Advance Policy Questions for Jerald S. Paul, Nominee to be Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration

**Duties**

Section 3141 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 stated that the Principal Deputy Administrator shall be appointed “from among persons who have extensive background in organizational management and are well qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and materials disposition programs of the Administration in a manner that advances and protects the national security of the United States.”

Q. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

A. The diversity of my background and experience will likely provide the most effective tool for coordinating the activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). This diversity includes perspective from education and experience as Nuclear Engineer and Marine Engineer; Operating Systems of power plants, both nuclear and fossil; experience coordinating nuclear fuel operations; practicing as an attorney; and serving as an elected official in the Florida State Legislature.

Q. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator?

A. My ability to perform my duties will be greatly enhanced by maintaining a visible proactive presence at our laboratories, plants, and offices within the complex where I can establish a close meaningful relationship with our front line managers and their teams.

Section 3141 goes on to state that the Principal Deputy Administrator “shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of activities among the elements of the Administration.”

Q. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) would prescribe for you?

A. If confirmed, the Administrator would likely assign me the following responsibilities:

- Partner with the Administrator in leading the NNSA.
• Serve as the “common superior” for the resolution of management issues arising between/among Headquarters and field offices.

• Serve as first line supervisor for NNSA senior managers in Headquarters and the field.

• Lead the Management Council (senior Headquarters managers) and the Leadership Coalition (Management Council plus Site Managers and Director of the Service Center).

• Lead the NNSA on DOE Management Challenges and 2004 Priorities.

• Senior NNSA focal point for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) on management issues.

• Chair NNSA’s Diversity Council and champion diversity in the NNSA workplace.

Major Challenges and Problems

The Principal Deputy Administrator is a new position.

Q. What is your understanding of the role that the individual appointed to this position will play in the overall administration of the NNSA?

A. The role of the Principal is to partner with the Administrator in providing leadership to and management of NNSA. In the short run, the Principal Deputy will focus on being the driving force in completing the re-engineering of NNSA.

Q. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?

A. Consistent with my responsibilities to ensure full implementation of re-engineering, one major challenge will be consolidating our business and technical services, together with the people who performs them, from Oakland and Nevada, to the NNSA Service Center in Albuquerque by the end of this fiscal year.

Additionally, identifying and remedying gaps and skill mix mismatches throughout the organization will be a continuing challenge that I will address.
We must be certain that the most qualified vendors available are selected to carry out the complex scientific and technical work needed by the Stockpile Stewardship Program and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.

Q. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

A. In each case cited above, I would work closely with the NNSA senior leadership team at Headquarters and at our Site Offices and Service Center to ensure that each activity is being managed in an efficient and cost effective manner. The NNSA Chief Operating Officer has established teams to oversee the specific challenges discussed above and he is working closely with the Headquarters and field managers to address areas of concern. He has developed milestones for each phase of implementation and is holding managers accountable for adherence to these schedules. If confirmed, I will ensure the responsibility for guiding these efforts and accomplishing these key objectives.

Q. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Principal Deputy Administrator?

A.

- The most serious problems involve the design and implementation of an appropriate line oversight and contractor assurance policy for the NNSA complex.

- A lesser problem is the number of delinquencies in the Technical Qualifications program. NNSA has a significant number of individuals, in some instances because of job changes due to re-engineering, who have not completed the technical qualifications for their positions.

- Finally, the role of Headquarters offices in overseeing the performance of the Site Offices and the Service Center needs to be more clearly defined.

Q. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

A.

- If confirmed I would look at immediately assigning an individual from the Service Center to assess the status of each Site and contractor. As Principal Deputy I will enforce a deadline to have the line oversight
and contractor assurance system designed and the first steps of implementation underway. The completion of the design of a system will include a resources loaded schedule that I will monitor.

- Each manager will be required to plan for completing the qualification of each individual in the program who works for that manager. The manager’s performance appraisal plan will include this item. Through the Chief Operating Officer, I will monitor progress.

- In my role of leading the Leadership Coalition, I expect to drive the resolution of issues regarding roles and responsibilities. I will monitor and effect how the roles and responsibilities are carried out. The Principal Deputy should initiate this effort at the first Leadership Coalition, should he be confirmed.

Priorities

Q. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Principal Deputy Administrator?

A. The first priority for the Principal Deputy will be completing NNSA’s re-engineering so that we have a fully functioning Service Center supporting our Site Offices and Headquarters.

Finalizing the roles and responsibilities among Headquarters, Site Offices, and the Service Center will be another priority.

Accelerating and completing NNSA’s workload reduction initiatives is a third priority.

Relationships

Q. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Principal Deputy Administrator with the following Officials:

QA. The Secretary of Energy

AA. Under the NNSA Act the Secretary, acting through the Administrator, can direct the activities of NNSA. In addition, the Secretary sets policy for NNSA and NNSA implements it.

QB. The Administrator of the NNSA
AB. The Administrator is the direct supervisor of the Principal Deputy. He sets priorities for the Deputy and serves as the common superior to resolve any disputes between the Principal Deputy and the other Deputy Administrators.

QC. Other Deputies in the NNSA

AC. The other Deputies are direct reports to the Principal Deputy who is their first line supervisor providing coordination, integration, and oversight of their performance.

QD. The Assistant Secretary for Environment Management

AD. The Principal Deputy will oversee the transition of legacy waste cleanup from the responsibility of EM to NNSA. As the common superior for both the Headquarters cleanup element and the Site Office managers, the Principal Deputy resolves any issues between Headquarters and the field.

QE. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs and the Nuclear Weapons Council

AE. The current incumbent is Dr. Dale Klein. In addition to his other duties within the Department of Defense, Dr. Dale Klein serves as the Executive Secretariat for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). NNSA legal representative to the NWC is the Administrator and, if confirmed, I will, along with the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, provide support to the Administrator in this critical role.

QF. Commander, Strategic Command

AF. The current incumbent is ADM James O. Ellis, Jr., USN. The Commander of Strategic Command is the central customer at the Department of Defense for the work of the NNSA. Along with the 3 laboratory directors, he provides his judgment annually on the certification of the stockpile along with the Nuclear Weapons Council to the Secretary of Defense. I expect that continual interactions with the Commander in Chief of Strategic Command regarding military requirements and stockpile size and composition will remain the primary responsibility for the Deputy Administrator for DP.

QG. The Nuclear Directorate of the Air Force and Navy

AG. (1) The current incumbent is Major General Robert L. Smolen, USAF. The Directorate is responsible for establishing Air Force policy and strategy for nuclear weapon systems, has oversight of nuclear operations and requirements and manages all aspects of the Air Force arms control
activities ranging from treaty negotiation support to implementation and compliance.

(2) The nuclear weapon Directorate of the Navy is broken into policy and technical organizations. The policy organization is the Strategy and Policy Branch within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Rear Admiral Carl V. Mauney is the current incumbent. The Navy’s nuclear weapon technical organization is Strategic Systems Programs (SSP). The current incumbent is Rear Admiral Charles Young. The Director of Strategic Systems Programs is responsible for all research, development, production, logistics, storage, repair, and support of the Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile Weapon Systems.

Interactions with both of these important offices are and should continue to be handled by the Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Military Application.

QH. Associate Administrator of NNSA for Facilities and Operations

AH. The Principal Deputy is the first line supervisor for this Senior Executive who is responsible for the corporate management and oversight of NNSA’s facilities management policies and programs, project management systems, and safeguards and security programs. There will be daily interaction with this Associate Administrator to provide oversight and resolve any issues that may arise among Headquarters and/or field managers, and to ensure the vitality and security of the industrial and laboratory infrastructure of NNSA. The Principal Deputy performs the annual performance appraisal of this Senior Executive, including the establishment of the performance plans and recommendations for compensation and awards.

QI. Associate Administrator of NNSA for Management and Administration

AI. The Principal Deputy is the first line supervisor for this Senior Executive who is responsible for the overall business management aspects of the NNSA enterprise by providing for the financial, procurement and acquisition, human resources, information technology and day-to-day business operations of NNSA. There will be daily interaction with this Associate Administrator to provide oversight and resolve any issues that may arise among Headquarters and/or field managers, and to ensure the overall vitality of the NNSA business programs. The Principal Deputy performs the annual performance appraisal of this Senior Executive, including the establishment of the performance plans and recommendations for compensation and awards.
Management of NNSA

Q. What is the role of NNSA’s Management Council and, if confirmed, what would be your relationship with the Council?

A. Broadly speaking, the role of the NNSA Management Council (Senior Headquarters Managers) is to address and make decisions on matters which, for the most part, impact the entire NNSA complex. For example:

- Personnel appointments for key Headquarters and field senior leadership positions that affect major NNSA activities/operations;
- Major organizational changes - such as re-engineering, etc;
- Business practices and systems (implementing E-Gov and other Administration data management systems, such as IMANAGE);
- Budget matters such as the functioning of the NNSA Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation (PPBE) activities;
- Issues of interest to the NNSA Leadership Coalition (Managers of the Site Offices, and the Director of the Service Center together with the NNSA Management Council) such as, contract management, budget, and Site Office interfaces with the Service Center.

Role of the Principal Deputy

I have discussed my potential role on the Management Council with Ambassador Brooks. I would provide management oversight of all Council activities for Ambassador Brooks. I would set the agenda for the weekly meetings and ensure that subject matter experts scheduled to brief the Council are fully prepared. I would ensure that the Management Council’s focus is on decision-making and implementation. My goal would be to help ensure that NNSA is being managed and operated consistent with the spirit and intent of the NNSA Act.

Weapons Program Work Force

Q. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for the NNSA to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly design capabilities, in the NNSA workforce?

A. Monitoring the status of our critical nuclear weapons expertise will be one of my highest priorities if confirmed. NNSA’s nuclear weapons expertise
resides in the workforces of our Management and Operating (M&O) contractors who manage the weapons laboratories, production plants and test site. NNSA relies on these contractors to maintain that expertise, but carefully monitors their status. We include performance metrics in each of our eight M&O contracts to ensure our contractors give this their highest priority. I will ensure that senior management and our contractors watch for negative trends in advance so that we can take appropriate corrective measures.

Q. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for the NNSA to ensure that new weapons designers are appropriately trained?

A. Activities that exercise weapons design skills are the most important action NNSA can take to appropriately train new designers. As time passes, NNSA continues to lose experienced designers from our laboratory workforces, and within the next decade we will have very few who have hands-on experience from designing new warheads, or planning and conducting underground nuclear tests. I believe we must continually seek worthwhile program activities that can exercise these skills as well as ensure that the expertise in our workforce is properly archived and that the next generation of designers learns from the current designers before they retire.

Q. In your view, what are the critical skills that are needed in the NNSA?

A. I believe the Chiles Commission review was on target regarding the critical skills needed for the future. As I understand it, the NNSA worked with its contractors following the review and has established processes for contractors to ensure that those skills are maintained, and establish processes for NNSA to ensure that we have appropriate operational awareness and oversight of the status. I would encourage each contractor to maintain its own list of critical skills and periodically reports metrics on recruitment, development and retention of those skills.

Safeguards and Security

One of the biggest initiatives of the Department of Energy and the NNSA over the past year was to establish a new design basis threat (DBT) standard.

Q. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to help ensure the NNSA meets the new DBT?

A. I would ensure that detailed schedules are in place along with milestones and timelines to adequately assess progress by the sites in implementing site safeguards and security upgrades included in approved plans. Further,
I would ensure that sites maintain this schedule, assess any delays that may occur, and champion requests for additional resources as needed.

Q. **How should the NNSA maintain an appropriate balance between adding security personnel and investing in force multiplying technologies and infrastructure in this area?**

A. Utilizing additional manpower to provide necessary upgrades in the level of security protection is generally the most expensive approach. Therefore, I believe it is important the NNSA invest in technologies that are available, reliable and cost effective to effectively complement the need for additional protective personnel.

Q. **In your opinion, what are the biggest threats to the nuclear weapons program?**

A. In my opinion the biggest threats to the nuclear weapons program is its aging facilities, systems and equipment compounds by the lack of necessary resources to upgrade these facilities to today’s security standards for protection and storage.

**Stockpile Stewardship Program**

Q. **What is your view of the Stockpile Stewardship Program’s progress towards its goal of being able to continuously certify the U.S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure and reliable without the need for underground testing?**

A. While I have not yet received classified briefs about the Stockpile Stewardship Program, I understand that it has been able for almost a decade to certify that the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. I also understand that it has solved problems in the stockpile that in the past would have been resolved using nuclear testing.

Q. **In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges confronting the Stockpile Stewardship Program?**

A. Again, I have yet to received a detailed briefing, but from my understanding the greatest challenge confronting the Stockpile Stewardship Program is maintaining confidence in the judgments in the absence of full scale testing data. The analysis must be rigorous and reviewed to ensure that we avoid a false sense of confidence in the safety, security and reliability of the stockpile. If the data suggests that there is a problem in the stockpile we must be prepared to initiate testing if
necessary for comprehensive, accurate analysis or withdraw the weapon from the stockpile until it is repaired, if that was possible.

**Q.** Do you fully support the goals of the Stockpile Stewardship Program?

**A.** Yes, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is one of this country’s most important national security programs. If confirmed, I will work with the Administration to ensure that this program receives the resources necessary to continue to its success.

**Nuclear Posture Review**

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in January 2002, contained the Administration’s plan to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1700 and 2200 by the year 2012. These reductions were included in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2003.

**Q.** Will any dismantlements occur as a result of the NPR and the Moscow Treaty?

**A.** It is my understanding that the answer is yes and that by 2012, the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile will be substantially reduced from today’s levels.

**Q.** With the large number of refurbishment and other life extension program activities planned over the next eight years, is there enough facility capacity and are there sufficiently qualified personnel in the NNSA workforce to also take on a large increase in dismantlement during the same time period?

**A.** As I understand it, the NNSA will continue to be able to dismantle warheads, but the rate of dismantlement will depend on the workload needed to support other priority activities including life extension programs, warhead surveillance, and stockpile maintenance modifications and alterations.

The NPR stated as one of its priority goals achievement of a reinvigorated infrastructure across the nuclear weapons complex.

**Q.** With competing budget priorities for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, directed stockpile work, safeguards and security, and maintenance and recapitalization, what steps would you take, if confirmed to ensure the infrastructure continues to be revitalized and well maintained?
A. I believe it is essential that our country has a modern and responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure as called for in the Nuclear Posture Review to maintain deterrence with a much smaller stockpile. I believe NNSA is on the right track with its FIRP program that will ensure that the current weapons complex is brought back up to modern standards, as well as looking at what the complex of the future will need to ensure the security of future generations to come, such as building a Modern Pit Facility.

Q. What recommendations, if any, would you make to improve management of the facilities in the nuclear weapons complex?

A. NNSA reengineering efforts are aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness. Based on my experience, management can best be improved by establishing clear performance objectives and the means for fairly judging contractor performance. I have been impressed with the work NNSA has been doing to clearly define and measure performance through its Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation (PPBE) process. I also support NNSA’s efforts to establish model contracts that streamline the interface between the government and its contractors by establishing assurance and evaluation systems based on external validation. If confirmed, I will focus my efforts on fully implementing NNSA’s Contractor Assurance Systems.

Facilities and Infrastructure

Upon its creation, NNSA inherited an infrastructure in need of significant work, particularly at the nuclear weapons plants, but throughout the aging nuclear weapons complex. At the request of the Department of Energy, Congress, in section 3133 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2002, established the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP).

Q. Although FIRP appears to be making good progress in revitalizing the infrastructure through elimination of maintenance backlogs, what recommendations would you make to ensure that current and future maintenance needs under the Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities program are met so that the nuclear weapons complex is revitalized when FIRP is terminated in 2011, as originally planned?

A. Based on my current understanding of facility conditions, I would recommend that NNSA develop a corporate strategy to ensure smooth and appropriate transition that will avoid falling back into an unacceptable deferred maintenance backlog. I understand a complex-wide coordinated plan to achieve required space reductions, modernize the facilities and
shift to a preventative maintenance approach rather than relying on corrective maintenance. I believe these programs are taking appropriate steps to define and manage maintenance requirements. We need to make sure both groups’ efforts are appropriately integrated as we approach the end of FIRP in 2011.

**Pit Production Capability and Modern Pit Facility**

In his testimony before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, on March 24, 2004, Admiral Ellis, USN, Commander, United States Strategic Command, while discussing the aging effects on plutonium, stated that “[w]e assume that there’s some risk in any significant delay to the current design of the Modern Pit Facility. Some would argue that we are accepting unacceptable risk by not having it in operation until the end of the next decade.”

Q. Please describe the progress being made on the environmental impact statement and design work for a Modern Pit Facility.

A. If confirmed, I look forward to reporting back to the committee as I have not been fully briefed on this matter. However, I do know that on January 28, 2004, the NNSA announced a delay of unspecified duration in the release of the MPF-EIS and selection of a preferred host site location.

Q. Please describe what process should be used to communicate military requirements on the Modern Pit Facility from DoD to DOE.

A. While I have not been briefed on these issues, nuclear weapons requirements are coordinated through the joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). Primary duties of the NWC are to prepare nuclear weapons stockpile plans, to include the size and composition of the stockpile in the out years, and to recommend these plans for approval by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and ultimately, the President. As I understand it the NWC regularly receives and acts on information concerning the Modern Pit Facility. This includes information on its appropriate size, timing, and capabilities.

**Environmental Restoration and Waste Management**

Q. What responsibility does NNSA have for managing and disposing of its current and future hazardous waste streams and environmental restoration?
A. NNSA is responsible for environmental operations at NNSA facilities, including managing waste streams from its activities and decontamination/decommission of surplus facilities. It is my understanding that NNSA assumed responsibility for five of its sites from the Office of Environmental Management during the late 1990’s for disposing of waste from the ongoing operations. In fiscal year 2006, an additional two NNSA sites will take over that responsibility.

Q. What specific steps is NNSA taking to phase these activities into its planning budgets in view of the cap DOE has placed on the activities of its Environmental Management (EM) program?

A. It is my understanding that part of the FY 2006 DOE budget planning process, NNSA is working with DOE’s Office of Environmental Management to develop a plan to transition all EM responsibilities at NNSA sites to the NNSA. A new office within NNSA’s Office of Infrastructure and Security (NA-50) has been assigned responsibility for evaluating NNSA’s liability and coordinating the transition. If confirmed I will fully engage in this process and report back to the committee that progress.

Q. What is the current plan, including milestones, to ensure that this responsibility is clearly identified and integrated into NNSA planning?

A. Again, it is my understanding that NNSA’s Office of Infrastructure and Security has developed a field data call for FY 2006 EM activities consistent with NNSA’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution/Evaluation (PPBE) process. NNSA will independently analyze environmental management requirements at its sites and integrate these new budget responsibilities into the FY 2006 Budget Request and Future Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP).

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs

Q. In your view, are any policy or management improvements needed in the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs? If so, what improvements would you recommend?

A. Uncosted balances remain a management challenge that all programs face. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) needs to continue to address its uncsted balances and implement and revise the practices it has created to reduce them.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002, the Department of Energy (DOE) was authorized to use international nuclear materials protection and cooperation program funds outside the borders of the former Soviet Union (FSU).

Q. Do you anticipate DOE will use this authority? If so, in what countries and for what purposes?

A. The National Nuclear Security Act (NNSA) Act of fiscal year 2000 directed the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) to reduce the global threat of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, it is my understanding that DNN’s mission is global. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 further strengthens DNN’s ability to continue working on Material Protection, Cooperation and Accounting (MPC&A) activities throughout the world. Pursuant to the President’s fiscal year 2005 budget, DNN plans to support MPC&A work in countries of concern worldwide.

National Ignition Facility

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is scheduled to reach ignition by 2010 using a new cryogenics target technology.

Q. In your opinion, is this technology feasible, and if confirmed, would you support restructuring the NIF budget to reduce the overall cost of the project with the goal of completing the project sooner than the current schedule would allow?

A. I have not been fully briefed by the Defense Programs staff on all technical details of the program for achieving ignition on the NIF. However, it is my understanding that NNSA scientists regard ignition as a great scientific challenge, and they are confident that they will ultimately be successful. Based upon preliminary briefings with the Defense Program’s staff, I have not been presented with a reason at present to restructure the NIF Project. The current budget plan for stockpile stewardship strikes a proper balance in schedule and resources for addressing this challenge.

Q. In your view, does the scientific information offered by the NIF program provide enough value to justify its cost as part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, even if the NIF does not reach ignition?

A. Yes, at present NIF is the only facility that can reasonably be expected to approach the conditions of temperature and pressure attained in a nuclear
weapon, and that makes it essential for stockpile stewardship even though it costs several billion dollars to construct. I understand from our scientists that there are many important stockpile areas that can be investigated without requiring ignition. One such area that provides value is the physical properties of weapons-related materials. There are similar needs in the field of nuclear engineering, with which I am familiar, but here the conditions of temperature and pressure are much higher.

Q. Would you agree that the NIF is a key Stockpile Stewardship facility?

A. Yes, as a nuclear engineer, I realize how important it is to have a facility like NIF to investigate issues in a regime approaching that found in a weapon. It will also be an important facility for training and maintaining the expertise of weapons designers.

Q. In your view, if the NIF fails to reach ignition, does that preclude us from being able to certify a nuclear weapon, without underground testing in the future?

A. While I believe the ability to certify a nuclear weapon without underground testing in the future depends on many factors including NNSA’s plans to achieve ignition on NIF. I have not been fully briefing on all of the issues associated with the scientific impacts if NIF fails to achieve ignition. However, I do understand that NIF is already providing good scientific data for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Our future ability to certify the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile using science based judgments, without underground testing will depend on our ability to continue to conduct a program of these types of activities, including NIF. We must maintain confidence that the program is providing us all the information needed to certify the ability of the weapon to perform its assigned mission.

Q. In your opinion, could the NIF meet its goal of ignition with a number of lasers below the 192-laser design?

A. I understand from NNSA scientists that the full 192 beam NIF is needed to reach ignition. It is not so much a matter of the laser energy as it is the configuration of the laser beams that requires the full set of 192 beams. All the beams are needed so that the NIF target can be illuminated as planned.

**Nuclear Weapons Testing**

Q. Do you support the current moratorium on testing?
A. Yes, I fully support the current moratorium on testing. Based on the briefings I have received, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is working today to ensure the continued safety, security and reliability of this Nation’s nuclear deterrent without returning to full scale testing.

Q. Do you believe that there is a need at the present time to resume underground nuclear weapons testing to support the current stockpile or to support new or modified nuclear weapons?

A. At the present time there is no need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing to support the current stockpile. As I understand it, there are no requirements from the Department of Defense for any new nuclear weapons and that the ongoing Life Extension Programs (W87, B61, W80, W76) and the work associated with the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator do not require a resumption of underground nuclear testing.

**Congressional Oversight**

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Q. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

A. Yes

Q. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration?

A. Yes

Q. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees in a timely manner?

A. Yes