Advance Questions for Lieutenant General John Abizaid, U.S. Army
Nominee for Commander, U. S. Central Command

Defense Reforms

More than ten years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of those reforms, particularly in your assignments as Director of the Joint Staff and Deputy Commander, U. S. Central Command.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the Military; improving Military advice; placing clear responsibility on the Combatant Commander’s for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the Combatant Commander’s is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Defense Reforms

1. Do you agree with these goals?

Answer: I do. Goldwater-Nichols allows the Combatant Commander to focus on warfighting. In my opinion, one need look no further than the USCENTCOM theater and Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM to demonstrate the soundness of those reforms. The importance of effective joint and combined operations under a clear chain of command cannot be overstated.
2. Do you believe that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

**Answer:** I think that Goldwater-Nichols got it right. I do not believe any significant changes to the Act are required.

3. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

**Answer:** Goldwater-Nichols required the Military to look beyond its Service parochialisms requiring deconfliction across the battlefield, to move more toward integration of effort and unity of command. While we still need to continue to move toward full joint/combined integration we would still be deconflicting battlespace between Services had Goldwater-Nichols not occurred. In addition, the enhanced role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot be overstated. His ability to provide his best military advice gives the Joint Force a powerful advocate.

4. Do you believe that the role of the Combatant Commander’s under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

**Answer:** As I stated earlier, I think Goldwater-Nichols got it right. I do believe, however, that there is unfinished business in carrying out the spirit of the Act, particularly in the area of resourcing. In my opinion, we should review the process within DoD that allots fiscal and manpower resources to the Combatant Commands. We all recognize the Service’s responsibilities to upgrade and improve installations, train and support their personnel and maintain and acquire new weapons and technology. These responsibilities and programs are intended to support the work of the Combatant Commands, but there are times when the priorities of the Combatant Commands conflict with those of the Services. For most missions assigned to a Combatant Commander, their Service components provide the resources. However, there are times when the Joint
Warfighting perspective and requirement needs greater visibility within our resourcing constructs. Such requirements are exemplified by ISR and strategic lift shortfalls in the Joint Force.

**Relationship Deputy Commander, Combined Forces Command**

5. Please describe your duties and role as Deputy Commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**Answer:** Combatant Commander staffs are generally resourced to conduct one major theater war at a time. The scope of the Iraq operation, coupled with continuing operations in Afghanistan, requirements for coordination elsewhere in the Global War on Terrorism, extensive basing demands and unexpected requirements for Joint integration made it clear that additional senior leadership in the region was needed. As the Deputy Commander, I helped sustain in-theater political and military support for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM by working on our relationships with militaries in the region, seeking access to bases and ports, and securing permission for staging and overflight.

During the war, I assisted the Commander by focusing on the integration of Joint (and inter-agency) capabilities and the integration of our Joint efforts with those of our allies.

The Commander focused my duties in the Iraq theater only. In his absence I made decisions at the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters and, at his direction, conducted detailed coordination between Component and Coalition Commanders.

The Deputy Commander’s permanent presence in Qatar permitted constant coordination with Coalition Commanders. Forward command presence in the theater facilitated coordination with European Command (EUCOM) and resolved potentially disruptive issues with nations in the region.

During the past seven weeks, I have facilitated CJTF-7 support of the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority and helped develop future plans for joint, combined and Special Operations Forces. In addition, my presence in the area of operations provides a frequent on-scene assessment of conditions within the Arabian Gulf theater of operations.
6. Do you support making this in-theater Deputy Commander position permanent, and, if so, where would you recommend the Deputy Commander be located.

Answer: I strongly support permanently assigning a three star Deputy Commander to a forward U.S. Central Command Headquarters in the theater. A three-star Deputy Commander forward facilitates engagement and development of personal relationships that are critical to pursuing bilateral and multilateral initiatives in a volatile region. With the Commander torn between the demands of a huge and difficult region and frequent interaction with Commanders, staffs and national leaders in the United States, it makes sense to have a senior leader forward.

7. How did you share responsibility with the Deputy Commander located at MacDill Air Force Base?

Answer: As the Deputy Commander forward, I focused the majority of my attention on supporting General Franks in the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. LtGen Delong, positioned in Tampa, remained aware of the situation in Iraq, but also focused effort on executing the Commander’s intent throughout the rest of the Area of Responsibility. He also helped maintain a Coalition of more than 70 Coalition partners who sent Senior National Representatives (SNR) to Central Command in Tampa. This command and control arrangement allowed the Commander to maintain a balance of focus between current operations, long range planning and inter-agency policy development.

As mentioned earlier, the scope of operations in the theater and the pace of operations allowed Mike DeLong and I to provide 24-hour senior level oversight and coordination throughout the campaign. Mike’s position in Tampa, in the same time zone as our leaders in Washington, was extremely valuable.

Qualifications

8. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Please see biography.
Major Challenges

9. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, U.S. Central Command?

Answer: We face obvious challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq and in the Global War on Terrorism. We must continue to apply offensive action against terrorist threats within our AOR and at the same time provide security for major stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Long range success in this mission depends on generating and effectively employing a sustainable mix of U.S. and Coalition military and non-military capabilities.

The threat we face is pervasive, asymmetric, adaptive and elusive. We must meet the threats of our region on their home ground.

10. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer: My immediate focus will be on continuing to improve the security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan while assisting in setting the conditions for long term success of the Coalition Provisional Authority and interim governments. Critical to these efforts are aggressive prosecution of the threat, strong support from our Coalition partners, creation and sustainment of indigenous police and guard forces as well as accelerated fielding of national armies. Our success in these areas will drive how quickly we can redeploy our own forces. In addition, we will work exceptionally closely with local governments, our Special Operations Forces and our intelligence agencies to confront and destroy terrorist entities throughout the region.

Most Serious Problems

11. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of Commander, U.S. Central Command?

Answer: With a region as broad, volatile and militarily active as the CENTCOM AOR, the most serious problems are span of control and unity of command. The issues are further complicated by the necessity to embed CENTCOM’s
military activities into the broader context of U.S. governmental policy and synchronized agency effort.

12. What management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer: Within the next year, we should assess ways to streamline and simplify procedures associated with policy and authority to support National efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, we will begin a complete reassessment of our strategies and operational concepts employed in the theater with regard to the War on Terrorism.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

13. From your perspective as an operational Commander, in theater, and now as the prospective Commander of United States Central Command, what are the top lessons learned with regard to planning Operation Iraqi Freedom, including ongoing stability operations?

Answer: Operation Iraqi Freedom was the most well-integrated combined and joint operation ever. It is a benchmark for future action by U.S. or Coalition forces. Carefully integrated planning and conduct of Mission Rehearsals during the three to four month period prior to the operation enabled continuous refinement of the plan prior to commencing operations. These "rehearsals" ensured all Components understood timing, synchronization, integration, maneuver, and employment of joint lethal fires and other non-lethal effects planned for the operation. Thus we must sustain and improve our robust planning and rehearsal capabilities for major operations.

The Force Deployment Planning and Execution process requires more flexibility. The current deployment management systems are "Cold War vintage." They were not adaptive enough to meet OIF political and operational planning, basing, access and over flight requirements. Automated tools are needed to speed force sourcing, planning and deployment execution.

Reserve mobilization policies and systems must also adapt to the more fluid force deployment and employment model we see in the future. The Reserve force management policies and systems are inefficient and rigid. Many
Reserve units provide the active force with critical combat support and service support, and there were instances where these enablers arrived late as a result of our current cumbersome mobilization and deployment system. At the Strategic and Operational levels, Battle Damage Assessment, interagency integration, and ISR management must be improved. Shaping Interagency Involvement, while a key factor in our success, will also require continued attention and support. Military power alone does not win wars and it certainly does not win the peace.

14. How would you assess the adequacy of forces provided to Central Command, both in terms of quantity and mix, to conduct Operation Iraqi Freedom up to the fall of Baghdad?

Answer: I assess that our force quantity and mix was adequate to conduct offensive operations. We employed the most lethal force ever to take the battlefield in less than half the time it took to posture for Operation Desert Storm twelve years ago. OIF had the right joint and combined force mix that allowed the Commander to employ their combine effects and meet objectives.

15. How would you assess the adequacy of forces provided to Central Command, both in terms of quantity and mix, to conduct the ongoing stability operations?

Answer: In general, the mix and quantity are correct for ongoing operations. Our analysis indicates force sizing is sufficient unless new missions are added to current requirements. As we moved away from combat operations to stability operations, the force mix changed considerably in favor of ground forces. As conditions change, the composition and size of our forces will continue to change. The factors that influence the force mix in Iraq are future enemy actions, the success we have in standing up the Iraq Police Force and the New Iraqi Army, as well as integrating Coalition force contributions. That having been said I will fully reassess our current operational set and force commitments for both Afghanistan and Iraq immediately upon taking Command.
16. What role do you foresee for forces from additional Coalition nations in Iraq in the future?

**Answer:** The role envisioned for Coalition forces focuses on assuming security, stability and reconstruction operations in various sectors throughout Iraq. As these Coalition forces arrive, we will be able to redeploy U.S. forces. It has always been important that we build a diverse and international force mix in Iraq. We currently have commitments for UK and Polish led Multinational Divisions (Under UK command—UK, Italian and Dutch Brigades; Under Polish command—Polish, Ukrainian and Spanish Brigades). We are continuing discussions with India to secure a commitment to lead a third division. We also have been working with Pakistan to provide major forces. Several countries have agreed to provide forces based on their capabilities to fill out these multinational headquarters/divisions. At this moment, 18 Coalition partners have deployed forces into the USCENTCOM AOR in support of military operations in Iraq. An additional 42 nations are conducting military to military discussions with respect to deploying forces to Iraq in support of post-conflict stability and security operations.

**Transformation**

17. Do current transformation initiatives support CENTCOM’s future requirements?

**Answer:** From recent and current combat operations experiences, I am confident that DoD initiatives will support CENTCOM’s future requirements. While we have the best fighting forces in the world, we must not be satisfied with the status quo. Growing asymmetric threats have dictated that we transform to a lighter, more flexible, more rapidly deployable force, while maintaining the lethality and overmatch of our heavy forces. We must remain committed and prepared to swiftly respond across the full spectrum of military operations, either unilaterally or in concert with other nations. The CENTCOM staff is linked to the various transformation efforts in DoD and provides combat proven lessons into the process of transformation.
18. How will the Army’s transformation impact CENTCOM’s current operations?

Answer: As long as the Army continues to build lighter, more agile forces and maintain the overmatch of our heavy forces while focusing on their ability to bring precision guided weapons to bear on the battlefield in a timely manner, I see nothing in the Army’s transformation efforts to give me concern. Beyond force structure and operational transformation, there are significant logistics aspects of Army transformation that will address sustainment issues. Continuing efforts to establish a common relevant logistics operating picture through asset visibility and in-transit visibility systems are particularly important transformational activities in a theater so far from home.

19. If confirmed, how do you anticipate you would have to adjust CENTCOM’s operational plans as a result of overall DoD transformation?

Answer: As DoD transforms, operational plans will be refined through life cycle reviews to take full advantage of improved capabilities, while focusing on transformational capabilities rather than transformational goals. We expect that transformational capabilities will allow us to reduce force buildup times, leverage precision engagement for greater effect, reduce anticipated logistics overhead, incorporate digital infrastructure to support information dominance, and protect the changing vulnerabilities of the transformed force. We must, however, guard against building plans which incorporate unrealized transformational theories and capabilities.

20. What impact will the Army’s transformation have on the large prepositioned stocks CENTCOM maintains in its Area of Responsibility?

Answer: The important aspect of this issue is whether the Army’s transformation will obviate the need for prepositioning; the answer is, no. As transformation continues, it is important that we maintain prepositioned equipment and stocks that reflect those changes. The right mix and correct positioning of equipment, munitions and
sustainment stocks will continue to be an essential component in the Central Command Area of Responsibility.

**Afghanistan**

21. **What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan?**

**Answer:** Significant progress has been made in the last 18 months. Thanks to the efforts of Coalition forces, Taliban forces no longer control the government or provinces and Al Qaida has been denied freedom of operations within the country. The Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA) is established in Kabul, provinces outside Kabul are beginning to rebuild efforts, and elections are scheduled for the summer of 2004. There remains much to be done. With continued emphasis on stability operations, reconstruction and with the support of the international community, I am confident our long-term goals will be achieved.

22. **What is the status of efforts to develop and field an effective Afghan Army and national police force?**

**Answer:** The German-led national police force training program is making strides in developing a high-quality police force. This police force is the key to long-term security and stability within the country. However, with only 1,500 in training of the 50,000 required, the current pace of training will not achieve the results required to provide security to all provinces in the near term. Greater USG and international support is required to achieve our goals.

The U.S.-led Afghan National Army (ANA) program is on track and will field a full-strength Central Corps by January 2004. Light infantry battalions are constantly training and providing military presence in provinces outside Kabul. The first ANA battalion will join Coalition forces in conducting operations within the next 30 days. The ANA has inspired confidence in the central government.
23. In your view, what additional Military or other assistance is required to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a stable, democratic, and economically viable nation?

**Answer:** Foremost, improve local security for both the Afghan people and international aid organizations by increasing the scope and speed of national police fielding. In addition, empower a civilian-led authority to oversee all non-military functions and reconstruction efforts; complete fielding of the eight planned Provisional Reconstruction Teams with U.S. assets and; press neighboring nations to end support for regional warlords.

**NATO Peacekeepers**

24. What additional opportunities, if any, do you foresee for NATO forces to conduct out of area operations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility?

**Answer:** I look forward to introducing a NATO presence in the CENTCOM AOR. NATO involvement brings professionalism and experience in a wide range of capabilities and the ability to integrate seamlessly with U.S. forces. Their presence and operations will enhance CENTCOM’s ability to fight the Global War on Terrorism throughout the region. As NATO forces are introduced, it is imperative that command and control relationships are established that ensure unity of effort under CENTCOM’s operational control.

**India–Pakistan**

25. What is your assessment of the current situation with regard to Pakistani-Indian relations?

**Answer:** The recent attempt at rapprochement between India and Pakistan is encouraging, but both countries clearly have a long way to go to put aside their deeply entrenched mistrusts and suspicions. There remain contentious and emotionally charged issues to be addressed and resolved, with Kashmir being the foremost issue. Clearly Indian-Pakistani conflict can lead to a nuclear war. CENTCOM’s continued relationship with Pakistan provides a venue for
dialog and confidence building that can do much to lessen tensions.

**Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned**

26. **From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from recent and continuing military operations in Iraq?**

**Answer:** As I mentioned earlier, operations in Iraq demonstrated a maturing of joint and combined force operations. Some capabilities reached new levels. From a Joint Integration perspective, our previous operations in our AOR (OSW/ONW, OEF) helped to develop a joint culture in our headquarters staffs and in our components. These operations also helped to improve joint interoperability and improve our joint C4I networks. Integrated battlefield synergy achieved new levels of sophistication. Our forces were able to achieve their operational objectives by integrating multiple and rapid operations incorporating ground maneuver, special operations, precision lethal fires and application of other non-lethal effects. We saw a real integration of forces to achieve effects as opposed to the de-confliction approach used in earlier conflicts.

Our overall Information Operations campaign supported both the operational and tactical objectives of the Commander. However, we found it difficult at times to assess and measure its effects during the operation. Better resolution of the IO effectiveness is now emerging during Phase IV operations. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance helped decision-makers plan and execute strikes and maneuver effectively. However, our ability to strike rapidly sometimes exceeded our ability to sense and assess the effects as quickly as we would have liked.

Some capabilities require additional work. Fratricide Prevention suffered from a lack of standardized combat identification systems. Units in theater arrived with seven different combat ID systems. Manual procedures and workarounds were rigorously applied by our Commander’s to overcome these shortcomings.

As mentioned earlier, deployment planning and execution need some work to meet emerging needs; deployment management systems must meet political and operational planning, basing, access and over-flight requirements in future contingencies.
Coalition information sharing must also be improved at all levels. Our Coalition partners need our full support during combat operations and we need to develop agile systems of information sharing that do not compromise sensitive U.S. -only information.

Finally, a significant command and control challenge was the task in determining future bandwidth requirements for the AOR infrastructure and new warfighting systems. The demand for ISR and battlefield information continues to grow. Additionally, command and control “on the move” was hampered by the finite number of UHF Tactical Satellite channels available. The demand for UHF TACSAT exceeded the finite capacity and forced continuous prioritization of those available channels as the operations unfolded.

Former Soviet Union States

27. What is your assessment of current U.S. Military relationships with these nations, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?

Answer: Our relationship with the Central Asian States (CAS) is good and improving. They have actively supported our efforts in Afghanistan with over flight and basing access for Coalition forces. We continue to expand our security cooperation programs by increasing and focusing our bilateral military contacts and security assistance programs to build interoperability and host nation capabilities to assist in the fight against terrorism.

28. What security challenges do you see in this portion of the CENTCOM area of responsibility?

Answer: Terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and the proliferation of WMD and their components remain the primary regional security concerns in Central Asia. These challenges are magnified by weak economies and porous borders that make this area a potential breeding ground for discontent and radicalism. Through our security cooperation programs, we are assisting the countries with improvement of their security and border controls. We remain cognizant of the need to implement strong force protection measures in a region where the lack of developed infrastructure could impact the security of our Coalition forces.
Iran

29. What is the view of U.S. allies in the region with regard to the threat posed by Iran?

Answer: Iran casts a shadow on security and stability in the Gulf Region. Iran’s military is second only to the United States. U.S. allies in the Gulf Region acknowledge Iran’s increasingly proactive efforts to soften its image and to appear less hegemonic; however, Iran’s military poses a potential threat to neighboring countries. U.S. forward presence will continue as a balance against any possible use of force by Iran. By continuing our forward presence in the AOR, we serve to influence Iran against any possible use of military force while providing assurances of long-term commitment to our friends and allies.

30. What is your assessment of the prospects for political reform in Iran?

Answer: This question is probably best addressed by the experts in the Department of State and the Intelligence Community. In my opinion, there is chance for political reform to occur in Iran. It will not happen without some internal instability in Iran which could also create regional tensions. In such an environment, a credible Central Command deterrent capability is vital for regional security.

Missile and WMD Threats

31. How do you evaluate Iran’s current capability to use ballistic missiles and WMD against U.S. forces, and what is your projection of Iran’s future capabilities?

Answer: Iran has the largest ballistic missile inventory in the Central Command region to include long-range WMD delivery systems capable of reaching deployed U.S. forces in theater. Systems include SCUD short range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and SHAHAB-3 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM).

Iran’s indigenous nuclear program continues. Iran has not declared all of its nuclear facilities and activities in a timely manner as required by the IAEA. Iran’s long term ability to develop nuclear weapons remains a source of
serious concern.

Iran signed the chemical weapons convention treaty banning chemical weapons but, Iran is assessed to have the largest chemical weapons (CW) program in the region. Tehran also has a biological weapons (BW) program, the size and scope of which remains unclear.

In the future, Iran will continue to develop more advanced/longer range ballistic missiles and more advanced CBW agents. Iran will continue to be a proliferation concern in our region.

32. How do you evaluate Iran's cruise missile capabilities, and Iran's ability to threaten U.S. naval forces and commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Arabian Sea?

Answer: Over the past five years, Iran has substantially improved its anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) capabilities through the acquisition of additional missiles, the indigenous production of mobile launchers and the purchase of new ASCMs from China and North Korea. However, realistic training has been very limited; we assess only a limited capability to effectively employ these weapons.

Nevertheless, the use of ASCMs and other weapons within Iran’s coastal defense forces support a layered force strategy which poses a viable threat to western naval forces and shipping. Iran’s strategy seeks to simultaneously employ air/land/ship-based ASCMs, submarines (3 x) and naval mines in concert with hundreds of lightly armed small boats in order to overwhelm the enemy and control the Strait of Hormuz (SOH). Iran’s focus remains in the littoral; its ability to project power into the Arabian Sea is marginal. Use of externally based terrorist elements and surrogates is planned to compliment maritime capabilities.
33. If confirmed, how would you protect the troops under your command from these threats?

**Answer:** I would use all available PATRIOT and AEGIS assets to counter any ballistic missile and/or cruise missile threat to U.S. and Coalition assets in-theater as appropriate. The command would work with Services to continue to develop ballistic missile defense capabilities. Certainly, military planning will fully consider tactics, timings, techniques and procedures to deal with the threat in the event of an escalating crisis.

**Force Protection**

34. If confirmed, what would your top priorities be in terms of force protection?

**Answer:** USCENTCOM will maintain an offensive orientation and carry the war on terrorism to the enemy. The Command will continue to develop and implement dynamic Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection/Critical Infrastructure programs to assess and mitigate threats to DoD personnel and assets. These programs include:

- Monitoring of terrorist threat intelligence with effective analysis and dissemination and to remain vigilant to address new terrorist tactics intended to exploit our weaknesses.
- Developing programs that help eliminate sanctuary for terrorists and enable host nations to detect, deter and eliminate terrorist elements.
- Pursuing host nation support for force protection measures to include measures to counter MANPAD threats (off base patrolling) and to continue the development of force protection infrastructure at U.S.-occupied bases.
- Conducting vulnerability assessments of DoD facilities and infrastructure regularly to assess and mitigate threats to personnel and assets.
- Integrating appropriate emerging technologies such as; scanning and imaging systems for vehicles and people; explosive and metal detectors; military working dogs; and other merging technologies on the verge of release to field.

I anticipate an ongoing critical need for substantial augmentation by active duty and reserve personnel to support Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection efforts. That
having been said, we will never be able to achieve 100% force protection in this volatile region.

35. **What additional steps, if any, need to be taken to ensure that personnel being assigned to the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility are fully prepared for potential threats?**

**Answer:** USCENTCOM must work closely with the Services to incorporate lessons learned from the field into relevant training, tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as the development of new technological capabilities.

**Horn of Africa**

36. **What is the strategic importance of this region to the United States?**

**Answer:** The Horn of Africa (HOA) sits astride one of the most critical sea lines of communications in the world. It is imperative that we maintain freedom of navigation to ensure strategic maritime access to the entire CENTCOM AOR and freedom of movement of ocean-borne commerce, including oil. The ports in Djibouti and Kenya also afford strategic entry points to the rest of Africa for humanitarian relief and contingency operations. Ungoverned areas in the HOA are used as safe havens for terrorist organizations that could potentially threaten our national interests. We must remain engaged in the HOA to deny the ability of these organizations to operate freely.

37. **Since EUCOM has geographical responsibility for most of Africa, what is the advantage of assigning the Horn of Africa to CENTCOM?**

**Answer:** The majority of the population in the HOA is more aligned along religious and ethnic lines with nations in CENTCOM than with the remainder of the African continent. Ungoverned areas within this region remain safe havens for terrorist and radical Islamic organizations that threaten our national interests. These organizations are connected to other elements that mainly operate in the central region. Leaving the HOA in CENTCOM’s AOR provides the strategic and operational advantage of seamless integration.
Pakistan

38. What is the current status of U.S.-Pakistan Military cooperation?

**Answer:** The U.S.-Pakistan military relationship is good, and continues to improve. Pakistan remains a strong ally in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The Pakistan military continues to improve its capability and effectiveness to deal with international terrorist organizations. They have actively pursued and captured terrorists within their country. We will continue to foster the relationship to demonstrate our commitment to long-term regional stability and improved U.S. relations.

Science Advisors for Combatant Commander’s

39. If confirmed, how would your command make use of the technical expertise available in the Services and their laboratories in order to provide scientific and technical advice to the warfighters?

**Answer:** I would not only leverage the Service laboratories, but also the laboratories in other public and private sectors. CENTCOM has established a Science Advisor position, whose principle responsibility is liaison with science and technology centers of excellence and supporting agencies that receive direct input from all public and private laboratories such as Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), Army’s Field Assistance in Science and Technology (FAST), Counter-Terrorism Technology Task Force (CITTTF) and the Service laboratories. I see the Science Advisor as the entry point for technology input into the process of transformation. The critical linkage between the laboratories and the battlefield is increasing as we attempt to develop the Future Force.
Bandwidth on the Battlefield

40. What challenges do you anticipate in fully utilizing these important assets with the limited bandwidth currently available to the warfighter?

**Answer:** Bandwidth is a critical warfighting resource and its availability was, itself, one of our greatest challenges – both inter and intra theater. Only through significant investments in commercial terrestrial and space segments leases were we able to secure the communications pipes necessary to prosecute the war. Our most significant challenge is determining future bandwidth requirements for the AOR infrastructure and new warfighting systems – because we know those requirements will grow. Sustained funding support for these commercial bandwidth resources is imperative. Operationally, our challenge will continue to be the smart, balanced employment of commercial and military communications assets to ensure redundant and reliable network support to the warfighter. To increase our capability command and control on the move, it is imperative that we secure additional UHF (TACSAT) bandwidth or alternate means. All Services have the obligation to aggressively pursue new technologies and system designs that take into account this limited critical resource.

41. What is your assessment of the bandwidth available during Operation Iraqi Freedom?

**Answer:** We had sufficient bandwidth for C4ISR requirements to prosecute the war. We achieved this sufficiency through intelligent investments in commercial communications as well as the smart, balanced employment of commercial and military communications assets like discussed in the paragraph above. We had marginally sufficient bandwidth for command and control on the move, specifically UHF TACSAT. The enormous demand for UHF channels exceeded the very limited availability of UHF bandwidth. However we measure sufficiency today, it is imperative that we do not underestimate the challenges in securing bandwidth to meet the future requirements as described above.
Congressional Oversight

42. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

43. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

44. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. Central Command?

Yes.

45. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.