Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Bryan D. Brown, USA  
Nominee for Commander, United States Special Operations Command

Defense Reforms

More than ten years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of those reforms, particularly in your assignments as Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, and Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Do you agree with these goals?

Absolutely. The defense reforms enacted enhanced the authority and responsibility of military commanders, even as they appropriately strengthened civilian control over the military.

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

The most important aspects of these defense reforms were clearly delineating the chain of command, firmly establishing the roles of the unified and specified Combatant Commands as warfighters, and requiring the armed forces to function as a joint force. Without these The Services have made significant strides toward joint operations as was demonstrated so superbly in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) because of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Do you believe that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

I believe Goldwater-Nichols is working very well, and know of no need to amend it at this time.
Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

Yes.

From the perspective you have gained in your previous assignments, do you believe that the authority and responsibility of the combatant commanders, in general, and the Commander, United States Special Operations Command, in particular, are appropriate?

Yes.
Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, to the following offices:

The Under Secretaries of Defense

The Under Secretaries of Defense were established to assist the Secretary of Defense in specific functional areas: Policy, Comptroller, Acquisition and Technology, Intelligence, and Personnel and Readiness. These Under Secretaries provide coordination and the exchange of information with Department of Defense components having collateral or related functions, which include the Combatant Commanders. Combatant Commanders are expected to respond and reciprocate. I would anticipate frequent interaction with the Under Secretaries, particularly in the development of military policy and the acquisition process. The law requires that coordination activity be communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

Title 10 USC, Section 138, establishes the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. He is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters as well as the senior management official within the Department for special operations and low intensity conflict. These responsibilities include the overall supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of special operations and low intensity conflict activities of the Department. While USSOCOM has the principal responsibility for the readiness and preparation of special operations forces (SOF) in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, USSOCOM’s ability to execute those missions would be greatly hindered without the sound policies and oversight, interagency coordination, and advocacy provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. I believe that this civilian oversight enhances USSOCOM's ability to carry out its missions. The relationship provides a key source of advice and information to both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

With the stand up of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and their principal mission of Homeland Defense, USSOCOM’s relationship with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense will be linked, to a great degree, with USSOCOM’s relationship to the NORTHCOM Commander. I anticipate close coordination and cooperation to determine the
role of SOF in Homeland Defense and to determine military support necessary to protect the United States and its citizens during times of national emergency.

**The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) responsibilities are clearly delineated in Title 10 USC, Section 153. He serves as the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The CJCS serves as an advisor but is not in the direct chain of command that runs from the President and Secretary of Defense directly to the Combatant Commanders. However, there are provisions for the President to direct communications between him or the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders be transmitted through the CJCS. This ensures the Chairman stays informed in order to execute his other responsibilities. I see it as a Commander’s duty to work with and through -- but never around -- the Chairman in the execution of Presidential and Secretary of Defense-directed taskings.

**The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

The functions of the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are prescribed under Title 10 USC, Section 154. The Vice-Chairman is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and when the Chairman is absent, or disabled, the Vice-Chairman acts in his stead. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) responsibilities are delegated to the Vice-Chairman. The VCJCS also regularly represents the Chairman on the Interagency Deputy’s Committee, the Defense Acquisition Board, and other boards and councils as necessary. Thus, the VCJCS plays an essential role for the CJCS in fulfilling his principal military advisor obligations. Communication between a Combatant Commander and the VCJCS is as critical as it is with the CJCS.

**The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces they provide to the combatant commands. The responsibilities are outlined in Title 10 USC, Section 165, which notes that the Secretaries are subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Combatant Commander’s authority over Service components including those forces assigned to him is clear, but requires close coordination with the Secretaries to ensure no infringement on those lawful responsibilities the Service Secretary alone may discharge.

**The Service Chiefs**

While the Service Chiefs are no longer in the chain of command, they do have two significant roles. First, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no Combatant Commander can hope to ensure the preparedness of his assigned forces for Presidential directed missions. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs
provide military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. Individually and collectively, the Joint Chiefs are a source of experience and judgment that every Combatant Commander can call upon; it would be a privilege to work with them. If confirmed as Commander, USSOCOM, I intend to continue a full dialogue with the Chiefs of all the Services.

The other combatant commanders

Today, more than ever, as USSOCOM takes on the Global War on Terrorism, I look forward to close, mutual support and continued dialogue on key issues with the other Combatant Commanders, as well as frequent face-to-face contact. The Combatant Commanders define requirements for their respective areas of operational responsibility, an effort that assists USSOCOM in defining its support requirements. In my relationship with Combatant Commanders, I will foster an atmosphere of teamwork and complete trust, which I believe is critical to executing U.S. national policy and meeting the commanders’ theater requirements.

Qualifications

If confirmed, you will be entering this important position at a critical time for the United States Special Operations Command.

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

I have over 36 years of military service in the United States Army, having entered as a private in 1967. My military background includes assignments in Army conventional and special operations units, and joint special operations units. I began my special operations career as a Green Beret Sergeant on a Special Forces A Team. Subsequently, I commanded at all levels to include three company commands, two battalion commands, and a brigade command -- at the only special operations aviation brigade. Additionally, I served for thirty months as the Directory for Strategy, Policy and Plans at Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and commanded the Joint Special Operations Command and U.S. Army Special Operations Command, both located at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.

My experience in special operations includes command of forces and management of resources. I have had the honor of command in combat and have directed requirements reviews, programming, planning and budgeting for all SOF. Because of my experience in the conventional Army, I also understand how special operations can support and be supported by general purpose forces.

As the Deputy Commander, USSOCOM, I am the principal advisor and assistant to the Commander -- responsible for preparing SOF to conduct special operations missions worldwide. On a daily basis, I am involved in the areas of: global war on terrorism; acquisition of special operations equipment; intelligence and information operations; operations, plans, and policy; and
force structure, requirements, resources, and strategic assessments. My military experience to date uniquely qualifies me to lead the joint services of USSOCOM.
Major Challenges/Lessons Learned

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command?

USSOCOM faces three significant challenges; Planning and directing the Global War on Terrorism, preserving the readiness of our special operations forces (SOF), and transforming to make our SOF more agile, adaptive and responsive. The terrorist threats we face are pervasive, asymmetric, highly adaptive and elusive. We must meet and defeat this global threat at a time and place of our choosing. Regarding readiness, our current OPTEMPO is the highest it has ever been in our history. This will continue to be a major challenge to readiness until the threat of terrorism is abated and the level of global security is improved. Finally, the challenge of transforming is ever-present and successful transformation will be key in defeating future threats to our national security. We must face these challenges head on.

What are the most important lessons you have learned during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the Special Operations community?

People continue to be the key to success. Our ability in special operations to attract, recruit, assess, train, and retain the right people is crucial. People with the right mentality for ambiguous situations and out-of-the box thinking; people that can master hi-tech, and are still comfortable operating in a world where there is low-tech, such as the mountains of Afghanistan; people that are dedicated to the mission, and willing to endure incredible sacrifice. These are the keys to effective SOF.

Additionally, there is no substitute for readiness–it is non-negotiable. We must be ready to fight tonight with all the capabilities we bring to the battlefield. If confirmed, readiness for the global war on terrorism is my most important issue.

If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Long term success in the Global War on Terrorism depends largely upon our ability to quickly employ a sustainable mix of capabilities with little advance warning. To address this challenge, USSOCOM has recently undergone a major reorganization to stand up a warfighting center to specifically focus on the war on terrorism and empowered to coordinate all elements of our national power against it. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on building teamwork and work closely with my fellow Combatant Commanders and other government agencies which have a significant role to play in the Global War on Terrorism. As mentioned previously, the Combatant Commanders define requirements for their respective areas of operational responsibility, an effort that assists USSOCOM in defining its support requirements. In my relationship with Combatant Commanders, I will foster an atmosphere of teamwork and complete trust. Of equal importance, other government agencies bring the full complement of our national
power to bear. I fully understand that USSOCOM cannot prosecute this unique war by itself and that it is a fully collaborative effort. We must continue to apply consistent offensive pressure against terrorist organizations around the globe, keep the terrorists on the run, off balance, and well away from America’s shores.

Readiness of the SOF is a statutory responsibility that USSOCOM has historically done well. To address the OPTEMPO challenge to our readiness, we must continue to closely prioritize what missions SOF take on, while at the same time emphasize our focus on the human element. Two of the command’s guiding principles are that our people are more important than their hardware and that quality is more important than quantity. Selection, assessment, training and retention of quality people will be keys to maintaining the readiness of our SOF.

Regarding transformation, we must continue to fund critical acquisition and modernization programs while at the same time refine tactics, techniques and procedures that enhance the capabilities of our precision forces. Additionally, we must ensure our equipment and procedures are interoperable with conventional and coalition forces so we can serve as a force multiplier in larger conflicts. The technology of our adversaries continues to increase, we must ensure ours is always better.

**Most Serious Problems**

*What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command?*

In my opinion, the most serious problems for the Commander USSOCOM are not problems, but issues of prioritization. USSOCOM's traditional responsibilities to man, train and equip SOF have not changed and will continue to be performed -- to the standards validated by successes in OEF/OIF. Charged by the Secretary of Defense with the lead in the War on Terrorism, USSOCOM will now face the challenge of prioritizing a global warfighting function, commensurate with the war on terrorism, along with these traditional Service-like functions.

*What management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?*

To address USSOCOM’s warfighting function, the headquarters has stood up the Center for Special Operations (CSO) and is continuing the refinement of time sensitive planning which streamlines operational mission planning and senior leadership decision making and breaks down barriers between Department of Defense and other government agencies. The timeline for this refinement and CSO's operational capability is ongoing.

USSOCOM will continue to manage OPTEMPO and prioritize special operations deployments as they relate to the Global War on Terrorism. USSOCOM has already transitioned
missions to conventional forces that were not special operations-unique in nature. Missions such as training foreign militaries in basic infantry tactics have largely been handed off to conventional forces, including the Marines. USSOCOM will have to continue to be highly selective in special operations employment taskings that could be drawn from the larger conventional force. For example, deployment orders currently written for SOF now must directly or indirectly support the Global War on Terrorism.

USSOCOM must continue to manage its resources, both the budgetary and human aspect. Management of our MFP-11 budget must be consistent with and support our new warfighting mission while helping us transform. The additional $1.7 billion proposed for Fiscal Year 2004 is an essential step in building a more robust SOF capable of responding effectively to this mission, now and in the future. Additionally, the human resource challenges that could result from our current high OPTEMPO need to be managed closely. While it is difficult to put a suspense date on OPTEMPO management actions, with gradual and measurable successes in the Global War on Terrorism, prioritization of SOF deployments and an improvement in the current level of global stability, OPTEMPO will gradually reduce.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

From your perspective as Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command, what are the main “lessons learned” from Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the ongoing stability operations?

Some of the key lessons learned involved special operations training and doctrine, early employment of special operations, and joint force integration. Training and Doctrine was validated on the battlefield. Special operation’s high selection standards were evident and relevant and their regional and cultural orientation greatly contributed to our successes. Early special operations engagement is imperative. Special operations engaged in advance of combat operations proved successful and critical. This concept was a major contributing factor for successful operations in Northern Iraq. The integration of special operations with conventional forces was a major success. There are examples throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom of conventional units under the operational control (OPCON) of SOF commanders and SOF units OPCON to conventional commanders.

What are the operational, research and development, and procurement implications of those lessons?

Special operations’ lessons-learned from both OEF/OIF validated the need, focus and importance of USSOCOM’s Advanced Technology Program. The program quickly responded with technology enhancements for situational awareness, communications, individual equipment and medical items for our special operations units. Specific technology successes included use of small unit unmanned aerial vehicles, improved operator protection with the special operations
body armor systems, and dramatically improved communications capabilities. Additionally, the Advanced Technology Program has been refocused on the current and emerging SOF requirements for the Global War on Terrorism. Key elements of our recent program successes were Defense Emergency Response Funds that facilitated rapid acquisitions and the ability of our research, development, and procurement programs to transform those funds into operational capabilities, in some cases within days.

**How would you assess the adequacy of special operations forces provided to Central Command, both in terms of quantity and mix, to conduct Operation Iraqi Freedom?**

Based on the outstanding results of special operations missions throughout Iraq, but especially in the West and North, the quantity and mix of SOF proved to be about right. Without exception, USSOCOM filled every Request For Forces (RFF) submitted by Central Command in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. USSOCOM also provided all SOF necessary to support two Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces established by Special Operations Command – Central Command in the area of operations. This included 152 special operations-skilled Reservists (Individual Augumentees) and, at its peak, 7,270 special operations personnel deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**Transformation**

As a result of your role in Operation Iraqi Freedom and in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, you are familiar with the requirements affecting U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) both as a supporting and supported command.

**Do current transformation initiatives adequately support SOCOM’s future requirements?**

USSOCOM has identified means in the materiel, organization, and doctrine categories that will spark and support transformation within special operations that include: the CV-22 Osprey, the Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS), the MX aircraft (to supplement our C-130 variants), Naval Special Warfare’s 21st Century realignment and Army Special Operations Aviation 21st Century reorganization initiatives, and improved theatre Special Operations Command (SOC) capabilities. These initiatives, along with our Headquarters reorganization and focus, and repositioning of forces, posture USSOCOM well to pursue its critical objectives and primary mission in the Global War on Terrorism. Transformation across the entire Department of Defense augurs an increasing integration of current conventional and special operational capabilities. Staying relevant in a dynamic future operating environment also demands we continue to implement enhancements in collaborative planning, information technologies and interoperability. The evolution of the threats facing our nation and military demands that special operations forces remain agile, flexible, dynamic and inculcate innovation into the future as a core competency.
How will the Army’s transformation impact SOCOM’s current operations?

Because of the relationship between the Army and USSOCOM in the areas of organizing, training, and equipping the force, Army transformation efforts enhance USSOCOM’s operations, current and long-term. Army programs -- aimed at organizing into a lighter, faster force -- parallel special operation’s doctrine, and SOF are directly involved in Army efforts. Special operations personnel have been imbedded in the Stryker Brigades, and lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom will show how conventional and SOF successfully worked together on the battlefield. Additionally, SOF are assisting in the development of training programs, such as close quarters combat, where we are more operationally experienced. USSOCOM will benefit from these efforts as conventional Army and SOF become more proficient in supporting each other because of quality training. And finally, Services are responsible for fielding non-special operations unique equipment to SOF. As a result, any equipment enhancements realized in the Army will be immediately available to SOF. In some cases, special operations-unique equipment has been provided to the Army for transformation test and evaluation. There are no negative impacts, and the transfer of lessons learned and equipment benefit both organizations.

Afghanistan

Almost two years after securing a military victory against the Taliban and al ‘Qaida in Afghanistan, that nation remains a place with areas of unrest.

What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan?

I have made numerous trips to that region over the past 18 months, to include being there just two weeks ago. Significant progress has been made in the last 18 months. I have seen significant progress made in the last 18 months. Thanks to the efforts of the Coalition, which included SOF, the Taliban no longer control the government or provinces. Moreover, al Q’aida has been denied freedom of operations within the country. Significant challenges remain. We continue to pursue Osama bin Laden, his key lieutenants, and other high value targets. I believe that effort critical. I am encouraged that the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan is established in Kabul, provinces outside Kabul are beginning to rebuild efforts, and elections are scheduled for the summer of 2004. Civil Affairs has been a crucial part of this reconstitution of the infrastructure and government. There remains much to be done, and SOF will be a critical component in the Coalition’s efforts. With continued emphasis on stability operations and reconstruction, and with the support of the international community, I am confident our Nation’s long-term goals will be achieved.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of special operations forces as Afghanistan transitions to a more stable, democratic, and economically viable nation?
The role of SOF in pursuing bin Laden and other high value targets remains appropriate. In addition, special operations assist in rebuilding the Afghani infrastructure through continued CA projects, which earn and maintain the trust of the Afghani people, and through information operations that support the message of freedom and support to these formerly repressed people. SOF continues to support Central Command’s goals and objectives in the region.

**Combating Terrorism**

If confirmed, you would play an integral role in the Department’s combating terrorism mission.

Which Department of Defense official provides the primary civilian oversight with regard to SOCOM’s combating terrorism mission?

Combating terrorism has two aspects; counterterrorism (offensive measures) and antiterrorism (defensive measures). The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, through the Department of Defense Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee, provides policy oversight and guidance to Department of Defense Components in support of respective antiterrorism and counterterrorism program efforts. With respect to the planning and execution of counterterrorism missions as a Combatant Commander, if confirmed, I would not hesitate to deal directly with the Secretary of Defense through, and in coordination with, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

What other Department of Defense officials would be involved in oversight of SOCOM’s combating terrorism mission?

Again, as a Combatant Commander, coordination directly through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for any deployments of SOF supporting our warfighting mission would occur. As a functional Combatant Commander, USSOCOM interacts directly with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate any emergent, unforeseen requirements that MFP-11 or the Services could not fund. Through USSOCOM’s representative to the Department of Defense Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee, USSOCOM would interact with various Departmental representatives from the Services, the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries on a routine basis along with the Defense support agencies.

**Force Protection**

If confirmed, what would your top priorities be in terms of force protection for SOCOR forces in the CENTCOM AOR?

Thirty-six years of military service have ingrained in me the importance of taking care of our Service members. I fully appreciate the awesome responsibility we have to do everything within our power to safeguard them. If confirmed, my task as Commander, USSOCOM would be to emphasize the importance of force protection to the people of this command. Only through my emphasis will they realize the criticality of resourcing and executing force protection to the fullest extent possible. I will instill in all 46,000 assigned, not just those in the Central Command area of operations, that force protection is a mission essential task. I will work closely with the other Combatant Commanders to ensure our personnel are being protected and utilized in appropriate special operations roles. I would set standards for pre-deployment training focused on SOF and field key force protection equipment that would enhance the security of SOF in all geographic Combatant Commanders’ areas of operation. I would not hesitate to get involved with any Combatant Commander if I felt there was any reason to be concerned about the safety of special operations personnel. It is a SOF truth that “humans are more important than hardware;” without those men and women the hardware does matter.

What additional steps, if any, need to be taken to ensure that personnel being deployed on SOCOM missions are fully prepared for potential threats?

Our current level of training and preparedness remains the same. We pride ourselves on the level of training and readiness that SOF receive. SOF are prepared to perform their assigned missions in all environments, throughout all regions.
Information Operations

Information operations and information warfare will likely play an increasing role in 21st Century warfare.

What role do you envision for U.S. SOCOM in overall U.S. information operations?

Special operations forces are very aware of the significant role Information Operations (IO) plays in today’s and in future conflicts. In fact, USSOCOM made IO one of the command’s core tasks in 1996. USSOCOM units have successfully employed IO core capabilities in both OEF and OIF, and IO continues to be embedded throughout SOF operations. However, USSOCOM continues to play a very significant role in PSYOP. As you know, USSOCOM owns the preponderance of the Department’s PSYOP forces and capabilities, including the EC-130 Commando Solo radio and TV broadcast aircraft. Due to the high demand for PSYOP forces, USSOCOM is in the process of growing its PSYOP force structure by adding two active duty regional companies and four reserve component tactical companies. This year the command also proposed an Advanced Technologies Concept Demonstration (ACTD) aimed at improving PSYOP planning tools and long range dissemination into denied hostile areas. In addition, USSOCOM is creating a 70 person Joint PSYOP Support Element, to provide dedicated joint PSYOP planning expertise to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, Strategic Command, and the Secretary of Defense.

Under what circumstances would the Commander, U.S. SOCOM, conduct information operations as a supported combatant commander?

USSOCOM became the lead for the war on terrorism IO planning after September 11th, 2001. In this new capacity, USSOCOM leads collaborative planning, coordination, and when directed, execution of IO. USSOCOM envisions IO supporting surgical, limited duration, counterterrorism missions, as well as, long range planning to develop coordinated, trans-regional strategies against terrorists and their supporters. Due to Strategic Command’s new Unified Command Plan responsibilities in regard to global IO, USSOCOM is working very closely with Strategic Command to insure mutual IO and PSYOP support and continuity.

Supported Combatant Commander

Recently, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld authorized an expanded role in the Global War on Terrorism for U.S. Special Operations Command, including authority to conduct operations as a supported combatant commander, in addition to continuing responsibilities as a supporting combatant commander.

In your view, under what circumstances would U.S. SOCOM conduct operations as a supported combatant commander?
The nexus of the Department’s Global War on Terrorism effort is at USSOCOM. As situations develop, we attempt to locate, acquire, and identify terrorist targets. Combat operations may follow. Some examples of special operations missions that might be conducted as a supported Combatant Command could include small, surgical, clandestine strike operations involving special operations forces only, missions tasked when the geographic Combatant Commander that is totally involved in other operations, or missions that involve the use of special skills or where two or more geographic Combatant Commander boundaries merge.

What resource, organization, and force structure changes will be required in order for U.S. SOCOM to be able to conduct both supporting and supported combatant command responsibilities?

USSOCOM is rapidly transforming from its traditional role as a purely resourcing headquarters to its expanded role as both a resourcing headquarters and a supported command for the global war on terrorism. The headquarters has reorganized within current resources to establish a Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (SOJICC) and a Command Special Operations Center to plan, coordinate and direct counter-terrorist operations on a global scale. The Department has recognized the increased requirements to meet the new missions while retaining the role of being a resourcing and supporting command, by providing an additional 5,100 authorizations command-wide between Fiscal Years 2004-2009. The added force structure supports the Global War On Terrorism, forward basing in Central Command, rotation forces to support regional forward basing, PSYOP and CA to support regional requirements, rotary-wing and fixed-wing assets to meet added requirements, and support and training base personnel to support increased demand. Organizational change, as a result of these additions include an additional CA Battalion (Reserve), an additional CA company (active), one MH-47 Army Special Operations Aviation Regiment battalion (active), one PSYOP company (active), and two additional Navy SEAL teams. We are also evaluating our mix of Active and Reserve forces to ensure they complement and support one another. As we gain experience in this campaign, I anticipate that additional shortfalls could emerge and, as always, we will continue to modernize and upgrade our fielded equipment to ensure our SOF personnel are capable of defeating known and likely threats.

Blue Force Tracking

General Tommy Franks, former Commander, U.S. CENTCOM, recently stated in testimony before this Committee that multiple, non-interoperable blue force tracking systems were a problem during Operation Iraqi Freedom, contributing to some confusion on the battlefield and complicating efforts to avoid friendly fire incidents. The U.S. Army has one such system. U.S. SOCOM uses different systems.

In your view, was blue force tracking of special operations forces effective during Operation Iraqi Freedom?
The overall effectiveness of Blue Force Tracking (BFT) in support of special operations was exceptional. While not all SOF were equipped with BFT devices, BFT systems facilitated coordinated events during combat operations, enhanced tactical resupply efforts, reduced recovery time for SOF extractions (both extremis and scheduled) and saved lives.

BFT proved to be an outstanding control mechanism. Without a doubt, BFT reduced the potential for fratricide events during Operation Iraqi Freedom and was the first positive step toward eliminating fratricide altogether. As with most emerging technology, technical and programmatic complications, such as inadequate joint procurement funding, limited fielding capability and command and control systems interoperability shortfalls have caused some reliability concerns that we are already working to resolve. It is important that all Combatant Commanders, as well as Allied and Coalition Force Commanders, recognize the value of BFT and are engaged in the further maturation and proliferation of this capability.

What steps would you recommend to ensure effective blue force tracking of all friendly forces on the battlefield — unconventional, conventional and coalition?

All Services and the Department have seen the value of Blue Force Tracking (BFT) and initiatives are underway to facilitate BFT interoperability, force-wide BFT requirements should be collected and programmed for rapid, joint acquisition. BFT capability should be integrated into standard communication devices, such as manpack and hand-held radios. Combined BFT development initiatives should be undertaken to ensure Allied and Coalition BFT interoperability. Current and future BFT capability should drive the acceleration of Combat Identification (CID) development since the anti-fratricide ability of BFT is, by nature, limited and time-late. USSOCOM will remain heavily engaged in the BFT and CID initiatives.
Transformation of Special Operations Forces

Much attention has been focused on the transformation of our armed forces, but most of that focus is on conventional forces.

Do our special operations forces need to be transformed?

SOF have been transformational by nature. To be successful in the unconventional environment or working on the margins of conventional force capabilities, SOF must continue to transform. As you know, USSOCOM has been given an expanded mission in the Global War on Terrorism which is, in itself, transformational. The only aspect of SOF that is not subject to change is our core values.

If so, what is your vision for such a transformation?

In the future, SOF should be ready to deal equally with the demands of both peacetime and warfighting roles. Special operations should be deliberate in its transformation to ensure that it continues to support critical national requirements. Given the range of missions, it is important to choose an evolutionary path that is supportive of, but not confined by, the future plans of conventional forces. Special operations should possess capabilities that expand the range of options available to policy makers and military commanders. To that end, future missions may include operations for psychological effect, low-visibility strike operations, advanced unconventional warfare, special forms of reconnaissance, and human and technical collections operations. SOF should achieve relatively low cost, high value force application as military and informational elements of national power integrate with political and economic elements to increase national security. Because the future is uncertain, SOF will pursue new combinations of concepts, skills, people and organizations to create a force capable of conducting full spectrum engagement in a joint environment, any time, anywhere, against any adversary.

Are the Special Operations Command and the Department of Defense investing in the technologies to realize this vision?

If confirmed, my vision will be to ensure USSOCOM provides the most capable and relevant SOF in existence while upholding standards of personal and professional excellence.

Yes, we are investing in those types of technologies. There are two integral parts to USSOCOM’s technology program, leveraging the Services, Defense Agencies, and government laboratory efforts, while harvesting those technology efforts that can be rapidly transitioned into capabilities for the operator. USSOCOM is significantly better off now than we were even two years ago in producing the kinds of capabilities we believe will be required to meet the challenges of the Global War on Terrorism. We will continue to pursue technological advances that address SOF unique requirements but which can also be integrated with the conventional forces, and to
aggressively develop advance technologies that provide high-payoff capabilities against near and long term threats to SOF.

**Recruiting and Retention**

**How successful has SOCOM been in recruiting and retaining the personnel it needs?**

World events significantly increased public awareness of SOF, consequently raising interest in joining special operations. SOF historically exceeds annual Service reenlistment rates in the non-commissioned officer corps (NCO). Accessions exceeded losses in each of the Services SOF during Fiscal Year 2002. While certain specialties are critically manned, the retention rates in those fields exceed those of the large Services (with few exceptions – Army 18D, Medical and Army 18E, Communications NCO). SOF personnel are historically promoted at a higher rate than their respective Service grades. Service initial accession bonuses, specific reenlistment incentives, and specific programs (for example, Critical Skills Retention Bonus, CSRB) that targeted the senior NCO experience base have positively influenced SOF recruiting and retention.

Primarily, the unique and important SOF mission is the fundamental reason that influences assigned personnel to remain in SOF. SOF warriors are proud to be a part of the special team of “Quiet Professionals.”

**What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in the SOCOM community?**

Maintaining the experience base and the personnel we have in our inventory to meet current operations tempo is paramount to successful mission execution. The programs mentioned earlier have had a successful impact on our force and continue to pay huge dividends with a return on investment for the future. As a supported command, any USSOCOM growth will impact an already limited pool of applicants. This concern is being addressed by reengineering our school houses without lowering standards. The current period is a new era where a policy of “one size fits all” does not work for a transforming military. Our emphasis on personnel strategy and policy must also include a progressive and consistent strategy that compliments Service policy yet flexible enough to meet the needs of the SOF Community-simultaneously.

**Specifically, what is the status of the efforts to increase retention among the Navy SEAL officers?**

Naval Special Warfare (NSW) officer advancements, selections and retention exceed Navy averages. The Special Warfare Officer Bonus has had a positive impact on reducing the number of mid-grade officer resignations. Special operations force transformation dictates that ongoing retention and recruitment initiatives continue to receive priority attention to sustain present levels
and to meet future missions in the Global War on Terrorism.

Special Operations Aviation units have some of the most highly trained and proficient pilots in our military.

What impact is the demand for pilots by the airlines and the current high operational tempo or our military having on pilot retention within Special Operations Command?

Because the airlines have not been hiring, pilot retention statistics have improved. The Air Force Special Operations Command is continuing to report pilot shortages equal to the overall shortages in the Air Force. When compared to the active component, Air Force SOF guard units are in relatively good shape. High deployment rates in support of OEF/OIF have slightly impacted training classes. This has resulted in limited numbers of aircraft and instructors available for schoolhouse training sorties.

Although the overall warrant officer inventory remains healthy, the Army continues to experience minor shortages in their senior grade aviators. This is a concern because the senior grade aviators provide the aviation experience at the unit level. We also face the challenge of gaining and maintaining pilots as our force structure increases.

What, if any, recommendations do you have to increase the retention of these highly skilled pilots?

The Army has participated in the Aviator Continuation Pay (ACP) bonus (contract) program for aviators. This bonus is paid between the 6th and 14th year of service. In Fiscal Year 2002, U.S. Army Special Operations Command received special permission to extend this bonus through 25 years of service for all aviators that agreed to remain in special operations.

The Air Force has two successful programs for pilot/crew retention that we are monitoring. They are the Aviator Continuation Pay (ACP) bonus program, and the Voluntary Return to Active Duty program which have helped offset retirements and separations.

**SOCOM/USMC**

In November 2001, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commander, U.S. SOCOM, signed a memorandum of agreement aimed at increasing Marine Corps support and cooperation with SOCOM.

What do you believe should be the appropriate relationship between the Marine Corps and SOCOM?
USSOCOM is working closely with the Marine Corps to integrate with and complement each others’ capabilities. I believe this is appropriate because SOF and the Marines offer unique and distinct mission sets. The Marines’ expeditionary capability is a direct result of their embarked sea-based deployment concept. The potential for SOF leveraging some of the unique options this concept provides, both in capabilities and sustainment, bodes well in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism. To fully assess the integration potential of Marines and SOF, USSOCOM and the Marines Corps re-established this formal relationship.

Special Operations Missions

When announcing additional responsibilities for SOCOM, Secretary Rumsfeld indicated that SOCOM may divest itself of some traditional missions, such as foreign military training, that can be conducted by conventional forces.

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?

USSOCOM executes its congressionally mandated Title 10 special operations activities in accordance with Section 167. We continue to study and refine employment taskings to ensure we retain a special operations focus while helping to reduce the burden on our High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) forces. In this regard, there are some recent examples of transition or divestiture of missions to conventional forces in order to free up these HD/LD forces.

USSOCOM continues to work the issue of mission divestiture with the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Secretary of Defense. As you are well aware, SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish nine core tasks (Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation, Foreign Internal Defense, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, PSYOP, CA Operations, Unconventional Warfare, and Information Operations). Unlike our core tasks, special operations forces also conduct other activities (Coalition Support, Counter-narcoterrorism, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Special Activities, Combat Search and Rescue, Humanitarian Mine Activities, Security Assistance, and Peace Operations).

The capabilities to perform these activities are derived from special operations’ ability to execute its core tasks and, in the context of prioritization of employment taskings in the war on terrorism; special operations may continue to perform some or all of these types of activities. The key is mission analysis and employment prioritization.

Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

No, there aren’t any additional missions I believe USSOCOM should assume. As previously stated, our war on terrorism mission has caused us to prioritize employment taskings. USSOCOM will continue to study and refine our special operations responsibilities; but we must
ensure we retain a special operations focus.

**Size of Special Operations Forces**

The recent successes of special operations forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have led many to advocate increases in the size of special operations forces.

Do you believe that we should increase the number of special operations personnel?

Yes. Additional personnel will enable USSOCOM to more effectively prosecute the Global War on Terrorism. This capability is additive to accomplishing current Title 10 missions. Even with prioritization of SOF deployments to directly or indirectly support the Global War on Terrorism, increased end strength will more fully maximize SOF’s global scout capability by ensuring SOF are forward deployed in theater and in position to respond to contingencies or react to actionable intelligence.

In your view, can the size of special operations forces be increased significantly if the rigorous recruiting standards for these organizations are to be maintained?

Yes.

**Civil Affairs Units**

The increased role of the United States military in numerous missions throughout the world has stressed the Special Operations Command, in particular the civil affairs units, most of which are in the Army Reserve.

If the current high operational tempo continues, would it be advisable to increase the number of civil affairs units?

Yes. Our CA force structure must increase. To that end, USSOCOM has included CA in our force structure growth plan.

If so, should the increase be in the active Army or the Army Reserve and why?

Prior to September 11, 2001, analysis of current and projected PERSTEMPO for Reserve CA forces identified future shortfalls in Reserve CA force structure to be able to support ongoing contingencies, i.e., Bosnia and Kosovo. As a result, the Department created two new Reserve CA Battalions to be stood up in FY04 and FY05 (one each year). After September 11, 2001, in support of GWOT, Bosnia, and Kosovo, analysis further identified shortfalls in the Active CA force structure. As a result, the Department created an additional two Active CA companies to be stood up in FY04 and FY05 (one each year). Current analysis of CA force structure is that with the addition of these Active and Reserve units, CA is properly sized to meet the challenges of
the Global War on Terrorism and future contingencies.

What impact has the high operational tempo had on recruiting and retention in reserve civil affairs units?

I understand U.S. Army Special Operations Command has achieved its U.S. Army Reserves recruiting goals for the last five years, and retention has remained within the goals during that time as well. I would expect these trends to continue.
Science Advisors for Combatant Commanders

Scientific advisors to combatant commanders have been effectively utilized as a means of assisting with technology transition and providing operators solutions to warfighter challenges.

If confirmed, how would your command make use of the technical expertise available in the Services, including their laboratories, to provide scientific and technical advice to the warfighters?

Due to our relatively small technology budget, USSOCOM relies heavily on the Services’ science and technology (S&T) knowledge base and laboratory infrastructure to support SOF. We have Memorandums of Agreement with the Service’s scientific communities that facilitate transfer of RDT&E related information and technology. We also have in-house Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Department of Energy liaison personnel who match their ongoing technology programs with SOF’s technology requirements. These associations allow USSOCOM to leverage Service S&T and other governmental agency programs as an economical and low-risk source for acquisition program technology insertions to provide the special operations warfighter with innovative evolutionary and revolutionary capability enhancements. The special operations S&T requirements and desired capabilities are also publicized through the Department of Defense’s centralized technology planning program.

Readiness and OPTEMPO

To what extent has the pace of operations in recent years had an impact on U.S. SOCOM’s readiness, retention, and resources?

The OPTEMPO has increased significantly in the last two years, but because of our training and education programs and the special care we pay to all our SOF families, it has been manageable. We are concerned about the amount of time our forces are deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism and pay close attention to our recruitment and retention efforts. As of this hearing, our accession, retention and promotion rates are equal to or higher than the Services. Additionally, our pilot retention statistics have been improving and our overall pilot inventory continues to improve in the MH-47, MH-6, and MH-60 communities. We are concerned about the OPTEMPO of our Reserve Component CA personnel and after September 11, 2001, shortfalls were identified. As a result, the Department created two new Reserve CA battalions to be stood up in Fiscal Year 2004 and Fiscal Year 2005. Air Force Reserve air crews are also a concern as many are approaching the end of their two year mobilization period. As we continue to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism, I anticipate that manpower and equipment shortfalls may emerge and, as always, we will continue to maintain, modernize and upgrade our fielded equipment to ensure our SOF personnel are capable of defeating any threat.

What actions can be taken to reduce any negative impacts?
USSOCOM must continue to grow SOF. We must discover new sources of quality personnel and efficient training methodology to accelerate the development of SOF warriors. We must also seek more effective methods to mitigate the effects of the high operational tempo.

**Congressional Oversight**

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.