NATO AND ENLARGEMENT:
PROGRESS SINCE PRAGUE

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TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:05 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. Bereuter. The Subcommittee will come to order. I open this hearing on the Subcommittee on Europe and welcome our witnesses and our guests. Today, we will examine the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to admit seven European countries to full membership in the Alliance and the qualifications of those seven members.

Our witnesses today are Mr. Robert Bradtke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia; and Mr. Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO affairs.

As two of the officials most closely involved in the enlargement process, they will testify on developments in the enlargement process since last November’s Prague Summit and the progress that the seven accession countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—have made since then in meeting the criteria for membership.

The decision to admit former communist nations from Central and Eastern Europe into the Atlantic Alliance is one of the great successes of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It is a bipartisan success, promoted by Republicans and Democrats in the Congress and by both the Clinton and Bush Administrations.

I am personally pleased that the House has performed an important leadership role in NATO enlargement. In fact, the expansion to the current 19 members can properly be said to have been initiated first in the United States and, within America, first in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Enlarging NATO is certainly nothing new; during the Cold War, the Alliance enlarged on three occasions, admitting Greece, Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain. But the decision to admit Europe’s new democracies to the Alliance that had until recently been their adversary was an important, even an historic, change.

Ten years ago, when voices in the Congress first promoted this idea, it may have seemed a questionable initiative to many Mem-
5 years ago, when the Senate gave its advice and consent to the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, it certainly was not as contentions as many observers had earlier expected. In fact, the admission of the new democracies of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic has reinvigorated the Alliance. With their recent history of life under communist rule, they appreciate the importance of safeguarding freedom, both in Europe and around the world, and they have provided evidence that they share our commitment to promote liberty and oppose tyranny.

The most recent examples of this came in Iraq. Polish special forces were on the ground in Iraq fighting alongside their American, British, and Australian counterparts. Though numbering only a couple of hundred, they participated in the capture of the port city of Umm Qasr, the first city seized by coalition forces. Our Czech allies provided a contingent of chemical weapons defense specialists based in Kuwait, a skill at which they excel, and our Hungarian allies hosted the training facility for Iraqi opposition forces.

While our three new allies have been a great help in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in the peace operations in the Balkans, it is true that their integration into the Alliance was not an unqualified success. We saw some backsliding on their commitments once they joined the Alliance in 1999, most notably in the case of Hungary. While enlargement has been a net gain for NATO, there have been concerns of free-riding allies, though they would not be the first European countries to shirk some of their obligations to the Alliance.

NATO has learned from the most recent round of enlargement and has worked with the incoming countries to ensure that they can contribute to NATO from Day One of their membership. The Membership Action Plan, or the MAP, allowed each candidate country to work with the NATO staff to create a road map to membership. While the MAP is not a check list for admission—that remains the prerogative of member governments and legislatures—it has helped the candidate countries develop reasonable defense planning that will make NATO stronger.

When the Alliance members voted at the Prague Summit to admit the seven incoming allies, they did so with the understanding that their defense reforms were incomplete. These seven countries have developed plans that will enable them to defend their territories, in cooperation with NATO, and that will let them contribute to Alliance missions. But they must continue to implement the reforms since the Prague Summit last November when they were invited to join NATO and since they signed the accession protocols on March 26th. Now, they must continue, of course, this reform process next year and beyond. Even before they become full Alliance members, though, we have seen the benefits that NATO and the United States will reap from having them as part of the Alliance, and we go on at some length about their commitment to implement the reforms.
length to describe the contributions they have made with respect to the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and I think in many cases my remarks are going to be very duplicative of what our two witnesses say, so I will insert that for the record.

The House of Representatives has long supported the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, dating back to 1994. Most recently, the House and Senate last October passed the Freedom Consolidation Act, a bill that I introduced in support of continued NATO enlargement, with my colleague, Mr. Gallegly, and a whole array of Democrat and Republican Members of the House. An overwhelming majority of this chamber—372 in favor versus 46 against—endorsed “the vision of further enlargement of the NATO Alliance.”

Now, according to the U.S. Constitution, of course, it is the Senate that must give its advice and consent to the treaty protocols that will enlarge the membership of the Alliance. On May 8th, the 58th Anniversary of the Victory in Europe Day, the Senate is expected to vote on whether these seven countries should become part of the Alliance. I believe, and certainly I fervently hope, that the Senate will give its advice and consent to the ratification of these protocols.

Our two witnesses have played an important role in the NATO-enlargement process for the past several years. Mr. Robert Bradtke has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs since August 2001. A 30-year veteran of the Foreign Service, Mr. Bradtke’s extensive experience includes tenures as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Executive Assistant to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in London, and Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

Mr. Ian Brzezinski has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO affairs since November 2001. For 7 years before that, he served as a senior staff member in the Senate. He worked for Senator William Roth from 1995 to 2000, including Senator Roth’s term as President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and he was the Secretary of the Senate delegation to the Assembly. I watched him firsthand for a number of years make invaluable contributions as an aide to the Senator and secretary for the entire Senate delegation, and he was a lot of help to the House delegation as well. He went on to work 2 years on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I look forward to the testimony of these two distinguished gentlemen, but I would like now to turn to the acting Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Engel, for such comments as he might like to make preliminarily to the witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

I open this hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe and welcome our witnesses and our guests. Today, we will examine the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to admit seven European countries to full membership in the Alliance and the qualifications of those seven nations.
Our witnesses today are Mr. Robert Bradtke, deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, and Mr. Ian Brzezinski, deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO affairs.

As two of the officials most closely involved in the enlargement process, they will testify on developments in the enlargement process since last November's Prague Summit and the progress that the seven accession countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia—have made since then in meeting the criteria for membership.

The decision to admit former communist nations from Central and Eastern Europe into the Atlantic Alliance is one of the great successes of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It is a bipartisan success, promoted by Republicans and Democrats in the Congress and by both the Clinton and Bush administrations.

Enlarging NATO is certainly nothing new; during the Cold War, the Alliance enlarged on three occasions, admitting Greece, Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain. But the decision to admit Europe's new democracies to the Alliance that until recently had been their adversary was an important, even historic, change.

Ten years ago, when voices in the Congress first promoted this idea, it may have seemed a questionable initiative to many Members of Congress; yet five years ago, when the Senate gave its advice and consent to the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, it certainly was not as contentious as many observers expected.

Nevertheless, the opponents of enlargement found no shortage of supposed reasons as to why it was imprudent to extend NATO's umbrella of stability and security to countries just emerging from four decades of Soviet occupation and communist misrule.

Opponents of enlargement argued that newfound freedom would result in these countries reopening old disputes and fomenting ethnic conflict, dragging the United States into border conflicts and civil wars. In reality, the prospect of NATO membership led nations to bury long-simmering disputes and to focus on strengthening their democracies.

It also was argued that admitting former Soviet allies would alienate Russia and create a new dividing line in Europe. In reality, NATO's relations with Russia have never been better, and NATO's open-door policy has helped bring the European continent closer together.

Furthermore, these opponents argued that the cost of defending new allies in Central Europe could cost more than a hundred billion dollars, with the United States picking up most of the tab.

In reality, their politically tainted analyses were off by a factor of a hundred, and enlargement costs the United States less than thirty million dollars a year, on average—a relatively small price to expand the reach of NATO and of Western democracy to a broad swath of Central and Eastern Europe.

Opponents of enlargement argued that adding new members would lead to less cohesion in the Alliance, as additional countries would make it more difficult to achieve the consensus that NATO requires for decisions.

In reality, it is several of our long-time allies who created a crisis in the Alliance in February when they temporarily blocked NATO action requested by Turkey to plan for its defense.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic played a constructive role; it was France, Germany and Belgium who initially obstructed the decision and called into question NATO's cohesiveness and its very commitment to defend an ally.

In fact, the admission of the new democracies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic has reinvigorated the Alliance. With their recent history of life under communist rule, they appreciate the importance of safeguarding freedom, both in Europe and around the world, and they have provided evidence that they share our commitment to promote liberty and oppose tyranny.

The most recent example of this came in Iraq. Polish special forces were on the ground in Iraq, fighting alongside their American, British and Australian counterparts. Though numbering only a couple of hundred, they participated in the capture of the port city of Umm Qasr, the first city seized by coalition forces. Our Czech allies provided a contingent of chemical weapons defense specialists based in Kuwait, a skill at which they excel. And our Hungarian allies hosted the training facility for Iraqi opposition forces.

While our three new allies have been of great help in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in the peace operations in the Balkans, it is true that their integration into the Alliance was not an unqualified success.
We saw some backsliding on their commitments once they joined the Alliance in 1999, most notably in the case of Hungary. While enlargement has been a net gain for NATO, there have been concerns of free-riding allies, though they would not be the first European countries to shirk some of their obligations to the Alliance.

NATO has learned from the most recent round of enlargement and has worked with the incoming countries to ensure that they can contribute to NATO from day one of their membership. The Membership Action Plan, or MAP, allowed each candidate country to work with the NATO staff to create a roadmap to membership. While the MAP is not a checklist for admission—that remains the prerogative of member governments and legislatures—it has helped the candidate countries develop reasonable defense plans that will make NATO stronger.

When the Alliance members voted at the Prague Summit to admit the seven incoming allies, they did so with the understanding that their defense reforms were incomplete.

These seven countries have developed plans that will enable them to defend their territories in cooperation with NATO and that will let them contribute to Alliance missions. Many of them are focusing on niche capabilities that will fulfill shortfalls in Alliance requirements. But it is important to emphasize that these seven countries must maintain their commitment to implement these reforms.

They have continued to implement their reforms since the Prague Summit last November, when they were invited to join NATO, and since they signed the accession protocols on March 26. Now, they must continue this reform process through the ratification process, through the accession process next year, and beyond.

Even before they become full Alliance members, though, we have seen the benefits that NATO and the United States will reap from having them as part of the Alliance. Most notable was the contribution that Romania made to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, when it sent a 400-strong mountain battalion to fight alongside U.S. forces in the Afghan mountains where al Qaeda and the Taliban took refuge.

Similarly, Lithuania contributed a 40-member special operations team. Bulgaria also made an important contribution to U.S. efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq, hosting U.S. Air Force tankers that refueled combat aircraft taking part in both operations. In fact, that base has proven so valuable that there is talk of establishing a permanent U.S. presence there, a proposal that the Congress will evaluate closely.

In addition, Bulgaria and Slovakia both sent chemical weapons defense teams to countries bordering Iraq. The three Baltic states have contributed engineers, medics, doctors, and ordnance disposal teams to both operations. And Slovenia has sent troops to the Balkan peace operations to free up U.S. forces. These seven countries had pledged even before the Prague Summit that they would act as "de facto allies." We see from their actions that they have done exactly that.

Of course, there are still a few concerns about some of these countries. Crime and corruption are cited as concerns in Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia, but all are to be commended for progress in this area, especially Bulgaria’s 2001 judicial reforms.

Romania has a legal and administrative framework in place for its anti-corruption campaign, but political will is needed to implement reforms. Likewise, while reforms are underway in Latvia and Slovakia, more work remains to be done.

In addition, some concerns have been raised about the potential handling of classified information in Bulgaria and Romania, particularly the concern about holdovers from the communist-era intelligence services, which were instruments of communist repression. These countries state that they have effective vetting procedures in place.

On balance, however, these are stable democracies that will help build a stronger North Atlantic Alliance. They are committed to NATO and its collective defense guarantee because they have recent memories of living under repressive dictatorships.

Having fought so long and hard to gain their freedom, these nations know how precious freedom is and how fundamental the defense of freedom remains.

These are nations ready to defend their freedom and that of their allies. We are fortunate to call these countries our allies.

The House of Representatives has long supported the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, dating back to 1994. Most recently, the House and Senate last October passed the Freedom Consolidation Act, a bill that I introduced in support of continued NATO enlargement. An overwhelming majority of this chamber—372 in favor versus 46 against—endorsed "the vision of further enlargement of the NATO Alliance."

According to the U.S. Constitution, it is the Senate that must give its advice and consent to the treaty protocols that will enlarge the membership of the Alliance. On
May 8, the fifty-eighth anniversary of Victory in Europe Day, the Senate is expected to vote on whether these seven countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia—should become part of the Alliance. I believe and, certainly, I fervently hope that the Senate will give its advice and consent to the ratification of these protocols.

Our two witnesses have played an important role in the NATO enlargement process for the past several years.

Mr. Robert Bradtke has served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs since August 2001. A thirty-year veteran of the Foreign Service, Mr. Bradtke’s extensive experience includes tenures as acting assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs, executive assistant to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in London, and executive secretary of the National Security Council.

Mr. Ian Brzezinski has served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO affairs since November 2001. For seven years before that, he served as a senior staff member in the Senate. He worked for Senator William Roth from 1995 to 2000, including Senator Roth’s term as President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and he was the Secretary of the Senate Delegation to the Assembly. He went on to work for two years on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I look forward to their testimony.

Mr. Engel. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the two distinguished witnesses. I have long been a supporter of NATO expansion, have voted that way in all my years on this Committee, and it is widely understood that NATO enlargement has been a great success. It hasn’t cost the outrageous amounts that were originally assumed. The new countries are making a real contribution to the security of the Alliance, and cooperation with other nations like Russia and Ukraine has increased.

The United States’ strongest allies in Operation Iraqi Freedom were the newest members of the Alliance, and I am concerned about the political future of NATO in light of the failure of diplomatic actions prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. I believe the best way to enhance our security and to strengthen NATO is to expand NATO. We obviously must continue to develop a peaceful, democratic, and undivided Europe allied with us against the security threats that exist in the post-9/11 world, and that is why NATO is so important.

NATO, of course, formed to combat the growing threat of the Soviet Union and expansion of the Soviet Union, now has made the transition and is facing different threats. This is a different world. It is no longer the Cold War world, it is now the post-September 11th world and I think terrorism is certainly something that is important and important to the NATO Alliance.

An example of how NATO enhances America’s security is the aftermath of September 11th, when members of the Alliance agreed to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, considering the attacks on New York and the Washington, DC area as an attack against all of the NATO nations. NATO’s airborne, early warning and control force were deployed to patrol America’s skies, and NATO’s standing naval forces are patrolling the Mediterranean to prevent terrorist movements in order to prevent terrorist groups from organizing and orchestrating operations against the U.S. or our European allies.

NATO has also decided to take over the command, coordination, and planning of the international peace-keeping efforts in Afghanistan, and as we see in the 21st century, there is certainly a need for NATO and certainly a need for expanding the role of NATO,
and I believe, again, that NATO expansion is something that is to be welcomed.

I also want to say that I look forward to the day when NATO can expand even further, taking in nations such as Albania and perhaps even Ukraine and some of the other countries that I think would ultimately aspire to be members of NATO. So I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to listening to our witnesses, and I look forward to asking them some questions. Thank you.

Mr. BERETTER. Mr. Engel, thank you very much. I share your sentiment and that hope and actually expectation.

Without objection, I will make my full statement a part of the record, and all Members of the Subcommittee may submit their statements for the record.

I would like to mention that I understand we have three Ambassadors from the seven accessionist countries in attendance today: The Ambassador of Bulgaria, Elena Poptodorova; and from Lithuania, Ambassador Usackas; and from Romania, Ambassador Ducaru. Gentlemen and lady, you are welcome.

Now, we are pleased to hear from our witnesses. We are going to allow 12 minutes for your statements so that you will have plenty of time to discuss all aspects, and if you need more than that, we will provide it to you. That is the reason we are having the hearing at this time of day, and you are our crucial witnesses. Your entire statements, however, will be made a part of the record. Secretary Bradtke, you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BRADTKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the Members of the Committee for making this opportunity available for us to testify on this important issue. At the outset, I would also like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your strong leadership in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. We are grateful for the time and effort that you have devoted to this important responsibility. I would also like to thank the Committee and its staff for the close cooperation we have had over the past 2 years. The discussions we have had have helped shape the Administration’s approach to NATO enlargement.

Mr. Chairman, it was last June when my colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary Brzezinski, and I appeared before this Committee to report on the process by which the Administration was evaluating the candidates which were seeking to be invited to join NATO at Prague. At that time, I testified that the nine countries that have been pursuing NATO’s Membership Action Plan—Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—were taking the MAP process seriously and that all were working hard on political, economic, and defense reforms. I also pointed out that the nine participants in the MAP were already acting in important ways as de facto allies in the war against terrorism and in the Balkans.

In the months following that hearing, the Administration continued to monitor carefully the progress of the candidates and to urge more work on reforms. In July of last year, I traveled to Riga,
along with our Ambassador to NATO, Nick Burns, to meet with the leaders of all nine countries on the margins of a “Vilnius-10 Summit” meeting. Later in the summer, we conducted what we called a “mid-term review” of reform implementation with each of the Embassies of the aspirant countries here in Washington.

Finally, in October of last year, another team, led by Ambassador Burns, including myself and Deputy Assistant Secretary Brzezinski, visited each of the nine countries. We met with every Prime Minister, nearly every President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defense. We pressed for work on reform programs, and we sought assurances that the reform process would continue well beyond the Prague Summit, if an invitation to join NATO would be forthcoming at Prague.

When NATO’s leaders met in Prague last November, they took stock of the candidates and made the decision to invite seven countries to join the Alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. By issuing the invitation to these countries, President Bush and his fellow NATO leaders determined that these countries were, in the words of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, “in a position to further the principles of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Mr. Chairman, developments since Prague have confirmed the wisdom of this decision. All seven invitees are continuing to behave as de facto allies by providing overflight and basing rights and offering troops to peace-keeping operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. All of the invitees, in statements issued by the Vilnius-10 group, offer their political support to the United States in dealing with Iraq. Six of the seven have joined the coalition to disarm Iraq, and all have expressed a willingness to help in post-conflict reconstruction.

All of the invitees have reaffirmed their commitment to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense and are in a position to make real contributions to carrying out NATO missions. All seven have undertaken broad political, economic, legal, and military reforms to overcome the legacy of communist rule. All are parliamentary democracies with free and fair elections, open-market economies, and respect for the principles of free speech and free press. All have taken steps to foster good governance by bolstering judicial independence and adopting anticorruption measures. All have improved their protection of minority rights and civil liberties, and all have taken steps to restitute property and deal with complex and difficult issues from the past.

My written statement contains more detail on the actions taken by each individual country, and there is also information available in the President’s Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement, which he submitted in March.

The record, Mr. Chairman, I think shows that all seven countries have impressive accomplishments, but just as no ally is perfect, the same is true of the invitees. Issues such as corruption, gray arms sales, treatment of minorities, protection of classified information, property restitution, and defense reform require the continued close attention of the leaders of the seven invited countries. Our intensive dialogue with them over the past several months has convinced us, however, that each of the invitees recognizes that contin-
ued reform measures serve their own self-interest and that they will continue their reforms, even after they are admitted into NATO.

This commitment to an ongoing process of reform was reaffirmed on March 26th in Brussels, when the Allies signed the accession protocols at NATO headquarters. Each of the invitees’ Foreign Ministers provided detailed lists of further political, economic, military, resource, security, and legal reforms with their own timetables. We and our NATO allies will help them meet their commitments with our continued moral support and, in some cases, such as dealing with corruption, gray arms sales, and protecting classified information, with technical assistance. The systematic and formal review process that NATO provides will also ensure continued progress on reforms.

Mr. Chairman, this morning, Secretary Powell appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to make the Administration’s case for quick action by the Senate to provide its advice and consent to the ratification of the protocols on enlargement. Expedient action will demonstrate to our current Allies and our new Allies our commitment to a larger, stronger, more capable NATO, even during a period of transatlantic differences. It will show our commitment to the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, the vision that President Bush put forward in his speech in Warsaw in June 2000.

Even beyond bringing these seven countries into the Alliance, the door to NATO must remain open. As President Bush has said, and I quote,

“All of Europe’s democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe, as Europe’s old democracies have.”

Therefore, we support the continuing pursuit of membership by Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, as well as other countries, and we view the partnership of the three countries I mentioned in joining with us in creating the Adriatic Charter, which we expect to be signed soon by Secretary Powell and the three Foreign Ministers, as a positive step in promoting and enhancing cooperation.

Before closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to share several brief anecdotes, which I think help capture why NATO is important and why this enlargement is important. Last fall, after the President decided that the United States would support the seven invitees, the State Department sent instructions to our Ambassadors in the field to deliver the good news to the governments.

There were, in each of the seven capitals, moments of joy, humor, and poignancy. In one capital, after our Ambassador had finished reading his instructions, a senior official, savoring the moment, asked the Ambassador to read his instructions a second time and then a third. In another capital, the Foreign Minister anxiously received our Ambassador. When the Foreign Minister suddenly realized the historic importance of the news he had just received, he exclaimed, “And I forgot to put my jacket on.”

And then there was the comment by one Foreign Minister, a comment that deeply touched many of us who joined the Foreign
Service well before anyone could imagine the end of the Cold War. After being told of the President’s decision, the Foreign Minister said,

“This is the end of the old Soviet borders, and even the borders in the minds of our people.”

Mr. Chairman, even in these difficult times, it is easy for us, as Americans, to take for granted what NATO means, but in the enthusiasm of our seven new allies, in their dedication to our shared goals, in their contributions to our mutual security, and in the hard work on reform that they have already done and that they will do in the future, our new Allies have reminded us of why NATO is so important. NATO is the enduring community of democracies. It is the essential transatlantic link. It is a guarantor of peace and stability. And for these seven nations, Mr. Chairman, it is the fulfillment of 50 years of hope and aspiration.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me this time, and I would be happy, at the appropriate moment, to answer your questions and hear your comments.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bradtke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you.

At the outset, I would also like to thank you, Chairman Bereuter, for your strong leadership in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. We are grateful for the time and effort you have devoted to this very important responsibility. I would also like to thank the Committee and its staff for the very close cooperation we have had over the past two years on NATO enlargement. These discussions helped shape the Administration’s decision-making before the NATO Summit in Prague.

Mr. Chairman, it was last June when my colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary Brzezinski and I appeared before this committee to report on the process by which the Administration was evaluating the candidates who were seeking to be invited to join NATO at Prague. At that time, I testified that the nine countries that had been pursuing NATO’s Membership Action Plan—Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—were taking the MAP process seriously, and that all were working hard on political, economic, and defense reforms. I also pointed out that the nine MAP participants were acting already in important ways as de facto allies in the War on Terrorism and in the Balkans.

In the months following that hearing, the Administration continued to monitor carefully the progress of the candidates and urge more work on reforms. In July, I traveled to Riga, along with our Ambassador to NATO, Nick Burns, to meet with the leaders of all nine countries on the margins of a “Vilnius-10 Summit.” Later in the summer, we conducted what we called a “mid-term review” of reform implementation with each of the embassies of the aspirant countries here in Washington.

Finally, in October, another team led by Ambassador Burns, again including myself and Deputy Assistant Secretary Brzezinski, visited each of the nine countries. We met with every Prime Minister and nearly every President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defense. We pressed for work on reform programs, and we sought assurances that the reform process would continue well beyond the Prague Summit, if an invitation to join NATO would be forthcoming.

When NATO’s leaders met in Prague last November, they took stock of the candidates and made the decision to invite seven countries to join the Alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. By issuing the invitation to these countries, President Bush and his fellow NATO leaders determined that these countries were, in the words of Article 10 of Washington Treaty: “in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Mr. Chairman, developments since Prague have confirmed the wisdom of this decision.
• All seven invitees are continuing to behave as de facto allies, by providing overflight and basing rights and providing troops to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan.
• All of the invitees, acting through the “Vilnius-10” group offered their political support to the U.S. in dealing with Iraq in a statement on November 21, 2002. And again in February in another V–10 statement, they reiterated this support. Six of the seven have now joined the Coalition to Disarm Iraq, and all have expressed a willingness to help in post-conflict reconstruction.
• All of the invitees have reaffirmed their commitment to spend at least two percent of GDP on defense, and are in a position to make real contributions to carrying out NATO missions. When they join the Alliance, they will bring with them 200,000 troops and important specialized capabilities, which will be further developed in accordance with the Prague Summit Capabilities Commitment.
• All seven have undertaken broad political, economic, legal, and military reforms to overcome the legacy of Communist misrule.
• All are parliamentary democracies with free and fair elections, open market economies, and respect for the principles of free speech and a free press.
• All have taken steps to foster good governance by bolstering judicial independence and adopting anti-corruption measures. All have improved their protection of minority rights and civil liberties. And all have taken steps to restitute property and deal with complex and difficult issues from the past.

While each of the seven countries invited at the Prague Summit shares these broad accomplishments, I would like to comment briefly on the specific contributions and reform efforts that each invitee has made to demonstrate its readiness to join NATO. I would note that the President’s Report to Congress on NATO enlargement, submitted in March, contains a more detailed analysis of each country.

Bulgaria—All segments of Bulgarian political opinion strongly support NATO membership (including all four parties represented in Parliament). Bulgaria has also given strong support for the disarmament of Iraq. On November 7, the National Assembly approved the Government’s decision to support coalition action against Iraq. Bulgarian support includes: over-flight rights and the transit of U.S. and coalition forces; basing for up to 18 U.S. aircraft at Sarafovo Airport near Burgas; and the offer to deploy Bulgarian nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defense units (up to 150 personnel) to the theater of operations. Bulgaria was an important partner of the United States in dealing with Iraq in the United Nations Security Council. Bulgaria also contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), including hosting a deployment of six US KC–135 transport aircraft and 200 support personnel at Burgas, the first stationing of foreign forces in Bulgaria since WWII. Bulgaria has also provided personnel for SFOR and KFOR and donated arms and ammunition to the Afghan National Army. The Government has agreed on a minimum level of defense expenditures as a proportion of GDP, projected at higher than 2.8% in 2003 and 2004.

Since the fall of Communism, Bulgaria has demonstrated its commitment to democracy by holding free and fair elections and the peaceful transfer of power. Basic civil liberties are guaranteed by the Constitution. Bulgarians pride themselves on tolerance, and no extremist group enjoys significant support, either inside or outside the political system. Bulgaria has made material progress on the return of private and communal property. Macro-economically, Bulgaria remains committed to the path of reforms laid out by the IMF and EU, even in the face of growing public dissatisfaction with low living standards.

Estonia—The former Prime Minister stated publicly on March 18 that Estonia is ready to contribute to post-conflict stabilization and security operations in Iraq. The new government, sworn in on April 10, has stressed continuity in foreign policy. Estonia presently contributes 100 troops to the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo—KFOR—on a six-month rotation. A 21-man military police contingent is also deployed to KFOR. Estonia has provided two explosive detection dog teams to Afghanistan to assist with airport security, and offered overflight and landing rights in support of OEF. It has also deployed an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team with ISAF.

Estonia is a fully functioning democracy with a successful market-oriented economy (GDP grew by an estimated 5.7% in 2002). The Government has committed to spending at least 2% of GDP annually on defense. Estonia is working actively to integrate its Russian-speaking minority by eliminating language requirements for electoral candidates and promoting naturalization. Estonia is also taking concrete steps to deal with the past, completing its restitution process entirely and empha-
sizing the work of its independent Historical Commission. In January, Estonia observed its first national Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust.

**Latvia**—The Latvian parliament passed a bill on March 19 to allow Latvian troops to take part in operations in Iraq. Latvia has deployed eight military medical personnel to ISAF, and participates in a six-month rotation, every 18 months, of some 100 personnel as part of KFOR (previously in SFOR). It also maintains a medical and military police team with the British and an EOD team with the Netherlands in KFOR. The government is committed to spending a minimum of 2% of GDP on defense through 2008. Latvia has also undertaken significant political and economic reforms. Following parliamentary elections in October 2002, a new government was formed headed by Prime Minister Einars Repse that has demonstrated a firm commitment to combating corruption. A newly created Anti-Corruption Bureau is working to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations within government. In addition, the new government has accelerated efforts to integrate Latvia’s minorities. Since 1995, 58,145 Russians and others have become naturalized citizens. The Government has reduced fees and adopted other practical measures to ease the naturalization process. Property restitution is also a great success story and is nearly complete. The Government promotes Holocaust education and public awareness, and commemorates Holocaust Remembrance Day on July 4.

**Lithuania**—On March 17, the Lithuanian government reaffirmed the February 5 “Vilnius-l0” statement supporting the U.S. position. Lithuania has deployed logistical and military medical support to the coalition in Iraq, and has offered to provide humanitarian aid. Thirty-seven Special Forces soldiers support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan; four military physicians support ISAF in Kabul. Airspace and airfields are on standing offer. Contributions in the Balkans include a six-month rotation every 18 months of 100 personnel with the Danish contingent in KFOR (previously in SFOR) and a platoon of about 30 servicemen with the Polish-Ukrainian contingent in KFOR. In addition, in March the Lithuanian parliament approved sending military physicians with a Czech and Slovak battalion to Kosovo, and contributing to EU-led operations in Macedonia. The Government is committed to spending a minimum of 2% of GDP on defense.

The Government has taken steps to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for combating corruption. It has successfully cracked down on corruption by customs and tax inspectors. We have also seen a genuine and exemplary commitment to address the injustices of the past. The Government has returned hundreds of religious scrolls to Jewish community groups, instituted a Holocaust education program, announced plans to restore parts of the Jewish Quarter in Vilnius’ Old Town, and consistently been one of the most active members of the 15-country International Task Force on Holocaust Education. A joint Government-Jewish community committee is working on an amendment to the property restitution law to allow communal property restitution.

In **Romania**, public support for NATO membership stands at approximately 80%. A staunch supporter of the war on terrorism and the effort to disarm Iraq, Romania granted blanket overflight, basing and transit rights to coalition forces for operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Black Sea port of Constanta and Mihail Kogalniceanu airbase have accommodated U.S. troops en route to the Persian Gulf. Romania also has deployed an NBC defense unit to support Iraq operations. Romania has provided robust support of OEF, self-deploying a 400-man infantry battalion to Kandahar, Afghanistan and a military police platoon to the ISAF mission in Kabul. The Romanian defense budget is projected at 2.38% of GDP in 2003–05.

The Romanian government continues efforts to strengthen democratic institutions, improve living standards, and create a society based on respect for the rule of law. Romania has a free press, five major political parties, and an established record of consistently free and fair elections. To improve transparency, the Government has drafted legislation to compel the disclosure of public figures’ assets, limit their ability to influence business decisions, make political party financing more transparent, and increase the openness of the government decision-making process. While Romania still has much to do in the matter of restitution, it has passed new laws (to replace the former ad hoc decrees) and is adjudicating thousands of claims. Economic growth resumed in 2000 after a three-year recession, with increases in GDP growth of 5.3% in 2001 and 4.5% in 2002. Decreases in unemployment and inflation represent encouraging developments.

**Slovakia** has also demonstrated its readiness and commitment to supporting U.S. national security interests by contributing to the global war on terrorism, operations in the Balkans/Afghanistan, and in Iraq. Contributions include sending 100 soldiers to Kosovo, an engineering unit to Kabul, and on February 26 a 75-person NBC defense unit to Kuwait. Slovak military reform is on course. Parliament is committed
to joining NATO (the ratification of Slovakia's accession to NATO passed by a 124–
11 vote) and has earmarked 2% of its budget for defense spending.

In September, Prime Minister Dzurinda's government was re-elected, firmly ce-
menting Slovakia's democratic reforms. Former authoritarian Prime Minister
Meciar's party HZDS has all but collapsed. Although economic reforms have been
painful, with unemployment currently at around 18%, the Slovaks nonetheless have
moved forward with privatization and financial reform, and their efforts are begin-
nning to bear fruit. Slovakia has engaged actively with its Jewish community and
with U.S. NGO's to settle outstanding restitution claims. The OECD has projected
a 4% economic growth rate, the highest in the region, for FY 2003.

Slovenia—In addition to offering facilities, overflight permission, and intelligence
support to the War Against Terrorism, Slovenia provided demining and humani-
tarian assistance to Afghanistan, donated arms and ammunition to the Afghan Na-
tional Army Training Program, and is helping train Afghan police. Slovenia also de-
ployed a motorized infantry company to Bosnia in January 2003, adding to troops
and equipment already sent to SFOR and KFOR. Slovenia shows good progress in
increasing interoperability and reforming its military, emphasizing deployable and
sustainable reaction forces. It will end conscription next year and plans to have a
fully professional force by 2008. Defense spending is rising steadily; the Govern-
ment has committed to spending two percent of GDP by 2008.

Slovenia has a stable, multi-party, democratic political system, characterized by
regular elections, a free press, an independent judiciary, and an excellent human
rights record. Slovenia has a free market economy, an impressive record of sus-
tained, broad-based growth, and a per capita GDP approaching 72% of the EU aver-
age. There is near-uniform support in Parliament for NATO membership, and 66%
of participants in a referendum on March 23 voted in favor of joining NATO.

Mr. Chairman, the record of contributions and accomplishments by the seven
invitee countries is impressive. But just as no Ally is perfect, the same is true of
the invitees. Issues such as corruption, gray arms sales, treatment of minorities,
protection of classified information, property restitution, and defense reform require
the continued close attention of the leaders of the seven invited countries.

Our intensive dialogue over the past several months has convinced us, however,
that each of the invitees recognizes that continued reform measures serve their own
self-interest and that they will continue their reforms even after they are admitted
into NATO.

This commitment to an ongoing process of reform was reaffirmed on March 26 in
Brussels when Allies signed the Accession Protocols at NATO headquarters. Each
of the invitees’ Foreign Ministers provided detailed lists of further political, eco-

domic, military, resource, security and legal reforms with their own aggressive time-
tables.

We and our NATO allies will help them meet their commitments, with our contin-
ued moral support and in some cases, such as dealing with corruption, gray arms
sales, and protecting classified information, with technical assistance. The system-
atic and formal review process that NATO provides will also ensure continued
progress on agreed reforms.

Mr. Chairman, this morning, Secretary Powell appeared before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee to make the Administration’s case for quick action by the
Senate to provide its advice and consent to ratification of the Protocols on enlarge-
ment. Expeditious action will demonstrate to our current Allies and our new Allies
our commitment to a larger, stronger, more capable NATO, even during a period
of transatlantic differences. It will show our commitment to the vision of a Europe,
whole, free, and at peace, that President Bush put forward in his speech in Warsaw
in June 2002.

Even beyond bringing these seven countries into the Alliance, the door to NATO
must remain open. Our vision remains, as President Bush has said, that “all of Eu-
rope’s democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between should
have the same chance for security and freedom and the same chance to join the in-
stitutions of Europe—as Europe’s old democracies have”.

We support the continuing pursuit of membership by Albania, Croatia and Mac-
edonia, and we view their partnership in joining with us in creating the “Adriatic
Charter,” which will be signed by Secretary Powell and three foreign ministers here
soon, as a positive step in promoting and enhancing cooperation.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to share several brief anecdotes, which un-
derscore why NATO is important and why this enlargement is important.

Last fall, after the President decided that the United States would support the
seven invitees, the State Department sent instructions to our Ambassadors to de-

erive the good news to the governments.
There were, in each of the seven capitals, moments of joy, humor, and poignancy. In one capital, after our ambassador had finished reading his instructions, a senior official, savoring the moment, asked the ambassador to read his instructions again, and then a third time. In another capital, the foreign minister, who had anxiously received our ambassador and then suddenly realized the historic importance of the news he had just received, exclaimed, “And I forget to put my jacket on!”

And, then there was the comment by one foreign minister, a comment that deeply touched many of us who joined the Foreign Service well before anyone could imagine the end of the Cold War. After being told of the President's decision, the foreign minister said: “This is the end of the old Soviet borders, and even the borders in the minds of our people.”

Even in these difficult times, Mr. Chairman, it is easy for us as Americans to take for granted what NATO means. But in the enthusiasm of our seven new allies, in their dedication to our shared goals, in their contributions to our mutual security, and in the hard work on reform that they have already done and that they will do in the future, our new allies have reminded us of why NATO is so important. It is an enduring community of democracies; it is the essential transatlantic link; it is a guarantor of peace and stability. For these seven nations, it is the fulfillment of fifty years of hope and aspiration.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me this time. I would be happy to answer your questions and hear your comments.

Mr. BERETTER. Thank you very much, Secretary Bradtke. The quotations you gave us from the reactions, I think, were rather noteworthy and heart warming, and I had similar kinds of thoughts as I was privileged to be in the afternoon session of the Prague Summit and watched the Presidents and Prime Ministers of the countries enunciate their great joy and expectations and continued commitment. It was a remarkable afternoon when that enlargement decision was announced.

Secretary Brzezinski, we are pleased now to hear from you. You may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to take part in this hearing on NATO enlargement. To reiterate what Secretary Bradtke said, we are very grateful for the leadership that you have provided on this matter, leadership that has contributed significantly to the implementation and fulfillment of the vision of a Europe that is undivided, secure, and free.

On a personal note, Mr. Chairman, since you mentioned the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I just wanted to say I look back with great fondness and pride at the opportunity I had while serving here on Capitol Hill, serving you and Senator Roth in your capacities in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. That is a body that has done much to forward the vision of NATO enlargement across the Atlantic.

This afternoon, I would like to complement Bob Bradtke’s testimony by briefly sharing with you the Department of Defense’s evaluation of how the seven democracies invited to join NATO will enhance the Alliance’s security and military capability.

At the end of last month, the accession protocols of the seven invitees were signed in Brussels. It was an important milestone, one that makes it appropriate to review the principles that serve as the foundation for our support for enlargement and, more broadly, our security relationship with Europe. Since Assistant Secretary
of Defense J.D. Crouch, my boss, reviewed these principles last March before you, I will be very brief.

The first principle is that a Europe that is whole, secure, and at peace is in the interest of the United States. NATO enlargement is the cornerstone for the implementation of that vision. An undivided Europe will be better able and more capable of serving as a partner with the United States in global affairs.

The second principle is that the United States and Europe exist in the same global security environment, facing the same opportunities, challenges, and dangers. Of the latter, none is more urgent and lethal than the nexus of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist organizations, and terrorist states. Cooperation with Europe is vital to the successful execution of the global war on terrorism.

The third principle is that NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security relationship with Europe. It is the central framework for military cooperation across the Atlantic. Each day, we are a witness to the value of that cooperation, as demonstrated by the fact that U.S. and European soldiers stand together, patrol together, and fight together in the hills of Afghanistan, in the mountains and hills of Kosovo and Bosnia, and, more recently, in Iraq. The foundation for their effectiveness on the field is 50 years of NATO operations, of NATO training, of NATO joint staffing, of NATO joint exercises. NATO provides a level of military integration among allies that is found nowhere else in the world.

Finally, Europe remains essential to the maintenance of the forward presence of the United States military. Our military forces stationed in Europe were among the first to take up positions in the war against Iraq.

It is these principles that constitute the core of our advocacy for NATO enlargement and the Alliance’s open door policy.

Our support for the NATO aspirations of the seven invitees has been matched by their enthusiasm and willingness to contribute to NATO-led operations in the Balkans, to Operation Enduring Freedom, to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, and, more recently, in the war against Iraq.

There are several important lessons we can draw, or conclusions we can draw, from these experiences. First, over the last decade, these seven invitees have been acting as de facto allies. They have demonstrated, by risking their own blood, that they not only understand the responsibility of NATO membership; they embrace it. These seven invitees also bring real capabilities to the table. Together, the seven add to NATO’s strengths over 200,000 men in arms.

The NATO invitees all have niche capabilities and specialties that will allow them to contribute militarily to the Alliance immediately upon accession. In fact, the invitees are already contributing many of these niche capabilities, be it chem-bio units, be it special operations forces, be it explosive ordnance disposal teams, to U.S. and NATO operations worldwide.

Through these contributions, their defense establishments have attained a better understanding of how NATO and NATO allies conduct military operations. Clearly, there is still much work to be done to bring their militaries up to the standards that we expect of all our NATO allies, but from my experience in working with
these countries and helping them shape and implement their defense reform programs, we are confident they are making very good progress and will continue to do so.

The Department of Defense has worked closely with the ministries of defense in an effort to cover the full spectrum of defense policy and operations, and from these experiences, which span several years, we have found that all seven invitees have put into place national security, defense policy, and defense reform plans that are integrated, coherent, and consistent with their agreed-upon, NATO-partnership goals, goals that will soon become force goals, NATO force goals. Moreover, these planning documents are backed by resource commitments that as an average amount to over 2 percent of their GDP, higher than the average GDP current NATO allies dedicate to defense.

They have improved their capacities in secure, deployable, and interoperable military communications. This, I am glad to say, remains a top modernization priority for all seven. All seven have committed to improve their reception station capacities, their ability or infrastructure for host nation support, and our use of Romanian and Bulgarian airfields in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom is testimony to the progress they have made.

Each of the invitees are improving their respective logistical support infrastructures and are working to make those units that they have dedicated to NATO operations, such as Slovakia’s Immediate Reaction Brigade, more self-sustaining.

All have improved their ability to protect NATO classified information and continue to work with NATO’s security office to refine the respective reforms and to improve their implementation.

Mr. Chairman, details of these and other defense reform priorities and the progress made by the invitees are found in the President’s Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement.

Mr. Chairman, in the travels that I and my colleagues undertook to these democracies that were reviewed by Bob, our assessments were always based on two fundamental questions: Will this candidate strengthen the Alliance’s ability to protect and promote its security, its values, and its interests? And, second, can we be confident that this candidate’s commitment to democracy and the Alliance’s responsibilities and values will be enduring?

From my vantage point in the Department of Defense, I believe the answers to these questions is yes for all seven. This conclusion is based on their conduct as de facto allies over the last decade. It is based on the soundness of their defense reform programs, which are multiyear endeavors that provide insight into out-year plans and intentions, and, most importantly, it is based on a final point we should never forget.

These democracies still have very fresh memories of foreign domination and totalitarianism, and with that comes a special appreciation for what it takes to protect the core values and interests of the Alliance. It explains in part their commitment toward responsibilities that come with membership in an alliance that brought down the Berlin Wall, helped end the Soviet Union, and that helped make these countries free. It explains why these democracies have sent their men in arms to stand with U.S. forces
in often dangerous missions, and why I am confident they will continue to do so as NATO allies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am prepared to answer any questions you or the Committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to take part in this hearing on NATO enlargement.

We are grateful for the leadership that you and this Committee have provided on this matter—leadership that has contributed significantly to fulfilling the vision of a Europe that is undivided, secure and free.

When Assistant Secretary of Defense Crouch testified before this Committee on March 13th, he thoroughly reviewed the results of the Prague Summit, to include the Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO Response Force, the Command Structure Review, and the invitations to seven NATO aspirants. Since that hearing, NATO took the important decision to take on the command, coordination and planning of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan later this year. This was a historic step that brought NATO operations well out of their traditional geographic domain and underscored the important role NATO can and should play in global affairs.

Today, I would like to share with you the Department of Defense’s evaluation of the seven countries invited to join NATO and how their membership in NATO will enhance the Alliance’s security and military capability.

On March 26th, the accession protocols for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were signed in Brussels. This is an important milestone in this round of enlargement, and I think it might be useful to review principles that serve as the foundation for our support for enlargement and more broadly our security relationship with Europe. While Assistant Secretary Crouch reviewed these principles last month with the Committee, they are so integral to the rationale and vision behind enlargement that they bear repeating.

The first principle is a Europe that is whole, secure, and at peace is in the interest of the United States. NATO enlargement is the cornerstone of that vision. An undivided Europe, whole and free, will be a better partner of the United States in global affairs.

The second principle is that the United States and Europe exist in the same global security environment. Before them lie the same opportunities, challenges and dangers. Of the latter, none is more urgent and lethal than the nexus of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist organizations and terrorist states. Cooperation with Europe is vital to the global endeavor underway to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, their leadership, their communications and their sources of financial and material support.

The third principle is that NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security relationship with Europe. It is the central framework for military cooperation with Europe, and NATO promotes among its members common defense policies and doctrines and integrated force structures. This level of military integration is found nowhere else in the world.

Finally, Europe remains essential to the maintenance of the forward presence of the United States military. In fact, U.S. forces forward deployed in Europe were some of the first to take up positions in the war against Iraq. It is with these principles in mind that we advocate NATO enlargement and the Alliance’s Open Door policy.

Our support for the NATO aspirations of the seven invitees has been matched by their enthusiasm and willingness to contribute to NATO-led operations in the Balkans, Operation Enduring Freedom, the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, and more recently in the war against Iraq.

What can we draw from these experiences? First, over the last decade, these seven invitees have been acting as de facto allies. They have demonstrated by risking their own blood that they not only understand the responsibility of NATO membership, they embrace it. Second, these seven invitees bring real capabilities to the table. Indeed, together the seven add to NATO strengths over 200,000 troops in arms.

The NATO invitees all have niche capabilities and specialties that will allow them to contribute militarily to the Alliance immediately upon accession. In fact,
invitees are already contributing many of these niche capabilities, such as special
operations forces, demining, and explosive ordnance disposal, to U.S. and NATO
missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the Iraq theatre.

Moreover, through their contributions to NATO operations in the Balkans and in
the global war on terrorism, their defense establishments have developed a better
understanding of how NATO and NATO Allies conduct military operations. Clearly
there is still much work to be done to bring their militaries up to the standards we
expect of our NATO members. But my experience in working with these countries
shaping and implementing their defense reform programs shows that they are mak-
ing very good progress and will continue to do so.

Mr. Chairman, in the travels that I and my colleagues undertook to these democ-
racies, we’ve looked at two questions. Will this candidate strengthen the Alliance’s
ability to protect and promote its security, values and interests? Can we be con-
fident that this candidate’s commitment to democracy and the Alliance’s responsibil-
ities and values will be enduring?

From my vantage point, I believe the answers to these questions is yes for all
seven. This conclusion is based on their conduct as de facto allies, and it is based
on the soundness of their defense reform programs, multi-year endeavors that pro-
vide insight into out-year plans and intentions.

As well, Mr. Chairman, I would like to provide the Committee with some background on
the defense reform efforts of each of the seven invitees. The President’s Report on
these invitees, provided to the Committee in March, provides more detail on each
country.

*Bulgaria*

Bulgaria has demonstrated its ability to operate with U.S. and Allied forces by
contributing a light infantry company for security of HQ SFOR, deploying engineer
and mechanized detachments in KFOR, and sending one transport aircraft to NATO
Balkans operations. Bulgaria provided overflight and basing for six U.S. KC–135
tankers at Burgas for OEF and deployed a 32-man NBC detachment in ISAF. For
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Bulgaria has provided 1 NBC company, overflight rights,
and basing at Burgas for six U.S. KC–135 tankers.

Bulgaria expects to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense through 2007; it spent
3.13% in 2002 and 2.84 % in 2003. Its management of its defense resources has im-
proved through the introduction of a sound Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS). The types of niche contributions that Bulgaria would bring to
NATO include: special operations forces, engineers, chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear defense, helicopter and transport aviation, and mine-sweepers.

Bulgaria’s Reform Plan 2004, based on U.S. and NATO recommendations, foresees
a smaller, more agile and mobile force structure, including a rapid reaction force
able to respond to deployments within 30 days. Bulgaria is building up its command
and control infrastructure with an integrated communications and intelligence inform-
ation system, an Air Sovereignty Operations Center, and a National Military Com-
mand Center.

Further progress is required in establishing systems necessary to provide ade-
quate protection of NATO classified information. Bulgaria is working closely with
NATO authorities to complete these reforms in the coming months.

The illicit Terem arms-dealing scandal, which involved the attempted sale of dual-
use military equipment to Syria in the fall of 2002, is of great concern to the United
States. The Government of Bulgaria cooperated with the U.S. Government in the
investigation of this case. Sofia continues to work on reforms that will preclude a
repeat of these kinds of sales. The U.S. Government does not consider the Terem
case to be closed and will continue to monitor closely the Terem investigation with
the expectation that all individuals involved will be held fully accountable.

**Estonia**

Estonian forces deployed with the U.S. and NATO have included an infantry com-
pany that rotates with the other Baltic states in KFOR; a military police unit in
KFOR in the Balkans; and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in ISAF in
Afghanistan. Estonia has also offered specialized support units for humanitarian op-
erations and a small security team for Operation Iraqi Freedom. These capabilities,
as well as military divers, naval mine countermeasures, and cargo handlers, are all
examples of niche capabilities that Estonia could contribute to the Alliance. Estonia
expects to spend 2% of its GDP on defense though part of this goes to the Border
Guard.

Estonia envisions shifting the priority away from territorial defense toward
deployable, sustainable forces that can more effectively contribute to the full spec-
trum of Alliance missions. Under the reform plan, Tallinn is modernizing its tactical
communications, continuing upgrades to its air surveillance radars, and improving
an airfield to serve as an aerial port of debarkation (APOD). While collective train-
ing is currently at the company level, Estonia is developing battalion-plus exercises.

Latvia

Latvia has supported U.S. and NATO missions by rotating an infantry company
with the other Baltic States in KFOR, maintaining military police and medical
teams with the UK in KFOR, an EOD Team with Norway in the Balkans, and a
medical team in ISAF. Riga has offered specialized support for peace enforcement
and humanitarian operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Latvia has a legal commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on defense from 2003–
8, though a significant part of the defense budget goes to the Border Guard. Latvia
can contribute niche contributions to NATO that include special operations forces,
EOD, military police, naval mine countermeasures, military divers, and cargo han-
derers.

Riga’s security policy is guided by its National Security Concept and State De-
defense Concept, while a new Force Structure Review, focusing on a national brigade,
is underway. Riga is making significant investment in communications and control
structures, including a Joint Operational Command to direct land, maritime, and air
operations, the procurement of new tactical radios, and the installation of new air
surveillance radars. The Training and Doctrine Command took over all training cen-
ters in 2002, and is refining training done at the company level and developing bat-
talion-and-higher training.

Lithuania

Lithuania’s participation in U.S. and NATO missions has included rotating an in-
fantry company with the other Baltic states and maintaining an infantry platoon
with the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion in KFOR, providing NATO an AN–26 transport
for Balkans support, and, in Afghanistan, deploying a special operations forces unit
with the U.S. and deploying a medical team in ISAF. Vilnius has deployed medical and
cargo handling teams for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Lithuania spent 2.16% of its GDP on defense in 2002, though a significant part
of the defense budget goes to the Border Guard and other non-defense institutions. Par-
lament has committed spending 2% of GDP on defense through 2004. To support
NATO, Lithuania can provide niche contributions that include special operations
forces, EOD, field medicine, naval mine countermeasure, and cargo handlers.

Lithuania is revising its Military Defense Strategy following adoption of the new
National Security Strategy in May 2002. These strategies will shift the role of its
Territorial Forces from combat to primarily host nation support. Much of Lithua-
nia’s military reform effort has focused resources on those units dedicated to NATO
responsibilities, including its Iron Wolf Brigade. Vilnius is upgrading its command,
control, and communications (C3) with the establishment of a military communica-
tions network and acquisition of new air surveillance radars.

Romania

Romania has been involved with U.S. and NATO missions through deployment to
the Balkans of 350 personnel—engineer and military police detachments, an EOD
platoon in SFOR, two infantry companies in KFOR, and one infantry battalion in
SFOR. Romania deployed a 400-man infantry battalion, a military police platoon,
and its C–130 aircraft to Afghanistan. Romanian forces fighting alongside U.S.
forces in Afghanistan were recognized by both the Secretary of Defense and fellow
soldiers from the 82nd Airborne for their skills. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, Ro-
mania is providing Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense/Consequence Manage-
ment forces, overflight rights, and basing at Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase for U.S.
forces.

Romania’s current defense spending is 2.3% of GDP, and Bucharest is committed
to at least 2% GDP through 2007. Romania’s niche contributions to NATO could in-
clude mountain troops, unmanned aerial vehicles, military police, and chemical, bio-
logical, radiological and nuclear defense.

Romania’s reform plan “Objective Force 2007,” which incorporates U.S. and NATO
defense recommendations, gives priority to improved interoperability and combat ef-
ficiveness of active and deployable forces. Bucharest is streamlining and modern-
izing its command, control, and communications (C3) arrangements through a func-
tional Air Sovereignty Operations Center, the fielding of a NATO-compatible secure
data management system. It is also moving its Navy headquarters to Bucharest
from Constanta to integrate more fully its joint command, control, and communica-
tions (C3). Like Bulgaria, Romania is restructuring its military away from large,
heavy Warsaw Pact-era forces toward smaller, light and more mobile units that will
be better able to serve in NATO operations in the future.
Slovakia

Slovakia's force contributions to U.S. and NATO missions have included an infantry company in KFOR, transport helicopters and a platoon in SFOR, an engineering platoon in Bagram, Afghanistan, and a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense team in Kuwait to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. Slovakia is spending 2% of GDP on defense, with Parliamentary commitment to maintain a level of at least 1.9% of GDP. Slovakia's niche contributions to NATO can include chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense, special operations forces, construction engineering, humanitarian demining, and field medicine.

Slovakia's reform efforts are guided by its Force 2010 defense plan, developed with the assistance of a retired U.S. general officer. Implementation of the plan is on track, with Parliament assuring needed financial backing. A centerpiece is the immediate reaction brigade, 5th Special Forces, which is being outfitted and trained for NATO-led operations. Slovakia installed a modern Air Sovereignty Operations Center, deployed new three-dimensional radars, and is improving the capacity for secure communications at all levels of military operations. Bratislava is making good use of U.S.-provided IMET and FMF for training, including English language training and officer professional development. Slovakia is making significant progress in personnel reform, especially in reducing senior officer ranks and establishing a competent NCO cadre.

Slovenia

To support U.S. and NATO missions, Slovenia provided an infantry company in SFOR in the Balkans and donated weapons/ammunition for 3 battalions of the Afghan National Army. Slovenia's defense spending is currently 1.6% of GDP on defense, which will increase incrementally to 2% of GDP by 2008. In October 2001, the Government of Slovenia decided to purchase a VIP government aircraft, at a cost equal to about 10% of one year's defense budget. This would have been a diversion of resources away from more urgent combat-related procurement priorities. Because of the magnitude of this purchase, the U.S. government relayed its strong concerns to the Slovene government regarding this purchase, noting the need for the Government to remain focused on its defense reform efforts and other procurement priorities. Noting U.S. concerns, Slovenia purchased a less expensive aircraft, reallocating the funds "saved" to purchase a multi-use helicopter for border control and rescue missions, a purchase with enhances Slovene counter-terrorism efforts.

For its niche contributions to NATO, Slovenia's specialized capabilities can include mountain warfare, humanitarian demining, military police, special operations forces, and field medicine. Slovenia's defense reform plan, “General Long Term Development and Equipping Program,” covers reforms through 2007. The focus of this effort is the 10th Battalion, the unit Slovenia is tailoring for NATO-led operations. Slovenia has developed a modern Air Sovereignty Operations Center, and its secure communications capability is improving. Ljubljana has developed good Host Nation Support facilities, including the port of Koper, a mountain warfare training center, and its NATO (English) language training facility. The Slovenian military is professionalizing its forces by 2004. Key military positions are occupied by U.S. trained officers, from 2nd Lieutenant through Colonel.

For those aspirants not invited at the Prague Summit, the door to NATO membership remains open. The three current NATO aspirants—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—are continuing to participate in the Membership Action Plan and to prepare themselves for the responsibilities of NATO membership. Through NATO programs and bilateral efforts, we will work with Kiev on the goal of Ukraine's integration into Europe—an integration that will not be complete as long as Ukraine remains outside of Europe's key political, economic, and security institutions.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to conclude on one final point: we cannot forget that these democracies still have fresh memories of foreign domination and totalitarianism. With that comes a special appreciation for what it takes to protect the core values and interests of the Alliance. It explains in part their commitment toward the responsibilities that come with membership in an Alliance that brought down the Berlin Wall, that helped end the Soviet Union, and helped make these countries free. It explains why these democracies have sent their men in arms to stand with U.S. forces in often dangerous missions over the last decade and why I am confident they will continue to do so as NATO Allies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am prepared to answer any questions the Committee may have.
Mr. BERUTER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We will now proceed under the 5-minute rule, and I think we will have enough time for a sufficient number of rounds to satisfy all of the Members of the Subcommittee in attendance or any Members of the Committee that join us.

I want to ask a question about the only three countries that will be left in the Membership Action Plan: Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—Mr. Engel made reference to them—along with Ukraine. This, of course, is the program to help the aspirant countries qualify for NATO membership. In effect, I suppose you could say it would transform the Partnership for Peace Program, which I regard as a very successful program, as something of a waiting room—I don’t mean that in a derogatory sense—for the prospective members in an organization that will then be made up mostly of countries, not entirely, but mostly of countries that, in all probability, do not expect to be invited to join NATO. So how do you see the PFP changing after these new members join NATO? As a second question, how will the U.S. work with Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to help them achieve membership? I would like responses from each of you, if I might.

Mr. BRADTKE. Certainly. Let me start out with the question about the Partnership for Peace and then turn to Albania, Croatia, Macedonia. The Partnership for Peace was always viewed as something that had merit on its own. It was not seen as simply a waiting room for NATO membership or a means to bring countries in the direction of NATO membership. I think it was always understood that there would be countries who were not interested in taking on the responsibilities of NATO membership.

But as you say correctly, Mr. Chairman, with the invitation to seven countries, we are, indeed, changing the composition of the countries that remain in the Partnership for Peace. We will have several highly developed, European countries, countries such as Ireland and Austria that will be in the Partnership for Peace. We will have countries from Central Asia and the Caucasus who will remain in the Partnership for Peace, and we have been looking very intensively at how we can develop the Partnership for Peace.

This was part of our Prague agenda: New capabilities, new members, new relationships. Under the new-relationships rubric, we included the idea of trying to revitalize the Partnership for Peace and see how it could be made more effective, given its changing membership. We have been looking at ways that some of the more developed partners, such as Austria, can help the countries that are less developed or that need assistance in improving their capabilities, for example, on things like border protection. So we have been looking at that element to see how the partnership can develop.

We have also been looking at ways that the partnership can directly strengthen its presence in some of the countries of Central Asia. For example, should there be a NATO office in some of these countries that would manage the partnership programs?

So work has been going on this since the Prague Summit. The NATO staff, international staff, has been producing some papers that we are looking at in NATO, but the partnership will remain
an important element of NATO's activities and one that we want to try to strengthen in the future.

Let me just say a word about Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, the three countries that are currently in the Membership Action Plan. We are looking at ways to strengthen their ability to prepare themselves for membership in NATO. We want to see that day come, and one of them is through something we call the Adriatic Charter. We are going to try to build a bit on the model of the Baltic Charter, which was very successful, and see whether we can intensify our consultations with these countries and encourage them to cooperate with one another. So we have already worked on a document, an Adriatic Charter, that the three countries cooperated on, showing their ability to work with one another.

They brought that document to the United States. We have reviewed that document and have made a few changes, but we will be prepared to sign this charter in the coming days. Secretary Powell had hoped to do this this week. That still may prove to be possible, but that will be another vehicle to try to strengthen their efforts to show that they can work together because the ability to cooperate with one another is one of the hallmarks of NATO members. So for these three countries to use this charter to show how they can work together will strengthen their candidacy for NATO membership.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Brzezinski.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I will just add three brief points to Bob's comments. First, we in the Department of Defense very much want to see the Partnership for Peace continue. We want to give it more life in the future. We saw the intense value it brought to our interests during Operation Enduring Freedom because our contacts through Partnership for Peace with Central Asian states provided the foundation for our ability to work so closely with them in that operation.

We envision the Partnership for Peace continuing many of its same functions: Developing interoperability between countries, fostering common procedures for crisis management, coordinated procedures for crisis management. We see it playing a continued role in democratization, particularly in the realm of helping establish civilian control over the military in some of the Central Asian and Caucasus partners.

If there were to be a shift in PFP, it would probably be a shift that reflects the nature of the international security environment that we face, a shift that would give greater emphasis to the global war on terrorism and the need to take on the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, gentlemen. I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel, for his questions or comments.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very glad that you raised the question of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. As I mentioned in my remarks, I look forward to the day when those three, along with Ukraine and others, would be part of NATO. I have been particularly active, since I chair the Albanian Issues Caucus in the Congress, and I just wanted to follow up on your question to ask a specific question about Albania.
Albania has been an active supporter of Operation Iraqi Freedom, has 70 special forces from the Albanian military joining the military effort, and are currently patrolling alongside American Marines in Baghdad. I wanted to ask if the Administration envisions any kind of timetable for Albanian membership, and Croatia and Macedonia as well, and what specific assistance programs are currently in place to aid the Albanian military to modernize? Perhaps Mr. Brzezinski can tell me about that, but I would like to hear from both of you.

Mr. BRADTKE. Let me just say, with regard to a timetable, when the NATO leaders met in Prague, they took a decision to have another NATO Summit in May 2004. They did not say anything specifically about a timeline for inviting additional members beyond the seven, so this is something that will be considered by NATO leaders, but there is no timetable that has been set for that.

Regarding assistance for Albania, we do have military assistance to try to help Albania improve its military capabilities, to help them with their planning mechanisms in military plans. I would be happy to defer to my colleague on that.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I would just add one point on the future rounds. It is also driven very much by the reforms in the applicants. That is probably the most important driving factor in terms of the timing of the next round of enlargement.

With regard to specific programs with Macedonia and Albania, I unfortunately don’t have those countries in my portfolio. Mira Cardell, the former Mira Barada, is responsible for those, and I could have her follow up for you.

[The information referred to follows:]

Material Submitted for the Record in Writing by the Honorable Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense

Military Assistance to Albania:

The U.S. provides security assistance to Albania through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Excess Defense Articles (EDA). For fiscal year 2003, Albania received $4.9 million in FMF, $6.6 million in FMS and $.900 million in IMET. The U.S. has authorized more than $37 million in grant EDA transfers.

In May 2003, the U.S. hosted Bilateral Defense Consultations with Albania. During these consultations, Albania and the U.S. signed an agreement to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This agreement allows the U.S. to provide Albania with training and equipment under U.S. International Counter-proliferation Program (ICP) to assist with the detection and interdiction of WMD and related materials. In March 2003, Department of Defense hosted 40 mid-senior level Albanian officials in Budapest for a seminar on WMD under the ICP program.

The U.S. is providing a $500,000 donation to support a project to develop an Ammunition Demilitarization Facility to address the problem of excess small arms in the country.

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. I would appreciate that. I want to ask a general question, which would involve the seven countries and others in the future. General James Jones, who is the new supreme allied commander in Europe, and others have suggested that the United States reduce its force presence in Europe. He suggests that we ought to close large, permanent bases, mostly in Germany, and establish a smaller footprint at bases in countries like Romania and Bulgaria, which are closer to areas of instability like the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.
In addition, moving the bases to Central and Southeastern Europe, the theory goes, would remove the need to get approval from neutral Austria to have U.S. troops and equipment transit its territory.

I am wondering if you could both comment on that, and have they been discussed with countries like Romania and Bulgaria, and how might Russia react to the establishment of U.S. bases in former Warsaw Pact countries?

Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, when Secretary Rumsfeld took office, one of his first taskings by the President was to reexamine our force structure and force posture worldwide, and that process is underway. It is a process being driven by an assessment of the new international security environment, an assessment that emphasizes the need for greater strategic and operational flexibility, an assessment that is driven by recognition by the Secretary of the unpredictability of future challenges, what he sees as a need to be able to respond not to just one or two but simultaneous contingencies happening at the same time.

Those studies are still underway, and I think the Secretary would want to speak directly himself, speak on those, to answer your questions, and so I would prefer to leave it to him, but, to my knowledge, there have not been negotiations with any countries on the footprint.

Mr. Engel. If he could get back to me, I would appreciate it, on this question.

Mr. Bradtke. If perhaps I could just add, because the same question was raised this morning, and Secretary Powell's comment was, on your point about Russia, was that whatever decisions are made, we would want it to be clear to the Russians, and they should understand, that this is not a case of NATO kind of moving up its forces to Russia's borders, that with the end of the Cold War, we do not view Russia as a threat, and that the motivation for moving our forces would not be to move them closer to Russia's borders. The Secretary said as well that he was confident that the Russians would understand this and that whatever changes that were made would be in keeping with the various understandings that we have with the Russians, including our arms-control agreements.

May I also come back, if I can, to your question about Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia because I wanted to add one point? And that was that while we are working with these three countries as a group, these countries' membership applications are not, so to speak, linked. We will continue to evaluate them, of course, as Secretary Brzezinski said, based upon their own reform implementation, so they will be looked at individually as they prepare themselves and try to qualify for NATO membership, but we welcome their cooperative efforts in working together.

Mr. Engel. Thank you.

Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, gentlemen. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Dakota, Governor Janklow.

Mr. Janklow. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If I could ask, as far as we know at this point in time, is there any real resistance from any of the members of NATO to these seven joining?
Mr. BRADTKE. No. I am not aware of any resistance to these seven joining. Of course, the leaders of all seven countries participated in the decision at Prague, and I am not aware of any problems that are expected to be encountered in the ratification process in the seven countries.

Mr. JANKLOW. So it is really a matter of time—

Mr. BRADTKE. Excuse me?

Mr. JANKLOW. I am sorry. I have a cold. Is this a matter of time at this point in time?

Mr. BRADTKE. Yes. Each country, just like the United States, has a different process, constitutional process, of ratification. Canada and, I believe, Norway have already completed their ratification process or their parliamentary actions. Other countries require the changes, if you will, in the Accession Protocols to lay before their parliaments for set periods of time, so there are different processes in each country, but the process is proceeding normally, and I am not aware of any problems.

Mr. JANKLOW. Are all of these countries aware—I assume they are—of how much an awful lot of people feel they have made immense accomplishments, and they have moved forward on a lot of fronts? Albeit we can nitpick and find problems with different aspects—people could do that to us—the reality of the situation is, I think, they have been remarkable in terms of what they have been able to accomplish since the Cold War ended, and they really found their freedom.

Mr. BRADTKE. I am very happy that you would say that because I think it is important that we recognize not just the problems but also how far these countries have come, the progress that they have made. I certainly feel that personally. As the Chairman mentioned, I have been in the Foreign Service for 30 years, and among some of my earlier assignments in the Foreign Service, I dealt with Romania, Czechoslovakia, what used to be Yugoslavia, and for me to go back to those countries now and see the changes, the reforms, things that I couldn't have imagined 20 years ago, is really a moving and heart-warming experience.

There are problems. There is the continuing need for reform, but the level of commitment to reform and the hard work that has been done already certainly deserves to be recognized.

Mr. JANKLOW. Given the fact that we don't have the Cold War concern or the Warsaw Pact, the world has really changed. Do we have any concern that, I should say, an expanded NATO with all of these countries in it, with the exception of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, are going to decide at some point in time they don't need us? I mean, really at this point, the shield that America offered those countries isn't as important as it used to be.

Mr. BRADTKE. I would be happy to have my colleague respond as well, but I firmly believe that what NATO does, the shield it provides, the capability it provides to defend all of its members against new threats—the threats have changed, but there are threats still there. The world is still a dangerous place, and the commitment NATO members have to one another is still very important.

Mr. JANKLOW. And I realize there is a distinction between the planning group and the other, but didn't we see a little microcosm recently with respect to the defense of Turkey, or Turkey's attitude
that it needed assistance and the response that was made, specifically with respect to France? And I realize they are not in that part of the planning side of it, but doesn't that give us cause for real concern, that the politicization of NATO at that level is something that has never been done before and that holds the potential to wreck the Alliance?

Mr. BRADTKE. There is no question that the problem that occurred after Turkey requested assistance from the Alliance under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty was a damaging one. I happen to agree with what Lord Robertson has said about this particular case, which was that the damage was above the water line rather than below, but it was a serious dispute. But in the end, I think the lesson that I draw was that after a difficult week, NATO was able to act. NATO found a way to move forward, it found a way to provide Turkey with the help it had requested, and the AWACs were deployed. The theater missile defense systems were sent.

So, again, it was regrettable that a small number of allies chose to make this an issue not about the defense of Turkey but rather about Iraq.

Mr. JANKLOW. What is the risk that is going to grow, that this is just the seminal one, the issue?

Mr. BRADTKE. I think there are going to be challenges in NATO as we deal with new threats. I take your point that it may be more difficult to achieve consensus as we try to deal with threats from terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, but I am confident that NATO members, and if you, again, look back at the episode involving Turkey, the vast majority of the allies were ready to move ahead with those measures, NATO did succeed in acting, and I think that that gives me confidence that we can work through whatever problems may occur in the future.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. We will come back. Please proceed in responding.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Concerning about the recent affair we had over the Article 4 decision concerning Turkey’s defense, it certainly was not a high point in terms of NATO, and the allies who helped stall the first consideration of Article 4 did no service to NATO. But if you look at it from an historical perspective, and you look at some of the showdowns we have had within the Alliance, showdowns that were always surrounded by articles about NATO’s demise, you can go back and look at German rearmament in the fifties, the Skybolt affair, the Suez Canal; you can look back at the neutron bomb decision in the seventies, the Dutrak decision in the eighties over intermediate nuclear missiles, Bosnia and Kosovo. Each time we had an incident where we had a showdown within the Alliance, a division within the Alliance, it was associated with a change in the national security environment, and NATO was adapting, and each time NATO came out stronger and more relevant.

What has followed since our debates over Article 4, we have now NATO now undertaking support for missions in Afghanistan, well out of the traditional geographic domain. So while I don’t think we had a great service done to us by four allies in January and February, we do have an Alliance that is going forward on a much more pertinent and relevant agenda.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. Both of you made reference to the fact that I am serving as the President of the Parliamentary Assembly for this year, probably for 2 years. I made a commitment to visit each of the seven aspirant states this year and visited Slovakia and will visit the Baltic states next month. Among other important objectives, I am trying to focus their attention on some of the remaining stronger concerns that some or all members of NATO have about that country’s state of reform, and rather than let this turn into a complete love nest, although I am very pleased with the progress that has been made—the reforms have been remarkable—I want to focus, just in alphabetical order, on some of the concerns that do persist.

Across the board, I think they are heavily concentrated in the area of inadequacies in the judicial system, the rule of law, corruption, public and private. But starting with Bulgaria—just systematically, we will go through them until I am done with my rounds—despite the reform agenda, the current government of Bulgaria still seems to suffer from a weak judicial system, particularly from corruption. How seriously are the problems in Bulgaria’s judicial system taken? How do you assess the government’s reform efforts there?

Mr. Bradtke. You are correct, Mr. Chairman, that this is an area where the government of Bulgaria is trying to deal with the problem. It is a difficult problem. I remember, in one of my visits to Bulgaria, meeting with—I believe it was the Minister of Justice, who said that reforming the judiciary was like reforming a cemetery. You couldn’t expect any help from people inside.

It was, I think, a comment about just how difficult it was to move forward. But my sense is that this government is committed to judicial reform and that they are working hard. They are doing things involving judicial training. They are working with us in some of our assistance programs dealing with training of prosecutors as well so that the mechanisms, the structures of the judiciary can be strengthened.

Mr. Bereuter. And many judges do have life tenure. A cemetery is not quite the same.

There are reports, of course, that we have heard about that a Bulgarian company attempted to sell spare parts for armored personnel carriers to Syria, allegedly to forward to Iraq, and so we are concerned, of course, about possible links between the company and the Defense Ministry. Do we have confidence that the Defense Minister and Defense Ministry is a person and an entity that we can work cooperatively and with confidence in today?

Mr. Bradtke. I will ask my colleague to say a word or two as well. The case you mentioned is a serious one. It was one that when it was brought to our attention, or when we learned about it, we raised it immediately with the government of Bulgaria. Their response was quick. The shipment was stopped. The government of Bulgaria allowed an American team to come, to have very good access to any officials that we needed to talk to who were involved in this. The government of Bulgaria dismissed the directors of the firm that were involved. There were two Deputy Defense Ministers who were fired over this issue, and there is a continuing ongoing investigation.
So at this point, what I would say is that this investigation continues. We have urged the Bulgarians to make sure that it is pursued wherever it leads and that there be political accountability as well for this particular incident.

So, again, beyond that, I would say that it is important that the government of Bulgaria takes steps to reform its export-control system. The system is, on paper, very good. The laws are good, but there is difficulty in implementation. There is inadequate training of the customs inspectors. There are procedures that exist on paper that aren’t followed in practice. There are laws dealing with dual-use exports that are just not being implemented and followed through on.

So beyond this particular case and beyond the problems of this case, we have also focused our efforts on trying to urge the Bulgarians to reform their system and take steps to strengthen their export controls.

Mr. Bereuter. Of course, the focus is to encourage additional reform and not for embarrassment that this is brought up. Mr. Brzezinski, do you want to comment specifically because this is about a defense ministry?

Mr. Brzezinski. Yes, sir. You hit it right on the head in terms of the seriousness of the case, and the company you mentioned is a government-controlled company, and so that sparks additional concern from us on the case.

I will back up Secretary Bradtke’s point that upon notification of this case, we have had excellent cooperation with the government of Bulgaria. The case is still open, and we are watching very closely. We want to make sure that everyone who was involved in this case is held accountable, be it in government or out of government. We are watching closely to see what follow-up is taking place, not just in terms of prosecution but in terms of reforms that will ensure that such cases don’t happen again.

Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. Mr. Engel?

Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Associated Press reported today that four European Union states which oppose the U.S.-led war in Iraq, namely, France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg, agreed to create a multinational force headquarters for European operations where NATO was not involved. I am wondering if you can comment on how the Bush Administration is working to preserve the strength of NATO as a viable security organization in light of this potential creation of a European security force that could possibly undermine the power and authority of NATO in a crisis situation.

Mr. Bradtke. Mr. Engel, I saw the declaration that the leaders of these four countries—France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium—issued today. I saw it earlier this morning. I have not had a chance to look through it as carefully as I would like to. I also want to have the opportunity to talk to representatives of those four governments to hear their explanations of what the declaration is aimed at achieving, to hear their explanations of some of the points, frankly, that I didn’t understand when I read it from the press.

I would say that there are a couple of positive elements in the statement. The statement does make reference to the importance
of the transatlantic relationship. It does reaffirm the commitment of the four countries to implement their Prague promises and their Prague commitments. But it does raise a number of questions, the question that you have asked, which is, are these proposals going to duplicate capabilities that already exist, capabilities that NATO has? How exclusive is this all going to be?

I find, and I have said this to my French colleagues and German colleagues, Belgium and Luxembourg as well, that we have made very good progress in the past 6 months in work on developing the institutional framework for NATO and the European Union to cooperate in defense matters. We had really a breakthrough last fall on the issue of participation by non-EU, NATO allies in EU operations, and then at the beginning of this year, we worked out the other elements of this package of arrangements called Berlin Plus that define a cooperative structure between NATO and the European Union, that make available NATO's assets to the European Union for a certain number and quality of defense missions: Peacekeeping operations, crisis management.

So, in a way, in a way, I find it a little surprising that after we have had this good success in moving forward on these institutional arrangements, and after we have had the first EU military mission take place, and that was a mission that was previously done by NATO in Macedonia, which has now become an EU–ESDP operation, with NATO support, that after we have had all of this progress and support, that these four countries have launched this other initiative because it seems to me potentially as a diversion from keeping the focus on the NATO–EU arrangements that we have launched, that we are making good progress on, and that I think provide a very good framework for the European Union to develop its defense identity.

So, again, I am going to go back, look through the statement more carefully, talk to the representatives of the four countries involved, but there are a number of questions, frankly, that I have at this point.

Mr.Engel. It almost looks as if it is the start of a rump organization—I don't mean to minimize it—declaring that if the United States has too much influence in NATO, well, we are going to just kind of pull out and form little groups of our own, and that, of course, is a concern.

Mr. Bradtke. I would say the concerns, some of which I have expressed, are not only the concerns of the United States; there are other countries who are members of the European Union who question this particular initiative. There was an editorial column written by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Ana Palacios, I think, in today's Wall Street Journal where she raised some questions about this particular initiative. So, again, it is not just the United States that is asking why are these four countries undertaking this initiative at this time. There are our European partners—the United Kingdom, Spain, other countries—who also have questions about this initiative.

Mr. Engel. Secretary Brzezinski?

Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, I guess I would answer your question as follows. I don't think it is a threat to NATO because I think NATO has got a history, it has got a value base, and it has got a vision
that is going to keep it strong and vibrant. But I would say that this meeting that took place today certainly contradicts the efforts to ensure that we have a harmonized relationship between NATO and the EU and its security component, ESDP. It is a relationship that avoids duplication of institutions, duplication that can be wasteful in terms of resources or that could generate unnecessary and unneeded institutional competition.

When I was reading the declaration this afternoon, I was struck by themes that certainly violated the Berlin Plus principles. They talked about a separate command structure, a separate planning cell. They talked about something akin to an Article 5 commitment. They talked about a separate defense procurement institution. They talked about establishing new defense colleges under the EU, all of which is one through NATO, designed to ensure that there is an integration of our military establishments, of our planning resources, and the way we handle our military forces. It is certainly not in the spirit of Berlin Plus, which Secretary Bradtke has devoted great energy into finalizing.

When we look at it, we tend to say we are looking for European institutions that complement NATO by bringing to the table new capabilities, not new institutions, and all I see is a thrashing for new institutions.

Mr. Engel. Thank you.

Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Engel. Governor Janklow.

Mr. Janklow. Gentlemen, I am a little bit puzzled. When I asked you earlier about a concern that any of us might have with respect to people in Europe starting to think maybe they didn't need us anymore, neither one of you seemed very concerned. You explained how strong the institutions were, the focus, the common principles, et cetera, in response to Mr. Engel's questions.

Now we have concerns about the action that has been taken in the last 24 hours. And I realize that we may not want to say anything that offends anybody, but isn't the reality that France and, to a lesser extent, Germany, clearly the Belgians at this point in time, don't have a need to feel that they need us as a security blanket? France hasn't felt that since DeGaulle's time or since the Cold War ended. And, yes, the war on terrorism is important, and, yes, they can be allies in the war on terrorism without being members of NATO. We have a lot of allies in the war on terrorism that have banded together that aren't members of NATO.

I mean, isn't the reality of the situation they are trying to figure out how they get along without us? Clearly, they are not doing this to get at Italy or Romania or the Czech Republic. It has got to be focused toward us and, to a lesser extent, the Brits, doesn't it?

Mr. Bradtke. Let me just clarify.

Mr. Janklow. Those four have a common heritage amongst them that bands them together.

Mr. Bradtke. The first point I want to make is I understood your initial question to be about the seven countries we are inviting in NATO and whether they would—

Mr. Janklow. I have expanded it. I am sorry. Okay.

Mr. Bradtke. So I was not thinking about France or these four countries.

Mr. Janklow. Fair enough.
Mr. BRADTKE. I am reluctant to kind of explain why they have chosen to take this action because I think that they are better positioned than I am to explain this. It is an action that I think, when we talked to them about this initiative, we talked to them about what they expected to accomplish with this meeting, they all said, we are not trying to create an institution that competes with NATO. We remain strongly committed to NATO.

I was in Paris last week, and I talked to the French government about this initiative. I got lots of reassurances that France is still committed to NATO, committed to the Alliance, believes in having the transatlantic relationship. So, again, we raised these issues, certainly, with Germany as well.

We hear strong professions of commitment to the transatlantic relationship, and there are many areas where they are working very closely within NATO. We think of the Balkans, for example, where France has 5,000 troops in the Balkans that are carrying out important missions. We look at the decision that Secretary Brzezinski referred to about NATO taking the lead role in ISAF. This was a decision that was taken with all 19 members of NATO participating.

So as I look at that kind of measure, I see a willingness to engage in NATO and a willingness to be part of NATO's actions.

Mr. JANKLOW. I only see this as an incremental step. I am not suggesting that they are going to announce in a week or two that they are pulling out of NATO. But isn't this really the planting of the seed? Isn't this really the seminal act, overt public act, at least? I have got to believe that they think maybe over time there will be more than four. Somebody else will join them, somebody else will join them, and pretty soon you have got competing organizations.

As Secretary Brzezinski read off a list of things that initially puzzle him, notwithstanding the protestations of the French and the Germans when you talk to them. As the kids say, the walk they are walking is different than the talk they are talking, and they are not consistent. What they have told you is not consistent with the list that he read.

Mr. BRADTKE. No, and I would agree with the list that he read. I don't think there is any difference between us on this point. I am concerned about the declaration precisely for these points because it does suggest a different intention, an intention to build an independent, separate capability, and that would be a problem, frankly. That would weaken the transatlantic relationship, and it is something that we would be concerned about.

Mr. JANKLOW. Yes, sir. Mr. Brzezinski, you had your hand up.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I didn't mean to alarm you.

Mr. JANKLOW. Oh, you didn't.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I was commenting on what this summit's declaration that I read this afternoon said. We also have to remember who participated, which is four countries. When I look at our relationship, and I look back at the 6 months, sure, I see a certain amount of tension between the United States and Europe, but I also see some very strong statements of support for our policies in Iraq, for example, from the V–10 countries.
Mr. JANKLOW. Sir, I understand that, and we keep always referring to the group that has given us the support. It is the other group that appears to be entrenching themselves more deeply and more solidly. My time is up, so I will come back to it. Thank you.

Mr. BERLEUTER. Thank you, Governor. Mr. Engel has certainly raised an interesting question and pursued by Governor Janklow as well, and I have been watching this upcoming meeting, which took place today, and I guess Reuters quotes Secretary Powell saying that they have apparently created “some sort of a plan to develop some sort of a headquarters,” and it goes on to say, what we need is not more headquarters; what we need is more capability in fleshing out of the structure and forces that are there with the equipment that they need.

It looks very much to me like an effort to develop a counter-weight to the United States to reduce our influence there, to reduce the influence of NATO, because they set out, if you can believe what they said before the meeting, in establishing a collective defense mechanism, but I would think that members of the European Union might be more concerned in light of what it seems to have done in diluting the effort to move to an effective ESDP.

Well, I would like to go down my list now, and the next one on my list is, alphabetically, Latvia. Last year, the Latvian Parliament eliminated a language requirement for political candidates. Two questions: Do you believe that there are any other problems with Latvia’s treatment of its ethnic minorities? And the second question relates to corruption. Both the EU and the State Department have found corruption and inefficiency are problems in the Latvian judicial system. How do you assess Latvia’s efforts to combat such corruption and inefficiency?

Mr. BRADTKE. To take your first question on the issue of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia, we think Latvia has made real progress there in social integration beyond the changing of this law. The new government of Latvia has created a Ministry of Social Integration and has named a prominent Latvian human rights activist as Minister.

The Latvians are also working the make the naturalization process easier so that those who are not naturalized face fewer barriers in becoming naturalized. The latest statistics I saw on this subject said that 95 percent of those who attempted, who tried the naturalization process succeeded on the first try. So we think that they have made progress, again, in trying to bring about the social integration that is so important to that country’s long-term future.

In the case of corruption, this is an issue that we have raised on our visits to Latvia; it is one that the previous Latvian government knew was a serious problem. The current government of Latvia, the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Repsa, campaigned on the issue of corruption. This was the most important issue in his campaign platform.

The new government has established an anticorruption bureau, and they have come to us for some assistance on how to staff and how to support this anticorruption bureau. A team from the Department of Justice has traveled to Riga to help provide some assistance. So we think that they are on the right path, that there
is a very strong commitment there that is rooting out and dealing with the problem of corruption.

Mr. BEREUTER. I think that question was primarily directed to you, in any case, because it was judicial, so I am going to go on to Romania and try to fit this question in. How do you assess Romania’s efforts and progress so far to improve its judicial system and discrimination against ethnic minorities and privatize and liberalize the economy? Mostly in your subject area as well, Secretary Bradtke, but I welcome comments from Secretary Brzezinski as well, if he has any.

Mr. BRADTKE. When I think of this question, Mr. Chairman, I think back to the comment that was made about the distance these countries have come, and I think back to our initial trip to Romania in February of last year and then the follow-up trip in October. In February, we had an evening meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Interior, the Economic, the Finance Minister. The Romanian government, at that meeting, demonstrated its commitment to reform, the fact that it was determined to have an integrated reform program, and they went back to their offices after we left and developed a program which we then used as a benchmark as we went along during the course of the year.

We came back out in October, as I mentioned, with Ambassador Burns, and we sat down around the table at a meeting that the Prime Minister chaired, and each of the Ministers made a presentation about the work they were doing on reform. And, again, there is still work to be done in all of these areas, but there is important legislation that has been passed, legislation dealing with the issue of corruption.

They have also set up an anticorruption bureau. They had difficulty staffing that bureau, which the Romanian government has been very candid about. It was difficult to be able to ensure that you were finding the right people to do this work, people who are not tainted by corruption themselves, convincing those people to move to Bucharest to take on what was a very difficult job. So there have been these kinds of problems in implementation.

Another area on the corruption front where the government has made good progress is on legislation dealing with conflict of interest. This was another area that, in our meetings, we singled out as one of great importance, that the relationships between people in enterprises and government were just too close, that people were coming and going and influencing decision-making. We explained a little bit about the kind of ethical considerations that one has to go through in government in the United States to deal with conflict-of-interest situations: To declare your assets, to have more transparency in economic decision-making.

One of the successful areas, again, to deal with corruption has been in the area of e-procurement, to make the procurement system more transparent. The government has developed a system of allowing bids to be handled electronically to open up the bidding process and procurement process to an electronic procurement system. So I think that there has been very good work there.

I think that the Romanian government is also committed to dealing with issues regarding minorities in Romania. I think there is
a strong commitment, and, I think, good progress on dealing with the issues relating to the Hungarian minorities in Romania as well. So I think that has been a successful area of work by the Romanian government.

Mr. BEREUTER. I know my time has expired, but can you say a word about the Roma population?

Mr. BRADTKE. The Roma population; this has been an area of concern that we have raised. There was a partnership protocol that was signed by the Ministry of Health and a representative for the Roma, the representative in Parliament, in April 2001. It sets forth a number of measures to ensure the access by the Roma to adequate health care. This resolved a number of the complaints that there had been by Roma about discrimination in the health care system, but this is something, again, where there is going to need to be vigilance and continued attention.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Mr. Brzezinski, do you have anything to add? Okay. We will turn to Mr. Engel. You are recognized, Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. There has been a lot of talk about the possibility of NATO leading the peace-keeping effort in post-Sad-dam Iraq. NATO, obviously, is a robust military organization that has the capabilities and expertise to effectively manage security in a post-conflict Iraq. NATO, for instance, could be given the task of securing and destroying weapons-of-mass-destruction stockpiles and could establish and implement a comprehensive plan for eliminating them, if we find them.

Since NATO has already promised to take on the big challenges facing the 21st century, and this is certainly the most important current challenge on the global stage, do the Departments of Defense and State believe that NATO can or should take on such a challenge?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, NATO is the world’s preeminent defense organization, so it is a natural question as to what kind of contributions it could make, for example, in stability operations in Iraq. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary of State Powell, and Under Secretary of State Grossman, all three of them, have approached the North Atlantic Council and talked or raised for consideration contributions NATO could make in terms of force generation, in terms of peace-keeping operations. We are very open to that idea. We think there is great potential for that.

I would note, though, that just assigning NATO the role of Iraq doesn’t solve your problems because NATO is a collection of allies, allies who are all making contributions right now in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and elsewhere. So there is a role it can play in terms of facilitating the functions that allies are now signing up to in stability operations in Iraq.

Mr. BRADTKE. I would just add that, as Secretary Brzezinski said, when Secretary of State Powell was in Brussels earlier this month, this was something that he raised in the North Atlantic Council with his ministerial colleagues. He did not put a specific proposal on the table, but he urged that NATO take a look at how it might play a role in the post-conflict situation, and among the ideas was the idea referred to by Secretary Brzezinski of helping
the countries who are NATO members who are part of the coalition to play some kind of role.

So, again, these are ideas that are being looked at. They are being considered. They are being discussed quietly in Brussels. We are supportive of a NATO role in post-conflict Iraq, but it will have to be something that all of the NATO allies would agree upon.

Mr. Engel. When expansion was put forth for the three countries in 1999, and there had been talk of seven or 10 countries coming into NATO now, some of the talk has been that Russia would react very negatively to the three Baltic countries coming into NATO, whereby the other countries coming in were all members of the Soviet Bloc, the three Baltic countries—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—were actually part of the former Soviet Union.

How has Russia responded to the invitation of the seven countries to join NATO, particularly the three Baltic countries? There are some who would say that Russia's lack of cooperation with the United States in Iraq was largely a result of Russia's displeasure with the United States pushing the Baltic nations to join NATO.

Mr. Bradtke. Maybe the best way I can answer that question is to recount my experience in Prague. I found it truly remarkable that at a summit which was making the very important decision to invite seven countries, including the three Baltic countries, to join NATO that we had a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council. And I remember sitting there behind Secretary Powell at the NATO-Russia Council meeting, with Foreign Minister Ivanoff present for that meeting, and as someone who served in Moscow in the 1980s, this was a particularly strong emotional feeling that I had.

There we were in Prague, at a meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister, at a summit meeting inviting seven countries to join the NATO Alliance, and the Russian Foreign Minister wasn't sitting around the table saying, "This is a mistake. NATO shouldn't do this. This is wrong. Russia opposes this." He wasn't saying those words. What he was saying was, We want to cooperate with NATO. We want to see how we can make the NATO-Russia Council work better. We want more progress in the NATO-Russia Council.

So here, at the Prague Summit, was the Russian Foreign Minister talking about how Russia and NATO could cooperate more. So, again, I think that is an indication to me of the way Russia has approached this. I don't think that whatever difficulties we may have had relating to Iraq are a reflection of Russian unhappiness with NATO's enlargement.

Mr. Bereuter. The gentleman from South Dakota, Governor.

Mr. Janklow. Thank you, sir. If I can go back to General Jones' statement for a second where he suggested, implied, that maybe we should reduce our presence in Europe, generally it is my impression that when a general makes that kind of a statement, it may be his commander in chief or the chain of command has suggested maybe that ought to be a position as opposed to freewheeling comments. Has there been any indication from others in NATO, the Germans, in particular, and others in NATO, as to the advisability of moving forward in that area?
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, I don't think General Jones was freelancing. I think what people have been doing is interpreting some of the briefings he has given in a broader way than he has.

Mr. Janklow. Okay. That is fair.

Mr. Brzezinski. He has talked about some of the principles that would guide his assessments in reevaluating the footprint we would have in his area of operations.

As for other countries, no, no one has come up to us and said don't do this. There is great interest in Central Europe, and we have great interest in Central Europe. There are new free democracies. They stood with us. They offer opportunities in terms of use of territory, use of staging, that they have demonstrated in the past, in the recent past.

Mr. Janklow. Have the Germans given an indication they would support that type of thing?

Mr. Brzezinski. Excuse me?

Mr. Janklow. Has the German government given any indication that it would support that type of action?

Mr. Brzezinski. To be fair, sir, I think the German government has reflected with unease over this, but I think they should be confident that any consideration is not being driven by any recent differences that we have had with the German government; it is being driven by operational requirements we have in a new security environment.

Mr. Janklow. Given some of the friction that has taken place of recent vintage in NATO, especially the public friction, has it affected in any material way the war on terrorism as opposed to the activities in Iraq? And I realize they are not separable, but let us separate them for a second. The actions in Iraq vis-a-vis the worldwide war on terrorism; has it affected the ability of all of the countries involved in NATO to work toward the elimination of terrorism?

Mr. Brzezinski. If I could make a first effort at that answer, I would say that, first, we have differences and agreements with all of our allies, and I would be remiss to say that some of the allies we have more disagreements with right now than is normal, for example, France and Germany, we have outstanding cooperation with on the global war of terrorism, outstanding cooperation.

Mr. Janklow. Is it still going forward that way?

Mr. Brzezinski. And it still goes on. So we can have cooperation even while we have disagreements.

And with regard to NATO, the global war on terrorism, I think, has helped bring in new light, new relevance to NATO. The fact that NATO is playing a role in Afghanistan and may even fly a flag in Afghanistan in support of ISAF is in part because of the global war on terrorism. The fact that we are having a discussion today about a potential role for NATO in Iraq is, in fact, a part of the global war on terrorism, and so it has brought to NATO a new perspective on the challenges and opportunities and responsibilities it has to its constituent members.

Mr. Bradtke. If I could just add in response to your question, I agree with Secretary Brzezinski. Whatever the disputes we may have had, they do not seem to have had an adverse impact on what is a very excellent cooperation in the war against terrorism, and
here I am thinking of the law enforcement cooperation that is such a crucial tool in dealing with terrorism. We have had very good cooperation from all of our European partners, including the French and the Germans, and we have not seen a negative impact on that cooperation.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Chairman, I want to yield the remainder of my time this round so you can go right down that list. That is a good list you are working off of.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman. I am aware of the contributions that a number of these countries' intelligence agencies have been making in the war on terrorism as well as their law enforcement entities. In the past, some of the countries that are now members of NATO, or will be soon, had excellent intelligence agencies, too good, as far as we were concerned, at the time, and I remember going into Czechoslovakia right after the Velvet Revolution, and the government there, the new government, couldn't understand where we could meet successfully because of concerns about the people remaining in the intelligence agencies, and that brings me to Romania.

Romania has made how much progress, would you say, in vetting its intelligence service, enough that we can be confident in ensuring NATO intelligence with them?

Mr. BRADTKE. It is very difficult in an open hearing, Mr. Chairman, to talk about intelligence cooperation, but let me say that—

Mr. BEREUTER. Let us just talk about the vetting that has gone on.

Mr. BRADTKE. I am sorry?

Mr. BEREUTER. Just about the vetting, to the extent that the vetting of the personnel within the Interior Ministry and in the intelligence agencies.

Mr. BRADTKE. Let me try to make a couple of points to see if I can answer your question. There is very good bilateral intelligence cooperation with Romania. That obviously involves sharing sensitive information. That has not been a problem in dealing with Romania.

Now, in terms of the cooperation within NATO in the sharing of classified information within NATO itself, all of these countries, including Romania, have been working hard on their vetting procedures, on their physical procedures for handling classified information. They have been working with the NATO Office of Security to make sure they meet NATO's standards. I think it is correct to say that in all cases there is some additional work that needs to be done, and the NATO Office of Security is working with all seven countries to be sure that they meet fully the NATO standards, and we obviously would expect them to meet those standards before we or our NATO partners would share classification information.

Mr. BEREUTER. Has there been a particular problem noted for Romania in terms of the reliability of the personnel, whether or not they have had adequate vetting?

Mr. BRADTKE. There is not a particular problem that I am aware of, but this might be a question that would be perhaps better directed to our intelligence agencies.

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes, indeed. I have done that.
I would like to go to Slovakia. Are you satisfied with the progress that Slovakia has made in fighting organized crime and corruption and with its treatment of ethnic minorities? Similar to the question I asked earlier about Romania.

Mr. Bradtke. The government of Slovakia, I think, is quite aware of the need to deal with the issue of corruption and organized crime. When we were out in Slovakia in October, we met with the Prime Minister, whose government had been strengthened as a result of the elections. I think we heard from him a very strong commitment to rooting out corruption and dealing with organized crime. This is not going to be a quick and short process.

The new government, in October 2002, after the elections, appointed new Ministers of the Interior and Justice. Both of these Ministers, we think, are working conscientiously and hard to reduce corruption and deal with the problem of organized crime. The number of prosecutions has risen. They are working at cleaning up problems within their own ministries. So, again, this is something that is an ongoing work, but I think there is a strong commitment at the senior levels of the Slovak government to deal with these issues.

The issue, in terms of Slovakia and treatment of minorities, again, involves the conditions of the Roma. There was a report in January of this year making a number of allegations about forced sterilization. The Slovak government has responded by investigating these claims. They have set up an investigative commission to determine whether any of these claims are correct. They have invited outside European experts from the European Parliament to be part of this process, so, again, this issue is an important one. It is one that we need to keep a close watch on. The government of Slovakia is committed to keeping a close eye on, but we see strong efforts by the government to ensure that whatever problems may exist are addressed when they are brought to their attention, and the official government policy is to ensure that there is no policy of discrimination.

Mr. Bereuter. It is not an easy problem to deal with.

Finally, Slovenia. They have about the strongest economy in Southeastern Europe, at least the strongest one in the Balkans, part of the former Yugoslavia and a stable democracy, it would appear. They are currently spending 1.61 percent of GDP on defense, less than 2 percent target. Do you have any concerns that they will make the effort to, in a relatively short time, bring themselves up to the 2 percent or to spend the money effectively for upgrading and reforming the military?

Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, on the positive side, they have one of the best defense-reform plans of the seven invitees. They are also extraordinarily good at matching their plans to their resources, so it is a well-resourced plan.

Mr. Bereuter. I have watched their mountain troops. They are excellent.

Mr. Brzezinski. They are first rate, sir. They are spending 1.6 percent of GDP on defense, the lowest of the seven. They have committed to raising that to 2 percent by 2008, and that is acceptable to my Administration, although I could add that it would certainly
help if they could move to that 2 percent mark sooner rather than later.

Mr. BEREUTER. It lags behind most or all of the other countries in terms of meeting the goal.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. In terms of meeting their defense plans, they are on the mark. In terms of how they stack up in terms of percentage GDP committed to defense, they are the last of the seven.

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes. Thank you. Mr. Engel?

Mr. ENGEL. The Chairman has talked about the countries that we have just admitted or that we have proposed for admission, and we have talked a lot about countries that were not yet invited like Albania. And by the way, Mr. Chairman, I just want to take this opportunity to say that the former Prime Minister of Albania and the current Defense Minister, who is the same person, will be in Washington on May 11th to the 14th and would welcome the opportunity to meet with Subcommittee Members, so I hope we can arrange that.

But we haven’t talked as much about the three nations that were admitted to NATO in 1999. Poland has demonstrated a strong commitment to NATO reforms, and it is generally thought that the Czech Republic and Hungary have lagged somewhat behind in terms of these defense reforms. Could you comment on that? Also, what steps have been taken in this round of enlargement to ensure that the invited countries will follow through with the defense reforms they have promised to undertake?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, you accuse me fairly of being biased, but I think it is true. Of the three, Poland, by far, has the most robust military force, and it is in part due to size. I think it is also in part due to tradition. They have demonstrated themselves spectacularly in our operations against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. They have done an outstanding job in Afghanistan. They have always been the first to put their hands up when it came down to force generation for Kosovo and Bosnia, and our units have always been very impressed by the cooperation they have gotten.

In fact, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld launched with his Polish counterpart a defense transformation initiative with the Poles that will feature cooperation in technology, cooperation between units, particularly between the 173rd, which is now in Iraq, and Poland’s 16th Air Assault Brigade. It is a good success story.

In terms of what have we done to ensure that the seven new invitees or current invitees will continue their defense plans, I would be misleading you, sir, if I said we had done this to ensure that they will do it, but we are confident that they will live up to their plans. As Secretary Bradtke emphasized, implementing those reforms are in their own self-interest. Implementing these reforms are consistent with their desires to work closely with the United States, which they are doing today in different theaters in the world. It is consistent with their desire to be useful, contributing members to NATO.

These are aspirations that I guess I can only say are demonstrated by their political history and also the insights that we have gotten into what are essentially multiyear plans, multiyear financing and budgetary commitments that aren’t an absolute guar-
antee but can give you more confidence over their intent to actually fulfill what they said they will do.

Mr. Engel. What about the Czech Republic and Hungary? You said that Poland has the strongest defense. What about defense reforms in those two countries? Have they lived up to their promises?

Mr. Brzezinski. I don’t think they have lived up to all of their promises, nor have the Poles. The Czechs have had resource problems, resource-allocation problems, which I think have led them to make decisions that didn’t focus on development of capabilities that would be most useful to NATO, and the Hungarians have had similar problems in that regard. The Hungarians, by the way, have undertaken a significant review of their defense plans, and so we are eagerly watching to see what that will yield. But I would be mistaken if I didn’t mention that Czech forces and Hungarian forces are significantly improved since they joined NATO.

Mr. Engel. So I guess, Secretary Bradtke, we would say that the admission of those three countries, on balance, has been a success.

Mr. Bradtke. There is no question that from my perspective and the State Department’s perspective, having those three countries join NATO has been a success. If you go back to when they joined NATO in 1999, within a matter of days they found themselves involved in NATO military action to deal with the problems of Kosovo, and the Hungarians, allowing us to use the facility in Hungary, made a very important contribution there. So they have, I think, learned very quickly the importance of the Alliance, of the contributions they would be called upon to make.

And I think the other point that I would perhaps make on this is that, recognizing some of the difficulties they have had with their reform process, that was one of the reasons that the Alliance created the Membership Action Program, so that countries could get a better idea earlier on of what would be expected of them, that they could have more of a structured dialogue with NATO so that when they joined the Alliance, they fully understood what they were getting into, and some of these problems could be addressed even before membership. But I think, in terms of the view of the value of having them in the Alliance, unquestionably they are good Allies. They have been strong, pro-Atlantic Allies in their orientation, and we have very much benefitted from having them as part of NATO.

Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Engel. Governor Janklow.

Mr. Janklow. Thank you very much. When we were moving toward dealing with the Iraqi situation, when our country and our coalition partners were, there were huge demonstrations various places in the world, including countries in Europe. How did the seven candidates—what were their publics like in terms of demonstrations?

Mr. Bradtke. I don’t know that I could give you kind of opinion-poll data on this issue. There clearly were demonstrations in the seven countries, to a lesser degree perhaps than in, say, France, Spain, places like that. But one of the things that I found significant was that even where there was not support for military action against Saddam Hussein, that there was still support for NATO and for their membership in NATO.
And I think Slovenia is an excellent example, where I think, quite clearly, there was strong public opinion against military action in Iraq, but nevertheless, the Slovenian Referendum, which took place in the middle of all of this, resulted in a two-thirds vote in favor of Slovenian membership in NATO. The Slovak Parliament as well took its vote on NATO membership in the middle of a very difficult time when one might have thought that controversy about Iraq would have been involved, but they took a very strong vote in favor of Slovakia's membership.

So, again, in these countries, as in other places in Europe, perhaps somewhat to a lesser degree, there were demonstrations, and the military efforts in Iraq were the source of protests.

Mr. JANKLOW. As I recall from the news stories, Hungary had a plebiscite on the issue, didn't they? Didn't Hungary have a plebiscite on the issue of NATO?

Mr. BRADTKE. Yes. Both Hungary and the Czech Republic had votes.

Mr. JANKLOW. And as I understand it, it was a poor turnout. The majority voted for it, but it was a poor turnout. Any reason that we attribute to the fact that there wasn't a very large public response, pro or con, on that issue in the vote?

Mr. BRADTKE. Hungary's vote would have been in 1999, so were you referring to Slovenia's vote?

Mr. JANKLOW. I am sorry. I mean Slovenia. I apologize. Yes. I apologize.

Mr. BRADTKE. I am not sure I can answer that. I don't think it was an organized boycott of the election.

Mr. JANKLOW. No. I am just wondering, is it just lack of interest?

Mr. BRADTKE. It was the same day that there was a vote on the European Union Referendum. It was a Sunday. It was a nice day in Slovenia. I am not sure I could read too much into the lower turnout in Slovenia.

Mr. JANKLOW. The topic of our meeting today is "NATO Enlargement: Progress since Prague." What are the biggest problems with NATO today that you two gentlemen perceive from your different perspectives?

Mr. BRADTKE. I am happy to take an initial try at that. NATO is involved in a difficult transformation.

Mr. JANKLOW. Let me add one other thing as you answer, sir. Is there anything we in the Congress can do to facilitate improving on what it is that you two gentlemen perceive, are the biggest problems with NATO today? And the answer may be no, but if you would, please.

Mr. BRADTKE. NATO is involved in a difficult transformation. We are trying, with our Allies, to truly transform NATO into a military structure organization which can respond to threats that come from anywhere in the world. That is a radically different notion than what NATO was doing in the past. So this is going to be a complicated transition period.

One of the crucial problem areas that is involved here is capabilities. From my perspective, and this is a personal view, there is no greater threat to NATO over the medium term and the longer term than a gap between the United States and its European partners on capabilities. If we are unable to fight side by side, if there are
NATO countries that fail to invest in the defense capabilities, then I think the cohesion of the Alliance over the long term is going to be seriously weakened.

So, for me, it is very critical that in the coming years and months, we see progress addressing these capabilities issues. This was item number one, not that there was a ranking of them on the Prague agenda, but it was a critical item on the Prague Summit agenda. We had agreement in the Alliance on a series of measures and the capabilities commitment that are very important to the long-term strength and cohesion of the Alliance. We had agreement on creating the NATO Response Force.

If we don’t follow up on those initiatives, if nothing happens, and NATO meets in 2004, and we haven’t had steps to increase capabilities, we have not moved ahead on the NATO response force, I think that this will be very damaging. I think this will raise long-term problems of NATO’s cohesion and its strength. So if I was to single out an area that I think is very important for the future, it would be the area of capabilities.

It is important that we have strong voices in Congress supporting U.S. activities in NATO, U.S. involvement in NATO, and I certainly welcome that. But the problems that I have referred to of capabilities are problems that our European partners must address.

Mr. Brzezinski. Secretary Bradtke put it very well. If there is one single problem that I would identify, it is capabilities, capabilities, capabilities. At Prague, we launched an agenda of command structure reform designed to streamline, not just for cost savings but also streamline so that NATO’s command structure could be more responsive, more mobile, more agile to the kind of threats that we face, challenges that we face, opportunities NATO will face to promote its values and interests abroad.

The Prague Capabilities Commitment is a follow-on into areas of effective engagement, strategic lift, communications, and such, areas where there have been longstanding shortfalls that NATO allies have failed, and consistently failed, to overcome. The NATO Response Force is a capabilities initiative designed to make NATO relevant to the kind of challenges it will face.

The missions that NATO is undertaking today in Afghanistan require mobility, require lift, require a degree of interoperability that is going to require a significant investment. The missions that it is considering in Iraq are in the same way, and Bob is absolutely right. The most dangerous threat to the Alliance is not so much differences in the politics of the day or cohesion but really is a growing gap between U.S. and European forces.

Mr. Bereuter. Thank you for your response to Governor Janklow. I think it was an important question to ask, and your responses were very helpful in the hearing record.

It seems to me that if, in fact, the focus of the Prague Summit was not mostly on the new membership, we would have been able to declare the Prague Summit a dramatic success because of the reform programs that were put on the table, almost exclusively with initial U.S. effort. And I think that the capabilities initiative, particularly the reaction force, are going to be important contributions that NATO can make. It will make it a much stronger mutual de-
fense organization, and I would think if anybody has any questions about the U.S. commitment to NATO, they only have to look at the Prague Summit and the initiatives that were offered.

Probably, the questions are raised more, it seems to me, by the kind of war that was necessary to fight in Afghanistan, a very different kind of war not requiring large, conventional land units. The fact that the United States did not make formal demands upon NATO is in part explained by the fact that it is a very different conflict, which many people yet don’t understand.

I think you can take all of these countries, despite the fact that I have focused on a few of the perceived shortcomings that stand out, even though progress is being made in those areas, you can point to all seven of these countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia—and see dramatic changes. I do think that the kind of reforms required for both NATO and EU membership have moved these countries along dramatically toward civilian control of the military and openness in budgeting and a liberalized economy and certainly democratic institutions and, yes, judicial reform as well. And so I think, in that respect, it was a dramatic step forward to push forward for these countries, and I think they are going to make a major contribution.

A question that I would end with, at least my part of the question period, relates to the fact that, as you know, Secretary Brzezinski, and you probably do as well, Secretary Bradtke, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has something called Rose-Roth seminars, which the State Department funded, for the most part, until the last 2 years, which have helped the legislative bodies, as well as some of the defense and other ministries, make changes toward democracy, toward openness in budgeting, but especially to help the parliaments understand how they function in an oversight capacity in defense and intelligence.

Now, we have three members and seven more soon to join them that have been major participants in those seminars. We still have the Caucasus and the countries of Central Asia, as well as part of the Balkans, that are in the PFP and can participate. You might share some thoughts about that, particularly you, Secretary Brzezinski, as to whether or not we ought to maintain that. I am not even asking for resources at this point because other countries are stepping forward, and we are doing it out of the budget of the assembly.

And, finally, you are both familiar, especially you again, Secretary Brzezinski, because I know—I visited with you—with the Marshall Center. How do you think the role of the Marshall Center will change, given the fact that we have added three, and soon 10, new members. They have been major participants in the programs of the Marshall Center. Probably, the majority of the participants have come from those 10—by no means, all, but perhaps the majority. How will the new environment affect the programs offered by the Marshall Center?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, on the Rose-Roth seminars, first of all, I am very biased on that program, and I haven’t given it fair thought recently, but I would say it is a very important program, and I would hope that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly will continue those. I think that they are relevant not just for the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia, in terms of sharing perspectives, lessons learned from the wide spectrum of political, economic, and military reforms that comes with moving closer and closer to NATO, but also can provide very relevant lessons to the seven new invitees.

Military reform is going to be an ongoing positive for all of them. Fighting corruption, as Bob Bradtke emphasized, is going to be an ongoing program. The Rose-Roth seminars can provide a very important venue to bring lessons from new allies, older allies into all of these countries. And I think we often underestimate the power that parliamentarians in these countries can have and should have, and the Rose-Roth seminar can serve as a way to kind of further empower them, as they did in Poland, in the Czech Republic, and in Hungary. So I would strongly encourage that, continuing many of the same themes that dominated the Rose-Roth agenda during the nineties.

As for the Marshall Center, it continues to play an important role, and it is under new leadership now. John Rose is in charge of it. I strongly encourage you to visit it when you have a chance. And it is continuing to do with same things that the Rose-Roth Center is doing, of course, with a primary focus on military affairs.

Mr. BERREUTER. Secretary Bradtke, would you care to comment at all on either? You are welcome to, if you wish.

Mr. BRADTKE. No. I really don't have anything to add. Thank you.

Mr. BERREUTER. Thank you. Are there any remaining questions? If so, please proceed.

Mr. ENGEL. Yes. I just have one final question, Mr. Chairman. In my opening remarks, I mentioned that NATO enlargement hasn’t cost the outrageous amounts that were originally assumed. One estimate we saw claimed that enlargement would be between, and we are talking about the previous countries, between $60 billion and $120 billion, and I understand that the actual cost of that round of enlargement would be about $1.4 billion, when all is said and done, over the 12-year period, mostly to integrate them into NATO’s command and control. I am wondering if you could tell me, in your opinion, why were the estimates last time so outrageously exaggerated, and what is your best estimate as to what it would cost to integrate the new seven countries into the Alliance?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I have to ask the same question. I was working for Senator Bill Roth at that time, and we had questions along the lines you were asking at that time. I think it was because it was the first time they were doing it, and they were trying to get a grip on what the costs were, these three countries that we knew not too much about—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. They were scrambling to do surveys of airfields, bases, infrastructure, railroad heads, ports, and trying to come up with something that would cover everything, and as they became more and more familiar with the terrain that they were encountering, the estimate shrunk and became more and more accurate.

Based on the lessons learned from that experience, we reported to Congress, the report on NATO enlargement that the President submitted, an estimate of $2.6 billion over a decade, with $580 million being the U.S. share over that period of time. Where do those costs go, one naturally asks. Well, they go into those common ef-
forts. They go into those national efforts to upgrade militaries. From a NATO perspective, they go into things, such as cost of improving and extending the command-and-control communications network NATO has in these countries. They go into upgrading reception facilities, airfields, ports, barracks that would be used by NATO forces when they transgress through those countries. They go into integrating these countries' air-defense systems into the NATO network. They also go into some training and exercises that help bring these countries up to those standards. That is some of the costs that go into that $2.6 billion estimate over the next decade.

Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.

Mr. Bereuter. Governor Janklow, do you have any comments or questions?

Mr. Janklow. I just have a comment, if I could. You know, as I listened to this testimony, I recall that most of my lifetime we are dealing with these seven countries that most of my lifetime were subjected to outside domination, control. We want them to move forward very quickly because we understand what it is really like to live in a free, open society. On the other hand, they are not moving fast enough on corruption, but this country never has either. They have trouble with some of their judiciaries with corruption. We have had federal, state, and local judges that have had trouble with corruption also. They have problems in their countries with the way they treat minorities. We have had problems in our country with the way people are treated as minorities.

They have problems in the way they plan their economic systems. It isn't like a $400 billion deficit is a model that other people should try and adopt proportionately with respect to how they do business. They have problems with the way they hold their elections sometimes. I don't think we have been without controversy with respect to how we hold our elections.

The key element is, are they continuing to move forward? Are they getting better? Are their people becoming freer? It isn't like they have a whole society or a culture of people that grew up understanding all of the various elements of democracy. They are quick learners. They have made phenomenal progress, and I think it is exciting. I think it is truly exciting.

I think the world is a safer place. It hasn't been very often in the history of the modern world that Europe has been as safe and secure as it is today, and NATO has been a very, very key ingredient in that.

Mindy France, with his dream that he had and the way the European Union came together also is important, but there would be no EU today, I don't believe, had there not been a NATO that was put together and really giving people the ability, if they can work together for their safety, they clearly can work together with respect to their economic activities.

So, thank you Mr. Chairman, this is terribly timely, for the leadership you give to this Committee, and I thank you, gentlemen. You are really doing good work, and things are moving forward. Generally, from my position, I criticize a lot of things. It is hard
to criticize what you are doing in these areas, and it is just a mat-
ter of whatever we can do to help you, we ought to do it.

Mr. BEREUTER. Governor Janklow, thank you for that excellent
and very positive statement. I am certainly in agreement with you.
We have general leave for Members to submit their statements, in-
cluding Mr. Wexler.

Gentlemen, I want to thank you very much for your testimony
and responding to our questions. Your written and your oral testi-
mony are extremely helpful, and now we will push on for success
in the Senate. Thank you for your work, and thank you for appear-
ing today. The Subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:03 p.m., the Subcommittee meeting was ad-
journed.]