UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN ON THE EVE OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS

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UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN ON THE EVE OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:03 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman HYDE. Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us as we find ways to understand and to pave the way for the Afghans to freely determine their own political future.

I commend the Administration’s recent decision to send 1,100 U.S. troops in addition to the current levels of 19,000 United States and coalition forces to Afghanistan on the eve of presidential elections. I also welcome reports that Spain and Italy will be sending additional troops to participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), whose current troop levels are at 7,348.

It would, however, be unwise and not in the interest of the United States to decrease the force levels of the ISAF before next spring’s parliamentary elections. Forces need to be in place to protect the local population from intimidation and extortion at election sites, especially if the private militia, so deeply feared, continue to be present.

Effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) are crucial factors in obtaining long-term security. The unyielding influence of warlords and their private militias impedes the country’s rehabilitation through the DDR process. That process must be implemented more aggressively if current Afghan optimism surrounding the election’s proceedings is to translate to a free and fair political reality.

I hope to hear from the witnesses what the U.S. defense establishment plans on contributing to this process. It seems to me that if a warlord has heavy weapons he refuses to turn in, his view of the situation would shift if those weapons were at risk from our very effective air forces. Can we not “accelerate the success” of the DDR process?

In previous testimony before the Committee, we have heard about the connection between narcotics trafficking and terrorism. We have repeatedly been in touch with the Administration about its plans to take on the druglords. Waiting will not make the situation any better. For now, the druglords are getting stronger faster.
than the Afghan authorities are being built up. In other words, we are falling further behind. If we wait, we will have to return to Afghanistan in great force once again because we will be unable to prevent the country from descending into the sort of absolute chaos upon which terrorists thrive.

The Afghan National Army and Police will need to create trust between the central Government and the people they seek to govern. However, again, the marriage between warlords and the drug trade undercuts the development of the rule of law in Afghanistan. Weak courts and inadequate correctional facilities further undermine the ability of the Afghan National Police to effectively do their job.

I expect to hear more today from our witnesses about the impact of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs were created to extend the risk of the central government outside Kabul. Currently there are 19 PRTs in Afghanistan. While some PRT models have been doing excellent work in the security area, others have not fared so well. In particular, we have heard that because they help out with the warlords’ favorite public works projects, some PRTs appear to be working for local warlords rather than working to control them. The warlord, rather than the national Government, gets the credit, and the community’s involvement, which could build local “ownership,” is minimal.

PRTs should be given a clearly defined mandate to focus on security, building state infrastructure and improved correctional facilities. We have NGOs to build schools and clinics. Would a shift in the PRT mandate help the Afghan central Government assert a more effective role throughout the provinces and strengthen the establishment of the rule of law?

We have a distinguished panel representing the Administration today, and I look forward to hearing from them about our country’s long-term commitment to Afghanistan and other important issues.

I now yield to my friend and colleague, the Ranking Member, Tom Lantos, for any opening remarks he may wish to make.

Without objection, Members may place their opening statements in the record of today’s proceeding.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for holding this important hearing.

Before talking about Afghanistan, I would like to say a word about the joint session that many of us attended earlier this morning where the Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Allawi, spoke, and I would like to comment on the pathetic performance of some of our NATO allies both in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

Next month, Afghanistan could be the scene of an unprecedented historic event; the spectacle of millions of Afghans, including millions of Afghan women, voting for the first time in a presidential election. There is no greater demonstration of the aspirations of the people of Afghanistan than the desire to vote.

Earlier today, Mr. Chairman, Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi reminded our Congress and the American people how important it will be to Iraq’s future for the Iraqi people to exercise that most precious freedom. Given the importance to the entire civilized world of a free and stable Iraq and the absolute necessity that the
January elections proceed on schedule, I simply cannot understand why four of our so-called allies—France, Germany, Belgium and Spain—are being so criminally shortsighted in withholding the minimal support we ask of them so that elections could be held in Iraq. NATO has apparently now committed to send some 300 officers to train Iraq’s security forces, a pathetic contribution from an alliance that claims to have over a million non-United States troops under arms. It is outrageous that these four wealthy countries, on whom we spent tens of billions of dollars after the second World War in aid and tens of billions of dollars to protect them during the cold war from the Soviet Union, now refuse to contribute one single officer to fulfill NATO's commitment to train Iraqi security forces. As a matter of fact, the French, the Germans, the Spaniards and the Belgians proudly proclaimed that they will not spend one dime on the training of security forces so that elections can take place in Iraq.

This historically unique, shortsighted and criminal lack of judgment extends also to the support for Afghanistan's future. Without a great NATO deployment to provide proper security, Afghanistan’s potentially triumphant exercise of freedom could become a tragedy with dozens of terror attacks against polling stations. Afghan officials, innocent men and women guilty of nothing more than wanting to exercise their right to choose their President, will be killed.

Terrorists fear and hate the ballot box. The Taliban and al-Qaeda and other enemies of the Afghan people have sworn that they will do everything possible to disrupt the presidential elections next month and the parliamentary election next spring.

At our last hearing on Afghanistan in early June, Mr. Chairman, I pointed out that our European allies are freeloading when it comes to shouldering their share of global security responsibilities, especially in Afghanistan and in Iraq. I am sorry to say that there has been no improvement whatsoever. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States contributes 512 troops per million Americans in our population. Five hundred and twelve troops. In Afghanistan, since they are contributing nothing in Iraq, Germany contributes 23 troops per every million German citizens while France’s contribution is a pathetic 9.4 troops per million of their people.

Last June, Mr. Chairman, I predicted that in spite of their encouraging and solemn words, some NATO countries would continue to lack the political will to participate in bringing a sustainable peace to Afghanistan or even to begin to participate in a significant way in the global war against terrorism. Now I am convinced of this outrageous fact. There was a joke circulating earlier that the new slogan for NATO could be “NATO—Keep the Myth Alive.” It seems that this sick joke is becoming a sad reality. If NATO is unwilling and unable even to provide a respectable force to be deployed outside the safer areas of Afghanistan, we have to question whether NATO is a credible military organization at all.

NATO must expand its mandate to provide security along major highways, to end banditry, human rights abuses, opium production and trafficking. I again call upon Turkey, which was supposed to send some 12,000 troops to Iraq—which for a variety of complex reasons never occurred—to send those troops to Afghanistan.
When I was in Egypt a few weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, to discuss my proposal to turn some $570 million of our military aid to Egypt, currently running at $1.3 billion, into economic and educational aid, all of my Egyptian interlocutors were horrified. I told them that there would be much less objection to continuing to provide $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt if Egypt would accept its proper responsibility in Afghanistan. There is not one Egyptian soldier serving in Afghanistan, and I want to serve notice that I will renew, next year, my effort to turn a great portion of our military aid program to Egypt into economic, educational and medical aid. Because clearly Egypt is not carrying any load militarily in Afghanistan.

Our Administration, Mr. Chairman, must do everything it can to convince our NATO allies to contribute to Afghanistan's freedom and security. It is not enough for our officials to express satisfaction at NATO summits with getting what little we ask of our European allies. With Europe, when you ask for little, you get less.

Afghanistan cannot wait any longer. It is too late to expect any more from NATO in time for the October election, but there is still time for NATO troops to deploy to the west and southeast to support the April parliamentary election. Mr. Chairman, the future of the Afghan people continues to hang in the balance. Increasing the number of NATO troops and ensuring the legitimacy of the electoral process may yet save Afghanistan from once again falling into chaos and ruin.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

I would like to welcome Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Prior to joining the Defense Department, Mr. Rodman was the Director of National Security Affairs at the Nixon Center. He also served at the State Department and National Security Council staff during the Administration of Presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan and the first President Bush. Welcome, Mr. Rodman.

Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, United States Army, is Director for Strategic Plans and Policy at the Joint Staff where he has served since March 2003. During his distinguished career, Lieutenant General Sharp commanded the 7th Cavalry Squadron in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Joint Task Force and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in the mid-1990s, and the Army's 2d Infantry Division and Multinational Division in Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia. Among his decorations are the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, and the Bronze Star. Welcome, General Sharp.

Robert B. Charles is Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the Department of State. He previously served as Chief Counsel and Staff Director to the House National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, and as the Chief of Staff for the Speaker's Task Force on Counter-narcotics. Welcome Mr. Charles.

Mr. Rodman, if you would proceed with a 5-minute summary of your statement. Each of the witnesses' full statements will be made a part of the record.

Mr. Rodman?
Mr. RODMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lantos, distinguished Members of the Committee. Mr. Chairman, you quoted the 9/11 Commission Report which highlighted the importance of our national commitment to Afghanistan. Of course, we second that recommendation.

You also asked whether we had a strategy, or you wanted reassurance that the Administration had a strategy, to see Afghanistan through particularly the immediate period in the run-up to elections. I can tell you that we do.

We have a strategy that is political as well as military. The political component is reflected in the new constitution that the Afghans agreed upon and the election process that you referred to. It is reflected in President Karzai's steady success in extending national authority over the country, his political authority, because that is the core of the strategy.

The legitimacy of an elected Government will help us isolate the extremists politically even while we, the coalition and the Afghans, defeat them militarily. In Afghanistan, as I would say in Iraq, the legitimacy of this political process is a way of empowering the moderates, strengthening the moderates against the extremists.

On the military side, General Sharp and I will discuss, for example, the fact that we have accelerated the training of the police, the national army and police, because these two are instruments of national authority and are helping to fill the vacuum left by the defeat of the Taliban.

The PRTs, as you mentioned, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, are expanding. These have proven to be a successful and flexible instrument for facilitating reconstruction and accomplishing other tasks around the country. The PRTs are also a vehicle for internationalizing the effort. While we share Mr. Lantos' disappointment, the fact is that the NATO allies have come into the process on the ground and one of the roles they are fulfilling is taking over the peacekeeping role of the International Security Assistance Force and some of these PRTs.

We have a new strategy in the south and southeast of the country. Not only do our military units go in and clean out the enemy, but we follow up very quickly with reconstruction aid and other forms of assistance in a systematic way—again, to extend the authority of the national Government and to extend stability.

In the counternarcotics area, we are doing more. All of these efforts that I mentioned are intensifying in the immediate period as we are doing everything we can to help with security in the context of these historic elections.

In sum, I would assure you we do have a strategy. It is a strategy that the President and Congress have worked together to develop and to sustain. It is a strategy that we need to continue to develop and to refine, but it is a strategy we need to persevere in pursuing.

In sum, I would say all of us—Executive Branch, Congress, the American people—can all be proud of what the Afghan people are accomplishing with our support.
Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you about our policy and progress in Afghanistan.

In October 2003, when I last appeared before you on Afghanistan, I described some of the initial results of President Bush's decision to accelerate progress in Afghanistan. I reported then that:

• eleven Afghan National Army (ANA) battalions had been trained and the first phase of Ministry of Defense reform had begun;
• four Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established and contributing to security and reconstruction efforts around the country; and
• President Hamid Karzai—through the replacement of provincial governors, police and security chiefs, and collection of customs revenues—was asserting national government authority throughout the country.

One year later, the Afghan people's courage, determination and desire for democracy have produced even more positive news:

• In January of this year, and despite threats of violence against delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga, Afghans ratified one of the most enlightened constitutions in the Muslim world. This was a major milestone in the building of Afghanistan's new national institutions.
• More recently, in defiance of deadly extremist attacks, more than 10 million Afghans (of which 41% are women) have registered to vote in Afghanistan's first presidential election ever, set for October 9. Eighteen presidential candidates are in the race. Whether by donkey back or Chinook helicopter, ballots will be transported to voters in the most remote parts of the country.
• Next spring, Afghans are to elect members of a new Parliament, an event that will bring the political process launched in Bonn in December 2001 to a successful conclusion.

More than 3 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan since 2002—in a sense, "voting with their feet," in a vote of confidence in their country's future. Afghans are rebuilding the country's roads, enrolling their daughters in school and beginning to lay down their arms to live in a democratic society governed by the rule of law and not the barrel of a gun. They are taking responsibility for their own security, with the ANA deploying with Coalition forces in combat operations in the border areas near Pakistan and to prevent further outbreaks of factional fighting in hot spots throughout the country.

Today's story is one of Afghans who are seizing every opportunity to return to traditional livelihoods and determine their own destiny, after a generation of upheaval. A new Afghanistan is being created. The United States and the international community can be proud of support they are providing.

SECURITY

Let me first review with you Afghanistan’s security situation.

The two primary sources of insecurity for the Afghan people remain: (1) attacks by insurgents against government employees and outposts, insurgents that find safe haven in the rugged border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan; and (2) warlord militias that resist the authority of the national government and often prey upon ordinary citizens.

A shift in our strategy with respect to the first problem has paid dividends in recent months. When Coalition forces deploy to a problem area they remain well after combat operations end, providing support for the local government and developing local sources of information. Remnant al-Qa’ida, Taliban and Hezb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) forces no longer mass in large numbers; they have been reduced to small group attacks against soft targets. The Pakistan Army’s unprecedented efforts in the lawless tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have contributed significantly to recent successes against Al Qaeda pockets. Regular consultations between Afghan and Pakistan leaders have improved their cooperation. This strategy is paying particular dividends in the South and Southeast of the country. The strategy combines military, political, and economic instruments of pol-
icy. Combat operations (like Operation MOUNTAIN STORM) are followed by intensified, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Already:

- we are collecting better and more intelligence on Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and other enemy forces—important contributions to the war against terrorism;
- reconstruction aid is being directed to where it is most needed;
- a total of nine US-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams have been established in the South and Southeast;
- NATO is augmenting its presence in the country in support of the election process.

We have also accelerated the training of the ANA so that four battalions are in training at the same time with an annual output of 16,000 new Afghan soldiers. Four thousand of the ANA’s current 12,000 personnel are deployed on combat and stability operations across the country, including in Herat and near the border with Pakistan. We are evaluating options to accelerate ANA training further—to 5 battalions or more concurrently—in order to field ANA combat forces more rapidly.

The Afghan government—with the support of the United Nations—has demobilized more than 16,000 of an estimated 60,000 warlord militia forces and made considerable progress in implementing a nation-wide heavy weapons cantonment program. (In Kabul, it is complete.) Still, work needs to be done. We support the Afghan Ministry of Defense’s efforts to make real gains in disarming the warlord militias before the October 9 presidential election so that Afghan voters can cast their votes in an atmosphere free of intimidation.

Concurrently, the Department of Defense is augmenting the State Department’s Afghan National Police training program. DoD is providing infrastructure, communications gear and other equipment for the National Police, Border Police and Highway Police, and deploying military Mobile Assistance Teams to help assess local police units’ procedures, administrative capacity, training and deployment plans, infrastructure and equipment.

Since the April 2002 G–8 decision to designate international “lead nations” for reform of Afghanistan’s security sector, the United States has worked closely with and supported the efforts of our lead-nation partners. Whether with Italy and the judiciary or Japan and the disarmament process or the United Kingdom on counter-narcotics, we have sought to maintain a truly multinational collaboration. We have come to the realization, however, that in some cases a more aggressive U.S. effort is needed, and, as with last year’s decision to train 20,000 Afghan police by June 2004, we have engaged ourselves more actively in a variety of areas.

THE DRUG TRADE

Few problems in Afghanistan are as pernicious and complex as the drug trade. The past year witnessed record levels of poppy cultivation in areas previously not used for this purpose. We know that profits from the production of illegal narcotics flow into the coffers of warlord militias, corrupt government officials, and extremist forces. The narcotics trade is endangering Coalition success in Afghanistan and corrupting Afghan governmental institutions that we are helping to build. The problem demands action across multiple fronts.

The U.S. government has developed an integrated program to address this problem, a program that supports and complements the efforts of the United Kingdom—the lead nation for counter-narcotics assistance to Afghanistan.

Thanks to your support for the $73 million in Supplemental funds last year, DoD is assisting the Afghan National Police, Highway Police and Border Police with personal and communications equipment and refurbishing 14 provincial police stations, as well as providing tactical and narcotics-related training and equipment to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and Afghan Counter-narcotics Police to establish an urban interdiction force. We are also providing 4–6 refurbished Mi–17 helicopters to be leased to the Ministry of the Interior for police interdiction operations.

Other support funded by the $73 million includes development of an Afghan narcotics information fusion center for the police, including equipment and training; refurbishment and construction of the Spin Boldak border crossing point along the Afghan-Pakistan border (a major smuggling route); and development of a Ministry of Interior public outreach program to propagate the government’s anti-narcotics message.

The narcotics problem needs to be viewed as a strategic problem in Afghanistan, in two senses of the word. Drug production and its revenues are fueling the adversaries of democracy in Afghanistan and corrupting institutions, as I mentioned. But,
second, an approach to addressing the problem has to be comprehensive. It's not just a matter of taking out a few drug labs.

The key measure of progress in this area is the increased capability of the Afghan government itself to address the drug problem. We therefore seek an approach that develops Afghan institutions and builds Afghan capacity, serving the broader strategic goal of building a stable, moderate Afghan government that can provide for its own security over the long term.

This is the only basis on which the progress that is made can be sustained. Although there is much we can and should do in the near term, this will be a long-term effort for the Afghan government. As President Karzai has said on many occasions, it will require changing an Afghan mindset so that poppy cultivation, opium production, and drug trafficking are deemed socially and culturally unacceptable—as they were several decades ago.

Finally, as noted, a counter-narcotics strategy has to be an integrated one. All elements of policy need to be pursued together. Without capable police forces, without a criminal justice system to try offenders, without programs to offer alternative livelihoods, without a national government able to assert its legal and political authority over warlords, without effective information programs—no counter-narcotics policy will succeed.

We are continuously reviewing and refining our policy in this area, given its clear importance.

GOVERNANCE

President Karzai continues to make progress improving the quality of governance at the national, provincial and district levels. Recent examples include his decisions to remove from office or curtail the power of some key regional power brokers who resisted national authority. An important factor in President Karzai's political success has been his ability to deploy both the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to areas outside of Kabul to assert the authority of the national government.

This too requires an integrated strategy. Further reduction of warlord power will depend on a successful disarmament process, strengthened border security, security sector reform (broadening the political base of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and Afghan intelligence service), and effective implementation of the counter-narcotics strategy.

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Although the majority of Coalition forces are American (approximately 16,000), 17 other countries contribute approximately 1,600 military personnel to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Fourteen of these countries also contribute 4,875 out of the 7,348 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces. Since last October, when the United States transferred command of the Kunduz Provincial Reconstruction Team to German forces under a NATO flag, NATO has established or taken over three additional PRTs.

When I last appeared before you, Committee members highlighted the need for the international community, and particularly our NATO allies, to do more in Afghanistan. This need is more acute now than ever. We are pleased that the Eurocorps has taken over command of the NATO/ISAF force. We are disappointed, however, that the NATO/ISAF force generation process has not produced sufficient forces for NATO to execute Stage Two of its expansion into western Afghanistan. The force generation process will resume in November, and we continue to urge allies to commit the resources necessary to support ISAF expansion in the West. At the same time, we are urging NATO allies to relax restrictions on their military forces' rules of engagement in Afghanistan and to support national government priorities (e.g., counter-narcotics) more actively as part of their mission.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude, Mr Chairman, by returning to the remarkable achievements of the Afghan people. Few nations are as poor and under-developed as Afghanistan was, even before twenty-plus years of Communist dictatorship, Soviet invasion, war, political violence and extremist savagery and repression destroyed national institutions and devastated traditional social structures. In the three short years since the Taliban were ousted from Afghanistan, Afghans have displayed resilience, bravery and a deep commitment to the establishment of a moderate, democratic system of government.

President Bush has stayed the course in his strategy to support the Afghan people in this enterprise. But bipartisan Congressional support has been crucial. It is our
national objective to advance a U.S.-Afghan partnership that helps Afghanistan get back on its feet, prosper, and never again be a safe haven for international terrorists. To this end, the United States and Afghanistan have declared their intent to establish a long-term security relationship that will include continued training and materiel support for Afghan security forces. This was declared in the Joint Statement issued on the occasion of President Karzai’s meeting with President Bush in Washington on June 15, 2004.

We pursue this strategy mindful of the lessons of Afghan history. Other foreign powers have been present in, and summarily evicted from, Afghanistan because they sought to subjugate and repress. A foreign presence that does not serve the Afghan people will be rejected by the Afghan people.

On this count we are encouraged by a recent nation-wide survey in which the overwhelming majority of Afghans polled support a U.S. military presence and credit the United States with providing reconstruction and security. A similar-sized majority wants the United States to stay until the security situation stabilizes.

This goal mirrors Afghan wishes: to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Afghan people until they are ready to stand alone. The United States sees Afghanistan as our friend, our ally, and our partner with a shared vision of a world free of the nightmare of terrorism and oppression. We believe our national strategy is succeeding. We look forward to Congress’s continued strong support, and we thank this Committee, especially, for its pivotal role and contribution.

Thank you.

Chairman Hyde. Thank you.

General Sharp?

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER L. SHARP, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, J–5, THE JOINT STAFF

General Sharp. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos, Members of the Committee, I would first like to thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today to provide an update on the progress in Afghanistan and express our appreciation for your steadfast commitment to the men and women of the coalition, both uniformed and civilian.

I would also like to acknowledge the leadership of Lieutenant General Dave Barno and Ambassador Khalilzad. They have achieved extraordinary synergy in the months of service together, and their tireless efforts are largely responsible for the progress we have made in Afghanistan since the fall of 2003.

Lieutenant General Barno and Ambassador Khalilzad are supported by a superb team of military and civilian personnel from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Justice and the Treasury and USAID and here in Washington by the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group, which brings together Afghan experts of equally high calibre across the U.S. Government.

The United States, coalition, and Afghanistan troops are conducting a wide range of counterinsurgency operations, including reconnaissance, interdiction, and patrols, many of which are joint patrols with coalition forces and Afghan National Army members, and maintenance of blocking positions along the Afghan and Pakistan border.

The greatest threat in the country remains al-Qaeda, Taliban and other indigenous militant groups. These groups operate mostly on the Pakistan border and in the south. The United States, coalition, and Afghan combat forces are positioned and employed to defeat these threats.

Warlords also pose a threat to stability, but their influence has noticeably been reduced over the past year. As part of his plan to
strengthen the national Government, Prime Minister Karzai has successfully relieved several powerful warlords of their core commands this summer.

Last week, he also relieved Ismail Khan of his position as the Governor of Herat. Although there were some demonstrations following the decision to remove Ismail Khan, the Afghan National Army, with supportive coalition forces, restored stability very quickly. There is now a new Governor in Herat.

These operations are a testament to our success in fielding the Afghan National Army. The Afghan National Army is a highly professional, multi-ethnic force with a current strength of over 11,800 soldiers. It is rapidly becoming the principal pillar of Afghanistan’s security.

The Minister of Defense is simultaneously standing up four regional Afghan National Army headquarters to further extend its capabilities. As we speak, Afghan National Army soldiers are deployed alongside coalition forces against the insurgency and preparing for the elections, and they are performing admirably.

In less than a month, Afghanistan’s citizens will take another step toward stabilization. They will vote in the first ever democratic presidential elections. Preparation for these elections has taken a tremendous effort on the part of the Afghan people, the many nations committed to its success and the United Nations. For our part, we are working very closely with the Afghan security forces and ISAF to ensure Afghan voters can go to the polls in a secure environment.

Now let me very briefly address the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs. Coalition and ISAF PRTs remain successful in their reconstruction and stabilization efforts and extending the influence of the Afghan Government. The coalition currently has 14 PRTs. ISAF has five. The Department of State, USAID, Department of Agriculture and the Government of Afghanistan are providing representation in most of these coalition PRTs.

Afghanistan is the first major out-of-theater operation undertaken by NATO since its formation in 1948 or 1949. NATO has deployed and employed forces at great distances from their home countries, although, as Mr. Lantos said, at the same time NATO forces are still working through a number of issues, including sustainment, deployment of resources sufficient to meet reconstruction stabilization needs and restrictions imposed upon sending nations.

NATO’s next step remains expansion beyond its present operation area in the northern and western part of Afghanistan. The alliance must generate forces required for ISAF expansion in western Afghanistan to include another four PRTs. Ultimately, NATO should assume responsibility for security and stability operations in the country, so we are working with them on these challenges to facilitate this goal.

Let me conclude by saying that we are making excellent progress toward achieving our strategic goals in Afghanistan. We and the majority of the people in Afghanistan are confident we will overcome the remaining challenges to Afghanistan’s stabilization and reconstruction. In a recent poll, 89 percent of the people said Af-
ghanistan is moving in the right direction, and 86 percent think that the worst times are behind them.

Sir, I would welcome the opportunity to respond to your questions.

Chairman Hyde. Thank you, General.

Mr. Charles?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT B. CHARLES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Charles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your words and thank you, Mr. Lantos, for your statement. I thank the whole Committee for letting me come here and have the opportunity to explain and update the Committee on our counternarcotics and rule of law programs in Afghanistan.

Our purpose in Afghanistan is straightforward: We are there to squeeze the lifeblood out of terrorism and to make democracy a reality. To achieve that purpose we contribute mightily to an international effort led by Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. The aim of that effort is to increase Afghan capabilities in police presence and public security, fighting narcotics and supporting the rule of law. We are committed to encouraging lead-nation ownership of these programs and the sharing of responsibility for transforming Afghanistan. My testimony today is intended to give you a bird’s-eye view of these three elements of our aggressive, unified effort. In many ways, these elements are the U.S. and coalition’s long-term “exit strategy.”

Police and the rule of law first. As designated lead country for policing, Germany has developed an intensive training academy that addresses long-term institution-building and will shape the future of the Afghan police as a nationwide institution. Our program complements the German approach by addressing short-term security requirements for police. We began by establishing a Central Training Center in Kabul in May 2003.

Since then, we have established five additional Regional Training Centers (RTCs) using interim facilities in Kandahar, Konduz, Mazar-i-Sharif, Gardez and Jalalabad, and have trained over 25,000 police.

In concert with this training, we have provided personal equipment packages including duty belts, flashlights, handcuffs, pepper spray, batons, pouches and uniforms for each of the police graduates.

The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) at the State Department has also provided $20 million to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Law and Order Trust Fund to support payment of police salaries. We are refurbishing and supplying more than 30 police stations. And with the exception of weapons, we have undertaken to equip the police to the maximum extent possible under the law. A limited number of weapons, including rifles and pistols, have been provided by Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro. These weapons flow through the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Program.
Somewhat miraculously, the State Department’s INL team has done all of this, once money became available, while imposing performance and accountability measures on the contractors, including such measures—and I imposed this one—of a $250,000-a-day fine for failure to deliver; and has stood up these academies despite a difficult security environment in a matter of months. I came to this job on October 6; the supplemental passed on November 6; our academies were operational within 3½ months; and by July 1, 2004, the State Department’s INL has trained nearly 20,000 police. And, again, by this month we have already trained 25,000 police.

Going forward, we are establishing additional training centers in Bamiyan and Herat, building permanent facilities at each site, while converting temporary academies to permanent structures.

We are constantly looking for ways to improve the quality of the police training program. To that end, we have expended our training curriculum into both border and highway police training. On current metrics, we fully anticipate training 3,000 border and 650 highway patrol police by January 2005. Our overall goal is to train 50,000 national police, 12,000 border police and 2,600 highway police by the end of December 2005. At that time, we will begin handing off retraining to the Afghan central Government, buttressed by the long-term German initiative.

We are developing a follow-on initiative that will build upon classroom skills and field training. This has been done effectively by State/INL in Kosovo, Liberia, East Timor and currently also in Iraq. We are pressing forward a major reform initiative for the Ministry of Interior (MDI) and have embedded 30 technical police experts as MOI advisors.

The MOI, or Ministry of the Interior—I do not like acronyms either—advisors are helping the Ministry develop a comprehensive reorganization including a command and control structure that they did not previously have, with clear internal roles and missions, standard operating procedures, professional standards and a credible, sustainable system for documentation and reporting. The Afghans are themselves looking at accelerated police recruitment, vetting and matching equipment needs, all within the larger framework of a nationwide commitment to community-policing.

The justice sector: Concurrently, INL provides support to Italy as a lead nation in reform and rebuilding of the justice sector in Afghanistan. Our direct assistance—made possible by the support and leadership of Congress as much as by the Administration—focuses on infrastructure, training and capacity-building for what are still fledgling institutions. Comprehensive United States and Italian training programs are targeted at training judges, prosecutors and defense counsel. There is also a conscious effort to re-integrate women into the legal sector. New buildings are going up in provincial capitals helping extend justice sector institutions beyond Kabul. Plans include such things as a National Bar Association and widening circles of legal education, and I am happy to expand on all of that.

Overall, we and our Italian allies are methodically moving the ball up the field, establishing the operational elements of a true justice sector and, I would add, in a place where there was almost none before.
Finally, on narcotics. On the narcotics front, tied like a ball-and-chain to security, justice and economic development, we stand in the darkness of a long shadow. We and the Afghans can see the way forward, and there is increased urgency to that mission, but there remain challenges.

President Karzai and other Afghan officials have said that drug trafficking and the corruption it breeds may be the biggest threat right now to Afghanistan’s long-term security and democratic future.

There is a bit of an M.C. Escher drawing here, and we are on that circle of staircases or pointing fingers, if you remember those drawings. Without security, crucial eradication efforts cannot rise to the necessary level required to deter heroin poppy cultivation. But, without tackling eradication, as well as heroin lab and warehouse destruction with vigor—without a “full throttle-up” way of looking at stopping narcotics—the overall security will not get better fast.

The “exit strategy,” therefore, involves not only more and better police, timely elections, wider economic development and a reliable justice sector, all of which are on track, but a unified, all-out effort to rob the forces of instability and terror of the money they gain from heroin production.

Due to the need for more security around eradication and the recent growth of heroin labs, we expect measurements of the 2004 poppy crop—which will be released in the next few weeks by the CIA’s Counternarcotics Center and the U.N. Office of National Drugs and Crime—to show yet another year-on-year increase. We need to work harder at lashing up all Afghan and coalition counter-narcotics efforts, while boosting legitimate investment and economic development. The Administration is intent on giving counternarcotics greater priority in terms of our work in Afghanistan and is undertaking a process to determine how best to ramp up efforts.

I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Charles follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT B. CHARLES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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POLICE AND THE RULE OF LAW

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Going forward, we are establishing additional training centers in Bamiyan and Herat, building permanent facilities at each site, while converting temporary academies to permanent structures.

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NARCOTICS

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and warehouse destruction with a vengeance—without a “full throttle-up” way of looking at stopping narcotics—the overall security situation will not get better fast.

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CONCLUSION

After my colleagues have spoken, I would be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.

Chairman Hyde. Nice timing. We have five votes pending, so we shall scurry over and vote and get back.

If you will take a little breather, we have some questions. As soon as the votes are over, gentlemen and ladies, please return so that these witnesses may answer our questions.

The Committee stands in recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman Hyde. The Committee will come to order. We will now commence the questioning of the panel. I am pleased to yield to Mr. Lantos.

Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend all three of our witnesses for their serious and substantial testimony. I have a few questions.

First, General Sharp, you made reference to General Barno. I just want to say what an outstanding job he is doing and how proud we all are of his work and the work of all of our troops.

Afghanistan is free of all the divisive political complexities of Iraq. In view of that, I would like to get a candid response from any of you, or all of you, as to why our European allies are as reluctant as they obviously are to play a significant role in bringing stability to this very important country?

I would also like to ask you to comment on the role of Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan. I would like to ask you to comment on the role of Iran in Afghanistan. I would like to ask you, Who has the portfolio to bring Turkish troops into Afghanistan?

Earlier on, the Turks performed extremely well leading the allied effort. There is no earthly reason why the huge Turkish military could not play a significant stabilizing role in Afghanistan. It would relieve us, and it would provide significant guarantees that over the next few years developments in Afghanistan will be constructive.

I would like to ask any of you, Why are we not making an effort to bring in Egyptian troops? There is no earthly justification why we continue providing Egypt with $1.3 billion, almost automatically, in military aid, but when we need them they are no place.

When I raised this issue in Cairo with the Foreign Minister, with some of their leading military, the impression I got was that we never asked, or if we did it was very proforma. Is there any reason why we would not welcome Egyptian military participation in sta-
bilizing Afghanistan? If we continue to get a negative response, why on earth do we automatically sign a $1.3 billion check for military aid to Egypt?

Finally, I would like to ask what your judgment is in the unfortunate eventuality that the next assassination attempt on President Karzai should be successful. As I understand it, last week he narrowly escaped an assassination attempt. I hope that there are adequate contingency plans to continue the operations should the next one tragically be successful.

Mr. Rodman?

Mr. RODMAN. Let me try some of these questions. You asked, Why are the European allies so reluctant to get into Afghanistan? I am not sure. What they claim is incapacity. General Sharp can add to this, but they are in Afghanistan. We have brought them in, and they have made a commitment.

NATO as an institution has committed itself to a greater role in Afghanistan. The problem is getting them to fulfill the commitments and provide the equipment and provide the personnel.

What the operational obstacle is, maybe General Sharp knows better.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, it is difficult for the rational mind to accept the notion that Germany, France and Spain cannot provide significantly higher levels of participation. You know, the credibility of your testimony is very much in doubt if you do not call a spade a spade as we have on this side of the table.

Clearly, they could participate in a dramatically more significant fashion. The Turks could be in there in a significant fashion. The Egyptians could be there in a significant fashion. They are not. I am wondering what we tell them.

Mr. RODMAN. Some allies are with us on the ground. The French are with us on the ground in OEF and doing important things. Numbers are not always as important as quality.

The Germans took command of ISAF for a period of time, which was something we thought was a contribution. The Germans have played a significant role in ISAF in Kabul. We see some of the allies taking on the PRTs. The Germans took over one of the PRTs.

We are drawing them little by little into a greater role and greater commitment. Whether there are limits on their numbers; I cannot really explain it. We have drawn them into roles that we have thought were significant and useful. Granted, we do not expect them to provide large numbers on the scale that we have.

Mr. LANTOS. Why not? That is the question. What do they tell us when we ask them, hopefully forcefully, Why do you not come through with adequate numbers?

Mr. RODMAN. Well, I am not sure what the answer is.

General SHARP. Let me just summarize. I am sure you are aware of the total contributions. I am not disputing what you are saying in your overall premise.

The total that is in Afghanistan today is right at 25,000, if you include ISAF and OEF. Of that, about 16,000 are U.S. and about 9,000 are from 40 allied countries around the world. So there is a significant contribution.

Having said that, I must agree with you. When NATO tried to expand in the north, sending the Germans up to Kunduz, and tried
to continue on with what they call their stage 1 expansion in the north and then further out to the west, NATO was not able to fulfill all of the requirements that were laid out for forces by the military committee or the NAC. The latest Force Generation Conference for the stage 2, which takes it further west, was even worse.

General Jones was in here recently. He is going to do another Force Generation Conference here in another couple weeks to try to expand this more and to push NATO more along the lines. You know, NATO has said that Afghanistan is their number one priority. The countries, the politicians, have got to step up to the plate from these countries in order to be able to fulfill that promise.

I think all of us, and you are doing it very well, sir, need to continue to push NATO to not only contribute forces, but also contribute forces with few national caveats that allow the excellent troopers—which there really are a lot of good troopers there on the ground—to do what they have been told by their country to do. I think in a lot of cases—in just about all cases—it is a political decision as to how many forces they will be able to put in.

I guess the last thing I will say is to reiterate what Mr. Rodman said. There are great numbers there that are doing very hard work and doing it side-by-side with us in OEF to be able to do not only stability operations, but the strike operations. There are a total of 17 countries that are with us in OEF over there. In as large numbers as we want? Obviously not, sir.

Mr. LANTOS. And what is their answer when we tell them that, General? I have the greatest admiration for what our people are doing, but I find it very disappointing that the Administration is unwilling to call a spade a spade.

Some of our major European NATO allies are making pathetically small contributions. They need to be reminded of the fact that for two generations we protected them from the Soviet Union, and there is a time when they have to step forward and do their share. They are freeloaders. This has to be told to them by the Administration because they depend on the Administration for a lot of goodwill.

What do they tell you when you tell them they are not generating the forces in adequate numbers?

Mr. CHARLES. Mr. Lantos, let me attempt to call a spade a spade because I think that is exactly the right place to begin.

First, let me say this hearing is extremely valuable for the very reason that you can say, and are saying, the very things you are saying. Secondly, remember my lane is the civilian side.

Mr. LANTOS. Yes, I know.

Mr. CHARLES. The police training and justice sector: Let me start by saying we have had donor conferences in which people have pledged to support us financially. Even if they do not have the infrastructure or the force structure to provide added people, they can provide money. I think some of those pledges still need to be fulfilled.

I also think that we are seeing some significant movement, but there needs to be a lot more. The room for more support, even in my lane, is substantial.
Now let me give you hard facts that tell you more, and I want
to come back to your first statement because I think those were im-
portant countries to name. I want to show you piece-by-piece what
we are doing.

First, the British. We, the United States of America and Americans, do an awful lot to bring the counternarcotics piece to the fore. This coming year we are going to be doing an awful lot more. The British are in the lead and, in fact, that does have meaning to it. I want to give you some of that meaning: For example, in the area of interdiction they have trained up a special Afghan force. Maybe in a closed setting I can tell you even more about it. The special Afghan force has been very effective in going out and hitting some of the labs and, all over the country, hitting “key nodes,” let us call them, of opium and heroin production. That is their responsibility and they are doing it. This year they have actually seized 34 metric tons of opiates.

They are also in the lead on creating what we call the central planning cell for eradication. They use some of their assets and national technical means, together with ours, to target the places where we are going to be highly aggressive as the capacity becomes available, particularly in this coming year.

They have been——

Mr. LANTOS. Well, you may have noticed I have not mentioned the Brits. I think they are carrying their share of the load.

Mr. CHARLES. Fair enough.

Mr. LANTOS. I am talking about the others.

Mr. CHARLES. Fair enough. We will go to Germany then. Their conception of how you do police training is longer term than ours. They do longer actual training. We do 8 weeks. They are talking about a year each. They sort of put a gold plate on it. The reality is, they are ponying up, and the Germans are doing a lot in Afghanistan on police training. They have trained thousands of police together with us.

The Italians: Again, infrastructure is hard to build. We are talking about a country that does not have laws, does not have courts, does not have judges, does not even have a lot of prisons, the basic things you need in order to be able to execute a—you know, once I put an arrest warrant out or these folks bring somebody in, you have to be able to then roll them through the system and create an outcome that is just. You of all people know that better than all of us. It is critical for that to happen. We are pushing that, and the Italians are helping us.

It is absolutely true that we all need to be doing more. As refinement of the problems become more clear; as you know the regions you need to go after and the Governors you need to work with; that is going to become ever more important. Those donations are going to become more important even for the people on the ground. Maybe we need to expand the interdiction teams, for example.

I want to just quickly respond to your other questions.

The Iran border is a very important border. It is, at times, a very porous border. I will tell you that one of the things that we have been working closely to do, is to monitor whether they are trying to stop the flow on counternarcotics, for example. They have lost some 3,000 people over the last decade, actually, trying to shut
that down. I think there is a growing commitment to try and get that to occur, and we certainly are supportive of that.

President Karzai, who is a phenomenal leader, is a person who, when I met with him in Kabul, I gave lots of outs. Are we not fully committed because of this or because of that? I got rock-solid, “We are committed to eliminating opium and heroin poppy from this culture and country as fast as we can do it.” This is in support, incidentally, of many of the MOAs who believe this same thing because, morally, they do not subscribe to the idea of heroin being a part of their culture.

You know, I look at President Uribe in Colombia showing extraordinary leadership in his realm, and I think President Karzai is doing the same and has a cabinet that is doing similar work.

Last point, Belgium: Our Bureau does the Iraq police training as well in concert with DoD. We do have trainers from some of these countries, including Belgium, training the Iraqi police.

I just wanted to put more on the table for you to think about and respond to me with.

Mr. LANTOS. Could one of you comment on my question with respect to Turkey? At an earlier stage there was serious discussion of a large Turkish force being deployed in Iraq. For a whole set of complex reasons that we do not have time to go into now, that never materialized.

Why is Turkey not participating in a major way in Afghanistan?

Mr. RODMAN. I do not know the final answer to why it did not work out. There were discussions about where they would be. Where the Turks had in mind to be was not where we thought was the optimum place for them to be. I do not know.

This was part of a wider effort we were making to bring troops from many countries in. Even more recently there has been additional discussion of looking at countries that were Muslim. We thought there was an interest in coming in. We thought countries might come in when the U.N. returned.

For a variety of reasons, perhaps because countries are reluctant to come into a situation that they saw as difficult, the Turks are not the only ones who seem to be reluctant in the end. I do not remember the specifics of that discussion.

Mr. LANTOS. General, do you have any comment on the lack of Turkish persons?

General SHARP. No, sir, I do not. Only the fact that there are 228 there today in ISAF, but why there are not more—I am sorry—I cannot answer.

Mr. LANTOS. How large is the Turkish military at the moment?

General SHARP. I do not have that number off the top of my head, sir, but fairly large.

Mr. RODMAN. They took command of ISAF, if you will recall.

Mr. LANTOS. I vividly remember that.

Mr. RODMAN. They did a very good job after the Brits, so they stepped up to that responsibility and did well at it.

Mr. LANTOS. Given the size of the Turkish military, to have 227 troops in Afghanistan is less than a token presence.

How about the Egyptians? Has anybody asked the Egyptians?

Mr. RODMAN. The Egyptians have a field hospital in——
Mr. LANTOS. I have been told that about a hundred times during my visit to Cairo, and I kept asking them why they do not have any troops. They answered they have a field hospital.

Mr. RODMAN. We have solicited troops for OEF or for ISAF. When the ISAF commanders have solicited troops, they have tended, in the first instance, to look at countries that had a certain level of capability.

Maybe it is not an accident that most of the ISAF countries are NATO members or other advanced countries. We are not looking for just numbers in this coalition. That may be part of the answer.

General SHARP. And you do know, sir, back on Turkey, that they will head the next ISAF rotation also after the EUROCORPS that is there now?

Mr. LANTOS. Yes, I do.

General SHARP. I expect some more. Again, your basic question is still valid.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I think one of the problems is that the populace of these countries do not support the war. You are not going to get too far out in front of your people if they do not support the war. Why do they not support the war? We have had some very poor public diplomacies selling our message to the world.

The Spanish experience made some of these leaders gun shy. For them to get out in front as Tony Blair did takes extraordinary heroism. That may be in short supply in some of these countries, but that is the way things are.

Yes, Mr. Rodman?

Mr. RODMAN. I would like to add one more point about Egypt. The Egyptians have given us very significant political support in Iraq. They had a lot to do with ensuring Arab League endorsement of, first, the Iraqi Governing Council and then the interim government.

In terms of taking a political stand, you know, whatever they may think about their popular mood, they stepped forward in significant political ways in the Iraq case. Of course, during the war the Egyptians also provided a lot of everything we needed in terms of access over-flight and use of the Suez Canal. The Egyptians stepped up politically to a significant degree in the Iraq case.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Paul?

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Shortly after 9/11 we passed the resolution that gave the authority to the President to go into Afghanistan. And the mission then was stated fairly clearly: Go after the al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. I would suggest that our mission has changed and now there is mission creep and we are not even talking about what we went in there for. It was Osama bin Laden. Now we have occupation. Now we are involved with nation-building. And now we want to expand into making the world safe from drug dealers. Quite frankly, I think we are going down the long path which does not look very productive.

A picture of Afghanistan has been painted, I think, overly optimistic. If you read the newspapers, what you are talking about does not even exist from the reports that I read about what is really going on. And when you hear about Doctors Without Borders
leaving after having been there through the Russian occupation; the U.N. wants to leave. The protection of the President is very precarious. We do not know what will come of that. The airports getting bombed; there are estimates that 90 percent of the country, at least a very large percent of the country, is under the occupation of the Taliban and the warlords.

We have a serious disconnect here. As Americans and as Members of Congress, we have to be realistic and not hide from the realities of what is happening. Even our memorandum from the staff states that the marriage between warlords and the drug trade continues to erode the existence of the rule of law in Afghanistan. I believe that is very accurate.

The question comes up about our allies. Why do they not do more? I think Chairman Hyde is really onto something. They do not have popular support back home.

You know, in a way we are working real hard for an election, like even an imperfect election is going to solve all our problems. Just have an election. Of course, if we have an election in Iraq and we get a radical Shiite, we are not going to be happy. We are told that will not happen.

Here we are waiting, begging, pleading and struggling for an election at the same time when our allies have an election and they have a democratic process, and they say we do not want to go in there. Then we hound them for not doing what we want.

I do not know if we can have it both ways. I think that it is correct that they are not there because the democratic process in those home countries of our allies are saying, “Is this worth it all?”

My question is, if we start admitting the truth, which I think ultimately your position or our position of those who have great concern, it will not matter. The truth will come out in the end. If the truth is that things are tough, what would it take? What would it really take? Because I realize we will not go back to the original mission and abide by the terms and go after the al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden because we are off nation-building elsewhere.

If we want to do what you are suggesting we do—continue to fight for this election, occupation, nation-building, clean up the Taliban, get it safe against all drug production—how many troops, General, do you think we would need to do that? I mean, how many would it take, honestly?

We have what, 17,000 troops now? Unless you argue the case that things are just fine and dandy and we do not need any more help, then we have to say, “Well, what do you need to do it? How many troops would you need?”

General Sharp. Sir, let me start off by saying that the commanders there on the ground have a mission to destroy Taliban and al-Qaeda; training the Afghan National Army; bringing stability and security throughout the country by working with ISAF and the Afghan National Army and the police forces within Afghanistan, which gets right at the counterterrorism because, as you know, Afghan National Army soldiers are standing side-by-side with us on the south and on the east border, killing Taliban and al-Qaeda today.

When you ask commanders what more do they need, they say they have what is necessary in order to be able to accomplish those
missions. So I think I paint a better picture than you do, sir. I believe that if you look at the progress that has been made in Afghanistan, look at any of the criteria as far as where the majority of the areas within the country—even by U.N. maps, which are very conservative—are “go” versus “no go,” the majority of the country is “go.” Yes, there are some areas along the south and the east and in a couple others that are not.

To get back to your original point of killing Taliban and al-Qaeda, that is the focus of OEF. That is where the great, great majority of the 17,000 soldiers that we have sent over there, in coordination with the other countries that are part of OEF, are accomplishing their mission today.

Mr. CHARLES. If I can add just a short add-on to that direct response?

I think you have a panel here that is all about truth, Congressman. This is a group of people who will tell you exactly as it is. I think we have a lot to be proud of over there.

We can go province by province, if you want. We can walk through program by program, but it is a fundamentally different place. We have run a lot of the terrorists out of business or killed them. We are training and moving a structure toward democracy.

I just want to hit your three points. The issue about an election; Why is it magic? Well, the beauty of democracy is that legitimacy and authority will flow from that election and from the national assembly. It is an incredible thing to be pushing toward. It will no doubt be imperfect. Elections are always imperfect in some way or another.

The reality is, it puts the people in charge, and that is the beauty of it because legitimacy flows. That will cause the central government to have greater authority over the provincial governments and to begin to move the ball forward. That is extremely important for us on the justice sector and on the counternarcotics.

On the drugs and the mission creep: I would not call it mission creep at all. I would call it a realistic assessment—again, we are all about truth—of what is going on there and why it is very important to understand that the revenue flow to some of these very individual nodes—maybe a dozen total of very wealthy warlord/drug traffickers and, of course, the extremists—is coming out of drugs.

Let us again be realistic and clear about it. Only 8 percent of the cultivated land in Afghanistan today is dedicated to poppy. Ninety-two percent is dedicated in rank order to cereals, wheat, barley and corn, and that 92 percent only feeds 10 percent of the market in Afghanistan for food.

They make about 3 to 10 times as much on poppies, so we have to raise the costs and the risks of doing business in poppy by getting a justice sector, going after these people, making clear examples of some of them. Maybe people like Jumacan and Norzi; we have to go after them and make it clear that this is not permissible.

At the same time, we also have to raise the incentives and the rewards of being in the legitimate economy. We are doing all those things. To put a metaphor with it, it is as if someone said to you, “In 24 hours I want you to stud up a house, put a roof on, lay the foundation, make it all happen.”
We are trying, and we are working pretty well together toward that end. The Afghans are working with us and President Karzai is working with us, but it will take time. Our real enemy here again is time. It is not any of the other individual granular pieces.

Finally, on police: Imagine for a moment a country that has no police to speak of and now 25,000 police have been trained and 15,000 ANA. They are what is going to stabilize this election and make it legitimate.

All of those are hopeful and, I think, things the American people should be proud of.

Chairman HYDE. Ambassador Watson?

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am hearing that there are other countries within the region that are not giving a full contingent. Then I just heard from the General that we have all that is needed.

I hear a very optimistic picture that we will have free and fair elections, and then I read—I do not know if it is the media manipulating and spinning—that security cannot be guaranteed. I understand that Karzai has a private security firm that is responsible for his protection.

It is hard to know what to believe. Now, you are the gentlemen who are on the ground. Of course, we get our information from the media. We do not get information from staff. We really do not. I do not care whether it is classified or public. We have to watch the media.

Can someone clarify for me what the legitimate reality is of Afghanistan, and can we be assured that we have the security necessary to have a free and fair election with the kinds of things we are hearing through the media, their spin I would imagine?

I am sitting here. I have been sitting here since we started and taking notes. I do not know what the true story is. Can someone help me?

General SHARP. Let me start, ma’am, with two things. First off, the conditions as far as the number of attacks, where we have seen attacks recently, and where our concerns are there. Then secondly, I will give you specifically what the security plan is for the election period itself.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you.

General SHARP. First off, on attacks: Since the May/June time period attacks have been up, mostly against our forces and against Afghan National Army forces as we conduct operations in the south and the east. That is where the great majority of attacks are coming. It is us getting after them and them trying to respond to stop the elections and start a security issue to the point where there will not be elections.

We do not believe that they will be able to do that. Karzai and the people of Afghanistan are adamant that they are going to do these elections. If you look at the number, the percentage that have registered, including women, the Afghans have spoken. They are going to have this election.

Secondly, what are we doing to make sure that we have got the elections best-postured in order to be able to have a secure environment for the voters to be able to go?
First off, there are three rings of security that are going to be in place around the election time. The first ring, which is the inner ring, the first layer, is going to be primarily Afghan police officers; the 25,000 that Mr. Charles talked about will be at all the polling stations—trained and coordinated at all the different polling stations.

The second layer is the Afghan National Army that have been trained and equipped. They will be out. They will be doing patrols through the areas. They will have quick reaction forces that are able to go to areas of violence as we move through.

Third, will be coalition forces, both OEF and ISAF forces, again primarily where we believe the key problem areas are going to be—where the key places of a lot of voters are going to be—to provide quick reaction to those two inner layers.

With the help of both Afghanistan individuals within the Government, OEF and ISAF, and the U.N., there have been several exercises that have taken place over the last month or 2 to pull all of these organizations together and do, not only the planning, but actual exercises. And the “what ifs” for election day, and that coordination, has taken place.

There is a combined elections operations command center that has been established in Kabul. It has, again, all of the elements that I talked about in one location with the communications set up and ready to do the election support as it goes through.

Can I say there will be no violence? Absolutely not. I am fairly convinced there will be some violence on election day, but we believe that we have the security in place to be able to make the great, great, great majority of Afghanistan safe. And the voters, I am confident, will come and vote.

Mr. CHARLES. If I could just add to that, again, to reinforce this idea that the Afghans have spoken?

We have in fact, Ambassador, believe it or not, sometimes had days or weeks where you had 120,000 a day registering. They are absolutely dedicated to the proposition of participating in democracy, and I think the numbers are 41 percent of the group at the moment.

General SHARP. Right.

Mr. CHARLES. A very strong turnout supporting the idea of, in a sense, gratitude to all those who have made it possible for them to be a self-determining country.

I do not doubt that it will occur. The rule of law is difficult, and you know, perhaps better than most, that there are forces out there seeking desperately to prevent good from happening. We are going to encounter them no doubt there, as we do in Iraq, but, again, optimism can also be realism, and that is what is happening now.

General SHARP. One last point on troops that have been deployed, both from the United States and other places, they are going to be there to serve, to have extra troops there during the elections.

ISAF has deployed two extra quick-reaction force battalions, one from Spain and one from Italy. They are there on the ground now. They have also deployed an additional five companies that will go out and help protect and be part of the security for the five PRTs that ISAF owns.
Finally, as you read this morning in the paper, we are sending a battalion out of the 82nd Airborne that will be a reserve quick-reaction force for General Barno there on the ground. So from the international community we have added more additional forces for this period during the elections.

Chairman Hyde. Chris Smith.

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all three of our distinguished witnesses for their service and for their very fine testimony today.

I do have a couple of questions with regard to the issue of human trafficking. As you know, the country of Afghanistan is a tier 2 country. That is to say, when the State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Office looked at Afghanistan, it was found to have a very serious trafficking problem in human persons, but was making efforts, substantial efforts, to mitigate that problem.

The trafficking report makes a point that there is a lack of resources being dedicated to this fight, and I wonder if any one of you would like to take a stab at the scope and the nature of the trafficking problem. We know that Afghanistan is a source and transiting country, and most recently, or at least within a year or so, about 219 Afghani children were repatriated from Saudi Arabia, so there are some good things happening. However, the bottom line is a lack of resources is hindering the ability to really provide protection for these children and mostly women who are trafficked.

Mr. Charles, on the issue of policing, I was encouraged by your numbers and statement that we are working toward 12,000 border police and the like. Does the training include how to spot traffickers, and how to spot and hopefully rescue those who are victims?

I would just point out for the record that the Bush Administration has initiated a very robust effort domestically called Rescue and Restore, in which it works with local police departments, local attorneys, including the U.S. Attorney, and faith-based charities like Catholic Relief Services. There recently was a rescue and restore effort held in Newark. The President himself traveled down to Tampa to roll out another effort, and they are happening all over the country, and they will continue to happen.

One of our Achilles' heels in the fight against trafficking that we have domestically and internationally is the training levels of police. The issue is whether or not they are adequately trained to spot a trafficked person, or whether that person is not recognized as a trafficking victim, and is rather dismissed by police to go right back to the victimization, and also a sense that we need to reign in on this.

If you could speak to the issue of police training in this area: Is there a package available? Yesterday I co-chaired a hearing with Chairman Hunter of the Armed Services Committee—I chair the Helsinki Commission—on what our military is doing, and it is doing an exemplary job in the area of trafficking.

General Leon LaPorte, U.S. Army commander in Korea, was one of our witnesses. Deputy Undersecretary for Defense Charles Abell also testified, as well as John Miller, our Ambassador for the Trafficking in Persons Office, and Joseph Schmitz, DoD Inspector General, who has done some landmark work as IG on trafficking.
The good news is that we do have prototypes. There is a very good plan for trying to help identify the women. As General LaPorte pointed out, you could easily miss a trafficked woman. It is very, very easy to miss, but when you are sensitized, and the police are trained adequately, it makes all the difference in the world.

Is that included in our training package? If you could respond?

Mr. Charles. Yes, sir, it is. Let me again elaborate a little bit. You are absolutely right. I talk with Ambassador Miller regularly about this. If you had him here instead of me, he would say the exact same thing.

It is a heartbreaking area to work in. Drugs are a tough area, as are all of the human rights, but this one is particularly egregious. It is also absolutely true and part of the training that you can pick these people out when they come across the border.

If you see someone traveling with young girls, or there are some clear signals, you can go straight to it and stop it. In fact, we have some anecdotal evidence, and I would be happy to give it to you in more detail, that this is actually working.

Now, this is an embryonic police force, large in numbers but no doubt in need of training and constant retraining, and I think with the border police, you are going to have even a ramped-up effort at addressing that.

I guess the short answer to your question is: Yes; it is a priority. It is not being in any way diminished, and in fact I would say it is gaining in its significance as far as the State Department is concerned.

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Before going on to the second question, if I could, Mr. Chairman, in terms of the resources focus, because the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report did focus on that, what about the other military or police trainers?

Again, we have had hearings on contract police, including UNMC, and at least eight individuals, according to some witnesses, who were trained were actually part of the problem. Here we have police in the Balkans who are supposed to be assisting and providing rule of law and enforcement of law, and they are actually part of the trafficking of women into forced prostitution.

Do the Germans and the others also have a package? Is there an integration of best practices so that the trainers, and the police who get that training, are doing their best job with what is available? Because there are some very good teaching aids on this.

Mr. Charles. Yes, sir. Let me say first for both the basic police and the border police, the TIP training is provided. What I can do is get you details on the curriculum if you are actually interested in seeing what they are teaching.

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. I would very much like to see it.

Mr. Charles. The second thing is your point about the contractors, it is right on the money.

I have been extremely tough on contractors in a lot of ways. One way is from the minute we got here we said there is going to be predeployment training so that you will make it crystal clear what is permissible and what is not permissible in the field. That is done with every contractor who goes into that country when they are working in our programs.

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you.
Chairman HYDE. Shelley Berkley?

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be very brief.

Thank you very much for being here and testifying, and thank you for your service to our country. I, unfortunately, was in a different hearing, and I did not hear your opening statements. I am going to read them because I am very interested in what you have to say.

I have to admit that I share the frustration and concern that has been expressed by a number of my colleagues on this Committee during this hearing. After 9/11, I believed very firmly that we needed to go and find these terrorists where they were located and take them out before they came and did this Nation more harm.

I remember watching television in November about the time we went into Afghanistan and applauding our efforts and being very encouraged that we would in fact have bin Laden by—I believe everyone was talking about Thanksgiving or Christmas of that year. Of course, it has been a while since that Christmas came and went.

I have a couple of questions that I would like to ask. From what I understand, and I have not been there, but I understand that in many regions of Afghanistan daily life resembles pretty much what it did, or daily life exists pretty much the way it did under the Taliban.

We have strong relationships with warlords who I do not think are particularly savory characters, and we know that they intimidate and do harm to democratic activists, aid workers, and Afghan civilians. They restrict freedom of women.

In your view, is it humanly possible to have long-term stability and democracy and respect for human rights if the current local and regional warlords retain their present political and military power? And what are we doing to break the hold that they apparently have on the regions that they control?

Since I may not have a chance to ask a followup, let me ask the followup now. Let us say that there is a very successful election, and there is a strong turnout and tremendous participation from the Afghani people. They have spoken that they want rule of law and democracy.

Even with an election, which I agree with you would send a strong signal, do the warlords disappear? Do they go away? Do they wake up the day after the election and say, “Oh, look at that. All the people that we are intimidating and harming and killing and brutally harming do not want us here any more, so we are leaving.”

What do we do to get that country to where it needs to be?

Mr. RODMAN. Let me start. The issue of warlord power is very significant, but it is actually an area which has seen significant progress in the last year and a half.

It was essential for President Karzai to, at some point, begin to assert national authority over the warlords, and it began in May a year ago. First he got some control over customs revenues and insisted, successfully, that the customs revenues start coming into the central Government. Then, he began replacing provincial Governors who were in fact often warlords. Some of them were forced to give up their military role. In other cases, he just replaced them,
including most recently one of the most powerful of all. Another significant warlord, or often called that, was Minister Fahim, the Defense Minister, who a year ago was considered a potential rival. Mr. Fahim has been dropped from the ticket.

It has been managed politically in what has been, by President Karzai, a very successful political strategy of gradually extending his control and asserting his authority successfully. We have supported that strategy, as you would expect.

The constitution that was drafted calls for a strong presidency. That was another test. The election itself will elect a person with that legitimacy. So we expect that, too, will be a step in the strengthening of national authority and the reduction of the power of the warlords.

That is what has been going on. It is essential that it happened and we have given President Karzai a lot of support as he went about this.

General Sharp. If I could just add some specifics as far as the weapons and the DDR program, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration?

As you know, Japan is the lead nation for DDR, but they honestly provide mostly just funds to be able to help in the process itself, which is backed and really run by UNAMA, the U.N. and the Government of Afghanistan.

The program itself calls for disarming individuals who were in the militia and then retraining them so that they can get a job out on the economy. The majority of them have been retrained in agriculture.

The current statistics, although not as far as where we would like them to be, are showing some progress. The current estimate of the number of individuals that need to be DDR'd is 40,000. That is the total amount that is out there.

We believe thus far there are about 17,000—16,500—who have started through the process, and of those about 13,000 have completed the process to include being reintegrated back into the society.

On the weapons side, I can speak specifically to the heavy weapons cantonment which is, as you point out, a critical part of taking those weapons away from the Afghans and taking them away from the warlords. Again, it is making some slow progress.

We believe that it is about 25 percent complete. There is a total of 5,500 heavy weapons that have been registered, and we think that is a pretty good number. Of that, about 1,400 have been put into cantonments. They are under our control. In most cases, batteries have been taken out of tanks and elements like that so that they cannot come back here.

Just to close, as Mr. Rodman said, there has been great progress with warlords. Karzai has done a super job. That is not to say we are looking the other way. General Abizaid was in the other day talking, and he again reiterates great progress, but we have to watch very closely because it could turn at any second. The individuals and the commanders we have in OEF and throughout the country, are doing that every single day.

Chairman Hyde. Mr. McCotter?

[No response.]
Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce?
[No response.]
Chairman HYDE. He is not here.
Mr. Rohrabacher?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman. As you know, we have three or four meetings here on Capitol Hill running at the same time.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on this issue. What happens in this theater of operation is going to have a dramatic impact in the long-term security of our country. I have been saying that for 10 years. Unfortunately, no one seemed to listen until 9/11.

A couple of serious questions here. First, before I get into the more contentious one, let me ask Mr. Rodman about what the General stated, that there are still operations going on against the Taliban, and described the remnants of the Taliban as the biggest threat still remaining. Would you agree with that?

Mr. RODMAN. As General Sharp said, that is the main mission of most of our troops. These operations are in the Afghan/Pakistan border area.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right, so the Taliban are still a force to be reckoned with?

Mr. RODMAN. Al-Qaeda and Taliban and some extremist allies of theirs.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Okay. With that said, could you tell me whether Ismail Khan helped us in defeating the Taliban?

Mr. RODMAN. Yes, he did.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.

Mr. RODMAN. I would say that of a number of political figures in the country.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Like Dosdom and Halily?

Mr. RODMAN. That is correct.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Why is it that we are so concerned and the State Department is so concerned about taking power away from those people who helped us defeat the Taliban when the Taliban still remains a threat?

Mr. RODMAN. Let me start answering. Our concept is that this country has to evolve to a condition in which political power does not rest on having private armies.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Could you tell me, Do you think that Ismail Khan would have been elected in his local area if there were free elections?

Mr. RODMAN. He may have a chance to.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Mr. RODMAN. First of all, the tradition has been——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So it is possible these people we are talking about, that we call warlords, are really ethnic leaders who during times—because of the times they are and the place that it is—have had to have armed groups in order to protect their certain ethnic groups?

Mr. RODMAN. I would not venture to predict who would win a free election and who would not. The fact is that there are militias,
and I think the health of the country depends on turning these warlords or militia leaders into political figures.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Correct.

Mr. RODMAN. There is also the tradition in the country that provincial Governors be appointed from the center. This is not a novelty of the current system. It is the tradition in the country that there be a central authority.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The tradition in the country is also that women are treated like slaves, and we decided not to do that, but to go a more democratic route and permit the women to have equal rights with men.

Let me note: I think we are going down exactly the wrong road. We are doing so in Afghanistan in order to do the same thing that we placated during the time when the Soviets were there, et cetera, and that is some push to nationalism that probably does not work in the best interest of the United States considering the second half of my question, which is going to be about drugs.

Maybe you could answer me this. Are most of the drugs produced in the Pushtoon areas in Afghanistan?

Mr. CHARLES. Let me give you an answer to both of your questions.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.

Mr. CHARLES. Because you asked about the State Department a moment ago, I just want to be clear.

There are times when the Middle Eastern adage rings true here. You and I agree on a lot of things, but on this one I am going to disagree because there are times when my enemy, my enemy, my friend is enough.

There are also times when you have two individuals who are both bad actors, and just because one of them helps you to take the other one out does not mean you forgive that first one for acts that then become impermissible.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me note that we allied ourselves with Joseph Stalin in order to defeat Adolf Hitler, and let me note that the General just stated that the great threat still remains the remnants of the Taliban.

Mr. CHARLES. Agreed, and I will say that at the end of the day Joseph Stalin got his one comeuppance when they ended up on the dust heap of history.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is correct.

Mr. CHARLES. Back to your second question, the Poshtoons versus the Tajiks.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.

Mr. CHARLES. Both environments obviously are deeply involved in the growing of poppy. In Nangarhar and in Helmont you have great growth and expanded growth, and the same is going to be true up in Badakshan, which is Tajik.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Was Ismail Khan involved with the poppy trade?

Mr. CHARLES. Which Juma Khan? Haji Juma Khan?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Ismail Khan.

Mr. CHARLES. Yes. I will tell you just my opinion, and that is, yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is not your opinion. You are the witness.
Mr. CHARLES. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So Ismail Khan was a major figure in the drug trade?

Mr. CHARLES. Well, again I think we are going to be splitting hairs here if we go down the path of how much and what makes somebody a major figure.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I guess what I am just trying to say, Mr. Chairman, is that what is happening in Afghanistan, from someone who has observed this area for a long time, is we are taking America’s friends and we are disarming them.

This was a big priority of the Administration even before the Taliban had been defeated. Yes, Joseph Stalin’s successors got their comeuppance, but long after Adolf Hitler had long left the scene, let me note.

Mr. CHARLES. Let me say, Congressman——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Back to this drug thing.

Mr. CHARLES. You are right. Let me give you this sort of calling a spade a spade.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, look. I only have about 2 minutes worth of questioning here.

Mr. CHARLES. Go ahead.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If I had 10 minutes, we could have a better discussion.

Mr. CHARLES. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are talking about how much? What is the number of tons of heroin being produced by Afghanistan today?

Mr. CHARLES. Regardless of how you process it, last year’s assessment was 61,000 by CIA estimates.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. 61,000 what?

Mr. CHARLES. Hectares. Hectares.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Mr. CHARLES. And 80,000 by UNODC estimates. My guess is this year, although the numbers are not in—they will be released in the next several weeks—we would be in the vicinity of probably 100,000 hectares.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How much in tons of opium or heroin does that mean?

Mr. CHARLES. Again, because there are different processing—I will get you a firm number, but let us just say a lot, and it is too much.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, can you give me more specific than a lot? Is that 10 tons? 100 tons? How many tons total do you think we have?

Mr. CHARLES. I do not have a rock solid number for you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is that 540 tons? Would that sound about right?

Mr. CHARLES. Depending on which estimate you take, that is definitely within the ballpark.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So 540 tons of opium were produced this year, and that is up almost 50 percent from last year?

Mr. CHARLES. No, I would not say that. First, we do not know what the number is, but, secondly, it is probably likely to be up between 20 and 40 percent.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, 20 to 40 percent.
Mr. CHARLES. But the amount of opium does correlate directly to the amount of heroin, yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Of course, I do not want to be argumentative, but to compliment anyone involved with keeping the opium production down in Afghanistan is a joke.

We have a herbicide that we all know about and we have talked about in open hearings so it is now no longer a classified issue. We have spent $25 million, something that I have pushed for in the past, actually, that has been spent over the last few years in R&D on this microherbicide.

Is there any reason we are not using that microherbicide, which would dramatically eliminate the opium production in Afghanistan?

Mr. CHARLES. Right now, the way we eradicate in Afghanistan, and this is really the first year, you will have full capacity. In May we started to have about 50 percent capacity. Now when we go at it this cycle we will have full capacity.

The way we do it right now is by hand, and we are anticipating 20,000 to 30,000 hectares being taken out.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is there any reason why we are not using the microherbicide?

Mr. CHARLES. To go to your exact question——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes?

Mr. CHARLES [continuing]. Glyphosate is what is used, as you know, in Colombia. In my view, it works pretty well, and it is conceivable that you could someday use it there.

However, number one, this is a decision of the Government of Afghanistan. Number two, it is a decision that has to be buttressed by the capacity to deliver. Congressman, right now we have no airframes there. Every time we fly a mission in Colombia, I put five helicopters in behind it.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.

Mr. CHARLES. We do not have that there right now.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Has the Government of Afghanistan been asked if we could use the microherbicide that is a major effective way of dealing with opium?

Mr. CHARLES. Let us be very clear. Microherbicides are something different from glyphosate. Microherbicides are being tested right now, and as you and I have discussed many times, there may be potential in this. But this is, number one, up to them to decide.

Number two——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Have they been asked?

Mr. CHARLES. No, because we do not have a microherbicide right now that you can deploy. It is in research, and it has been in research.

As you know, you and I have both been pushing others to research faster and understand better what could be done there, but there is no applicable item right now.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlemen's time has expired.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If you pass until next year on this, next year it is going to be tough. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Royce?

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On Afghanistan, when we read the 9/11 Commission in terms of aid, they say we have heard again and again that the money for assistance is allocated too rigidly. They say the U.S. Government should allocate money so that lower-level officials have more flexibility to get the job done across agency lines, adjusting to the circumstances they find in the field. This should include discretionary funds for expenditures by military units that often encounter opportunities to help the local population.

The concept here is that a better coordination of our assistance will go a long way toward increasing security, perhaps more so than simply deploying more soldiers. This is one of the reasons why I am a supporter of the PRT concept.

I had an opportunity to meet with one of those Provincial Reconstruction Teams in March 2002 on a trip I took to Afghanistan. I think they are very effective. We now have a total of 19 of these teams, 13 being U.S. led.

My question is, do the commanders of these PRTs have adequate access to discretionary funds for reconstruction projects in the countryside? Do they have a commander’s emergency response program in place? Chairman Duncan Hunter and I worked very hard to get that in place in Iraq. Do they have that at their disposal?

In other words, if the village elder says he would like to have a school built and they concur that this would be helpful, how many layers of command does that PRT team have to wade through, or can it be built on the spot?

General Shoup. Sir, I think I can start on that. The PRTs and the regional commands, first off as to how much they have spent. Fiscal year 2004 CERP money spent or committed: $40 million. If you look at the OHDACA funds: 430 projects for $23 million.

Mr. Royce. Do you think they are effective, these provisional reconstruction teams?

General Shoup. Absolutely. Absolutely. I think they do a couple things. They not only build the local economy, build what is needed out in the local area, but there is a clear tie back into the central government.

Mr. Royce. They build a bond with the government.

General Shoup. The other thing they do that is effective in most cases is they bring a place where they can coordinate the security that is provided by the local police and if any ANA are deployed in their area and the NGOs together to help coordinate the security for non-governmental organizations out there.

Yes, sir. I think they are a very effective way to get reconstruction started out there.

Mr. Royce. Here is my other concern. We have 18,000 troops in country. What percentage are forward deployed in the countryside? What percentage are actually part of the effort in the provinces outside of Kabul, outside of Bagram Air Base?

Let me give you a perspective on this. There is a respected military writer, Robert Kaplan, who had a piece in this week’s Wall Street Journal. You may be familiar with his thesis, but Kaplan’s theory is this:

“The smaller the American footprint . . . the more effective the operation. The smaller the tactical unit, the more forward
deployed it is, and the more autonomy it enjoys from the chain of command the more that can be accomplished.

“A successful forward operation base is a nearly empty one in which most units are living beyond the base perimeters among the indigenous population for days or weeks at a time.”

He says, we have to

“advance the merging of the Departments of State and Defense as never before . . . planting significant numbers of State Department personnel inside the military’s war fighting commands and Defense personnel inside a modernized Agency for International Development.”

I would like to get your response on Kaplan’s thesis in general, but also, How close is the cooperation between State and DoD in Afghanistan and who calls the shots?

Thank you, General.

General SHARP. Yes, sir. I could start on the military side because we are very proud of this. It starts at the top with General David Barno and Ambassador Khalilzad, as I said in my opening statement.

That is a model of how State and DoD should work together. They start every morning together with a country team, and they end every afternoon with getting back together to see where they are. They coordinate very closely, not only from a military perspective, but also from a perspective of where reconstruction projects should go, what should be the emphasis within the country.

That is extended beyond Kabul. That is extended out into the PRTs, as you mentioned, because in the 13 U.S. PRTs that are out there we have representation not only from the military, but from the State Department, USAID, and other organizations to be able to pull that together. Those small teams are very, very effective, and I agree with the premise that you laid out that they can be.

When you get into combat operations, it is a different story. Combat operations are where you need to be able to have a strong chain of command to mass forces to be able to mass effects out there. I think we have exactly the right balance in Afghanistan.

Mr. ROYCE. What percentage is forward deployed, though? That is a key question. How much is outside of Kabul? This is a concern for President Karzai. You know, how do you make certain that the entire country really is secure?

General SHARP. We are still working on the exact percentage, and I am trying to figure out what is in the headquarters back there in the different locations versus the 13 PRTs and the majority of the forces that are part of OEF.

Maybe, Bob, if you could?

Mr. CHARLES. Again, we will try to find an exact percentage, but let me say there is an increasing deployment outside. From my visit there, I think you are seeing deployment really increase.

I would also say that in both Iraq and Afghanistan, General Sharp and I see each other at least twice a week—sometimes in the NSC, sometimes elsewhere. We are talking regularly and e-mailing daily with the Embassy to make sure that our forward deployed folks know exactly what the overall priorities are. If they need
something, I can backfill it here, ultimately come to you all if we need help.

In the reality here, we are in fact lashed up better, I think, in Afghanistan and in Iraq than we probably have been anywhere.

Mr. ROYCE. In closing, let me just second Mr. Lantos' observations. Mr. Rodman, I think all of us find it unconscionable and unbelievable that outside of the United States and the U.K. there has been such little interest, given the fact that our allies have shown such little interest in Iraq that they could not at least step in in Afghanistan with more PRT teams and with other important work.

I am sure all of us will be conveying that, but I really hope you will as well, Mr. Rodman.

Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. McCotter?

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Just a quick question so you can have time to answer it.

Much of what we hear today obviously is focused on Iraq. Afghanistan, sometimes—although you could argue, fortunately—does not get a lot of media attention. I get concerned that long-term, right now, we see that Iraq's greatest national resource is its oil. That is where, essentially, the strength of that economy is going to come from for years.

The problem we have potentially in Afghanistan is that the strength of much of that economy comes from poppies, comes from the illegal narcotics trade; and that over time, as the security situations are addressed, as democracies are instilled, Iraq is in many ways better positioned for its future because its greatest commodity is legal and that the United States—as we do in other countries like Colombia—will be funding the very people who want to kill us through their own self-destructive behavior and lust for drugs.

Do you think that is potentially an accurate scenario, that if we do not pay attention to, could likely come true?

Mr. CHARLES. Let me address it with all the gravity that it implies. There is no question. We have to go after heroin. I think it is important to keep the entire picture in perspective so there is positive and there is negative, and even within that there is positive and negative.

Let us start at the top level. Top level economics are going to drive. Like with any democracy, you are going to have to have a stable economy that is legitimate, not illegitimate, in order to keep that democracy alive.

Let me say again, as I said earlier, that the overall percentage of cultivation, if you go just to agriculture right now, 92 percent of it is legitimate, and that is a good sign. We have to keep it there. We cannot let it migrate backwards.

We also need to note that it is going to take time to put the rest of the infrastructure in place. It is not just the justice sector. We have non-agricultural income streams that have to be developed, and we are doing that.

I think again I am going to come back to the idea that time is our enemy. There is no question that these things have to be done and they are being done, but it is not going to happen overnight.
Mr. McCOTTER. And I appreciate that. If I still have some time, the thrust of my remarks was, number one, that we should not forget the role we are playing in destroying ourselves here.

I would also hope that in many ways we can look to some of the examples we have had with countries that have been affected by narco-terrorism due to our own self-destructive behavior, such as Colombia, to see how democracies have had to deal with this over time, what their challenges were and what they will continue to be.

I agree with you that time is not our friend, but I also wanted you to understand that my position is that I fully know what you are dealing with, and I fully know—with a great amount of sadness in my heart—the amount of difficulty we, here at home through our own criminal behavior, cause you that far away.

I am not going to ask you for immediate results. What I am asking from you today is to look toward some of those examples as you build toward this future.

Mr. CHARLES. Sir, I could not agree with you more. We lose 21,000 children a year in this country to narcotics, and that means we have to do a better job of educating the parents and the kids about how to stop that.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Houghton?

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here. I know it has been a long afternoon. I just have one very simple question. What is this doing to our troops? What are the narcotics doing to our troops?

The story of the Russians when they were there, it affected up to half of all their troops in terms of use or sending it home or selling it or something like that. What is going on with our people?

General SHARP. Sir, I am very proud of our military that is over there, the professionalism of our soldiers, the strength of our command.

Specifically, as soldiers go into Afghanistan they are very well educated as far as what the dangers are. They clearly understand the penalties if they either use or try to deal with narcotics or try to get that out. There are many different processes in place to ensure that that does not happen both in country and as they leave to come in and out of country.

Your military today is a professional military that does not have the problems the Russians had back when they were there.

Mr. HOUGHTON. And you do not think this in any way has gotten out of control?

General SHARP. Absolutely not. No, sir.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you very much.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Houghton.

The Committee thanks the panel for participating and for your insightful comments and for your service to our country and the cause of freedom.

With that the Committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m. the Committee was adjourned.]
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for convening this hearing today on United States security policy in Afghanistan as we anticipate the October 9th national elections.

Since the war in Afghanistan began in the fall of 2001, the oppressive Taliban regime has crumbled, an interim government has been formed and approved by the loya jirga, and a permanent constitution was adopted on January 4, 2004. Despite setbacks in the timing of presidential elections, nearly 40 political parties have been registered by the Ministry of Justice, and as of the August 15, 2004 close of most registration sites, about 9.9 million voters were registered. About 41% of those are women.

However, as I have stated in other hearings regarding Afghanistan, I remain deeply concerned about numerous reports that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban continue to plan, stage and coordinate attacks on Pakistani territory and then cross the border to launch attacks in Afghanistan. Cross-border activity is leading to increasing destabilization in the south. Recent reports reveal that the Taliban and others are attacking Afghans who registered to vote in the elections.

The Pakistani government has done much to assist in the war on terror, but as long as training of militants occurs on Pakistani soil, there is much more that must be done. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda must be shown that there is NO safe haven for them anywhere.

In addition, it is vital that the U.S. government address the clear and growing links between narcotics and terrorism. Recent reports reveal that as the U.S. military raids terrorists’ hide-outs, they often find drug stashes. Obviously, as we and our allies remove funding sources, terrorists will look for other ways to fund their destabilizing and horrific operations.

Further, the increase in narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan continues to undermine the central government and keep power in the hands of warlords. We ignore the link between narcotics and terrorist financing at our peril.

As the date of the election draws near, and the terrorist activities and the narcotics trafficking continue to undermine the Kabul government, it is vital that the Afghan people understand the elections. Who will educate the people that the ballots are secret? Who will ensure that the ballots are actually kept secret? What is being done to prevent fraud when warlords and their militias control certain regions of the country? Who will monitor these elections? And, who will ensure that legitimate results are honored?

The Afghan people deserve a clear, transparent, and properly conducted election. A flawed election will not only bring further destabilization but it will also undermine the Afghan people’s hopes for democracy.

The report of the “9/11 Commission” recommends that “...the United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan ... so that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism.” Mr. Chairman that is what we must do.

I look forward to hearing from Secretary Rodham, Secretary Charles, and Lt. General Sharp as they discuss the roles of their respective departments in our work in Afghanistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Chairman, The challenges in Afghanistan are enormous. So too are the rewards: Ending a cycle of war and countless ceasefires; ending violence and extremism and a terror that has blanketed this country in fear for so long; ushering a new era of respect for minorities, women; higher standards of education and healthcare; a more promising future with new freedoms, opportunity, development, political participation, and stability. These will be the fruits of the hard work of the Afghan people and the support of the international Coalition.

Unfortunately, recent assessments indicate that destabilizing forces continue to present difficulties for the central government of President Karzai and preparations for elections next month. Coalition efforts are up against heavily-armed militias controlled by warlords, rampant corruption and a narco-economy that undermines reconstruction activities.

With presidential elections less than three weeks away, we have only trained a fraction of the Afghan security forces, including the Afghan National Army, police, and border guards, needed across the country. Meanwhile, many of the same warlords who helped the Coalition oust the Taliban are now fighting amongst themselves and exert control over vast regions.

Expanding NATO’s mission in Afghanistan through the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will help stabilize the security environment for the elections and thereafter. NATO must deliver a more robust commitment of equipment and personnel support to ensure the success of The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)—units that concentrate military and civilian capabilities in critical locations outside Kabul. This initiative has been hampered by a lack of resources, equipment, common doctrine, coordination, and training.

The warlord armies we read about so often support themselves through the opium trade valued at close to $2.3 billion last year (more than 50 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product). The opium trade funds Taliban units, Al Qaeda remnants and other criminal and terrorist elements. The United States and our Coalition partners are working with Afghan officials to destroy poppy fields and drug labs, disrupt drug smuggling trade routes, and introduce sustainable crop substitutes and alternative sources of income. Counter-narcotics and police training funds—approximately $220 million—are being provided this year. But the rules of engagement and mission of NATO/ISAF need to state clearly that one of its missions is to destroy the drug trafficking network. Coalition forces must amend their rules of engagement to include an offensive command to go after drug traffickers.

According to the World Bank, Afghan reconstruction will require at least $28 billion over the next 7 years. The international community has disbursed only $3.7 billion in nonmilitary aid, with $1.4 billion of this sum coming from the United States. Total pledges from all sources since 2001 add up to less than $10 billion, of which about one-third are American. Much more is clearly needed.

We cannot permit this country to again become a haven for terrorists. The elections next month serve as a crucial step in a long-term process of reconstruction, stabilization, and ultimately democratization. I commend this committee, under your leadership, and the administration, for marshaling the financial and diplomatic capital necessary to stay the course. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DIANE E. WATSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan has all but disappeared from the headlines as the Administration has opened up new fronts on its war against terrorism. But Afghanistan should inform all of us that our nation's goal of containing and eradicating terrorism will require long term commitments of manpower and money. Some would argue that we have neglected and shortened those commitments.

The focus on Iraq has turned our attention away from addressing the central and, I would argue, more important issue of dismantling Al-Qaeda, which some experts argue has grown stronger as our attention has been diverted. Critics have described the war in Afghanistan as a war begun and then abandoned. Rather than destroying Al-Qaeda terrorists, the fighting only dispersed them. Terrorists are now reported to move around the country freely, the U.S. military presence is too small, and our aid is insufficient to counter a resurgent Al-Qaeda and Taliban.

Since coming to power after the American-led invasion to overthrow the Taliban, the interim government of President Karzai has largely been dependent on the U.S. for its survival. The security situation, in Afghanistan, as far as I can tell, still remains tenuous, at best. The president, who is usually holed up in his well fortified
palace because of threats on his life, reportedly has made only one campaign trip outside Kabul since the election campaign began earlier this month. And that trip was aborted when a rocket missed the U.S. military helicopter in which he was traveling.

We now read reports in the press that the U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan and his aides are pushing behind the scenes to ensure a convincing victory by the pro-American incumbent, President Karzai.

Mr. Chairman, I am not convinced that things are going well in Afghanistan at the present time. The Taliban has stepped up its attacks. The various alliances and factions throughout Afghanistan act with increasing impunity and with very little, if any, direction from Kabul. The President is confined to his palace with armed U.S. security guards to ensure his safety. Many critics maintain that the U.S. military presence is too small and that the U.S. Embassy is understaffed. Relief organizations are losing their effectiveness because they cannot protect their personnel from insurgent attacks. And opium cultivation in Afghanistan remains at such a high level that U.S. officials are increasingly nervous that Afghanistan could emerge as a “narco state.”

It is my hope that today’s witnesses can convince me that, under these current conditions, we will see credible presidential elections in Afghanistan next month and that our assistance programs are making a difference in what can only be described as a very, very difficult situation.