Prepared Statement

of

The Honorable David S. C. Chu

Under Secretary of Defense

(Personnel and Readiness)

Before the

House Armed Services Committee

July 7, 2004
David S. C. Chu was sworn in as the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on June 1, 2001. A Presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate, he is the Secretary's senior policy advisor on recruitment, career development, pay and benefits for 1.4 million active duty military personnel, 1.2 million Guard and Reserve personnel and 680,000 DoD civilians and is responsible for overseeing the state of military readiness.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness also oversees the $15 billion Defense Health Program, Defense Commissaries and Exchanges with $14.5 billion in annual sales, the Defense Education Activity which supports over 100,000 students, and the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, the nation’s largest equal opportunity training program.

Dr. Chu earlier served in government as the Director and then Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) from May 1981 to January 1993. In that capacity, he advised the Secretary of Defense on the future size and structure of the armed forces, their equipment, and their preparation for crisis or conflict.

From 1978 to 1981, Dr. Chu served as the Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs, Congressional Budget Office, providing advice to the Congress on the full range of national security and international economic issues.

Dr. Chu began his service to the nation in 1968 when he was commissioned in the Army and became an instructor at the U.S. Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee VA. He later served a tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam, working in the Office of the Comptroller, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. He attained the rank of captain and completed his service with the Army in 1970.

Prior to rejoining the Department of Defense, Dr. Chu served in several senior executive positions with RAND, including Director of the Arroyo Center, the Army's federally funded research and development center for studies and analysis and Director of RAND's Washington Office.

Dr. Chu received a Bachelor of Arts Degree, magna cum laude, in Economics and Mathematics from Yale University in 1964 and a Doctorate in Economics, also from Yale, in 1972. He is a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration and a recipient of its National Public Senior Award. He holds the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public service with silver palm.
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, and distinguished members of this Committee, it is my pleasure to join my military colleagues in discussing with you the upcoming troop rotations supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States military has proven itself to be flexible and adaptive in meeting the operational demands of the new security environment. I would like to take the opportunity today to tell you about the guidance, process, and initiatives we are using to ensure that we are responsive to both the needs of the Combatant Commanders and the men and women who serve this nation.

Our first and overarching priority is to fight and win the Global War on Terrorism. To the fullest extent practical, we must do so without overburdening those who elect to serve in our military forces. The Secretary of Defense has challenged us to ensure the judicious and prudent use of our forces, and we have instituted a number of improvements in how we manage the deployment of our forces to meet the Secretary’s guidance.

I would like to highlight our deployment review process to illustrate the care we exercise before we call upon our military forces to deploy. First, the Department conducts a thorough analysis of alternatives prior to deploying U.S. military forces. These alternatives include host nation assets, allied forces, and commercial support. Only if these alternative sources are infeasible do we then consider the use of U.S. military assets. These alternative manpower sources have allowed us to reduce the need for reserve support forces in OIF.

For requirements that are to be met by U.S. military units, we take a global view of the available assets, and where prudent, may use forces from around the world and across Combatant Commands to meet the need. Likewise, we look across the Military Departments for similar
force capabilities so as to distribute the mission requirements. We are also expanding the use of Joint Manning Documents to facilitate our ability to draw critical skill sets across all four military services. When we must turn to our Reserve component forces, we first encourage the use of volunteers for the mission, if appropriate, through the use of incentives. If a unit must be mobilized, we first look to ensure that unit has not been mobilized in the past six years. If that is not possible, then we consider the nature and duration of the last deployment, and choose the unit that has had the least deployment burden. Additionally, we call upon the Individual Ready Reserve, where necessary, to reduce the amount of cross leveling needed between units preparing for mobilization, and to fill critical skill shortfalls such as military police and combat engineers. Using members of the Individual Ready Reserve provides trained manpower quickly, without raiding other units and undercutting their integrity.

For Operation Iraqi Freedom III and Operation Enduring Freedom VI, we have used the following standards to guide our deployment effort:

- Ensure forces do not exceed one year “boots on the ground.”
- Protect a 1:1 “dwell” time, i.e. the amount of time spent at home station should be no less than the time spent deployed.
- Identify Reserve Component requirements as early as possible; and encourage the use of volunteers.
- Do not exceed 24 months cumulative mobilization time.
- Share the mission across the Department so that all military services contribute fully.
- Manage carefully the flow of forces rotating into theater to control bottlenecks, capability gaps, and backlogs.
• Protect transformation initiatives.

We are also employing a number of innovative force management practices to meet the challenge of current operations. Approaches such as the continuum of service concept, volunteerism, and “reachback,” can help to ensure that we have access to individuals with the skills and capabilities required for both emergent operations and sustained, day-to-day activities. However, to fully benefit from some of these initiatives, we will need your help in enacting legislation to improve flexibility in personnel management.

**Continuum of Service** – This is a proposed management practice that sets aside the traditional definitions of Active and Reserve components, and recognizes that service may range from full-time duty to availability in the event of mobilization without participation in military training or performance of duty on a regular basis. Between these extremes is a pool of individuals who may participate at varying levels of service throughout a career. Movement along the continuum should be transparent, and supported by a continuum of benefits that match service member contributions.

**Individual Volunteerism** – The Department needs greater flexibility in accessing individuals that have the skills that can meet military requirements, but who do not fit the traditional career-oriented profiles generally recruited. Several pilot programs have been established for the Reserve components to test direct entry concepts into the IRR. One example is the Army’s Arab Linguist Program that is focused on recruiting native Arab speakers into the IRR.

**Reachback** – In an effort to reduce the number of forward deployed personnel needed to support combat troops, DoD has taken a close look at mission areas that might be accomplished remotely via reachback. Reachback refers to the ability to connect electronically to sites in CONUS or other locations around the world to accomplish essential tasks and missions. An illustrative
example of this is the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program that is comprised of 27 Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRIC) located in CONUS where reservists provide mission support to supported commands. During OIF, Central Command used mobilized reservists in JRICs to perform targeting, bomb damage assessment, and imagery exploitation.

**Individual Ready Reserve** - We have redefined how we access the IRR to make IRR members a more viable source of military manpower and to provide greater depth of capabilities. Efforts on the part of the Services to reconnect with their IRR members and to clarify their mission and expectations will reduce the amount of cross leveling needed between units to prepare for mobilization.

**Force Rebalancing** – To enhance early responsiveness and minimize the need for reserve mobilization, the Department has shifted or “rebalanced” about 10,000 military spaces both within and between the Active and Reserve components in fiscal year 2003, and is rebalancing about 20,000 spaces in fiscal year 2004. By fiscal year 2005, we expect an additional 20,000 spaces.

**Phased Mobilization** – As a result of our experience with previous rotations, we have determined that phasing a unit, i.e. mobilizing the leadership and those requiring specific additional training prior to deployment in advance of the majority of the unit’s members, results in a smoother mobilization and training transition.

**Adaptive Training** – We are working toward providing adaptive training programs and expanding the training base to accommodate rapid, responsive retraining to build new capabilities when needed.
Military-to-Civilian Conversions – We are converting support functions that are not inherently military in nature to be performed by civilian personnel. This ensures that our soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen are available for military operations.

Train–Mobilize–Deploy – This legislation will support training efforts in advance of deployment, and will particularly help alleviate shortfalls in critical skills that are in high demand.

Building Additional Combat Capability

As is well known, the Army is building additional active combat capability of the type relevant to our contemporary military challenges, within its existing structure of ten active divisions. In the future, each division should be able to provide four brigades, versus the three that characterizes today’s force. The 3rd Infantry Division, scheduled to be part of OIF 3, will be the first to complete this conversion. And, these new brigades will be “modular”—that is, easily able to operate with brigades from another division, or as part of another division. The Marine Corps is similarly refocusing its manpower on contemporary combat needs, likewise with the objective of creating additional capability within the same permanent end strength.

Marines Corps 7-MONTH ROTATION

You have asked about the difference between the Army’s one-year rotation and the seven-month rotation policy of the Marines Corps. To ensure continuity and minimize disruption, headquarter elements will deploy for twelve months. A seven–month rotation for the battalions was decided by the Secretary of Defense as the best use of Marine manpower under present circumstances. It allows for several rotations during the first enlistment period, given a 1:1 dwell time and typical Marine enlistment contracts. And, for I MEF it recognizes their service in OIF.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, we are all impressed and gratified by the performance of our military during this very challenging and fluid time in its history. The consistency and enthusiasm displayed by so many is properly the focus of great national pride. We should applaud the Active Duty and Reserve Service members, their families, Defense civilians, and contractors who, in the face of often daunting circumstances, have remained committed to the call to serve professionally and responsibly.

This concludes my statement. I thank you and the members of this Committee for your outstanding and continuing support for the men and women of the Department of Defense.