STATEMENT OF

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UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
STRATEGIC THEATER TRANSFORMATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished Members of the Committee--It is my privilege to appear before you as Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM), to discuss our strategic theater transformation plans and to discuss the way forward for both EUCOM and the NATO Alliance. On behalf of all the men and women in EUCOM and their families, all of whom proudly serve this nation, I want to thank the committee Members and staff for your unwavering support since my assignment began in January 2003. During this time I have had several opportunities to appear before you, to meet with Members and staff in a number of different venues, both here and in theater, and to share the vision for the transformation of the 91 nation European and African theater. Your insightful and candid appraisals of this important endeavor have been instrumental in refining a plan that will enable us to do our part to protect our democracy, contribute to the security of our nation, support the 26 nation NATO Alliance, and help improve security and stability conditions within our area of responsibility. Your dedication and efforts on our behalf are both recognized and greatly appreciated.

As you know, in 2001 the Secretary of Defense initiated a comprehensive, strategy-based review of the U.S. global defense posture, and subsequently directed all combatant commands to evaluate their structure, organization and processes in order to gain transformational efficiencies and develop new capabilities to meet emerging requirements. The efforts we are undertaking to meet the objectives laid out by the Secretary represent the most extensive adjustments to the European theater in its history. The changes we are proposing contain broad and far-reaching implications for our nation, our allies, and our military. As we embark upon this important endeavor we must be mindful of the unique leadership responsibilities we enjoy in the community of nations, and we must ensure that the measures we undertake will, in its end state, increase our strategic effectiveness. In a world full of uncertainty and unpredictable threats, the United States continues to be viewed as an influential leader in providing stability and security. It is a responsibility this nation has not merely accepted, but has embraced for more than half a century. As we map a course for the future we must remain cognizant of the key elements that enabled us to be successful in the last century and be wise enough to recognize the new security challenges we face. Our ability to be successful in fighting the Global War on Terrorism and
achieve a force posture necessary to operate across the broad spectrum of potential conflict requires innovative thought and comprehensive coordination at all levels of our government. I look forward to working with you and your staff as we set about this important enterprise that will ultimately establish the framework for a new capability for a new and different era.

II. THE RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

EUCOM’s greatest contribution to security and stability lies as much in preventing conflict as it does in prevailing on the battlefield. This is accomplished through influence, forward presence and engaged leadership. It is sustained only through our enduring and visible presence and commitment in our theater.

EUCOM’s current structure is still centered based on a threat-based, defensive, and static philosophy facing east. Happily, this threat has passed, and the continuous flux of the security environment since the end of the Cold War has rendered obsolete the foundation of making threat-based changes to our strategic posture. Our transformation vision, therefore, seeks to evolve to a capabilities-based strategy that supports the full range of military operations better suited to meet new challenges. The strategic and operational environment and mission direction have changed radically, and EUCOM must change as well.

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked a significant turning point in the national strategy and in the utilization of the resources required to support our theater security objectives. The United States has periodically changed its overseas defense posture as strategic circumstances themselves evolve. In the post-Cold War period, EUCOM significantly reduced its force structure while simultaneously increasing its stability and contingency operations. For example, EUCOM force structure has been reduced from 315,000 troops and 1,421 installations to 112,000 troops and approximately 500 installations concentrated in Western Europe since 1991.

The operational environment within EUCOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) continues to evolve in ways that were largely unforeseen and difficult to predict just a few short years ago. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), expanding Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) requirements, instability in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and NATO expansion largely define recent changes and necessitate a transformational shift in EUCOM’s theater strategy for new challenges and realities in a new century. In contrast to the Cold War-era monolithic threat and its linear battlefield, EUCOM and NATO can expect to face global, multiple, and asymmetric threats in the 21st century. The new security menace is transnational, characterized
by enemies without territory, without borders, and without fixed bases. Today’s security environment includes threats such as the export and franchising of terrorism, eroding control of weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, unanticipated and uncontrolled refugee flow, and illegal immigration. Many of these threats are nurtured in misgoverned or even ungoverned regions as terrorists and extremist organizations seek to find new havens from which to operate.

We must change our posture to reflect the realities of the 21st Century (Figure 1). Our remaining forces, now at less than 40% of our Cold War force, are not necessarily equipped or sited to adequately address the emergence of an entirely new array of threats and security requirements. EUCOM is transitioning east and south to engage these emerging threats. In order for EUCOM to be better postured to achieve national interests in theater, we must significantly change the manner in which we execute our new missions in response to our new challenges. The foundation of EUCOM’s transformation should be evaluated in the context of

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Figure 1
seeking to dramatically increase our strategic effect, retain our historical leadership role in the NATO Alliance, enhance our ability to develop our growing bilateral relationship, and underscore the significant benefits of forward deployed forces.

III. THE STRATEGIC BASIS OF EUCOM’S TRANSFORMATION

EUCOM’s theater transformation is based on the assumptions that the United States:

• Desires to maintain its current position as a nation of global influence through leadership and the efficient and effective application of informational, military, economic, and diplomatic power

• Remains committed to its friends and allies through global, regional and bilateral organizations and institutions, and supports treaties and international agreements to which it is a signatory

• Pursues a global strategy, a cornerstone of which is increased access and forward presence in key areas, which contributes to the first line of defense for peace, stability and order

• Supports in-depth transformation of its armed forces and basing structure to respond to 21st century asymmetrical threats and challenges

• Seeks ways to mitigate or offset obstacles posed by 21st century sovereignty realities through a re-orientation of its land, maritime, air and space presence

• Recognizes current U.S. basing within EUCOM may not adequately support either the strategic changes attendant to an expanded NATO Alliance, or the national requirements of a rapidly changing AOR

• Seeks to preserve those assets which have enduring value to its missions, goals, and national interests

• Continues to enhance and build defense relationships enabling the United States, allies, and friends to respond effectively

These assumptions, if agreed to, serve as the cornerstone which underpins EUCOM’s Theater Transformation Plan.
IV. EUCOM'S CRITICAL THEATER CAPABILITIES

EUCOM’s success hinges on maintaining critical capabilities as both a supported and a supporting combatant command. These capabilities include: as much freedom of action as possible within our many agreements with nations who host our forces; power projection; bases for our operations; Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I); alliances and coalition partners; theater based and rotational forces; and facilities for joint and combined training opportunities. EUCOM gains and maintains freedom of action and the ability to build alliances and coalitions through its security cooperation efforts and an effective interagency process.

Power projection platforms and associated bases must optimize our limited strategic air and sea-lift, maximize available intra-theater lift, leverage existing enduring bases, and well-maintained pre-positioned equipment. EUCOM should preserve our critical capabilities by maintaining select (Joint) Main Operating Bases where currently located, and by establishing new (Joint) Forward Operating Sites and (Joint) Cooperative Security Locations where needed. The temporary and semi-permanent expeditionary installations established throughout the AOR will provide essential facilities and equipment for expeditionary forces in proximity to the areas of interest, crisis, or conflict and will avoid saturation at key nodes and along lines of communication. Where possible, (Joint) Propositioned Stocks will provide additional means to rapidly project equipment to contingency response areas. By design, the inherent agility of these expeditionary forces will enable a more precise and rapid response, intervening into a crisis at its inception, thereby reducing the potential for larger scale operations requiring massive force. However, if a larger force is required in theater or in an adjacent theater, EUCOM’s basing plan is flexible enough to allow for a rapid expansion of follow-on forces whenever needed. This built-in scalability will provide the initial agility necessary for EUCOM to effectively support a truly global strategy.

Lexicon: Transformation Assets

(Joint) Main Operating Base (JMOB) – By definition, this is an enduring strategic asset established in friendly territory with permanently stationed combat forces, command and control structures, and family support facilities. (J)MOBs serve as the anchor points for throughput, training, engagement, and U.S. commitment to NATO. (J)MOBS have: robust infrastructure;
strategic access; established Command and Control; ready access to training areas; (Joint) Forward Operating Sites and (Joint) Cooperative Security Location support capability; and enduring family support facilities. As previously stated, these are already in existence.

(Joint) Forward Operating Site (JFOS) – An expandable host-nation “warm site” with a limited U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment. It can host rotational forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training. These sites will be tailored to meet anticipated requirements and can be used for an extended time period. Backup support by a (J)MOB may be required.

(Joint) Cooperative Security Location (JCSL) – A host-nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. presence. (J)CSLs will require periodic service through contractor and/or host nation support. (J)CSLs provide contingency access and are a focal point for security cooperation activities. They may contain propositioned equipment. (J)CSLs are: rapidly scalable and located for tactical use, expandable to become a JFOS, forward and expeditionary. They will have no family support system.

(Joint) Preposition Site (JPS) – A secure site containing pre-positioned war reserve materiel (Combat, Combat Support, Combat Service Support), tailored and strategically positioned to enable rotational and expeditionary forces. They may be collocated with a (J)MOB or (J)FOS. JPSs are usually maintained by contractor support and may be sea based. They are an important component to our transformation efforts.

“En Route” Infrastructure (ERI) – A strategically located enduring asset with infrastructure that provides the ability to rapidly expand, project and sustain military power during times of crises or contingencies. ERI bases serve as anchor points for throughput, training, engagement, and US commitment. They may also be a (J)MOB or (J)FOS.

In addition to maintaining our traditional lines of communication and access, we will seek new access to facilities, and routine freedom of transit through nations of the east into the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Levant, and Africa in order to support current and future operations. In the near-term, attention will focus on Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, supporting similar near- to mid-term efforts in the Caucasus states.
"En Route" Infrastructure

A significant component of our ability to prosecute the war on terrorism and maintain operational access is the En Route Infrastructure Program. Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have highlighted the importance of our primary en route bases in the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and Italy. Enhancing their capabilities in the near- to mid-term is essential to our continued ability to deploy and sustain U.S. forces.

EUCOM will develop new installations for engaging the many threats we face today and that we will respond to in the future. Retention of critical JMOBs will preserve existing infrastructure for the Joint Reception, Staging and Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) Center functions. Establishing JFOSs, CSLs, and JPSs in new countries will allow the command to develop and mature host-nation support and contractor agreements to support additional JRSOIs.

The ability to rapidly project military power during times of crises or contingencies is the central and most enduring premise of the concept of forward stationing of forces. The very presence of such forces, either forward based or rotational and the military capabilities they possess are powerful instruments of national influence. A robust “En Route” Infrastructure combined with an array of (Joint) Pre-positioned Sites throughout the EUCOM theater, will enable the United States to have the strategic agility to operate across the spectrum of conflict. Beyond strict military significance, forward forces serve to strengthen U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy; demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of U.S. friends and allies; demonstrate to potential challengers the resolve of the United States to meet its commitments; and bolster regional security through our theater security cooperation programs.

Rotational Forces

A key aspect of EUCOM’s transformation plan is the reliance on “rotational” units as a significant portion of the forces in theater. By design, the inherent agility of these expeditionary forces will enable a more precise and rapid response, intervening in a crisis at its inception, thereby reducing the potential for larger scale operations requiring massive force. Further, rotational forces arrive trained and ready to operate immediately within the theater. As a force
provider (supporting command), EUCOM can provide these rotational forces quickly in support of other combatant commands.

This combination of permanently-based and rotational forces will permit a full range of operational capability in areas and regions within our area of responsibility that are increasingly important. EUCOM’s Service components will develop and execute effective plans to integrate and employ a combination of permanently assigned forces and rotational forces from CONUS. The transfer of heavy forces to CONUS in no way reflects a reduced commitment or interest in our region, but rather a shift from conventional thinking and a desire to adopt new methods to better protect our interests. The decrease in overall numbers in the theater will be offset not only by the retention of inherently expeditionary units such as airborne brigades, aviation units, and naval forces, but also by the introduction of our most modern transformed forces (e.g. STRYKER Brigade), providing the agility needed to operate effectively in EUCOM’s unpredictable and fluid international security environment.

The employment of rotational forces in the European theater is not a new concept. The Navy and Marine Corps deployed Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG’s) and Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEU’s) to the Mediterranean throughout the Cold War, and the new Fleet Response Plan will continue the rotational presence of Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups (CSG/ESG’s). The Army has had tremendous success with the use of rotational forces in support of operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Air Force’s transformation to the Expeditionary Wing structure enabled rotational presence during operations in the Balkans and in support of Operation Northern Watch (northern Iraq no-fly zone enforcement). European Command’s Theater Security Cooperation engagement today is conducted with rotational forces in Africa and the Caucasus. The efficacy of rotational forces is a tried and proven concept. The linchpin to EUCOM’s theater transformation is the recognition that the continuing and expanded role of rotational forces is essential to increasing our strategic effectiveness in an area of responsibility that encompasses 91 countries in Europe and Africa.
Joint Force Command and Control

Reliance on rotational forward presence forces, new and enhanced bilateral and multinational agreements, our leadership role in a transformed NATO, and the decisive execution of the GWOT has transformed EUCOM’s command and control structure and architecture.

In accordance with Secretary of Defense Guidance, EUCOM has established its Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) and the European Plans and Operations Center (EPOC). It will rapidly achieve an agile, proven command and control capability for joint and multi-national forces within EUCOM through the execution of command and control exercises. The EPOC will also be the cornerstone of the JCS-funded exercise program in EUCOM and will ensure multi-echeloned training of theater command and control headquarters.

Each component will be organized to participate and lead in the command and control of joint and multi-national forces as a joint task force (JTF) or a combined joint task force (CJTF) throughout the theater. At end state, EUCOM will have the ability to establish six JTF core headquarters. This represents a substantial increase from current capabilities and more accurately matches potential command and control headquarters requirements with emerging requirements, thus enabling joint solutions to emerging or existing crises.

Transformation will also afford theater components opportunities to leverage emerging technologies and doctrine and, in some cases, lead transformational command and control for the Department of Defense. Allies and coalition partners will experience similar gains as we assist their transformation efforts.

V. EUCOM AND THE NATO ALLIANCE

NATO, which has been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security since its inception, continues to transform in order to remain the preeminent security alliance in the world. During the recent NATO Summit in Istanbul, Turkey, the Alliance reaffirmed its new global commitment to undertake the necessary measures to confront present day threats. NATO’s decision to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, including the establishment of several more Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and its decision to assist the Interim Iraqi Government with the training of its security forces, underscores the level of transition occurring in the Alliance. Additionally, efforts to enhance the Mediterranean Dialogue
program and to offer cooperation to the Greater Middle East is a testament to the desire of NATO to be fully engaged on issues that will help shape our common future.

Further, as the Alliance deploys beyond its members’ boundaries, I believe that EUCOM can provide essential support with operationally focused, all-source intelligence. In concert with our NATO partners, EUCOM is standing up the NATO Intelligence Fusion Cell (NIFC), a dedicated intelligence element comprised of U.S. and other NATO personnel. This element will have a core of intelligence professionals operating under common tactics, techniques, and procedures, enhancing U.S. and NATO-nation intelligence interoperability. The NIFC will be co-located with our EUCOM Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom.

As I stated during my testimony before this committee in March of this year, the ongoing transformations in EUCOM and NATO are inextricably linked to the challenges inherent in today’s international security environment. These simultaneous transformations are mutually supporting and complementary, the synthesis of which produces an effect greater than the sum of its parts. By its leadership and example, EUCOM supports both the Alliance in its transformation, as well as NATO member nations undergoing their own internal transformations.

A transformed posture in Europe - one that supports NATO’s own transformation goals—requires forward forces that are rapidly deployable both within and beyond Europe. They must be able to perform the full range of military operations and serve as a deterrent, as well as a combat force. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is the transformational vehicle for the Alliance. The expeditionary standards and certification training serve to ensure the forces meet the desired level of capability and interoperability. Our NATO allies have fully embraced the NRF and we will achieve full operational capability early next month. The Alliance continues to work with member nations to ensure political decisions are made which will enable us to deploy the NRF within the timeframes established at the Prague Summit in 2002. These forces will train alongside other NATO forces to improve their interoperability and serve as a model to enhance the capabilities of the Alliance.

EUCOM facilities and activities also play a vital role in NATO’s transformation. They provide both training opportunities and the power projection platforms necessary for joint and combined operations. One such example is the Joint and Combined Expeditionary Training Center at Grafenwohr, Germany. This advanced training facility, along with other high-capacity mobility and throughput infrastructure, i.e. Ramstein Air Base, Germany, will have an
increasingly important role in the development of our allies’ capabilities and our future European posture.

NATO’s recent expansion to include seven new nations has shifted the Alliance’s focus eastward. At the same time, long-term NATO member nations have improved their individual and collective ability for mutual defense and find themselves well ahead of the new member nations. While NATO welcomes new member nations, the Alliance recognizes that their military capabilities are not yet fully interoperable with NATO forces and will require significant investment. This is ongoing work.

Our new allies have offered extensive training opportunities and areas, as well as fewer restrictions on maneuver. Encroachment challenges at our current bases and training areas and the desire for increased training with our new allies lead EUCOM to pursue further Eastern European access. Increasing EUCOM’s forward presence in Eastern Europe through operating sites, training, and exercises will increase security cooperation engagement, bolster these new members’ military capabilities and pave the way for greatly enhanced future contributions to NATO. As these forces transform, they will become more expeditionary and better able to respond to global requirements.

Additionally, EUCOM forces will be in a position to exercise and maintain leadership roles in any new NATO force or command structure developed in Eastern Europe. Although EUCOM will maintain strong participation in established NATO countries through the recently approved NATO command structure, an eastward move will concurrently develop our constructive influence within the new NATO countries and allow the United States and our NATO partners to meet the goals of the Prague Summit more quickly.

VI. EUCOM’S THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION

EUCOM’s Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) program forms the centerpiece of our efforts to promote security and deter aggression. The TSC program is indispensable in building relationships, enhancing allied and coalition capabilities, and providing access to en route infrastructure. This program will not only pave the way for our transformation plan, it will also be enhanced as the benefits from that transformation are realized.

Theater Security Cooperation builds and strengthens key relationships that promote U.S. strategic interests. These relationships involve interactions at multiple levels from heads of state to students who engage in the many and varied training programs provided by the U.S. and its
allies. Capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations are enhanced by TSC and OPTEMPO demands on U.S. forces are reduced. Through the TSC, essential peacetime and contingency access and “en route” infrastructure is provided and the development of regional security organizations to prevent or mitigate conflicts with minimal U.S. participation is accelerated.

A number of programs are provided under the TSC umbrella including: bilateral and Partnership for Peace training events and exercises; Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET); the State Partnership Program (SPP); and foreign assistance programs such as International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).

One extraordinarily successful example is the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). This was a EUCOM executed program that trained Georgian tactical units to conduct up to company-level operations that were instrumental in enhancing Georgia’s ability to protect its sovereignty and stabilize the region. Similarly, the Pan Sahel Initiative is an ongoing effort to assist four countries--Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania--in detecting and responding to the migration of asymmetric threats across and within their extensive and poorly controlled borders. Under this program, company-sized units are trained and equipped as rapid reaction units, providing them the mobility, communication, navigation, and individual soldier skills essential for border security, internal defense, and counterterrorism efforts.

Similar TSC programs include: training assistance in Poland to the OIF Polish Division rotations; training assistance to NATO ISAF training preparation in the NATO Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway; Exercise Bulwark '04 in Bulgaria featuring rotational forces from CONUS, permanently assigned forces from EUCOM, and Bulgarian forces in Novo Selo, Bulgaria; and the recently initiated Torgau exercise series with Russia being conducted both in Russia and in Germany. All of these programs are initiatives that require small investments, but that yield enormous dividends in our effort to promote peace, stability, and democracy. They are also an example of how rotational forces can operate at the tactical level and produce a strategic result.

Two current strategic initiatives that EUCOM continues to develop and expand include “Caspian Guard” and the “Gulf of Guinea Guard.” These are two engagements that demonstrate a regional approach towards establishing stability and security in relatively remote areas within the theater susceptible to transnational threats.
Theater Security Cooperation programs have become critical enablers of EUCOM’s proposed theater transformation by building and maintaining the key relationships that will allow us to establish new Forward Operating Sites and Cooperative Security Locations. These new sites will enable EUCOM to protect growing U.S. interests in areas of increasing importance to regional security and economic opportunity, while extending the global power and reach of U.S. forces. TSC effectiveness is directly linked to an effective and focused forward basing strategy.

VII. THE TRANSFORMATION TIMELINE

The process of transforming EUCOM requires a comprehensive, synchronized approach integrating many segments of our government and those of our allies and partners to achieve our theater goals. The timeline and ability to implement our Strategic Theater Transformation plan is based on a number of interlocking variables that must be carefully considered, evaluated, and orchestrated in order to gain the greatest benefit. How we do this is as important as what we do. The underlying principles that guide our collective efforts should be the eight assumptions - discussed earlier - that formed the basis for the development of EUCOM’s Strategic Theater Transformation plan.

The speed at which transformation will occur depends in large measure on the bilateral and multilateral legal arrangements we have with sovereign countries pertaining to our military personnel, installations, and activities. These legal arrangements constitute the formal framework for our military presence, access, and ability to conduct actions that enhance our operational readiness. Although EUCOM has worked extensively to identify existing installations that will be maintained and those that will need to be established, the final outcome will be predicated, in large measure, on renegotiating longstanding agreements already in place with current allies and negotiating new agreements with new allies or partners that share our concerns for global security. The Department of Defense and the Department of State have already conducted a series of consultations and are proceeding with negotiations to ensure present and future arrangements optimize our ability to train, deploy, and conduct missions in support of our National Security Strategy.

Several key determinates beyond our direct control will influence the transformation tempo in EUCOM. These include the Army’s ability to source and deploy “rotational” forces to the theater; identifying and providing installations for units returning to CONUS; available funding to support the plan to establish Joint Forward Operating Sites, Cooperative Security
Locations, and additional Joint Pre-positioned Sites throughout the AOR; and the relationship between operational imperatives within the theater and the support we provide to adjacent combatant commands.

While a decision has been made on the essential elements of the plan, considerable efforts to negotiate, resource, and implement the details of that plan remain. This is not a turn-key operation that can be completed in a few short years. Rather, it is a deliberate, methodical process that will require several years of investment and a considerable degree of interaction on many levels within our government and with the governments of our allies. Congress is an integral part of this process. We greatly appreciated the visits to EUCOM’s theater by Members and staff of this committee to learn more about our requirements and plans for the future.

VIII. CONCLUSION

We have historically unique opportunities before us. Our efforts over the past year to develop new basing and operational concepts have produced a consensus among our services and our allies. If implemented, this new direction will enable us to move our capabilities more fully into the new century and away from some 20th century paradigms that are no longer relevant. The physical and visible presence of the United States military in the EUCOM theater is as important as it ever was, however, its character stems from new and different reasons. The security threats of the 21st Century are no longer either linear or predictable. They require a “capabilities based” strategy at the core of our thinking with regard to transformation. Those who wish to draw false conclusions with regard to our national commitment to Europe and Africa will no doubt be increasingly vocal as we propose further reductions in our troop and family numbers permanently based in Europe. The response to such criticism is that the historical doctrine suggesting that “mass equals commitment” is no longer as valid a concept as it once was; what we now need is sufficiency and usability in our new basing doctrines.

Augmented forward presence (the combination of permanently based, but increasingly expeditionary forward forces augmented by sufficient and predictable rotational forces) along with the war reserve material at Joint Pre-Positioned Sites, and a robust “En Route” Infrastructure will form the nucleus of our strategic presence across an expanding European-African theater. Such capability, while currently lacking, is urgently necessary. Our firm intent is to increase the strategic effect of our forward based and rotational forces in such a way as to
form the basis of a vastly improved capability to respond to the new array of threats we face as a nation, as a member of future coalitions, and as a member of NATO.