Advance Questions for General Gregory S. Martin, USAF  
Nominee for Commander, U. S. Pacific Command

Defense Reforms

Almost two decades have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of these reforms, particularly in your assignments as Vice Director, Force Structure and Resources, on the Joint Staff from May 1995 through July 1996 and as Commander, U. S. Air Forces, Europe from January through August 2003.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

I fully support the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These reforms have clearly strengthened the warfighting readiness and operational performance of our Armed Forces.

What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

I believe the Department has embraced these reforms in both spirit and intent. As is always the case whenever a major change is implemented, the cultural transformation associated with that change requires a certain amount of educational and process evolution. As I review the conditions, as I remember them, in 1985 and compare them to the partnership and teamwork I observe between the Services today, I think we all can be proud of the progress that has been made in implementing these defense reforms.

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

From my perspective as a nominee to serve as a combatant commander, I believe the clear message to all officers that their opportunity to progress to positions of higher responsibility depended on their knowledge, training and performance in the joint environment cannot be overstated and has been a major impetus for bringing about the changes envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols Legislation. Further, in addition to strengthening civilian control and clarifying chain of command relationships, these reforms have provided a clear and unambiguous delineation of the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities as they relate to the planning and execution of their missions. Last, I believe we have made significant progress in building joint training, exercises and experiments in a way that brings our forces together to create tremendous synergy and quantum increases in combat power. As the Commander of United States Air Force in Europe, a component of the US European Command, I saw firsthand the positive effects and synergy between the Services and the combatant commanders in the strategic and operational planning processes, in the development of
requirements, and in the execution of our operations during a number of contingencies including Operations Joint Forge, Joint Guardian, Atlas Response, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Goldwater-Nichols strengthened our ability to train, prepare, plan, and execute as an integrated force in a joint operational construct. I believe strongly in that model.

The goals of the Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Do you agree with these goals?

Yes. These goals have been central to the development of a more integrated, joint capability which in my mind is critical to the Services, to DoD, and most importantly, to our Country as we move forward in an environment where we must be able to predict, respond and prevail against conventional, unconventional and asymmetric threats.

Do you believe that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you think it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was implemented to build a more joint military capability. It is important to constantly assess how well we have progressed since implementing the defense reforms nearly 20 years ago with regard to their intended purpose. At this point, I do not have any proposals; however, if I am confirmed, I will probably see issues from a different perspective, and at that point, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review options and alternatives for presentation to the Congress.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

The duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command include exercising command authority over all commands and forces assigned to the Pacific Command and prescribing, organizing, and employing the subordinate commands and forces to carry out the Pacific Command’s assigned mission. Fundamentally, that mission is to deter attacks against the United States and its territories, possessions, and
bases, and to protect Americans and American interests and, in the event that deterrence fails, fight and win.

As a combatant commander, the Commander of US Pacific Command is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the performance of these duties, the preparedness of its assigned forces, and the execution of its missions.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I have had operational and command responsibilities for nearly 23 of my 34 years of service. In addition to many overseas deployments, I have been stationed overseas for nearly nine years including more than four years in the Pacific. In addition to flying a tour of combat during the VietNam conflict, I served in various positions culminating as Commander, 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Kadena AB, Okinawa between 1981 and 1985. Since that period, I was fortunate enough to have commanded three fighter wings, two of which had global deployment responsibilities. As my career transitioned from tactical orientation to operational and strategic duties, I served on the Joint Staff and then just before my current position, I was the Commander of US Air Forces in Europe with a second hat as the Commander of NATO’s AIRNORTH Headquarters. While in Europe I was responsible to the Commander of the US European Command, for the planning and execution of all US and combined air and space operations in support of European contingencies, such as Operations Joint Forge, Joint Guardian and Northern Watch. Additionally, I was responsible for planning and executing, the air operations required through Europe to support the US Central Command in conducting Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. While in Europe, I worked with Air Chiefs, Chiefs of Defense and, in many cases, Ministers of Defense or Heads of State to cement relations, improve interoperability and achieve valuable access for basing and overflight rights. I believe the opportunities I have had in planning and conducting operational activities, coupled with the senior level responsibilities I have been assigned in Joint and Combined contingencies have prepared me for Combatant Commander duties.

If confirmed as the Commander of the US Pacific Command, I will work to continue the strong relationships and partnerships that have been established by Admiral Fargo and his predecessors across the Pacific region. Further I will ensure the preparedness of the forces assigned to the US Pacific Command to execute contingency and operational plans in support of that command’s assigned mission. Lastly, I will ensure USPACOM continues to capitalize on the broad regional expertise and continuity afforded by component commanders and subunified commanders to make certain our national and theater security interests are met.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

If confirmed and before taking command, I will have met with each of the Service Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, many of the
Defense Agency heads as well as the OSD and State Department Pacific and East Asia Policy heads to ensure my understanding of US positions and relationships with the Pacific Theater nations. Next I will complete a thorough orientation with each of the PACOM staff divisions, subordinate organizations and component commanders to ensure I am fully conversant with the issues and challenges they face on a daily basis. Importantly, I will master theater operational and contingency plans needed to fight and win any conflict that may arise. Last, I will develop a carefully constructed trip schedule to meet with appropriate military and civilian leadership of the nations throughout the Pacific region to better understand their concerns while continuing to present a consistent message of US policy. I expect this transition to take several months as I pursue every opportunity to expand my knowledge and understanding.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command, to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

The chain of command flows from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. The Secretary is my immediate supervisor and I will report directly to him and provide the best possible military advice to execute my duties and responsibilities in the Pacific. As is custom and traditional practice, I will communicate with the Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on occasion, serves as the acting Secretary in the absence of the Secretary. During these periods my relationship with the Deputy Secretary will essentially mirror my relationship with the Secretary. I will endeavor to provide him with the best possible military advice and the same level of support as I would the Secretary. Otherwise, I will support, consult with, and coordinate with him in those areas and issues that the Secretary has assigned him to lead for the Department.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, USD(P), is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF for all matters concerning the formation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. CDR USPACOM works for SECDEF, but within these key areas of USD(P) responsibility, CDR USPACOM ensures that his staff works closely with OSD/P and Joint Staff counterparts in responding to SECDEF
initiatives and queries, as well as in advancing USPACOM initiatives. An example of such close coordination is the ongoing initiative to improve global force posture.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on DoD intelligence issues. The Under Secretary is my initial point of entry into OSD for intelligence policy, organizational, and functional issues. The Under Secretary also transmits the Secretary's instructions to DoD intelligence activities.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Title 10, Sec. 163, allows communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to flow through the Chairman in accordance with the Unified Command Plan. If confirmed, I intend to keep the Chairman fully involved and informed by providing appropriate recommendations regarding requirements, strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the joint employment of Pacific Command forces.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Title 10, Sec. 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned to combatant commands. This responsibility is routinely exercised within Service lines via the subordinate Service component commander. On occasion it is important to exchange views personally and directly with a Service Secretary on issues involving the preparedness of forces and their administration and support.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Service Chiefs are responsible, in accordance with Goldwater-Nichols, to organize, train, equip, and provide trained and ready forces for combatant commanders to employ in their area of responsibility. The full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs is important to the preparedness of assigned combat forces and the missions directed by the Secretary of Defense. Also, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense and President. Individually and collectively, the Joint Chiefs are a source of experience and judgment that can and should be called upon. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a full dialogue with the Chiefs of all Services.

The other combatant commanders

If confirmed, my relationship with the other combatant commanders will be one of mutual support, continued dialogue, and frequent face-to-face interaction. In today’s
security environment, with special regard to the global campaign against terrorism, an atmosphere of teamwork, cooperation, and sharing is critical to executing U.S. national policy. As a supporting commander, I will do my utmost to assist other commanders in the execution of their assigned missions. As a supported commander, I would expect the same from fellow combatant commanders.

**Major Challenges and Problems**

I have reviewed and agree with Admiral Fargo’s five top command priorities for USPACOM. They are:

- Sustaining and Supporting the War on Terrorism
- Improving Readiness and Joint Warfighting Capability
- Improving Quality of Service for our Men and Women
- Reinforcing the Constants in Asia-Pacific Security
- Promoting Change and Improving our Asia-Pacific Defense Posture

These goals positively address challenges that continue to impact peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific. Challenges include:

- **Stability on the Korean Peninsula.** Although the likelihood of war is low, the stakes would be high if war occurred, even higher if North Korea continues to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities. Additionally, North Korea raises the risk of WMD proliferation, and for that reason brings a global dimension to this challenge.
- **Terrorism.** Militant extremists are at work in South East Asia, seeking to disrupt peaceful, law-abiding communities striving for freedom and economic prosperity. US Pacific Command must continue to coordinate with other Combatant Commanders and employ the entire spectrum of American strength and resources, in cooperation with our regional friends and allies to defeat this threat.
- **Potential for miscalculation, particularly across the Taiwan Straits or in Kashmir.** Rapid military modernization or breakdown in regional relationships could build momentum and add to a risk of hostilities.
- **Transnational threats—such as proliferation, trafficking in humans or drugs, or piracy—recognize no borders.** We require a changed approach to meet these complex security challenges.

Global Force transformation is key to meeting the challenges above. I anticipate a broad and continuing effort to implement proposed changes for an enduring, enhanced US force posture that can respond to the new threat context of the 21st century.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

As is evident, the problems and challenges facing the U.S. Pacific Command reflect a new security environment, substantially different than that of the 20th Century Cold War. This new environment is complex, necessitating transformation of our posture and
processes. Our alliances and friendships with regional neighbors remain eminently important, and a joint approach to solving problems remains key.

Working closely with the Secretary and Chairman, I will continue force posture transformation to best meet the challenges of this 21st century security environment. Specifically, I intend to:

- Continue posturing forces in a manner that ensures agility, flexibility, and readiness. These forces must be rapidly deployable bringing concentrated combat power in light, transportable packages.
- While consulting closely with friends and allies, seek a U.S. military presence that is not only enduring but also capable. This presence will reflect the strength and capacity of our friends who share our common views and welcome a U.S presence.
- Posture military force so it is relevant both within and across the region, and able to support national needs anywhere around the globe.
- Continue to build on already strong regional relationships through meaningful and substantive dialogue within the Pacific Command Area of Responsibility. Principle to these efforts is a cogent and effective theater security cooperation plan.
- Continue to assess and improve our plans, focusing on capability and places, not bases.
- Work closely with the Interagency process to solve complex, transnational problems. These issues require long term, multi-faceted solutions that involve concerted efforts across a wide variety of government and international entities.

Homeland Defense

What is your understanding of the role and responsibility of PACOM in homeland defense?

PACOM's role in homeland defense is defined in the Office of the Secretary of Defense Strategic Guidance Statement for Homeland Defense Planning. This guidance tasks development of plans and options to detect, deter, prevent and defeat conventional and asymmetric attacks against the Homeland. Our aim is early detection and defeat of our enemies far from U.S. shores. PACOM's plan is fully integrated with the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Homeland Security and relevant combatant commander contingency plans and activities. In performing its homeland defense task, USPACOM works closely with and conducts training with state and local authorities.

How do PACOM and NORTHCOM ensure that their overlapping missions in this area do not inadvertently create “seams” that might be exploited by our adversaries?

USPACOM is coordinating with USNORTHCOM to ensure a seamless strategy for defense in depth of the U.S. In October 2003, a Command Arrangement Agreement was signed which established procedures and delineated responsibilities. It prescribes the
arrangements necessary to support the employment of USPACOM forces in support of USNORTHCOM missions and the control of forces operating in USNORTHCOM's Area Of Responsibility and Joint Operations Area. Further it establishes the methodology under which the transfer of forces between USPACOM and USNORTHCOM will be executed for homeland defense and civil support.

What are your thoughts on the proposal to create a “maritime NORAD”?

I am aware of a maritime NORAD concept, but do not believe a concrete proposal has been developed. If confirmed I will ensure my staff coordinates closely with NORTHCOM and others during development of the concept. Maritime domain awareness is a significant issue for USPACOM. I support the previous commander’s Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to combat transnational threats and enhance maritime security awareness and capacity. Secure waterways are vital to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. RMSI will improve our view of the sea space and is gaining momentum in the Asia-Pacific theater.

How could PACOM forces and expertise contribute to such an organization?

Though the concept is still under development, a USPACOM Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Pacific and the Pacific Shipping Coordination Center, will likely contribute to such an organization once the concept has matured. Additionally, USPACOM Joint Interagency Task Force – West and the US Coast Guard may also support the concept. USPACOM does have forces, expertise and experience to contribute to such an organization.

Global Defense Posture Review

What are the implications of the proposed global force structure changes in the U. S. Pacific Command’s Area of Responsibility?

As ADM Fargo recently noted, the new threat context demands profound and enduring improvements in the way we command, equip, employ, and station our forces. My understanding of the concept is that we will be able to capitalize on the value of our major improvements to warfighting capabilities brought about by such things as: precision weapons, increased lethality from range, rapid mobility, enhanced presentation of the battlespace picture and more responsive command and control. These joint capability enhancements will allow us to array our forces in a way that places less emphasis on “near-location” before hostilities start, and more emphasis on responsive movement of lethal force to the point of greatest effect when required. This concept also recognizes the growth and improvement in the capabilities of our allies’ ability to perform essential warfighting tasks. This shift does require, however, strong partnerships with our friends and allies to assure access when needed. But in general, this concept allows us to rely on speed, mobility, precision and lethality in a way that allows us to pursue a “places versus bases” strategy.
North Korea

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs along with the potential for proliferation is a serious global concern. Further, North Korea has continued to pursue nuclear technology and nuclear weapons development in a way that can only be destabilizing to the region if not checked. While the Six-Party talks continue, I believe the forces of the Pacific Command, in consonance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces, and other Asian partners must provide a credible deterrence and be prepared to respond as directed by our national leadership. I believe the job of USPACOM is to ensure diplomacy is backed by viable military capabilities.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

The Korean peninsula is a place where the likelihood of war may be low, but the stakes of such a war are extremely high. I believe North Korea’s continuing development and proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities poses a serious threat to US allies now and to the US in the near future.

What, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula?

I believe that having other regional partners’ support for the US-ROK alliance will contribute to both deterrence and regional stability. I also support continuance of global force posture transformation in full consultation with the ROK Government while strengthening this alliance.

South Korea

What is your understanding of the U.S. security relationship with South Korea?

The ROK-U.S. security relationship as it has evolved over the past 50 years has helped to create one of the world’s most successful nations. And as a result, the Republic of Korea has become one of the United States’ strongest and most helpful allies. The Republic of Korea has become the third largest contributor of forces in Iraq, while also sending support forces to Afghanistan, the Western Sahara and East Timor. The ROK has continued an aggressive effort to modernize its military forces in a way that allows the US to relocate some of our forward based forces without sacrificing stability or weakening deterrence.
If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take, in conjunction with the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, to improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?

The relationship between the Commander U.S. Pacific Command, and Commander of U.S. Forces Korea is unique and vital. The Pacific Command commander’s responsibilities are regional in nature and include the security situation on the Korean peninsula. The Commander-in-Chief, U.N. Command/Combined Forces Command primary focus is on deterrence of a North Korean attack specifically on the Korean peninsula, and should that deterrence fail, the ability to fight and win against that threat. He is also a subordinate unified commander to Pacific Command in his role as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea.

Our strong alliance with the Republic of Korea has assured 50 years of peace and prosperity for the South Korean people. I will remain fully committed to this important alliance and defense transformation to include weapons systems enhancements and consolidation of our footprint south of the Han River. Such transformation will enhance power projection, readiness, and deterrence.

China

How would you characterize the U.S. security relationship with China?

We have a constructive relationship with China and we are working to promote shared interests with this growing regional and economic power. Although the economic relationship between the US and China is expanding, there are still hurdles to overcome with regard to China’s massive growth in military spending, its intentions towards Taiwan, and its strategy of increasing regional influence in Asia and the Pacific.

What is the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

From my discussions with Admiral Fargo, I would characterize our military-to-military relations as modest and limited to non-warfighting venues, such as high-level exchanges and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief cooperation. In the past year, I am aware of several US-China reciprocal ship visits to Zhanjiang, Shanghai and Guam, along with several other senior military officer exchange visits.

Do you favor increased military-to-military contacts with China?

Normal military-to-military contact with the Chinese military is dependent upon our laws and the interests of the United States. In general, such contact should be both transparent and reciprocal in nature. Under these guidelines, I am supportive of a modest military-to-military relationship. It is clear to me that frank discourse clearly aimed at preserving peace and stability throughout the region should be the way ahead.
How do you assess the current cross-Strait relationship, and how can we help to prevent miscalculation by either side?

Cross-strait relations continue to be an area of concern and a sticking point in our efforts to improve relations with China. I believe we prevent miscalculation by continuing frank, open communication with both parties and by maintaining a constant signal of deterrence with ready, credible forces. The foundation of our discourse is and will continue to be the Taiwan Relations Act and the three U.S./China communiqués. As President Bush clearly stated, the United States opposes any attempt by either side to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

What is the proper balance, in your view, between helping Taiwan defend itself and preventing miscalculation by the Taiwanese government?

We should continue to focus our assistance on modernizing Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, in view of the very rapid pace of China’s military modernization during these past five years. However, we need to continue to make it clear that the U.S. will come to the assistance of Taiwan only if an unprovoked attack occurs.

China’s economy is growing by as much as ten percent per year, and China it is using that economic growth to fund a substantial military modernization.

In your view, what is China’s intent in pursuing such a rapid military modernization?

In my view, China’s rapid military modernization is motivated by their desire to determine its own destiny without undue influence from outside nations. With that in mind, I believe they want to have greater influence over the course of events within the Asia-Pacific region and they want to insure their own defense as they observe other nations in the region grow and gain access to sophisticated weaponry such as the nuclear weapons possessed by India and Pakistan. That said, we can not be complacent with regard to China’s modernization.


What steps have been taken to prevent incidents of this nature from occurring in the future?

The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), in existence since 1996, was established expressly for the purpose of reviewing tactics and procedures to ensure safety of Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft operating in proximity of each other. After the tragedy, a special session was convened utilizing the MMCA to specifically address the issues of surveillance aircraft and interceptors. New agreed-upon separation distances and rules of engagement resulted. In subsequent months and years, adherence
to these new rules has been very closely monitored and both sides have acted with a reinforced sense of responsibility.

What steps, if any, still need to be taken?

Each nation must be vigilant with regard to violations, determined in their demarches and held accountable for those violations. This is a safety of life issue. For the moment, the MMCA remains the venue for bilateral dialogue focused on operational safety.

Taiwan

What are the priorities, in your view, for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

I believe we should continue to focus our assistance on modernizing Taiwan’s air defense system, their command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability, improving their missile defense capability, and assisting them in the improvement of their Anti-submarine (ASW) capabilities.

Republic of the Philippines

What is the current state of U.S.-Philippine military-to-military relations and activities?

The US and the Philippines have a solid military-to-military relationship centered on the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) initiative. US support of this initiative is important as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) work to improve their equipment, training, logistics and command and control capabilities in an effort to create a long term capacity to deal with insurgents and while maintaining stability. US military support through Security Assistance training, Humanitarian Civilian Assistance projects and Special Operations Forces operations and intelligence fusion teams are having a positive impact on the Philippines’ ability to counter terrorist and insurgent activities within their nation.

Do you believe that the U.S. military should support Philippine efforts to fight the Abu Sayaff Group and other terrorists in the Philippines? If so, how?

Yes, I believe we should support the Philippine effort to fight terrorist activities in the Philippines. As outlined above, however, that support should be limited to providing training, intelligence fusion and logistics support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines as they pursue counter terrorist activities.
Indonesia

Is the Indonesian government fully cooperating with the United States in the Global War on Terrorism?

I believe the Indonesian government’s position and support for the Global War on Terrorism has been helpful since the 2002 Bali terrorist attack and their response to the most recent attacks on the Marriott Hotel and the Australian embassy demonstrates their resolve. The recent elections bode well for strengthening their support on the Global War on Terrorism.

If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights in the Indonesian military?

I believe it is important to continue security cooperation activities with the Indonesian military (TNI) that demonstrate the importance of civilian control of the military, respect for the rule of law and human rights. The USPACOM two year plan for Security Cooperation with Indonesia lays out a carefully designed approach to improving senior level exchange opportunities while encouraging a coherent series of educational conferences, seminars and workshops, all oriented towards instituting civilian control of military and adhering to the rule of law in conducting military activities. One of my early objectives, if confirmed, would be to better understand how well we have been able to proceed with the objectives of the two year plan and determine in conjunction with the Joint Staff, OSD and the Ambassador if alterations should be considered. We should continue to serve as a role model for the TNI, shaping their reform through positive engagement in accordance with Department of Defense, Department of State regulatory procedures and the Leahy Amendment.

If confirmed, would you recommend more or less military-to-military contacts with Indonesia? What would you want to achieve with any recommended change?

In general, I believe that increased military-to-military contacts serve to benefit TNI reform, bi-lateral relationships, and regional stability. But those contacts should be tempered by clear objectives and progress towards the basic principles we hold dear. We should be supportive of Indonesia’s efforts to strengthen its democratic institutions, and reinforce the concept of a military force subservient to the civilian government with an abiding respect for the rule of law. Given the strategic location of Indonesia and the opportunity to establish an important democratic model in the world’s most populous Muslim nation, I believe we should be proactive within the dictates of congressional and Title 10 authorities in building our military-to-military relationships.
Global Strike and Missile Defense

Unified Command Plan 2002 Change-2 assigns to Strategic Command overarching responsibility for planning, integration, and coordination of global ballistic missile defense as well as planning, command and control, and conduct of prompt global strike. However, many of the details of Strategic Command’s relationships with other combatant commands with respect to these new responsibilities remain to be worked out.

What is your understanding of the current relationship between the commander of PACOM and the commander of STRATCOM with respect to ballistic missile defense deployment and operations?

The current command arrangements provide the flexibility to respond to diverse challenges using the full power of the United States. USPACOM is responsible for the defense of US territory and interests within its AOR including the missile defense of Hawaii. In those responsibilities, PACOM is supported by USSTRATCOM, as is USNORTHCOM, in the planning, integration and coordination of global ballistic missile defense operations and support (sea, land, air and space based) for missile defense and for developing desired characteristics and capabilities for global missile defense and support for missile defense.

What is your understanding of the current relationship between the commander of PACOM and the commander of STRATCOM with respect to global strike operations and mission planning?

USSTRATCOM will be the supported commander for Global Strike course of action development in full partnership with the affected Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). USPACOM, in coordination with other GCCs, functional COCOMs, and government agencies, will participate in Global Strike collaborative planning in order to provide appropriate close, timely coordination during Course of Action development. The Secretary of Defense will designate supported and supporting relationships for execution upon Course of Action selection. The affected GCC will normally execute subsequent Global Strike operations as the supported commander in his Area of Responsibility. If directed, CDRUSSTRATCOM shall exercise command and control of selected Global Strike missions, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, in close coordination with the affected GCC.

Would you recommend any changes in these relationships?

Not at this time. For both Ballistic Missile Defense and Global strike, the current command arrangements provide the flexibility to respond to diverse challenges using the full power of the US.
Space

The U.S. military is dependent on space assets for communications; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; navigation; and weather data.

Geographical distances in the Pacific theater make this reliance even more pronounced in Pacific Command.

What are the strengths and weaknesses, in your view, of the support Pacific Command receives from U.S. military and intelligence space assets?

Clearly, the advantage of having space assets is our ability to have access to information, communications and intelligence without violating the sovereignty of or depending on other nations. And in the PACOM area of responsibility, where they face the “tyranny of distance” in all they do, the use of space systems is crucial in their ability to plan, coordinate and properly command and control the full spectrum of their responsibilities. With that in mind, it must also be said that with the worldwide explosion in information technology, along with the shadowy activities associated with transnational threats and global terrorists, our current space communications and intelligence assets are seriously constrained in their ability to deliver the quantum increases of information available and necessary to conduct all missions required of the USPACOM. Further, our intelligence satellites are limited in number, capacity and exploitation capability to be able to cover all of the areas of interest necessary for our national leadership and combatant commanders to be as prepared as desired to counter emerging threats.

What actions would you recommend to correct any weakness you have identified?

As the Department of Defense proceeds with the Future Imagery Architecture, MILSATCOM upgrades, Transformational Satellite communications, space based radar, operationally responsive space, the joint warfighting space initiative and the horizontal integration of those capabilities with airborne assets, we will begin to reduce the shortages we face in sensor, bandwidth and exploitation availability and capability, and I support these efforts.

The Air Force and Congress have taken a recent interest in “operationally responsive space.”

Do you believe that operationally responsive space launch and payloads could contribute to Pacific Command’s military capabilities?

Yes, an operationally responsive space concept would provide PACOM with a way to mitigate our communications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance shortfalls. Having a readily available supply of mission-specific satellites and the ability to place them in orbit when required, instead of using the current, and rather inflexible,
launch schedule, would give the theater a much needed ability to fill in gaps in space-based support

**SOCOM**

What is your understanding of the relationship between Special Operations Command teams working to fulfill the global terrorism mission, U.S. Pacific Command, and the Ambassadors in the relevant countries?

The relationship between Special Operations Command teams, US Pacific Command and Ambassadors in relevant countries has been well received and productive. US Pacific Command works efficiently and effectively to ensure all SOF operations are fully coordinated and supported by Joint Staff, SOCOM, and US Ambassadors in relevant countries. If confirmed, I intend to maintain a close relationship with Ambassadors in theater.

Under what circumstances in executing the global war on terrorism would the Pacific Command support SOCOM?

PACOM fully supports SOCOM in their role as lead for GWOT planning. In some cases, where a CT action occurs across an AOR boundary or if control of forces is more easily exercised from SOCOM Headquarters at MacDill AFB, SECDEF may direct PACOM forces to support SOCOM operations.

Do you foresee circumstances in the global war on terrorism where PACOM would be the supported command? If so, under what circumstances?

Yes. In situations where a theater or regional operation requires unique capabilities beyond USPACOM’s special operations forces, I would anticipate the SECDEF directing USSOCOM to support USPACOM operations. In cases where USSOCOM is supported, USPACOM’s security cooperation arrangements will play an important role in supporting USSOCOM and in ensuring the long-term goal of peace and stability in the Pacific theater.

**POW/MIA Accounting Efforts**

If confirmed, what plans do you have to enhance POW/MIA efforts in the area of responsibility (AOR) of the Pacific Command?

I am aware that since the creation of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command in October of 2003, the Commander of the US Pacific Command now has worldwide responsibilities with regard to the proper accounting for our POW/MIAs. Although I have a great deal to learn regarding the details of JPAC’s operations, I fully understand the priority our Nation places on this issue. It is my solemn belief that the noble mission of JPAC and the US governments’ commitment to accounting for our missing from past conflicts is a powerful signal to our nation’s military and their families that we believe
What steps need to be taken to further accomplish the objective of finding or accounting for all POW and MIAs in the PACOM AOR?

As I learn more about the agreements and relationships we have made with other nations and organizations which allow the JPAC to accomplish its mission, I will work to improve the security cooperation arrangements and to support technological enhancements that might offer the JPAC greater access and opportunity to discover our missing warriors.

In the context of maintaining and improving PACOM’s engagement strategy, and fully recognizing the POW/MIA effort as humanitarian, I will establish an environment to encourage full cooperation by the host nations where we conduct POW/MIA activities and continue to reinforce the US government priorities as I meet and talk with the leaders of these countries.

I will ensure that JPAC is fully resourced to accomplish its mission and pledge that we will not compromise the integrity of the mission or the ability of the US government to provide the fullest possible accounting to the families of our Nation’s unaccounted for.

Policies Regarding Sexual Assault

The previous Commander of the U. S. Air Forces, Pacific, conducted a comprehensive survey on the incidence of sexual assault in the U. S. Pacific Command AOR in 2003. The Air Force recently completed a Report Concerning the Assessment of USAF Sexual Assault Prevention and Response which concluded, among other findings, that the Air Force must develop a sexual assault prevention and response policy, integrate databases to report and track rapes, and develop victim treatment and assistance capabilities.

How do you assess the progress of the Air Force in responding to the problem of sexual assaults in the ranks?

First, let me say that the U.S. Air Forces Pacific effort served as a model for what we did across the Air Force. While we have made progress in the Air Force on responding to the problem of sexual assaults in our ranks, I and other senior leaders have attempted to accelerate our efforts. Our Secretary and Chief of Staff have taken aggressive steps to address the problem and established a 3-star level working group with all Major Air Command Vice Commanders to look at the problem in-depth. The USAF approach is founded on our Air Force core values: Integrity, Service, and Excellence—which are used more explicitly to develop, train, and reinforce expected behaviors. At the next level down we are focused on a concept we call the “Culture of Airmen” which means, essentially, that Airmen take care of Airmen, and one Airman should never hurt another Airman. Our first priority has to be to take care of one another...in all situations. That effort is long-term. Finally, the Air Force is determined to offer sensitive care to those...
victims of assault from notification until no longer needed, however long that may take. The United States Air Force has always had a policy of zero-tolerance for any type of harassment, including sexual harassment, and of course sexual assault is a criminal violation of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, and we aggressively pursue and prosecute members who commit this crime.

If confirmed as Commander, U. S. Pacific Command, what steps would you take to ensure the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces under your command are appropriately implementing policies aimed at preventing sexual assaults and appropriately responding to victims of sexual assault?

As one of my very first actions, if confirmed, I would reissue under my signature the memo Admiral Fargo sent to all commanders across Pacific Command directing a zero-tolerance policy for sexual harassment and requiring swift justice and harsh punishment for those who fail to comply or who commit sexual assault. I would also direct that we take all actions to protect our people from assault and, if necessary, consistently and appropriately respond to victims of sexual assault. Let me be clear. Sexual assault is a crime and will not be tolerated. I will ensure appropriate measures are taken when a sexual assault is reported to include ensuring that allegations are fully investigated and all available services for sexual assault victims are made available. I am strongly committed to ensure that comprehensive measures are implemented to prevent sexual assault, provide responsive care and treatment for victims of sexual assault, and hold accountable those who commit the crime of sexual assault.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.