STATEMENT OF
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BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SEA-POWER SUB-COMMITTEE
ON
NAVY ON-STATION ENHANCEMENT OPTIONS
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Chairman Kennedy, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of this sub-committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a privilege to report to you on the status of several initiatives the Navy is either undertaking or exploring to increase our forward naval presence, and we appreciate your continuing support.

Today, over 32 percent of our naval force is deployed in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) as well as normal deployments to maintain our global presence. Our Sailors and Marines continue to reflect the best of what America has to offer, and we are extremely proud of their efforts. Today more than ever we need to explore potential alternatives for enhancing our ability to fulfill requirements placed on our Naval Service. Earlier this month The Vice-Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William J. Fallon, discussed several initiatives the Navy is exploring to alleviate the strain on our current OPTEMPO. OPTEMPO has an important impact on current readiness. USS JOHN C. STENNIS deployed weeks early in order to support maritime operations in the Arabian Sea and USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT, recently spent 160 consecutive days at sea without a port visit. This increased OPTEMPO is a concern because over time it could yield negative effects on retention, as well as increased wear and tear on equipment. While our commitment to limiting deployments to six months in peacetime remains firm, we recognize that we are in a war of indeterminate duration. Therefore, we currently are exploring plans to ameliorate the effects of this increased OPTEMPO by a variety of means. My goal today is to provide background information on several deployment posture and manning initiatives. While some are in the early stage of development and others have been studied at length, we are encouraged that several
initiatives have the potential to improve not only OPTEMPO, but also our ability to provide additional forward presence with the current force:

**Issues addressed:**

1. Assign additional ships and submarines to homeports closer to their areas of operations. This is sometime referred to as forward homeporting.

Not a new alternative, but one that must be considered is the homeporting of Naval forces overseas. The largest example of this is our Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) homeported in Japan. The KITTY HAWK Battlegroup, with her embarked airwing and support ships along with the ESSEX Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) are designed to provide a nearly continuous presence in the western Pacific capable of executing missions across the entire spectrum of conflict from peacetime presence to major war. Over the past few years there have been numerous studies completed that have looked at other potential ports within WESTPAC, the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf to homeport Naval forces. The results of these studies are all similar; there are numerous ports throughout the region that have the capability/infrastructure to conduct port calls, but the required infrastructure to support the permanent homeporting is not available and would require substantial investment by the U.S. and the host nation. The studies also reflect zero potential to increase the size of the force that is forward deployed to Japan. Additionally, required training facilities and formal schools are not available overseas to meet all the requirements. The workup training opportunities such as Fleet exercises with an Aircraft Carrier and battlegroup would be greatly diminished by homeporting away from the majority of the fleet. Exercises are the backbone for preparing ships and crews to conduct required operational missions. Finally, the loss of
stateside quality of life would be significant for those families, both civilian and military who would be required to relocate. This could have an adverse impact on retention. However, the U. S. territory of Guam offers a near term potential to increase our forward presence in the Western Pacific. Beginning in September 2002, the first of three refueled 688-class submarines will be homeported in Guam. This will provide approximately 90 additional in theater mission ship days per year over what could be provided by three submarines homeported in the Eastern Pacific. Ship and maintenance support is in place with the submarine tender currently homeported in Guam. Pier facilities and weapons support facilities are adequate. The housing and family support facilities on Guam will quickly support the first homeported SSN, and will require minor upgrading in addition to the current renovation plans to support all three newly assigned submarines. Personnel/training requirements will result in flying portions of each crew to Pearl Harbor or to Yokosuka for schools and team trainers at a cost of about $300 thousand annually per submarine. Crew maximum tour length is set at three years and is within existing overseas assignment guidelines. Submarines will need to shoot exercise torpedoes about every 15 months to maintain proficiency. This may be accomplished by transit back to Pacific Missile Range Facility, Hawaii (cost is about 15 days of operations and engagement) and by scheduled exercises in Seventh Fleet. Additional transits to Hawaii maybe required for nuclear maintenance or dry-docking. Currently the USS FRANK CABLE transits to Japan in support of Seventh Fleet ships three times per year for a period of about one month each time. With FRANK CABLE’s current Manning she cannot continue this level of support outside the submarine force and take on the support of homeported submarines in Guam. In order for her to support her current Seventh Fleet
level of effort FRANK CABLE’s Repair and Weapons department manning will be increased to meet the additional requirements resulting from the additional three SSNs.

Current naval forces stationed in Guam include:

- Three SSNs to be completed by CY04
- One tender (USS FRANK CABLE)
- Four Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships.
- Helicopter Combat Support Squadron FIVE (HC-5).
- Explosive Ordnance Detachment (EOD) One.
- Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Group One.
- Five pre-positioning ships off of Saipan

2. Assign a ship to remain in a forward area of operations and rotate crews. Although not typically rotated in forward areas, the dual crewing or “blue/gold” crews on SSBN are an example.

   Crew Rotation (sometimes referred to as “Sea Swap”): Extending ship deployment length while swapping crews in mid deployment appears to offer significant potential for improving on-station time without increasing either OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO or, to a great extent, ship wear and tear. Rotational Crewing/Sea Swap is a variation on the multi-crewing themes referred to as “Horizon” suggested by the CNO Strategic Studies Group, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and others. The primary difference is that where most multi-crewing options involve more crews than ships; for example 3 for 2 (CNA), 5 for 4
(Horizon), 2 for 1 (SSBN) (Blue/Gold”), or several for 2 (MCM-1), the basic unit of Crew Rotation (1 for 1) is two or more similarly configured ships with an equal number of similarly trained crews.

The Crew Rotation scheme would extend individual ship deployments from six months to a nominal 11.5 months or longer while holding crew deployments at 6 months. At the 5.5-month point in the cruise, a relief crew from a sister ship is flown into theater to man the deployed ship. After turnover, the relieved crew is flown back to CONUS where it mans the non-deployed unit of the operational pair. The deployed unit remains deployed for a total of 11.5 months or longer before being relieved on station in traditional fashion. Essentially, sea-swapping crews reduces ship transit—using instead airlift to replace the crew. The six-month PERSTEMPO limit is not exceeded for any crew.

In the case of deployments from the West Coast to the Arabian Gulf, eliminating every other transit provides an additional 2 to 2.5 months of on-station time for each pair of ships without necessarily changing turnaround ratio or OPTEMPO for either crew or ship. Three pairs of ships in Sea Swap can create up to 20 additional on station ship months over four years when compared to the current deployment methods. The advantages of this concept are:

- Significantly improved efficiency in meeting CINC requirements for forward deployed units;
- No crew is without a ship and no ship is without a crew. This should improve training opportunities and contingency surge capability;
• Crews stay with the same ship for approximately 2 years and with same operational pair throughout their sea tour, providing an improved sense of ownership compared with other rotational crewing plans;

• Ships return to CONUS often enough to reduce or eliminate the need to do major maintenance overseas;

• The capability to do major maintenance and upgrades (without disrupting deployment schedules) improves because ships enjoy longer periods in CONUS between cruises;

• Turnaround ratio – Ship 2.91:1/Crew 2.75:1; Deployment time – Ship 11.5 months/Crew 6 months

• Additional ship months generate opportunities for multi-ship action groups to meet emerging challenges or additional ship availability for employment opportunities to support Homeland Security/Defense.

The Navy is currently developing a pilot program to employ the “Crew Swap” concept in an effort to determine the true costs and potential savings, while developing lessons learned to provide a firm analytical basis for recommendations to either expand the concept or look for other alternatives. In maintaining the focus on the fleet and the impacts that a shift in deployment methods may have, Commander Surface Forces Pacific has been designated the lead for development and implementation of the pilot program. The current plan will employ SPRUANCE class destroyers beginning this summer with the deployment of the LINCOLN CVBG and then expand to ARLEIGH BURKE class Guided Missile Destroyers later this fall with the deployment of the CONSTELLATION CVBG. Both plans have the potential to gain an additional 100 days
on-station for a net gain of 200 days. This will reduce total transits to four for six ships which cover four battlegroup deployment cycles. It is from these two experiments that we will be able to determine recommendations.

3. Retain ships to the end of their full Service Life by investing in the support funding needed to keep them serviceable. For example, we might decide that keeping DD-963s in active service might make sense for the capabilities they provide (such as presence and ASW capability), rather than retiring them because they are not adequate to meet certain threats (because they do not have the very latest anti-air warfare systems).

**Force Structure**

The Navy must balance between transforming and building the future Navy to meet emergent warfighting requirements and operating the current force to meet existing missions, while remaining within the President’s budget. While new ship procurement decisions dominate force structure recapitalization, the retention or decommissioning of ships has the greatest near term impact on force structure size and composition. The key element in decisions to extend or contract the service life of a ship class is affordability versus capability.

**Service Life Considerations**

The service life of our warships has a significant impact on force structure. Extending service life by delaying decommissionings can maintain or increase force structure and, correspondingly, accelerating decommissioning can reduce force structure. The decision
to extend or accelerate decommissioning of a class of ships is based on a cost/benefit analysis that focuses on the affordability of the platform and what warfighting capabilities it brings to the Joint Commander’s tool box. In some cases, such as TICONDEROGA (CG 47) Class cruisers and PERRY (FFG 7) Class frigates, it is considered prudent to invest in conversion and modernization of ships to extend their service life. In other cases, such as SPRUANCE (DD 963) Class destroyers, it makes more sense to decommission the ships.

**Historical Service Life vs. Estimated Service Life**

Sophisticated combat systems must keep pace with advancing threat technology. As the combat systems and the hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) systems of a platform age both must be maintained and upgraded, but the combat systems upgrades tend to be more extensive and expensive. Additionally, as ships age, the cost of operating and maintaining the ships can increase depending on the overall condition of the vessel. For example, if a ship has had a number of maintenance actions deferred over the course of its operating life, and it has experienced high OPTEMPO, the cumulative effects on the ship can lead to higher operating and maintenance costs. This must be considered in investment decisions. In making service life decisions, warfighting capability gained from an upgrade is compared to the cost of the upgrade and the operations and maintenance cost of the ship. Unless modernized, a surface combatant class’ Historical Service Life (HSL) is shorter than the Estimated Service Life (ESL) established via instruction. For destroyers, HSL is 20 years compared to an ESL of 35 years. In the case of frigates, HSL is 20-22 years compared to an ESL of 30 years.
Cruiser Conversion

The Navy has made the commitment, through the conversion program for TICONDEROGA (CG 47) Class cruisers. The program will upgrade the AEGIS combat systems and install warfighting improvements including Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) capability, and upgrades to the AEGIS Baseline to accept Sea Based Ballistic Missile Defense capability (pending Missile Defense Agency (MDA) approval and funding of development), land attack, force protection. Additionally, service life extension work including Smart Ship upgrades all electric alteration, weight and moment adjustments, and distributive systems improvements. Modernizing these ships will make them more capable to project theater-wide offense and defense while providing an additional 20 years of service life beyond the HSL.

Frigate HM&E and Self Defense Upgrades

In the FY 03 budget submission, PERRY Class frigates will receive HM&E upgrades to reduce their operating costs and extend their service life. Additionally, the combat systems will be upgraded with selected ship self defense technology. These ships with their relatively small crew size and low operating costs provide affordable warfighting capability.

Destroyer Decommissionings

DD 963 Class is expensive to maintain because of its large crew size and age and provides only marginal warfighting capability due to the ship’s older and more focused
mission combat system. These ships had an earlier modernization with the introduction of the Vertical Launch System (VLS), which extended the combat system relevant life beyond the historical 20 years. However, while the ships still provide some warfighting capability with two 5’ 54” guns and an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) suite, the higher Manning requirements and operational costs do not justify additional funds for further modification or extended service life. New DDG 51 Class ships being introduced to the fleet provide substantially more capability and an ample number of VLS tubes to support current Tomahawk inventory. It is not cost effective to keep the DD 963 Class in the inventory. The currently structured decommissioning schedule will save the Navy about $1.25 billion over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) that can be applied to transformational efforts such as electric drive, advanced networks and stealth technology which will bring new warfighting capabilities to the fleet.

However, we are funding the LPD-4 Extended Sustainment program. This program was developed to improve the dependability of HM&E systems and living conditions for the Sailors and embarked Marines. Additionally, it is expected that LHA's will be required to serve a median 42 years, significantly beyond their ESL of 35 years, before being replaced by the LHA(R) ships currently being studied.

The requirement for amphibious ships is driven by two factors, Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) deployment cycle and Marine Corps lift requirements. Today's 12 ARGs are the minimum required to meet presence requirements and each ARG consists of an LHA/LHD, LPD, and LSD. Overall lift is currently below the 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift programmatic goal and full requirement of 3.0 MEB lift. LPD-4s (Austin Class) will be required to serve an average of 41.5 years, well beyond their
original ESL of 30 years, in order to meet amphibious requirements until the LPD-17 class ships deliver.

4. Preposition additional ships in forward operating areas that would be maintained by very small crews during normal circumstances. This concept would be analogous to the manner in which certain Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships are kept ready to begin operations in just a few days.

The current Ready Reserve Force is maintained in a 10/20-day activation status, with no caretakers on board. The ships undergo a sea worthiness inspection by USCG every two years. The ships in a Reduced Operating State (ROS) have 4/5-day windows as well as 30/45/90 windows for underway; the 4/5-day ships are manned with Civilian mariners to maintain the ships propulsion system. The role of these ships is to support U. S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and sea-lift for current OPLANS. The ROS and RRF ships do not have complex C4ISR systems or weapon systems that are maintained. The time required to develop minimum standards of crew proficiency for combat operations will take longer than the transit time saved.

5. Other Studies and Initiatives:

Manning Initiatives

The ability to optimize the manning of our ships also will provide efficiencies. Within OPNAV and the Fleet we are in the process of exploring several alternatives that will enhance our ability to man our ships and squadrons at optimum levels during the Inter-
Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) and scheduled deployment. These efforts involve or will involve the units within 2 CVBGs/ARGs and six other ships affecting additional CVBGs. The number of Sailors directly involved or temporarily moved by these initiatives will exceed 2000 as manning levels for each are adjusted to the requirements for their respective initiative. These initiatives will span timelines from 15 months to 36 months as the concepts are formulated, execution strategies developed, plans executed and final data analysis is complete. The fleets are aggressively exploring these manning alternatives to address such issues as requirements determination, retention and personnel development, and increased operational flexibility. These efforts highlight the transformational research that the fleets are doing to help identify the true requirement.

Fleet Manning Experiment (FME) led by Commander Atlantic Fleet (CLF) and Commander Pacific Fleet (CPF)

The CLF/CPF FME is a bottom up fleet review of manpower Requirements, which identifies the true manning requirement in today's infrastructure and war fighting environments. The FME is not an exercise in shipboard manning reduction. The period of this effort is from July 2001 to July 2003. FME test units are contained within the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON CVBG and NASSAU ARG. These units (and the CVBG/ARG as a whole) will be evaluated during their IDTC, deployment and post deployment maintenance periods for the effects of these changes. Manning adjustment began in January 2002. In order to achieve the FME levels for rating/Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) and pay grade on the test units, about 570 Sailors are being moved within the CVBG, where possible. As an example of the cooperation and success of these efforts, General Detailed (GENDET) manning for the three players requiring the
majority of additional non-designated personnel will be met in May of this year. This has been an exceptional effort to identify the true requirements by all involved and will have significant impact on the way we determine manpower requirements for our sea units in the future.

**Optimal Manning Project (OMP) led by Commander Naval Surface Force Pacific (CNSP)**

The CNSP OMP is a bottom up review of the billets authorized (BA) on a DDG and smart CG in an effort to develop, from the fleet perspective, the ship class manning requirements for the future including minimal manning concepts. Reductions will be based upon policy and procedural changes (internal and external), technology insertions and shore infrastructure changes. Although most of its assumptions are the same as the FME, it explores a number of potential shore infrastructure changes that can be used to reduce overall at sea manning requirements. The most significant changes involve the current day functions and workloads associated with maintenance and personnel administration. The period of this effort is roughly the same as the FME. The OMP test units will also be evaluated during their IDTC, deployment and post deployment maintenance periods for the effects of these changes as in the FME. OMP manning reduction resulted in a decrease of 95 billets. Manning reductions to the OMP levels began in November 2001.

MOBILE BAY (CG-53) and MILIUS (DDG-69) are on track in the IDTC and have operated successfully at sea. An ashore maintenance detachment, which was established in Oct 2001 using consolidated OMP-BA excess, is supporting additional ship
maintenance periods other than their parent commands. An administrative detachment using consolidated OM-BA excess is conducting pay/personnel issues from ashore.

Accelerated Sailor Achievement Program pilot (ASAP) led by Commander Atlantic Fleet and Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP)

ASAP is directed at improving GENDET attrition and retention; 1) by starting the Sailor mentorship process early in the recruiting phase and continuing it through the Sailors first sea tour and; 2) by providing an absolute advanced school opportunity following a 24 month initial sea tour. Early association of the new Sailors to a final parent command will begin as they are recruited for a specific CVBG/ARG, assigned earlier in the process to units within that CVBG/ARG and personally and professionally developed during their at sea time for successful application to an advanced training school of their choice. We believe that this early incorporation of the young Sailor into his first at-sea team with a very tangible reward at its completion will provide significant gain in this area as well as exercise our covenant leadership responsibilities to them. The time period for this effort will extend for about 36 months. The ASAP test units are tentatively within the TRUMAN CVBG.

a. Initial manning analysis indicates that 300 to 350 young Sailors will participate in this pilot.

b. This pilot holds great promise in getting at the heart of GENDET losses: early mentoring, command concern for the individual’s well being and personal and professional development. It addresses near term and long-term readiness by investing in our people at a point where career decisions are made. Although too early to tell whether
this pilot will be a success, from a leadership perspective, this seems like a winner. In the final assessment, our determination of Return On Investment (ROI) should not be limited to a straightforward cost analysis.

**Long Deployment initiative**

This concept involves deploying a unit for 9 months while rotating a contingent (about a $\frac{1}{4}$ of the crew) back stateside every 2-¼ months so that we can maintain our forward commitments while not bearing the entire burden on the backs of our Sailors. This concept requires an increase in assigned personnel of 25 percent. The time period for this effort will extend for about 15 months. This concept has the potential to define the way ahead in Sailor employment. By manning sea-going units to 125 percent of current levels, we keep Sailors at sea while providing the ship with the excess capacity to allow their Sailors the time to pursue their personal and professional development. At the current level of 160,000 Sailors at sea in combat units, 40,000 billets would need to be realigned from other activities. We could increase sea tours for our Sailors without adversely affecting their Quality of Life (QOL) or careers. Longer sea tours would increase unit readiness through crew stability, increased experience level, surge capacity, and increase skill sets onboard through shore side training opportunities, etc. QOL for these Sailors would improve with additional manpower to address shipboard duties, additional opportunity to fully participate in the transformation envisioned by the Navy’s Task Force Excel, training opportunities to improve shipboard skills with Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) assignments to base security units, Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMA), Personnel Support Detachments (PSD), clinics, etc.
I hope the background information provided today on several deployment posture and manning initiatives was helpful. Some initiatives are in the early stages of development and others have been studied at length. I remain optimistic that the initiatives presented will improve OPTEMPO and our ability to provide additional forward presence with the current force.