Defense Reforms

You previously have answered the Committee’s policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in connection with your nominations to be Commander, U.S. Space Command, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your most recent confirmation hearing on September 13, 2001?

No. My fundamental view has not changed. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was a watershed event for needed defense reform. Overall, the reforms have clearly strengthened the warfighting capabilities of our combatant commands while maintaining appropriate civilian control over the military. In terms of enhancing the effectiveness of military operations, the performance of the armed forces in Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrates the results of implementing those reforms.

Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Clearly our fight in the global war against terrorism and our need to work with many agencies outside DoD as well as with our coalition partners is creating a much different security environment from the one that drove defense reform in 1986. For these reasons and others, I have directed my staff to form a working group to identify suggested changes to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of selected processes that allow me to carry out my duties as described in Title 10. I look forward to receiving their recommendations and those of others working on potential ways Goldwater-Nichols might be adapted to our new environment.

Duties

What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as laid out in title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the Department of Defense pertaining to functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

I serve as the principal military advisor to the POTUS, SecDef, and National Security Council as established by Title 10. I think the Goldwater-Nichols Act has provided the
appropriate language to facilitate my primary function. However, in the post-September 11th environment my role has taken on greater significance in the fight against terrorism in that I am the senior military officer who maintains a total global perspective for many issues that cross the boundaries of Combatant Commander AORs. This perspective is also critical for defense of the homeland, and therefore I think it would be appropriate to formally document my new role as principal military advisor to the Homeland Security Council.

**Relationships**

Section 151(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships between the Chairman and other officials.

**Please identify any changes in the relationships the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff have experienced with the following officials since your last confirmation hearing:**

**The Deputy Secretary of Defense.**

Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters that the Secretary is authorized to act. I have not noticed any changes in the relationship between the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Deputy Secretary of Defense since my last confirmation hearing.

**The Under Secretaries of Defense.**

Title 10, United States Code, and current DoD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Since my last confirmation hearing, the only changes in the relationship between the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretaries of Defense has been associated with Unified Command Plan changes and the SecDef’s recent establishment of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. As specified in UCP 2 CHG 2, as with other communications between the POTUS, SecDef and combatant commanders, communications between Under Secretaries and combatant commanders should be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I have worked closely with OSD, the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM to delineate the roles and responsibilities of each entity to carry out the intent of the POTUS-approved Unified Command Plan.

**The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.**

The SecDef has created a new Assistant Secretary for Networks & Information
Integration who reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He has also created a new ASD for Homeland Defense who reports to USD (Policy). I have not noticed any changes in the relationship between the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense since my last confirmation hearing.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I have not noticed any changes in the relationship between the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since my last confirmation hearing.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

I have not noticed any changes in the relationship between the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Secretaries of the Military Departments since my last confirmation hearing. However, the Undersecretary of the Air Force now acts as the Executive Agent for Space Program procurement.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

I have not noticed any changes in the relationship between the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff since my last confirmation hearing.

The Combatant Commanders.

Since my last confirmation hearing, the only changes in the relationship between the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders have been associated with Unified Command Plan changes.

UCP 2 created USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM’s missions include Homeland Defense and providing assistance to U.S. civil authorities.

UCP 2 CHG 1 disestablished USSPACECOM and established the new USSTRATCOM. UCP 2 CHG 2 assigned USSTRATCOM with the emerging missions of Global Missile Defense, Global Strike, DOD Information Operations, and C4ISR.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that you would confront if confirmed for a second term of office as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

I see two major challenges for the near term. First, we must maintain our current commitments while being prepared to respond to others. Second, we have the challenge
of transforming our Armed Forces to become a force well positioned to face the threats of the twenty-first century.

Our greatest challenge will be to meet the near-term demands in winning the war on terrorism while simultaneously transforming the force to meet future challenges. Demands on the force today will continue to stress our ability to maintain readiness. We must set clear priorities for force management and ensuring the institutional health of the force. We must also continue to balance recapitalization of existing capabilities in the near-term with the demands of modernization and transformation that ensure our military superiority in the mid-to longer-term.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

I have set three strategic priorities: winning the global war on terrorism, enhancing joint warfighting and transforming the force.

As we fight the war on terrorism, we continue to improve our ability to conduct joint and combined operations, integrating all elements of national power, and employing intelligence in ways that reduce our response time and allow us to attack time sensitive/time critical targets.

To enhance joint warfighting, we are integrating lessons learned in the WOT, improving our adaptive planning processes, and making organizational refinements. Joint doctrine that encompass not only military forces, but their complementary interagency partners as well, ensures unity of effort and increases the synergy required for success. The joint operational concepts developed during the war on terrorism and refined through experimentation will lead us to new capabilities and a transformed joint force.

Our capabilities-based approach requires that we define the strategic landscape and identify the types of transformed capabilities the Armed Forces need to project military power globally. The operational environments our forces will face are such that a wide variety of robust force mixes may be used to achieve the same strategic objectives. Our primary responsibility in this arena is to actively explore all possible mixes and employ the best combinations based on the situations at hand. To support this approach, we will continue to invest in our current capabilities while simultaneously investigating new technologies that will ensure our global primacy.

Across the force, many units have an inordinately high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. As a result, we are reviewing the mix of active and reserve component forces to ensure the right mix for future operations.
Additionally, as we develop our rotation plan for the WOT, we hope to add predictability for our forces, to improve morale as well as readiness.

We continue to refine the roles and relationships of organizations like US Northern Command and US Strategic Command. As this process continues we will also redesign our joint deployment and mobilization processes to support the application and sustainment of decisive force.

These priorities and their associated tasks will be more fully defined in our future National Military Strategy, the Joint Vision and the Joint Operations Concepts documents when they are completed.

Priorities

In your responses to the Committee’s advance policy questions in connection with your last confirmation, you identified your initial priorities as joint warfighting, modernization and transformation, making the JROC more strategically focused, better defining the military’s role in homeland security, finding ways to enhance Joint Forces Command’s role in experimentation and transformation, sustaining our quality force, and taking care of people.

How would you describe your progress to date in attaining each of your priority goals?

We have continued to make real, sustainable progress in attaining my priorities. Our progress in the Global War on Terrorism continues unabated toward the singular goal of victory. Overseas, our ongoing successful operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and around the world continue to pay dividends in weakening terrorist organizations. With respect to Homeland Defense, we established United States Northern Command with the mission to deter, prevent and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the US. We have made progress, but much work remains ahead.

The US Armed Forces’ ability to conduct Joint Warfare is better today than any time in our history, but challenges remain. Key to improving our joint warfighting is the development of the Joint Operations Concept to provide an overarching linkage between strategy and capabilities. We will continue to improve joint warfighting by learning from previous operations like Operation Iraqi Freedom.

OIF demonstrated the importance of improved C4ISR capabilities to joint operations and warfighting. Improving the warfighter’s knowledge of the battle space and increasing the speed of decision-making has increased success and saved lives. DoD is committed to investing in transformational command and control programs. I greatly appreciate this committee’s continued support for these critical programs.
We continue our transformation throughout the military. With the institution of the new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, we have moved the Joint Requirements Oversight Council from a requirements-based to a capabilities-based process.

USJFCOM continues to play an important role in transformation. We modified the UCP to provide USJFCOM with the responsibility to support the development and integration of fully interoperable systems and capability. We followed that last year by providing the resources necessary to implement these new responsibilities.

**If confirmed, what would be your priorities for your second term as Chairman?**

My priorities for a second term will continue to focus on winning the war on terrorism, improving joint warfighting, and transforming our Nation’s military to face the dangers of the 21st Century while taking care of the men and women serving in the Armed Forces.

**Transformation**

*If confirmed, you would continue to play an important role in the process of transforming the Armed Forces to meet new and emerging threats.*

**With the benefit of almost two years in office, please describe the progress that the Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, has made in transforming the armed forces?**

**Future Joint Force:** We are transforming the US armed forces into a truly joint force that is dominant across the range of military operations. To guide our efforts, we published the Joint Warfighting and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century perspective on how the joint force will operate in the future, establishing the precedent on which joint force development will progress. This includes a redefined range of military operations that covers warfighting and peacetime operations alike.

**Operations Concept:** Against this perspective, we are developing the Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC). It provides the operational context for the transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities.

**Joint Experimentation:** Under Joint Staff and OSD guidance and Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) direction, JFCOM has implemented a robust joint experimentation campaign plan that runs through 2005. This plan incorporates lessons
learned, post war defense assessment, and emerging Service and joint concepts. From this experimentation effort, specific recommendations for joint force improvement are being submitted for JROC approval and implementation.

**Joint Training:** We have automated the Joint Training System through the development and fielding of the Joint Training Information Management System. This permits full implementation of key business practices linking strategy to joint training and exercise programs.

**War Planning:** Transforming war planning is a work in progress. For example, we have streamlined the plans review and approval staffing process to ensure plans are relevant and current. The OSD and the Joint Planning and Execution Community are conducting parallel plan review in order to complete the review process more quickly. The first round of this streamlined review process in being completed now. Historically the plan review process took 6 months, and we have transformed it to a 6-week process. We believe our ongoing efforts will enable us to initiate a new deliberate plan, voice guidance, conduct analysis and approve it in less than 10 months, where in the past it has taken 2 years.

**Joint Professional Military Education:** Many changes have been made to educate our force on what it means to be Joint since Operation DESERT STORM. Joint operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq highlighted the need to readdress what is being taught in all the military schoolhouses. One new initiative at NDU is designing what we anticipate will be a one-week course for newly selected three stars Flag and General Officers. This course, once fully fielded, will give our senior leaders needed insights into the demands of the Joint Force Commander. Additionally, we changed CAPSTONE to address Joint Warfighting at the Operational level for our one-stars.

**What are your goals regarding transformation in the future?**

**Capabilities-based Force:** Using the joint operating and functional concepts, we will complete transformation to a capabilities-based force that is better prepared to respond to asymmetrical threats and crises worldwide.

**Translating Experimentation to Capabilities:** The recommendations that come out of the joint experimentation efforts will focus on being “Born Joint,” so that integration is incorporated from conception of the relevant ideas, regardless of the Service, command or agency providing the capability.

**Doctrine:** We have started to implement a joint doctrine consolidation effort. Over the next 5 to 7 years we have a proactive plan to reduce the number of joint doctrine publications. This will promote Jointness and transformation by integrating joint mission areas, grouping functional doctrine together and eliminating inconsistencies and redundancies.
**Training:** We are continuing to provide dynamic, capabilities-based training for the Department in support of national security requirements across the full spectrum of Service, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

**Joint Professional Military Education (JPME):** We desire to increase the number of officers who are able to participate in JPME by increasing the exposure of all officers to JPME over the course of their careers. We also intend to tailor the JPME level II program in-residence, and use distributed learning technology in order to make JPME II attendance more accessible. To achieve this objective, we require legislation to eliminate the requirements for JPME II to be taught only at an NDU school, and for the curriculum at JFSC to be at least 3 months in duration.

For our Reserve Components, we initiated a course of JPME encompassing a mix of distributed learning and resident instruction. Once complete, we expect a throughput of approximately 1,500 Reservists and Guardsman per year. On the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) side, we also see an ever-increasing amount of Senior NCOs assigned to Joint Headquarters. We will continue to aggressively improve JPME for NCOs.

**War Planning:** We are revising the deliberate planning process to complete planning from initiation to approval in 10 months. In today’s uncertain security environment we need to be able to develop war plans that are flexible, and adaptable to specific changes from the initial planning assumptions, and do it more quickly.

**Military Culture:** The biggest challenge to transforming the military is changing the existing culture. That means that our junior personnel must think differently from day one. Instead of a service-centric focus, they must have a joint-centric focus. We are reviewing all levels of military education, including that of our Non-Commissioned Officers to facilitate this cultural change.

**What is the role of special operations forces in the overall transformation vision?**

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated the overall maturation of US special operations forces, especially SOF integration with precision airpower. SOF, conventional ground, air, and maritime operations occurred simultaneously in space and in time frequently with conventional forces under SOF command and control. The transformation lesson learned is to continue to expand our Joint Training Exercises integrating SOF, conventional and coalition SOF forces.

**Specifically, what do you believe transformation should mean for the special operations community in terms of missions, training, equipment, or in any other aspect?**
In future missions, we will rely more on SOCOM to look globally. SOF transformation requires continued progress in providing the necessary equipment and training to stay ahead of the threat. As technology spreads, even a local terrorist group can obtain secure wireless communications, global positioning systems, and other tools that were unique to military powers only a few years ago. For SOF to continue pressing the fight against these groups, their own tools must continue to mature and become more transportable, survivable, and effective.

What, if any, special role can SOCOM’s development and acquisition capability play in Service and DoD efforts?

SOF will continue its important role in development and acquisition. Many items now in common use among conventional forces began as SOF-specific requirements.

**Expanded Roles of U. S. Special Operations Command**

The Secretary of Defense recently announced that U.S. SOCOM would take on additional, expanded responsibilities in the global war on terrorism, as a supported combatant commander, in addition to its more traditional role as a supporting combatant commander.

In your view, what types of missions should U. S. SOCOM conduct as a supported combatant commander?

USSOCOM should serve as supported combatant commander for campaigns against those terrorist organizations whose cells, support networks, or activities are spread across several geographic combatant commander (GCC) boundaries. This will allow USSOCOM to synchronize military operations against these groups, while using the GCC’s regional experience and expertise to plan and conduct specific operations. It is important to resource SOCOM for these new roles as reflected in ’04 budget proposals.

For some missions, the Secretary may direct CDRUSSOCOM to exercise command over special operations overseas, as allowed under USC Title 10. This will generally occur when the GCC is unable to provide the necessary command and control capability or when the mission parameters (available time, national risk, political sensitivity) make this command relationship desirable.

**Afghanistan**

Given the current level of instability in Afghanistan, do you believe that the U.S. troop contribution is appropriate in terms of size and composition?

Despite many achievements by the Coalition and the Afghan Government, Afghanistan is
challenged by recent increases in violence and internal political tensions. DOD, OMB, and DOS are currently reexamining policies and resources required to address the changing conditions. As for our troop size and composition, US and Coalition, they are as requested by the CENTCOM Commander and I believe adequate for the tasks at hand.

**What, if any, types of military assistance would you recommend in addition to current efforts?**

Our current efforts are about right. Although we have a ways to go in Afghanistan, we are making great strides. We are planning to increase the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to eight, which will provide one PRT in each province. I expect release of this Planning Order within the next few days.

The size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) will increase to 7,200 by JAN 04 and to 10,000 by JUN 04. By accelerating the training of the ANA, and increasing the number of PRTs, we will be able to transfer more of the security responsibilities to the Afghan government, thereby reducing the demand on US/Coalition forces.

CENTCOM has dedicated forces with the mission of locating High Value Targets. They have also developed a Reward Program, offering rewards for enemy personnel on the Black List. CJTF 180 is conducting operations in the vicinity of the Pakistani border to interdict infiltration/exfiltration routes that we believe Al Qaida/Taliban forces use. Killing, or capturing, remaining Al Qaida/Taliban forces remains a high priority mission for our forces in Afghanistan.

**Status of the Armed Forces**

Ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the Horn of Africa, coupled with deployments to places such as South Korea and a potential deployment to Liberia, place enormous pressures on the active and reserve components.

In your view, how is the overall morale of forces at present, particularly with regards to those units and individuals those who have been deployed for an extended period of time or have been deployed numerous times in recent years?

Overall, morale remains good and will improve when we formalize the rotation policy. Individual service members will continue to express concerns about the equity of the rotation policy and we will address those concerns. My assessment is that there is not a significant morale issue in the armed forces.

Current global force requirements will remain steady, or increase modestly, and as such we are developing a rotational plan in support of OIF. This rotational plan will facilitate our ongoing operation in support of OIF, sustain our all-volunteer force, and defend our
homeland, while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to unexpected requirements.

Leveraging our Total Force, this rotational plan maximizes the employment of mostly active component (Army and USMC) to OIF while the reserve components conduct other global requirements. By establishing theater tour length policy of up to 12 months, we will ultimately meet respective services’ OPTEMPO deployment goals. This rotation allows the Marine Corps to reconstitute their force and maintain the capability to respond to emerging requirements. Increased use of coalition support from one Multi-National Division (United Kingdom) to three Multi-National Divisions will greatly assist and help lessen out troop requirements in support of OIF.

**What plans do you have to address the stress this high operational tempo places on our forces and their families?**

We are aggressively working to ensure families have the support they need during these stressful times. Further, the family support professional and volunteer staffs are making every effort to reach out to the spouses, children and parents of our service members. Military families come together in times like these. This is part of the military’s true strength.

**Joint Officer Management**

Provisions of law in title 10, United States Code, regarding such matters as management policies for joint specialty officers, promotion objectives for joint officers, joint professional military education, and joint duty assignments have been in effect for over 15 years. Among other factors, changes in the size and composition of the officer corps, in the career patterns of officers, in operational requirements, and in the personnel requirements of the combatant commanders in successfully pursuing joint warfare have resulted in proposed legislative changes to existing law in this area.

Based on your extensive experience in the joint arena, what legislative changes, if any, would you recommend in joint officer management and joint professional military education?

Our recent experience in OEF/OIF reveals that we require flexibility to ensure joint officer management and joint professional military education meet the realities of today’s military environment. In particular, we need to update JOM to award appropriate joint duty credit for joint experience officers receive when serving in high OPTEMPO environments.

In Mar 2003, the Department forwarded the report of the congressionally directed Independent Study of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military
Education. The completed report made several recommendations regarding changes needed to update JOM/JPME. We are preparing legislation incorporating these recommendations. In addition, we are developing a strategic plan to help shape JOM to meet our future joint requirements.

**Space Capabilities and Transformation**

Space assets have played a crucial role in recent military successes, and future space assets such as space based radar, long dwell imaging and advanced wideband communications satellites could transform how the military operates.

Are you satisfied that such space programs have strong support within the Department of Defense and the services, and are appropriately resourced?

Space systems and programs enjoy strong support from the Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Intelligence Community. I believe that the programs included in the budget are resourced adequately. The full depth and breadth of space capabilities required to support the new defense strategy is still under study.

On the intelligence side, the Department and the Intelligence Community are engaged in a thorough, joint, end-to-end review of space and airborne collection systems known as the Transformational Air and Space Project (TSAP). This effort provides the space and airborne direction for the future and answers questions of numbers and types of systems, ISR architecture, and future resource requirements.

**Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Support (ISR)**

Are you satisfied with the level and quality of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support for U.S. forces? If not, what further steps would you recommend to improve ISR support?

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets provide daily support to U.S. forces in all theaters, providing crucial and timely information to warfighters and other intelligence agencies. The current satisfaction with ISR support, however, is tempered by an aging platform baseline, and high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO demands on platforms and personnel. We are developing follow-on ISR programs that bring more capabilities to defeat emerging threats and offer more options to warfare commanders, such as persistent surveillance. I intend to maintain the emphasis to create a more flexible and adaptable collection capability to continue to support warfighters and decision makers.

**Close Air Support**

In Operation Enduring Freedom, there was some criticism of the procedures by
which close air support was provided; some cases involved fratricide and others involved allegations that available aircraft were not being efficiently used.

What steps were taken to improve close air support prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and what was the impact of these steps?

The Army and Air Force Warfighter staff talks held after OEF established the dialog for addressing OIF specific and some enduring CAS issues. This led to the acceleration of the Terminal Attack Control Program (TACP) modernization effort, the establishment of a very robust Air Ground System, pushing TACP assets down to the lowest level to include coalition allies, and the establishment of a robust Air Coordination Element (ACE) at CFLCC and Army V Corps Air Support Operations Center (ASOC).

We outfitted A-10s with targeting pods capable of day/night, laser, infrared, and night vision goggle employment. The pod enables standoff from the target to identify enemy and friendly forces, which gave the aircraft more time over the target area and increased survivability. During the sand storm, targeting pod equipped A-10s were able to “see through” the sand to distinguish friendly and enemy forces and increase the effectiveness of the attack. We also reduced the amount of command and control nodes to increase responsiveness to forces on the ground. And finally, all ground attack aircraft were equipped to use GPS-guided bombs to attack enemy positions very accurately in all weather.

Overall, we significantly improved Joint Close Air Support Operations from OEF to OIF, to the degree that we seamlessly provided CAS regardless of Service. For example, we had Air Force CAS for Marines, and Australian CAS for Army and Marine Ground Forces.

What areas remain to be addressed in the conduct of close air support?

We will focus on increasing JOINT Close Air Support (CAS) training. Additional improvements include, but are not limited to, providing SATCOM radios to forces on the ground to increase communications capabilities and the outfitting of all A-10s with targeting pods to limit collateral damage, reduce fratricide, and provide instant positive battle damage assessment.

Strategic Lift

The Mobility Requirements Study for Fiscal Year 2005 was conducted with the assumption of the previous National Military Strategy of two Major Theater War (2-MTW). For strategic airlift, the study identified a requirement for 54.5 million ton-miles a day, with available airlift at the time falling well short. Steps have been taken to improve our capability since then by continuing the C-17 production line and initiating two C-5
Based on your experience of the last two years, how do you assess our current strategic airlift capability?

The need to conduct the War on Terror on several fronts simultaneously, changes in how we deploy forces, new DPG (including homeland defense), Army transformation, and the proliferation of anti-access weapons signal potentially significant changes in the combatant commanders’ requirement for strategic lift. Under MRS-05, 54.5 MTM/D was the minimum for a moderate risk solution, but we are planning to conduct another full scale Mobility Requirements Study to further clarify strategic lift requirements.

Precision-Guided Munitions

With an ever-increasing percentage of air-launched ordnance being precision-guided, do you believe there is a need to re-visit the inventory objectives for precision-guided ordnance?

In response to the increased demand for guided weapons, and to rebuild supplies depleted first in Afghanistan and then Iraq, Joint Direct Attack Munition kit and laser guided bomb production have increased significantly. As part of our ongoing operational planning process, we are currently reevaluating our war plans. We will closely monitor inventories of precision munitions, adjust them as appropriate, and with the assistance of Congress fund them at an appropriate rate.

Information Operations

Information operations and information warfare will likely have an increasing role in 21st Century warfare. To date, the role of information operations in contemporary military operations has not been readily apparent.

What role do you envision for information operations in future U.S. military operations?

Information Operations are maturing rapidly across DoD as a whole and within each individual Service. We are committed to fully integrating IO into the Joint Force Commanders’ toolkit on a par with Air, Land, Maritime, Space and Special Operations. Information Operations are comprised of five core military capabilities: Computer Network Operations, Electronic Warfare, Psychological Operations, Military Deception and Operations Security. The Joint Force Commander employs these core capabilities in an integrated, coordinated manner across the full range of military operations to better achieve his objectives. Recent operations have highlighted the importance of each of these core capabilities and IO in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was more effective than ever
before. And we are addressing the limitations and shortfalls that must be fixed.

**What concerns do you have regarding the conduct of extensive information operations?**

My primary concern is that the mission area receives required support, both in terms of resources and tailored intelligence. The IO mission area is relatively new, when compared to other established military operations. As such, it is in danger of not competing well for scarce resources. In terms of intelligence support, IO has some non-traditional requirements that we must scrutinize and prioritize along with our other intelligence requirements.

**Blue Force Tracking**

General Tommy Franks, former Commander, U.S. CENTCOM recently stated before this Committee that multiple, non-interoperable blue force tracking systems were a problem during Operation Iraqi Freedom, contributing to some confusion on the battlefield and complicating efforts to avoid friendly fire incidents. The U.S. Army has one such system, which they shared with U.S. Marine Corps units. U.S. SOCOM uses different systems. Our coalition partners had no such capability.

**What steps would you recommend to rapidly ensure effective blue force tracking of all friendly forces on the battlefield —unconventional, conventional, and coalition?**

In his testimony, General Franks also described the "unprecedented situational awareness" during OIF. This "SA" was in fact enabled by the integration of these various blue force tracking systems (BFT) within a common picture. The issue wasn't our inability to integrate the tracks; rather, that this integrated view of blue tracks was not always available at the lowest echelon - the shooter at the point of the engagement decision.

In the near term, our emphasis is on developing interoperable systems that ensure this integrated BFT picture is distributed to the shooter. The Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness (JBFSA) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) is already in progress, and addresses this exact issue. The ACTD will demonstrate, by end of FY04, an integrated architecture of existing BFT capabilities that includes dissemination and display of a consistent blue force picture to the US and coalition shooter. In the longer term, the US Army, as the Department's JBFSA Lead Service, will assist USJFCOM, the Joint force integrator, in guiding the efficient acquisition of this transformational capability.

**Army Transformation**

Secretary Rumsfeld has established transformation of the Armed Forces to meet 21st Century threats as one of the Department’s highest priorities and has stated that only
weapons systems that are truly transformational should be acquired.

How would you assess the level of risk to our forces of foregoing or curtailing current acquisition programs in favor of future transformation?

We have been very careful to balance the risk in trade-offs today to fund the necessary capability advances for tomorrow. There has always been tension within the defense establishment between readiness today and readiness tomorrow. Given the performance of our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, I feel that the Services have the balance about right.

But even with these successes, we must evaluate lesson learned from each of these events and constantly look at our procedures and emerging technologies. Long term, we are taking the view that we should focus on transformational programs where these make sense.

To pay for transformation to the Objective Force, the Army has taken an acceptable level of risk in the modernization and recapitalization of the current force. Fielding Stryker Brigade Combat Teams fills an immediate capabilities gap identified by the combatant commanders – allowing the Army to pursue transformation objectives and priorities while meeting current warfighting requirements.

Can we afford this risk given the current level of global threats?

Given the current level of global threats, we can’t afford not to. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated that transformational programs that provide speed, precision, improved battlefield command and control, persistence and remote sensing are exactly the capabilities we need.

Rebalancing Forces

In a memorandum of July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed action by the Services, the Joint Staff and OSD aimed at achieving better balance in the capabilities of the Active and Reserve components. The Secretary noted that the Department “needs to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solution based on a disciplined force requirements process.”

What do you consider to be the principal problems that the Secretary of Defense is attempting to address in his memorandum?

The Secretary emphasized the need for continuous improvement in assigned roles and responsibilities, functions and capabilities between the Active and Reserve components that allow us to swiftly respond to meet the nation's military requirements. As we
transform the military to deal with future uncertainties and the needs to defend our territories, we must ensure the RC capabilities are properly realigned to meet this challenge. I believe the Secretary’s vision is to balance capabilities between the Active and Reserve component so that our force would be available on-demand, agile, and more responsive to deal with any future threat, without overextending any specific segment of our RC forces.

What do you consider to be the biggest obstacles to achieving the goals that the Secretary of Defense has set forth in his memorandum?

I believe the Secretary’s tasks are realistic and achievable. Homeland security, global terrorism, and regional uncertainties will be the determining factors on how difficult our tasks will be. The rebalancing of active and reserve capabilities require that we look at all available options and the resources required. We will work with the Services and the Department in the evaluation of manpower availability, management techniques - including contractor support, and technical applications to ensure our forces remain agile, responsive, and ready.

The timeframe for achieving those goals will be challenging. However, in light of the significant changes we have experienced in global requirements since the end of the Cold War, it is appropriate to review our force alignment and make changes where needed as soon as practical.

U.S. Forces in Korea

Living and working conditions for many military personnel stationed in Korea fall far below acceptable standards. The current and previous Commanders, U.S. Forces Korea, have publicly called for significantly enhanced pay and compensation for personnel assigned to Korea to address these factors.

In your judgment, what steps, if any, need to be taken to improve living and working conditions and the attractiveness of military assignments for career personnel in Korea?

The former Chief of Staff of the Army chartered a Tiger Team that included Joint Staff and OSD representatives to look at conditions in Korea. The Team took an in-depth look at living and working conditions, special pay, increasing accompanied tours and MILCON.

Many living and working conditions in Korea are substandard. This adversely impacts morale, retention and readiness. USFK currently has 41 installations to maintain. As part of the Korea Land Partnership Plan, USFK plans to reduce that number down to 21 installations. Along with that base realignment will come improved living and working conditions. The USFK Commander, as part of the current and future defense strategy
review, is aggressively working the MILCON issues to ensure we take proper care of our service members.

With regards to special pay we have made significant progress with the authorization of assignment incentive pay. The Senate Report for the FY04 NDAA includes provisions for an assignment incentive pay ($100 per month) specifically for Korea. Additionally, we are hopeful that the House and Senate will enact provisions for the FY04 NDAA, authorizing officers an overseas tour extension incentive identical to what we currently offer enlisted personnel.

With respect to unaccompanied tours, the FY03 NDAA requested the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to report on a plan to increase accompanied tours in Korea from 10 percent to 25 percent. Increasing the number of accompanied tours in Korea will require a substantial infrastructure (family housing, medical care facilities, childcare facilities and other facilities required to support the increase in command sponsored dependents) investment.

**National Military Strategy**

**What aspects of the National Military Strategy, if any, require modification or clarification as a result of changed world events since issuance of the Strategy in 2001?**

In 2001, the Secretary of Defense published the Quadrennial Defense Review, which promulgated a new Defense Strategy. The Defense Strategy directed the Armed Forces to adopt a capabilities-based approach for force planning and force development given that the US faces dangerous adversaries and the certainty that these adversaries will continuously adapt their capabilities in ways that will challenge us even more in the future. This document, released in the immediate aftermath of September 11th provides the foundation for the new National Military Strategy.

The National Military Strategy will describe our concept for employing military force to achieve prescribed objectives in this dangerous and uncertain environment. Moreover, the strategy will describe the capabilities the Armed Forces must possess to succeed today and in the future incorporating the lessons learned in the War on Terrorism.

This draft strategy continues to reflect our highest priorities: winning the war on terrorism, enhancing joint warfighting and transforming the joint force. It builds on the new National Security Strategy and supporting strategies that have been released since September 11th and positions the Armed Forces to conduct preventive and preemptive operations in defense of the United States and its global interests.

**Colombia**
U.S. military personnel have been involved in the training and equipping of Colombian military forces involved in counter-drug operations. U.S. military personnel, however, do not participate in or accompany Colombian counter-drug or counter-insurgency forces on field operations in Colombia.

Do you favor continuation of this limited role for U.S. military personnel in Colombia?

Yes. US policy for Colombia is clear that we will assist the Colombian Government to regain control over its territory but that the Colombian Government is ultimately responsible for resolving its own conflict. Our forces are doing an outstanding job of training and assisting the Colombian military and police without deploying on combat operations with them. I do not believe that allowing US military personnel to accompany Colombian security forces would have a strategic impact. Additionally, the Colombian military is not asking for this type of assistance and is a properly trained and competent force.

Excess Infrastructure

How high a priority do you place on the closure of excess Department of Defense installations and why?

In an environment where resources are scarce, we must eliminate excess physical capacity to allow for increased defense capability focused on ‘jointness.’ I strongly support needed infrastructure reductions facilitated by BRAC 2005.

How do you respond to arguments that initiation of a new round of base realignment and closure should be postponed until the requirements of the global war on terrorism come into better focus?

In the wake of September 11, it is more important than ever to avoid expending resources on excess capacity. The authority to realign and close bases we no longer need is an essential element of ensuring the right mix of bases and forces within our warfighting strategy as we transform to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

Readiness Reporting System

You previously have indicated that expansion and refinement of the Global Status of Resources and Training System was necessary and that a comprehensive readiness reporting system is necessary.

What progress have you made in improving the readiness reporting within the
Department?

The Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) will meet the comprehensive readiness reporting requirements. A development contract has been awarded on the DRRS. The system is on-track to achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) by the end of FY04 and Full Operating Capability (FOC) by FY07.

The Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS) will continue to provide timely and accurate macro-level readiness information until the DRRS reaches FOC. The Joint Staff also makes discrete changes to the CRS as required to better capture readiness data, decrease the reporting burden, and more closely align the CRS with the DRRS vision.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.