WARrior ethoS

I am an American Soldier.

I will . . .
Always place the mission first.
Never accept defeat.
Never quit.
Never leave a fallen comrade.

I live by this Creed.
A statement on the
Posture of the United States Army 2004

By

The Honorable R.L. Brownlee
And
General Peter J. Schoomaker

Presented to
The Committees and Subcommittees
Of the

UNITED STATES SENATE

And the

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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The annual Army Posture Statement is an unclassified summary of Army roles, missions, accomplishments, plans, and programs. Designed to reinforce the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army posture and budget testimony before Congress, The Army Posture Statement serves a broad audience as a basic reference on the state of the Army.

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Our Nation is at war. The security of our homeland, the Global War on Terror, and sustained engagement around the world define today’s complex and uncertain strategic environment. The future will be no less ambiguous.

We must prepare now to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Rather than focusing on a single, well-defined threat or a geographic region, we must develop a range of complementary and interdependent capabilities that will enable future joint force commanders to dominate any adversary or situation. A capabilities-based approach to concept and force development, as articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, is the major focus of defense transformation.

Over the past year our Army has met the demands of the Global War on Terror, with more than 325,000 troops deployed around the world in over 120 countries. The Army was instrumental in the defeat of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban and the subsequent liberation of more than 46 million people from oppression and despair. The Army remains a central and critical participant in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Although these and other operations have stressed the force, our Soldiers have responded magnificently.

Our Army’s commitment to the Nation remains absolute. While we execute the Global War on Terror, our Army simultaneously continues its organizational and intellectual transformation to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. In support of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy we are improving our warfighting readiness and ability to win decisively. We also remain dedicated to the well-being of our Soldiers, their families and our civilian workforce.

The United States Army is the most powerful land force on earth. With this power comes a great responsibility. American Soldiers show by their daily actions that they understand this, and are fully worthy of the trust the American people have placed in them.

For 228 years the Army has never failed the Nation, and it never will.

Peter J. Schoomaker
General, US Army
Chief of Staff

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army
PURPOSE OF THE POSTURE STATEMENT

The Army Posture Statement provides an overview of today’s Army. Focusing on the Soldier, the centerpiece of the force, it explains the current and future strategic environments that provide our mandate for transformation. Our core competencies and how we intend to meet our current demands and future challenges are outlined. It describes what we must become in order to provide more ready and relevant forces and capabilities to the Joint Team.
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Addendum B: Army Support to Combatant Commanders
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2004 ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OUR NATION AT WAR

Our Nation, and our Army, are at war. It is a different kind of war, fought against a global terrorist network and not likely to end in the foreseeable future. In the days following the attacks on September 11, 2001, President Bush spoke candidly to the Nation. “These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life.” He added: “The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it and destroy it where it grows.”

Our Army exists to fight and win our Nation’s wars. We are an integral member of the Joint Team committed to winning in fulfillment of our responsibilities to national security. We are fighting to preserve the American way of life and to safeguard the many freedoms our citizens enjoy. Our Soldiers and their families have not forgotten the events of September 11, which launched us to action in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are reminded daily of the ongoing conflict through separation, concern for forward-deployed loved ones and, most regretfully, news of casualties. Our Army continues the mission and remains committed to defeating our enemy.

OUR ARMY’S CORE COMPETENCIES

As our Army fights the current war and remains dedicated to transforming, we are focused on our two core competencies: (1) Training and equipping Soldiers and growing leaders; (2) Providing relevant and ready land power to Combatant Commanders as part of the Joint Force.

Our Army must be an agile and capable force with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. This mindset is the lens through which we view our service. We must be mobile, strategically deployable and prepared for decisive operations whenever and wherever required. We must be lethal and fully interoperable with other components and our allies, as well as flexible, informed, proactive, responsive and totally integrated into the joint, interagency and multinational context. Our management and support processes must reflect and support these same characteristics.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT – OUR MANDATE FOR TRANSFORMATION

At the end of the Cold War, the United States had no peer competitor. Our Army was much larger and was built around heavy, mechanized and armored formations. Because America stood as the lone superpower during this time of global realignment, we were able to downsize our force structure. Today, the future is uncertain and presents many challenges. The emerging challenges manifest themselves as new adaptive threats, employing a mix of new and old technologies that necessitate changes to the ways in which the elements of our national power are applied.

The 21st century security environment is marked by new actors and a noteworthy proliferation of dangerous weapons, technologies and military capabilities. While threats from
potentially hostile regional powers remain, increasingly non-state actors, operating autonomously or with state-sponsorship, also are able to endanger regional and global security. These forces — insurgents, paramilitaries, terrorists, narco-traffickers and organized crime -- are a growing concern. They often are networked and enabled by the same tools and information systems used by state actors. Our adversaries will rely more frequently on indirect and asymmetric methods, such as anti-access and area-denial strategies, unrestricted warfare and terrorism, to mitigate their relative disadvantage. The most dangerous of these threats are the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – including biological or chemical agents, or radiological “dirty bombs” – to attack the United States. This security environment requires that the Army have the capability to dominate throughout the spectrum of conflict and to plan for multiple future contingencies.

As a result of this adaptive enemy and our worldwide commitments, current organizations, systems and facilities are and will continue to be stressed. We now rely on our Reserve Component to support our operations to a degree not seen since World War II. As of January 14, 2004, there were more than 164,000 Reserve Component Soldiers mobilized with over 139,000 of them serving overseas. The institutional Army is being asked to do more, applying lessons learned from current operations. These lessons are critical to our organizations and individual Soldiers as they prepare for worldwide missions. Therefore, the current and future strategic environments require the Army to have the capability to dominate throughout the spectrum of conflict and to plan for multiple contingencies. These new security challenges, coupled with the current war on terrorism, require a different approach.

**ARMY FOCUS AREAS**

Last summer, Army leaders identified immediate focus areas instrumental to adapting Army organizations and processes that will help us to better meet the Nation’s security requirements. All of our focus areas should be viewed in the context of our ongoing efforts to retain the campaign qualities of our Army while simultaneously developing a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. Of these focus areas, a critical enabler is the redesign of our resource processes to be more flexible, responsive, and timely. Our goal is to be a better Army every day – better able to execute our core competencies as members of the Joint Team.

**ADAPTING RESOURCE AND ACQUISITION PROCESSES**

The resource process is at the core of our Army’s mission success. Our Nation faces a cunning and adaptive enemy, predictable only in his zeal and intent. We are just as cunning and our Soldiers are constantly changing tactics and techniques in order to disrupt the enemy’s plans. In the same way, our resource and acquisition processes must become more flexible, responsive and timely in order to take immediate advantage of technological improvements and to sustain the quality of the force over time.

**RESETTING OUR FORCE**

Quickly resetting our forces upon their redeployment from current operations is a strategic imperative. The reset program incorporates lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), retrains essential tasks, adjusts pre-positioned stocks of equipment and ammunition, and brings unit equipment readiness back to standard. Units must recover quickly in order to provide the Combatant Commanders with landpower capabilities for future requirements. We will face challenges as we rotate troops from
deployment to home station, while simultaneously maintaining vigilance and readiness.

Continued congressional support and adequate resources are needed to accomplish our reset tasks and to mitigate the risk we have incurred to our Current and Future Forces. The FY04 defense legislation and supplemental appropriation delivered substantial assistance toward covering the cost of current operations and initiating the reset process. We fully appreciate the exceptional support Members and their staffs have provided this year. But, the job is not complete. In fact, it has only just begun.

**MITIGATING STRATEGIC RISK THROUGH INCREASED LAND POWER CAPABILITY**

Today our Army is executing operations in defense of the homeland (Operation Noble Eagle); stability and support operations in the Balkans (Stabilization Force/Kosovo Force); peacekeeping in the Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom). We are also forward stationed in Korea and elsewhere. Approximately two-thirds of our active and reserve combat formations were deployed in FY03 and will be deployed in FY04.

These deployments, coupled with planned future rotation of units into OIF and OEF, the largest movement of Army troops since World War II, have highlighted already existing stress to our force. To mitigate risk, the Army is embarking on a series of initiatives. The first initiative is resetting forces returning from OIF and OEF to a standard higher than before their deployment. A second establishes force stabilization measures to reduce turbulence amongst Soldiers, units and their families. Thirdly, the Army is internally rebalancing Active and Reserve Component forces to better posture our existing force structure to meet global commitments. And lastly, we are beginning to increase the number of available combat brigades through improved force management and modular reorganization. This increase allows the Army to improve strategic flexibility, sustain a predictable rotation cycle, and permits the Reserve Component to reset.

To facilitate this end state, the Army will seek to maintain, or even to increase temporarily, its current level of manning. These measures, when resourced, will mitigate risk and ultimately provide increased capability to Combatant Commanders.

**CONCLUSION**

Our Nation is at war and our Army is at war; we remain ever relevant and ready to meet today’s challenges. Yet there is much more to do. We are prioritizing wartime requirements, incorporating next-generation capabilities into current systems where appropriate, and preserving essential investments in the Future Force. We also are becoming more joint and expeditionary. We do not move forward alone, but as part of the Joint Team. We need the support of the American people and the U.S. Congress. With this backing, we will continue to carry the fight to our enemies to provide security here at home.
CORE COMPETENCIES

Our Army has two core competencies, supported by a set of essential and enduring capabilities. These core competencies are: (1) training and equipping Soldiers and growing leaders; and (2) providing relevant and ready land-power capability to the Combatant Commanders as part of the Joint Force. Additionally, our Army's senior leadership has established immediate focus areas and issued specific guidance for planning, preparation and execution of actions aimed at rapidly effecting necessary transformation in support of these core competencies. See Addendum I (available at www.Army.mil) for more information on the Army’s focus areas.

TRAIN AND EQUIP SOLDIERS AND GROW LEADERS

Our Army prepares every Soldier to be a warrior. Our training replicates the stark realities of the battlefield in order to condition Soldiers to react instinctively in combat. Such training is essential to building Soldiers’ confidence in themselves, their equipment, their leaders, and their fellow Soldiers. Constant training in weaponry and field craft, and a continuous immersion in the warrior culture, give Soldiers the skills they need to succeed on the battlefield. Mental and physical toughness are paramount to the development of the warrior ethos and apply to all Soldiers from private to general. Every Soldier is called upon to be a leader.

THE SOLDIER

The American Soldier remains the centerpiece of our combat systems and formations and is indispensable to the Joint Team. Adaptive, confident and competent Soldiers, infused with the Army’s values and warrior culture, fight wars and win the peace. As a warrior, every Soldier must be prepared to engage the enemy in close combat; the modern battlefield has no safe areas. Our Army trains our Soldiers to that standard, without regard to their specialty or unit. The Soldier -- fierce, disciplined, well-trained, well-led and well-equipped -- ultimately represents and enables the capabilities our Army provides to the Joint Force and the Nation.

Our Soldiers are bright, honest, dedicated and totally committed to the mission. All share common values, a creed and a warrior ethos.

Our Army defines selfless service as putting the welfare of our Nation, Army and subordi-
nates before your own. Soldiers join the Army to serve. Most Americans do not fully realize the personal sacrifices these Soldiers and their families endure. However, our Soldiers know that they have done their part to secure our Nation’s freedoms and to maintain the American way of life.

Our Soldiers’ Creed captures the warrior ethos and outlines the professional attitudes and beliefs that characterize our American Soldier. The warrior ethos is about the refusal to accept failure and the conviction that military service is much more than just another job. It defines who Soldiers are and what Soldiers do. It is linked to our long-standing Army Values, and determination to do what is right and do it with pride.

RECRUITING AND RETAINING A HIGH-QUALITY VOLUNTEER FORCE

All of our Soldiers are warriors whose actions have strategic impact. Because we are at war and will be for the foreseeable future, we must recruit Soldiers who have the warrior ethos already ingrained in their character, who seek to serve our Nation, and who will have the endurance and commitment to stay the course of the conflict. We must recruit and retain Soldiers who are confident, adaptive and competent to handle the full complexity of 21st century warfare.

We will continue to bring the highest quality Soldier into the force. All newly enlisted Soldiers are high school graduates (diploma or equivalent) and 24 percent have some college. These young Americans, who believe service to our Nation is paramount, make our success possible. They display a willingness to stand up and make a difference.

Our recruiting and retention efforts continue to be successful. The active Army met its recruiting and retention goals in fiscal year 2003 (FY03). The Army National Guard exceeded its retention goals for FY03 and simultaneously met its end strength objectives. The Army Reserve met its recruiting goals and all but one retention target in FY03. Most importantly, all components sustained their end-strength requirements.

We do not know yet the effect the high operational pace of recent months will have on our recruiting and retention in FY04 and future years. We must carefully monitor recruiting and retention trends and adequately resource our successful recruiting and retention initiatives. Incentives such as the Enlistment Bonus Program, The Army College Fund and the Loan Repayment Program, have successfully enabled the Army to execute precision recruiting in FY03. Our Special Forces Candidate “Off the Street” initiative continues to attract highly motivated and qualified warriors. Significantly, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, such as the Present Duty Assignment Bonus and the Theater Selective Reenlistment Bonus, which are intended to enhance unit stability, have helped us realize our retention successes. For more information on recruiting, see Addendum C.

CIVILIAN COMPONENT ENHANCES OUR CAPABILITIES

Army civilians are an integral and vital part of our Army team. They are essential to the readiness of our Army at war and our ability
to sustain operations. Our civilian employees share our Army values. They are smart, resourceful and totally committed to supporting our Soldiers and our Army to do whatever it takes to meet the challenges that come our way. These dedicated civilians perform critical, mission-essential duties in support of every functional facet of combat support and combat service support, both at home and abroad. Army civilians serve alongside Soldiers to provide the critical skills necessary to sustain combat systems and weaponry. They work in 54 countries in more than 550 different occupations. In FY03, nearly 2,000 Army civilians deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). They have the education, skills and experience to accomplish the mission while ensuring continuity of operations for all commanders.

REALISTIC TRAINING – ESSENTIAL TO MISSION SUCCESS

Tough, realistic training ensures that our Soldiers and units maintain readiness and relevance as critical members of the Joint Force. Our Army’s combined-arms training strategy, including an appropriate mix of live, virtual, and constructive training, determines the resource requirements to maintain the combat readiness of our troops. We revised our training ammunition standards to allow Combat Support and Combat Service Support units to conduct live fire exercises under conditions similar to those they might encounter in combat.

The Army’s OPTEMPO budget is among its top priorities. Our leadership is committed to fully executing the Active and Reserve Component ground and air OPTEMPO training strategies, which include actual miles driven and hours flown, as well as virtual miles associated with using simulators. The flying hour program is funded to achieve a historic execution level of live flying hours per aircrew per month. If units exceed the historic execution level, our Army will increase their funding. Thus far this year, OPTEMPO execution reports show units exceeding their programmed miles driven and hours flown. These are the units that are aggressively preparing for deployments to OIF and OEF, as well as the units who recently have returned and are preparing for future operations. Our combined arms training strategy is working and sustaining our warfighting readiness. We see the results every day in Afghanistan and Iraq.

JOINT AND EXPEDITIONARY

Our Army is the dominant ground component of the Joint Team and provides the Joint Force Commander a campaign quality force with unique and complementary capabilities. We are vital and indispensable members of the Joint Team first and are a Service second. We must remain aware that our Army always conducts operations — offensive, defensive, stability and support — in a joint and expeditionary context. Acting in concert with air and naval power, decisive land power creates a synergy that produces a Joint Force with abilities far exceeding the sum of the individual service components. Our Army can: support civil authorities at home and abroad; provide expeditionary forces at the right time and the right place; reassure our allies and multinational partners; deter ad-
versary and, should deterrence fail, decisively
defeat the enemy; and win the peace through
post-conflict operations, in concert with inter-
agency and multinational efforts. Our Army
must continually examine the capabilities re-
sident in and required by the Joint Force. We
will concentrate our energies and resources on
those attributes which our Army is best suited
to provide to the Joint Force. Our Army will
arrive on the battlefield as a campaign-qual-
ity force fulfilling the requirements of the Joint
Force Commander — lethal, agile, mobile, stra-
tegically responsive, and fully interoperable
with other components within the interagency
and multinational context.

**TRAIN AND EDUCATE ARMY MEMBERS OF THE JOINT FORCE**

Our Army is taking action across a broad front
to make jointness an integral part of our culture
by including this concept in our education and
training programs. We have always produced
leaders with the right mix of unit experience,
training, and education. As we look to the fu-
ture, we know that, to meet our current and
future leadership requirements and those of
the Joint Force, we must redesign aspects of our
Army’s training and leader development pro-
grams to include lessons learned from current
operations. Our objectives are to increase our
ability to think and act jointly and to provide
our Soldiers with the latest and most relevant
techniques, procedures and equipment that
will make them successful on the battlefield.

Additionally, the changes acknowledge
the current and projected pace of opera-
tions and deployments. As a result, we
will be better prepared for the current and future strategic environments.

Maintaining a ready Current Force
today and achieving a transformed Fu-
ture Force tomorrow requires a shift in
the way units train for joint operations.
Our Army’s Training Transformation
Initiative (TTI), which supports the
June 2003 Defense Department Training
Transformation Implementation Plan, provides
dynamic, capabilities-based training and mis-
sion rehearsal in a joint context.

**LEADER DEVELOPMENT — TRAIN FOR CERTAINTY, EDUCATE FOR UNCERTAINTY**

Leader development is an essential part of our
Army’s core competencies and the lifeblood of
our profession. It is the deliberate, progressive
Army leaders at all levels bear responsibility for America’s Soldiers and accomplishing the mission, whatever it may be. The range of missions and their complexity continue to grow, presenting our leaders with even greater challenges than previously experienced. The evolving strategic environment, the gravity of our strategic responsibilities, and the broad range of tasks that the Army performs require us to review, and periodically to refocus, the way we educate, train and grow professional warfighters.

We have a training and leader development system that is unrivaled in the world. Our professional military education prepared our officers and noncommissioned officers to fight and win in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will continue to develop our leaders with the right mix of operational assignments and training and education opportunities that meet the current and future requirements of the Army and Joint Force. Our leader training focuses on how to think, not what to think. We will maintain our investment in the future by sustaining the highest quality leader training and education for our Army.

**COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS (CTC)/BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM (BCTP)**

The CTC program is a primary culture driver for our Army. Additionally, our CTCs are a primary enabler of, and full participant in, the Joint National Training Capability. The CTCs develop self-aware and adaptive leaders and Soldiers and ready units for full spectrum, joint, interagency and multinational operations. CTCs continuously integrate operational lessons learned into the training. Our Army enhances the training experience offered by our CTCs (National Training Center in California, Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana, Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany and Battle Command Training Program based in Kansas) by increasing the focus on development of capabilities essential to joint operations. Leader training and development during CTC exercises hone the Joint and Expeditionary Mindset and promote our Army’s warrior culture.

**PROVIDE RELEVANT AND READY LAND POWER CAPABILITIES TO THE COMBATANT COMMANDER AND THE JOINT TEAM**

To meet global commitments across the full spectrum of military operations, our Army has mobilized more than 164,000 Reserve Component Soldiers. More than 325,000 American Soldiers are serving overseas and more than 23,000 Soldiers are supporting operations within the United States. This high operating tempo is no longer an exception. Sustained operations and deployments will be the norm for our Army forces supporting multiple and simultaneous shaping and stability operations around the globe. At the same time, we will continue to contribute to Joint Force execution of major combat operations, homeland security missions and strategic deterrence.
Army Global Commitments

Our Army is engaged in more than 120 countries throughout the world. To highlight our Army’s commitment, a review of the major warfighting formations of the Active and Reserve Component serves as a measurable benchmark. Over 24 of the Army’s 33 Active Component Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), and five of our 15 Reserve Component Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESB) were deployed in FY03. This trend will continue in FY04, with 26 of 33 Active Component BCTs and six of our 15 Reserve Component ESB brigades projected for deployment.

The majority of these combat formations are deployed in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility (AOR), effectively executing stability and support operations. More than 153,000 Soldiers are supporting CENTCOM operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait and the Horn of Africa. We are currently in the middle of the largest movement of troops since WWII, as we rotate more than eight-and-a-half divisions and two ESBs to or from the theater. The approximate ratio of Active to Reserve Component forces today is currently 63 to 37 percent, respectively. Once our current rotation is complete, the ratio will change to approximately 54 to 46 percent, Active to Reserve Component. Since September 11, we have mobilized almost half of the Reserve Component. They are trained, professional, and ready to execute any task.

Army support to other Combatant Commanders remains high. U.S. Northern Command’s Army component, U.S. Army Forces Command, provides more than 23,000 Active and Reserve Component Soldiers for duty in the defense of our homeland. These troops are available for missions including Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), emergency preparedness, and anti-terrorist operations. The Army Reserve provides to NORTHCOM significant voice and data connectivity necessary to execute real-time operations. U.S. European Command provides forces, such as V U.S. Corps, to CENTCOM; and to Stability Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) in the Balkans. U.S. Pacific Command supports ongoing operations in the Philippines, as part of the Global War on Terrorism, in addition to maintaining more
than 31,000 Soldiers on the Korean Peninsula. **U.S. Southern Command** is fully engaged as the headquarters for 1,500 Soldiers executing detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; has deployed 740 Soldiers to Joint Task Force – Bravo at Soto Cano Airbase, Honduras; and is assisting the government of Colombia in its war on narco-terrorism. **U.S. Special Operations Command**’s Army component provides professional, dedicated, and specially trained Soldiers to each Combatant Commander. These Soldiers, working closely with conventional forces, have been instrumental to our success in the Global War on Terrorism.

In addition to federal missions, our Army National Guard (ARNG) plays an important domestic role, routinely responding to state emergencies. In FY03, there were 280 requests for emergency support, ranging from basic human needs to engineering support during natural disasters. Our ARNG has fielded 32 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams (CST), which assist first responders in the event of an incident. Another 12 CSTs are due to be activated within 18 months. To date, these teams have responded to 74 different requests for support. Also, more than 8,000 ARNG Soldiers have executed critical force protection duties at 148 Air Force installations in CONUS.

**RESETTING THE FORCE**

The extraordinary demands major combat and stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are placing on our equipment and personnel require that our Army quickly reset returning units for future national security needs. The reset program will incorporate lessons learned from OIF and OEF, retrain essential tasks, adjust pre-positioned stocks of equipment and ammunition, and bring unit equipment readiness back to standard. The objective is to ensure our Army forces are ready to respond to near-term emerging threats and contingencies. However, reset cannot be viewed as a one-time event. Reset will continue to be key to our future readiness as our military executes our National Security missions.

Through reset, all returning active duty and Army Reserve units will achieve a sufficient level of combat readiness within six to eight months of their arrival at home station. The Army National Guard will take longer to achieve the desired level of readiness. The goal for these units is to reestablish pre-deployment readiness within one year. Our Army also will take advantage of reset as an opportunity to reorganize units into modular designs that are more responsive to regional Combatant Commanders’ needs; that better employ joint capabilities; that reduce deployment time; and that fight as self-contained units in non-linear, non-contiguous battlespaces. This effort began with the 3rd Infantry Division and will soon be expanded to include the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

In addition to investing in new equipment to replace items that were destroyed or worn out during combat and stability operations, the reset program will repair major items used in OIF and OEF. Repair requirements have been determined for all OIF1 units and the workload for this comprehensive effort is immense: about 1,000 aviation systems; 124,400 communications and electronics systems;
5,700 combat/tracked vehicles; 45,700 wheeled vehicles; 1,400 missile systems; nine Patriot battalions; and approximately 232,200 items from various other systems. This effort represents a significant expansion of normal maintenance activities, requiring the increased use of CONUS and OCONUS based depot, installation and commercial repair facilities.

Reconfiguring existing Army pre-positioned stocks for global coverage of potential missions is a major component of the reset process. The intent is for each stock to have sufficient combat power to meet the immediate threat, as well as enough materials to render relief in other contingencies.

Congressional support, in the form of supplemental appropriations, has been invaluable in beginning the reset effort. Our readiness depends directly on the successful execution of the reset program, and it will remain an ongoing priority for the foreseeable future. Continued resourcing will be needed to ensure that our Army can fight the current war and posture itself for future missions.

**TRANSFORMATION: MOVING FROM THE CURRENT TO THE FUTURE FORCE**

The goals of Army Transformation are to provide relevant and ready forces that are organized, trained and equipped for full-spectrum joint, interagency and multi-national operations and to support Future Force development. Army Transformation occurs within the larger context of changes to the entire U.S. military. To support our Army staff in the execution of transformation, the Army leadership directed the establishment of an Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Futures Center, operational as of October 2003.

Our Current Force is organized, trained and equipped to conduct operations as part of the Joint Force. It provides the requisite decisive land power capabilities that the Joint Force commander needs across the range of military operations: support to civil authorities at home and abroad; expeditionary forces; the ability to reassure friends, allies and multinational partners; dissuading and deterring adversaries; decisively defeating adversaries should deterrence fail; and winning the peace as part of an integrated, inter-agency, post-conflict effort.

Our Future Force is the operational force the Army continuously seeks to become. Informed by National Security and Department of Defense guidance, it is a strategically responsive, networked, precision capabilities-based maneuver force that is dominant across the range of military operations envisioned for the future global security environment.

As our Army develops the Future Force, it simultaneously is accelerating select future doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities into our Current Force. This process will be fundamental to our success in enhancing the relevance and readiness of our Army and prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism. Similarly, the operational experience of our Current Force directly informs the pursuit of Future Force capabilities.

**BALANCING CURRENT AND FUTURE READINESS**

Balancing risk between current and future readiness remains a critical part of our Army's
transformation process and one that requires continual assessment to ensure that plans and programs are aligned with overall requirements. Without question, the issue of current operational readiness is our Army’s highest priority. During the past several years, our Army made a conscious decision to accept a reasonable degree of risk to the readiness of our Current Force in order to permit investment in capabilities for our Future Force. This risk came in the form of reductions in and limitations to modernization and recapitalization programs. As part of the past four budget submissions, our Army made difficult choices to cancel and restructure programs, shifting resources to the development of transformational capabilities. Some of these investments have already produced results: for example, the new Stryker Brigade Combat Team formations now being fielded, the first of which is currently deployed on the battlefield in Iraq. Others are helping to develop emerging technologies and capabilities that will be applied to our force throughout the coming decade.

Besides the ongoing efforts related to equipping the Current Force, our Army also has begun other major initiatives that will improve our readiness and relevance in the future. These include an effort to realign Active and Reserve Component units and capabilities, in order to make our Army more readily deployable and available to Joint Force Commanders; home-basing and Unit Focused Stability, which will improve readiness and reduce personnel turbulence; and the reorganization of Army units into more modular and capability-based organizations.

While the previous decisions to accept reasonable risk in our Current Force were considered prudent at the time, the strategic and operational environment has significantly changed in light of the large-scale engagement of Army forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and other expeditionary operations. Ever-changing demands on our force, coupled with our commitment to mitigating risk to our Soldiers, have necessitated re-examination and transformation of our Army’s resource process and business practices (see Addendum H at www.Army.mil).

MAKING THE RESOURCE PROCESS MORE RESPONSIVE

The resource process is our Army’s center of gravity. Without the right people, the proper equipment, top-notch installations and adequate dollars to support all appropriately, our Army would not be able to fulfill its duty to our Nation.

In order to maintain our premier warfighting capability, Army resource processes must be flexible, dynamic, transparent and responsive to both our requirements and those of the Joint Force. This is especially true in today’s environment. We are at war against conventional and unconventional enemies, and simultaneously pursuing transformation. Our resource process must be transformed to allow us to keep pace with changes brought on by the enemy. Though we anticipate the battle against terrorism will last for years, possibly decades, we cannot program and budget in advance for that war. Our Army obviously cannot ignore our country’s current security needs, yet it would be equally imprudent to deviate from the de-
velopment and fielding of our Future Force. Balancing these requirements will be one of our toughest tasks.

The GWOT requires a host of radical paradigm shifts in the way we view the face and nature of our global operating environment, as well as in the way that we conduct operations. Responsible yet creative stewardship of our resources will remain absolutely necessary. Internal controls must be tightened and waste eliminated; outsourcing non-core functions is still an important option. Risk will continue to be a factor and our resourcing decisions must take this into account.

We must transform our resource processes and adjust our priorities to meet the challenge of the current strategic environment. Because we cannot mass-produce a volunteer Army, the retention of the right volunteer force is an imperative. This force is essential to the combat effectiveness of an increasingly complex and technologically sophisticated Army. We must refine and streamline the resource, acquisition, and fielding processes for equipment and supplies as we cannot make up for lost time in a crisis.

**ACCELERATED ACQUISITION AND FIELDING**

We have adapted and continue to improve our acquisition and fielding processes. In 2002, as Soldiers reported equipment shortages in Afghanistan and elsewhere, we implemented the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) to ensure that all of our troops deploy with the latest available equipment. Equipment fielding schedules were revised to support unit rotation plans, and procurement and fielding cycles were radically compressed.

Incoordination with field commanders and our Soldiers, a list of more than 40 mission-essential items, including the Advanced Combat Helmet, close-combat optics, Global Positioning System receivers, Soldier intercoms and hydration systems, was identified for rapid fielding. Laying the foundation for acquisition transformation, RFI already has equipped nine brigade combat teams (BCTs). In FY04, RFI will upgrade a minimum of 18 BCTs and eight enhanced

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>WHERE WE WERE A YEAR AGO</th>
<th>WHERE WE ARE TODAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soldier Body Armor</td>
<td>Est 12% OIF Soldiers equipped</td>
<td>On hand-In OIF- Enough body armor to equip all Army Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored HMMWs</td>
<td>500 OEF/OIF HMMWs</td>
<td>More than 1900 OEF/OIF HMMWs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-of-the-Art Soldier Equipment “Rapid Fielding Initiative”</td>
<td>2 % OEF/OIF Soldiers equipped</td>
<td>100% OIF2 ESBs-Feb 04 50% OIF 2 Soldiers - Jun 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoring of Light-skinned Vehicles</td>
<td>Contingency missions only</td>
<td>Executing plan to armor more than 10,000 OEF/OIF vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styker/Bradley Add-on Armor</td>
<td>Bradley plan only</td>
<td>100% Styker armor 75% OIF 1 Bradley complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)</td>
<td>All OEF/OIF rotary wing aircraft equipped</td>
<td>Upgrading OEF/OIF rotary wing w/ASE &amp; equipping select fixed wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID)</td>
<td>3 OEF systems deployed</td>
<td>4 OEF/OIF systems deployed, on contract for 17 additional systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter IED Device</td>
<td>None fielded</td>
<td>Capability in theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical &amp; Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)</td>
<td>0 OEF/OIF systems deployed</td>
<td>9 OEF/OIF systems deployed; Objective: 194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Separate Brigades, serving in OIF and OEF. Additionally, we are accelerating fielding of select future capabilities to our Current Force. These items include thermal weapon sights, enhanced night vision goggles, improved body armor, the Future Combat Rifle, and a new sniper rifle. Congressional support for regular budget and supplemental spending requests enables our Army to put this improved equipment in the hands of our Soldiers.

With this support, our Army also has instituted a Rapid Equipping Force (REF) that works directly with operational commanders to find solutions to operational requirements. These solutions may be off-the-shelf or near-term developmental items that can be made quickly available. For example, the REF established a coordinated effort to supply U.S. Forces with immediate solutions to counter improvised explosive device (IED) threats. Currently, IED teams are on location providing expertise and material solutions, to safeguard our Soldiers. We are acting aggressively to improve the armor protection of our armored and light-skinned vehicles. Other recent examples of REF products are the Well-Cam and PackBots. The Well-Cam is a camera, attached to an Ethernet cable and a laptop, that enabled Soldiers in Afghanistan to search wells for weapons caches. PackBots are operational robots used to clear caves, buildings, and compounds so Soldiers are not unnecessarily put in harm’s way.

RFI and REF provide timely support to our relevant and ready forces and to the Combatant Commanders, and facilitate Army Transformation.

BALANCING OUR ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE STRUCTURE

Currently, neither our Active nor Reserve Component is optimized for today’s rapid deployability requirements. We will continue ongoing efforts to restructure our forces in order to mitigate stress; to align better with the current and projected security environments; and to offer campaign-quality land power capabilities to the Combatant Commanders. By doing so, we will ensure that our Army provides the responsiveness and depth required to achieve strategic and operational objectives, while simultaneously defending our homeland.

Our Army is restructuring and rebalancing more than 100,000 positions in our Active and Reserve Component force structure. These conversions increase the Active Component capabilities available to support the first 30 days of a rapid response operation. In response to Secretary of Defense guidance, we have already completed approximately 10,000 positions. For example, the Army National Guard provisionally organized 18 additional military police (MP) companies. Between FY04 and FY09, our Army will divest approximately 19,500 positions of less frequently used Active and Reserve Component force structure to further resource critical high demand units such as military police, civil affairs, and special operations forces. We project that future rebalancing efforts will convert an additional 80,000 positions of lower-priority force structure. Despite these changes, our Army will remain stressed to meet antici-
pated requirements. To ensure that our Army can fulfill its commitment to our Nation, we should have the force capability level required to facilitate rebalancing, resetting, restructuring, and transforming of the Army.

Military-to-civilian conversions are another way to improve manpower efficiency. More military personnel will fill the operational force if they are moved out of positions that can be prudently performed by civilians. To improve the Army's ability to better support worldwide commitments, it is essential to start this process now.

Our Reserve Component relies heavily on Full-Time-Support (FTS) personnel to sustain support of current contingencies while restructuring the force. FTS personnel perform the vital, day-to-day organizational, administrative, training and maintenance activities that ensure the highest level of Soldier and unit readiness. To guarantee that our Army's Reserve Component will continue to fulfill ever-increasing demands with trained and ready units, our Army plans to raise FTS authorizations by 15 percent, from the current level of 71,928 to 85,840, by FY12. In 2003, the Army Reserve began implementation of the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative. The goal is to better meet contingency requirements and to improve unit readiness.

ACHIEVING GREATER COMBAT CAPABILITY WITH MODULAR, CAPABILITIES-BASED UNIT DESIGNS

Modular units are interchangeable, scalable, and tailorable formations, which provide the Joint Force Commander with a strategically responsive force that greatly increases his ability to defeat any adversary. Modularity enables us to tailor our capabilities to the requirements of the situation and delivered at the right time and the right place. Modularity permits the Combatant Commander to optimize his warfighting tool set.

Moving toward independent, echelon-above-brigade headquarters will enhance modularity. In accordance with our Unit of Employment (UE) construct, a UE will provide the command-and-control structure into which modular, capabilities-based Units of Action (UA) are organized to meet Combatant Commander requirements. These UAs will incorporate essential maintenance, intelligence, and communications functions previously provided by higher level organizations. Our UE headquarters, while able to accept joint capabilities such as a Standing Joint Force Headquarters element, will have an organic capability, depending on the contingency, to function as a Joint Task Force or Joint Force Land Component Command headquarters like we have already done in Afghanistan and Iraq.

FORCE STABILIZATION

The great demands placed on our Army have forced us to re-examine many of our long-standing personnel and basing practices. As a result, our Army is transitioning to an improved Manning system, designed to augment unit readiness by increasing stability and predictability for commanders, Soldiers and families. Force Stabilization will allow Reserve Component Soldiers to plan for their deployments while supporting their civilian jobs and their
community commitments. It places greater emphasis on building and sustaining cohesive, deployable, combat-ready forces for Combatant Commanders.

The home-basing initiative keeps our Soldiers in their assignments at specific installations longer, thus reducing unit turbulence and increasing unit cohesion. Unit Focused Stability synchronizes our Soldiers’ assignments to their units’ operational cycle, providing a more capable, deployable and prepared unit.

**INSTALLATIONS AS OUR FLAGSHIPS**

Our installations are an essential component in maintaining the premier Army in the world. For the warfighter, installations are the platforms from which we project military power. Our installations perform the following key missions: 1) provide effective training facilities; 2) rapidly mobilize and deploy the force; 3) provide reach-back capabilities; 4) sustain and reconstitute the force; and 5) care for our families. As power projection platforms, our installations must be equipped with a robust information infrastructure that gives the deployed commander quick and efficient reach-back capabilities. All of these missions help to maintain our Army’s deployability and fighting edge.

Historically, we have accepted risk in our infrastructure and installation services in order to maintain our current readiness. The cumulative effect on our installations is that commanders rate more than 50 percent of our facilities as “adversely affecting mission and training requirements.” We have adjusted our management processes to be more effective stewards of our resources. In 2002, we established the Installation Management Agency (IMA) to create a corporate-focused structure that provides efficient installation management worldwide. The IMA uses creative management programs to sustain quality installations and maintain the well-being of the entire Army family.

The Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program (I3MP) enhances the installation’s role in power projection and provides the architecture to address the essential reach-back requirement. Additionally, our Installation Sustainability Plan addresses ways to fulfill environmental requirements without impacting current or future training. Other important progress include modernization of barracks and housing; a Residential Communities Initiative; and divestiture of redundant facilities infrastructure and non-core utility systems through privatization.

In the past few years, the administration and Congress have helped us to begin addressing our infrastructure challenges. We received 94 percent of funding required for installations in FY04. We have made progress in improving our installations by adjusting existing programs and developing new management strategies. However, there is much still left to do in order to upgrade our installations to better support the mission, Soldiers, and our families.

**ARMY FAMILIES AND WELL BEING**

People are the heart and soul of the Army – Soldiers, civilians, family members, and retirees. Our readiness is inextricably linked to the well being of our people. The Army Family, for both the Active and Reserve Competent, is a
force multiplier and provides the foundation to sustain our warrior culture. We have placed significant emphasis on our Reserve Component this year in recognition of their contributions to the Global War on Terrorism. With the help of the administration and Congress, many improvements have been made including the retention and increase of Imminent Danger Pay, Family Separation Allowance, and a sizable pay raise. Other key well-being initiatives include the Spousal Employment Partnership, new TRICARE policies for the reserve components, and improvements in barracks and family housing. For more information on other Army well-being initiatives, see Addendum D (available at www.Army.mil)

**INTRODUCING NEW CAPABILITIES INTO CURRENT FORCE**

While at war, the urgency to accelerate the development and fielding of new and enhanced capabilities to our fighting forces in the field has never been greater. Our Army is making significant strides in this regard with the employment of a new brigade combat team organization, equipped with the latest available technology, to provide the Combatant Commander with enhanced warfighting capabilities. The rapid fielding of the Stryker vehicle demonstrates our Army’s ability to use the acquisition and resource processes to meet a Combatant Commander’s urgent needs.

**STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (SBCT)**

In 2003, our Army deployed our first SBCT, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, to Operation Iraqi Freedom, delivering its enhanced capability to the Joint Force in record time: four years from broad concept to deployment. Exceptional support from Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, along with close collaboration between the Army and industry, made this achievement possible.

Stryker brigades are our Army’s first truly network-centric force, filling the capability gap between light- and heavy-force units with an infantry-rich, mobile force that is strategically responsive, tactically agile, and more lethal. Improved battlespace awareness and battle-command technologies embedded in our SBCTs enhance combat effectiveness and survivability by integrating data from manned and unmanned air and ground-based sensors and providing real-time, continuous situational understanding. Planned enhancements will incorporate still-developing technologies. Significantly, our SBCTs will improve our Army’s understanding of Future Force processes, helping us to formulate an advanced warfighting doctrine that will serve as an important bridge...
to the development of our Unit of Action, the structural foundation of our Future Force.

This spring, our second SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington, will become operational. Our third SBCT, in Alaska, will be available in 2005. Continued OSD and congressional support will ensure that subsequent brigades in Hawaii, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania, are fielded between 2004 and 2008.

FUTURE CAPABILITIES

Our Army plans to field a number of systems this decade that will provide a foundation for informing the transformation of our Current Force capabilities into those needed by our Future Force. Once fielded, these systems will perform as interdependent systems of systems and will greatly enhance joint warfighting capabilities. Our future capabilities programs are designed to enhance the campaign-quality land-power capabilities that we provide to the Combatant Commanders. Our programs undergo continuous reviews to ensure they meet the capability requirements of the Joint Force. When required, we restructure programs, revise requirements and reprogram resources. The following are just a few of the key transformational systems our Army will begin to field during the next six years:

The Network. Our Future Force situational dominance will depend upon a comprehensive, ubiquitous, and joint-interoperable Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture (the Network) that enables the Joint Force Commander to conduct fully interdependent and network-centric warfare. The Network will provide the backbone of our Future Force and the future Joint Force, enabling the maneuver commander to effectively coordinate battlefield effects. Some of the more important systems within our Network include:

- Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T). WIN-T will be the communications network of our Future Force, optimized for offensive and joint operations, while providing the Combatant Commander the capability to perform multiple missions simultaneously.

- Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). JTRS is a family of common, software-defined, programmable radios that will become our Army’s primary tactical radio for mobile communications.

- Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A). DCGS-A is a single, integrated, ground-based, ISR processing system composed of joint, common hardware and software components and is part of the DOD DCGS family of systems.

- Aerial Common Sensor (ACS). This ISR system and platform will use robust sensor-to-shooter and reach links, (such as DCGS-A ground stations), to provide commanders at every echelon the tailored, multi-sensor intelligence required for joint operations.

Future Combat Systems (FCS). By extending the network capabilities into the Unit of Action, the FCS provide a system of systems capability
that was not previously available to Soldiers and commanders in joint operations. The core of our Future Force’s maneuver Unit of Action is the Future Combat Systems, comprised of 18 manned and unmanned platforms that are centered around the Soldier and integrated within a C4ISR network. FCS will provide our Soldiers greatly enhanced situational awareness, enabling them to see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively. Our FCS platforms will offer the Joint Force networked, lethal direct fire; indirect fire; air defense; complementary non-lethal fires and effects; and troop transport capability. In May 2003, FCS moved, on schedule, into the System Development and Demonstration phase. Our Army is aggressively managing our FCS development effort and intends to achieve initial operational capability by the end of the decade.

ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The Army Science and Technology (S&T) Program provides our Army superiority in both human and materiel systems arenas—preventing technological surprise. The Army S&T program retains a dynamic portfolio of investments that are responsive to warfighter needs today and into the future. The priority for Army S&T is to pursue paradigm-shifting technologies that can alter the nature of the military competition to our advantage in the future and, where feasible, to exploit opportunities to accelerate the transition of proven technologies to our Current Force.

The Army S&T program exploits technology developments from the other services, defense agencies and commercial industry as well as international communities. The S&T program focuses on technology relevant to our Army and joint capabilities. It synchronizes operational concepts development and acquisition programs through transformational business practices that speed technology fielding to the Soldier. The Army’s S&T program is balanced to satisfy the high payoff needs of the future force while seeking rapid transitions for critical capabilities to our Current Force.

JOINT OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS (JOPSC)

The Joint Force has transitioned from independent, de-conflicted operations to sustained interoperability. It must now shift rapidly to joint interdependence. To that end, we are reviewing training requirements, traditional relationships and developmental and institutional programs. This process includes ensuring that our operational concepts are nested inside those employed by the Joint Force.
cepts and initiatives listed below discuss particular Army emphasis areas; these areas are not all-inclusive. Functional concepts and other Army initiatives that support the JOpsC are discussed in detail in Addendum K (available at www.Army.mil).

**ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE**

Our Army also is focused on attaining actionable intelligence — intelligence that provides situational understanding to commanders and Soldiers with the speed, accuracy and confidence necessary to influence favorably current and future operations. Actionable intelligence achieves its intended purpose of empowering greater individual initiative and self-synchronization among tactical units by fusing information across organizations and echelons — accelerating the speed of decision-making and the agility of operations.

**FOCUSED LOGISTICS**

Our Army’s current actions around the world in support of the Global War on Terrorism present a view of future military operations and provide valuable insights as we transform our logistics systems from the Current to the Future Force. The successes enjoyed during OIF were the result of the integrated logistics team of Soldiers, civilians and contractors, all of whom developed innovative solutions to a range of challenges caused by four major capability gaps in the current logistics system. To sustain combat power, our Army must have the ability to “see the requirements” on-demand through a logistics data network. We require a responsive distribution system, enabled by in-transit and total-asset visibility and managed by a single owner who has positive end-to-end control in the theater. Our Army needs a robust, modular, force-reception capability — a dedicated and trained organization able to quickly open a theater and support continuous sustainment throughout the joint operations area. Lastly, we need an integrated supply chain that has a single proponent, who can reach across the breadth and depth of resources in a joint, inter-agency and multinational theater. As we move from the Current Force to the Future Force, we will build confidence in the minds of the Combatant Commanders by delivering sustainment on time, every time.
A COMMITMENT TO OUR NATION

Our Nation and our Army are engaged in a Global War on Terrorism -- a war of survival against an insidious and cruel enemy that threatens our civilization and our way of life. This enemy is actively targeting the interests of America and our allies, both within our own country and abroad.

Defeating this enemy requires the continued, strong support of our Nation. The steadfastness of our Nation in this effort is readily apparent. Ordinary Americans are doing their part and will continue to do so. Congressional support for our troops has been critical to our success. The industrial base also has responded, accelerating production of items essential to our Soldiers’ protection and warfighting ability.

Our Army, too, remains committed to its heritage of preserving freedom. American Soldiers display unrelenting tenacity, steadfast purpose, quiet confidence and selfless heroism. For America to survive and flourish throughout the 21st Century, our Army must defeat decisively the threats that challenge us today. To accomplish this essential task, we must recognize some important truths.

▪ The fight against terror will be a long one
▪ Our Army must simultaneously deter aggression, defeat the forces of international terrorism, and maintain our campaign qualities
▪ We must continue to modernize to meet the challenges of our future
▪ Our operational tempo is high and will remain so
▪ Sustained operations and deployments will be the norm for our Soldiers -- NOT the exception
▪ Old rules and operational methods may no longer apply; we will not achieve victory with a business-as-usual approach

Congressional backing for reset, our continued transformation to the Future Force, our rebalancing and restructuring of the Active and Reserve Component, and improvements to our installation infrastructure is essential to continued mission readiness. We fully appreciate the exceptional support Members and their staffs provided this past year. The support of the American people and their elected representatives in the United States Congress is essential. Our Army’s commitment to the future is certain. We will continue to provide our Nation, the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders a unique set of core competencies and capabilities. We remain dedicated to training and equipping our Soldiers and growing leaders. We will continue to deliver relevant and ready land power to the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Force. We will protect our country and our way of life as we have for 228 years. It is our privilege, our duty, and our honor to do so.
Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to the implementation of the Pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves, which was started under Section 414 of the NDAA for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard, including information relating to the implementation of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (title XI of Public Law 102-484, and referred in the addendum as ‘ANGCRRRA’). Section 521 reporting was later amended by Section 704, FY 1996 NDAA. U.S. Army Reserve information is also presented using Section 521 reporting criteria.

**Section 517 (b)(2)(A).** The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active-component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared to the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year 2002 (percent)</th>
<th>AC in RC*</th>
<th>Army Average**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year 2003 (percent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

**Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

**Section 521(b).**

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National
Guard or U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

a. Army National Guard (ARNG) officers: 21,042 or 57.1 percent.
b. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) officers: 9,986 or 24.78 percent.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

a. ARNG enlisted: 137,428 or 43.7 percent.
b. USAR enlisted: 35,261 or 20.55 percent.

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before completion of their active-duty service obligation. Of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
   • In FY03, no officers were released to the Selected Reserve to complete their obligation.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:
   • In FY03, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
   • In FY03, no distinguished ROTC graduates were released before completing their active-duty service obligation.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:
   • In FY03, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (A) two years of active duty, and (B) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year; (and the number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year).

• In FY03, a total of four ROTC graduates were released early from their active-duty obligation. Of this number, three are completing the remainder of their obligation through service in the Army.
National Guard, and one officer through service in the U.S. Army Reserve.

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant and, of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with U.S. Army Reserve data also reported).

a. 96 USAR officers from units were recommended for unit vacancy promotion; 59 were favorably considered.

b. 1,797 ARNG officers from units were recommended for unit vacancy promotion and promoted.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for noncommissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

- In FY03, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each state, of personnel in the initial entry training and the non-deployable personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (A narrative summary of information pertaining to the U.S. Army Reserve is also provided.)

a. In FY03, the number of ARNG non-deployable personnel was: 42,276. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

b. In FY03, the total number of personnel in the Initial Entry Training (IET) and non-deployable category for the Army Reserve who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment was 16,446 (15,489 enlisted and 957 officers). This number includes 957 officers who had not completed the Officer Basic Course; 11,600 enlisted personnel who had not completed Advance Individual Training (AIT); and 3,889 enlisted who had a reservation and were scheduled to ship (grade was not a category in ship database). The Army Reserve makes a substantial investment in training, time, equipment and related expenses when people enter military service. Separation before completion of an obligated period of service is wasteful because it results in loss of this investment and generates a requirement for increased accessions. Consequently, attrition is an issue of significant concern at all levels of responsibility within the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve identifies Soldiers exhibiting the propensity for early separation and provides counseling, retraining and rehabilitation in an attempt to retain a qualified and trained force. Non Prior Service (NPS) enlistees in Army Reserve units normally are ordered to Initial Active Duty Training (IADT) within 270 days of enlistment. Non Prior Service direct enlistees in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) must enter IADT within 180 days of their enlistment date. Non Prior Service enlistees may be authorized an additional period of delay to reporting for duty as provided in AR 601-25, paragraph 3-4. In accordance with DA Pam 611-21, Army Reserve unit commanders determine alternate MOSs for qualified enlisted Soldiers incapable of completing initial training. An enlisted soldier who cannot satisfactorily complete the MOS
training for which he was selected will be required to accept training to qualify for an alternate MOS as determined by the Army Reserve unit commander (DA Pam 611-21).

(The tracking of new Soldiers who have not completed training is done by the use of the training-pay category codes. All Soldiers who are awaiting shipment to their Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT) are listed as Pay Category P. Those Soldiers who have completed IADT, returned and are waiting to attend Advanced Individual Training are coded as Pay Category Q. Those Soldiers attending training are carried in Pay Category F while at school. Those Soldiers who are not deployable for reasons other than lack of IET are listed on the personnel databases with a code indicating the reasons for their non-deployable status.)

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each state, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (A narrative summarizing procedures followed for discharging members of the USAR who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months of entering the USAR also is provided.)

a. The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ARNGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the ARNG is 32 Officers and 9,444 enlisted, which includes all 54 states and territories. The breakdown by each state is maintained by NGB.

b. Those soldiers who have not completed the required Initial Entry Training (IET) within the first 24 months are discharged from the Army Reserve under AR 135-178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel. Before discharge, every means available is used to ensure the Soldier has had the opportunity to be trained. In some cases, the Soldier was unable to attend the required scheduled training through no fault of his own, and therefore would be given another opportunity to complete his training (e.g., temporary medical condition, death of an immediate family member, failure to complete high school and requiring an additional semester of summer school). In FY04, the Army Reserve will begin implementation of a Delayed Entry Program (DEP). The purpose of the DEP is to allow the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) to have complete ownership of new enlistees until they report to the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) for their Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT). This has changed USAREC’s mission from solely a contract mission to a contract and ship mission. DEP enlistees do not become members of Troop Program Units, nor are they counted within Army Reserve end strength, until they report to the MEPS to ship for their IADT. If the DEP enlistee is discharged at any time within the DEP, the recruiter is required to recruit a new enlistee to replace the one discharged.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each state, that were granted by the Secretary during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

- In FY03, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each state, (and the number of U.S Army Reserve members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year
to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (A) the number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment; and (B) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

a. Screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

- In FY03, approximately 78,791 ARNG Soldiers underwent a physical. Of these personnel, 3,076, or 3.9 percent, did not meet the minimum physical profile standards required for deployment.
- In FY03, approximately 33,145 USAR Soldiers underwent a retention physical. Of these, 7,405 were identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

b. The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

- In FY03, 823 members of the ARNG were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

12. The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each state, who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

- Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13. The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each state, who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

- Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

14. The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each state, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

- Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization and, of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

- Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by state, of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA.

- Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1119 of ANGCRRA.

a. Estimated time for post-mobilization training is reported through the Unit Status Report, is classified, and is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3, Force Readiness Division.
b. Information on the type of training required by units during post-mobilization is maintained by the Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs).

c. Post-mobilization training for enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB) can be categorized as maneuver, attack, defend, command and control, gunnery, NBC defense and sustainment.

d. Post-mobilization training for FSP units is principally common-task testing, NBC defense, force protection, sustainment, command and control, weapons qualification and tactical communications training. Virtually all units also require branch-specific technical training to meet deployment standards. Five additional days are required to conduct convoy lane training (includes live-fire and immediate-action drill training).

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the U.S. Army Reserve).

The Army National Guard (ARNG) made significant progress in the use of Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations (TADSS) during the preceding fiscal year. ARNG teamed with the Training and Doctrine Command’s Systems Manager Combined Arms Tactical Trainer in developing a Maneuver Gated Training Strategy that incorporates the use of maneuver simulators into training plans, increasing unit proficiency.

Currently, ARNG is fielding the Abrams Full-Crew Interactive Simulator Trainer (A-FIST XXI) to M1A1 Abrams units. The A-FIST XXI program is co-managed by the National Guard Bureau and the product manager (PM), Ground Combat Tactical Trainers within the Program Executive Office-Simulations, Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI). The system was approved by the Commanding General, United States Armor Center in March 2003 as a precision-gunner trainer for the ARNG. A-FIST XXI allows Soldiers to train on their assigned combat vehicles at home station, virtually replicating the demanding doctrinal Tank Table Standards of a live range. The Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (AB-FIST) will complement the Abrams trainers. Following a rigorous Limited User Test by the Infantry School and the Army Research Institute, AB-FIST was approved in October 2003 by the Commanding General, United States Infantry School as a mobile training device that can be used for Bradley crew training, in addition to the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer, to meet established live-fire prerequisites as outlined in DA PAM 350-38. In addition, ARNG is rehosting legacy Simulations Network (SIMNET) assets. The SIMNET Upgrades Program will augment SIMNET M1A1 and M2A2 modules with a new, PC-based visual system and host computer, a sound system, and input/output linkages. These modules will be collocated in tank and mechanized infantry platoon sets with upgraded after action review stations.

Janus Battle Staff Trainers are being updated to the Army’s approved software solution. Hardware procurement that will support One Semi-Automated Forces (One-SAF) Future Combat System (FCS) fielding in a seamless manner is being planned and executed. The Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000) is the Army’s approved collective marksmanship training device in FY04. It primarily is used to train and evaluate individual marksmanship for initial-entry Soldiers at the Army training centers. EST 2000 also is used to provide unit collective-gun-
nery and tactical training for dismounted infantry, special operations forces, scouts, engineers, military police squads, and combat support and combat service support elements. These systems also support units conducting the vital homeland-defense and airport-security missions assigned to the ARNG.

In addition to the EST 2000 collective marksmanship trainer, the ARNG developed and fielded the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) with the Beamhit Corporation. ARNG began fielding the LMTS in 2000. We currently have more than 700 systems fielded, down to the company level. LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier's weapon without live ammunition. Optimally, it is used to reduce the number of live rounds used during initial, remedial and sustainment training. LMTS is utilized for developing and sustaining marksmanship skills, diagnosing and correcting marksmanship problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills. In August 2003, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved LMTS as an Army training device to be used by units as a component of their basic, rifle-marksmanship training program.

ARNG also has formed a unique partnership with PEO-STRI in the development, verification, validation and accreditation of systems and system upgrades. Through the ARNG Distributed Battle Simulation Program, civilian infrastructure commanders receive assistance from “graybeard” mentors, TADSS facilitators, and Janus Technical Team Exercise Support in the planning, preparation and execution of simulations-based training that augments the support provided by Training Support XXI Soldiers and greatly enhances unit proficiency and readiness.

The U.S. Army Reserve continues to focus on integrating simulations, simulators and TADSS into training plans. Army Reserve units participate in Corps Warfighter and Battle Command Staff Training exercises to enhance training readiness. The Reserve remains an active member of the Army's simulation community by contributing to the Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) Training Environment Periodic Review and the LVC Integration Concept Team. The Army Reserve continues to press PEO-STRI and the National Simulation Center regarding the development of combat support and combat service support functionality within the Army Constructive Training Federation to ensure training capabilities for the entire spectrum. The Army Reserve has also identified the need for greater digital equipment fielding for the reserve components. Current and Future forces need digital capability to train effectively in the contemporary operating environment (COE) and the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) environment of Army capabilities. The Army Reserve continues to improve training capabilities with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) to enhance Army Reserve Soldiers’ ability to achieve and maintain marksmanship skills; the Reserve has directly supported the Infantry, Military Police and Transportation schools in the development of devices and simulator-based training, ranging from basic combat to advanced tactical marksmanship involving firing from moving vehicles. The Army Reserve has begun fielding the LMTS as well as the Engagement Skills Trainer 2000. The Army Reserve continues to investigate alternative training mechanisms to simulate urban terrain and potential terrorist activities, including the Virtual Emergency Response Training System (VERTS), which replicates the Fort Dix installation, an Army power projection platform. The Army Reserve continues to develop the Simulations Operations functional area assessment to
ensure that capabilities exist to support the DOD Training Transformation goal of integrated live, virtual and constructive training in a joint environment.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each state, (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information. Readiness tables are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary’s overall assessment of the deployability of units of the Army National Guard (and U.S. Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with such section 1121:

   ▪ Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information.

19. Summary tables, shown for each state (and the U.S. Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of section 105 of title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;

b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector’s determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions. (For purposes of this report, data for Operational Readiness Evaluations will be provided on eSB and FSP units of the ARNG and for FSP units of the USAR. Training Assessment Model data will be provided to meet this reporting requirement for all other units of the ARNG and USAR. Data on ARNG units will be reported by State and on USAR units by RRC/DRU.)

   ▪ During FY03, ARNG state inspectors general conducted approximately 586 extensive inspections throughout the United States, visiting 970 separate units. Because IG inspections focus on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of inspections conducted by inspectors general may be requested for release through The Inspector General of the Army. Operational Readiness Evaluation Data for FSP and eSBs is unavailable because these inspections were eliminated as requirements in 1997. Data available under the Training Assessment Model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not available in an unclassified format. TAM data is maintained at the state level and is available upon request from state training readiness officials.

   ▪ In accordance with AR 1-201, the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducts inspections of RRCs/DSUs within the USARC Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). USARC maintains the results of all OIPs. The OIP focuses on findings and recommendations and the units do not receive pass/fail ratings. During FY03,
six OIPs were scheduled, but only two were actually conducted. The four units not inspected were not available due to mobilizations. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) maintains the results of the CONUSA inspections and Training Assessment Models (TAMs), and holds the data for reserve component FSP unit inspections.

- Summary tables depicting CONUSA inspection numbers by state for the ARNG and by Regional Readiness Command for USAR units are available from DCSOPS, FORSCOM.

20. A listing, for each Army National Guard combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that Army National Guard (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRA, shown by State, for each such Army National Guard unit (and for the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRA.

The listing is contained in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4.

a. Detailed assessments of specific RC units are maintained at the two numbered Armies in the continental United States (CONUSA) and three CONUS-based corps.

For Army National Guard divisions and eSBs:

- Manpower. Several eSBs have shortages in enlisted personnel and junior officers. Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (DMOSQ) is a training challenge because military occupational specialties (MOS) require extensive training, during a limited training window, in different schools that are often taught simultaneously. Within the eSBs, Full Time Support (FTS) continues to be a challenge, currently filled at approximately 55 percent of requirement. In ARNG divisions, recent force-structure authorization increases have caused near-term shortfalls in fill percentages.

- Equipment. Lack of modernized equipment continues to hamper the eSBs. Shortages in chemical defense equipment and night vision devices limit the full range of capabilities for training of the eSBs. The eSBs continue to receive the bulk of any new equipment fielded to the ARNG.

- Training. Adequate training resources in FY03 enabled eSBs to sustain platoon, pre-mobilization training proficiency. Distances to crew-served weapons ranges and the availability of adequate maneuver areas continue to challenge most units. Current simulations do not provide a theater-level simulation system, compatible with current simulation suites that replicate a major-theater-of-war scenario.

For ARNG (and Army Reserve) Force Support Package (FSP) Units:

- Manpower. Shortfalls in FTS manning limit operations and training management. DMOSQ is impacted by limited school spaces for low-density MOSs. Some MOSs require extensive training (11B, 19K, 13B, 13F, 31 and 63H) and sequential schools demand a Soldier’s
absence from his civilian employment for extended periods.

- Equipment. Reserve component units do not have the same level of modernization as their active component counterparts in all cases. This can limit interoperability of combat, combat support and combat service support forces and create command-and-control problems, especially during training. Several FSP units will require that shortfalls in force modernization equipment be addressed at the mobilization station. The following are examples of current and projected modernization efforts in the RC: SINCGARS radios, HMMWVs, generators, FMTVs, Javelin and night vision devices.

- Training. Some Equipment Readiness Code-A (ERC-A) equipment shortages inhibit effective training. Additionally, significant shortages of ERC-B and ERC-C equipment hamper collective training. Army Reserve and National Guard units often have significantly older equipment on which to train. Units will require additional training time after mobilization to achieve proficiency on collective tasks, especially if modernized equipment is provided after mobilization. Limited funds and/or limited days available for training generally preclude some Soldiers from attending either Annual Training or DMOSQ schools. Distance to training areas and facilities further erodes available training time.

b. The results of the validations by the commander are maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.

For ARNG divisions, eSBs and ARNG (and Army Reserve) FSP Units:

- Modernized equipment is the foremost compatibility issue. As Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment in units are updated and unit reorganization continues, the compatibility issue will improve. Additionally, the truck fleet remains a major disparity, because the Army Reserve has been substituting 1980’s vintage 5 Ton trucks for 1960 series 2-1/2 Ton Cargo trucks, which the AC has already replaced with the Light and Medium Family of Tactical Vehicles (LMTV and FMTV).

- Lack of force modernization equipment in the Army Reserve and National Guard affects compatibility the most. Nonstandard software systems in these units impact both the Standard Installation Division Personnel System and the Unit Level Logistics System. System compatibility between components is often a challenge. Until reserve component units are modernized and supported at the same level as AC units, most FSP units will not be fully compatible with the active component until after mobilization. Decreased mobilization-to-deployment and/or employment timelines make it imperative that reserve component units be modernized and equipped at the same level as the active component. The National Guard/Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funding allows the Army Reserve to procure modernization equipment that the Army does not provide. This will reduce the disparity in AC/RC compatibility, but is not sufficient to bring the components to full compatibility.

21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 USC. 261 note), shown (A) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), (B) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (C) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

As of 30 Sep 2003, the Army had 4,750 active component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. The Army goal is to fill 100 percent of the 5,000 personnel authorized for the AC/RC Program. Although constrained by ongoing support to the Global War on Terror, the active Army is maintaining AC/RC program strength and plans to achieve 100 percent fill by the end of FY04. U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully tracks fill of Title XI positions in both the Officer Distribution Division and Enlisted Distribution Division.

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The Soldier’s Creed

I am an American Soldier.
I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States of America and live the Army Values.

I WILL ALWAYS PLACE THE MISSION FIRST.

I WILL NEVER ACCEPT DEFEAT.

I WILL NEVER QUIT.

I WILL NEVER LEAVE A FALLEN COMRADE.

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my Warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.

I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.