceration (if necessary) of those who perpetrate acts of terrorism and criminality within their borders. The key to making this move effectively is the development of rights based, rule of law justice systems in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will strongly encourage more rapid development of these institutions, and will seek to transfer responsibility for detainee operations to these two sovereign governments just as quickly as their legal institutions mature.

Trained, capable and loyal Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are the key to defeating the insurgents and to securing a new Iraq. Training ISF is our main effort for 2005. As the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) constitutional process moves forward, Coalition military efforts will focus
on training, equipping, validating, fielding and mentoring competent and ready Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces. Enhanced training and mentoring of these forces is important to assure Coalition success.

It is important to understand that Iraqis are fighting and dying to secure a new Iraq. Since June 2004, more ISF have died in action against the insurgents than Americans. Predictably, the employment of newly-formed ISF units produced some disappointments during the past year, including the performances of Iraqi Army units in Fallujah and Ramadi (April-May 2004), police in western Baghdad (August-October 2004), and police in Mosul (November 2004). Conversely, focused training and mentoring of Iraqi Intervention Forces (IIF), Iraqi Special Operating Forces (ISOF), and National Guard (ING) forces generated capable and competent units that contributed to successful Coalition operations in Najaf and Kufa (August 2004), Samarra (September 2004) and Fallujah (November 2004). Notably, the ISF turned in an impressive security performance against a determined enemy during the January 2005 elections. ISF success in this major endeavor has boosted confidence, and may serve as a springboard for future growth.

CENTCOM's major effort to adopt lessons learned, and to better coordinate U.S. government and international efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi Security Forces led to the establishment in June 2004 of the Multi-National Security Training Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). Despite an active insurgency with great demands for immediate commitment of newly formed Iraqi units, MNSTC-I has made steady progress in developing Iraqi security forces that can fight and win over the long haul.

Upon activation, and in coordination with the new Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), MNSTC-I conducted a comprehensive security requirements review. This review generated requirements for an Iraqi Police Service (IPS)
with 135,000 officers; for a Department of Border Enforcement with 28,000 officials; and for an expanded Iraqi National Guard (ING) from 45 battalions under six brigade headquarters to 65 battalions under 20 brigade and six division headquarters. MNSTC-I enters 2005 focused on a program designed to fully train, equip and field Iraqi Security Forces that are competent, loyal and responsive to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD). It is also partnering with the U.S. Embassy and the new Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) to assure that quality security force leaders are selected and that a cohesive chain of command responsive to civilian control is established. It is also helping the ITG to establish intermediate organizations and headquarters to assure security forces at the local level are responsible to elected Iraqi officials at the national level.

**Ministry of Interior Forces** – Focused on a goal of 135,000 trained and effective police, MNSTC-I is partnering with Jordan and Egypt on a police training program featuring a 3-week Transition school for police with prior experience, and an 8-week Academy regimen for new entrants. As of early 2005, some 30,000 Iraqi police have completed the three-week Transition Integration Training Program, and over 12,000 have completed the 8-week Academy Training program. MNSTC-I is expanding the capacity of academy training programs in Jordan and Baghdad and across new regional academies in Iraq. Expansion has increased the police academy graduation rate to approximately 5,000 per month. MNSTC-I is also assisting MOI in the development of a specialized policing capability including Special Police Commandos, an Emergency Response Unit, a Bureau of Dignitary Protection, and a Civil Intervention Force. The Special Police Commandos will eventually consist of six operational battalions. The Emergency Response Unit will augment the regular police with a special operations police capability and be responsible for high-risk arrests, hostage rescue, and explosive ordnance
disposal. The Bureau of Dignitary Protection will be responsible for protecting Iraqi government leaders. The Civil Intervention Force will provide a national, high-end, rapid response police capability to counter large-scale civil disobedience and insurgency. Special Police Commandos and the Emergency Response Unit have already been used in operations and have acquitted themselves well. MNSTC-I’s efforts include police infrastructure development of nine brigade-sized bases, and over 100 police stations and training academies, most of which will be completed by June of 2005.

In concert with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (US DHS), MNSTC-I also has improved training for the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE). Iraqi border control training now features a 4-week training program at the Jordanian International Police Training Center. MNSTC-I is assisting with infrastructure development for over 300 border posts and 15 ports of entry. As of early 2005, 35 border forts are complete, with 74 forts under construction or refurbishment. Four (4) of 15 ports of entry are under construction or rebuild. MNSTC-I and US DHS have also provided Iraqi Border Department with new technologies to control Iraq’s lengthy borders.

**Ministry of Defense** - Iraqi national defense forces incorporate Iraqi Regular Army (RA) formations, Iraqi Intervention Forces (IIF), Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF), Iraqi National Guard (ING) elements, and a Presidential (or Muthanna) Brigade. A small air force and a coastal defense service round out the Iraqi defense forces.

As of mid-February 2005, Iraq’s total Army consists of over 70 battalions. 24 of these are operational regular army (RA) battalions, with 3 in training; 4 separate, special battalions; and a transportation battalion. 42 of these are fielded ING battalions, with another 8 in training. This trained and equipped force has gone from nothing in June 2003 to what we see
today. 12 of the 24 operational RA battalions are basic Iraqi army units. The IIF has the other 12 operational battalions, with ISOF and the Muthanna Brigade now fielding 2 operational battalions each. Of further note, a first battalion of the initial Iraqi armored brigade stood-up in time to help with security for the January 2005 elections. Mechanized brigade fielding and training will continue throughout 2005.

The Iraqi Air Force (IAF) established a limited capability in September 2004. Designed for tactical support and air mobility missions, the IAF has 3 operational squadrons of 9 aircraft as of February 2005. It will continue development in the coming year. After successful training by our British Coalition partners, the Iraqi Coastal Defense Force (ICDF) is now at full operational capability, with five 100-foot patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels and a naval infantry regiment. The ICDF is helping to secure Iraq’s maritime oil export infrastructure, oil platforms in the Arabian Gulf and Iraq’s coastal waters.

Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention Force battalions have already been deployed as part of Coalition missions to combat the insurgency. To date, their missions in a counterinsurgency role have consisted of route security, force protection, and patrol and cordon operations. We have learned that quality mentoring by professional Coalition forces is essential to successful Iraqi units, and are committed to assure such mentoring of fielded Iraqi forces continues.

Separately, we work with the Iraqis and our Coalition partners to expand and enhance independent training and equipping of Iraq’s national security forces. An Iraqi Training Battalion has already trained and graduated soldiers that are part of active Iraqi units, and the first classes have started at two Iraqi military academies. NATO’s agreement to provide training to Iraq’s security forces will greatly enhance our ISF training
efforts. In response to a July 2004 request from Prime Minister Allawi, NATO established a security force Training Implementation Mission Iraq (NTIM-I) to identify options for NATO training of Iraqi Security Forces. NTIM-I officially changed its name to the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) in December 2004. At the same time, the Commander of MNSTC-I was dual-hatted as Commander of NTM-I to assure consistency and continuity of training effort. NTM-I has been coordinating with Iraq’s MOD and MNSTC-I to harmonize the training and equipping of ISF. NATO’s contribution will help in establishing an Iraqi Training Command, and an Iraqi Training, Doctrine, and Education Center. In addition, NATO will help establish a War College and assist in the development of the Iraqi Armed Forces Joint Headquarters. As 2005 progresses, NTM-I will help with MNSTC-I’s critical missions, help facilitate allied burdensharing, and greatly enhance ISF training.

While demonstrable progress has been made in recruiting, training and equipping a modern ISF during the latter-part of 2004, MNF-I and MNSTC-I have identified the need for more Coalition mentoring and monitoring of fielded Iraqi forces as these units transition to greater self-reliance. Consequently, MNF-I has directed MNC-I units to increase partnering activities with affiliated ISF. This effort will be a component of our commitment to capable, competent, and increasingly self-reliant Iraqi security forces.

Security and reconstruction are interdependent dimensions of building a new Iraq. Coalition troops have contributed to reconstruction and restoration of Iraqi basic services in a number of important ways. Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds remain the most effective tool for our commanders to facilitate reconstruction, build goodwill, and combat insurgent propaganda that wrongly paints our forces as Iraq’s occupiers. CERP funds have allowed Coalition commanders to complete
thousands of local construction projects during the past year. Due to its flexibility, CERP has been used for projects as diverse as employment of youth in Sadr City to clean-up city blocks and rebuild water and sewage systems, to those aimed at helping local police procure the basic equipment.

We are committed to broadening the international Coalition that will assist the ISF move forward. Our OIF Coalition remains robust, with twenty eight (28) countries contributing over 24,000 troops working to stabilize Iraq and build its self-reliance. We are grateful for the assistance of Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and the Federal Republic of Germany who run programs that school and train Iraqi police. We also welcome an expanded NATO presence in the training of Iraqi security forces, and hope to extend further our partnerships with the many Arab nations in the region that share our interest in seeing Iraq emerge as a stable and secure country that respects the rule of law.

Iraq’s January 2005 national election was an important step toward sovereignty and security, but will remain challenging throughout the coming year. While those working to unify a peaceful new Iraq outnumber those working to break it apart, the enemies of a new Iraq remain determined. The processes of writing an Iraqi constitution and forming a new Iraqi government should remain politically-focused, but we cannot rule-out the possibility that they may trigger more violence. Together with our Coalition partners, CENTCOM enters 2005 committed to empower Iraqis to build political institutions, weave the fabric of a tolerant Iraqi society, extend and expand economic opportunities, and defeat the insurgents who threaten Iraq’s emerging new identity.

VI. AFGHANISTAN

CENTCOM currently has about 19,000 Coalition forces deployed in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This total includes
some 17,300 U.S. and about 1,700 Coalition personnel from seventeen (17) nations. All are commanded by Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A), which assures unity of effort with the U.S. Ambassador in Kabul and manages the military-to-military relationship with the Governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Combined Joint Task Force – 76 (CJTF-76) is a division-level subordinate command with 14 separate task forces; including combat, support, medical, engineering, and training units. CJTF-76 directs major and routine combat operations throughout Afghanistan. Linked into CJTF-76 is a robust special operations capability from U.S. and Coalition nations.

The participation of over eight (8) million Afghans in the October 2004 Presidential election marked important progress towards stability, sovereignty and representative government. Voters endorsed President Karzai’s moderate leadership and, with the help of the international community, viable institutions and governmental structures are being rebuilt. Extremists failed to make good on threats to disrupt the elections. This failure coupled with Coalition offensive military efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistani military activity in Waziristan put severe pressure on extremist groups.

While significantly diminished in 2004, threats to stability in Afghanistan come from three groups. In the northeast and the Kabul regions, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), an al-Qaida affiliate led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, remains active and dangerous. In the southeast, al-Qaida strives to regain an operational foothold through the use of Arab and non-Afghan foreign fighters. In the south and elsewhere around the country, remnants of the Taliban continue sporadic and increasingly ineffective operations. While each is fading, these enemies continue a robust propaganda effort and plot
attacks against the Afghan government. As ever, the enemy remains patient, hidden and dangerous. Continued development of effective Afghan security institutions and a viable political agenda are keys to reducing the enemy’s ability to reappear in strength.

The Coalition experience in Afghanistan affirms the need for timely, actionable intelligence tied to a flexible, lethal response. CFC-A and other government agencies continue to develop regional intelligence architectures and build command and control systems effective for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations. Yet no purely military solution provides the key to stability. Civil-military operations which enable reconstruction progress remain essential to isolate insurgents from their support bases.

While successes in 2004 were noteworthy, the enemy remains elusive and dangerous. In 2005 the Coalition must focus on six imperatives: (1) continued direct pressure against enemy sanctuary through offensive operations; (2) building competent, capable Afghan security forces, (3) completing the militia Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program: (4) anchoring Afghan control of the countryside, instilling confidence in the Afghan Government, and enabling reconstruction and good governance through Coalition regional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); 5) facilitating cooperation with neighboring friendly states; and, 6) increasing Coalition coordination with an expanding NATO presence.

Coalition forces will continue to mentor and accelerate training efforts of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and assist the Afghan police as they assume a larger role in counter-insurgency operations. Coalition forces will target and attack remaining pockets of al-Qaida, HIG, and Taliban to remove the threat they pose to stability.

During 2004, CENTCOM and CFC-A focused our efforts on defeating the insurgents and terrorists, building Afghan security institutions, de-
legitimizing Afghan warlords, disarming and demobilizing irregular Afghan militias, and countering Afghanistan’s growing drug trade. While our 2004 priorities were directed toward the first three categories, evolving conditions in Afghanistan necessitate that militia disarmament and counter-narcotics support will rise to the top in 2005.

The Japanese-led, international community program for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of Afghanistan’s irregular militia forces produced good results by the end of 2004. As of early 2005, an estimated 34,000 of 63,000 irregular militia forces had gone through the DDR process. CFC-A will continue its close support of international community efforts to complete the DDR of all Afghan irregular militias during 2005. However, not all militias or armed groups are relics of Afghanistan’s violent, fragmented past. Some are engaged in another sort of menace to Afghanistan’s goals, the booming narcotics trade in poppy, heroin and opium.

In 2005, the UK leads an accelerating international assistance effort for Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics program. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) leads U.S. national efforts that partner with this UK-led program, and U.S. forces in Afghanistan are in strong support. Unchecked expansion of poppy cultivation and the drug trafficking culture that accompanies it poses a clear threat to Afghan and regional stability. To support INL’s assistance of Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics fight, we have established a Counter Narcotics Branch in our Tampa Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to better coordinate DoD’s support for U.S. national efforts. During 2004 CFC-A also delivered $73 million in FY03 DoD supplemental funding in support of INL programs for the Afghan police, border security, and Counter-Narcotics Police (CNPA) equipment and training.
We will continue these counter-narcotics support programs and extend all assistance that is legally permissible to build the Afghan infrastructure and security sector capacity to defeat the counter-narcotics threat. Our efforts will be earnest, yet our expectations must be realistic. There will be no quick fix to Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics challenge. Success will require patience, persistence, and the knowledge that successful counter-narcotics programs take time, while unsuccessful ones rush to failure. Armed with this knowledge, we can help the Afghans achieve their counter-narcotics objectives at a pace that will not jeopardize stability, or fuel the popular unrest that could give Afghan insurgents a second wind. Creating viable alternate livelihoods to counter the ‘easy money’ of poppy production will take time. Crop substitution, establishment of legitimate cottage industries for employment alternatives, and access to ‘drug free’ capital will provide Afghans with greater legitimate economic choices.

Training, equipping and mentoring the Afghan National Army (ANA) remains the key component for military activities to stabilize Afghanistan. Coalition teams actively train five new ANA battalions at a time over a three-month training cycle. As the ANA is fielded, we must continue Coalition initiatives to reform the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Afghan General Staff, and the ANA Regional Commands. This process gained momentum in late 2004 with establishment of four ANA Regional Commands.

Now almost 20,000 strong, the ANA is earning the trust and confidence of Afghan citizens, and is competent in combat operations. ANA troops played a major role in securing the October Presidential elections. ANA battalions rapidly deployed to restore the peace when factional violence broke out in the western city of Herat last May. American field commanders report that ANA companies perform extremely well in combat against insurgents along Afghanistan’s southern borders.
While the ANA has exceeded our expectations in performance and effectiveness, the Afghan National Police (ANP) force requires additional seasoning. The Afghan police suffer from limited access to comprehensive training, improper equipment, leadership by regional authorities often unaccountable to a central ministry, and irregular or substandard pay. Corruption within the police remains a concern for ordinary citizens. Despite a well-intentioned, but limited international program to assist the police, more needs to be done. Although they have grown to over 34,000, many more must still be properly trained and equipped.

Reconstruction remains an important part of isolating our enemies, depriving them of their support base, and giving Afghans hope for a better future. Conceived by the Coalition in 2003, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are small civil-military headquarters situated in an Afghan province that brings together Coalition security forces and civil affairs teams, U.S. interagency political and reconstruction representatives, Afghan government authorities, and representatives from international assistance organizations and NGOs. Coalition PRTs help enhance local security and extend the authority and visibility of the Afghan government into its provinces, thereby facilitating reconstruction and development. Afghan PRTs number nineteen (19) today, with fourteen (14) directed by CFC-A, and five (5) northeastern sites under the authority of NATO-ISAF. Due to the success of the PRT program, CFC-A and NATO-ISAF plan to expand to another 7 sites, producing a total of 26 PRTs by the end of 2007. As Afghan institutions strengthen, and regional governance capacity grows, these PRTs will phase out of existence in favor of sovereign Afghan institutions and agencies. In the interim, PRTs will help the Afghan people toward a better future.

A final component of our strategy in Afghanistan is increasing Coalition coordination with an expanding NATO International Security Force
(ISAF) presence, now some 8,000 troops strong. NATO has taken steps to expand the ISAF stability and security presence to the west, and then to the south of Afghanistan during the coming two years. This expansion will have NATO take ownership of three (3) Coalition PRTs in the west of Afghanistan during 2005, and up to four (4) more in the south by 2006. We welcome ISAF’s expansion, and are working closely to assure that NATO-ISAF and Coalition missions complement each other, and fully address the security needs of the Afghanistan government.

Afghanistan is moving toward stability, but much work still must be done. With Coalition and NATO-ISAF partners, we will continue support of Afghan reconstruction and for the growth of competent Afghan security institutions. With an increasingly capable ANA, we will fight to secure Afghanistan and complete the defeat of the diminished, but dangerous extremist-insurgent enemies. Finally, we will set the conditions to turn over more and more of Afghanistan’s security to the Afghans, adjusting U.S. force levels as growing Afghan capacity allows.

VII. HORN OF AFRICA (HOA)

CENTCOM continues to refine its operational focus in the Horn of Africa and the surrounding maritime environment. Here, our streamlined efforts are designed to prevent enemy access to regional safe-havens, and to encourage and support the efforts of moderate regional governments. In many ways, the CENTCOM program in the Horn of Africa is a model for how military forces might operate across the wider region in the future.

Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is the CENTCOM command element for the Horn of Africa which includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and the Seychelles, and has an area of influence throughout Eastern Africa. With approximately 1,400 assigned
forces -- 1,300 U.S. and about 100 Coalition -- CJTF-HOA is supported by two subordinate command elements; to include Commander Task Force – 150 (CTF-150), which is commanded by a German Flag officer with 9 ships from 5 countries, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Horn of Africa (JSOTF-HOA). CJTF-HOA conducts operations and training to assist host nations combat terrorism, and establish greater regional security and stability. CJTF-HOA’s IMET program, Disaster Preparedness (DP) program, and intelligence sharing agreements are valuable examples of significant cooperation with regional partners that yields important results.

The Horn of Africa is vulnerable to penetration by regional extremist groups, terrorist activity and ethnic violence. Regional instability is fueled by internal conflicts, border disputes, uncontrolled borders and territorial waters, extreme poverty, unreliable internal security capabilities, natural disasters, lack of dependable food and water sources and an underdeveloped infrastructure. These factors combine to create an environment ripe for exploitation by extremists, terrorists and criminal organizations.

CENTCOM continues to synchronize CJTF-HOA actions with other U.S. agencies and international organizations in order to develop a regional approach to combating terrorism, while increasing local capacity to deal with threats to security. While we prefer an integrated regional approach, we continue to develop bi-lateral relationships in HOA to address mutual security interests and foster long-term goals. The CJTF-HOA strategy aims to increase pressure on existing regional terrorist cells, and to deter migration of terrorist operatives seeking sanctuary in the region. Central to this objective are Coalition efforts to enhance HOA nations’ capabilities to detect and combat the terrorist threat. This effort requires aggressive
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations to develop an intricate understanding of extremist activity.

Regional partners are cooperating in the pursuit of our common goals. Djibouti has given extraordinary support for U.S. military basing, training, and counter-terrorism operations including maritime interdiction of several terrorist associated dhows. Kenya, a leader in East African regional affairs, is a key ally against terror and has been instrumental in promoting peace in Sudan and access to Somalia. Ethiopia, despite limited resources, is undertaking an ambitious program of security sector reform and is also committed to combating terrorism and countering extremism within its borders. We are effectively reaching out to Eritrea and Yemen, redefining relationships in the process. Instability in the Horn is a long-term problem. Somalia is a failed state that Islamic terrorists continue to use as a transit point and temporary safe haven. Sudan has suffered decades of civil war and retains great potential to become an extremist training and staging location. Border tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain high with renewed conflict a possibility.

Our Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs work to increase national capabilities for border and maritime security, Counter-Terrorism (CT), intelligence fusion, and information operations. Programs featuring medical and veterinary assistance, well drilling operations, and various engineering projects that rebuild or refurbish hospitals, schools, pedestrian bridges and public facilities have built considerable goodwill between Coalition forces, host nations and the local populace. This goodwill helps discredit extremist propaganda and generates local desires to defeat terrorists before they can become entrenched.
VIII. THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION (TSC) AND OTHER REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

TSC and Regional Partnerships

CENTCOM’s Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) program builds essential cooperative security relationships with allies throughout the region. Our TSC program improves allied military self-defense capabilities, boosts interoperability with U.S. forces, encourages military transformation, enhances intelligence sharing and information exchange, and reinforces U.S. military access when required. The pillars of our TSC program include: International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing/Foreign Military Sales (FMF/FMS), and the Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). Each of these initiatives strengthens partner relationships across the region, and merits long-term U.S. commitment.

FMF/FMS initiatives have been especially important in improving the capabilities of the Pakistani Armed Forces by providing the weapons and equipment that allows them to more effectively locate, track, and engage our common enemy along the rugged border with Afghanistan. Last year’s regional Foreign Military Financing (FMF) allocation of $2.3B provided a vital increase of $150 million over FY2004’s allocation. This helped to strengthen our relationships with Egypt and Jordan, bolster the national armies of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and improve our cooperation with other Central Asian nations.

IMET provides foreign military members the opportunity to attend courses at U.S. military institutions and supports Congressionally-mandated democratization programs. Last year’s $16.8M IMET allocation sustained CENTCOM emphasis on Jordan, Pakistan, Egypt, Oman, Yemen and several Central Asian nations. Our investment in IMET is incredibly important to winning the war on terrorism. Officers and civilian defense leaders exposed to U.S.
training and institutions can often help us bridge the all too deep cultural gap that exists in the region. Given the opportunity, we would welcome the chance to train many more regional officers and defense leaders in our school systems.

The new DoD Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is also an important cooperative program. CTFP provides counter-terrorism education and training to selected military and paramilitary leaders of our regional partners. This training facilitates improved techniques, processes and procedures for defeating terrorists. It also fosters regional collaboration for countering terrorist threats. FY 05’s CTFP allocation allowed USCENTCOM to emphasize training for Jordan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Oman, Yemen, Kenya, Ethiopia and most of the Central Asian nations. CTFP is an important new program for building counter-terrorism competence in the region, thereby increasing regional capacity for self-reliance. We strongly support its continuation and expansion.

We also conduct several TSC programs including Cooperative Defense (CD) against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Gulf States, and Disaster Preparedness (DP) in the Horn of Africa and with the Central Asian states. These improve host nation capacity to cope with natural and man-made disasters.

FMF/FMS, IMET and CTFP are productive and important programs that build independent regional defense capability. While our most pressing priorities for the coming year continues to be the stability of Iraq and Afghanistan, the greatest long-term danger may be from extremist influence in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the small Gulf States. Our TSC program aims to support the efforts of these nations and others to reinforce moderation and implement reforms designed to achieve long-term stability. We should not under-
estimate the value of these programs. We will support them as a matter of highest priority.

**Pakistan**

Pakistan is arguably our most important partner in the broad struggle against extremism in the region. Pakistan’s military and intelligence campaign against foreign terrorists have produced significant results. Since September 11, 2001, more than 300 al-Qaida terrorists have been killed or captured in Pakistan. Recognizing that the frontier areas along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan had become a safe haven for terrorists, President Musharraf deployed over 70,000 regular Army troops into the border region alone. Improved dialogue and reduced tensions between Pakistan and India has allowed President Musharraf to focus attention on this counter-terrorist fight to the west, with less worry about an immediate flashpoint to his east. Equally important, President Musharraf has taken the leading role in the Islamic world as an advocate for moderate, responsible, and tolerant approaches to religion and political expression. His personal efforts are encouraging other regional leaders to take a stand against extremism and for moderation.

The Pakistani Army offensive astride the Afghan border is not yet complete, but has already helped to significantly diminish terrorist forces there. The Army’s 2004 offensive into South Waziristan uprooted extremist sanctuaries, disrupted terrorist planning and training, and has put al-Qaida leadership on the run. Pakistan’s recent capture of several high profile terrorists including Abu Musab al-Baluchi, a nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Abu Talha a-Pakistani, a key facilitator of al-Qaida efforts in the Horn of Africa, and al-Ghailani, an operative wanted in connection with the bombing of the U.S. embassies in East Africa, foiled global terrorists’ initiatives and placed al-Qaida on the defensive.
We are supporting Pakistan’s efforts with increased intelligence sharing and security assistance. We have greatly improved operational coordination between CFC-A and the Pakistani military during the past year. We hold regular meetings with Pakistan’s military leaders. These meetings have enhanced transparency, situational awareness and military cooperation along the Afghan-Pakistan border. We will continue to support Pakistan with its requests for assistance. Helping Pakistan help itself is an essential element of the plan to help regional states win the war against extremist-inspired terrorism. Moreover, it is essential that we continue to develop a long-term partnership with the world’s second largest Muslim nation and aid its transition back toward democratic institutions even as it fights against extremism.

**Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)**

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) remains a major battleground in the war against terrorists. Al-Qaida and its affiliates in the Kingdom attacked a number of Saudi and western targets during this past year. The violence of these attacks, and the revolting cruelty by terrorists against both western and Muslim workers residing in the Kingdom, unmasked the ruthless nature of this enemy, and galvanized a strong response from the Saudi government.

Saudi security forces have conducted major operations against al-Qaida cells and operatives, killing and capturing many extremists across the country. Saudi counter-terrorist forces improved their capabilities to find, fix and destroy the al-Qaida network operating within the Kingdom. The Saudis also continued their work to disrupt terrorist financial and support networks. They are making progress, but more remains to be done.

We continue to work with the Saudis to increase their counter-terrorist capabilities and to widen the scope of Riyadh’s regional counter-terrorist
cooperation. The Saudi government took a positive step in this direction when it hosted a Global Counter-Terrorism Conference in Riyadh during early February 2005.

We plan to continue positive engagement with Saudi Arabia across a wide range of security enhancement initiatives. Building on programs already ongoing between the U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) and the Saudis, it is important to support Saudi Arabia’s efforts to build capable security structures, enhance counter-terrorist organizations, and develop networks to share information. We will continue to do all we can to assist Saudi efforts to defeat terrorist organizations and promote stability.

**Arabian Gulf States and Yemen**

The Arabian Gulf States of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman are valued partners in our struggle against extremist-inspired terror. Their support has been essential in our operations across the region. Kuwait remains host to the Combined Land Forces Component Command (CFLCC) and serves as the primary staging point for our forces operating in Iraq. Bahrain serves as the home to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the United States Fifth Fleet. Qatar continues to host the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters and the Combined Forces Air Component Commander’s Combined Air Operations Center (CFACC-CAOC).

The Bahraini government has committed to establishing a Counter-Terrorism Operations and Intelligence Center. The UAE promotes regional cooperation and combat effectiveness by hosting academic and flying courses at its Gulf Air Warfare Center. Oman looks to the United States for cooperation to help patrol its extensive coastline and to upgrade its military capabilities. CENTCOM’s naval component remains engaged with all Arabian Gulf states to improve maritime security, oil infrastructure protection, and aides to navigation. CENTCOM will continue to improve the
capabilities of these friendly Gulf nations, encouraging them to provide for their own security, border integrity, and counter-terrorist capability. We will also work with them to generate their funding for security projects and facilities necessary for a long-term stability and security in the region. Finally, we will continue to work with these Arabian Gulf governments to disrupt al-Qaida’s stated desire to attack the region’s oil industry; and, if a successful attack occurs, help them to organize timely and effective consequence management operations for mitigation.

Yemen remains an important regional partner in the struggle against extremism. Yemen’s porous borders and loosely-controlled tribal areas remain a magnet for extremists seeking to transit, support, and supply their networks. Our cooperative program for Yemen has focused on counter-terrorism training and establishment of a Yemeni Coast Guard to patrol its maritime borders and interdict illicit trade to and from the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. These efforts in Yemen have yielded tangible results, including recent bilateral cooperation with Saudi Arabia to tighten border security. Our continued assistance to Sa’naa is essential to improve Yemeni effectiveness in the struggle against extremism.

E
c
y
t

Egypt

The influential leader of the Arab world, Egypt remains a strong Coalition ally against regional extremism and central to solving the difficult equation of Palestinian-Israeli peace. Egypt again demonstrated leadership as a strong champion of peace between Israel and Palestine when it hosted the face-to-face meeting between Israeli President Sharon and new Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Abbas in Sharm-el-Sheik shortly after Abbas’ January 2005 election as PLA head. Its role in cooperative military engagement with the United States also does much to enhance regional stability. Egypt has materially supported Afghan and Iraqi reconstruction
efforts. Egyptian access and transit rights remain essential for the conduct of military operations throughout the region.

During 2004, Egypt conducted training for Iraqi police, began a recurring training program for Iraqi army personnel, and hosted the November Sharm El-Sheik Conference to promote Iraqi elections. Egypt now has donated over 65 tons of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, contributed arms and ammunition to the new Afghan National Army, and deployed a field hospital to Bagram with a commitment to serve through at least May 2005. Egypt also has made a significant effort to resolve the North-South problem in Sudan, furthering its reputation as an ally for peace and stability in the region.

The U.S. has maintained close military relations with Egypt since the signing of the Camp David accords in 1979. Egypt’s important military capabilities and its leadership role as a moderating voice in the Arab world should not be underestimated. The U.S. continues to provide Egypt with $1.3 billion annually for the procurement of U.S. manufactured weapons systems. We also support professional training of Egyptian officers with nearly $1.2 million annually in IMET funding. U.S. aid has generated good will and yielded an Egyptian military that has a majority of U.S. vehicles and equipment, with high levels of interoperability and significant numbers of U.S.-trained senior military leaders. We look forward to a strong and continuing partnership with Egypt, supporting the key role Egypt continues to play in the struggle against extremism and terrorism while promoting regional stability.

Jordan

Jordan remains an essential friend in the collective struggle against regional extremism and achievement of stability in Iraq and Palestine. King Abdullah II openly supports U.S. efforts in the region, and has postured Jordan as a voice for moderation and tolerance in the Arab world, hosting a
November 2004 Conference that produced the “Amman Declaration” advocating a peaceful and inclusive future for Islam. The country’s strategic location and influence throughout the region greatly assists U.S. regional objectives. Jordan hosts important training schools for Iraqi Special Forces and police. These programs are major pieces of our effort to build competent and capable Iraqi Security Forces, able to lead in the fight against their insurgents. Jordan’s highly trained and professional armed forces represent a positive example for other regional militaries. The Kingdom provides extensive military education and training opportunities. We strongly support Jordan’s offer to establish a Special Operations Center of Excellence to boost regional special operations forces (SOF) capacity. Jordan’s very capable SOF makes this a natural site for a high caliber regional training and cooperation center.

U.S. economic and military aid programs for Jordan are essential to help this regional partner help itself. Jordan uses our assistance to strengthen its economy, modernize its armed forces, and improve regional efforts to defeat extremism. We will continue to focus our security assistance with Jordan to develop her peacekeeping and Special Forces capabilities, and to build intelligence sharing and personnel exchange programs in support of counter-terror efforts. Across a wide range of activities and programs, Jordan remains an invaluable regional partner in our fight against extremism.

**Syria and Lebanon**

Part of the CENTCOM region since April 2004, Syria continues to play an unhelpful role in regional stability. Damascus continues to defy UN Resolution 1559 calling for removal of troops from Lebanon. A designated state sponsor of terrorism, Syria has provided political and material support to Palestinian terror groups. Iranian support for Hizballah continues to
transit Syria into Lebanon with tacit Syrian approval. Damascus also remains under scrutiny for poor adherence to international WMD non-proliferation norms. Furthermore, Syria has failed to crack down on Iraq anti-Coalition insurgents, their supporters and their sympathizers who find safe haven within Syrian borders, in a meaningful way. While Syria should share a common interest with us in stabilizing Iraq, its actions instead demonstrate a state committed to fostering instability. CENTCOM’s military capability in the region acts as a deterrent against more aggressive Syrian behavior. Syria’s behavior is all the more disturbing given its own vulnerability to extremist forces. Although Syria enjoys a relatively high literacy rate, its centrally controlled economy has not kept pace with a rapidly growing population, resulting in high unemployment and slumping GDP. Syria’s minority Allawite government has many internal and external opponents, and is vulnerable to the emergence of domestic extremist movements.

Iraqi former regime elements (FRE) and extremist groups, including the Zarqawi al-Qaida network, are using Syria as a primary transit point for organizing and funding anti-Coalition fighters in Iraq. While insisting that Syria curb the flow of foreign fighters and FRE across its borders, we are attempting to work with Damascus to improve border security and make greater progress in stemming the infiltration of foreign fighters into Iraq.

After years of civil war, Lebanon has enjoyed a period of relative calm and prosperity over the last fifteen years. However, Lebanon remains unstable, with portions occupied by Syria, and with a number of terrorist groups and private militias resident within its borders. Thirteen years after the deadline for its withdrawal from Lebanon under terms of the Lebanese Peace Accords, and months after UN Security Council Resolution 1559 calling for its immediate withdrawal, Syria retains more than 15,000 troops and significant military intelligence presence in Lebanon. This continuing
presence provokes hostility from Israel, inhibits proper development of Lebanese security forces, and promotes the development of ungoverned space within Lebanese territory. Lebanon will only move toward stability and security once Syria departs.

We have a growing Security Assistance program with Lebanon. We run an International Military Education & Training (IMET) program that trains Lebanese officers at U.S. military schools. Our Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program is designed as a train-the-trainer program for the Lebanese on how to render safe the over 350,000 land mines and unexploded ordinance that litters Lebanon. The HMA program has produced 350 Lebanese trainers, and the Lebanese National Demining Office reports over 45,500 mines cleared as of June 2004. Once Syrian forces depart, and when the Lebanese government asks, we are prepared to expand these programs and to explore others that will improve Lebanese security capabilities across a wide array of missions. We also stand ready to assist Lebanon disarm private militias and to develop the military skills necessary to conduct counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations that defeat extremist groups and deter their return.

USCENTCOM recognizes that unaltered Syrian behavior threatens regional stability. We are also aware of the degree to which extremism and terrorism could threaten Syria and Lebanon. Thus, we are postured to deter Syria, and remain ready when asked to partner with Lebanon in developing the military capabilities to defeat extremism, terrorism and instability.

Iran

The political situation in Iran remains complex. Tension exists between moderates who desire a greater voice in politics and the hard-line religious Mullahs who control Iranian security forces and the mechanisms of political power. Iran has multiple centers of power and its closed society makes assessing their national intentions difficult.
The situation with Iran is tense, and the possibility for miscalculation high. We will watch Iran carefully to try to prevent any destabilizing activities that could complicate our efforts, contribute to internal Iraqi or Afghan frictions, or threaten regional stability. We will continue to deter Iranian support of terrorism. Iran is also central to our counter proliferation planning and nonproliferation efforts. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities and, working with the Britain, France and Germany (the EU-3), continues to demand Tehran’s compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

While generally thought to be for defense, Iran continues to build a credible military capable of regional power projection. It has the largest military capability in the region and a record of aggressive military action in and around the Arabian Gulf.

Iran’s military force has the capability to threaten the free flow of oil from the Gulf region. Iranian forces include a Navy of small attack boats carrying torpedoes and missiles that are well suited for the restricted confines of the Straits of Hormuz. A new generation of indigenously produced anti-ship cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles threaten both oil infrastructure and shipping. It is important for us to maintain reconnaissance capabilities to monitor these forces. To counter this threat, our forward-based posture retains a Navy Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) presence that demonstrates our commitment to unrestricted international access to the Gulf’s resources.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Force (IRGC) and Intelligence Service (MOIS) are very active throughout the Arabian Gulf and the broader Middle East. Iranian sponsored groups, backed by their intelligence Services, could become a source of difficulties in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere in the region.
Therefore, we stand with our regional partners to safeguard our mutual vital interests.

Central Asian States

Our continuing engagement with the states of Central Asia addresses significant sources of instability in the region. Our partnerships with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan focus on developing counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics capabilities. They also work toward improving border security and enhancing military professionalism. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, for example, have undertaken programs of military reform designed to increase the professionalism of their armed forces. We will continue to foster security sector reform, encourage regional cooperation, and seek their constructive involvement in our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.

It is clear that our relationship is mutually beneficial. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan provide key access and overflight rights for our operations in Afghanistan. The government of Uzbekistan has provided access to Karshi-Khanabad (K2) Airfield at no cost to U.S. forces. Kyrgyzstan also provides U.S. basing at Manas. Kazakhstan continues to provide engineering troops for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Our engagement in this region supports the efforts of these nations as they move forward from their Soviet pasts. Military-to-military contacts and educational opportunities provided under IMET continue to enhance the reform programs that are in place. Through bilateral and multilateral exercises, we will develop greater interoperability and provide a positive example of a professional force subordinated to legitimate civilian authority.

The Central Asian States continue to struggle with reform and free enterprise, while their people clearly desire to participate in the growing prosperity enjoyed by other former Soviet countries. The risks associated
with failure of these states include regional instability, drug trafficking, smuggling and safe haven for terrorists. Our security cooperation efforts aim to improve border control and enhance counter-terrorism capabilities. Al Qaida, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and other extremist groups are active in Central Asia. Continued regional cooperation is an important element of countering extremist activity.

IX. JOINT WARFIGHTING

CENTCOM has been fighting continuously as a Joint team for almost four years. Throughout our operations, patterns have emerged as to what is going well and where we continue to face joint warfighting challenges.

Successes

First, our Special Operations Forces (SOF) have proven their capabilities in the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns. Their ability to operate alongside and multiply the capabilities of indigenous forces is central to our counter-insurgency fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. When enabled by focused intelligence and precision strike capabilities, SOF are able to sustain unrelenting pressure on extremist networks, denying them safe haven.

The adaptability of our conventional forces has been extraordinary. We have seen them shift from high intensity fighting (both in urban and open environments) to conducting counter-insurgency operations and transitioning into civil-military operations within very short timeframes. We have made great progress in conducting military operations in urban areas. We have developed effective methods to defeat insurgents operating in urban terrain by using precision munitions, sophisticated sensors, non-lethal weapons, and adaptive tactics which have been lethal to the enemy while minimizing collateral damage and saving civilian lives. Such adaptability is the product of the unprecedented quality of our forces, the rigor of their
training, and the superb equipment they employ. Today our armed forces are professional, combat-proven and unrivalled around the world. We must do everything we can to retain their experience, and sustain their qualitative edge over all potential adversaries.

Intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) systems, especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are a key part of the Joint warfighting team. All the Services contribute to this diverse array of systems and all benefit from the integrated intelligence products they produce.

Another success has been joint command and control across a region where we simultaneously conduct large-scale ground combat, precision counter-terrorist operations, maritime interdiction operations and full-spectrum air support. All of our major headquarters are joint, and are manned by leaders and staffs that merge Service expertise into joint solutions. We have progressed to the point where it is difficult to imagine fighting other than as a joint team.

**Challenges**

Our experience also highlights challenges that remain in joint warfighting. Command and control (C2) systems are still developed and maintained by the Services and are not easily integrated for Joint operations. We need C2 systems that not only enable but enhance the capabilities of Marine aircraft flying from a Navy carrier under the command and control of an Air Force headquarters in close support of Army troops or Special Forces on the ground. Today our systems are mostly patched together, often with great effort and resulting in sub-optimal performance. The whole is less than the sum of the parts. To reverse this situation, we must field systems purpose-built for joint operations, so our superb joint forces are enabled rather than inhibited.
We still have a long way to go with interagency coordination. We have learned that interagency coordination is best done at tactical levels, and have seen the proof of this during the conduct of the joint inter-agency task force (JIATF) focused on al-Qaida senior leaders and the one focused on former regime elements (FRE) in Iraq. Above this local level, however, challenges too often overwhelm accomplishments. Too many organizational agendas and hard-wired boundaries inhibit the type of openness and sharing that are required to fight the extremist networks. We are simply not structured for success at higher levels of integration against an enemy that recognizes no organizational, geographical, legal, or informational boundaries.

As mentioned elsewhere in this statement, we must improve the protection we afford our troops against the greatest enemy threat: improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This challenge highlights the need for our joint and service acquisition systems and the industrial base to be capable of adapting rapidly as the enemy adapts his tactics against us. We have made some important progress, but more needs to be done.

Lessons of asymmetric warfare are being learned by our enemies. The trend is unmistakable; we see extremists employ the same tactics in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. No enemy is likely to confront us willingly in a face-to-face military engagement, for we are simply too proficient. Instead, they will seek to win the perception battle by using terrorist tools like a car bomb, relying upon the bloody spectacle it creates to be amplified in the mass media. The doctrinal, educational and training centers of our Services must undertake a major shift in emphasis to allow us to contest this trend. We must go to school on the tendencies and vulnerabilities of those who practice asymmetric warfare just as we mastered
the logic for nuclear deterrence and for meeting massed Soviet armored formations during the Cold War.

Finally, we must close the cultural gap between us and the extremist enemies we face. We must invest far more in the “human capital” that will empower our joint forces to better understand the enemy in the years ahead. During the Cold War the U.S. military could boast of literally tens of thousands of experts on the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the ideology of communism. Today, we are lucky to find even a few hundred in our own ranks who know about Islam, the Middle East, and the ideological forces that fuel terrorism. As discussed in detail later, bridging this gap requires more human intelligence (HUMINT) specialists, linguists, area specialists, and civil affairs officers. All of these are critical for the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist fights; and, to our ability to forge functional relationships with our regional partners. As we build U.S. human capital, we must also grow the human capital of future military leaders of the region. Consequently, an expanding IMET program is necessary to build long term relationships.

X. STRATEGIC BASING

We envision a future regional footprint that has few permanently deployed units at forward locations to support expeditionary U.S. forces that react promptly to theater needs. This posture is premised on a minimized footprint, partly because the region has low tolerance for long-term foreign military presence no matter how well intentioned, and partly because the dynamic nature of the region requires maximum flexibility. It is also guided by the need to have most of our forward deployed posture oriented toward assisting the local forces in the region, so they can be the main agents to
secure regional peace and stability while combating terrorists, extremists and other external threats.

We will leverage infrastructure and investment already made by the U.S. and our host nation allies over previous decades. Existing U.S. locations will serve as the foundation for our future footprint, and we will work closely with regional partner nations that desire our presence and can afford the costs to contribute a significant share of financial resources to modernize and properly improve these locations.

Our construct for the future will consist of Forward Operating Sites (FOS) and Cooperative Security Locations (CSL). A FOS will host operational U.S. units that rotate into and out of the AOR in support of operations, contingencies, training, and theater security cooperation programs. A CSL is generally a less robust location with less infrastructure and that will host military operations to include exercise support and security cooperation. As we posture our forces for stability operations in the future, FOS’s and CSL’s will be maintained in the Arabian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa to provide capabilities to assist regional states in the long war ahead against terrorism and extremism. The classified details of FOS and CSL locations can be found in the September 2004 Defense Department report to Congress entitled, “Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture.” Specific CENTCOM plans that align with this construct are under development.

Stateside, we are working with the U.S. Air Force (our executive agent for funding) and with DoD to conduct necessary refurbishment and expansion of our Headquarters facility in Tampa.

XI. USCENTCOM CRITICAL MISSION ENABLERS

Nearly four years of continuous operations from Afghanistan to Iraq and the Horn of Africa have highlighted several major mission enablers. These
include: strong Coalition allies, timely and responsive airlift, intelligence, adaptive force protection, a flexible theater reserve and logistics base, and sufficient access to communications bandwidth and talented personnel. Coalition allies expand CENTCOM operations, and share operational burdens across a pool of like-minded nations. Our AOR geography and lack of assigned forces makes us uniquely dependent on airlift for timely and flexible employment of forces. Complex and widespread operations place heavy demands on quality, fused intelligence and the communications bandwidth to allow command, control and distributed intelligence across the entire force. Enemy tactics place heavy demands on force protection; and our widely dispersed area of operations mandates a flexible theater reserve and logistics base. Finally, our multi-level headquarters and high OPTEMPO missions require quality people.

**Sustaining a Strong Coalition**

Our Coalition partners in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have contributed significantly to our success. 2005 will be a pivotal year for the Coalition. We must re-shape Iraqi Coalition forces to accommodate expanding Iraqi security capabilities and enable Iraqis to take the lead against the insurgents. We also need greater participation from the international community to build strong and capable Iraqi intelligence, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist capabilities. Simultaneously, our Enduring Freedom Coalition must adapt to accommodate growing Afghan security capacity and to complement NATO-ISAF’s increasing role. The better we adapt and manage the Coalition, the fewer U.S. service members will be required to achieve our objectives across the region.

**Strategic Sealift and Inter-Theater Airlift**

Capable and robust airlift and surge sealift capacity are essential to CENTCOM strategy. Ongoing CENTCOM operations and our anticipated future
posture rely heavily on a rapid flow of forces into theater to meet an array of contingencies. As of October 2004, over 1,753,510 personnel and 89,562,160 cubic feet of cargo have been transported to the CENTCOM AOR in support of OIF and OEF. The C-17 aircraft generated the majority of the strategic airlift for these operations, and its performance and versatility has been outstanding.

CENTCOM intra-theater airlift requirements in OEF and OIF indicate a growing need for this constrained capability. Two initiatives look promising as a means to expand this capacity. CENTCOM has had success with a contract for Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) aircraft use by the Afghanistan CJOA. We have also been able to use Commercial Airlift Tenders to move cargo and passengers. We commend future use of these and other airlift options within the CENTCOM area.

**Intelligence**

Intelligence is the main driver of counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations throughout the region. Our close interaction with imbedded interagency partners from the CIA, NSA, and other government agencies has helped secure the intelligence necessary for our successful conduct of many diverse and complex operations. Several key capabilities will better facilitate our ability to collect, correlate and fuse real time intelligence:

**Common Intelligence Picture (CIP)** - A CIP that is accessible and available to all friendly forces is critical to battlefield success. CENTCOM has been able to cobble-together a CIP for the wider region, but the process has been complicated, expensive, and inefficient due to the great number of service intelligence systems that do not work in a common environment. Our experiences highlight the importance of an established joint interoperability standard for all DoD intelligence systems. Eventually, all will be required to work with others within a joint and combined collaborative environment.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) –

The CENTCOM requirement for theater-wide ISR assets remains large and continues to grow. We continue to improve a redundant ISR network integrating strategic, theater and tactical systems. Demand for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) has been insatiable. We must continue to expand the availability of airframes, control stations, bandwidth, manned units, and trained crews for UAVs. We must also increase the number of UAVs with integrated Electro-Optical Infrared Full Motion Video (EO/IR FMV) and SIGINT capabilities, both of which are critical for tracking High Value Targets (HVT).

Manned airframes are also essential in our gathering of timely and accurate intelligence. For example, the unique capability of the U-2 aircraft to provide flexible, long dwell capability coverage of very large area makes it indispensable for USCENTCOM. We support the U-2 Extended Tether Program (ETP), which adds a data relay capability to ground based locations for rapid processing and dissemination of U-2 intelligence data.

Linguists are essential for airborne signals intelligence collection. Linguists manning levels continue to fall well below USCENTCOM-identified requirements. We need to increase the supply of low density language specialists to catch-up with the demand.

Finally, operational reliance on each of these ISR capabilities places a heavy demand on the C4ISR infrastructure. We must continue to generate C4ISR systems with the capability for effective and efficient dissemination of information from the various sensors to the commander, or individual soldier on the ground.

Counter-Intelligence and Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) System

Shortfalls – Counter-insurgency operations place heavy demands on people to collect, analyze and disseminate actionable intelligence. During 2004, DoD
re-focused the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) from a search for WMD toward the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) in support of USCENTCOM. While this shift helped, CENTCOM HUMINT resources - critical to defeating the insurgency - remain in short supply. Development and integration of Iraqi HUMINT collection assets during 2005 will help, but CENTCOM and MNF-I require additional trained and capable U.S. HUMINT assets to ultimately quell the Iraqi insurgency and to win the regional fight against the wider extremist movement.

In the near term, we require additional funding for contract support to meet immediate requirements. For the future, we require increased U.S. service school generation of CI/HUMINT personnel including case officers, tactical HUMINT collectors, interrogators, polygraphers, technical surveillance countermeasures personnel, and linguists. However, numerical increases alone will not correct all our HUMINT issues. We must provide our collectors with sufficient funds and authorities to enhance their ability to rapidly develop and exploit human sources. One such key authority is that of permission to clandestinely operate in the tactical environment. We also require more soldiers and leaders trained in Middle Eastern cultural awareness: Arabic, Farsi, Dari and Pashtun language skills; historical knowledge of Islam and Muslim traditions; and a more coherent pattern of assignments for enlisted, NCOs and officers with these vital skills.

Finally, we have worked to integrate information systems and databases that were not designed for an interoperable environment. These interim solutions for CI/HUMINT system shortfalls have been working. However, a better integrated, long-term joint solution is required.

**Force Protection**

Force protection remains a top priority. Across the USCENTCOM region, the Services are engaged in programs to meet CENTCOM requirements to protect
individual soldiers, their vehicles, their bases and their living areas. These programs include those providing individual body armor, up-armored vehicles and enhanced base protection systems. Supplemental funding for Individual Body Armor (IBA), additional Up-Armored HMMWVs (UAH), and Add-on-Armor kits (AoA) has ensured that our soldiers have the proper equipment to protect themselves on the battlefield. The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund (CTRIF) has provided us with the resources to meet over 98% of our requests for physical and infrastructure protection.

Every soldier and civil service employee in Iraq and Afghanistan is equipped with IBA. We are now focused on improving soldier body armor to provide enhanced protection by adding Deltoid Auxiliary Protection (DAP) attachments to Individual Body Armor. Industry now has geared up to produce nearly 10,000 sets of DAPs a month. We now have nearly 102,000 sets of DAPs on hand, which is 62% of our current requirement.

Our response to the IED threat has included a robust program for adding armor to soldier vehicles. An intense effort to produce up-armored HMMWVs has generated nearly 6,800 as of February 2005. This represents over 82% of our current requirement, and we expect to meet the full requirement by the end of May 2005. We also continue to install add-on armor (AoA) for wheeled vehicles. All told, over 60% of the wheeled vehicles in theater now have some form of armor protection, and we are working with the Army to assure that all wheeled vehicles working outside of secured areas have at least an intermediate level of armor protection. We continue to expand up-armor and add-on armor installation capacity in Iraq and Kuwait. Overall, the vehicle force protection situation in CENTCOM has significantly improved. We have also worked with the Joint Staff as it established the Joint IED Defeat Integrated Process Team (IPT). The IPT is investigating over 260 innovative ways to fill capability gaps for defeating IEDs. The IPT has focused on
developing “next generation” protection materials for personnel, infrastructure, buildings and material. Additionally, the IPT is investigating technologies that will increase our force protection standoff capability for the detection of chemical, biological, and explosive devices. To date, the IPT has fielded scores of advanced technologies to defeat IEDs and protect our soldiers from IED effects.

CENTCOM’s Joint Security Directorate manages a robust force protection program for all countries in our region. We continue to monitor evolving terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures to identify new trends and modify our force protection standards and requirements that stay a step ahead of the enemy.

**Logistics**

CENTCOM operations have benefited from pre-positioned assets and adaptive logistics systems that keep pace with our diverse requirements. As we begin a fourth year of major operations in the region, we must remain wary of potential new threats, and work to reinforce logistics successes. OEF and OIF operations drew heavily on strategic and pre-positioned equipment stockpiles, both ashore and afloat. This equipment has been worked hard, and remains heavily engaged today. As soon as operational conditions will allow, reconstitution of the afloat and maritime pre-positioning forces must be an imperative for the Services, and be fully funded for reconstitution and modernization.

CENTCOM has initiated a deployment and distribution-oriented organization for our region that allowed the Command to access timely and accurate information about unit strategic deployments and cargo distribution movements. We are working with the Joint Staff and USJFCOM to capture lessons learned, and are helping their effort to expand joint theater logistics constructs across all of the Department of Defense (DoD).
Communications

Since September 2001, USCENTCOM satellite communications utilization has increased by over 8000%. 75% of our theater SATCOM capabilities are provided by costly and vulnerable commercial satellite services. This situation will grow even worse in coming years without funding for new MILSATCOM to replace the already inadequate and rapidly deteriorating network. We need MILSATCOM that provides the transformational capabilities to rapidly disseminate time-sensitive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) data, and that can provide our deployed forces with reliable “comms-on-the-move” capability regardless of operating location. We support enhanced funding for the DoD MILSATCOM programs to achieve these aims.

We also share more information with more nations and more U.S. interagency elements than ever before. Yet, we must do even better. We need more systems that are interoperable with allies and across all agencies in the U.S. government. We confront many systems that are not interoperable, and resort to bridging them, when possible, with often inefficient technical solutions. We need to develop common operating standards for all systems that will plug into our expeditionary, joint and multinational information backbone. Robust, interoperable communications networks are the critical enabler of success on the modern battlefield.

Personnel

The majority of CENTCOM forces are deployed forward in combat zones. Consequently, Quality of Life (QOL) enhancements for deployed forces and families is important. Combat Zone Tax Relief (CZTR), Imminent Danger Pay (IDP), Hardship Duty Pay-Location (HDP-L), and Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) contribute significantly to our service members’ quality of life and morale. The Rest and Recuperation Leave Program has been a major success. To date,
over 150,000 troops have benefited from this program. The Special Leave Accrual (SLA) has also been important to our long-deployed soldiers, allowing them to retain up to 120 days accumulated leave for up to 3 years. We encourage continuation of each of these helpful programs.

We also advocate adoption of other programs to help our servicemen and women deployed across the region. We support an increase in Serviceman’s Group Life Insurance (SGLI) for our troops, and are working with DoD to ensure that families of the fallen are adequately protected in their time of greatest need.

Finally, it is important to fill our headquarters with talented leaders. Granting full joint credit to qualified officers who serve in a CENTCOM joint task force headquarters for a year or more will help attract the high quality personnel that our joint headquarters require. We are working with DoD to ensure personnel who serve in these demanding billets are afforded the joint credit they deserve.

CENTCOM is also working to address low density high-demand personnel requirements across the theater. In addition to those already addressed in the CI/HUMINT and linguist skill sets, we are working with DoD to offset shortages of civil affairs, special operations and counter-insurgency capable forces, and information technology (IT) professionals. We are investigating opportunities to conduct civil affairs missions with other service elements or civilian contractor expertise. We also encourage DoD expansion of functional expertise of critical civil affairs skills like: urban planning; economic development; business planning; law enforcement; criminal justice; public works and engineering; and those with management skills that can build capacity in government organizations.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are in high demand across the theater due to their skill in counter-insurgency operations. CENTCOM supports
creative DOD efforts to re-enlist quality special operators, and to identify other qualified individuals with critical counter-insurgency skills.

Finally, our demand for information technology (IT) professionals throughout the region is great and growing. As a result, we are working with the Services to develop IT career paths that better support technical education and development, and that better manage assignments of these professionals into our subordinate commands.

We have built the finest, most operationally and tactically experienced Armed Forces ever known. It is an all volunteer force with high esprit and tremendous professionalism. The key to its quality is experienced professionals who stay with the team. The most important weapon in our inventory remains our people.

Flexible Funding and Authorities

Congress has been extremely responsive in providing USCENTCOM with the flexible authorizations we require to fight the enemies we confront across the theater. We request continuing Congressional support for the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), for CERP remains the most direct and effective soft-power tool available to our commander’s in the counter-insurgency fight. Likewise, the DoD Rewards Program has proven tremendously beneficial, generating information leading to the capture of terrorists, insurgents and the seizure of a number of weapons caches. Coalition Support Funds (CSF) and the newer authority to provide transportation and sustainment support to selected Coalition partners are important to sustainment of our Coalition partnerships. Finally, Congressional authorities to expeditiously train and equip Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces, and to help develop allied nations’ capabilities for counter-terrorism have made great contributions to the essential work of building organic security capacity across the region. We will continue to work with DoD and the Congress to sustain or enhance the
necessary funding and authorities to sustain our forces and support our allies and friends in this struggle.

XIII. CONCLUSION

CENTCOM remains fully committed to the defeat of extremist-inspired terrorism across the region. We are focused on creation of a secure and stable Iraq and Afghanistan, to provide assistance that allows Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to help themselves, deter Syria and Iran from threatening regional stability and security, set conditions to continue the free flow of regional energy products, and effectively synchronize all elements of U.S. national power to assist moderate Muslims in their fight against extremists.

2005 can be a decisive year for the Coalition. Our efforts across the region are setting the conditions for victory against a patient, persistent, and ruthless enemy. We will require our own patience and courage to cement this victory. The growing weight of hard-won successes in Afghanistan and Iraq, so amply demonstrated in their recent elections, must be sustained throughout a period of continued political change and development. As in any wartime situation, some setbacks are bound to occur, but our strength in capability must be matched by strength of purpose. No power in the region can defeat us.

Effective Coalition combat operations against our enemies remains vital, yet military activity alone is insufficient for victory. True victory in this fight will require the effective application of all elements of our national power to enhance political participation, encourage economic enfranchisement, and enable social advancement across the wider Islamic world. Ultimately our goal is to give the people of the region their own security tools to shape a better future. With our friends in the region and our Coalition partners, we have the right team to prevail. All of CENTCOM’s
military efforts in the region are focused toward giving our courageous young men and women the tools they need for success. We thank this Congress for the oversight and support for our troops in the field.