STATEMENT OF

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BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

On behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, I thank you for this opportunity to testify on security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Having served as Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDR USPACOM) over the past year, and previously serving as Commander, United States Pacific Fleet for 30 months, has fortified my belief that a secure, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region is of paramount importance to our country and the world. In contrast, an Asia that is uncertain presents grave dangers to our nation and the security of our friends and allies in the region.

We have a number of security concerns, and they are addressed clearly in our national military strategy and supporting guidance:

- Conflict on the Korean Peninsula
- Miscalculation over the Taiwan Strait or in Kashmir
- Transnational threats like terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and illegal drug trade
- Instability associated with a failing nation-state or humanitarian crisis, and
- Ensuring the readiness of our forward deployed forces in the region.

We are not facing these concerns alone. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September and over the past year, we have had unprecedented cooperation in combating and supporting the Global War on Terrorism and backing from concerned neighbors to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have continued to build on the longstanding bilateral alliances and friendships necessary to deter regional aggression and coercion, dissuade military competition, and assure our allies and friends of our commitment to them and the region. We’ve accomplished this by our forward presence in the theater and by the actions of our forces as they execute tasks and operations.
in support of our nation’s security. In short, we have begun a journey to “operationalize” the strategic guidance we have received. Our destination is a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.

Last year during my confirmation hearing, I provided five broad priorities for Pacific Command. Since then, I’ve used the priorities as a roadmap for focusing the command, directing operational initiatives and assessing progress. Today, my intent is to provide you an update on these priorities as they pertain to the defense posture of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).

**Sustaining and Supporting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)**

Our highest USPACOM priority is sustaining and supporting the GWOT. This includes not only operations in the Pacific, but also as a force provider to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM—Afghanistan (OEF-A), or wherever international terrorism might threaten our interests worldwide. Although we don’t have any government-supported sanctuaries for terrorists in the Pacific, terrorist cells and organizations that operate in the region provide unique challenges to USPACOM and to the countries in which they proliferate.

**GWOT Update.** Regional and local terrorist groups with ties to al-Qaida pose the most dangerous threat to U.S., allied, and friendly interests in the USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Bolstered by financial and technical support from al-Qaida, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the southern Philippines have demonstrated their capability to attack U.S. and Western interests. Our task, in coordination with other agencies, is to ensure these terrorists do not destabilize established governments in the region or threaten Americans or our friends. Regional alliances and partnerships are critical to achieving both our short-term goal of eradicating regional terrorist groups and our long-term goal of establishing a security environment throughout the Asia-Pacific region that rejects terrorism and addresses the factors that breed terrorists.
Southeast Asia witnessed a number of terrorist acts in 2002, including the bombings of tourist nightclubs on the Indonesian island of Bali on 12 October that killed nearly 200 civilians, including seven Americans, and a series of bombings across the Philippines also in October. We believe the ASG was responsible for the attacks in the Philippines that killed at least 22 people – including a U.S. serviceman – and wounded over 200 others. Coincident investigations and arrests in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia have revealed an extensive, sophisticated network, centered on the Jemaah Islamiyah, that continues to plan attacks against U.S. and Western diplomatic interests and less defensible commercial or tourist venues across the region. We have credible information that al-Qaida has long sought to expand its movement in Southeast Asia. By leveraging its connections with sympathetic groups and individuals, some previously trained in Afghanistan, al-Qaida seeks to expand its network and obtain the support of local proponents in establishing a regional pan-Islamic state supportive of radical Islamic ideology.

To meet this challenge, USPACOM and regional governments have strengthened counterterrorism cooperation over the past year. Regional governments have made progress achieving counterterrorism goals through legislation that combats terrorism and its resource methods, by capturing and detaining terrorists, and through interagency coordination and intelligence sharing. To date, over 100 terrorist suspects have been arrested or detained, primarily in Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Indonesia. The U.S. government has designated JI, the ASG, and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This action enables us to identify and freeze the financial assets of these groups and sets the conditions for their isolation. Governments in the region are also increasing their cooperation with regional counterparts – forming bilateral and multilateral alliances to combat terrorist activity. ASEAN’s plan to establish a regional Counterterrorism Center in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia is a
noteworthy example. USPACOM continues to support the efforts of these nations to strengthen the rule of law, improve the effectiveness of regional armed forces, and promote democratic ideals of pluralism and religious tolerance. Our long-term effort is to use international, regional, and local relationships to defeat terrorism through coordinated diplomacy, education, information operations, and the use of force when necessary. This is our challenge – and we will meet it.

We’ve learned a great deal about terrorism in Southeast Asia over the past year: how these entities organize, how they operate, and what they seek to achieve. We realize we have much more to learn and to accomplish. I am convinced that our best approach is to disrupt terrorist activities where we can while helping build our regional partners’ capabilities to do the same. It is a team effort.

To better synchronize our efforts in combating terrorism in the Pacific, we have assumed the offensive while putting in place an “active defense.” Offensively, we established a full time Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter Terrorism (JIACG-CT) at USPACOM Headquarters. Defensively, we designated our Army component, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), as our Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) for Hawaii; Commander, Pacific Representative-Guam (COMPACREPGUAM) as our JRAC for Guam; and Commander, Alaska Command (ALCOM) as Joint Task Force-Alaska. These command and control constructs are successfully prosecuting the War on Terror while protecting our forces and critical infrastructure.

**JIACG-CT.** We have established a Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter Terrorism (JIACG/CT) to coordinate DoD and other government agency (OGA) activities in USPACOM AOR, develop targets for future military or OGA operations, plan USPACOM regional and country counterterrorism (CT) campaigns, and enhance U.S. and partner nation CT capabilities in support of national objectives in the GWOT. It is an all-encompassing and focused effort, where we are now integrating our Theater Country Teams to assess host-nation
concerns and necessary conditions to proceed with our CT campaign. This team endeavor has been extremely successful as demonstrated by the actions of regional countries that are supporting U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan and regional operations, like those in the Philippines, while conducting CT operations in their own countries - all in the past year.

**Forward and Deployed Forces.** Within the last year, the USS KITTY HAWK, JOHN C. STENNIS, CARL VINSON, CONSTELLATION, and ABRAHAM LINCOLN battlegroups; maritime patrol aircraft; USS PELELIU, BONHOMME-RICHARD, BELLEAU WOOD, and TARAWA Amphibious Ready Groups with the 11th, 13th and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units; 5th, 11th, and 13th Air Forces; and the 509th Bomber and 40th Air Expeditionary Wings have deployed in support of major roles in OEF-A and operations in the Persian Gulf. Further, many USPACOM countries continue to provide tangible support to OEF-A within their means. Australia, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have all contributed support ranging from overflight, access and basing to escort, logistics, and troops on the ground. We appreciate their many contributions and valuable cooperation.

**Regional Counterterrorism.** Information sharing between countries in the Pacific has provided unprecedented insights into the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al-Qaida networks in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, Singapore and Malaysia have arrested dozens of members of JI, the primary transnational terrorist organization in the Pacific with links to al-Qaida. And Indonesia has arrested suspected terrorist leaders and bombing suspects since the October bombings in Bali. However, Indonesia has a difficult problem and has factions that do not want to aggressively investigate groups within Indonesia sympathetic to al-Qaida. We need to cooperate more effectively at all levels with Indonesia on terrorism. An International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Indonesia is key to our engagement effort.

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) continues to attack terrorist infrastructure and capabilities in the Philippines and
throughout the region. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is firmly on our side in the GWOT – strongly supporting the effort. Our advice and assistance, including our maintenance and training packages provided under security assistance authorities, are improving the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) CT capabilities. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) serves as the ideal vehicle for U.S. forces to advise and assist the AFP in the development of skills necessary to fight terrorists. Additionally, the infrastructure improvements to roads, hospitals, and schools and the construction of water wells on Basilan Island under DoD’s humanitarian and civic assistance program provide positive impacts on local communities – highlighting America’s positive role while assisting the Philippines in dealing with the socio-economic causes that entice disenfranchised Filipinos to support terrorist activities. As a result of this well integrated operation, the ASG is on the run on Basilan and its influence with the local populace there has been dampened.

USPACOM’s Antiterrorism Program is proactive and dynamic in its approach to protect our people and resources throughout the Pacific. It is an “active defense” because it has offensive qualities. Since 11 September, we have come a long way in better protecting DoD personnel and critical infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region.

Joint Rear Area Coordinators (JRACs) in Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Japan, and Korea are the focal points for force protection, coordinating security measures and intelligence fusion among the different services in their AORs. JRACs provide the command and control construct to synchronize our DoD anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) efforts for military installations and property with federal, state, and local agencies and with the host nations in the cases of Japan and Korea. USPACOM's JRACs are models for interagency coordination, combined scenario-based training events, and unprecedented cooperation and information sharing. We are working continuously with US Northern Command to standardize and synchronize our efforts and procedures.
USPACOM has an aggressive vulnerability assessment program that covers DoD bases, ports, airfields, and training areas in the AOR that are not under U.S. control. We use assessment teams from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the services, and our components to ensure our facilities have current assessments and proactive antiterrorism plans. USPACOM personnel work closely with their Department of State counterparts to ensure host-nation support is adequate to protect our deployed forces and that all are employing the latest AT/FP procedures.

Force protection is "operationalized" in USPACOM. Our staff continually monitors threat information and the environment in which our forces are based. Theater and country specific Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) are continually reviewed and upgraded as necessary. Random Antiterrorism Measures are employed to complicate terrorist planning. USPACOM also has a travel restriction program, providing a tool to declare entire countries or portions thereof "off-limits" to DoD members, thus keeping them out of harm's way. In addition, Force Protection plans are required for all travel in our AOR, from major unit deployments to individuals on leave. The resource drain from increased FPCONs is a formidable challenge to both manpower limitations and Force Protection Technology initiatives. Your continued support is necessary to sustain the progress we are making in this area.

Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) program and Homeland Security. Currently, we support Homeland Security and Forward Base security efforts primarily through Information Analysis, Infrastructure/Personnel Protection, and Quick Reaction Forces. The Critical Infrastructure Program is our operational initiative to improve security in the AOR. The program is on track in developing processes and methodologies. The first CIP Appendix to one of our theater Operational Plans (OPLAN) will go to the Joint Staff on 30 April 2003. Additionally, a comprehensive USPACOM CIP Operation Order (OPORD), our Theater Infrastructure Assurance Plan, is in final staffing. Notably, the program has resulted in a partnership with the Joint Program Office for
Special Technology Countermeasures to develop and field a prototype Combatant Command CIP Database in May 2003.

_Homeland Defense and Civil Support (HLD/CS)._ With the recent direction to consolidate the security, defense, and support for the homeland, we are working to integrate existing functions as well as expanded mission requirements to enhance our protection of the USPACOM Homeland AOR that includes the State of Hawaii, the Territories of Guam and American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Programs such as the JRAC, CIP, Homeland Air Security (HAS), Consequence Management for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosive (CBRNE), and Domestic Support Operations are but a few of those being combined into one plan to maximize our capabilities and still refine the use of our resources. USPACOM’s HAS mission deters, prevents or interdicts aerial threats and aggression directed toward Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and U.S. territories within USPACOM’s AOR. The HAS air threat spectrum ranges from ballistic missiles and aircraft to future low-altitude cruise missiles and radio controlled sub-scale aircraft. The potential for a terrorist to gain this capability is rising. USPACOM has addressed this challenge with close integration, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration among international, federal, state, local agencies, and governments. This fusion of individual agency capabilities, including our military, into an integrated, multi-layered response is key to our collective success.

USPACOM also supports other non-Homeland Security functions. Civil Support operations will be an enhancement of our existing Domestic Support Operations to the Homeland. Although not directly related to securing the homeland against terrorism, this support affects the impact of terrorist action. With Secretary of Defense direction, we quickly support the Department of Homeland in mitigation and recovery efforts relating to natural disasters. Typhoon Pongsona in Guam is a good example. The USPACOM HLD/CS program has taken on a renewed effort with great scope and responsibilities. Our Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) will build on our
processes for intelligence sharing, AT/FP, CIP, CBRNE and natural disasters as well as other requested support to the civilian sector, providing a comprehensive program for Hawaii, Guam, and all our territories in the AOR.

**Information fusion.** USPACOM’s Counterintelligence Program remains the key link between DoD and Law Enforcement Agency efforts in the Pacific Theater. We are committed to furthering the integration efforts of the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group—Counter-Terrorism (JIACG-CT) and counterintelligence missions with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces and with allied international agencies. Along these lines, we are pioneering efforts to promulgate all-source intelligence fusion to connect local, state, national, and DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agencies. These efforts, coupled with a joint international training regimen encompassing asymmetric warfare and analysis from multiple perspectives, hold great promise in developing an “actionable intelligence” capability.

**Manpower Requirements.** Legislation mandates reductions in Higher Headquarters (HHQ) staffs by 15 percent. USPACOM and our sub-unified commands are executing these reductions in ways that will minimize the impact on our missions. The need for intelligence gathering, analysis, production, coordination, dissemination, campaign planning, and capabilities testing in exercises and coalition building is greater than ever. Adequate manpower resources are essential to mission planning to counter emerging asymmetric threats. Achieving synergy of forces launched from around the globe during conflicts while providing effective reach-back for those forces creates high mission demand on our combatant headquarters (HQ) staff.

The GWOT has created additional manpower requirements. Increased security patrols, both shore-based and waterside, in response to enhanced FPCONs; non-U.S. controlled port and airfield assessment teams; 24/7 coverage for JRACs and Crisis Action Teams; and the already expanding Homeland Defense, Civil Support and CT missions are a few examples of manpower generating tasks. Additional AT/FP billets are needed to address the full range of force
protection, antiterrorism, and CT missions throughout USPACOM. As we continue to develop the Homeland Defense and Civil Support plan, we already see the need for enhanced information analysis capabilities and consequence management resources for CBRNE events.

**Integrating Reservists.** Throughout the 1990’s, we increasingly relied on our Reserve and Guard members to help accomplish our mission. These outstanding service members/citizens contributed not only hard work, but also unique talents and perspectives. It is not an understatement to say that they have helped in every facet of the USPACOM mission. After 11 September, with the sharply increasing demands of the GWOT, we needed their support. Throughout USPACOM, we only mobilized about 5,000 Reservists - about 10% of the immediate 11 September mobilized force capability. They helped with force protection, logistics flow, and increased shifts in a myriad of areas. As we continue to tap into our Reservists and National Guardsmen to support operations, we need to ensure they receive benefits comparable to our active duty service members. America can be proud of how our Reserve and Guard forces have responded.

**Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CbT RIF).** USPACOM received $3.98 million in CbT RIF funding in FY02. The FY03 worldwide allocation stands at $47 million. This initiative provides the Geographic and Functional Commanders additional avenues for resourcing against emergent and emergency terrorist threats. USPACOM received $4.14 million (10 projects) of the $32.4 million available in the first allocation of FY03 funding, not including $2.56 million (14 projects) for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). USPACOM funded CbT RIF projects include emergency Explosive Ordnance Disposal responder gear for USARPAC; a perimeter wall for the new USPACOM Headquarters; vehicle gates and barriers for Tripler Army Hospital; mass notification system for Misawa Air Base (AB), Japan; closed circuit television for Fort Buckner; gates for Yokota AB, Japan flight line; barrier gates for Fort Shafter; crash
barriers for Camp Zama, Japan; and a standoff initiative with HQs security upgrades for Yokota AB.

Special Operation Forces (SOF). USPACOM, through Special Operations Command, Pacific and JTF-510, maintains the ability to deploy SOF under the command of a general officer to any location to combat terrorism. We have used this capability in Operation Enduring Freedom - Philippines and continue to refine it to support the GWOT. This capability, however, depends on building and maintaining relations with supporting allies and friendly nations. We build and maintain these relationships through our Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and other Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs. We look forward to working with the Congress to ensure these activities continue to receive future resource consideration.

**Improving Readiness and Joint Warfighting Capability**

Improving the readiness and joint warfighting capability of USPACOM Forces is critical to assuring our friends and allies, dissuading future military competition, deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests, and defeating an adversary if deterrence fails. It includes the force levels, spares, operating dollars, and training needed to maintain ready forces. It also means innovating, transforming, and improving our capabilities and developing operating concepts and technologies needed to keep our forces ready for a wide range of alternative futures.

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).** The GWOT and traditional regional military threats demand ever-increasing agility and innovation in military intelligence. In the Asia-Pacific region, Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) remains our best means to provide timely information on threat developments and intentions. It is key to tracking terrorist activities in Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as maintaining warning indicators and situational awareness on areas such as Korea, tensions between
India and Pakistan, and China’s continuing military modernization and
relations with Taiwan.

The ability to integrate National Security Agency (NSA) and service
SIGINT is vital in peacetime and in crisis. Rapid advances in
telecommunications technologies, and their use by adversaries, present a
daunting SIGINT challenge. I strongly support NSA’s transformation efforts to
defeat any perspective gains the digital technology revolution may present to our enemies.

I strongly advocate the accelerated development and fielding of joint,
interoperable, modular, rapidly reconfigurable tactical SIGINT equipment for
land, sea, and air platforms. These improvements should be balanced by
collaborative intelligence processing systems at national, theater, and
tactical levels to make the best use of the increased data obtained.

Without concurrent improvements in NSA’s capabilities and in service
cryptologic systems it will be increasingly difficult to predict, find, and
target the most serious threats in our region.

Substantial improvements are needed to enhance Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) collection capability against key USPACOM Indications and Warning
requirements, to include hard and deeply buried underground facilities
supporting the adversary’s command, control, and communications and WMD
infrastructure. Focused and coordinated source development is critical.
Sustained resources for both CIA and DoD (Defense HUMINT Services) will yield
the progress we need. Our military commands must have insight into enemy
plans and intentions that only good HUMINT can provide

Cryptolinguists remain a long-standing shortfall with Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM proving the value of personnel fluent in languages and dialects. We are partially meeting the current challenges by training cryptolinguists to become familiar with low-density dialects and using speakers fluent in these
dialects to augment our force. Ensuring the Defense Manpower Data Center's
Automated Language Finder database tracks all USPACOM languages and dialects
would significantly improve our ability to find speakers of languages/dialects required for future operations. Additionally, it is essential the Defense Language Institute develop tests for languages/dialects that accurately assess language skills of service personnel.

To support future contingencies, crises or OPLANs, we require a full-up and exercised joint ISR architecture with adequate ISR assets. One positive development sponsored by the U.S. Air Force is the multi-intelligence tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) environment with the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) at Hickam Air Force Base (AFB). This system will distribute data from theater, commercial, and tactical ISR sensors to multiple users - national, joint, and combined - involved in a crisis. To fully benefit from the DCGS, additional funding is needed to ensure USPACOM service components have a sustained airborne ISR infrastructure, to include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and extended tether U-2 high-altitude surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.

**Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4).** Over the past 3 years, improving the C4 posture in the Pacific has been a top USPACOM priority and still is one of the most critical challenges we face today. The C4 infrastructure must be continually sustained and protected. We've invested heavily in command and control systems and equipment, communication devices, and computers across the command. We do this because our current and future requirements demand that we do. For example, the Air Force recently declared initial operating capability for a new Air Operations Center at Hickam AFB in Hawaii. This function can deploy in part or as a whole to operate through the full spectrum of contingency operations, reaching back for support from the rest of the Air Operations Center at Hickam. Every planning action, training event, operation, and weapon system in existence today relies heavily on the ability to communicate. Providing our fighting men and women with the weapons they need comes with a large price tag, but it's worth it. To do otherwise would be tantamount to denying them ammunition in the heat of battle.
C-4 Challenges. The GWOT demands effective communication systems and equipment to link national authorities and local first responders with real-time information. We have made great strides in improving C4 capabilities in the Pacific Theater, but we must continue improvements at a rapid pace to keep up with expanding requirements for connectivity, capacity and security. C4 ties all technology together and is the underpinning for Transformation, both directly and indirectly. We must enhance our information infrastructure to be more robust, able to rapidly capitalize on improving technology, and more cost efficient.

To achieve information superiority we need to move large volumes of information to and from the warfighter to maintain vivid and complete situational awareness and achieve understanding at a glance. Many folks envision large volumes of information as pages and pages of text messages, which can overwhelm users and result in “information overload.” Instead, we are talking about maximum use of multi-media such as video, shared applications through collaboration software, and high-resolution imagery. Through these types of tools, our operators can digest more information and we can collectively move towards a more knowledge-based environment.

This type of capability requires large network capacity. Our warfighting requirements for remote and austere locations require that this network capacity be robust and resilient. Enhanced satellite capability is one of USPACOM’s most critical needs. Today we do not have enough bandwidth in any of the military satellite bands, Ultra, Super, or Extra High Frequency, to fully support our operational plans. Commercial SATCOM capacity can support much of this shortfall, however, commercial SATCOM availability is subject to market pressures and is not fully dependable. For example, an important commercial SATCOM service to the Navy was preempted by media coverage of the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, Australia.

Additionally, USPACOM principally relies on geo-stationary weather satellites to track destructive typhoons over the vast expanse of USPACOM’s
ocean areas. Our current geo-stationary satellite weather information comes from foreign-owned and operated satellites that are reaching their designed service lives.

Consequently, it is absolutely crucial to fully fund and keep on track satellite upgrades, launches of new communications and weather satellites, and new satellite programs. The Transformational Communication System (TCS) system being proposed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I looks promising for meeting our SATCOM needs.

Our terrestrial communication infrastructure also needs attention. Most of our bases, posts, camps and stations are supported by mid 20th century cable and wire technology. The Global Information Grid (GIG) Bandwidth Expansion Project promises to replace this legacy infrastructure with the fiber optic connectivity needed for our in-garrison forces, command centers and training facilities.

Radio communications that connect us with federal, state and local government agencies are also important for force protection, homeland security and disaster response. We appreciate the congressional support for the Pacific Mobile Emergency Radio System (PACMERS), which will help us meet National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) mandate for frequency consolidation and allow for excellent interoperability with non-military partners.

**Information Assurance and Information Sharing.** Communication connectivity and capacity are only part of the solution for network centric warfare. Communication and information security must be maintained while simultaneously sharing information and collaborating with bilateral and multilateral coalitions. Our ability to share information with coalition partners is inhibited by our need to restrict information within enclaves that are not accessible to coalition partners. To be network centric, we need the network to be agile and allow for the dynamic interconnection of nodes that support several communities of interest. Typically, we can have several
simultaneous operations involving different coalition partners occurring in the Pacific at any given time. Being able to support these concurrently, with sufficient network capacity, is an information technology challenge.

Our Combined Operations Wide Area Network (COWAN) initiative is helping us achieve this goal by developing an information system that is interoperable with U.S. and coalition forces and is agile enough to allow us to selectively collaborate in multiple joint /multi-national environments simultaneously. We have formed a strong partnership with CENTCOM to roll our COWAN solution into the Combined Enterprise Information Exchange System, CENTRIXS, which may become the single network environment for all joint forces to support coalition operations and intelligence networking requirements. This single, highly meshed environment would be much more responsive and financially efficient than the multiple networks required today to support each individual coalition community.

Communication and information security measures are both part of our comprehensive Information Assurance strategy. As the Internet expands and becomes more pervasive, our adversaries are continuously finding ways of using computer vulnerabilities and network weaknesses to deny access to our information resources or exploit our information content. There are many programs focused on information assurance involving encryption, intrusion detection and network emergency response. Coordination of these programs and computer network defense activities requires a highly trained team of network professionals working around the clock with and a strong relationship with the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations (JTF CNO). I cannot cite any single program that is more important than any other in the Information Assurance area; however, emphasis in this area is a must if we expect to rely on network centric operations.

With regard to information sharing, we have made great strides in gathering and taking advantage of “open source” information and providing it to our coalition and inter-agency partners to build trust and improve
understanding. The vast amount of this information necessitates focused collection and analytical efforts to identify accurate and relevant information to enhance security cooperation. Open source products provided by the Virtual Information Center (VIC) and the regional information exchanges conducted via the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) have increased our situational awareness of events and developments in the Asia-Pacific region that affect all of our operations. More importantly, these web-based activities have enabled us to expand our information base and share the results instantly with our foreign counterparts and potential coalition partners.

**Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW).** The Pacific undersea warfare challenge is growing at a significant rate. In recent years, the USPACOM AOR has seen the greatest increase in submarine order of battle in the world. A robust and integrated ASW architecture and more capable force structure are essential to counter the growing submarine threat. The premier ASW asset remains submarines. To ensure sufficient submarines are available to track and kill enemy forces, we must continue to support the refueling of 688-class submarines and follow through in reaching a VIRGINIA-class submarine build rate at two per year in FY 2007. I also strongly support the rapid transition to acquiring Automatic Periscope Detection technology for surface ships and Navy Maritime Patrol Aircraft employed in littoral regions. Congressional efforts last year resulted in funding for a welcomed and much needed 688-class submarine refueling overhaul program and funding that enabled the transition from a science and technology program to an acquisition program for airborne Automatic Periscope Detection technology. I appreciate your support as we make necessary improvements in our ASW war fighting capabilities.

**Missile Defense (MD).** Short and medium range ballistic missiles pose the most pervasive and challenging missile threat for USPACOM MD. Effectively defending against this threat requires a layered, complementary mix of sea and ground based lower tier and upper tier terminal phase defense systems. Until
a robust upper tier system is fielded, lower tier systems remain paramount to successful execution of theater OPLANs. A mix of forward deployed ground systems and sea-based lower tier systems offers the lowest risk and earliest deployment options. Accordingly, I support delivery of a sea-based terminal system as soon as technologically feasible and a moderate increase in Patriot PAC-3/GEM+ missile production/conversion to meet current OPLAN and contingency plan (CONPLAN) warfighting requirements. From a homeland defense perspective, continued development and fielding of a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capable of intercepting missiles in all phases of flight (i.e. boost, midcourse, and terminal) against all known threats remains a top priority. Key capabilities that support these requirements, now and in the future (Missile Defense Agency’s Block ‘04–’06 BMDS capabilities), for USPACOM include PATRIOT PAC-3, Sea Based Midcourse Defense Segment, Theater High Altitude Air Defense, and Airborne Laser ½ power. Congressional support of the BMDS programs remains vigilant, and I applaud your continued support of Ballistic Missile Defense initiatives.

**Mobility and Operations.** During 2002, we made great strides partnering with U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to modernize our strategic air and sealift infrastructure to meet potential operational needs ranging from disaster relief to the GWOT and all the way to a major war. The USPACOM En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee has identified, validated, and championed over $500 million in hydrant, ramp, and runway projects throughout the AOR to support the National Military Strategy as mandated by the Defense Planning Guidance and by the Mobility Requirements Study 2005. Our current en route airlift system includes Elmendorf AFB Alaska, Hickam AFB Hawaii, Andersen AFB Guam, and Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Kadena AB, Misawa AB, and Yokota AB Japan. Additionally, we have developed an AOR-wide prioritized list of air and seaports to visit and assess their capability as potential en route locations.
The heavy use of Naval Supply Facility in Diego Garcia, a British Island in the Indian Ocean, in support of OEF, has led to its near-term consideration as an en route port supporting both USPACOM and USCENTCOM operations. We have identified over $38.7 million in infrastructure improvement projects to expand the facility’s current operational throughput capability. Projects nearing completion include improvements in temporary containerized munitions handling pads and storage areas, wharf lightning protection, and transient berthing projects. Similarly at Wake Island, we have identified significant infrastructure improvement projects to ensure continued access to this critical location supporting our Pacific Tanker Air Bridge. The FY02 MILCON $9.7 million Repair Island Access Facilities is currently restoring the wharf and marine bulkhead in preparation for major airfield pavement replacement starting with the FY03 MILCON $24.9 million, which replaces the entire deteriorated runway pavement. Following that, four more phases in FY04 and beyond will complete replacement of the airfield taxiways and aprons and upgrade of the water supply, electrical power and sanitary sewage systems, for an additional $74 million. These investments and others like them throughout the Pacific will ensure we have the necessary infrastructure readiness when we need them.

As early deployers, air-refueling tankers are critical to executing theater war plans for establishing the Pacific Tanker Air Bridge. Ongoing OEF and Noble Eagle have demonstrated the operational impact that air-refueling capability has in support of the GWOT. The KC-135 aircraft comprises 90% of the tanker fleet and their usage increased 45% over what was programmed following 11 September 2001.

The High Speed Vessel (HSV) provides a flexible alternative for intra-theater movement in USPACOM, including its use to augment airlift. Since October 2001, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has been testing and evaluating deployments using a leased HSV with great success and cost savings for exercise deployments and redeployments, as well as operational employment.
JOINT VENTURE HSV X1, the Joint Army/Navy HSV that participated in Millennium Challenge 2002 and other exercises, was scheduled to support U.S. Army training in the USPACOM Theater from March to April 2003, but was diverted to support U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). USPACOM fully supports the pursuit of high speed sealift technology as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and a future force projection transportation platform.

USPACOM supports USAF and USTRANSCOM efforts to procure C-17 aircraft to meet strategic airlift needs in our AOR. Our number one strategic lift shortfall is airlift due largely to the retirement of aging C-141 and C-130 airframes and substandard C-5 aircraft performance. Additionally, to better meet operational response in the AOR, we fully support the initiative to forward base eight C-17s each at Hickam AFB, and Elmendorf AFB starting in FY06 and FY07 respectively. To have facilities available on arrival of these aircraft, Hickam’s C-17 beddown military construction (MILCON) will start in FY04 with six projects totaling $64 million. Elmendorf’s C-17 beddown MILCON will start in FY05 and the MILCON funding stream for these facilities will total about $105 million each over the FY04 to FY09 MILCON FYDP to provide the needed facilities for these assets to have full mission capability. These strategic mobility aircraft will bring a much-needed aerial delivery capacity to the Pacific Theater and prevent any lapse in capability during the reduction of C-130’s in the AOR. We also support USAF efforts to procure F/A-22 Raptors. The F/A-22 will provide a unique, rapid response to swiftly defeat enemy threats in the USPACOM AOR.

A V-22 Osprey tiltrotor capability is truly transformational – exhibiting leap-ahead technology. If the current test program proves successful, this capability will extend our operational reach and access in the AOR. The Osprey's projected design, performance, and reduced vulnerability and susceptibility will provide USPACOM with a highly survivable and flexible capability. The aircraft's enhanced lift abilities provide significant migration for the medium-lift requirement.
The Pacific region needs three of the six planned Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) to fully support theater warfighting capabilities and region transformation efforts. The primary military force of our friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region is their Army. SBCT participation in regional events reinforces our commitment to support allied transformation efforts and coalition building by continuing Army-to-Army high technology training and exercise events. Additionally, the SBCTs show great promise in providing joint commanders the means to better integrate Army force capabilities as part of a joint or coalition task force.

**Training Areas.** We are tasked to perform an increasing number of missions, from peace operations to strikes and raids to noncombatant evacuation to humanitarian assistance. Each mission requires preparation. The only way to prepare and ensure readiness is through tough, oriented, and realistic training. Dropping dummy bombs and firing inert ordnance cannot replace “live-fire” practice. The first exposure to “live fire” our forces face must be in a controlled training environment where they learn from their experience at less risk than in hostile combat.

However, we routinely receive encroachment pressure on our training ranges throughout the AOR. Restrictions on space, hours, ordnance, and radio frequencies impact our ability to exercise our equipment and train to standard. Last Spring, a suit pertaining to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) temporarily closed our primary aircraft live-fire range, Farrallon de Medinilla, near Guam, until the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted an emergency stay. Fortunately, timely Congressional action amended the MBTA to exempt DoD military readiness activities, and a subsequent appellate court order dismissed the case as moot. Likewise, Makua Range on Oahu is in use but severe limits in the number and type of ground force training cycles have forced us to accomplish most small unit training in Hawaii through expensive deployments to the Pohakuloa range on the Big Island.
Range and training limitations in Japan and Korea cause units to deploy away from their home station for routine training. Moreover, although aircraft, artillery, and pistols are noisy instruments of war, they are basic parts of our business. Developments now demand noise restrictions that force important low-altitude maneuvers to unrealistically high altitudes and limit the use of ranges.

We are good stewards of our environment. Success stories are numerous, but often the stories aren’t well known. We have set aside space for protected species, altered or deferred some units’ training to avoid interference in nesting areas, and developed specific programs to increase the populations of protected or endangered species.

The military's answer to encroachment challenges has been to work around the problems while seeking to minimize the impact on the quality and quantity of training. But, maneuver space is less, training lanes have become narrow and artificially tunneled, and our individual maneuvers have become too predictable or repetitive. The work-arounds may still accomplish the training, but usually require additional costs – in terms of money, time, and impact to the well-being of our service members. Readiness and training experiences decline; we cannot let this continue.

Many of our environmental laws, while well intentioned, are vague. For example, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) prohibits harassment of protected species without prior authorization from the respective regulatory agency. The current definition of "harassment" of marine mammals can be mere "annoyance" or "potential to disturb" without biologically significant effects. Any Navy test or training activity that harasses a protected species must be approved by the applicable regulatory agencies – often after delays, or subject to restrictions, that degrade the quality of the training. And sometimes inflexibilities in the statue preclude our regulators from approving
even activities that many believe have insignificant impacts. Additionally, litigants using the Endangered Species Act are seeking to force the Fish and Wildlife Service to lock up thousands of acres of military ranges as “critical habitat”, even though our own congressionally mandated Installation Natural Resource Management Plans afford habitat protection. In fact, litigants are seeking to force the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate such critical habitat on significant areas of DoD training ranges for endangered species that are not even present on such lands. As these examples show, such loose language and broad definitions can and do impede essential air, land, and sea activities near marine mammals or endangered species locations. Clear definitions and consideration of national security requirements should be important points in all environmental legislation.

In April 2002, the Administration sent a legislative package to Congress recommending clarifications to certain environmental statutes as part of the Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative (RRPI). The proposed package was prepared to help DoD maintain its ability to train forces and continue to protect the environment in which we train. Last year, Congress enacted three elements of our proposal but did not act on the remaining five. This year, the President has resubmitted the remaining RRPI proposals, with some modifications based on both discussion with Congress and other environmental stakeholders and a significant decision last year concerning the MMPA in the SurTASS lawsuit. We thank Congress for support of the RRPI and ask for your support on future encroachment issues that impact our readiness.

**Logistics.** An aging aircraft inventory and some parts shortages continue to drive reduced Mission Capable and reduced fill rates for our "go to war" Readiness Spares Packages and high cannibalization rates. The result is lower than expected readiness at increased costs. Although funding for spare parts has improved over the last 2 years, some shortages continue. For example, only three of eight Pacific Air Force (PACAF) A-10, F-15, and F-16 wings maintained minimum Mission Capable standards during fourth quarter FY02.
PACAF requires excess cannibalization to meet wartime mission planning sortie generation rates. PACAF cannibalization rates are higher than 8% for the F-16, F-15C/D, F-15E, and A-10. Likewise, the U.S. Army uses controlled substitution to achieve peacetime mission-capable Aviation Fleet goals. Delays in stock availability due to 12-18 month spares delivery lead-times are a root cause of controlled substitution and create difficulty in matching funding lines with projected capabilities. Increased spares at the Army wholesale level are required to meet the increased flying hours necessary to surge to wartime Operational Tempo.

We have made progress but need your continued support in fully funding materiel and personnel requirements for organizational, intermediate, and depot maintenance levels. Additionally, we need support for each Service's Life Cycle Support program to extend the life of our aging aircraft fleets.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosive (CBRNE) defense is a significant concern in the Pacific theater, and a potential showstopper for U.S. military operations, causing significant operational risk to Major War OPLAN execution. CBRNE is a critical operating condition and potentially the greatest theater threat I face, affecting everyone, everywhere, including our allies and the homeland. Aircraft exposure on the Korean Peninsula or an attack on a few strategic choke points, including Guam and key Japanese air and seaports, could stop U.S. force flows and other critical support operations. Significant differences exist between what we would like to achieve against CBRNE threats and our actual capabilities. Specific shortages include Individual Protective Equipment, Chemical/ Biological Point and Standoff detection, inadequate decontamination standards, and significant shortcomings in detailed and actionable intelligence on adversary WMD processes and facilities.

We are active in the Joint Service Installation Protection Program and with other ongoing studies and demonstrations. For example, we are sponsoring a Restoration Operations (RESTOPS) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
(ACTD) to examine the actions necessary to protect against and immediately react to the consequences of a chemical or biological attack at a fixed site. Through this venue, we are investigating new tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as exploring new detection, decontamination, early warning networks, and medical technologies. The RESTOPS ACTD will have its final demonstration at Osan Air Base, Korea, in February 2003. Another effort we are sponsoring is a DoD-wide biological warfare (BW) seminar. The DoD WMD community collectively assessed the shortfalls within DoD for responding to enemy BW and gave us a way-ahead to resolve these issues. We are working to integrate procedures and technologies that allow us to mitigate the impact of such an attack. We cannot do this alone. USPACOM needs support from the entire joint community to improve our abilities to protect our forces and to operate in this difficult environment should the need arise. Your continued support is critical to CBRNE defense readiness.

**Quality of Service for our Men and Women**

While winning the war on terrorism and transforming our forces to ensure a qualitative military edge, we must improve on the Quality of Service (QOS) for our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. QOS means providing the high quality operating facilities, the tools, and the information technology necessary for our service men and women to achieve their goals and execute their missions with efficiency and a minimum of frustration. My travels throughout the Asia-Pacific region – first as Commander, Pacific Fleet, and now as Commander, Pacific Command – confirm my belief you have done a great service to our military members and their families in the area of personnel entitlements.

The QOS initiatives included in the FY03 National Defense Authorization Act show service members that military and congressional leaders are taking actions to meet the needs of our service men and women and their families. Thank you for your support on recent initiatives, including the 4.1% pay
raise, assignment incentive pay, and the ability to grant emergency leave of absence. These QOS initiatives will assist in retaining highly skilled troops and their families. Many USPACOM personnel will benefit from the ability to defer their Consecutive Overseas Tours travel entitlement, from recent increases in Basic Housing Allowance, and from the additional Basic Allowance for Subsistence provisions in areas with inadequate messing facilities. Deployed personnel will be more at ease knowing that additional family assistance has been provided in the form of childcare, education, and youth services for our men and women who are in harm’s way, supporting contingency operations and the GWOT.

Military Family Housing remains a top priority. All services have devised plans to eliminate inadequate housing by 2007 with a combination of traditional military construction (MILCON) and privatization (Public Private Venture or Residential Communities Initiative). Congressional support has provided immediate benefits to our men and women who serve. Continued funding is essential, however, to enable further progress in reducing the number of inadequate quarters and in limiting out of pocket expenses to our service members and their families while maintaining a high standard of construction and quality. While we have made progress, we still have considerable work remaining. We appreciate your continued attention on this important issue.

Dorms and Barracks for our single service members is another area where we have seen significant improvement. Our service components are now pursuing well thought out plans to meet the FY08 goal of eliminating open bay berthing and central latrine-style barracks. We must retain our current operational funding stream, however, to maintain existing facilities as renovation proceeds. Again, congressional support has had a direct and beneficial impact on our young service members.

Our base infrastructure is still below standards. Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) of facilities and infrastructure throughout the USPACOM AOR continues to be an important concern. FY01
Installations Readiness Report rated about 80% of USPACOM facilities at C-3 (having serious deficiencies) or C-4 (not supporting mission requirements). In many areas, USPACOM facilities are 1940’s vintage and not mission conducive. For example, modern weapons no longer fit into WWII vintage magazines and require improved piers for safe, proper handling. As you know, the DoD goal directs components to achieve a 67-year recapitalization rate by FY07 and restore readiness of existing facilities to C-2 (minimum acceptable performance) status on average, by the end of FY10. Current funding puts achieving this directive at risk. In addition to maintaining our facilities, we have equally important infrastructure requirements above SRM needs that require attention. These include new mission bed-downs and essential environmental requirements. Our facilities and infrastructure provide a foundation for optimum readiness and quality of service critical to mission success. We appreciate Congress’ past funding efforts and call upon your continued assistance to ensure adequate facilities and proper maintenance for the long term.

By far the most important weapons systems in our inventory are our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines. These individuals require life-cycle support and maintenance just like other systems. Force Health Protection is that maintenance program. Ensuring the health of our forces directly relates to our ability to implement effective disease countermeasures that include vaccines, antibiotic stockpiles, and automated disease surveillance systems. I ask you to continue your support for ongoing research and development efforts that will improve our disease detection capabilities.

The upkeep and replacement of military medical facilities remains one of our top QOS priorities. We are working to replace or renovate our substandard facilities, particularly for Naval Hospital, Guam, further degraded by Typhoon Pongsona in December. We must continue to ensure our military medical infrastructure is safe, modern, and secure.
We appreciate the MILCON appropriations to the USPACOM AOR. These funds are vital to maintain our ability to work and fight together with our allies and to help transform and modernize our forces. In FY03, $1.1 billion was allotted toward mission and mission support requirements and $300 million toward family housing needs. In FY04, we need continued MILCON support for vital readiness and QOS issues. For example, we require MILCON for new mission bed-downs, such as the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams and the C-17 aircraft. Our backlog of major infrastructure repairs is reflected in the need for complete or major repair of airfield pavements at all U.S. Pacific Air Force bases, as well as the major repairs needed on critical infrastructure at bases and long-range radar detection in defense of the homeland. In the wake of destruction from Typhoon Pongsona in November 2002, it is clear we require supplemental MILCON support for a “typhoon-proof” concrete aircraft hangar as well as several other projects at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The hangar will provide reliable support for critically important current and future Air Expeditionary Force and OPLAN requirements. Also, we require MILCON for consistent environmental stewardship and essential dorm and family housing deficits and renovations. I thank Congress for using MILCON where enhanced force protection is necessary.

The New USPACOM Headquarters is under construction and designed to provide advanced information management, decision support and visualization technologies for our people to efficiently accomplish their mission.

Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) MILCON for two schools on Guam is my top family QOS priority. One is an elementary school that is currently not in the DoDEA MILCON program due to lack of funds. The second is a replacement high school programmed in the DoDEA’s FY06 MILCON program. Current facilities are 1997 building conversions in poor, substandard condition that received significant damage from two typhoons in 2002. Further, numerous seismic events over the past few years have significantly weakened the elementary/middle school. Our military family dependents need
safe, soundly built schools conducive to a good learning environment. We need your near term support for these two DoDEA school MILCON projects in Guam especially in light of our increased force posture on the island.

*Pacific Warfighting Center (PWC).* Increasing operational and exercise activity, training complexities, and C4I modernization have rendered obsolete USPACOM's exercise simulation infrastructure and support capabilities. This deficiency significantly reduces the ability to train USPACOM and Joint Task Force commanders in crisis action readiness procedures; limits their ability to rehearse key operational orders; degrades the ability to improve combined interoperability with friends in the region; and contributes to increased OPTEMPO, training time, and associated costs for USPACOM forces before responding to contingencies. The current facility does not support future technologies or meet force protection requirements. The planned, state-of-the-art operations and simulation center will improve total force readiness and achieve OSD's goal for transforming training by exploiting emerging technologies to create a robust, networked, live, virtual, and constructive training and mission rehearsal environment for joint and combined force commanders and their staffs.

PWC will be a key node on the Joint National Training Center's global grid of operational warfighting centers. Specifically, it will fully integrate with, and extend the capability of, the Joint Forces Command’s Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center and U.S. European Command’s Warrior Preparation Center. Accordingly, the PWC will provide an effective venue for decision support, OPLAN mission rehearsal, and combat analysis for headquarters and deploying forces. The planned simulation center will transform USPACOM through the use of emerging information technologies to support advanced warfighting concepts and joint experimentation. The PWC promises to save exercise funds and enhance regional security cooperation using INTERNET-based information exchange opportunities via the Asia-Pacific Area Network. This MILCON project will provide a secure facility in Hawaii.
for assembling military, civil-military and interagency representatives from throughout the Asia-Pacific region for interoperability exercises, collaborative research, and seminars. The facility will also support component conference requirements in a secure and protected setting.

Again, much has been accomplished in QOS improvements, but we still have more to do. Thank you again for the support you have provided and I thank you in advance for your continued future support.

Reinforcing the “Constants” in the Pacific Region

Our long-standing bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, our friendships and the presence of our forward-deployed combat forces continue to be the foundation of the region’s peace and stability. One of my goals is to build on these relationships while nurturing multinational efforts that support the region’s mutual interests. Our forward posture is fundamental and our combat capability essential to deter regional threats. We look for initiatives that help shape our overseas posture.

Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). Dramatic events of the past 2 years have brought into focus new and challenging national security demands for the 21st century. A mix of traditional and non-traditional threats jeopardizes the unprecedented levels of Asia-Pacific security and prosperity of the last 50 years. These threats are reminders that evolving challenges require more prompt and effective responses to ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. At USPACOM, we “operationalize,” national and defense security strategy with regional emphasis. Attaining national security and defense objectives in the Asia-Pacific region requires a broad understanding of threat capabilities, a frank assessment of political-military realities, and a well-charted course supported by meaningful and mutually beneficial security cooperation.

Our acute theater security concerns include conflict on the Korean Peninsula (where the stakes are high); miscalculation between regional
strategic rivals (such as China-Taiwan or India-Pakistan); and transnational threats such as terrorism, proliferation, drug-associated violence, and instability from failed nation-states. Although we anticipate peaceful resolution of longstanding security concerns in places like the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and Kashmir, the strategic situation in these potential flashpoints and elsewhere mandates vigilance and preparedness. We are strengthening our current security relationships and military capabilities while developing new relationships and capabilities to deter conflict and dissuade would-be regional competitors.

The USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plan supports the overall mission by enhancing U.S. influence, expanding U.S. operational access to train (and deploy) forward-deployed and forward-based combat forces, and increasing interoperability with our coalition partners to support potential efforts across the spectrum of military operations. Every TSC activity we undertake enhances our joint/combined capabilities and communicates our intent to assure friends, or dissuade, deter, or defeat potential enemies. Security Cooperation is an engine of change that, along with our Joint Training and Experimentation Plans and our operational focus, solidifies the link between national strategy and focused, enduring regional security.

The dividends of a relevant, adaptive TSC plan are clear - our treaty allies and friends have provided incomparable support to OEF and the GWOT. Every day, our TSC planners, exercise planners, security assistance personnel, and forward-deployed forces coordinate, plan, and execute meaningful security cooperation activities that strengthen military-to-military cooperation and prepare U.S. forces and their prospective Coalition partners for the next challenge.

Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance has never been stronger. From the outstanding rapport at the highest levels of our governments to the action officers, our two countries are moving forward in strengthening ties and resolving problems. Nearly 38,000 U.S. armed forces personnel are stationed
in Japan, which also serves as a forward-deployed site for about 14,000 U.S. naval personnel. Japan provides over $4.5 billion in host-nation support, the most generous of any U.S. ally. Without these forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces, it would be much more difficult for the U.S. to meet commitments and defend American interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is fundamental to security and peaceful development in the region.

Since becoming Prime Minister (PM) nearly two years ago, PM Koizumi has stressed the importance of the alliance and has sought to move Japan’s security policies forward. He exerted exceptional leadership in response to the 11 September terrorist attacks, pushing support for the GWOT. After 11 September, the Government of Japan (GOJ) rapidly passed legislation and obtained Cabinet approval of a Basic Plan that provides the framework for significant Japan Self-Defense Force contributions to the war on terrorism. The speed with which Japan reacted is unprecedented in the 50-year history of the Japan-U.S. security relationship. GOJ contributions to the GWOT include the provision of over 70 million gallons of fuel oil to coalition ships by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force has provided over 1700 flight hours moving tons of important cargo and passengers throughout the theater. We take every opportunity to express our appreciation to the GOJ for its support following 11 September.

The significant progress in building national support against terrorism does not eliminate concerns, however, about U.S. military activities in Japan. Although Japanese public support for the alliance remains high, about 70 percent, a majority of Japanese citizens would like to see a reduction in the burden of our presence. The normal range of base-related issues, including constraints on training and concerns about crime and the environment require continued careful management.

Efforts continue to implement the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report. While 15 of 27 SACO initiatives have been completed, 12
(2 of 5 noise reduction and 10 of 11 land release initiatives) are still in progress. The cornerstone of the Japan-U.S. SACO Final Report is the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). GOJ approval of a Basic Plan for the off-shore portion of the FRF highlights the progress in the SACO process. However, we continue to emphasize to the GOJ that our requirements have not changed, and a complete replacement facility is required before returning Futenma.

The U.S.-Japan alliance requires our proper attention. At the same time, significant growth opportunities exist for advancing U.S. interests. U.S. forces' presence here, from the country team perspective, is secure, and careful management of the issues will ensure it remains so. My hope for the coming year is that our security dialogue with Japan will advance beyond the discussion of current issues related to bases and training to address our longer-term interests in sustaining our vital alliance. We also look to expand and improve U.S.-Japan coordination with other countries within the region to address regional security issues.

Republic of Korea (ROK). The ROK remains one of our strongest allies. The new Korean government is committed to the alliance. Unfortunate incidents marred the relationship this past year - the most tragic was the death of two young Korean girls in an accident involving a U.S. Forces Korea vehicle. In this regard, the U.S. has at every level offered our profound sympathy and apologies.

The late fall protests indicate the depth of emotion the Korean people feel on issues related to perceived inequalities in the ROK-U.S. relationship. However, they are not indicative of the solution sought by most Koreans or the Korean government. The Korean people in general recognize the great contributions made by the United States to their nation’s security and believe the relationship is in their interest, as it is in ours. In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and United States Forces Korea, we continue to review our force presence in the ROK and North East Asia.
As a partner, the ROK has been steadily increasing its regional security role. USPACOM is working with the ROK Joint Staff to ensure our regional security cooperation efforts are in consonance with one another and integrated where appropriate. In particular, the ROK supports USPACOM exercises and seminars aimed at increasing regional cooperation and interoperability among U.S. friends and allies. Korea’s contributions to regional peace and stability were clearly demonstrated this past year in Timor-Leste, where ROK Army troops participated in UN peacekeeping efforts to support the region’s newest nation. This growing regional role for Korea contributes to the security of the region while not detracting from its peninsular defense responsibilities.

The ROK continues steadfast support to anti-terrorism efforts. The Korean Armed Forces are with us in the GWOT, from Guam to Central Asia and on the ground in Afghanistan, supporting our efforts with transportation and medical support. In the USPACOM area, the ROK Air Force has flown over 2000 hours moving tons of important cargo and passengers throughout the AOR. Similarly, the ROK Navy has provided important sealift to bolster our efforts in South Asia, moving 3500 tons of material. In the aftermath of Typhoon Cha'ataan, the ROK landing ship tanks (LSTs) provided emergency sealift of over 350 tons of bottled water and other disaster relief supplies and materials to Guam. The ROK Army deployed a Mobile Surgical Hospital initially to Manas, Kyrgyzstan, and subsequently to Bagram, Afghanistan. A civil engineering battalion will soon join these forces to assist in rebuilding the infrastructure of that emerging nation. These contributions have been, and will continue to be, important to the success of OEF, and we thank the Korean people for their support.

The events of 2002 remind us of the dangers posed by the Kim Jong-Il regime and the threat our ROK-U.S. combined team faces on the peninsula. The conventional threat from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains unabated, illustrated by the unprovoked naval attack in July on an ROK
Navy vessel that resulted in the loss of four young ROK sailors. The DPRK maintains more than 60 percent of its forces within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and the Kim regime persists in its “military first” policy, providing sufficient resources to keep its large force fed, equipped, and exercised, while its citizens face deprivation and starvation. While the DPRK has so far not broken its promise to suspend ballistic missile test flights, it continues development efforts including static engine tests. Additionally, the DPRK exports missiles and missile technology, posing a grave counter-proliferation concern. Finally, the Kim regime continues to engage in nuclear brinkmanship, with the disclosure of its Highly Enriched Uranium program and progressive steps to restart its plutonium production and reprocessing program. These actions are in violation of the Agreed Framework, DPRK pledges to the IAEA, and the 1992 North-South Basic Agreement calling for denuclearization of the Peninsula. The DPRK is not above precipitating a crisis to strengthen its bargaining position. Now more than ever it is critical our ROK-U.S. partnership stand firm.

The ROK is a strong ally that is increasingly contributing to regional peace and stability. Together we face a common threat on the Peninsula. However, the Korean people are looking for ways to foster reconciliation with the DPRK. We recognize the importance of these efforts to the Korean people and their government. Moreover, we agree on the crucial role of the Armistice Agreement in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula, and we are committed to ensuring that efforts at reconciliation do not increase risk for the security of the ROK or the United States.

In sum, through continuing support to the coalition to combat global terrorism and efforts to participate fully in regional security, the ROK plays a very positive role in the region. U.S. and ROK forces remain prepared, and we are looking for ways to strengthen the alliance to deal with current and future challenges.
Australia. Our strong ally and partner, Australia has demonstrated steadfast commitment and bold leadership in the GWOT and in essentially every other security endeavor in the region. Its military contributions to the coalition against terror are substantial and include Combat Air Patrols (CAP), tankers, Special Air Service (SAS) troops, guided missile frigates and, most recently, support for Sea Swap, our USN initiative to exchange crews of select vessels forward in theater. Additionally, Australia has become a regional leader in pursuing multilateral counter-terrorism initiatives in Southeast Asia by signing counter-terrorism MOUs with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand while pursuing others. USPACOM remains focused on maintaining strong levels of interoperability with the Australian Defence Forces across the full spectrum of contingency operations including counter-terrorism. Australia continues to lead international support for the struggling nations of the Oceania region, providing humanitarian assistance and training. Australia is the southern anchor of our security architecture in the region, and we will maintain the vibrancy of this strategic relationship.

Republic of the Philippines. Our relationship with the Government and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) developed and matured throughout 2002. Through comprehensive security assistance packages and focused security cooperation, the AFP has improved its ability to fight terrorism on its homeland as demonstrated by the AFP Southern Command’s effective neutralizing of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on Basilan Island and the continuing fight in Jolo. This has not come without cost. Both American citizens and service members have been wounded, or lost their lives to the terrorists in the Southern Philippines.

Despite these losses, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – Philippines (OEF-P) has produced tremendous successes. The Joint Task Force advised and assisted AFP forces in their mission to rid ASG terrorists from Basilan Island. As a result, the ASG threat declined significantly on Basilan Island. Although the road that circled Basilan was repaired to support AFP/U.S. tactical mobility,
it will also help the people of Basilan in their economic livelihood as will the new water wells, repairs to school buildings, critical hospitals, and other medical treatment areas throughout the island. These humanitarian and civic assistance program successes acted as force multipliers for U.S. and AFP operations because the programs separated the citizens of Basilan from supporting the terrorist threat. To ensure the AFP can successfully respond to the terrorist threat, the U.S developed a Security Assistance (SA) Program that will provide the AFP with additional counter-terrorism training and equipment. This program is just starting and will consist of light infantry battalion, light reaction company, night-vision, intelligence fusion, Non-commissioned Officer, and Civil Military Operations training. The SA modules will occur at various locations in the Philippines to benefit the AFP beyond its Southern Command units. Additionally, USPACOM is implementing a Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Maintenance Assistance Plan that will sustain AFP critical tactical mobility platforms, including UH-1H helicopters, C-130 transport aircraft, two-half ton trucks, and 78-foot patrol craft. We seek your assistance in ensuring funding for this program through the next 3 years. This will give the AFP an opportunity to address current equipment maintenance shortfalls.

Action has not been limited to the southern Philippines. We have completed various large-scale exercises in Luzon and continue to plan for security cooperation events in 2003. On 21 November 2002, the AFP signed a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement with USPACOM – a positive sign of reciprocity and an improving relationship. We have already used the agreement by leasing body armor to the AFP. This small gesture will improve the AFP force protection posture and support Philippine efforts to combat terrorism.

The Philippines plays a strategic role in the USPACOM AOR. As training areas for U.S. forces dwindle, excellent training facilities in the Philippines remain available, though repairs are required. Last year, the U.S.
provided $25 million dollars in FY 2002 supplemental funding for the SA modules currently underway in the Philippines.

We have accomplished a lot in the GWOT and in securing our strategic objectives with the unwavering support of the Philippine Government. The security situation in the Philippines needs continued improvement to attract investments and promote economic stability. Continued U.S. support through comprehensive, focused and timely SA funding is one way we can influence the situation in the Philippines. Supporting the GRP in their fight against the ASG is another way. A sustained GRP counterterrorism capability is the goal.

**Thailand.** The Kingdom of Thailand is a treaty ally that continues to have an outstanding military-to-military relationship with the U.S. Exercise COBRA GOLD (CG) is a centerpiece of this relationship. CG-2003 will be our 22nd joint/combined bilateral exercise with Thailand, and the 4th of the expanded observer program - making it USPACOM's premier multilateral event. By adding this multinational exercise dimension in an environment that trains for transnational issues, Thailand is assuming an active role in promoting South East Asia security.

Military-to-military policy with Thailand is managed through annual Thai-American Consultations. Benefits to Thailand include U.S. counterdrug/border security support, demining training, peace operations training and support, and an extensive security assistance program with a robust International Military Education and Training (IMET) component. Thailand's contributions as a regional leader include a peacekeeping troop presence in Timor-Leste, a commitment to providing engineering support in Afghanistan to support the GWOT, and an intent to contribute to the peace process in Aceh, Indonesia.

As a result of our strong relationship with Thailand, we have received access to facilities, ports, and airfields, and the granting of overflight clearances in support of operational emergencies. Our ongoing security cooperation program, including exercises such as COBRA GOLD, helps to address
the security interests of both our countries and serves as a catalyst for enhancing our regional security posture.

**Singapore.** Our relationship with Singapore is one of the strongest in the region. Following the 11 September terrorist attacks, Singapore provided access to airfields and naval facilities to U.S. forces, detained 31 suspected terrorists, froze terrorist financial assets, increased protection to shipping in the Strait of Malacca, and implemented the U.S. Container Security Initiative. Singapore’s recently published White Paper on the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists and announcement to launch a terrorist research center in 2003/2004 testifies to its comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. Our efforts with Singapore focus on reinforcing our already strong foundation through improved interoperability and cooperation.

**Malaysia.** Some of the most aggressive action against terrorism in Southeast Asia has occurred in Malaysia. To date, Malaysian security forces have arrested more than 70 suspected terrorists and have taken the lead in several initiatives aimed at increasing cooperation in combating terrorism and other areas of mutual interest. The proposed Regional Counter Terrorism Training Center in Kuala Lumpur is one such initiative and represents an important opportunity to enhance regional efforts at combating terrorism. By providing expertise, information, and funding when appropriate, we can assist Malaysia and other nations of Southeast Asia in developing the skills necessary to defeat terrorism. As a moderate Muslim nation with a secular democratic government, Malaysia’s influence extends beyond the region. Its January announcement to discontinue funding for private religious schools is an example of a government taking action against the root causes of terrorism by not supporting deviant extremist teachings that breed hatred. Currently, Malaysia holds the chairmanship of the Organization of Islamic Conference and remains influential in the Non-Aligned Movement. Together, we remain committed to cooperating in areas of mutual interest and improving our ability to operate in combined regional efforts.
India. Based on the policy direction provided by the Indo-U.S. Defense Policy Group, USPACOM embarked on an aggressive security cooperation program with India over the past year. To date, our forces have conducted a number of successful exercises - ranging from airborne operations to surface warfare naval exercises - that have improved the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces. Over the past 10 months, USPACOM and its components have met with their Indian counterparts and established a long-range plan outlining mutually beneficial activities. These programs will increase our interoperability with, and access to, Indian forces. Our growing military cooperation supports the transformation of our relationship with India and serves to further this strategic partnership. This partnership was evident in India’s strong support for the GWOT, most notably its naval escorts of U.S. ships transiting the Strait of Malacca last summer. As my recent trip to the troubled state of Kashmir confirmed, terrorists also menace India. Our improved relationships with India and Pakistan were invaluable as we helped these rivals step back last year from the brink of war.

Indonesia. The government of Indonesia responded admirably to the terrorist bombings in Bali on 12 October 2002, arresting many key operatives and developing information on the domestic and regional terrorist threat. Globally, radical Islam continues to destabilize Muslim countries and threaten the interests of tolerant, democratic nations. Indonesia is a key battleground in the struggle against terrorism and radicalism. In the face of economic turmoil, separatist and communal violence, and political transition, the world’s most populous Muslim nation is struggling to maintain its secular, democratic character, and to cooperate with the international community in eliminating transnational security threats. The Indonesian military (TNI) is also going through a difficult transition from protector of an autocratic regime to defender of a popularly elected government. This is a significant cultural and institutional transition that will not happen by itself.
Accountability, essential to democratic civil-military relations, must improve. Critical to the success of this effort is Professional Military Education that exposes TNI officers to democratic norms and modern defense management techniques while building personal bonds of trust and goodwill. Particularly important is influencing the younger generation of officers to support the struggle against terrorism. International Military Education and Training (IMET) is another important tool as is FMF support for equipment, such as patrol boats for monitoring Indonesia's porous borders, to improve TNI's ability to counter transnational threats.

_East Timor_. This past May, Timor-Leste became the world’s newest democracy following 20 plus years of occupation and over 200,000 deaths. Though the greatest credit for this achievement goes to the Timorese people, the U.S. military provided significant assistance in Timor-Leste’s transition to a democratic state. Our U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET) played a vital role in providing a stabilizing military presence during Timor-Leste’s transition to independence. We conducted monthly ship visits, built schools and roads, repaired water and electrical systems, and provided medical and dental treatment for thousands of Timorese. We are proud of USGET and our military forces that contributed to Timor-Leste independence.

Although USGET deactivated on 17 December 2002, USPACOM continues to play a positive role in Timor-Leste’s development as a democratic state. Through IMET and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) we are funding English language training, helping develop the Timor-Leste Defense Force (ETDF) logistics system, purchasing basic equipment, and designing training programs to help develop Timor’s Defense Secretariat and the ETDF. My key goals are to support the development of a civil/military defense establishment subordinate to civilian authority and the rule of law and help develop the ETDF as a credible self-defense force.

_China_. We have a modest but constructive military-to-military relationship with China. Our relationship is guided by PL 106-65 (NDAA 2000),
which limits us to the areas of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) and other non-warfighting venues. Our activities are part of ongoing DoD efforts to place such contacts with China on a new footing since the April 2001 aircraft collision incident. The USS PAUL FOSTER port visit to Qingdao in November 2002 and my visit to China from 13-17 December 2002 were the first USPACOM bilateral military-to-military contacts with China since March 2001. One objective of these exchanges is to demonstrate the quality of our forces and our values by developing personnel exchanges between the younger generation of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and U.S. military personnel.

**Taiwan.** For Taiwan, our actions are guided by the Taiwan Relations Act. We have worked this past year to support self defense improvements that can best meet Taiwan’s identified defense needs. We want Taiwan to remain stable, democratic, and economically prosperous while it develops a professional, civilian-controlled defense establishment with a modernized, joint operations-oriented military.

**Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS)** brings together current and future military and civilian leaders to discuss regional security concerns. The Center provides a unique platform to discuss security issues while promoting USPACOM and OSD regional cooperation policies. Now more than ever, we realize each country must contribute to regional security to assure its continued political, economic, and social stability. Through executive courses and conferences, the APCSS gives Asia-Pacific leaders a regional forum to recognize security challenges, not only from a U.S. viewpoint but also from the perspective 45 participating nations, including Russia, Chile, Canada, and Pakistan.

**Center of Excellence (COE).** COE’s peace operations seminars have improved peace support capabilities in countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. This improvement is evident in Thai and Filipino participation in peace stability operations in Aceh, Indonesia.
These and other COE activities demonstrate our long-term commitment to relationships across the civil-military spectrum in the Asia-Pacific region. The Center’s contributions complement other efforts to eliminate immediate terrorist threats. COE continues to prepare our forces to perform effectively in more complex environments with new actors and less predictable behaviors toward civilian victims of conflict. The Center’s unique position as a civil-military humanitarian organization allows it to engage authorities from diverse countries in non-intrusive ways that help USPACOM reach out to new and otherwise reluctant partners. Your support for the COE in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance provides valuable assistance in executing USPACOM priorities.

**Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference.** One of our premier theater security activities, USPACOM annually hosts this regional conference, bringing together Asia-Pacific CHODs (CJCS equivalents) for a series of discussions on regional defense issues. The November 2002 conference, which was held in Singapore and was co-hosted by the Singapore Armed Forces and Chief of Defense Lieutenant General Lim Chuan Poh, gathered senior military leaders from 21 nations, including the Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace. The conference’s theme, “Meeting Security Challenges in the 21st Century,” provided a forum for candid dialogue among senior leaders. The October 2002 Bali bombings heavily influenced discussions and underscored the ability of terrorists to cut across borders and present a common regional and global threat. The CHOD’s conference continues to provide an excellent opportunity to foster understanding, build confidence among participants, strengthen relationships, and promote stability.

**Foreign Military Financing (FMF)** provides vital support to developing countries involved in the GWOT. Funds provided in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act, 2002 and the emergency FMF Supplemental directly supported Security Cooperation priorities in the East Asian Littoral and other regions in USPACOM. FMF delivers the military
articles, services, and training required to support the efforts of our friends and allies that promote U.S. security interests. We appreciate your support of SA programs and our efforts to improve their effectiveness and responsiveness.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) is an effective, low-cost component of the SA effort. The program provides U.S. access to foreign governments and influences those governments far out of proportion to its modest cost. Furthermore, it exposes future leaders to U.S. values and commitment to the rule of law and the role of a professional military in a democratic society, and it promotes military professionalism. Recent restoration of full IMET to Indonesia is a welcome development. Having a core group of well-trained, professional leaders with first hand knowledge of our values and democratic institutions will make a difference in achieving our strategic security goals in Indonesia and throughout the theater.

Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) or Mutual Logistic Support Agreements (MLSA) have enhanced interoperability and readiness and provided a cost effective mechanism for mutual logistics support for U.S. and Allied Forces. USPACOM forces that participated in the FY02 multinational exercise COBRA GOLD greatly reduced their logistics footprint by using an ACSA. Three countries within USPACOM’s AOR have deployed forces outside our AOR under ACSA provisions in support of the GWOT – Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea. Thus far, these countries have benefited from approximately $350,000 worth of logistics support, supplies, and services via reimbursable ACSA transactions. Primary logistics support provided includes food, medical services, dental support, force protection, transportation/material handling equipment, billeting, vehicle/equipment maintenance, and fuel. Thailand is preparing to deploy forces to the USCENTCOM AOR soon in support of the GWOT, and the ACSA has been instrumental in providing Thai forces with cold weather and NBC gear on a reimbursable basis. USPACOM has 10 ACSAs in place (Philippines, Australia, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, New
Zealand, Fiji, and Tonga) with eight other countries within our AOR in DoD’s ACSA - Eligible status (India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Brunei, Maldives, Madagascar, and Sri Lanka). We will continue to negotiate with ACSA-Eligible countries to expand the options we have to integrate coalition capabilities.

Forward stationed or deployed military presence provides the leading edge of U.S. combat power and forms the cornerstone of deterrence. Within the Asia-Pacific region this equates to roughly 100,000 forward-deployed personnel located primarily in the Republic of Korea and Japan. These forces deter conflict, dissuade competition, respond to crisis, man the infrastructure to receive follow-on forces, and fight if necessary. USPACOM is committed to developing the most effective regional command and control constructs to maximize the employment of our forward-deployed forces. In conjunction with ongoing DoD restructuring initiatives, we are reviewing these command and control structures and our force posture to ensure they are consistent with today’s operational requirements and geo-political realities. The goal is to consolidate and transform our headquarters in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and throughout the region to provide an immediately employable force capable of decisive operational effects. Of course, these improvements will be undertaken in close consultation with our allies. Prototype command and control constructs such as the Joint Mission Force or Standing Joint Force Headquarters leverage both enhanced joint warfighting equities and transformation dividends. Along with our efforts to improve our command structure, we will continue to develop diversified access throughout the region. We foresee ongoing requirements to consolidate and improve our facilities in Korea, Japan, and other locations in the region. We also expect to enhance our access to facilities in Southeast Asia (SEA) and the South Asia Indian Ocean (SAIO) area to meet regional and global requirements and support the GWOT and other operational or contingency demands.

Promoting “Change” and Improving the Asia-Pacific Defense Posture
Our country is undergoing the most fundamental transformation of its defense strategy and Armed Forces since the Second World War. Guidance for this transformation is clear and starts with the National Security Strategy. At USPACOM, we are putting that guidance into action, operationalizing it with Asia-Pacific emphasis. Our efforts include strengthening command and control constructs, updating plans, improving force posture, diversifying access and enroute logistics, improving capabilities for immediate employment, and developing new operating patterns and concepts.

Our progress toward successful transformation of our force is the result of a deliberate, iterative process of innovation and experimentation. This process necessitates that we collaborate and stay in close touch with service initiatives – ensuring they are synchronized into the joint team. Likewise, we continue to build a collaborative bridge between our experimental efforts and the experimentation underway in USJFCOM, the lead command for joint experimentation.

Consistent with Secretary Rumsfeld’s Transformation Planning Guidance, USPACOM has a multifaceted program covering a broad range of technological, organizational, and conceptual initiatives. It is a focused effort to explore and integrate innovative concepts and mature technologies to address our toughest challenges to effective joint operations.

Our transformation and experimentation efforts are necessary steps in advancing improvements to the speed of action and effectiveness of joint operations across strategic, operational, and tactical force levels. To date, our new standing operating procedures and enhancements to collaboration have yielded as much as two weeks’ reduction in time to stand up and deploy a Joint Task Force (JTF) in response to a contingency. By experimenting with and fielding mature technologies and prototype decision tools – placing them in the hands of operators well within the traditional acquisition cycle time – we have established information superiority and enhanced efficiency for theater command and control. With continued support, we can zero-in on even greater
improvements to JTF effectiveness, such as integration and synchronization of operational fire and maneuver, surpassing information superiority with decision superiority, and expediting the fielding of mature technologies and concept prototypes to forward-deployed JTF Commanders.

Within USPACOM, our Joint Mission Force (JMF) initiative provides the coherent framework for experimentation and transformation to enhance JTF operations across the spectrum of missions from forcible entry through humanitarian assistance. This mature initiative has allowed us to focus our transformational efforts toward a specific end-objective: seamless joint operations. The JMF concept will serve as USPACOM’s segue to implementing the Standing Joint Force Headquarters as directed in the Defense Planning Guidance.

Each year during exercises such as COBRA GOLD, our multilateral exercise co-hosted with Thailand, and TANDEM THRUST, our theater-wide biennial joint exercise with Australia, we experiment with JMF initiatives that address our “Top Ten Challenges” to enhancing JTF speed of action and effectiveness. By experimenting while we exercise, we can accurately assess the military utility of new technologies and procedures. As a direct result of success during exercises, JMF has fielded several key technologies within USPACOM’s designated JTFs. Over the past year, Bandwidth Monitoring and Control devices have given our JTFs dynamic control of limited bandwidth for critical communications. The Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) now provides USPACOM Headquarters Joint Operations Center and our JTFs an interoperable tool for sharing a common operational picture for dynamic tracking and targeting and for conducting personnel recovery operations. JMF has provided our designated JTFs with a suite of collaborative tools and the training required for planning, executing, and assessing joint operations. Our design and implementation of a standard JMF web tool provides an internet “one-stop shop” for JTF real-time information sharing, planning, and execution.
Additionally, JMF has operationalized other important command-wide capabilities such as our Combined Operations Wide Area Network (COWAN) for secure operations with our coalition partners, the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) for civil-military and non-government organization operations with coalition forces, telemedicine for joint medical operations (JMO-T), and language translation capability such as DARPA’s “Phraselators.”

To bridge the gap between our major joint exercises, hone readiness, and provide periodic spiral development opportunities, USPACOM conducts routine command and control exercises (C2X). These short duration, vignette-driven exercises not only test our JTF command and control procedures, they also provide an important venue for spiral technology and procedural development and fielding. This JMF initiative has proven effective in USPACOM as a readiness-enhancer.

Over the next 2 years, with your support, USPACOM’s Joint Mission Force will integrate emerging technologies into information operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance management. Our transformation and experimentation initiatives include our coalition partners.

In Korea, we have worked Integrated Total Asset Visibility and language translators during exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS. USFK has the lead for the Theater Precision Strike Operations ACTD and this year is sponsoring the Theater Effects-Based Operations ACTD.

We have installed our JMF Web tool on the Japan Self-Defense Force bilateral secure wide-area network. We also have an information sharing agreement with Japan, and Japan has used Coalition Rear Area Security Command and Control in exercises such as KEEN EDGE and YAMA SAKURA.

As COBRA GOLD 2002 participants, Singapore Armed Forces and Royal Supreme Thai Command members were directly involved with our initiatives for collaboration tools, virtual Civil Military Operations Center, and COWAN. Additionally, Singapore is participating in the SPARTAN ACTD and is pursuing
involvement in other ACTDs, such as RESTOPS and JTF WARNET (Wide Area Relay Network).

The JTF WARNET initiative approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) on 25 April 2002 provides organic, wireless secure Internet Protocol-based connectivity among tactical components of a JTF. WARNET applications, interfaces, and procedures enhance JTF command and control by sharing tactical situational awareness data among service command and control systems, enabling joint fires and collaborative planning and execution. JTF WARNET provided tactical-level force integration during MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002. We will conduct WARNET regional tests and a pre-deployment exercise in Hawaii and Japan in FY03 before WARNET becomes a JTF operational capability in FY04, culminating in COBRA GOLD 2004.

USPACOM served as the host Combatant Command for the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (JWID) 2002 and will host JWID 2003. For the first time, Japan, Korea, and Singapore have been invited to sit on the Coalition Task Force (CTF) staff. Their inclusion in the traditional mix of U.S., NATO, U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand participants is pushing the envelope on coalition interoperability as it demonstrates the true nature of our interoperability challenges.

The Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program complements the IMET program. DoD funding has sent foreign military officers to U.S. military institutions and selected regional centers for non-lethal education. This program has provided regional combatant commands with additional flexibility in executing our security cooperation strategies and has had an immediate and positive impact in encouraging reform, professionalism, and regional cooperation in addressing counter-terrorism and other transnational threats.

The fellowship focus for USPACOM has been toward educational programs that encourage these advancements among Asia-Pacific nations addressing transnational threats with a focus on counter-terrorism. Specific courses
have assisted in minimizing terrorist threats in the Asia-Pacific region, severing links between indigenous terrorist groups and global terrorist networks, allowing the establishment of a more professional military, developing stronger mutual security partnerships, and enhancing theater security cooperation. We are using the program to provide non-lethal training to Indonesian, Malaysian, and Philippine military officers at U.S. military educational institutions. U.S. military courses provide the basics for success in any military operation. A secondary benefit is the exposure students receive to the higher standards of ethics and behavior associated with a professional military that is under competent civilian control. Your continued support in providing this flexible funding alternative is appreciated.

**C2 for Coalitions.** The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) Program involves a group of military planners from the U.S. and many nations in USPACOM’s Area of Interest. The purpose of MPAT is to increase operational interoperability among participating countries’ interoperable planners who can rapidly augment a multinational force headquarters in response to a regional crisis. Using multinational, but standardized skills and procedures, MPAT planners would plan and execute coalition operations to support a multinational and interagency response to a small-scale contingency. Through a series of workshops and information exchange events, including four major crisis action planning exercises, MPAT members have developed a knowledge base of the various national crisis action planning procedures in the Asia-Pacific region. They have also developed a strong working relationship with each other. Military planners from over 25 countries and representatives from the UN and various non-governmental and international organizations have attended these workshops.

As part of the MPAT initiative, we and other nations in the region are developing a multinational force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) that any nation leading a coalition crisis response relief effort can use. This
MNF SOP has coalition/combined task force activation, forming, and planning procedures focused on military operations other than war (MOOTW), from humanitarian assistance through peace operations, and includes counter-terrorism aspects. Planners from 30 nations practice and validate the MNF SOP during MPAT and other multinational exercises each year.

Since the Asia-Pacific region does not have a regional NATO-like organization, the MPAT and MNF SOP efforts represent the major regional program aimed at developing multinational procedures and maintaining a cadre of multinational military planners using common planning and operating procedures for coalition operations. USPACOM’s Internet-based Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) enables the working-level communications required to develop these procedures. APAN’s easily accessible collaborative capability enables us to extend regional dialogues begun in functional forums such as CHOD conferences into exercises and operations that improve our regional response to the growing range of military missions we face today. The ability to place instructional material on APAN for mutual benefit of the U.S. and Asia-Pacific partners would enhance the USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation program and U.S. national security interests. The provision of internet-based training and education should include such programs as Advanced Distributed Learning and similar internet tools. USPACOM could thereby more effectively use focused military education programs to develop regional skills required to accomplish cooperative security missions, improve civil-military relations, increase respect for human rights, and strengthen democratic principles.

I would like to express our appreciation for past congressional support of the Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) appropriations -- support that has ensured a robust beginning for these programs. As we continue with the MPAT and MNF SOP development, we will improve the capabilities and interoperability of countries in the region to support operations that we may lead while enhancing the ability of other countries to lead coalition operations as well.
**Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTF-FA).** Achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans is a high USPACOM priority, and we will continue to devote the necessary personnel and resources to obtain the answers the POW/MIA families so richly deserve. During Fiscal Year 2002, JTF-FA conducted 10 joint field activities (JFAs) – 4 in Vietnam, 5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia. The JTF-FA field teams investigated 211 cases and excavated 50 sites. In total, they recovered and repatriated remains believed to be those of Americans unaccounted-for from the war in Southeast Asia from 27 sites (9 in Vietnam, 12 in Laos, and 6 in Cambodia). Furthermore, 31 individuals from recovery operations were identified and returned to their loved ones during this period. JTF-FA will maintain its pace of operations in FY03, with 10 JFAs scheduled – 4 in Vietnam, 5 in Laos, and one in Cambodia. JTF-FA will also conduct an underwater survey in China.

Following Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s direction to determine the feasibility of merging JTF-FA and the Army’s Central Identification Laboratories, Hawaii, we have put in place a comprehensive plan of action and milestones to ensure a smooth merger and standup date of 1 October 2003. Merging of the two units under a single command is operationally sound and will clearly demonstrate our government’s commitment to our unaccounted for citizens. Three critical items remain. First, realignment of the Department of the Army’s Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii (CILHI) funding to the Department of the Navy as Executive Agent for USPACOM and the merged organization. Second, transfer of Department of the Army civilian positions and functions to the Department of the Navy. Third, determining the permanent location of this new organization with the attended adjustment and advancement to the CILHI approved FY-08 MILCON headquarters building project.

**Land Partnership Plan (LPP).** The Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has reached agreement with the ROK government on an LPP that will consolidate U.S. force presence. The plan will reduce the number of major U.S. bases in Korea from 41 to 23 while significantly enhancing training and combined
warfighting capability – better supporting our long-term regional strategy. The LPP will also have a significant positive affect on the quality of life of our servicemen and women and their families assigned to our forces on the peninsula. Our partner is committed – the LPP has received the full backing of the Korean government and its National Assembly, and will be a model for future discussions.

**Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs).** USPACOM continues to lead in innovating tactics, techniques, procedures, and concepts of operations that make the nation’s investment in science and technology productive for our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and Airmen in the field. We do so through a continual cycle of experimentation, demonstration, and special projects aimed at our early understanding of emerging technologies and their impact on military operations in the Asia-Pacific region.

Transformation depends heavily on ACTDs. Today we are involved in 19 ACTD projects, more than any other regional command. We have distributed the Transformation workload across the whole theater – almost all service component and Sub-Unified Commanders and most of my Staff Directors have responsibility for executing one or more ACTD.

Our new FY03 ACTD will provide us with new tactical capabilities. The Overwatch ACTD will give us a capability to detect and pinpoint sniper fire in an urban environment, enhancing security and situational awareness for our troops in the field. In addition to our new ACTDs, we have pioneered co-development of technology with Singapore with the SPARTAN Unmanned Surface Vessel ACTD. This ACTD provides technological developments to improve capabilities for multi-mission packages in Mine Warfare, force protection, precision strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Additionally, it will enhance battlespace awareness and increase force protection for surface and subsurface operations through the unmanned surface vessel with modular sensor packages.
The ACTD program is clear proof that when system developers and operators come together we can get useful military products into the hands of the user faster than with standard acquisition. However, this is only true if the technology successfully transitions into a program of record. I am proud to report that we will successfully transition all five of our ACTDs completed this year. Soon all combatant commanders will reap benefits in the areas of Joint Fire Control, personnel recovery, small unit logistics, telemedicine, and decision-support tools from our completed projects.

Our Joint Experimentation program focuses on Joint Task Force (JTF) operations. It is fully coordinated with the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Experimentation Program and includes technology insertion experiments during our regular exercises to advance our state of practice of JTF operations, both in the U.S. only venue and in coalition venues. This year, we executed the first two major experiments. The first occurred as part of our C2X exercise series where we train to establish command and control of a deployed JTF. The experiment augmented our normal C4I surveillance and reconnaissance equipment suites with new capabilities to manage and control information flow on the JTF networks and provide enhanced fires management capabilities across the joint force. Our second experiment occurred in a coalition environment during the COBRA GOLD exercise with Thailand, Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia. We also added new technology from Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to improve network security and the commander’s understanding of the war plan. We are finding that by experimenting as we exercise, we can provide a continuous series of warfighting improvements that are field tested in joint and combined operations before we make key procurement decisions.

I’ve highlighted just a few of the experimentation and modernization initiatives in USPACOM. Our initiatives, like those of other Regional Combatant Commanders and the Services, in concert with USJFCOM, promise to modernize the force and enhance mission capability. We are working hard with
USJFCOM to synchronize and bring coherence, prioritization, and continuity to the transformation of our forces.

**SUMMARY STATEMENT**

America’s Armed Forces in the Pacific continue to promote security, peace, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Through the professional efforts of our dedicated men and women, we continue to assure our allies, dissuade our adversaries and deter aggression. We are relentlessly pursuing terrorists, improving our force protection posture and maintaining our readiness so that if called upon, we will decisively defeat any adversary. U.S. Pacific Command’s priorities for the near term remain unchanged: sustaining and supporting the Global War on Terrorism; improving our Readiness and Joint Warfighting Capability; improving the Quality of Service for our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines; reinforcing the Constants in the Pacific Region; and promoting change and improving our Asia-Pacific Defense Posture for the Future.

The men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command welcome this opportunity to tell their story. The support of the Congress and the American people is greatly appreciated. Thank you.