Defense Reforms

Almost two decades have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of these reforms, particularly in your assignments as Commander, Carrier Air Wing EIGHT, in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy for Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic, from 1993 to 1995, and as Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff for United States Atlantic Command from 1996 to 1997.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

Yes. I support full implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act reforms.

What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented in the Navy vis-a-vis the other Services?

In my experience, the Department of Defense and the Armed Services have embraced these reforms. The Navy, like the other services, went through some difficult adjustments in the initial stages of implementing the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. Traditional attitudes and approaches had to give way to innovation and change. The services work and operate together much better today than pre-Goldwater-Nichols. The Navy faces a unique challenge in that our people operate at sea and the premium we place on gaining experience in that environment has made it difficult for some officers to complete the joint educational requirements of Goldwater-Nichols. Recently, there has been substantial progress in this area.

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

First and foremost, the reforms have improved our collective warfighting effectiveness and efficiency. In addition to strengthening civilian control of the military and clarifying chain of command relationships, they provided a clear delineation of the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities as they relate to the planning and execution of their missions. We have made significant progress in joint training, exercises and experiments.

The goals of the Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions;
ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Do you agree with these goals?

Yes.

Do you believe that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you think it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

I do not have any recommendations to amend Goldwater-Nichols at this time; However, if confirmed, I would not hesitate to offer proposals in the future should I see something that might be helpful.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

The duties and functions of Commander, U. S. Pacific Command include exercising command authority over commands and forces assigned to the Pacific Command and prescribing, organizing, and employing subordinate commands and forces to carry out the Pacific Command’s assigned mission. Fundamentally, that mission is to deter attacks against the United States and its territories, possessions, and bases, and to protect Americans and American interests and, in the event that deterrence fails, to fight and win.

As a combatant commander, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the performance of these duties, the preparedness of assigned forces, and the execution of its missions.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I have benefited from a broad range of assignments during my nearly 38 years in uniform, from tactical to operational command, and have considerable experience with joint and coalition operations, including combat operations. I was privileged to command Carrier Air Wing EIGHT in USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. In 1995, as a flag officer, I served as Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT and Commander, Battle Force, U.S. SIXTH Fleet during NATO's Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia. During these operations, I worked closely
with joint U.S. and combined forces in planning, coordinating, and executing sustained combat operations. I also served as Deputy Director for Operations, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, directing air operations in the Iraqi No-Fly Zones. I have additional experience in joint and combined planning and operations at both the operational and strategic levels through assignments as Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy, for Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and as Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff for the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the former U.S. Atlantic Command, the predecessor to U.S. Joint Forces Command. For nearly three years, I served as Commander, U.S. SECOND FLEET and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic, working directly with all U.S. armed services as well as those of our NATO allies in training and in developing and testing joint and combined tactics for the entire spectrum of combat operations. As Vice Chief of Naval Operations from 2000 to 2003, I worked in close cooperation with OSD, the Joint Staff, and the other Armed Services developing transformational strategies and Joint Requirements. In my current assignment as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, I serve as Naval component commander to U.S. Joint Forces Command, and support U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Strategic Command. The widely varied opportunities I have had during my career have given me a deep appreciation of, and experience with, all branches of our Armed Forces and many of our allies.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command?

I intend to solicit the experience, advice and counsel of members of this committee, the U.S. Government, specifically, Department of Defense and Department of State personnel, as well as leaders and knowledgeable people throughout the Asia-Pacific region in order to broaden my understanding of U.S. positions and relationships in the region. I will meet with U.S. Pacific Command staff divisions, subordinate organizations and component commanders to understand fully the issues and challenges they face. I intend to develop personal working relationships with the military and civilian leadership of the nations throughout the Pacific region, to better understand their concerns while continuing to represent U.S. national interests.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, to the following officials: Because the question is related to PACOM, relations to other than the SECDEF and Chairman are reasonably inferred.

The Secretary of Defense
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and is directly responsible to him to carry out its assigned missions.

**The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs duties as directed by the Secretary, and performs the duties of the Secretary in his absence. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command is responsible to ensure that the Deputy Secretary has the information necessary to perform these duties, and coordinates with him on major issues.

**The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

Under Secretaries are key advocates for combatant commander requirements. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on strategic policy issues involving the Asia-Pacific region.

**The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence**

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as needed to set and meet the U.S. Pacific Command's priorities and requirements for intelligence support.

**The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Section 163 of title 10, U.S. Code, allows communication between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to flow through the Chairman. As is custom and traditional practice, and as instructed by the Unified Command Plan, I would communicate with the Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant commands. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command coordinates closely with the secretaries to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip Pacific Command forces are met.

**The Chiefs of Staff of the Services**

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command communicates and exchanges information with the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of U.S. Pacific Command's mission responsibilities requires close coordination with the
Service Chiefs. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Service Chiefs of Staff to understand their service capabilities and to effectively employ those capabilities as required to execute the missions of U.S. Pacific Command.

The other combatant commanders

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command maintains close relationships with the other combatant commanders. These relationships are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy, and are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of information on key issues.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

- Stability on the Korean Peninsula, complicated by North Korean development of WMD and proliferation of these weapons and delivery systems.
- China/Taiwan cross-strait tensions, combined with China's emergence as a regional power and the increase in Chinese military capabilities.
- Terrorism and other transnational threats. Narco-terrorism, piracy, proliferation, and human trafficking, linked through illegal banking and finance, threaten the region. This is a particular challenge in the southeast Asian archipelagos where extremist Islamic ideology and terrorist-linked movements exist.
- Transforming U.S. global force posture to respond to a complex security environment that includes Irregular, Catastrophic, Traditional, and Disruptive challenges to our national interests.
- The scope and span of the region, which encompasses the three most populous countries in the world - China, India, and Indonesia - and the vast expanse of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, an area of one hundred million square miles.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Specifically, I intend to:

- Support U.S. national interests and Policies.
- Work in close consultation with U.S. agencies and military commanders, and with our many friends in the region to develop a clear understanding and appreciation of U.S. national interests and the issues facing the nations in the U.S. Pacific Command region.
- Identify steps that can be taken to signal the strong resolve of the United States to support U.S. national interests and to enhance regional stability.
- Posture U.S. forces to ensure readiness, agility, flexibility, and readiness, emphasizing the
Homeland Defense

What is your understanding of the role and responsibility of U. S. Pacific Command in homeland defense?

The Secretary of Defense’s Contingency Planning Guidance and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan direct USPACOM to deter attacks against the Homeland as early and as far away as possible, defend the USPACOM domestic AOR, and to work with and provide support to civil authorities. (Specific taskings within these documents are classified). As part of the larger effort, U.S. Pacific Command's plan complements and is integrated with the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Homeland Security and relevant contingency planning and activities.

What is your understanding of how U. S. Pacific Command and U. S. Northern Command work to ensure that their overlapping missions in this area do not create “seams” that might be exploited by our adversaries and how this process might be improved?

In October 2003, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command and Commander, U.S. Northern Command signed a Command Arrangement Agreement, to “establish procedures and delineate responsibilities” between the two commands. This agreement also prescribes employment of U.S. Pacific Command forces in support of U.S. Northern Command missions and the control of forces operating in Northern Command's Area of Responsibility. Both commands, by conducting Joint Exercises, have validated the arrangements, demonstrating commitment to Homeland Defense. We will continue to develop a close working relationship between the two commands.

What is your assessment of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, and what steps should be taken to improve upon it?

The Regional Maritime Security Initiative offers an opportunity to address transnational threats collectively with participating states. The initiative is gaining momentum in the Asia-Pacific region. Its effectiveness can be increased through better information sharing and investing the time and effort to improve understanding of the challenges and needs of the partner nations. This will remain a high priority effort.

How could U. S. Pacific Command forces and expertise contribute to more effective homeland defense capabilities?

U.S. Pacific Command’s military and intelligence activities in the western approaches to the continental United States contribute to the Nation's active, layered defense. Improvements in our
ability to collect actionable intelligence and maintain situational awareness are critical to our ability to combat threats. Active regional engagement is a key to success. We will facilitate this effort by maintaining and building on Pacific Command’s Theater Security Cooperation Program.

Global Defense Posture Review

Perhaps more than in any other combatant command, military exigencies in the U. S. Pacific Command are subject to the “tyranny of distance” in getting forces to points of conflict.

How important is the forward homebasing strategy to the ability of U. S. Pacific Command to execute its operational contingencies, and is the ongoing Global Posture Review taking this into account?

The forward basing and presence of rotational forces is key to U.S. Pacific Command’s ability to assure allies and friends in the region, deter potential adversaries, and execute operational contingencies when required. U.S. Pacific Command is fully integrated into the ongoing Global Posture Review, adjusting our posture from a static Cold War orientation to one that is more agile and flexible, with improved capabilities to better address current and potential threats.

What are the implications of the proposed global force structure changes with respect to U. S. Pacific Command’s Area of Responsibility (AOR), particularly in Korea and Japan?

The objective of the proposed changes is to better position U.S. forces to respond to present and future challenges. I intend to study the proposed changes immediately so that I fully understand the details of the proposals, and their implications for our global and regional defense strategies.

What impact, if any, will the proposed changes in posture have on our ability to defend South Korea and Japan, and to react to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

As I understand the proposed posture changes, U.S. forces will continue to be in a position to defend South Korea and Japan, and to react to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait.

North Korea

North Korea represents one of the greatest near term threats to U. S. national security interests in Asia.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and
the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs remain a serious concern. Additionally, the North Korean conventional force posture, particularly the forward basing of a large percentage of its most-capable forces, creates a volatile threat environment. U.S. Pacific Command's job is to facilitate ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing the threat, while maintaining a credible deterrent posture.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

North Korea’s continuing development and proliferation of WMD and ballistic missile capabilities pose a serious threat to the U.S. and our allies.

What, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula?

While diplomatic efforts continue, PACOM will maintain a strong deterrence together with our ROK ally through demonstrated capabilities and exercises.

Republic of South Korea (ROK)

Since the end of World War II, the U. S. - ROK alliance has been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.

What is your understanding of the current U. S. security relationship with South Korea?

The U.S.-ROK security relationship is robust and strong. It has been the key to deterrence on the Korean peninsula over the past 50 years. Adapting to new security challenges, the Republic of Korea has become the third largest contributor of forces in Iraq, while also sending support forces to Afghanistan, the Western Sahara and East Timor. They have continued an aggressive effort to modernize their military forces to improve interoperability.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take, in conjunction with the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, to improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?

The Commander-in-Chief, U.N. Command/Combined Forces Command’s primary focus is on deterrence of a North Korean attack specifically on the Korean peninsula, and should that deterrence fail, the ability to fight and win against that threat. He is also a sub-unified commander to U.S. Pacific Command as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea. If confirmed, I will work closely
with him to ensure transformation initiatives enhance readiness and deterrence.

Do you support expanding the number of personnel assigned to Korea for two or three years of duty?

I generally support the idea of longer tours, which would provide better staff continuity, stability within our units, and improve morale for our troops accompanied by their families. However, it should be noted that this brings with it the costs of providing additional base infrastructure, housing, medical/dental facilities, and schools. If confirmed, I intend to consult with the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea as soon as possible to study this matter so that I fully understand it and can make informed recommendations. Increasing the tour length of married personnel stationed in Korea on unaccompanied orders from one year to two or three years would, in my judgment, have a negative impact on morale.

China

Many observers believe that one of the key national security challenges of this century is how to manage China’s emergence as a major regional and global economic and military power.

How would you characterize the U.S. security relationship with China?

The U.S. relationship with China is constructive. We seek to promote shared interests with China as a growing regional and economic power. Although the economic relationship between the U.S. and China is expanding, we must gain greater insight into China’s growth in military spending, its intentions towards Taiwan, and its regional strategy in Asia and the Pacific.

What is the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations, and do you favor increased military-to-military contacts with China?

Our military-to-military relations are limited to non-warfighting venues, such as high-level and academic exchanges and ship visits. I support continued contact to promote a constructive relationship with China, to gain greater insight into its intentions, and to impart a clear understanding of our defense strategies.

How do you assess the current cross-Strait relationship, and how can we help to prevent miscalculation by either side?

The cross-straits relationship between China and Taiwan is a concern. It is in the U.S. interest to prevent miscalculation and to maintain a steady signal of deterrence with ready, credible forces. The foundation of our discourse is and will continue to be the Taiwan Relations Act and the three U.S./China Joint communiqués. As stated by the President, the United States opposes any attempt by either side to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
China’s economy is growing by as much as ten percent per year, and China is using that economic growth to fund a substantial military modernization.

In your view, what is China’s intent in pursuing such a rapid military modernization?

I believe that China is rapidly pursuing military modernization in order to determine its own destiny without undue influence from other nations. China desires greater influence over the course of events within the Asia-Pacific region and to be recognized as a global power.


Describe the steps that have been taken to prevent incidents of this nature in the future.

The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) was established in 1998 to promote common understanding regarding activities undertaken by U.S. and PRC maritime and air forces when operating in accordance with international law. The MMCA has addressed the issues of surveillance aircraft and interceptors and separation distances. Compliance with the MMCA is closely monitored by U.S. Pacific Command and they are working with OSD policy to improve implementation with China.

What other areas, both geographic and operational, present potential problems for conflict with Chinese military forces, and what steps, if any, still need to be taken to prevent incidents?

Whenever our forces operate in close proximity, there is a need for vigilance and adherence to safe and professional operating procedures.

Taiwan

What are the priorities, in your view, for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

It is important that the U.S. assist Taiwan in strengthening its defensive posture through improvement of their joint operating capacity and modernization of their military capabilities.

What is the relationship between the type of assistance we offer and regional stability?

U.S. assistance is primarily aimed at systems that improve Taiwan’s ability to defend itself without being characterized as offensive in nature. A strong defensive capability enhances regional stability. We need to continue to make it clear that the U.S. opposes any attempt by either side to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
Republic of the Philippines

What is the current state of U.S.-Philippine military-to-military relations and activities?

The U.S.-Philippine military relationship is based on the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1952 and is characterized by small-scale exercises and advisors to Philippine military. Our military-to-military relationship is substantive. It is focused on enhancing their ability to defeat insurgencies and to promote long-term institutional change through the Philippine Defense Review.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a key Asian power, and is the largest Muslim country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and expand U.S. relations with Indonesia where possible.

To what extent is the Indonesian Government cooperating with the United States in the Global War on Terrorism?

The Government of Indonesia has cooperated with the U.S. and our Australian allies in investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators of the October 2002 Bali bombing and the subsequent August 2003 Marriott and the September 2004 Australian Embassy bombings. Since the Bali bombing, Indonesia has captured or detained over 100 suspected terrorists, passed a new anti-terror law and worked with the U.S. in creating a new anti-terror police unit.

Is the Indonesian Government cooperating in the investigation into the American deaths in Papua in August 2002?

My understanding is the government of Indonesia is working closely with the FBI on the Timika investigation.

If confirmed, would you recommend more or less military-to-military contacts with Indonesia? Why? If yes, under what conditions?

The U.S. would benefit from increased military contacts in areas such as civil-military reform and countering transnational threats. The Armed Forces of Indonesia (TNI) is important to the stability, unity and future of Indonesia as it consolidates its democracy. In turn, Indonesia’s continued democratic development is important to U.S. interests in combating terrorism and the security and stability of Southeast Asia. Increasing TNI professionalism and commitment to democratic rule of law should lead to increased U.S.-Indonesian mil-to-mil contacts.
India

What is the current state of the U.S.-India military-to-military relationship, and what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

Our military-to-military relations with India are good and improving.

If confirmed, my priorities for the U.S.-India military-to-military relationship will be to expand contacts and discussion with an objective of a deeper and more substantive relationship. We will seek increased levels of cooperation and interoperability between our forces, the value of which has been highlighted in recent tsunami relief operations.

U.S. Pacific Command Tsunami Assistance

U.S. Pacific Command has made enormous contributions to tsunami recovery and relief efforts since the tragic events of December 26, 2004.

Do you believe there is a continuing role for U.S. Pacific Command in the long-term recovery effort?

Yes, but U.S. Pacific Command’s extensive and successful relief efforts are essentially complete. Pacific Command does have a role in the long-term recovery of the region. We shall be prepared to offer whatever follow-on assistance may be desired by affected nations and agreed to by the U.S. Government.

Due to the massive number of killed and injured, the evacuation of severely injured U.S. citizens from nations affected by the tsunami was sometimes a problem.

How did military forces under U.S. Pacific Command participate in evacuation efforts and otherwise lend assistance to injured U.S. citizens?

Pacific Command did not receive any request for assistance from U.S. country teams in the disaster area for evacuation or medical support for U.S. citizens. The welfare of U.S. citizens was certainly a principal concern, and in coordination with our Embassies, U.S. forces were always prepared to provide transportation and medical assistance.

What improvements, if any, would you recommend to ensure that U.S. citizens who have been injured are promptly assisted?

Concurrent with the execution of tsunami relief efforts, Pacific Command has initiated a
comprehensive lessons learned program to capture both the successes and deficiencies of the relief effort. This effort is on-going and the lessons regarding assistance and support to U.S. citizens will be incorporated into our disaster relief procedures.

Do you believe new opportunities for strengthening military-to-military ties and advancing U.S. interests in the AOR have been created as a result of the tsunami tragedy and the relief effort? If so, how do you expect to build on such opportunities?

Despite the tragic consequences of the Tsunami, the spirit of cooperation and the successful combined response of many nations and governments in affected countries, provides an opportunity to improve the relationships between the militaries of the U.S. and affected nations. Conditions have been set for greater cooperation and the U.S. Pacific Command will continue to enhance the relationships, common operating procedures, and trust developed during the course of the relief operation.

**Missile Defense**

What is your understanding of the current relationship between U. S. Pacific Command, U. S. Northern Command, and U. S. Strategic Command with respect to ballistic missile defense deployment and operations?

All three commands have responsibilities that collectively address the missile defense threat across the Unified Command Plan boundaries. STRATCOM has overarching responsibility for planning, integrating, and coordinating global ballistic missile defense. STRATCOM develops enabling capabilities for BMD. PACOM shares responsibility for defense of the homeland with NORTHCOM; specifically the defense of Hawaii and the U.S. territories in the Pacific. PACOM closely coordinates with NORTHCOM and STRATCOM in the performance of the missile defense mission.

What is your understanding of the arrangement whereby Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers of the U. S. Pacific Fleet will be made available, or dedicated, to ballistic missile defense missions, and what impact will this arrangement have on the capability of U. S. Pacific Command and U. S. Pacific Fleet to fulfill their other missions involving Aegis-class ships?

We will employ our emerging capabilities in Missile Defense where they can best be utilized in support of our national interests. Through an established rotational ship schedule and a system of readiness conditions for missile defense, our forces, to include Aegis-capable ships, will be prepared to meet mission requirements.

How would you propose to strike an appropriate balance between missile defense and non-missile defense missions for ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet?
I will solicit the recommendations of Commander, USPACFLT about how best to address the issue and ensure the command’s capability to employ available forces is balanced between missions.

**Special Operations Command**

What is your understanding of the relationship between Special Operations Command teams working to fulfill the global terrorism mission, U.S. Pacific Command, and the Ambassadors in the relevant countries?

The relationship among Special Operations Command teams, U.S. Pacific Command and Ambassadors in relevant countries has been positive and productive. U.S. Pacific Command maintains operational control of special operations deployments throughout the AOR. All activities concerning PACOM’s efforts in the Global War on Terrorism are fully coordinated with U.S. Ambassadors in relevant countries. If confirmed, I intend to maintain that close relationship.

**Technology Priorities**

U.S. Pacific Command has been active in the Advanced Concept Technology Development (ACTD) process and currently has several projects on the transition list, including the future tactical truck system and theater effects based operations.

What processes, contacts and tools will you use to make your requirements known to the department’s science and technology community to ensure the availability of needed equipment and capabilities in the long term?

U.S. Pacific Command analyzes major operations plans, and Global War on Terrorism and Homeland Defense responsibilities to determine the capabilities needed to execute assigned plans and to identify any gaps in current and programmed capabilities. These gaps form the basis for U.S. Pacific Command's annual Integrated Priority List, which identifies priority capability needs to the Department of Defense’s science, technology and acquisition communities.

The U.S. Pacific Command is active in the ACTD process. If confirmed, I would continue participation in this program. ACTD projects offer our warfighters direct impact on technology development and acquisition, potentially speed acquisition of needed capabilities, and sometimes provide capabilities to directly support current operations. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom today, U.S. Pacific Command ACTD projects are providing capabilities for explosive ordnance disposal operations, medical information management, sniper detection, and language and document translation.

**Exercises and Training**
What is your assessment of current U. S. Pacific Command exercises and training for peace and stability operations? Are they sufficient in your opinion, and, if not, how would you change them, if confirmed?

U.S. Pacific Command conducts about 20 joint exercises a year, with service components adding an estimated 200 service-specific exercises every year. I assess the U.S. Pacific Command exercise program as extremely valuable. The success of relief operations under Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE can be directly attributed to U.S. Pacific Command’s annual COBRA GOLD exercise in Thailand (focused on peace and stability operations), in which several nations, including Thailand, Singapore, and the U.S., train together.

U.S. Pacific Command strives to focus limited training resources to enhance readiness, sustain and improve Theater Security Cooperation, deter potential adversaries, and win the Global War on Terrorism. Due to the vast distances in the Pacific theater, significant amounts of strategic lift, including military air, sealift, and commercial carriers, are required for operations and large-scale exercises. This means the strategic lift necessary for the Chairman’s Exercise Program (CEP) is very important, especially for large-scale joint and combined exercises.

How might U. S. Pacific Command work with U. S. Joint Forces Command to improve or augment training and exercises for peace and stability operations?

USJFCOM provides Joint Warfighting Center support to several PACOM joint exercises every year, and JFCOM has assigned a full-time Liaison Officer at PACOM. The Pacific Warfighting Center (PWC) will be integrated into JFCOM’s global grid of warfighting centers that will make up the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC). The PWC and JNTC will allow PACOM and JFCOM to cooperatively develop transformational training concepts and infrastructure.

POW/MIA Accounting Efforts

The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, U. S. Pacific Command, is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of missing military members. Recovery of remains of U. S. service members from World War II, the Korean War, and the Viet Nam war continue to be a very high priority.

What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, U. S. Pacific Command, and its relationship to the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Office?

I fully understand the priority our Nation places on the identification and recovery of missing Americans. The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) conducts operations to support a full accounting of personnel unaccounted for as a result of hostile acts. U.S. Pacific Command provides higher headquarters support and direction, and the interface between JPAC and the Joint Staff.
and/or OSD, as necessary. The Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) exercises policy, control, and oversight within the Department of Defense for the entire accounting process. DPMO and JPAC coordinate directly with one another on routine POW/MIA issues.

If confirmed, what plans do you have, if any, to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the AOR of the U. S. Pacific Command?

JPAC’s resources and accounting efforts are focused not only in the Pacific Command region, but throughout the world. I will encourage full cooperation by the host nations where we conduct POW/MIA activities and continue to reinforce U.S. Government priorities in our accounting and recovery efforts.

If confirmed, what steps would you take, if any, to assess the adequacy of resources available for this work?

I will provide JPAC the full support of the U.S. Pacific Command in the conduct of their mission, and continuously assess the adequacy of resources in the performance of this important mission.

Quality of Life

Combatant commanders are responsible for establishing and sustaining a high quality of life for military personnel and their families assigned within their AOR.

If confirmed, how would you define and ensure appropriate resources are available for quality of life programs for military members and their families within the U. S. Pacific Command?

Quality of Service (QOS) for our men and women is one of my top priorities. Inseparable from combat readiness, QOS is more than just good Quality of Life. It means providing the high quality operating facilities, the tools and information technology necessary for our personnel to achieve their goals and execute their missions effectively and efficiently.

QOS requires continuous assessment of housing, schools, commissary and exchange services, medical/dental facilities, Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) Programs/Facilities, Pay and Entitlement Programs, spousal employment opportunities and childcare facilities.

What are the potential effects and challenges associated with global rebasing on the quality of life of members and their families in the U. S. Pacific Command AOR?

Implementation of global rebasing must and will reflect our commitment to our peoples’ QOS.

Policies Regarding Sexual Assault
As a result of deficiencies in DOD and Service policies regarding sexual assault in the Armed Forces, the Department and the individual Services are required under section 577 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 to develop comprehensive policies aimed at preventing and responding to sexual assaults involving members of the Armed Forces and ensuring, among other things, appropriate law enforcement, medical, and legal responses, integration of databases to report and track sexual assaults, and development of victim treatment and assistance capabilities.

If confirmed as Commander, U. S. Pacific Command, what steps would you take to ensure the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces under your command are appropriately implementing policies aimed at preventing sexual assaults and appropriately responding to victims of sexual assault?

I am strongly committed to implementing comprehensive measures to prevent sexual assault, provide responsive care and treatment for victims of sexual assault, and hold accountable those who commit the crime of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will take all actions to protect our people from assault, and direct consistent and appropriate responses to victims of sexual assault.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

I agree.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

I agree.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

I agree.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?
I agree.