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HEARINGS TO EXAMINE THREATS, RESPONSES, AND REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING IRAQ

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HEARINGS TO EXAMINE THREATS, RESPONSES, AND REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING IRAQ

WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2002

U.S. Senate,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Feingold, Wellstone, Bill Nelson, Lugar, Hagel, Chafee and Brownback.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Welcome, everyone, here this morning to what is the beginning of, I hope, for lack of a better phrase, a national dialog on a very important question. There are some very difficult decisions for the President and for the Congress, and we think it’s important, the members of this committee, that we begin to discuss what is being discussed all over, but not here in the Congress so far.

The attacks of 9/11 have forever transformed how Americans see the world. Through tragedy and pain, we have learned that we cannot be complacent about events abroad. We cannot be complacent about those who espouse hatred for us. We must confront clear danger with a new sense of urgency and resolve.

Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, in my view, is one of those clear dangers. Even if the right response to his pursuit is not so crystal clear, one thing is clear. These weapons must be dislodged from Saddam Hussein, or Saddam Hussein must be dislodged from power. President Bush has stated his determination to remove Saddam from power, a view many in Congress share. If that course is pursued, in my view, it matters profoundly how we do it and what we do after we succeed.

The decision to go to war can never be taken lightly. I believe that a foreign policy, especially one that involves the use of force, cannot be sustained in America without the informed consent of the American people. And so just as we have done in other important junctures in our history, the Foreign Relations Committee today begins what I hope will be a national dialog on Iraq that sheds more light than heat and helps inform the American people so that we can have a more informed basis upon which they can draw their own conclusions.

I’m very pleased and grateful for the close cooperation of my Republican colleagues, Senator Helms, in absentia, and his staff, in
particular Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel, in putting these hearings together. This is a bipartisan effort. It reminds me of the way that things used to work in this committee when I joined it in 1973.

I want to say a word now about what the hearings are not about, from my perspective. They are not designed to prejudice any particular course of action. They are not intended to short-circuit the debate taking place within the administration. I know I speak for all members of the committee in saying at the outset that we recognize our responsibility as we conduct these hearings to do so in a way that reflects the magnitude of the decisions the administration is wrestling with and the Congress will have to deal with.

We’ve coordinated these hearings closely with the White House. We’re honoring the administration’s desire not to testify at this time. We expect, at some later date, to convene hearings at which the administration would send representatives to explain their thinking once it has been clarified and determined. We do not expect this week’s hearings to exhaust all aspects of this issue. They are a beginning. But over the next 2 days, we hope to address several fundamental questions.

First, what is the threat from Iraq? Obviously, to fully answer this question will require us to have additional and closed hearings on top of hearings in S–407 and discussions we’ve already had with the intelligence community. Second, depending on our assessment of the threat—or depending on one’s assessment of the threat, what is the appropriate response? And, third, how do Iraq’s neighbors, other countries in the region, and our allies see the, “Iraqi problem”? And, fourth, and maybe most important, if we participate in Saddam’s departure, what are our responsibilities the day after?

In my judgment, President Bush is right to be concerned about Saddam Hussein’s relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the possibility that he may use them or share them with terrorists. Other regimes hostile to the United States and our allies already have or seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. What distinguishes Saddam is that he has used them against his own people and against Iran. And for nearly 4 years now Iraq has blocked the return of U.N. weapons inspectors.

We want to explore Saddam’s track record in acquiring, making, and using weapons of mass destruction and the likelihood, in the opinion of the experts that will come before us in the next 2 days—the likelihood that he would share them with terrorists.

We want to know what capabilities Saddam has been able to rebuild since the inspectors were forced out of Iraq and what he now has or might soon acquire. We want to understand his conventional military strength and what dangers he poses to his neighbors as well as to our forces, should they intervene.

Once we have established a better understanding of the threat, we want to look at the possible responses. The containment strategy pursued since the end of the gulf war and apparently supported by some in our military has kept Saddam boxed in. Some advocates for continuing this strategy believe it’s exceeded their expectations. And some others advocate the continuation coupled with tough, unfettered weapons inspection. How practical is that? Others believe that containment raises the risks Saddam will con-
to continue to play cat and mouse with the inspectors, build more weapons of mass destruction and share them with those who wouldn’t hesitate to use them against us. In this view, if we wait for the danger to become clear and present, it could become too late. It could be too late. Acting to change the regime, in this view, may be a better course.

But a military response also raises questions. Some fear that attacking Saddam Hussein would precipitate the very thing we’re trying to prevent, his last resort to weapons of mass destruction. We also have to ask whether resources can be shifted to a major military enterprise in Iraq without compromising the war on terror in other parts of the world.

My father has an expression, God love him. He says, “If everything’s equally important to you, Joe, nothing is important.” How do we prioritize? What is the relative value? What are the costs?

We have to inquire about the cost of a major military campaign and the impact on our economy. As pointed out yesterday in one of the major newspapers in America, in today's dollars, the cost of the Gulf war was about $75 billion. Our allies paid 80 percent of that, including the Japanese. If we go it alone, does it matter? Will we encompass and take on the whole responsibility? What impact will that have on American security and the economy? We have to consider what support we’re likely to get from our key allies in the Middle East and Europe, and we must examine whether there are any consequences if we move for regional stability.

Finally, the least explored, in my view, but in many ways the most critical question relates to our responsibilities, if any, for the day after Saddam is taken down, if taken down by the use of the U.S. military. This is not a theoretical exercise. In Afghanistan, the war was prosecuted exceptionally well, in my view, but the follow-through commitment to Afghanistan security and reconstruction has, in my judgment, fallen short.

It would be a tragedy if we removed a tyrant in Iraq, only to leave chaos in its wake. The long suffering Iraqi people need to know a regime change would benefit them. So do Iraq’s neighbors. We need a better understanding of what it would take to secure Iraq and rebuild it economically and politically. Answering these questions could improve the prospects for military success by demonstrating to Iraqis that we are committed to staying for the long haul.

These are just some of the questions we hope to address today and tomorrow and in future hearings and, no doubt, in the fall. In short, we need to weigh the risks of action versus the risks of inaction.

To reiterate my key point, if we expect the American people to support their government over the long haul when it makes a difficult decision, if the possibility exists that we may ask hundreds of thousands of our young men and women in uniform to put themselves in harm’s way, if it is the consensus or a decision reached by the administration that thousands or tens of thousands of troops would be required to remain behind for an extended period of time, if those measures are required, then we must gain, in my view, the informed consent of the American people.
I welcome our witnesses today. We have a group of extremely competent people, one of whom got on a plane in Sydney and traveled 24 hours straight to be here for this hearing, and others who have come from long distances, as well. These are men and women of stature, background knowledge, academic and practical understanding of the region and the country, and we’re anxious to hear from them.

I would now ask Senator Lugar if he would like to make an opening statement. And although we usually reserve opening statements just to the ranking member and the chairman, I would, since we only have a few members here at the moment, invite my other three colleagues if they would like to make a, “short”—not as long as the chairman’s—short statement.

When you get to be chairman, you can make long statements.

Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership in organizing these hearings and for a comprehensive statement that really does set forward the major issues we must discuss.

I was an outspoken advocate for United States military action against Iraq that culminated in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I urged President Bush at a very early date to seek congressional authorization for deployment of troops and the use of force in the Persian Gulf. At the time, many in and out of the administration feared the possibility of losing that vote. I believed all along the votes would be there, but had the votes for authorization not been there, it would have been far better to have known this at the beginning rather than to be surprised down the road that the Nation was not behind the President. A few weeks later, the House and Senate did vote to authorize President Bush to use military force against Iraq, and the administration benefited immensely from this overt decision of the American people.

If President Bush determines that large-scale offensive military action is necessary against Iraq, I hope that he will follow the lead established by the previous Bush administration and seek congressional authorization. The administration must be assured of the commitment of the American people in pursuing policies and actions in Iraq after focused and vigorous discussion and debate. It is unfortunate that today, some 10 years after the gulf war, we still face threats posed by Saddam Hussein. This did not necessarily have to be the case.

On April 18, 1991, I wrote to President Bush urging him to send our forces to Baghdad and to complete the job. He was gracious enough to receive me in the White House to discuss that letter. I believe that while we had the forces present, we should end the regime of Saddam Hussein and build a democratic Iraq. And, for a number of reasons, our President chose instead to pursue a policy of containment. Those important reasons for that decision, then and now, include our plans for the future of a post-Saddam-Hussein Iraq and future stability of Iraq’s neighbors.

We must estimate soberly the human and economic costs of war plans and postwar plans. I am under no illusion that this will be an easy task. The President and the administration will have to make the case to the American people regarding the threat posed
to the United States security by Saddam Hussein and the weapons of mass destruction he appears intent on producing and potentially utilizing against Americans and other targets.

But the President will also have to make a persuasive case to our friends and allies, particularly those in the region. Simply put, Saddam Hussein remains a threat to the United States, allied, and regional security. However, the situation on the ground in the region has changed since 1991, and it is not at all clear that the tactics of that campaign should be re-employed today.

Ten years ago, the United States had done the military and diplomatic spade work in the region. We had developed a war plan. Allies in the region permitted the United States forces to launch attacks from their territory. We had collected a coalition of willing and able allies. Our allies were willing to pay for $48 billion of the $61 billion cost. We were prepared to utilize the force necessary to defeat Iraqi forces. And, most importantly, we had the support of the American people. We have not yet determined if these same conditions are present today. They might be, but we have not yet engaged all the parties necessary to ensure a successful outcome.

At the end of the Persian Gulf war, the agreements surrounding the cease-fire included an Iraqi commitment to destroy a stockpile of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the ability to produce them in the future. I fully supported this endeavor. Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction represents a potential threat the world cannot ignore. On several occasions since the end of the war, the United States and our allies have resorted to the use of military force to counter the threat Iraq poses to its neighbors and to the United States’ vital national-security interests. Saddam Hussein has demonstrated his ability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction and spread instability through military force against his own people and neighbors.

Unfortunately, the overriding priority of his regime has been the maintenance of his own power. These hearings seek to shed light on our policy alternatives. The administration understands that ultimately it will have to make a case for its policy decisions. This is not an action that can be sprung on the American people. Leaks of military plans are dangerous to our security. But public debate over policy is important to the construction of strong public support for actions that will require great sacrifices from the American people.

I look forward to working closely with the chairman to lead this debate and to lay some of the foundation of the coalescing of administration and congressional thinking and support that will be essential for a campaign against Saddam Hussein.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Gentlemen, I’ve just been informed that there are going to be four rollover votes in a row starting at 11 o’clock, so I am going to rescind my offer. And if you want to put your statements in the record or make a 1-minute statement, literally, do that, but we’ll never get to our witnesses.

Would anybody like to make a very brief opening comment?

Senator WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I’d just ask unanimous consent that my statement be included in the record. I was a teacher,
and I’m used to 70-minute classes. I don’t know how to do it in 1
minute.

[The prepared statement of Senator Wellstone follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL WELLSTONE

For months now, high-ranking administration officials have openly discussed
launching a military attack on Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Until very re-
cently, however, serious public discussion on the nature and urgency of Iraq’s
threat, the range of possible U.S. policy responses, and the consequences of a pos-
sible U.S. or allied military attack has been in short supply. I believe a free-ranging
and open discussion of the policy options facing us on Iraq is long overdue, and wish
to thank Senator Biden for scheduling this hearing today, and those which are to
follow. By initiating these hearings, the committee is taking an important and his-
toric first step in meeting its constitutional obligations to ensure that the represent-
avatives of the people have a chance to thoroughly assess these profoundly important
questions before any action is taken.

From all that I have seen, I do not believe the administration has yet made a
case for taking military action against Iraq. Before any decisions about major
changes in U.S. policy in the region are made—including possible military or other
action—our country and our people need to learn as much as we can about the
available choices on Iraq and their likely consequences.

Among other things, we must know the impact of a U.S. pre-emptive attack on
the international coalition effort to combat terrorism, our nation’s number one na-
tional security priority. With few exceptions, our coalition partners and regional
friends oppose military action. We need to take a hard look at whether taking mili-
tary action against Iraq would be worth jeopardizing the steady progress we are
now making with scores of other nations in actually preventing terrorists from ac-
quiring the resources to attack us again as they did on September 11.

We also must know the nature and urgency of the threat from Iraq, the range
of possible American policy responses beyond the use of force, the legal authority
for U.S. or concerted international action there, the impact on our economy and on
the world economy, and the human toll of any such conflict.

We must also have some clearer idea of our policy goals. Should the goal of U.S.
policy be to overthrow the regime and install a regime less hostile to U.S. interests,
to compel Iraq finally to agree with unfettered UN-sponsored weapons inspections,
to destroy suspected weapons of mass destruction production facilities, or some com-
bination of these? What is the precedent for the U.S. to launch a major military op-
eration in the absence of direct provocation by the target country? Should U.S. ac-
tion be targeted and covert, or overwhelming and overt? What would we expect the
loss of life among U.S. service personnel to be in a potential war on Iraq, and would
it be higher, as most experts agree, than in the current war in Afghanistan? Are
ordinary, innocent Iraqi civilians? Why is the UN-sponsored sanctions process, re-
cently overhauled and more narrowly targeted, continuing to erode, and what can
be done about that? All of these questions and more must be answered in this proc-
есс.

The most recent leaked military plan for invading Iraq calls for a heavy reliance
on air strikes, focusing first and primarily on Baghdad. What is never mentioned
in this report is the fact that Baghdad is also a crowded city of four to five million
people, and it would be virtually impossible to take measures sufficient to prevent
innocent non-combatants from being harmed.

We must also consider the major responsibilities likely to flow from any military
victory. What would it take to secure Iraq and to rebuild it economically and politi-
cally? How many U.S. forces would be required to go in, to secure the country and
restore some semblance of democratic rule, and for how long would they stay?
Would the American people be willing to shoulder the cost of billions of dollars need-
ed for this effort, billions of dollars also urgently needed back here at home? In
short, after a military victory has been declared, will the U.S. stay committed for
the long haul? In Afghanistan, we won the war, but the follow-through commitment
to secure Afghanistan’s peace through security and reconstruction has fallen short.
That fact, probably as much an any other, has had a chilling effect on regional sup-
port for U.S. action on Iraq.

No one here disagrees that the world would be a much better place without the
brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. He has preyed on his neighbors, has used
chemical weapons on his own people, and continues to be one of the world’s worst
violators of human rights. However, if a decision to take military action is made,
it should only be made after the administration has engaged in a serious and thoughtful sustained public discussion on Iraq with the American people, and only after all diplomatic and other peaceful options have been exhausted. Further, if the administration decides to move, it must come back to Congress and seek war powers authorization before engaging in a large scale escalation of hostilities.

I believe these hearings are an important first step in beginning a serious and thoughtful discussion of U.S. policy toward Iraq, one which has been sorely needed, and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses before us.

Senator WELLSTONE. I'd like to thank the panelists for being here today, and I would like to ask unanimous consent that a statement by Phyllis Bennis at the Institute for Policy Studies be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be.

[The statement referred to can be found on page 265.]

The CHAIRMAN. And every Senator's statement will be placed in the record if they have one. I sincerely apologize for that.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. I think this is tremendously important, what you're doing. I think this is tremendously valuable. I know there are those who question the motivations behind all of this, but I can't think of any more valuable function that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can perform than do exactly what we're doing here. I think it not only educates our colleagues, educates ourselves and the American public, it gives the administration an opportunity to focus its ideas and policies. I think one of the best debates that ever occurred in my 20 years in the Senate was the debate surrounding the issue of the gulf war back in 1989.

And so I thank you for doing this. This is a very, very valuable service, and I hope our colleagues pay good attention to what we hear.

Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BROWNBACK. If I could for just a quick moment, I want to thank you for holding the hearings and second what Senator Dodd has said as to their importance. And I know the administration looks with importance on these hearings as engaging the country.

I would just note, I think, to our panelists and to other, I don't think there's a question but that we've got to, at some point in time, deal with Saddam Hussein. Many would have argued we should have done it 11 years ago. Some would have argued we should have done it 5 years ago. I think the question now becomes, should we do it now? And if so, how? And what does it impact throughout the region?

So I hope our panelists can really address that issue, because I think there's pretty strong unanimity in the Congress that at some point in time we're going to have to deal with this guy. Is now the time? And what's the way? And I hope we can get at that through these hearings.

Senator WELLSTONE. Mr. Chairman, I know everybody's being very brief, but just given the comments of a colleague that I work with, could I just say something in 30 seconds? I used 30 seconds before——

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.
Senator WELLSTONE [continuing]. Which is I do not believe, as the Senator does, that the administration has yet—has yet made the case for military action against Iraq, and I think that before any decision is taken about whether or not we go to war, we need to have a careful and deliberate and substantive discussion, not only here, but with people in our country, and we'll see whether the case has been made.

I think these hearings are extremely important. This is why I wanted to become a United States Senator, to be a part of a discussion about a question that so crucially affects the world that we live in. And I think that your putting these hearings together is one of the best things you've probably ever done as a United States Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you. Let me just say, to reinforce one point, yesterday at the White House at the signing of the corporate responsibility bill, the President came up to me in the audience and shook my hand and thanked me for holding these hearings.

I want to make it clear. The administration has told me they have not made a decision yet. I take them at their word. They've indicated to me there's nothing in the near-term. I take them at their word. And we have not given a veto right on how we proceed, but we've asked for their cooperation, offered input, as we did from others, any witnesses they would like to have. And so, so far, this is as I think it should be, the beginning of an open discussion in a bipartisan way to examine the major issues we've outlined here.

Let me begin with our first panel. And as I referenced indirectly, Ambassador Richard Butler—and I sincerely thank him for literally getting in a plane in Sydney and coming, and he obviously thinks these hearings are important or he wouldn't have made that trip.

Richard Butler has served as the executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission, the so-called UNSCOM, from 1997 to 1999. He was also the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations from 1992 to 1997. He's currently a diplomat in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations and one of the most articulate men in the world, actually, on the subject of Saddam Hussein and Iraq, and we're delighted he's here.

Dr. Hamza is the director of the Council for Middle Eastern Affairs in New York. He was a top Iraqi nuclear engineer working on Iraq's nuclear weapons program until he defected in 1994. He is the author of the book, “Saddam's Bombmaker,” and we appreciate him being here and look forward to his testimony.

And a man we often see on television and who's been kind enough to share his wisdom with this committee on many occasions, Professor Anthony H. Cordesman. Professor Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He's also a national security analyst for ABC, and we thank him, as well, for being here.

Gentlemen, if you could proceed. And I realize we told you 5 minutes. I'm not going to hold you literally to 5 minutes. What you have to say is so important. But if you can keep it in the range of 10 minutes, because we want to be able to engage you. And we will—and you've all been here before—maybe Dr. Hamza hasn't—
we’re going to have to break about probably ten after 11 and be gone for 40 minutes. With a little bit of luck, we will be able to get this panel finished, or if we’re still engaged, we’ll ask you to hang around, if you can.

But, with that, why don’t I know yield the floor to you, Mr. Ambassador. And, again, thank you for the effort and your service.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BUTLER, FORMER EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, UNSCOM, DIPLOMAT IN RESIDENCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY

Ambassador BUTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of this committee, I’m greatly honored to have been invited to be here. This is an important debate, and I hope I can make a useful contribution to it.

Mr. Chairman, having worked within the Australian Parliament, I’m well aware of the division bells and rollcall votes and so on, and I appreciate your duties in the Chamber. I will, therefore, come straight to the point and try and speak with dispatch.

My subject, as allocated to me by you and your staff, is Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. I’ll make these opening remarks and be happy—then the paper has been circulated, and I’ll be happy to take part of whatever discussion——

The CHAIRMAN. Your entire statement will be placed in the record for our colleagues.

Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, Iraq’s stated position is that it has no weapons of mass destruction. As recently as last week, two senior Iraqi officials, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, reiterated this claim. It’s more than interesting that in his public statement, Saddam Hussein never claims to be disarmed. On the contrary, he threatens a degree of destruction of his enemies, which implies his position of mighty weapons.

It is essential to recognize that the claim made by Saddam’s representatives that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction is false. Everyone concerned, from Iraq’s neighbors to the U.N. Security Council to the Secretary General of the United Nations, with whom Iraq is currently negotiating on the issue, everyone, simply, Mr. Chairman, is being lied to.

It is now over 10 years since Iraq was instructed by the U.N. Security Council to cooperate with action to destroy, remove, and render harmless,” its weapons of mass destruction. Those weapons were specified by the Council as these—all nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and the means to make them, and missiles with a range exceeding 160 kilometers. The Security Council’s instruction to Iraq was binding under international law. And all other states were equally bound by law not to give Iraq any assistance in WMD, weapons of mass destruction.

From the beginning, Mr. Chairman, Iraq refused to obey the law. Instead, it actively sought to defeat the application of the law in order to preserve its weapons of mass destruction capability. The work of UNSCOM, the body created by the Security Council to take away Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, had varying degrees of success. But, above all—above all—it was not permitted to finish
the job, and almost 4 years have now passed since Iraq terminated
UNSCOM's work. And in that period, Iraq has been free of any in-
spection and monitoring of its WMD programs.

Now, I've given this briefest of recollection of that history be-
cause, Mr. Chairman, I put to you and your colleagues it shows two
key things. One, Iraq remains in breach of international law. Two,
it has been determined to maintain a weapons-of-mass-destruction
capability at all costs. Now, we need to know, as far as we can,
what the capability it today.

First of all, nuclear weapons, although, sitting on my left here,
Dr. Hamza is far more expert than I am in that field, but I'll say
quickly what I believe is the case. Saddam has sought nuclear
weapons for two decades. Ten years ago, he intensified his efforts
in a so-called crash program. The gulf war put an end to this. Sub-
sequent inspection and analysis by the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency [IAEA] and UNSCOM showed that in spite of rel-
atively deficient indigenous sources of uranium, Saddam's program
was, in fact, when stopped, as close as 6 months away from making
a crude nuclear explosive device. Of the three components nec-
essary for a nuclear weapon—materials, equipment, and knowl-
edge—Iraq has the latter two. On the relevant equipment and com-
ponents, Iraq actually refused to yield them to the IAEA and
UNSCOM inspectors.

The key question now is, has Iraq acquired the essential fission-
able material, either by enriching indigenous sources or by obtain-
ing it from external sources? And I don't know the answer. And I
will say, throughout my remarks, Mr. Chairman, what I don't know
as well as what I think is the case. I don't know the answer to that.
It is possible that intelligence authorities in the West and Russia—
and you all know why I mention Russia, in particular—may know
the answer to that question.

But what there is now is evidence that Saddam has reinvigorated
his nuclear weapons program in the inspection-free years. And over
2 years ago, the IAEA estimate was that if he started work again
on a nuclear weapon, he could build one in about 2 years.

Now I turn to chemical weapons. Saddam's involvement with
chemical weapons also spans some 20 years. He used them in the
Iran-Iraq war in the mid 1980s and on Iraqis in the north who
challenged his rule in 1998. UNSCOM identified an array of chem-
ical-weapons agents manufactured by Iraq. This included the most
toxic of them, VX. Iraq's chemical weapons program was extensive,
and UNSCOM was able to destroy or otherwise account for a sub-
stantial portion of it, of its holdings of weapons and its manufac-
turing capability. But, Mr. Chairman, not all of it.

It was particularly significant that following UNSCOM's dis-
cov ery of Iraq's VX program and the fact that Iraq had loaded it
into missile warheads together with other chemical and biological
agents, it was particularly significant that Iraq then strengthened,
in 1998, its determination to bring UNSCOM's work to an end.

Now I turn to biological weapons. Iraq also maintained an exten-
sive biological weapons program with an array of BW agents. Its
attempts to conceal this program were most elaborate, implying
that BW, biological weapons, are, in fact, particularly important to
Saddam. I often thought that there was a relationship here. The
extent of their attempts to prevent us from finding something demonstrated the degree of importance of it. And if that rule applies, BW is very important to Saddam.

Iraq weaponized BW—for example, it loaded anthrax into missile warheads and continually researched new means of delivery—spraying devices, pilotless aircraft. UNSCOM’s absolutely refusal to accept the transparently false Iraq claims about its—what it called its “primitive, failed, unimportant” BW program—and UNSCOM’s examination of the possibility that Iraq had tested BW on humans. These also contributed to Iraq’s resolve in 1998 to terminate UNSCOM’s work.

Finally, missiles. Iraq’s main prescribed ballistic missile was the Scuds it had imported from the USSR. It also sought to clone those indigenously and continuously sought to develop other medium- and long-range missiles. UNSCOM’s accounting of Iraq’s Scuds was reasonably complete. A good portion of them had been fired or destroyed during the gulf war. But the disposition of a number of them, possibly as many as 20, was never unambiguously established.

In addition, Iraq was working, while UNSCOM was still in Iraq, on the further development of a missile capability which would breach the 160-kilometer range limit. I asked them to stop that work, but the general in charge of it categorically refused.

And there was another issue in the missile field which also contributed to Iraq shutting us down in 1998. I had asked Iraq to yield to us 500 tons of fuel that would only fire a SCUD engine, and they refused.

Now, what do I derive from this SITREP, Mr. Chairman? Quickly, six main points. We do not know, and never have known fully, the quantity and quality of Iraq’s WMD. Its policies of concealment ensured that this was the case. Two, we do know that it has had such weapons, has used them, and remains at work on them. Three, what it has been able to further achieve in the 4-years without inspection is not clear, in precise terms. That is the inner logic of inspections. You cannot see what you are not permitted to look at. Fourth, Saddam Hussein knows what he is working on, he always had, and the assets he holds in the WMD field. His refusal to allow inspections to resume has nothing to do with notions of Iraqi sovereignty. It is designed to prevent the discovery of and to protect his weapons-of-mass-destruction program. Next, intelligence agencies might know more than they are able to say in public. Certainly what has been published of defector and intelligence reports confirms that during the past 4 years Iraq has been hard at work across the board to increase its WMD capability.

And, finally, there are a number of deeply disturbing possibilities within Saddam’s WMD program, which need urgent attention, but especially these. Has he acquired a nuclear weapons capability by purchasing it from Soviet stock? I think that’s an important question. And, second, is he working in the BW field on smallpox, ebola, and plague?

Now, there is a question as to why does Saddam want these diabolical weapons? Why has he defended them at such great cost to the Iraqi people? In many respects, Mr. Chairman, he’s told us himself in his various outbursts. They make him strong. They help
him stay in power at home. They help him fight what he thinks—his enemies outside Iraq.

But, even more disturbing than those so-called goals and his view of the world is his apparently cataclysmic mentality. He surely must know that, especially following September 11, any use by him, and, indeed, any threat of use of WMD against the United States or possibly its allies, would bring a terrible response. It would be intelligent for him to now recognize that his WMD capability is an insupportable liability for him and his regime. Yet, Mr. Chairman, he shows no sign of such intelligent judgment. And this is perhaps the ultimate pathology of the man.

Will he make his WMD available to terrorist groups? Again, I don't know. We do know that Iraq has trained terrorists from around the region and has mounted terrorist actions of its own as far afield as in Southeast Asia. I have a personal experience of that. But I have seen no evidence of Iraq providing WMD, as such, to non-Iraqi terrorist groups. I suspect that, especially given his psychology and aspirations, Saddam would be reluctant to share with others what he believes to be an indelible source of his own power.

On the elemental question, therefore, the one put to me, Saddam and weapons of mass destruction—that is, does he have them, et cetera—what's the state of affairs contrary to his assertions that he has none? In addition to what I've put to you, I would refer this committee to the traditional test of whether or not a person can be judged to have committed a crime, and this is, did the accused have the motive, the means, and the opportunity? And, Mr. Chairman, Saddam plainly has all three and has demonstrated this fact.

What should be done? I was told that's not my issue for this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we would welcome your input.

Ambassador BUTLER. Well, clearly an ideal situation would be the resumption of arms control in Iraq—inspections and serious arms control—but, Mr. Chairman, not if that means the shell game—phony inspections, more deceit, more concealment. That would, in fact, I suggest, be deeply dangerous, providing an illusion of security.

So if the decision has to be taken to remove Saddam, then I'd just say this. Do it for the right reasons. As you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, have this debate and make clear to the world what this is about. It is about weapons of mass destruction, but please do not leave out Saddam's hideous record, in terms of human-rights violations—he should be on trial in The Hague alongside Milosevic—and, second, the fundamental violation by his regime of international law, something which trashes the system of international law and harms us all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Butler follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD BUTLER, FORMER EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF UNSCOM, DIPLOMAT IN RESIDENCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

IRAQ AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Iraq’s stated position is that it has no weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As recently as last week, two senior Iraqi officials—the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister—reiterated this claim.

It is more than interesting that in his public statements, Saddam Hussein never claims to be disarmed. On the contrary, he threatens a degree of destruction of his enemies which implies his possession of mighty weapons.

It is essential to recognize that the claim made by Saddam’s representatives, that Iraq has no WMD, is false. Everyone concerned, from Iraq’s neighbors to the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General of the UN, with whom Iraq is currently negotiating on the issue, is being lied to.

It is now over ten years since Iraq was instructed by the UN Security Council to cooperate with action to “destroy, remove, or render harmless” its weapons of mass destruction. Those weapons were specified by the Council as: all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; the means to make them; and missiles with a range exceeding a hundred and sixty kilometers.

The Security Council’s instruction to Iraq was binding under international law. All other states were, equally, bound by that law to deny Iraq any assistance or cooperation in the field of WMD.

From the beginning, Iraq refused to obey the law. Instead, it actively sought to defeat its application in order to preserve its WMD capability.

The work of UNSCOM, the body created by the Security Council to implement its decisions on Iraq’s WMD, had varying degrees of success. But, above all, it was not permitted to finish the job. Almost four years ago the Iraqi’s terminated its work. Iraq has been free of inspection or monitoring since then.

This briefest of recollections of relevant background history reveals two salient facts: Iraq remains in breach of the law; it has been determined to maintain a WMD capability.

We need to know as far as is possible, Iraq’s current WMD status.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Saddam has sought nuclear weapons for some two decades. Ten years ago he intensified his efforts, instituting a “crash program.” The Gulf War put an end to this. Subsequent inspection and analysis by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UNSCOM, showed that in spite of relatively deficient indigenous sources of the fissionable material needed to make a nuclear weapon, Saddam’s program was as close as six months from yielding a bomb.

Of the three components necessary for the fabrication of a nuclear explosive device: materials, equipment, knowledge, Iraq has the latter two. On the relevant equipment/components, Iraq refused to yield them to the inspectors.

The key question now is has Iraq acquired the essential fissionable material either by enriching indigenous sources or by obtaining it from external sources?

I don’t know the answer. It is possible that intelligence authorities, in the West and/or Russia do. But, there is evidence that Saddam has reinvigorated his nuclear weapons program in the inspection-free years. Over two years ago, the IAEA estimate was that if he started work again, Saddam could build a nuclear weapon in about two years.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

Saddam’s involvement with chemical weapons also spans some twenty years. He used them in the Iran-Iraq war in the mid-eighties and on Iraqi’s who challenged his rule, in 1988.

UNSCOM identified an array of CW agents manufactured by Iraq. This included the most toxic of them—VX. Iraq’s CW program was extensive. UNSCOM was able to destroy or otherwise account for a substantial portion of Iraq’s CW holdings and manufacturing capability. But, not all of it.

It was particularly significant that following UNSCOM’s discovery of Iraq’s VX program and the fact that Iraq had loaded it and other CW and BW agents into missile warheads, Iraq strengthened its determination to remove UNSCOM from Iraq.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (BW)

Iraq also maintained an extensive BW program with an array of BW agents. Its attempts to conceal this program were the most elaborate, implying that BW were particularly important to Saddam.

Iraq weaponized BW. For example, it loaded anthrax into missile warheads and continually researched new means of delivery: spraying devices; pilotless aircraft.

UNSCOM’s absolute refusal to accept the transparently false Iraqi claims about its “primitive, failed and unimportant” BW program and its examination of the possibility that Iraq had tested BW on humans also contributed to Iraq’s resolve, in 1998, to terminate UNSCOM’s work.

MISSILES

Iraq’s main proscribed ballistic missile was the Scuds it had imported from the USSR. It also sought to clone these indigenously and continually sought to develop other medium- and long-range missiles.

UNSCOM’s accounting of Iraq’s Scuds was reasonably complete: a good portion of them had been fired or destroyed during the Gulf War. But the disposition of a number of them, possibly as many as 20, was never unambiguously established.

In addition, Iraq was working, while UNSCOM was still in Iraq, on the further development of a missile capability which would breach the 160 kilometer range limit. I asked them to stop that work. They refused.

There was another issue in the missile field which also contributed to Iraq shutting down UNSCOM in 1998. I asked Iraq to yield some 500 tonnes of fuel which would only drive SCUD engines. It refused.

It is very important to make the following points:

- We do not know and never have known fully the quantity and quality of Iraq’s WMD. Its policies of concealment ensured this.
- We do know that it has had such weapons, has used them, remains at work on them.
- What it has been able to further achieve in the four years without inspection is not clear, in precise terms. That is the inner logic of inspections—you cannot see what you are not permitted to look at.
- Saddam Hussein knows what he is working on and the assets he holds in the WMD field. His refusal to allow inspections to resume has nothing to do with notions of Iraqi sovereignty. It is designed to prevent the discovery of and to protect, his WMD program.
- Intelligence agencies might know more than they are able to say in public. Certainly what has been published of defector and intelligence reports confirms that, during the past four years, Iraq has been hard at work, across the board, to increase its WMD capability.
- There are a number of deeply disturbing possibilities within Saddam’s WMD program which need urgent attention, but especially these: has he acquired a nuclear weapons capability by purchasing it from former Soviet stock; is he working, in the BW field, on smallpox, plague, ebola?

Why is Saddam so deeply attached to these diabolical weapons and defended this attachment at massive cost to Iraq and its people?

In many respects he has told us himself, in his various public outbursts. They make him strong against enemies within and without Iraq. They support his posturing to lead the Arab world against its enemies.

Even more disturbing than Saddam’s goals and view of the world, is his apparently cataclysmic mentality. He surely must know that, especially following September 11, any use by him and indeed any threat of use of WMD against the United States, or possibly its allies, would bring a terrible response.

It would be intelligent for him to now recognize that his WMD capability is an insupportable liability for him and his regime. Yet, he shows no sign of doing so. This is perhaps the ultimate pathology of the man.

Will he make his WMD available to terrorist groups?

I don’t know. We do know that Iraq has trained terrorists from around the region and has mounted terrorist actions of its own, as far afield as in South East Asia. But I have seen no evidence of Iraq providing WMD to non-Iraqi terrorist groups.

I suspect that, especially given his psychology and aspirations, Saddam would be reluctant to share what he believes to be an indelible source of his power.

On the elemental question of whether, contrary to assertions authorized by him, Saddam possesses WMD, I would refer to the traditional test of whether or not a
person can be judged to have committed a crime: did the accused have the motive, means, and opportunity? Saddam plainly has had and continues to have, all three. What should be concluded from these facts?

The resumption of arms control in Iraq is urgently required. But, it would have to be serious. If Iraq again refused to cooperate, then to pursue compromised inspections would be dangerous. If it is decided to take military action against Saddam it will be crucial for it to be for the right reasons. There are, in fact, three: Saddam's flagrant violation of human rights; his continuing refusal to comply with international law as expressed in binding decisions of the Security Council; and, his violation of arms control obligations and treaties.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I particularly agree with your last point. I have been pushing for 8 months that he should be indicted as a war criminal. Even if we cannot get him, he should be indicted as a war criminal so the world understands.

Doctor, welcome.

Dr. HAMZA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF DR. KHIDHIR HAMZA, FORMER IRAQI NUCLEAR PHYSICIST; PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, NEW YORK, NY

Dr. HAMZA. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, yesterday Saddam met members of the Atomic Energy Organization addressing then as what he calls mujaheddin. That is people who exert extreme effort and may sacrifice themselves for their work. And this is what he had to say yesterday. “The Americans and British say that if Iraq is left to its own means, it might make such and such weapons.” He didn’t name them, but it’s clear what he meant. “They mean to harm us.” “It is to prevent any Arab or Muslim from progress.” He calls it progress. “This is the evil program of the West, and especially the Americans assisted by Zionism and their supporters.” It is clear now, at this critical juncture, that at his meeting with Atomic Energy exhorting them to do their “national duty”—we see Saddam back at his own old games of trying to create at least the impression that he is a dangerous man and a menace and should not be trifled with.

The last meetings of the Iraqi delegation with the U.N.-relevant personnel on resuming inspections in Iraq, the Iraqi Government decided, after they failed to make the U.N. agree to their terms of getting the inspectors back, they wanted some concessions. They declared that the inspector’s job is to disarm Iraq and leave it defenseless against American strikes since the Americans will never remove sanctions. So the whole game they thought the inspectors are charged with is to disarm Iraq. Since the inspectors are charged only with dismantling weapons of mass destruction and their facilities, this was an admission that Iraq may possess these weapons and also an implied threat that, facing an invasion, it might use them.

If we go back to the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Iraq built its own weapons of mass destruction in technologies indigenously with some foreign help. It understood that its main assets were not the equipment but the scientists and engineers that makes these weapons. Thus Saddam’s government kept a tight lid on its science and engineering military teams at the same time it allowed
UNSCOM and IAEA to demolish some of its weapon production sites.

That these science and engineering teams were capable of rebuilding the program was made manifestly clear in the aftermath of the Gulf war. Within less than a year, these teams rebuilt successfully most of Iraq’s services infrastructure. This included rebuilding power stations, major telephone exchanges, and oil refineries.

Elated by their success, Saddam kept these teams as contracting entities to the government for the civilian sector with a much-reduced load and assigned them the rebuilding of the needed facilities for the nuclear and other weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. This provided them with a cover as civilian contractors with the actual work to prove it. But, at the same time, their weapons-of-mass-destruction work continued unhindered.

Thus, the computer we used for the nuclear-weapon design is now located in a hospital in Saddam City at the outskirts of Baghdad. If an inspector should arrive at the site, he or she will be shown contracts for the civilian sector. The only indication that things are not what they seem is that it is headed by a man who worked extensively on the Iraqi nuclear-weapon design and that most of his staff are former workers in the nuclear weapon program.

Legally, and according to the current mandate of UNMOVIC, the U.N. inspection body, the burden is on the inspectors to prove otherwise. Thus, Saddam has managed, from the experience of the last 11 years, to create the perfect cover. In effect, it turned the whole Iraq science and engineering enterprise into a giant weapon-making body. And since they do actually accomplish civilian tasks, the economic burden on the government is also reduced.

Saddam valued his people more than equipment. And while he initially allowed the U.N. teams to destroy some of his equipment and facilities, Saddam kept tight control over his scientists and engineers. Thus defections were kept to a minimum. This was helped by well-publicized cases of defectors seeking help and were turned down. One of them got killed in Jordan by Iraqi agents while waiting for the U.S. Embassy to grant him an entry visa. Not a single high-level defector left the regime since the botched defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam’s son-in-law, to Jordan in 1995. This kept the information flow out of Iraq to a minimum, increasing the opacity of the WMD programs.

Iraq is well into CW production and may well be in the process of BW production. With more than 10 tons of uranium and 1 ton of slightly enriched uranium, according to German intelligence, it has in its possession, Iraq has enough to generate the needed bomb-grade uranium for three nuclear weapons by 2005.

Iraq has corporations in India and other countries to import the needed equipment for its programs, then channel them through countries like Malaysia for shipment to Iraq. Germany already blacklisted some of these companies for violating sanctions imposed on Iraq.

Iraq is importing directional-control instruments for its missiles of much higher precision than those needed for the allowed 160 kilo-
ometer missiles under U.N. sanctions. Thus, Iraq is gearing to extend the range of its missiles to easily reach Israel.

The type of equipment imported indicate that Iraq is in the process of creating its own foundation for the production of needed materials, thus avoiding detection if these materials are on the watch list of exporting countries. Following this logic, Iraq is or will be able to produce its own growth media for the biological weapons program and many of the precursors for chemical weapon program.

The same can be said for local uranium production from phosphates. This removes many limitations on production and allows Iraq to accelerate its own weapons programs.

The inspection regime in Iraq had a mixed history. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the body charged with ensuring that nuclear facilities are not used for nuclear-weapons purposes, failed in its task with regards to Iraq before the gulf war. The International Atomic Energy Agency remains basically a weak organization beset by its international composition and multiple loyalties of its workers though within its sphere it has been quite successful in accounting for and keeping a tab on essential components of the nuclear fuel cycle, but it has limited leverage with the states and works best in a cooperative and amiable environment.

Against determined states such as Iraq, it is at a great disadvantage, thus it failed again after the gulf war when it declared early that it took care of basically all of Iraq’s nuclear program. It took the defection of Kamel, Saddam’s son-in-law, to force the Iraqi Government to declare the actual scope of its nuclear weapons program and forced the inspectors to start all over again in revealing what has not been declared before.

We are talking about a two-stage process—dismantling what is there and monitoring after—so that it does not get rebuilt. With Iraq’s aggressive behavior toward inspectors and the cat-and-mouse game it continuously plays with them, monitoring becomes problematic at best in the later stage of keeping Iraq disarmed. So even if some equipment are dismantled, getting them not to be rebuilt again will be problematic in any future program. Iraq could just at any time stop cooperating and it might be just too late to stop it from continuing its weapons program.

If the inspectors go back now, there is very little human intelligence that will help them locate the new weapons sites. Spread widely among the government infrastructure in smaller hard-to-detect units, the inspectors will have a hard time locating all the program’s components. A recent defector with credible information asserted that all units are built with a backup. If one is detected or is in danger of discovery, all activity is immediately transferred to the backup facility.

The new UNMOVIC inspection body do not have the support and free hand UNSCOM enjoyed. With Russia and other states that favor removing sanctions, keeping the pressure, the onus now is on the inspectors to prove that Iraq is in violation. Not finding a smoking gun after a series of inspections is all that the Russians and the French need to declare that the United States has no case and sanctions must be lifted. The U.S. case will be considerably weakened, and more voices will rise against U.S.-Iraqi policy as baseless if the inspectors go in and find no smoking gun that Iraq
is making weapons of mass destruction. This is a danger that must
be carefully examined before inspection teams are allowed back in
Iraq possibly to divert an invasion.

Many voices declared that Iraq was not pursuing nuclear weap-
on before the gulf war. This included the IAEA, International
Atomic Energy Agency, that declared Iraq clean in many state-
ments. This happened even after the German publication, Der
Spiegel, reported Iraq’s successful attempt to acquire classified ura-
nium centrifuge enrichment technology from Germany.

However, the United States knew better and used the gulf war
setting as a way to dismantle Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. But
its dismantling process ignored the knowledge base acquired over
the years that can be used easily to rebuild what was destroyed.
A similar insistence on proof before taking serious action will be al-
lowing Saddam to achieve his goals and challenge the U.S. inter-
est again.

With no large, easily distinguishable nuclear sites, and little or
no human intelligence, it is difficult to see how any measure, short
of a regime change, will be effective. Saddam is totally indifferent
to the human suffering of his people. And with his threats of re-
prisals against the families of weapons-of-mass-destruction workers
has managed to stop defections among his personnel despite the
fact that a large number of Iraqis from other walks of life managed
to escape. With a Soviet-style economy that’s basically geared to
war and its requirements, Iraq is currently the only Arab state
that all Arab extremists look at as the future challenger to Israel
and U.S. interests in the region. Thus, if Saddam makes it in the
nuclear arena, he will be the region’s undisputed leader in Arab
eyes. It will then be much harder to agree on the needed conces-
sions for a peace process, and a viable peace will be impossible to
achieve under any terms.

Saddam has used and will continue to use the Palestine issue to
rally the Arabs around him as he did when he used the Arab lead-
ers meeting in Baghdad to challenge the peace treaty of Egypt with
Israel that President Sadat agreed to.

Saddam and terrorism: Saddam Hussein has a long history of in-
volvement in international terrorism, from assassinations of Iraqis
abroad in the 1970s and 1980s to support for radical anti-Western
groups in the 1980s and 1990s to links with Islamic fundamental-
ists today. His track record speaks for itself.

Always the opportunist, he has used the biannual Islamic con-
ferences held in Baghdad since the 1980s as a recruiting ground for
Islamic radicals from around the Muslim world. A former Iraqi in-
telligence officer now in Europe has described how he would dress
as a cleric and approach Islamists from key countries to put on the
Iraqi payroll for special operations. He was tasked—that is, the in-
telligence officer—to recruit Pakistanis, Indonesians, and Malays-
ians, while other officers concentrated on Palestinians and Arabs.

We know from credible sources that Osama bin Laden was a fre-
quently visitor to the Iraqi Embassy in Khartoum when bin Laden
was a resident of the Sudanese capital until 1996. It is no coinci-
dence that Khartoum is one of Iraq intelligence service’s largest
foreign station.
It has also been confirmed that the Iraqi Ambassador in Turkey, Farouk Hijazi, traveled to Afghanistan and met bin Laden in December 1998. It is revealing to note that prior to being appointed Ambassador to Ankara, Hijazi was head of foreign operations for Iraqi Intelligence Service. Incidentally, the same Hijazi who was hurriedly pulled out of Ankara on September 29, 2001, has recently resurfaced as Iraq’s Ambassador to Tunisia.

There have been several confirmed sightings of Islamic fundamentalists from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Gulf states being trained in terror tactics at the Iraq intelligence camp at Salman Park, 20 miles south of Baghdad on the Tigris River. Three intelligence officers have reported that they were surprised to find non-Iraqi fundamentalists undergoing training at the facility. The training involved assassination, explosions, and hijacking. All three reported that there is a fuselage of an old Tupolev 154 airliner used for hijack training. This was later confirmed by satellite photographs.

Iraq military capability has been considerably depleted since the gulf war. Part of the drive to rebuild larger weapon-of-mass-destruction stockpiles is to make up for this depletion in military capability. Iraq, now, has practically no air force, a much degraded air-defense system, and practically no new tanks, heavy artillery, or armored vehicle. What is left functioning from the gulf war arsenal is basically in the hands of the Special Republican Guard, and the rest of the Armed Forces are basically armed with light weaponry.

With a highly corrupt officer corps, the Iraq Army suffers from a large number of absenteeism, poor or nonexistent medical care, pilfered rations and little or no pay.

It is estimated that Iraq has no more than a quarter of the fire power it possessed at the onset of the gulf war. With the original Ba’ath Party members mostly murdered or jailed, Saddam’s government now is purely a personal dictatorship of Saddam and his clans. The original rhetoric of the Ba’ath party no longer carry any weight with the population.

Iraqi WMD are under the control of the special security organization. This is the same group that is charged with Saddam’s security. This feared and ruthless organization is mainly composed of conscripts from Saddam’s hometown and very loyal tribes in the adjacent areas. They have an observer in all major military meetings, and they are present at the headquarters of all the division commanders, and they report directly to Saddam’s younger son, Qusseyy.

Any operation to disrupt the authority of the central government of Iraq or the Iraqi command structure and especially the handling of deployment of weapons of mass destruction must target this organization. Precision bombing and strict enforcement of no-drive zones should eliminate most, if not all, of the dangers of Saddam possibly using his CBW against U.S. forces. Past defections from this pampered group indicate that it is not as tightly controlled as was earlier thought, and defection rate may increase considerably when faced with an imminent invasions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hamza follows:]
THE IRAQI THREAT

Failing to obtain concessions in return for allowing the inspectors back, the Iraqi government turned the argument around by claiming that the inspectors’ job is to disarm Iraq and leave it defenseless against an American strike. Since the inspectors are charged only with dismantling weapons of mass destruction and their facilities, this was an admission that Iraq may possess these weapons and also an implied threat that facing an invasion it might use them.

Iraq is currently the country with the most extensive experience in the use of chemical weapons (CW). Its extensive use of these weapons and biological toxins during the war with Iran and against its own Kurdish population provided the Iraqi government with a huge database of information about the effectiveness and strategy of use of each of these agents. The two tests of dirty bombs carried in Mohammediyat in 1988, though were inconclusive as to their effectiveness in a war setting, provided Iraq with extensive design and testing experience in this area, probably the only Middle East country to do so in the last two decades. This provides Iraq with another tool for possible use in a terrorism setting. The recent defector reports of purchases of Russian radioactive materials through an African country reinforces Iraq’s intents in this direction.

It is understood that CBW use is mainly intended to create a terror situation in the targeted area. Any lethality that can be achieved using CBW can be surpassed by conventional means. But the effects are not the same. The Iranian attackers who showed no hesitancy in facing all the fire Iraq can muster were terrified of the limited CBW Iraq used at the time. The Iraqi port of al-Fao was occupied by Iranian forces that repelled many conventional attacks, but collapsed easily under the continuous flow of CW that was thrown at them in the closing days of the war with Iran. The same goes for the Kurds who fought with incredible bravery against the Iraqi armed forces but ran away in terror to Turkey and Iran when the Iraqi armed forces approached after the Gulf war fearing the use of CW after the Halbja massacre.

Iraq’s use of these weapons included also the threat of use to prevent an attack. Thus Saddam’s government firmly believes that it thwarted a second Israeli strike against its nuclear installations in 1990 when Saddam threatened to “burn half of Israel using the binary” (chemical weapon.) Thus a firm belief in the utility and effectiveness of these weapons by Saddam’s government emerged to present an option that the regime believe that it cannot survive without. The WMD option is firmly believed to be the reason behind not losing the war with Iran and preventing further strikes by Israel, and if the Americans have not interfered would have helped in quelling the Kurdish uprising.

Iraq built its own WMD technologies indigenously with some foreign help. Saddam understood that his main assets were not the equipment but his scientists and engineers. Thus Saddam’s government kept a tight lid on its science and engineering military teams at the same time it allowed UNSCOM and the IAEA to demolish most of its weapons production sites. That these science and engineering teams were capable was made manifestly clear in the aftermath of the Gulf war. Within less than a year these teams rebuilt successfully most of Iraq’s services infrastructure. These included rebuilding the destroyed control rooms of the power stations, the major telephone exchanges and oil refineries. Elated by their success Saddam kept these teams as contracting entities to the government for the civilian sector with a much reduced load and assigned them the rebuilding of the needed facilities for the WMD program. This provided them with a cover of civilian contractors with actual work to prove it but at the same time their WMD work continued unhindered. Thus the computer we used for the nuclear weapon design is now located in a hospital in Saddam city at the outskirts of Baghdad. If an inspector should arrive at the site he or she will be shown contracts for the civilian sector. The only indication that things are not what they seem is that it is headed by a man who worked extensively on the Iraqi NW design and that most of his staff are former workers in Group Four the Iraqi nuclear weapon team. Legally and according to the current mandate of UNMOVIC, the new UN inspection body, the burden is on the inspectors to prove otherwise. Thus Saddam has managed from the experience of the last eleven years to create the perfect cover. In effect it turns the whole Iraqi science and engineering enterprise into a giant weapon making body. And since they do actually accomplish civilian tasks, the economic burden on the government is minimized. Thus Saddam not only used the international markets to import dual use items
under false pretenses, he created for the first time in the third world dual use engineering teams.

Unlike the UN, Saddam valued his people more than the equipment. And while initially the UN teams concentrated on destroying equipment and facilities Saddam kept tight control over his scientists and engineers. Thus defections were kept to a minimum. This was helped by well publicized cases of defectors seeking help and were turned down. One of them got killed in Jordan by Iraqi agents while waiting for the U.S. Embassy to grant him an entry visa. Not a single high level defector left the regime since the botched defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam’s son in law, to Jordan in 1995. This kept the information flow out of Iraq to a minimum increasing the opacity of the WMD programs.

German Intelligence (the BND) has been the only major Western intelligence service to provide assessments of the Iraqi WMD programs openly. Though flowed in some minor details it provides a broad outline of the clandestine Iraqi activities in the WMD and missiles areas. As a minimum it generated a large database on Iraqi purchases from Germany and other countries that when put together with defector and other information can present a credible assessment of the current and future Iraqi WMD programs. These may be summarized as follows:

(a) Iraq is well into CW production and may well be in the process of BW production.

(b) With the more than 10 tons of uranium and more than one ton of slightly enriched uranium in its possession Iraq has enough to generate the needed bomb grade uranium for three nuclear weapons by 2005.

(c) Iraq is using corporations in India and other countries to import the needed equipment for its programs, then channel them through countries like Malaysia for shipment to Iraq. Germany already blacklisted some of these corporations for violating the sanctions imposed on Iraq.

(d) Iraq is importing directional control instruments for its missiles of much higher precision than those needed for the allowed 150km missiles under UN sanctions. Thus Iraq is gearing to extend the range of its missiles to easily reach Israel.

(e) The type of equipment imported indicate that Iraq is in the process of creating its own foundation for the production of needed materials thus avoiding detection if these materials are on the watch list of the exporting countries. Following this logic Iraq is or will be able to produce its own growth media for the biological weapons program and many of precursors for its CW program. The same can be said for local uranium production from phosphates. This removes many limitations on production and allows Iraq to accelerate its output.

Iraq realized that CBWs are more instruments of terror than they are of war. A real deterrence is the nuclear weapon option. Realising that a few nuclear weapons are not a serious deterrence because of the need for testing, it configured its program to generate its own materials for the nuclear core. Thus the plan that was set in 1982 targeted a 100 kg (220 lb) of bomb grade uranium a year. This is equivalent to 6 implosion or two gun type bombs a year. With a worked out design for the implosion option Iraq planned on being a major power in the region through its nuclear arsenal. Thus under this program Iraq was not much interested in purchasing the materials needed for the nuclear core through its extensive black market network. However under threat the situation did change. After the invasion of Kuwait Iraq embarked on a crash program to make one nuclear bomb using the French supplied fuel at its disposal. This option, now declared by the Iraqi government was dropped only after it was made clear that the uranium extraction capabilities were not good enough to achieve enough materials for one bomb. Recent defections indicate that Iraq is seeking actively all kinds of nuclear materials. It is also active in seeking the needed components to accelerate its uranium enrichment program.

With the workable design and most of the needed components for a nuclear weapon already tested and in working order, Iraq is in the final stages of putting together its enrichment program to enrich enough uranium for the final component needed in the nuclear core. Thus Iraq’s nuclear achievement when it happens, together with its history of use of its available WMD will turn it into a serious threat to U.S. interests in the region. Serious punishment (regime change) will be largely discounted. Iraq’s posturing, aggressiveness and harassment of unfriendly regimes will increase considerably. The window of opportunity to abort this option before it happen is closing down possibly within the next two to three years, after that a change of regime will be a much costlier prospect.

The inspection regime in Iraq had a mixed history. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN body charged with ensuring that nuclear facilities are
Not used for nuclear weapons production failed completely in its task with regards to Iraq before the Gulf War. The IAEA remains basically a weak organization beset by its international composition and the multiple loyalties of its workers. Within its sphere it is quite successful in accounting for and keeping tab on the essential components of the nuclear fuel cycle and its utilization over the globe. But it has limited latitude with the states and works best in a cooperative and amiable environment. Against determined states such as Iraq it is at a great disadvantage. Thus it failed again after the Gulf war when it declared early that it took care of basically all of Iraq's nuclear program. It took the defection of Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law to force the Iraqi government to declare the actual scope of its nuclear weapons program and forced the inspectors to start all over again in unraveling what has not been declared before. Thus while it managed to dismantle a large part of the Iraqi nuclear program it was at a loss by the time the inspectors left in 1998 as to the whereabouts of many of the important figures in the program. The new Iraqi policy of giving up some of the equipment but keeping the working teams intact was beyond the inspectors mandate. There was nothing they could do to prevent the Iraqi teams from rebuilding what was destroyed.

Iraq is actually quite open about its intents and goals. It refused to promulgate laws that make it illegal for its citizens to work in the area of WMD as was required by UN resolutions. It also refuses to accept the limitations imposed by sanctions declaring them to be illegal. Thus as stated by the former Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Nizar Hamdoun, Iraq is not going to impose sanctions on itself. This is forced on Iraq and as such the Iraqi government is not bound by its terms. Policing what Iraq imports is a problem for the UN and not the Iraqi government.

If the inspectors go back now there is very little human intelligence that will help them locate the new weapons sites. Spread widely among the government infrastructure in smaller hard to detect units, the inspectors will have a hard time locating all the programs components. A recent defector with credible information asserted that all units are built with a backup. If one is detected or is in danger of discovery all activity is immediately transferred to the back-up facility.

The new UNMOVIC inspection body does not have the support and free hand UNSCOM enjoyed. With Russia and other states that favor removing sanctions keeping the pressure, the onus is now on the inspectors to prove that Iraq is in violation. As stated by the former Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Nizar Hamdoun, Iraq is not going to impose sanctions on itself. This is forced on Iraq and as such the Iraqi government is not bound by its terms. Policing what Iraq imports is a problem for the UN and not the Iraqi government.

The claim that the U.S. needs a smoking gun to prove that Iraq is in violation of its commitments regarding WMD discounts all the past experience in dealing with Iraq.

Many voices declared that Iraq was not pursuing nuclear weapons before the Gulf war. This included the IAEA that declared Iraq clean in many statements. This happened even after the German publication Der Spiegel reported Iraq's attempts to acquire classified uranium enrichment technology from Germany. However the U.S. knew better and used the Gulf war setting as a way to dismantle Iraq's nuclear weapons program. But the dismantling process ignored the knowledge base acquired over the years that can be used easily to rebuild what was destroyed. A similar insistence on proof before taking serious action will be allowing Saddam to achieve his goals unchallenged.

With no large easily distinguishable nuclear sites and little or no human intelligence it is difficult to see how any measure short of a regime change will be effective. Saddam is totally indifferent to the human suffering of his people, and with his threats of reprisals against the families of WMD workers has managed to stop defections among its personnel despite the fact that a large number of Iraqis from other walks of life managed to escape. With a Soviet style economy that is basically geared toward war and its requirements, Iraq is currently the only Arab state that all the Arab extremists look at as the future challenger to Israel and U.S. interests in the region. Thus if Saddam makes it in the nuclear arena he will be the region's undisputed leader in Arab eyes. It will then be much harder to agree on the needed concessions for a peace process and a viable peace will be impossible to achieve under any terms. Saddam has used and will continue to use the Palestinian issue to rally the Arabs around him as he did when he used the Arab leaders meeting in Baghdad to challenge the peace treaty of Egypt with Israel that President Sadat agreed to.

Limiting Iraq's access to technology is bound to fail in the end. The U.S. cannot police the transfer of technology in the age of the Internet and the widening of the science base all over the globe. Perversely, limiting sales of high technology equip-
ment created financial difficulties for many high tech companies and scientists and made them an easy target for countries like Iraq. Lawyer Michael Rietz who represented three of the main German exporters of technology and know-how to Iraq tells a sobering tale. One of his clients, Karl Schaab sold the blueprints for the uranium enrichment centrifuge to Iraq for a mere forty thousand dollars. He also provided more than a hundred classified reports in the deal. He provided 36 high tech carbon fiber rotors for the centrifuges for a million dollars. Iraq’s investment to buy technology this way was much cheaper than developing it themselves. Dietrich Hinze provided flow forming machinery to make missile shells and gave away half ownership of his company to Iraq all for less than 20 million dollars. He also taught the Iraqis how to use the equipment. Locally he was so much admired for bringing business to his small town in Germany that he was honored with a statue in a main location in town. All those represented by Rietz were more or less sentenced for time served and released though they all pleaded guilty. Actually according to Rietz, one of the men working for the German Federal Export Agency, Dr. Welzien, opened a consulting business charging very high rates to German companies for advising them on how to use loopholes in the German export laws to expedite making some questionable exports, and it is legal. With Europe no longer in an accommodating mood Iraq shifted its purchasing bases to India and Malaysia among others. Thus technology transfer restrictions, which failed in the past to limit advances in the Soviet Union’s weapons programs are failing again in limiting access to weapons technology as was demonstrated by India, Pakistan and now Iraq and possibly Iran. Another failure for the policy of containment.

Iraq and terrorism

Saddam Hussein has a long history of involvement in international terrorism. From assassinations of Iraqis abroad in the seventies and eighties, to support for radical anti-western groups in the eighties and nineties, to links with Islamic fundamentalists today, his track record speaks for itself. Always the opportunist, he has used the biannual Islamic Conferences held in Baghdad since the 1980s as a recruiting ground for Islamic radicals from around the Muslim world. A former Iraqi intelligence officer now in Europe has described how he would dress as a cleric and approach Islamists from key countries to put on the Iraqi payroll for “special operations.” He was tasked to recruit Pakistanis, Indonesians and Malaysians while other officers concentrated on Palestinians and Arabs.

We know from credible sources that Osama Bin Laden was a frequent visitor to the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum when Bin Laden was a resident of the Sudanese capital until 1996. It is no coincidence that Khartoum is one of the Iraqi Intelligence Service’s largest foreign stations.

It has also been confirmed that the Iraqi ambassador in Turkey, Farouk Hijazi, traveled to Afghanistan and met Bin Laden in December 1998. It is revealing to note that prior to being appointed ambassador in Ankara, Hijazi was head of foreign operations for the Iraqi Intelligence Service. Incidentally, this same Hijazi, who was hurriedly pulled out of Ankara on September 29, 2001, has recently resurfaced as Iraq’s ambassador in Tunisia.

There have been several confirmed sightings of Islamic fundamentalists from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states being trained in terror tactics at the Iraqi intelligence camp at Salman Pak, 20 miles south of Baghdad on the Tigris River. Three former intelligence officers have confirmed that they were surprised to find non-Iraqi fundamentalists undergoing training at the facility. The training involved assassination, explosions, and hijacking. All three reported that there is a fuselage of an old Tupolev 154 airliner used for hijack training. This was later confirmed by satellite photographs.

Iraq’s conventional military capability has been considerably degraded since the Gulf war. Part of the drive to build larger WMD stockpiles is to make up for this depletion in military capability. Iraq now has practically no airforce, a much degraded air defense system and practically no new tanks, heavy artillery or armored vehicles. What is left functioning from the Gulf war arsenal is basically in the hands of the Special Republican Guard and the rest of armed forces are basically armed with light weaponry. With a highly corrupt officers corps the Iraqi army suffers from a large number of absenteeism, poor or nonexistent medical care, pillfered rations and little or no pay to the conscripts. Pay and rations are usually split among the officers and party members. It is estimated that Iraq has no more than a quarter of the firepower it possessed at the onset of the Gulf war. With the original Baath party members mostly murdered or in jail, Saddam’s government now is purely a personal dictatorship of Saddam and his clan. The original rhetoric of the Baath party no longer carry any weight with the population. Thus the army that
surrendered to the American forces in droves in Gulf war is now in an even worse shape and would regard an American invasion as a welcome liberation army. American inspectors and media personnel who visited Iraq were surprised by the friendliness and lack of rancor of the population toward Americans. This is in contrast to the image of the Americans as evildoers that Saddam was trying to project in all his speeches.

Iraq’s WMD are under the control of the Special Security Organization (SSO). This is the same group that is charged with Saddam’s security. This feared and ruthless organization is mainly composed of conscripts from Saddam’s hometown and very loyal tribes in adjacent areas. They have an observer in all major military meetings and they are present at the headquarters of all division commanders and they report directly to Saddam’s younger son Qussey. Any operation to disrupt the central authority of the Iraqi command structure and especially the handling and deployment of weapons of mass destruction must target this organization. Precision bombing and strict enforcement of a no drive zones should eliminate most of if not all the dangers of Saddam possibly using his CBW. Past defections from this pampered group indicate that it is not as tightly controlled as was earlier thought and defection rate may increase considerably when faced with an imminent invasion.

Iraq is now at one of the lowest points in its history. Saddam managed to destroy its middle class and its hope in a viable future. Millions of Iraqis are believed to have left the country since the Gulf war taking with them most of its professional class. With no future to look forward to Iraqis will welcome an American invasion with open arms. With a long history in government and a large bureaucracy it will not revert to the situation in Afghanistan now. The Kurds promised to rejoin the rest of Iraq under a coalition government. And above all if a democracy is established and nurtured in Iraq it will be a turning point in the region’s history.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, doctor.
Professor Cordesman.

STATEMENT OF PROF. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, SENIOR FELLOWS AND ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Professor CORDESMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Let me begin with a caveat. It is very easy to be arrogant about trying to predict a war that no one has ever fought in the face of the kind of information you can obtain from unclassified sources. And I think it is very dangerous to make quick sweeping generalizations about the military capabilities of Iraq. As a result, I would like to enter into the record a net assessment of Iraq’s capabilities—those of the United States and the other forces in the region—and call the committee’s attention to that statement as something to look at as a reference as your hearings proceed.¹

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your statement will be placed in the record.

Professor CORDESMAN. I would like to begin with one point that I think needs to be made very clearly. Iraq might be a far easier opponent than its force strengths indicate, but it also is potentially a very serious military opponent, indeed. And, to be perfectly blunt, I think only fools would bet the lives of other men’s sons and daughters on their own arrogance and call this force a “cakewalk” or a “speed bump” or a war whose risks you can easily dismiss.

I see every reason for the reservation of the American military and the Joint Chiefs, and I think efforts to dismiss the military capabilities of Iraq are dangerous and irresponsible. These forces do have serious defects, but Iraq is still the most effective military

¹The report can be accessed at the Web site of the Center for Strategic and International Studies: http://www.csis.org
power in the gulf. It still has active forces of over 400,000 men. It still has an inventory of over 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, 2,400 major artillery weapons. It still has over 300 combat aircraft in its inventory, although perhaps less than half of these are truly operational. And it certainly still has some chemical and biological weapons.

This is not a force that can be dismissed. It has, out of its 23 divisions, a core of perhaps six Revolutionary Guard divisions and six regular-army heavy divisions, plus some significant special forces which have a long record of combat capability and which I believe U.S. experts indicate have reasonable levels of manning and readiness.

Having said that, I should note that while Iraq has a total of at least 23 division equivalents, probably half of these have only limited effectiveness manning levels as divisions of under 8,000 men. In the regular army, most of its units probably have manning levels of 70 percent or less. And, we saw during the gulf war that infantry units and other elements that were dependent on Shi'ite, Kurdish, and Turkoman conscripts or low-quality reservists did not fight well or with great competence.

It is a fact that Iraq has had no major new arms deliveries in a decade. It does, however, still have 700 relatively modern T–72 tanks, 900 BMP series armored infantry fighting vehicles, and significant numbers of self-propelled artillery weapons and multiple rocket launchers. It has a significant number of modern anti-tank guided weapons, and it can still operate a significant number of attack helicopters and a large number of utility helicopters.

At least in urban warfare, the fact that there are nearly 120,000 other men in the security, border, and other paramilitary forces has to be taken into careful account. And the Special Republican Guard units and some Republican Guard units themselves, plus Saddam's bodyguards, are trained for urban warfare.

The Iraqi air force is certainly a weak link. Out of the 300-odd combat aircraft, they can often fly very intensive sortie raids, but there are no signs of meaningful training for air combat or air-to-ground combat of or organized use of air forces in effective ways. The air force performed badly during the Iran-Iraq war. It performed only minimally during the gulf war.

It is also an air force without modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets without modern electronic warfare capabilities as airborne assets. It is not an air force which perhaps can do more than fly limited penetration raids, and those would only be meaningful if it used weapons of mass destruction.

I would be more careful about Iraq's surface-based air defenses. It has no modern surface-to-air missiles, nothing like the S–300 or S–400 series. Its basic force structure is dependent on SA–2s, SA–3s, and SA–6s, which date back in design to the 1960's. But it has one of the most dense air-defense networks around its urban areas and populated areas in the world, much more dense than any around Hanoi at the time of the Vietnam war.

Iraq has made real progress in many areas of its command and control. It has deep buried shelters, an excellent survivable communication system. It has learned to adapt to things like anti-radiation missiles. It uses tactics like pop-up and remotely linked radar
activity, decoys, ambushes, deployments in civilian areas, and it was sufficiently effective to have advised Serbia at length during the fighting in Kosovo. And I think anyone in the U.S. military would say it had considerable success. It is a reality that this system can probably be suppressed, but will survive, and we have learned that to our cost since Desert Storm.

While sanctions have cut off arms imports, Iraq maintains a very significant import network which it uses for the weapons of mass destruction, as has been described by Ambassador Butler and Dr. Hamza. The only really disturbing aspect of this that has been made public is an increasing flow of weapons out of Eastern and Central Europe through Syria. This flow is known to have included engines for MiG aircraft, new tank engines, and equipment for the land-based air defenses, plus spare parts. At this time, however, I suspect that it has had only limited impact on the overall readiness of Iraqi forces.

The thing that would bother me most is not whether we can win, but whether we are honest about the intangibles in this war in Iraqis’ military capabilities. And let me just mention a few of those very quickly. It is easy to talk about the unpopularity of the regime and to assert that units are not reliable. People did that throughout the Iran-Iraq war, and they were wrong virtually every time. We did not see mass defections in the Gulf War until Iraq forces came, under intense pressure. The Republican Guard units and the heavy divisions retreated in good order.

We talk about tyranny and repression, violence is part of this regime, but so are incentives and bribery. It is impossible to know who will take these bribes and incentives seriously. Saddam has been in power throughout the lifetime of some 80 percent of the Iraqi people. To say that he has had no impact, that he does not have loyalty, that there are factions that will not follow him, is reckless and dangerous. Uprisings can be meaningful in some areas. But uprisings are very unlikely in the core areas of Saddam’s strengths—Baghdad, Tikrit, and the cities in the center—and urban warfare is a dangerous and uncertain structure.

We do not know whether he has reduced the rigidities of his command. It seems very doubtful, and that does mean that the possibility of striking at the core of his power and ignoring the flanks is a possibility.

I should also note, when I talk about urban warfare, that it is one thing to train for urban warfare with the kind of training the Iraqis get, and quite another to actually fight it. They did not do well during the Iran-Iraq war in this area. At the same time, their ability to use decoys, human shields, to use civilian buildings as cover, is a well-proven capability. And our precision air power did not, even in Afghanistan, demonstrate the ability to strike with such precision that you will not inflict significant civilian casualties and collateral damage.

Iraq’s combat engineering is good. I leave it to other witnesses to comment on the quality of our bridging and water-barrier crossing capabilities. But one uncertainty here is whether it could use its helicopter mobility at all, and we have great helicopter mobility. The problem is not whether we can suppress their air defenses, but
how long it will take and what cost. And certainly over Baghdad, without stealth, we could face serious limits.

We do not really know how cohesive their maneuver capability can be in the face of our air power. And the ability to bring units together and concentrate in one area to deal with limited U.S. attacks could be critical.

People talk about their capability to execute asymmetric warfare and their support of terrorism. I think this is an area where the committee should pay very careful attention to the American intelligence community and put little faith in outside reports.

Other witnesses have commented on weapons of mass destruction. I want to make a caveat here, and I want to go back to my own experience as the one-time manager of DARPA’s program on chemical, biological, and theater nuclear weapons. Very often, we confuse the ability to proliferate with war-fighting effects. In the case of the nuclear weapons, those effects are fairly well known. In the case of chemical and biological weapons, this is not known. Very minor issues in engineering and in the method of delivery can affect the lethality of chemical and biological weapons by two orders of magnitude or more. That is a hundred times. And you can go, as was the case from anthrax with zero effect, to anthrax attacks with near nuclear effects, depending on how the agent is presented, deployed, the quality of the manufacture. It is very unlikely that we will know the answer to those issues until a war takes place. It is a certainty that Iraq lacks the sophistication to conduct training and testing and know the lethality of its own weapons in these areas before it uses them, an uncertainty we need to remember very carefully.

Let me just say, in conclusion, that I do not regard Iraq’s military strength as a massive force that can make use of most of its assets, but I think it is incredibly dangerous to be dismissive. It is very easy to send people home unused and alive. It is costly to send them home in body bags because we did not have sufficient force when we engaged. And to be careless about this war, to me, would be a disaster.

I am reminded of a quote about 2,000 years old by Pliny the Elder, “Small boys throw stones at frogs in jest, but the frogs do not die in jest; the frogs die in earnest.” This is not a game, and it is not something to be decided from an armchair.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Professor Cordesman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, SENIOR FELLOW AND ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR FOR STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Any effort to provide an assessment of Iraq’s military capabilities involves a wide range of challenges. The uncertainties and “intangibles” affecting any assessment of Iraq’s military capabilities—and any war that has not yet been fought—are at least as important as the hard data on its force strength and order of battle.

There is reason for modesty in any form of military analysis, and above all in speculating about future wars. The proper rules for such analysis were laid out over two millennia ago by Thucydides in writing his “History of the Peloponnesian War,” (c. 420 BC): “...I did not even trust my own impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible.” These are tests no one can meet in talking about Iraqi ability to fight a war that has not happened.
I have been asked today to talk about Iraq military capabilities, but this is in some ways a limited value unless the discussion focuses on capabilities in a given contingency. As a result, I would like to submit a detailed report for the record that provides a fully net assessment of the possible wars that can take place, and how Iraq might fare against given threats and opposition forces.

I would also note that in some ways we are already at war. Iraq has been involved in a political struggle against the U.S. and its neighbors ever since the ceasefire in the Gulf War that is an extension of war by other means. The course of this “war of sanctions” can sharply alter its military capabilities over time. While current attention focuses on U.S. military efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq may become involved in a wide range of conflicts, many of which may take on a number of different forms and become asymmetric in character. Iraq’s continuing efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery systems compound both the uncertainties in assessing its military capabilities, and the uncertainties as to how it would behave in given contingencies.

Nevertheless, a great deal is known about Iraq military capabilities and probable behavior, as well as about the military capabilities and behavior of its potential enemies. The list of potential contingencies is limited and there are often severe constraints on the options available to Iraq and its opponents. As a result, it is possible to make educated “guesstimates” as to Iraq’s capabilities relative to most key scenarios, and about the strengths and weaknesses of its position in most contingencies.

IRAQ’S CURRENT MILITARY FORCES

It is relatively easy to estimate the total size of Iraqi military forces, and to comment in broad terms on their capabilities. Although Iraq’s forces have many serious defects, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf, despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle. Iraq still has armed forces with around 424,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. As weak as many aspects of Iraq’s forces may be it is a major military power by regional standards and has at least some chemical and biological weapons. Iraq must be taken seriously both in regional terms and in any military effort to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein.

The International Institute of Strategic Studies estimates that the Iraqi army still can deploy some 375,000 men, organized into seven corps, with two Republican Guard corps and five regular army corps. These forces include six Republican Guard divisions (3 armored, 1 mechanized, and 2 infantry) plus four Special Republican Guard brigades. The regular army has some 16 divisions, and while 11 are relatively low-grade infantry divisions, 3 are armored divisions and 3 are mechanized divisions. The regular army also has five commando and two special forces brigades. While these units lack modern training and the regular army units are heavily dependent on conscripts, over one third are full time regulars or long-service reservists, U.S. experts estimate that Iraqi divisions differ significantly by unit, but have an average authorized strength of about 10,000 men, and that about half of the 23 Iraqi divisions have manning levels of around 8,000 men, and “a fair state of readiness.” Although at least half of the regular army has manning levels of about 70% of authorized strength or lower, and some infantry units have very poor manning levels, and are heavily dependant on Shi’ite, Kurdish and Turkoman conscripts.

Republican Guard Divisions have an average authorized strength of around 8,000 to 10,000 men, and seem to average at least 80% of authorized strength. Brigades average around 2,500 men—the size of a large U.S. battalion. Both sets of estimates give Iraq a total force, today, of approximately 20-23 division-equivalents, versus 35-40 division-equivalents in the summer of 1990, and 67-70 division-equivalents in January 1991—just before the Coalition offensives began in the Gulf War. Iraqi manning levels are, however, uncertain. There are many reports of badly undermanned units, but Iraq has also carried out a number of reserve call ups in 2002.

The Iraqi Army relies on large numbers of combat-worn and obsolescent weapons, but it does have some 700 relatively modern T-72 tanks, 900 BMP-series armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), 150 self-propelled artillery weapons, and 200 multiple rocket launchers. It has extensive stocks of AT-3, AT-4, Milan, and High-subsionic Optically Teleguided (HOT) antitank guided weapons, and roughly 100 aircraft and 275 utility/transport helicopters. The mobile elements of Iraq’s 17,000 man Air Defense Command can deploy large numbers of manportable surface-to-air missiles, plus SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, and Roland vehicle mounted surface-to-air missiles.
Iraqi combat engineering and bridging, however, is good. Iraqi logistics are weak, subject to political controls to prevent coup attempts, and limited by sanctions that have prevented most arms imports for over a decade. Iraqi combat engineering and bridging, however, is good.

Iraq also has extensive internal security and paramilitary forces. The entire police and law enforcement system performs internal security functions, and there are parallel internal security services with units in virtually every town and city. The Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units are specially trained for urban warfare and security operations, as well as conventional military operations, and there are three paramilitary forces. The security troops have some 15,000 men, the border guards around 9,000, and Saddam’s Fedayeen consist of 18,000 to 20,000 men.

The Iraqi Air Force has around 30,000 men. It still has some 316 combat aircraft, although only about 50-60% are serviceable. Senior pilots still fly 60-120 hours a year depending on the aircraft, but junior pilots fly as few as 20.

The IISS estimates that the air force has 6 obsolete H-6D and Tu-22 bombers, and 130 attack aircraft. These include Mirage F-1EQs, Su-20s, 40 Su-22s, 2 Su-24s, and 2 Su-25s. Iraq still has extensive stocks of short-range air-to-ground missiles and cluster bombs. It also has 180 air defense fighters, including 12 MiG-25s, 50 Mirage F-1EQs, and 10 MiG-29s, plus 5 MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft. Additionally, the air force has extensive stocks of MiG-21s, training aircraft, and drones, and has experimented with using them as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). It still has 2 IL-76 tankers and large numbers of transport aircraft.

Jane’s provides a different estimate with the following key combat types; the number estimated to be in service are shown in parenthesis: 40(0) F-7, 30 (13) Mirage F-1EQ, 36 (15-25) MiG-21, 35 (15-20) MiG-23, 6 (3-6) MiG-25, 17 (1) MiG-29, 33 (15-18) Su-20/22, 21 (6-11) Su-25, 2 T-22, and 3 Tu-16.

Air Force air-to-air and air-to-ground training is limited and unrealistic. In the past, command and control has been over-centralized and mission planning has often set impossible goals. The two No Fly zones have further limited air training and comat experience. There are no modern airborne sensor, command and control, or intelligence capabilities, other than a small number of UAVs. Air control and warning is still heavily dependent on outdated ground-based intercept capabilities. The Air Force has, however, practiced penetration raids by single low-flying aircraft, and has shown that it can conduct independent offensive operations at the small formation level.

The heavy surface-to-air missile forces of the Air Defense Command are still organized into one of the most dense defensive networks in the world. There are four regional air defense centers at Kirkuk (north), Kut al Hayy (east), Al Basra (south), and Ramadia (west). Major command facilities are underground and hardened. Additionally, there is a network of redundant radars and optical fibre command links. Reports differ over the extent to which China has helped Iraq create a modern and highly survivable optical fibre command net. There are unconfirmed reports of more modern radars being smuggled in from the Ukraine.

The system is backed by extensive low-altitude anti-aircraft (AA) guns, and SA-8b, SA-11, and SA-13 short and medium range missiles. The Sterla 2 and 10 (SA-7 and SA-10) are used for terminal defense of key buildings. Iraq has learned to rapidly move its fire units and sensors, use urban cover and decoys, use “pop-on” guidance techniques, and optical tracking. Its mix of SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s is badly outdated, but some modifications have been made.

Iraq has learned a great deal about land-based air defense operations from the Gulf War and more than ten years of operations against the U.S. and British aircraft enforcing the “No Fly Zones.” Iraq provided significant aid to Serbia in air defense tactics during the fighting in Kosovo, and helped Serbia make effective use of decoys, “pop-on” and remotely linked radar activity, various ambush tactics, and the use of deployments in civilian areas to limit NATO will ingress.

Iraq is certain to have developed contingency plans to move and disperse its land-based air defenses in the event of a major U.S.-led attempt to overthrow the regime, and to try to concentrate such defenses to protect the regime and try to use them to partially compensate for the lack of an effective Iraqi Air Force.

To strike, Iraq has developed some countermeasures to U.S. anti-radiation missiles since the Gulf War, and has recently begun to get significant equipment through Syria.

The 2,000 man Iraqi Navy has never been an effective force and was devastated during the Gulf War. It now has only 6 obsolete Osa and Bogomol guided missile patrol craft, and three obsolete Soviet inshore minesweepers. Iraq does, however, retain all of the shore-based Silkworm and other anti-ship missiles it had at the time of the Gulf War, and extensive stocks of mines—some of them relatively modern and
sophisticated. (The U.S. never succeeded in targeting land-based Iraqi anti-ship missiles during the Gulf War, and the U.S. and British Navies entered Iraqi mine fields without detecting their presence.)

It is difficult to generalize about Iraqi forces where each land and air unit has such different levels of effectiveness and where political and internal security considerations are so important however, Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not, however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some individual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It also has not demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces.

Sanctions and the impact of the Gulf War have also had a major impact on Iraqi war fighting capabilities. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any major equipment—with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic “dogfight” air-to-air missiles. Iraq’s inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is now obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers, and then sustain coherent operations.

Iraq has, however, maintained much of the clandestine arms purchasing network that it set up during the time of the Iran-Iraq War. It has prior experience in buying from some 500 companies in 43 countries, and has set up approximately 150 small purchasing companies or agents. Intelligence experts feel that Iraq also has an extensive network of intelligence agents and middlemen involved in arms purchases. Iraq has probably obtained some air defense equipment from countries like the Ukraine and China, and may have been able to smuggle in some spare parts through Syria, Turkey, and Jordan. Deliveries through Syria have become significant since mid-2001, and include parts and weapons assemblies for MiG and Shukoi aircraft, armor, and land-based air defenses. Nevertheless, Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force structure to compensate for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It has not visibly deployed any major new weapon system since 1991, or been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure.

KEY PROBLEMS IN ASSESSMENT

Wars and battles are rarely decided by “tangible” factors, like manpower and equipment numbers, quantifiable aspects of sustainability, or other measures of effectiveness. One historical case after another, shows the real world outcome of war has been determined by “intangibles,” where various experts differ sharply over the relative capability of each side. Today’s experts find it very easy to assert that Iraq’s major combat units will fight with loyalty and determination because of their privileges, dependence on the regime, and nationalism. Others find it equally easy to assert that Iraqi forces they will rapidly collapse or defect because the regime is an unpopular tyranny.

In practice, Iraq’s performance in past wars has shown that many aspects of its military behavior cannot be predicted until a war starts, and that these uncertainties interact with the uncertainties affecting any predictions about the military performance of Iraq’s opponents. The following “intangibles” and uncertainties regarding Iraqi warfighting capability affect any dynamic net assessment of Iraq:

- Real world popularity and unpopularity of the regime among the various elements of the armed forces and in areas of military operations. Loyalty may vary across different force elements, such as Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, regular army with regular manning, and regular army with largely conscript manning.
- Real-world impact of repression and tyranny versus incentives, nationalism, and propaganda in determining popular support for the regime or active opposition. The impact of issues like ethnic divisions, UN sanctions and the oil for food program, and backlash from the Second Intifada.
- Willingness of various Kurdish factions to participate in a conflict or ride one out; loyalty of various Shi’ite elements versus uprisings and resistance.
- Efficacy of the regime’s bribes and incentives in buying loyalty.
- Impact by combat element of more than 10 years without open access to world arms market, along with limited discretionary funding for force maintenance and modernization; and limited ability to smuggle in parts, weapons, and munitions.
Uncertain sustainability of current stock of munitions and spare parts.

Quality of training, and leadership experience by unit and force element.

Reliance on a rigid logistic system, emphasizing “flood forward” techniques to make up for a lack of response to the needs of commanders and the tactical situation, by moving supplies forward in large amounts, regardless of the immediate need.

Progress in reducing the past rigidities and over-centralization of the command system, and its failure to allow for independence of action.

Real-world ability to execute urban warfare and military operations in built up areas; also, the ability to shelter in populated areas, and use human shields, without popular uprisings or action. Impact of ethnic divisions, tribal loyalties, etc. in given areas.

Level of improvement in air operations and in ability to conduct effective air-to-air and air-to-ground combat using dispersed forces capable of independent operations.

Efficiency of dispersal techniques and human shields, plus decoys and deception, in limiting the efficacy of U.S. intelligence and strategic reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, and air strike capabilities.

Ability to make effective use of water barriers and earth barriers; ability to tie combat engineering to real world military tactics in the face of U.S. airpower and helicopter mobility.

Ability to effectively deploy and concentrate air defense assets for tactical purposes, versus exploit largely fixed SA-2/SA-3, and SA-6 system.

Short and medium-term wartime survivability of heavy surface-to-air missile defenses.

Current status of joint warfare and combined arms expertise, and improvement in such expertise, if any.

Cohesive maneuvering capability and ability to use helicopters to overcome water barriers and to reinforce.

Since 1991, improvements in artillery tactics and methods to acquire long-range targeting capabilities and manage and switch fires.

Planning and real-world capability to execute asymmetric warfare, covert warfare, and use terrorist proxies.

Effectiveness of the security and paramilitary forces in the face of any serious popular opposition.

Size and effectiveness of Iraqi opposition forces, if any.

Size and effectiveness of current holdings of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and missiles, and other delivery systems. Possible possession of a biological or nuclear weapon so lethal that it could inflict massive damage or casualties and make a major change in the level of deterrence or war fighting capability.

Existence of preplanned launch on warning (LOW), launch under attack (LUA), and retaliatory strike capability to deliver CBRN forces; deployment of covert and terrorist proxy capabilities.

It is easy to guess at—or to assert—some judgment about Iraqi capability in any of the above areas. It is certainly true that little about Iraqi military behavior since 1991 implies that Iraq will suddenly achieve dramatic degrees of surprise and innovation in military operations, however this can scarcely be ruled out, and the key issue in war fighting is often one of marginal or relative efficiency.

In a contingency, like a U.S.-led invasion to overthrow Saddam, Iraq may have enough war fighting capability to require a very significant U.S. and allied response. In many other contingencies, the weaknesses in Iraqi forces may not be critical relative to similar or different weaknesses in Iranian and other Gulf forces.

IRAQ AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Iraq has a much more serious history of exploiting proliferation than Iran. It has seen proliferation as a counter to conventional superiority since the late 1960s. It sought weapons of mass destruction long before the Gulf War showed it what the “revolution in military affairs” and U.S. conventional superiority could accomplish. Since 1991, Iraq has been unable to obtain significant imports of conventional weapons, and it is incapable of producing its own. As a result, it is scarcely surprising that Iraq sees proliferation as its key potential method of countering the U.S. advantage in conventional forces and has been willing to pursue such options in the face of massive economic costs, UNSCOM and IAEA efforts to destroy its remaining capabilities, and the extension of UN sanctions.
Iraq continues to work on its Samoud ballistic missile system and other similar systems that supposedly have a range of less than 150 kilometers—although none of these systems are believed to be deployed, and lack the range for effective strikes on most foreign cities and facilities. Iraq likely has at least 12-25 surviving Scud missile assemblies, however, and could have in excess of 40.

UNSCOM inspectors note that UNSCOM’s claims to have identified 817 out of 819 Scud imports are extremely soft and may well have an error of 60 weapons, and that no accurate count exists of Iraqi produced components. This could give Iraq a range of 20-80 operational Scuds and Iraq has shown in the past that it can produce its own TEL launchers. Iraq also continues development work on shorter range missiles since missiles with ranges of 150-kilometers or less are permitted under the terms of the ceasefire. UNSCOM made it clear in all of its reports, up through the final expulsion of its inspectors from Iraq, that Iraq was concealing the nature of its chemical and biological weapons effort and had systematically lied in every major disclosure report it had submitted to UNSCOM from the start to the end of the inspection effort.

In spite of the Gulf War, and nearly eight years of UNSCOM efforts before Iraq forced an end to the UN inspection effort, Iraq still presents a major threat in terms of proliferation. It is all too clear that Iraq may have increased this threat since active UNSCOM and IAEA efforts ended in December 1998. It is known to have continued to import precursors for chemical weapons and may have increased its holdings of biological growth agents. No one can dismiss the risk that Iraq does have weapons with very high real-world lethality.

Much depends on how well Iraq has organized its CBRN forces and weaponized its chemical and biological agents. Virtually nothing is known in the unclassified literature about the Iraqi process since 1991 in this latter area, which can affect the real-world lethality of chemical and biological warheads, bombs, munitions, and sprayers by up to two orders of magnitude.

Iraq developed effective 155-mm artillery and 122-mm multiple rocket rounds for the delivery of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War and could probably modify such technology to deliver biological weapons. The effective use of chemical weapons armed with artillery and multiple rocket rounds against large enemy ground forces does, however, require an extensive inventory of munitions, however, even in using VX-gas. It is unclear that Iraq could conceal the production, deployment, and training for an operation of this scale. The delivery of biological agents using such weapons would present two critical problems: The effects would probably only develop after the battle was over and there would be a serious risk of secondary effects if the agent blew back over Iraqi troops and civilian areas. The use of such attacks cannot be ruled out, however, particularly as a last extreme, and the troops firing such weapons would not have to be informed of such risks.

Iraq has had cluster bomb technology since the Iran-Iraq War, and has long had the theoretical engineering capability to use non-explosive release mechanisms like air bags to release chemical and biological munitions. Before the Gulf War, Iraq developed crude parachute release designs for its missile warheads, designs which would be substantially more effective than the primitive contact fuse warheads and bombs it had at the time of the war, and which might well have produced negligible weapons effects if they had ever been used.

Iraq must realize that the crude contact fusing, and chemical/biological warhead/bomb designs, it had at the time of the Gulf War drastically limited the effectiveness of its CBRN weapons. Iraq has had strong incentives to correct these problems for over a decade, and the development of parachute release weapons is only moderately challenging. Iraq has also had a decade to adapt non-destructive dissemination technology like airbags. Nevertheless, experts are deeply divided over Iraq’s systems integration and engineering skill and the probability that Iraq has developed lethal missile warheads.

There is broad agreement among experts that Iraq has probably developed effective sprayer and line source-delivery technology since the Gulf War. This is the most lethal way to deliver chemical and biological weapons, and is far more effective than using even advanced missile warheads. Iraq also experimented at the time of the Gulf War with using aircraft like the Czech L-29 trainer as a remotely piloted drone to carry out such deliveries at long ranges, and U.S. forces were deeply concerned that Iraq might be using its UAVs for such missions early in the Gulf War. The use of fighters, helicopters, and drones for such missions requires relatively large aircraft, and they would be vulnerable to air defenses. It is at least possible, however, that Iraq could use its best strike aircraft to fly a one-way mission and succeed in penetrating deep into Southern Gulf, Turkish, and Kurdish territory or the rear area of U.S.-led coalition ground forces. It is also possible that Iraq might be able to use a drone, UAV, or modified fighter, GPS, and earth-hugging flight profiles to
create the equivalent of cruise missiles for such missions with sufficient accuracy and reliability to attack city sized targets at long ranges.

Similar critical uncertainties exist in other areas of Iraqi CBRN warfighting. Several UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq lied about its ability to produce a stable form of persistent VX nerve gas during the time Iraq was still under inspection, just as it had lied earlier about weaponizing of VX. Iraq’s mustard gas inventory proved to be highly stable during the period of inspection, and it seems likely that Iraq now has both stable non-persistent and persistent nerve gas. Iraq is known to have continued to smuggle in precursor chemicals during the inspection period and since 1998. Persistent VX would probably be at least 10 times more lethal than anything Iraq used in the Iran-Iraq War or against its Kurds.

Iraq has experimented with the conversion of biological agents into dry, coated micropowders that can be lethal to two orders of magnitude or more versus slurries of wet agents. At least in the case of the most lethal, advanced weaponized forms of dry-storable Anthrax—such biological weapons can achieve the lethality of simple nuclear fission weapons. They can have far more immunity to heat and sunlight, disseminate without clumping, and are extremely lethal when inhaled. They can be non-explosively disseminated with air bag technology, and are far better suited for covert use in bombs, missile warheads, and covert attacks. Similarly, little is known about any Iraqi advances in sprayer and line-source delivery technology, and in tailoring CB agents to make them more effective in such delivery profiles. Contrary to some literature, truly effective line source and sprayer delivery is a complex engineering problem involving both the agent and delivery system.

The greatest single unknown, in terms of Iraqi capability to use biological agents, consists of infectious agents like Smallpox and Plague. Iraq was one of the last countries to have a natural outbreak of smallpox and may well have the culture. Smallpox is easy to reproduce in a small facility and is infectious enough so agents willing to commit suicide or individuals who are unwittingly exposed could create serious corridors of infection. The long period between exposure and symptoms deprives such agents of immediate impact in war fighting scenarios, but they could be used in port, airbase, or rear areas during the staging of enemy forces with limited risk because Iraq’s borders would be sealed. Infiltrating the agent into Turkey, Southern Gulf states, Israel, or the U.S. and U.K. would be an option; as is sending in exposed unwitting or deliberately infected individuals. No meaningful capability now exists to screen for the agent or exposed individuals, and agents carrying Smallpox agent could be immunized, as could those infecting unwitting subjects.

IAEA and U.S. intelligence experts privately put little or no faith in the claims of various Iraqi defectors that Iraq retains the ability to make fissile material, has extensive covert fissile material production facilities, and has workable bomb designs small enough to be used in missile warheads. IAEA experts note that the Iraqi centrifuge designs proved to be far less effective during laboratory review than they initially estimated, and that Iraq does not seem to have understood the technical problems in using centrifuges to enrich fissile material beyond 90%. They note that cascades of centrifuges are relatively easy to conceal in multistory buildings, but that Iraq is extremely dependent on imports to create such a facility and would probably need outside technical support.

Iraq did, however, have at least two workable fissile weapon implosion designs that could be used in large bombs at the time of the Gulf War, had solved the technical problems in making and triggering high explosive lenses for nuclear weapons, and had workable neutron initiators. If it could obtain fissile material, it could probably make a large explosive device relatively quickly, but not fit one to a missile warhead or build a bomb that any of its aircraft other than its bombers and MiG-24s could deliver at long distances, particularly in low-altitude penetration missions. Iraq might be much more successful in arming any actual nuclear weapon it could obtain, particularly because of the relatively crude PAL systems fitted to many FSU weapons, and the duplicative code sequences used to arm them.

Iraq has shown both that it can disperse and conceal and that it is willing to take serious risks in doing so in spite of the centralized nature of the regime. During the Gulf War, Iraq was willing to place large numbers of chemical weapons under the control of its regular Army forces, although biological weapons and missiles were placed under the control of special units of the Republican Guard which seem to have had a significant element of Iraqi security forces. Iraq also showed during the Gulf War that it could disseminate chemical weapons (and possibly biological weapons) over a wide area without detection by Coalition forces. Coalition intelligence and targeting of such weapons stocks was a near total failure through the end of the war, and advancing forces sometimes had to be warned of the existence of stockpiles of chemical weapons by surrendering Iraqi officers. Iraq mixed chem-
ical and conventional munitions stockpiles without special security precautions and even dispersed unguarded weapons at unused airstrips for possible arming in a last-ditch emergency.

A number of experts believe Iraq could disperse most of its covert biological production on warning or under attack. Iraq is known to have mobile laboratories and storage equipment and to have developed advanced techniques for rapid equipment and material movement during the time of UN inspection. It is not known whether Iraq has developed special survivable communications for such dispersal efforts, or exactly who would control such units and how loyal they would be under extreme conditions—particularly knowing the probable level of reprisals both in terms of the level of attacks on Iraq and future treatment of war criminals. Regimes like Iraq’s do, however, have a long history of successfully indoctrinating and lying to carefully selected “loyalist” units. Such units can now also make use of GPS rather than presurveyed sites, and may well be able to make use of GPS for preplanned targeting or to change targeting in the field. This could increase the dispersal area and the effectiveness with which an Iraqi force would be able to target cities and fixed facilities at long ranges.

Cumulatively, these uncertainties make it impossible to do more than guess at Iraq’s warfighting capabilities. As such a guesstimate, Iraq’s present holdings of delivery systems, and chemical and biological weapons, seem most likely to be so limited in technology and operational lethality that they do not severely constrain U.S. freedom of action, or seriously intimidate Iraq’s neighbors.

Barring classified intelligence to the contrary, Iraqi CBRN capabilities must be taken seriously, but do not seem great enough to change U.S., British, Iranian, Israeli, Saudi and/or Southern Gulf perceptions of risk to the point where they would limit or paralyze military action against Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition or prevent large-scale Israeli strikes on Iraq.

Iraq has not fired any Scud variants in nearly twelve years. There are no public reports that it has tested dry-storable biological weapons, or has made major advances in its weaponization of nerve gas. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that Iraq can openly build up major production and deployment capabilities without them being detected and targeted, and without provoking strong U.S. counter-proliferation programs, including preemptive or retaliatory strike capabilities.

Nevertheless, Iraq’s possession of even moderately effective CBRN weapons must affect other aspects of U.S., British, Southern Gulf, and Israeli perceptions of the risks inherent in attacking Iraq. President Bush has already made it clear that the U.S. might well make maximum use of its advanced intelligence, strike, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and air and missile power to carry out a massive preemptive strike on Iraq’s CBRN and delivery capabilities at the first sign of any major crisis or as a prelude to an invasion to overthrow Saddam. Such weapons create a strong incentive for preemption even in “peacetime conditions” if (a) they can be targeted with sufficient reliability and depth of coverage, (b) the U.S. and its allies are confident the resulting strikes would do sufficient damage to offset the risk of Iraq lashing out with its surviving weapons, (c) the U.S. is confident any secondary effects in terms of Iraqi civilian casualties would be limited, and (d) the U.S. is convinced it can show the world that Iraq was in violation of the UN ceasefire. Preemption might also take place regardless of these risks if the U.S. was convinced Iraq was prepared for the use of such weapons or was dispersed a major force for the possible delivery of such forces.

It should be noted in this regard that the physical destruction of stored or dispersed chemical and biological facilities and munitions stored on the ground presents only a limited risk of major collateral damage and secondary civilian casualties unless the weapons are in densely populated areas. No one can disprove the idea of trace effects from such explosions, such as those associated with Gulf War syndrome, but the probabilities are limited.

FACTORS SHAPING IRAQI OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR U.S.-LED COALITION MILITARY EFFORT

Iraq cannot hope to win a conventional war in the face of decisive U.S. force, but it does have a wide range of options, and some might be effective in the face of inadequate U.S. and coalition force levels:

• The key battle is already underway and is largely political. Iraq’s best strategy is to deflect the political momentum for a major U.S. attack on Iraq, and to win as much Arab support as it can. This means strengthening the political accommodation it has already reach with other Arab states—including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—and attempting to win broad Arab political support through its support for the Palestinian cause in the Second Intifada. Some form of Iraqi accommodation in terms of resuming UN inspections is another potential option,
although one that Saddam and other hard-liners in the regime is certain to be reluctant to take. Using oil wealth and control over much of the media to mobilizing popular support is another approach the regime is taking and one that both deters U.S. military action and strengthens Iraqi operational capabilities. In contrast, the U.S. faces the backlash from the Second Intifada, has been unable to mobilize Arab or European support for a war tied largely to the threat of proliferation, and has no smoking gun in terms of Iraqi support for terrorism.

• The worst Iraqi option is to repeat the mistakes of the Gulf War and send its best forces out into the desert where they are most exposed and have the least air defense. Some counterattacks and raids may be needed, but a forward defense strategy is the one most vulnerable to U.S. military action. Similarly, digging in forward areas, and the extensive use of static forces and earth barriers, could be useful in defending Basra and a few critical lines of communication, but makes Iraqi forces easy to bypass and outmaneuver.

• A city-populated area based strategy presents the most problems for the U.S. in using air power effectively, and provides the most political advantages in exploiting collateral damage and civilian casualties. It is also unlikely to lead to uprisings or opposition action as long as loyal forces are in place and willing to fight.

• Iraq may be able to exploit water barriers against heavy U.S. forces, but is more likely to lose bridges and road mobility to U.S. airpower. Pre-positioning forces and supplies to defend a limited part of the country with the most loyal population and most critical cities—an urban redoubt strategy—offers more survivable flexibility than either a forward deployed or central reserve strategy. Iraq’s surface to air missile system also supports such a strategy.

• Some form of Iraqi redoubt and scorched earth strategy is also an option. Iraq set Kuwait’s oil fields on fire during the Gulf War, and might well try to use the oil weapon in such a contingency. It has already talked about oil embargoes in the context of the Second Intifada, and Saddam Hussein might well see burning Iraq’s oil fields and CBRN attacks on major Gulf oil fields as both a defense and form of revenge. Iraq could also combine such a strategy with falling back on a largely Shi’ite dominated “redoubt” by using the cities and towns in North Central Iraq for its defense while leaving as much of a scorched earth as possible in the areas of a U.S.-led coalition advance.

• Fighting delaying actions inside urban areas offers Iraq a way of using human shields, limiting U.S. air strike capability, and forcing U.S.-led coalition forces to fight on the most restricted terms. It cannot win against mobility and decisive force, but it is certain to be more effective than putting infantry in earth barriers—the “speed bump” strategy that Iraq used in the Gulf War.

• Iraq is virtually certain to try to exploit civilian casualties and collateral damage as a political and media weapon, and mix this with the use of deception and decoys. Saddam Hussein’s regime will attempt to fight a political battle to the last.

• Iraq might try to use CBRN weapons to preempt a U.S. build-up, launch on warning (LOW), or launch under attack (LUA) against key U.S. and coalition bases. He might try to use selective escalation to using remaining missiles and/or CBRN weapons to try to involve Israel in the war risks escalating the physical damage to Iraq, and make maximum use of the backlash from the Second Intifada. Saddam Hussein seems to have put his missiles and CBRN forces in the hands of loyalists who might well execute a LOW, LUA, and/or desperate retaliatory option. The problem with a desperate retaliatory option is that Saddam must realize that waiting until the regime is collapsing, and then conducting CBRN operations against Arab states, or conducting covert CBRN strikes against the U.S. when the regime is already in extremis, is far more likely to increase the severity of coalition action. He must also realize that major, highly lethal, Iraqi CBRN strikes on Israeli population centers are likely to trigger a major nuclear war.

Anyone who looks seriously at this list of variables will quickly see that it is impossible to predict whether and how the U.S. will use decisive force, the Iraqi response to a U.S.-led coalition, the nature of a U.S.-led coalition, how long Iraq can endure, and what strategy Iraq will actually pursue if it does use its CBRN weapons.

What does seem likely, however, is that it would take a major U.S. miscalculation about the size of the forces needed to defeat Iraq and/or a poorly structured and over-constrained U.S. operation, to allow Iraq to ride out the U.S.-led attack through even the best combination of urban and redoubt warfare. Furthermore, most forms
of extreme Iraq escalation can make things worse for both the attacker and defender, but will probably end in hurting Iraq more than the attacker.

Blundering into war is not a plan, and while Iraq has many military weaknesses, it is not a “cake walk.” The human costs of fighting Iraq can be all too real, and betting the lives of other men’s sons and daughters on anything other than decisive force can be exceedingly dangerous. Military adventures that kill U.S. or allied troops and local allies and still end in defeat or frustration are even worse, and civilian casualties and collateral damage have a moral price tag. Here, it is worthwhile to remember another quotation from the classical world, and this time by Pliny the Elder: “Small boys throw stones at frogs in jest. But, the frogs do not die in jest. The frogs die in earnest.”

FOOTNOTES


2 USCENTCOM briefing by “senior military official.”

3 Estimate first provided by USCENTCOM in June, 1996 plus interviews.


6 An analysis by Charles Duelfer indicates that the count of 817 missile assemblies certified by UNSCOM includes 8 used in training before the Iran-Iraq War, 516 used during the Iran-Iraq War, 69 used in testing, 93 used in the Gulf War, 48 destroyed by UNSCOM, and 83 that Iraq asserted it had unilaterally destroyed. The count of those used in testing is particularly suspect.

7 According to some reports, General Tommy Franks, the commander of USCENTCOM, has made such preemptive strikes part of his contingency planning. See John Henderson, “In Iraq, U.S. Faces New Dynamics,” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 2001, p. 1.
armor, the amount of air power, the attack helicopters, the force mix and the basing. And when we talk about this kind of option, we're talking about access to major bases. And while we might not need 2,800 sorties a day, as we flew in the gulf war, being able to mount less than 1,000 to 1,500 would be reckless.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, doctor, let me ask you. In your book, you discuss the merits of helping scientists working on the regime's weapons of mass destruction to escape Iraq. Based on your experience, what was the missing ingredient, if there was one, in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program, its human expertise for research, its design and production, or raw ingredients—for example, highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons? What was the weakest link?

Dr. HAMZA. Senator, the weakest link was research—that is, research that could resolve the bottlenecks in the program. For example, with uranium enrichment which one needs at the bomb core—you need some bomb-grade uranium, so you need to enrich natural uranium using enrichment processes—we were held for 5 years because we could not develop an enrichment barrier that will separate the heavy from the light uranium. So the bottlenecks in technology were the hold up.

The same goes for the calutron process to enrich uranium using the electromagnetic method. We were held up by simple technologies here, but these were insurmountable problems to us over there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any reason to believe they have surmounted those bottlenecks?

Dr. HAMZA. They declared they did. In 1993, Iraq surmounted the bottleneck in the diffusion barrier technology and declared it in its full, final, and complete declaration. So Iraq did declare that some of these bottlenecks—for example, in the diffusion process—were resolved. But still it leaves a very small core of researchers to be the really critical part of the program. And if these small cores of researchers—that's what I mention in the book—were taken care of, the program will be probably hindered.

The CHAIRMAN. In conclusion, how confident are you about your assertion that you used in your statement saying that by 2005 you
believe the Iraqi Government will have enough fissile material to build three nuclear weapons?

Dr. Hamza. This is the German assessment I mentioned. As I mention in the report, I took parts of these statements to save time, but this is the German BND assessment based on what it observed from Iraqi defectors and Iraqi capabilities.

The Chairman. When was that assessment made?

Dr. Hamza. It was made last year, and there are reports that they repeated it this year again. It was February of 2001.

The Chairman. My time is up.

Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Dr. Cordesman, much of the argument about the need to attack Iraq now is really based upon the thought that Dr. Hamza suggested, that they could develop a nuclear capability by 2005, or even Ambassador Butler’s comment that at the end of the Gulf war or thereabouts, Iraq may have been within 6 months of developing a nuclear weapon. If that is so, and given the point you’ve made about the efficacy of biological and chemical weapons being very difficult to estimate, the case for continuing the so-called containment strategy is that Iraq has not been able to develop weapons capable of providing a massive first strike capability. And, as a matter of fact, the strategy apparently, as we see it, is that Saddam would use these weapons defensively and simply threaten the rest of the world with retaliation if an event occurred that threatened him.

However, what is your judgment, leaving aside intelligence reports that may help the committee or, more importantly, the President and others, to determine the imminence of Iraq’s capability? What is the case against simply continuing as we are now? If evidence appeared that he had developed a nuclear weapon outside of a covert situation, couldn’t we just reserve the right for preemptive strikes or take action to try to eliminate that. Is there a big enough threat that cannot be contained?

And then, second, if we adopt that strategy, is it possible we could wind up with a policy with our allies and neighboring states that in the event that Saddam did develop and did strike somebody that we all attack together, as opposed to the current situation in which almost all the neighbors, plus our NATO allies, are highly skeptical of the efficacy of our initiating a strike at this point. They suggest they are uncertain that Saddam has the weapons, and likelihood of development, and worry that in the process of attacking we might trigger the use of whatever Saddam does possess much to the detriment of his own people and those he would strike.

I’m asking you for a general summation on the efficacy of containment as we know it.

Professor Cordesman. Senator, the first assignment I had when I came out of graduate school, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was to work on a study of proliferation. That was back in the 1960s, and I have been working on such studies ever since. The ability of experts to predict who would really develop a nuclear weapon at a given time over a period, has been so poor that I think what we really have to say to ourselves is we can’t make such predictions.
I would not put any great faith in WMD predictions. I'm not sure that we can ever predict this. You ask the intelligence community how soon they can do it, and the answer always tends to be 2 to 3 years unless you have positive evidence that they have done it. But the fact is that with areas like centrifuge technology, you never will really know. They are relative easy to conceal, as Ambassador Butler pointed out. UNSCOM found that both the calutron effort and centrifuge effort, the more they looked into it, the worse it was designed, but that was 10 years ago. And to say that nobody has changed in 10 years and we can detect it, is not realistic.

In biological weapons, the problem really is not the agent; it is whether you can convert it to a very small powder of exactly the right size, coat it, and find an unexplosive or non-destructive way to disseminate it. Iraq's designs for chemical weapons and biological weapons at the time of the gulf war bordered on the actively stupid. I mean, they did not represent a lack of the necessary technology. They were just miserably executed. They used contact warheads, and crude binary chemical weapons and ignored technology that Iraq had already obtained from Chile. There was simply no reason to do anything this badly.

But, again, as Ambassador Butler pointed out, we haven't found Iraq's sprayers. We don't know what they've tested. You don't need to do this in the open, and a lot of it could be done clandestinely.

So in the biological area, let me make a very clear point here. They may have anthrax weapons today with nuclear lethality. If they have smallpox—and they were among the last countries to have a smallpox outbreak—that is a weapon which has nuclear lethality.

Our problem here is the more time goes on, the more the time lines give Saddam the ability to get there, and it is far from clear that anyone will ever be able to answer your questions or know when or where or how these kinds of weapons will be used.

You talked about the risk of going in and striking at these weapons. If they have the kinds of weapons we think they have—primarily wet agents, old bombs, limited delivery systems—that risk is acceptable today, but there could be collateral damage. They might also use them on ports, our bases, or our forces in the gulf. We can't dismiss those kinds of attacks.

I do not believe that any amount of air strikes, suddenly executed, will do the job. I invite the committee to look at the battle damage for Desert Fox and ask very probing questions about the sources of that battle-damage assessment data and the quality of that damage-assessment data.

I would remind people that we flew some 2,400 sorties trying to suppress the Scuds once dispersed in the gulf war. We saw some 48 plumes. We hit nothing. In spite of claims by some British Special Forces people, the entire Special Forces effort was a waste of time. It did not produce a single meaningful target. And these are realities I think we have to live with.

The fact is, the time lines move is toward more and more risk, as both the previous witnesses have pointed out.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I think these statements by our witnesses and the responses already to the
questions make the case of the value of having these hearings. And we appreciate immensely your participation.

Let me pick up again, just on a followup point that Senator Lugar was making, Professor Cordesman, that I would like you to address, if you could, and that is the importance and the prosecution of a military option of international support or regional support. You mentioned in your statement the necessity of having bases of operation, being able to place supplies in forward positions and the like would be very important. We at least hear today of the criticism that is coming from allies as well as regional powers in the region who at least call themselves allies. Could you please give us some sort of an assessment of how important that factor is in the successful prosecution of the military option?

Professor CORDESMAN. I think we have to be prepared for the fact that if we do this, it will, in many ways, be our first preemptive war. We will not have a clear smoking gun. There will not be a simple cause to rally around. I think we will have the support of the British Government. Most of our NATO allies will, at best, be reluctant and seek, if anything, to delay it to use the U.N. But we had some of those problems during the gulf war. Remember, the French Defense Minister resigned to protest just before the fighting began. We didn't get our aircraft into Turkey until 48 hours because the authorization was only given by the Turkish Government 48 hours before the air war began. Coalitions take on a cachet in retrospect that they never had at the time. But there are some realities here. You're going to need Turkish air basing far more, because the center of Iraq's power is a lot further north. Saudi airspace will be critical. So would Saudi bases, if possible.

There were 23 airfields and air bases at the time of the gulf war. We used every single one of them to capacity, put Marine Corps aircraft into unimproved strips because there were no areas left. And 11 of those bases were in Saudi Arabia.

If we are going to fight this war we, at a minimum, are going to need all of the capacity of Qatar, of Bahrain, and Kuwait. We are going to need to be able to stage through Oman. We probably are going to have to use most of our carrier assets, at least initially, because of the lack of basing, unless you can get Saudi Arabia. And so any assessment of relative capability and scenarios is determined, not so much by what our European allies do, but what we can actually get by way of support in the region.

Senator DODD. Do I have time for one more question?

The CHAIRMAN. You sure do.

Senator DODD. Let me jump back, if I can, doctor—Ambassador Butler, to the efforts of compliance. Is there any sense or any scenario which you could conjure up which would cause Saddam Hussein to—and his government—to take a different view toward inspections? Or is that, in your view, an option that has been exhausted and the past events have proved the futility of trying to have the kind of cooperation necessary to pursue that avenue of dealing with this issue?

Ambassador BUTLER. Well, Senator Dodd, my answer, I'm afraid, will be a pessimistic one. In the concluding part of my remarks, I said that I believed it was essential—if one asked the gut question of what is needed here, my answer is arms control and disar-
mament. What that implies is—and others tended to agree—was that it is, in theory, essential that we have Iraq brought into conformity with the law, which is that it must cooperate with a full-scale international effort to, (a) take away the weapons that it made in the past and which already exist, and, (b) institute a system of long-term monitoring that Dr. Hamza referred to, for example, to ensure that those weapons are not reconstituted in the future.

Now, central to such a structure is the cooperation of the Government of Iraq, and it never gave it. Remember, at the beginning of my statement, I concluded from the brief history of UNSCOM, incredibly brief, that there were two points. One, the first point, was that Iraq never obeyed the law. And the other was that it had always been utterly committed to having weapons of mass destruction.

Now, I must, I’m afraid, give a pessimistic answer to your very pertinent question. Are they likely to do it? No, they’re not. Does it mean that we should, therefore, now stop trying to get that restored? No. I think we have got to go a little further way—if for no other reason than to make clear to the world that we went the full distance to get the law obeyed and arms control restored before taking other measures.

Senator DODD. May I ask you quickly what specific avenues would you pursue to take this the final yard or two, as you describe it?

Ambassador BUTLER. I’ve said many time before, Senator, and I’ll repeat it here, the pathway lies in cooperation with Russia. It is Russia and, to some extent, France in the Security Council in 1998 and 1999 which brought our efforts—and I don’t mean the United States’ efforts; I mean UNSCOM and the civilized and interested community that wanted to see this horrible problem of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam’s mind and behavior brought under control. It was Russia’s split with the United States, Russia’s decision that it had greater interest in sticking with Saddam that brought our effort down.

Now, it follows logically from that, and indeed there’s a lot of practical evidence for it as well as mere logic, that the way ahead would be through and with Russia. If we could get Russia and then France—the U.K., of course, is a given. I don’t mean that disrespectfully to them. They’ve been staunch on this. If we could get Russia to work seriously with us in Baghdad to make very clear to the Iraqis that, “This is it. This is it. You will do serious arms control, or you’re toast,” to put it simply, we might have a chance. But absent that, we won’t.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Can I ask for a point of clarification, professor? Without Qatar, without Bahrain, without Kuwait, is it possible to launch successfully a military action that has a high probability of success and a relatively low probability of high casualties for American forces?

Professor CORDESMAN. You could conduct a very destructive bombing and air campaign, but short of having access to both Jordan or Turkey, the answer would be, “I think not.” And, I think
it would be devastating to risk the lives of the Kurds or the Iraqi opposition or U.S. Special Forces on some kind of operation which might conceivably succeed, but which would have no probability of succeeding and where we could never back it up by bailing them out.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you. I appreciate the indulgence of my colleagues.

Senator Hagel. Obviously, we don’t have the vote at 11 yet, so we’re just going to keep going. So why don’t you proceed, Senator, and we’ll go through this round.

Will you all be able to stay? Again, they said four votes, which means it will be at least 50 minutes. Are you able to do that? We may have to go through lunch here, because we have very important panels to follow you. We would make the room available. We don’t want to call it the back room, but we would make the ante-room here available to you all, and maybe we can get you something to drink—coffee or a cold drink of some kind.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you each for your contributions this morning.

I’d like to ask each of you this question. In light of your testimony, in light of what you have heard your other colleagues discuss this morning, is it each of your opinion that the policy of containment is now exhausted and we now must face the reality that it does not work?

Some of the testimony that was given this morning by each of you, some more direct than others, regarding, if I understood this—in your case, in particular, Dr. Hamza—that any further inspection regime would essentially be meaningless and useless—so if that, in fact, is where you are, and I don’t know where the other two are exactly, then containment doesn’t work, inspections are useless, and we are just continuing to march around the bush here. So, therefore, we must face the reality of what we are dealing with, if this is the case, and move to another policy. Then if that is the case, what is that policy? Do we have no other option than the military option?

Ambassador Butler.

Ambassador BUTLER. I’m not prepared to say that containment has failed outright. I think, Senator Hagel, one has to ask, where would we be had we not behaved as we have in the last decade or had UNSCOM not existed? Saddam Hussein would now be armed to the teeth with all three forms of weapons of mass destruction. It would be an awesome situation.

I think the same logic is true for containment. Had we been less determined to contain him and his efforts in various ways, we would face an appalling situation. I think your question, though, by stating it as an absolute, “Has containment failed,” does highlight the fact that to rely solely on containment is actually folly.

So I would argue that what we need is a combination of continuing behaviors by us and others that serve to contain this outlaw regime. I’ve emphasized legality several times. We’re essentially dealing with an outlaw regime here. And those behaviors have to do with trade in strategic goods, for example, other sources of comfort to the man and his weapons aspirations.
Now, in addition to those measures of containment, we need very specific things directed at the specifics that Iraq and Saddam presents to us, and that is that it has been in the form of inspections. The regime of inspections was unique in history. We've never seen such a thing before.

Why was that done? Because he's unique. This is something—this is a point that I would like to particularly put to this committee. This man is different. If you look around the world—and I was deeply impressed by the approach that Professor Cordesman, yet again, took this morning. I think it was hardheaded and right. He's worked all his life in nonproliferation.

If you look around the world of 180 countries, you see 160 who basically behave properly, and there's about 20 who don't. Three of them, extra-systemic to the nonproliferation treaty, have nuclear weapons—India, Pakistan, and Israel. That's not good. But in numerical terms, the world in that sense is basically, for 40-odd years, the period since the Second World War, has behaved more or less well. When you get down into analyzing those who haven't, one sticks out beyond and above all others, and it's Saddam Hussein and what he has done to his country and to those around him.

Now, that means, in my view, we need to continue fundamental elements of containment. Should we—this is your question, I think—should we rely on it as the answer? No, because, in and of itself, it doesn't work. Do we discard it altogether? No. We need some elements of containment. But we also need a specific solution to the specific problems posed by this particular—and I suggest unique—outlaw.

Now, maybe resumed inspections would never be successful, as Dr. Hamza has said. I don't think we'll actually get to there, because, as I've already said, I suspect the Iraqis might even let them begin. But then if that is the case, we have to consider something else, and that's what I think these hearings are about. What is that other thing to deal with this unique problem? I don't yet know the answer.

Senator Biden has started a process with Senator Lugar of finding that answer, and I just think we've got to press on and find it.

Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I beg the indulgence of the committee to ask the other two witnesses for a short answer to the question?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Senator Hagel. Thank you very much.

Dr. Hamza.

Dr. Hamza. I agree with Ambassador Butler. Containment did keep Iraq from accelerating its production, limited what is available to it, destroyed most of its weapon repository. But in the end, it's not the answer for the simple reason Iraq restructured its science and technology base around the containment policy, so it created a new international network for purchasing, redistributed its scientists and engineers so that they will not be very visible to air strikes and to possible inspectors if they go in. So, in the end, Iraq is working to defeat containment. And, in the end, it will achieve its purpose.
So containment did delay—yes, I agree with the Ambassador—considerably Iraq’s—Iraq would have been now in possession of nuclear weapons without containment and a much larger stockpile of chemical and possibly much more biological weapons. But in the end, we need something else with containment. My suggestion, as I stated earlier, is that regime change as the stated U.S. policy would be the correct way to deal with this problem.

Senator Hagel. Thank you. Professor Cordesman.

Professor Cordesman. I would have to agree largely with the previous witnesses. I think we should remember, however, what containment means. It isn’t just sitting there. Are we really aggressively going to try to stop arms transfers? In which case I have heard no one in this country point out the fact that Syria’s become a serious conduit.

What happens if we detect proliferation? Remember that we could go to war tomorrow if we had a U.S. or British aircraft shot down, and have to repeat another Desert Fox. Are we really willing to go to war immediately if there’s a violation on missile testing, if we detect a biological facility, if we have the confidence? Containment is not pacifism. It is not simply reliance on arms control. But to say containment is exhausted, you can only say that when you are really ready, Senator, to do something else. That means we need a critical minimum of allies and bases, a national commitment to using decisive force, and a willingness to win the peace as well as the war.

And, I think that until nation-building becomes a bipartisan term and one where there is a serious commitment to what could be years of peacekeeping, economic help, and help in building a democracy, we aren’t ready to say containment is exhausted.

Senator Hagel. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

I would like to congratulate the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding these timely hearings on Iraq. I agree with my colleagues that we need a national dialogue on what steps we should take to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Americans need to be informed about the complexities and consequences of our policies in Iraq.

I look forward to listening to and learning from the distinguished witnesses before us today about the nature and urgency of the threat we face from Iraq, including their evaluations of what the best policy options may be for meeting this threat; the prospects for a democratic transition after Saddam Hussein; and what the implications of our policies in Iraq may be for the stability of the Middle East and our security interests there.

Much of the debate by those advocating regime change through military means have so far focused on the easy questions. Is Saddam Hussein a ruthless tyrant who brutally oppresses his own people, and who possesses weapons of mass destruction that have the potential to threaten us, his neighbors and our allies, including and especially Israel? Yes. Do most Iraqis yearn for democratic change in Iraq? Yes, they do. Can Saddam be rehabilitated? No, he cannot.

In my opinion, complicated and relevant questions remain to be answered before making a case for war, and here is where these hearings will play an important role. What is the nature, and urgency, of the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States and Iraq’s neighbors? What do we know about Iraq’s programs of weapons of mass destruction? There have been no weapons inspectors in Iraq since December 1998. Is Iraq involved in terrorist planning and activities against the United States and U.S. allies in the Middle East and elsewhere?
What can we expect after Saddam Hussein in Iraq? What do we know about the capabilities of the opposition to Saddam inside Iraq? While we support a unified and democratic opposition to Saddam Hussein, the arbiters of power in a post-Saddam Iraq will likely be those who reside inside, not outside, the country. And these individuals and groups we do not know. Who are they? And where are they? These are the Iraqis we need to understand, engage, and eventually do business with.

What will be the future of Iraqi Kurdistan in a post-Saddam Iraq?

How do we accomplish regime change in Iraq given the complexities and challenges of the current regional environment? The deep Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues; our relations with Syria are proper though strained; we have no relationship with Iran; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan have warned us about dangerous unintended consequences if we take unilateral military action against Iraq; and Afghanistan remains a piece of very difficult unfinished business, an unpredictable but critical investment for the United States and our allies.

I can think of no historical case where the United States succeeded in an enterprise of such gravity and complexity as regime change in Iraq without the support of a regional and international coalition. We have a lot of work to do on the diplomatic track. Not just for military operations against Iraq, should that day come, but for the day after, when the interests and intrigues of outside powers could undermine the fragility of an Iraqi government in transition, whoever governs in Iraq after Saddam Hussein.

An American military operation in Iraq could require a commitment in Iraq that could last for years and extend well beyond the day of Saddam’s departure. The American people need to understand the political, economic, and military magnitude and risks that would be inevitable if we invaded Iraq.

There was no such national dialogue or undertaking before we went into Vietnam. There were many very smart, well intentioned professionals, intellectuals, and strategists who assured us of a U.S. victory in Vietnam at an acceptable cost. Well, eleven years, 58,000 dead, and the most humiliating defeat in our nation’s history later we abandoned South Vietnam to the Communists.

Let me conclude by saying that I support regime change and a democratic transition in Iraq. That’s easy. The Iraqi people have suffered too long, and our security and interests will never be assured with Saddam Hussein in power. The tough questions are when, how, with whom, and at what cost. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses over the next two days on these critical questions.

The CHAIRMAN. We’re going to come back. One of the things I’m sure we’re going to be asking you about is the extent that Saddam Hussein is the unique element in this picture. What is Iraq without Saddam Hussein? How dangerous is it, even if he dropped dead tomorrow, how would that—all by itself, nothing else, just Saddam Hussein—how would that alter the situation, if at all?

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. I thank our witnesses for your indulgence. Of all days to have four votes back to back, it was today. I apologize for that.

Let me now yield to Senator Feingold. I think he’s next in line.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for holding these hearings. And I want to offer my gratitude to all the witnesses and particularly this panel. We had a long time voting there, but I can tell you, a lot of people commented on how excellent this panel has already been. So I appreciate what you’ve done.

In April, I chaired the related hearing of the Constitution Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, and much of that earlier hearing focused in detailed legal terms on the authority of the President to launch a military operation against Iraq. And after listening to many constitutional experts, I certainly concluded that the Constitution requires the President to seek additional authorization from Congress before he can embark on a major new military undertaking in Iraq.
Today, these hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee begin the important work of considering the complicated policy issues that are at stake, gathering information, and coming to some informed conclusions about what we will and will not authorize with regard to U.S. intervention in Iraq.

I want the committee to know a number of my constituents have contacted me prior to today’s hearing, and they have delivered one very clear message. They want to be certain that this committee carefully considers a range of views and informed perspectives on Iraq, and they want to be certain that we do not accept as fact any one set of subjective assumptions about Iraq. They are right to insist on a sober and honest effort. And given how much of the rhetoric surrounding U.S. policy toward Iraq in recent months has suggested that American families should be prepared to send their sons and daughter to war, we do owe the American people nothing less than a thorough examination of the situation before us and a careful consideration of our policy options. And I again thank the Chair for the role these hearings will play in that process.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I want to start by thanking Senator Biden for holding these important hearings. They come at an important time in our struggle to respond to worldwide terrorist threats, and they offer a critically important opportunity for the Congress to begin to gather information and come to some informed conclusions about what we will and will not authorize with regard to U.S. intervention in Iraq.

I also want to offer my gratitude to all of the witnesses who will help us think through the difficult issues and options that confront us today. A number of my constituents have contacted me prior to today’s hearing, and they have delivered one very clear message: they want to be certain that this committee carefully considers a range of views and informed perspectives on Iraq, and they want to be certain that we do not accept as fact any one set of subjective assumptions about Iraq. They are right to insist on a sober and honest effort. Given that much of the rhetoric surrounding U.S. policy toward Iraq in recent months has suggested that American families should be prepared to send their sons and daughters to war, we owe the American people nothing less than a thorough examination of the situation before us.

As we begin these hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, I would note that I chaired a related hearing in April of the Constitution Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee. Much of that earlier hearing focused, in detailed legal terms, on the authority of the President to launch a military operation against Iraq. The Judiciary Committee hearings in April followed an important precedent that was first established in January 1991, as the former President Bush was threatening to launch a similar military operation against Iraq, again without seeking congressional authorization. At that time, Senator Biden chaired a hearing before the Judiciary Committee in which prominent scholars questioned the authority of the President to authorize the use of force in Iraq without congressional approval. Based in part on the 1991 Judiciary hearings, former President Bush ultimately sought and received congressional authorization for operation Desert Storm. That was an important victory for the Constitution and for our constitutional structure.

It was based on that 1991 precedent, then, that I organized a similar hearing on war powers and the case of Iraq in the Judiciary Committee in April. At that hearing, after listening to many constitutional experts, I concluded that the Constitution requires the President to seek additional authorization before he can embark on a major new military undertaking in Iraq. I also concluded that this may well be one of our last opportunities to preserve the constitutionally mandated role of Congress in making decisions about war and peace.

The April hearing focused on important constitutional questions. These two additional days of hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee will provide us with an equally important opportunity to consider the complicated policy issues that are at stake in any decision on Iraq. Through these hearings, it will be important to assess the level of the threat that exists, along with the relative costs and dangers
that would be posed by a massive assault on Iraq. We must give careful attention
to the risks to American soldiers, and to our relations with some of our strongest
allies in our current anti-terror campaign.

Regardless of which policy path we choose, our goal is presumably to make Amer-
ica more secure in the long-term. That means that it will be crucially important to
think through the aftermath of any proposed military strike. That means thinking
about whether or not there will be a context of order in which controls can be im-
posed and maintained on weapons of mass destruction and the means to fashion
them, and that means thinking about the conditions and the will of the long-suf-
fering Iraqi people. We have to be honest with ourselves and with the American peo-
ple—these are big issues, and addressing them may require very serious commit-
ments.

I don’t think we need access to classified information to begin today to weigh the
risks and opportunities that confront us. But I also look forward, in both secure and
open settings, to hearing the administration make its case for a given policy re-
sponse. Certainly the perspective of the Administration is one that we must hear
before coming to any ultimate conclusions. Today, however, I think we have an op-
portunity to explore the general nature of the threats, dangers and policy options
that exist. As a starting point, these considerations are crucial.

Following these hearings, and subsequent consultations with the Administration,
Congress may ultimately conclude that America’s interests require a direct military
response to threats emanating from Iraq. If we do come to that grave conclusion,
I would urge my colleagues to honor the Constitution by providing congressional ap-
proval for military action. And I would counsel the President that by following in
his father’s footsteps and seeking congressional authorization, the President would
ensure that any military response against Iraq would be taken from a constitu-
tionally unified, and inherently stronger, position.

I look forward to these initial discussions.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask all of you this. All of us here
would agree that the President has the constitutional authority to
launch a preemptive strike in self defense in advance of an immi-
nent attack by Iraq on the United States. And this is especially
true in the face of an imminent attack on the United States with
a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon, but the key here is to as-
sess the level of the threat and the imminence of the attack.

The War Powers Resolution creates a high threshold for unilat-
eral Presidential action, action which must be authorized in any
event within 60 days of any preemptive strike. So I would like to
ask you, do any of you believe that we have already reached that
level of threat, that we now face an imminent attack on the United
States? Mr. Butler.

Ambassador BUTLER. An imminent attack upon the United
States by Iraq? And you’re talking about 60-day notice. Look, Sen-
ator, my simple answer is no, we do not.

Senator FEINGOLD. Doctor.

Dr. HAMZA. Surely what we are talking about here really is a
preemptive strike for a possible future danger which is much larger
than what we have right now. And it would be much costlier in the
future, or not? Yes. If we do it much later, it will be a much costlier
strike than what we do now.

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand that, but you don’t believe there
is an imminent threat of an attack on the United States.

Dr. HAMZA. What I believe is it is much easier now at much less
cost and less danger to the United States to do it right than to do
it after the window closes.

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s not the question I’m asking, but I ap-
preciate the comment.

Professor Cordesman.
Professor Cordesman. Senator, I do not believe, in any classic sense, it is imminent, but I have to issue a very strong caution. I don't think you will ever get that kind of warning. As we learned at the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon, the idea that you have enough warning to tell you an attack is imminent on the United States or our allies, particularly from a man like this when he has biological weapons or nuclear weapons, this is not the world we are going to live in. And I have to say that if that is the interpretation of the War Powers Act, it is so fundamentally obsolete that it has become irrelevant to asymmetric warfare.

Senator Feingold. It is simply a threshold question. I think we need to determine—to figure out what procedure we should follow in terms of dealing with this issue.

Ambassador Butler. Thank you. Could I just say I agree with what my two colleagues have said? Dr. Hamza, of course, answered a different question. But I want to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to make this point. This was a very specific question from Senator Feingold. I gave the only answer I could give. I also agree, in particular, with Professor Cordesman that that is not to say that we don't face a danger.

I want to say this. I've searched my mind thoroughly about my Iraq experience and the inner meaning of what the last 10 years have been since the end of the gulf war until now. And I'll put this to you, Mr. Chairman, and to your colleagues. If there is an inner meaning to what we now face it is this. And it's one of life's great principles, I submit. That is that if you defer, put off to another day, the solution to a serious problem, it will only be harder and costlier in the end.

Senator Feingold. I think there's a lot of force to all those comments, and I don't necessarily disagree with them. What I'm trying to do here is determine the basic assumptions that we can share with our colleagues and the American people. What is the threat? And I think the first thing to ask is, is there an imminent threat to the United States being attacked directly? The answer is no, but that doesn't necessarily lead to any other conclusion about whether it's advisable to move forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Nelson. Give me your opinion. What would be the possibility of an uprising from within if we were to have some kind of external attack with some internal clandestine operations? Is Saddam Hussein's control on the leadership of that country so tight that it's very difficult to have that uprising from within?

Dr. Hamza. Is that to me?

Senator Nelson. To all of you, please. Doctor, go ahead.

Dr. Hamza. I believe the experience of an attack from outside that caused an uprising was there in the gulf war, and it gave us an example of what could happen. I believe the circumstances are even better right now for an uprising than was the gulf war. I mean, we had sanctions then of less than a year. And we had a
very strong uprising that took off Saddam government in more than two-thirds of the country. What we have now is a country that’s under sanctions for 11 years and under Saddam oppression for all this period. The Iraqis are, by now, giving up hope of any possible change unless they get rid of that man. And so I believe if there is a serious U.S. intent to remove him, and there is an attack, the Iraqis will join the U.S. forces, like what happened in Afghanistan. And there will be an uprising, and there will be a great support for any invasion from inside Iraq.

Professor Cordesman. If I may, Senator, I would be very cautious, because one thing is what kind of uprising and for what? I don’t believe you’re going to see the Kurds rush out to take adventures and risks at this point in time, and that has been fairly clear from a great deal of discussion. There are problems, certainly, for the Shi’ites. They have many reasons to rise up, but if they rise up in the south, they also are now dealing with a much better-structured security force.

Saddam has adapted, as well. And I am struck by the fact that while there are many different opposition capabilities, to the extent I’ve seen any really organized efforts, they have come from SAIRI. Yet, they have had more and more operational problems. I’ve seen fewer and fewer indications that claims of operations actually have reality.

And if this uprising happens in the south and we have not the strength to get rid of the regime in Baghdad and its core, then we may see again that we expose people, frankly, to becoming martyrs or victims.

At best, you’re not going to see a united Iraq. But, if we don’t have the proper military strength, you might well see something happen that could be just as bad as what happened in 1991.

Senator Nelson. I want to come back to a followup, but I would like to get Mr. Butler’s opinion, as well.

Ambassador Butler. Senator, just very quickly, I think the Iraqi are a thoroughly decent people. I think they have been the first victims, the most evident victims of a brutal homicidal dictatorship, and I think if they saw the possibility that that would be taken away, they would welcome it.

How that would occur, a spontaneous democratic uprising, is something that—I agree with Professor Cordesman—you would have to be very careful about. Whether instead the coming demise of Saddam would be seen by various factions in the country as providing them with an opportunity to take power for their own ends is something that could be a source of difficulty.

The question really is about who would replace him, and I think that is a very important question. But as far as the Iraqi people are concerned, yes, they know what they’ve suffered under for a very long time. And in that elemental sense, I believe, in the end, they would feel good about being relieved of the burden of Saddam Hussein.

Senator Nelson. May I followup?

The Chairman. Please.

Senator Nelson. To the professor, the fact that we have, basically, air cover over two-thirds of the country in the north and the south, how do you utilize that to your advantage to provoke the
uprisings even before you go into the center core one-third that we
don't have the air cover on right now? And can you utilize that in
a way to stir the rebellion before you have to move in on Baghdad?

Professor Cordesman. Senator, I have to say there are no conceivable conditions under which I would do that. To try to minimize our casualties and the level of force we use by risking the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians is simply not, to me, an option. And that would be the effective result.

Now, can we use air power to isolate areas in Iraq where we have reasonable intelligence that there would be strong support for our operations? Yes, if we can absolutely guarantee that we can secure them, and if, in an emergency, we can concentrate sufficient force, which might take things like Rangers or U.S. ground troops, to protect the people. I do think we have to certainly make every effort to use the Iraqi opposition. We have to make every use that we can of isolating troops, perhaps getting them to defect. But the scenario that you suggested bothers me deeply, because it doesn't imply that we can guarantee the protection of the people involved, that we will have sufficient force.

And I have been here before. I was stationed in Iran in the early 1970s. I visited the Kurds in Iraq then, and I watched them abandoned after 1975. And I think you might find that the Kurds would feel they've been abandoned since. Once is enough.

Senator Nelson. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. And I'm going to ask a couple of questions, and then I'll yield to my colleague, and I'll try to do this quickly.

Mr. Ambassador, I share your view that Saddam, at all costs, will agree to no inspection that may cost him his weapons of mass destruction. But I have a different question. Is it possible to construct an inspection regime that—if it were agreed; we both agree it's not likely to be, but if it were, that it would efficacious, that you would have some—how intrusive would it have to be in order to have some significant expectation that you would be able to root out the bulk of his biological, chemical, and/or potential nuclear capacity?

Ambassador Butler. Mr. Chairman, the conduct of inspections is entirely within our technical and intellectual capability. If we were allowed to go anywhere anytime, we can do the job. We can do it well and competently and completely. What it relies on is the willingness of Iraq to allow us to go anywhere anytime. Absent that, it will never—

The Chairman. Well, some in our Defense Department make the argument that, notwithstanding the fact you theoretically could be allowed to go anywhere anytime, that over the last 4 years, the regime has been able to, through mobilizing, if you will—making mobile their biological-weapons laboratories and digging deep into the ground in places where we don't know—even if we were free to roam, we would still not be able to do the job.

Ambassador Butler. Yes, I've read and heard, with great interest, of course, the mobilizing and burial arguments, as recently as in the last 24 hours by a very distinguished member of the administration. I think they can be overstated, quite frankly, and I'm a bit concerned about the stridency with which some of those things are said, almost as if to justify a coming invasion.
I repeat, it can be done. No arms-control inspection or verification is perfect. Anyone who's been in that business will tell you that. I've been in it for a quarter of a century, and I'll tell you straight up, there can be errors and mistakes. But, Senator, there is an enormous gap between an inspection regime that is given full access, and one that is cheated upon.

Now, given full access, our technologies and intelligence are such that we can do a very, very good job. I don't think it serves our purpose well—that is, the purpose of getting to the clear truth of things—to say this work is inherently flawed. It isn't. What is its big problem is refusal to allow it to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that's why I asked the question.

Ambassador BUTLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to get—yes, Professor.

Professor CORDESMAN. Senator, I agree, in broad terms, with what Ambassador Butler has said. But going anywhere at any time means having all the manpower, the mobility, the resources, the monitoring you need. The more you have to do, the more of these resources you need. And, you have to have a base point to begin with, which means at some point you would have to survey and inspect Iraq again, knowing that you will no longer have audit trails to the time of the gulf war.

But beyond that, I don't know of anyone at CDC and USAMERID—and I would suggest you ask them—who believe that if a country is willing to use infectious agents or genetic engineering you can be certain they will be found through inspection. The facilities involved are so small, so easy to scatter, the amount of agent that is needed is so limited, ways you can deliver them can be covert or use human agents. So, you may end up, if you try to inspect without putting the resources in, by pushing people into biological options and into the worst-possible attack scenarios. That risk should be kept firmly in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. I acknowledge that, understand that. That is able to be done by Iraq, even if Saddam is gone.

Professor CORDESMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And so I think we should be looking for here—at least I'm looking for the broadest, most rational understanding of what our options are and what we can and cannot be certain of. And the truth is there's a lot of things we can't be certain of, but everything is probabilities as we move down this road.

I realize my time is up. I'm going to followup, though, with the permission of my colleagues, on one question, and that relates to nuclear capability able to be married to a missile, a medium-range or longer-range missile. Both of you who have been involved in the inspection side of this in the past, and you, doctor, who were involved in the production side, if you will, to use the phrase loosely, would be as qualified as any witnesses we're going to have to answer the following question, and that is that if Saddam were successful in building an intermediate-range missile or a missile that is—much further than 160 kilometers, and if he were able to provide a nuclear warhead on that missile—as we all know, it's a heck of a lot easier to put a chemical or biological warhead, for no other reason, for the layman out there, other than the pure weight of the object—would we be able to have enough notice of that, not in
terms of whether they developed the capacity on the nuclear side, but on this missile side, and would we be able to preemptively move against that system, that nuclear delivery system, as others have on other occasions? Do you understand my question?

Doctor Hamza.

Dr. Hamza. There are two stages, Senator, for the delivery system to be successful. One is that the nuclear weapon itself has to be hardened to withstand the missile trip itself, which can—

The Chairman. What you mean by that, it has to be hardened enough so the vibration and the thrust and the force and the warhead can sustain that and stay intact, correct?

Dr. Hamza. Exactly.

The Chairman. OK.

Dr. Hamza. Iraq has not done that, until I left. Now I'm talking about 8 years ago since I left. We had no, as I said, high-level defector to tell us what is going on down there in any case. I expect that's a defined project and this work must be done. So Iraq needed to do that at the time. I don't know if it has been done. I don't think the inspectors found anything in that direction up to 1998. They are in a better position to answer that. My impression, they did not find any trace of serious Iraqi work in that direction. Whether it happened since 1998 until now, my guess it would.

The second stage is mating that to a missile. The Iraqi missile has a problem, that's the payload gets much smaller with the increased range, because what they are doing is not—

The Chairman. By “payload,” you mean—

Dr. Hamza. Yes.

The Chairman. It's important, I think, if this is being listened to by the American people. The payload means the actual weapon that sits on top of that missile—

Dr. Hamza. Exactly.

The Chairman [continuing]. And the heavier that payload the less distance that same missile could travel.

Dr. Hamza. Exactly.

The Chairman. If you had a light payload, it can travel further. If a heavier payload, it travels less far. Correct?

Dr. Hamza. Exactly correct.

The Chairman. All right.

Dr. Hamza. And the problem with the Iraq missile system is that Iraq did not develop a medium-range missile. It took short-range missiles and extended the range, and that meant the payload will be smaller eventually. So we had that problem. We faced it when I was there. And that was one of the things that was under consideration. I don't know if Iraq resolved that either.

So the problem of delivery of a nuclear warhead by a missile remains to be questionable by Iraq, so one has to look at other options that Iraq could use to deliver its nuclear weapons. But my belief right now, Iraq does not have this capability yet.

The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Butler. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I'll try and keep this short because of the time factor. What Iraq was doing in my time there was trying to increase—

The Chairman. For the record, your time ended when?
Ambassador Butler. The last time I was in the country was 1998. My job ended in 1999.

They were attempting to increase the fuel loading on a given missile to make it go longer. That is, another way to make a missile fly longer is to increase the amount of fuel. But if you do that, you reduce the amount of space left for the size of the warhead.

In our experience then, Iraq had loaded chemical and biological agent into warheads, and it seemed to be more interested in that. I think the ultimate goal of Saddam is to have a nuclear weapon deliverable by missile. That's a very effective way to deliver a nuclear warhead. It's by long distance. You're well away from where the explosion will take place. And it's very dangerous, very effective. But that requires a certain kind of missile, one that will fly a good distance, carry a nuclear weight at the top, and have a good guidance system. I don't believe that Iraq is near that yet. Does he want it? Yes.

The Chairman. Well, my question is where do you think they are?

Ambassador Butler. I think what they were contemplating what they were contemplating was delivery of a nuclear weapon by other means.

The Chairman. In the past, and, Professor, I'd like you to respond, as well. In the past—I've been doing this strategic doctrine issue for 30 years—when we were talking about Russia, we used to always say Russia would never deploy what they haven't flight tested. Russian would never rest—no nation would rest its security based upon a missile—or a system that hadn't been tested.

I assume we're operating on a different premise relative to this fellow, but would there not—add to your answer, if you would, whether or not there would be a requirement for some, or is there a requirement for any flight testing in any way for this guy to engage in the contemplated use of that combination of a missile and a warhead that's nuclear?

Professor Cordesman. Senator, all I can do is give you another worst-case scenario, because I think Dr. Hamza and Ambassador Butler are completely correct. If you could obtain small Russian nuclear weapons, if you could get these in ways which allowed you to bypass the Russian security systems on the weapons—and it is a matter of public record that some of these systems are relatively primitive and non-destructive—

The Chairman. Again, for our listeners, we're talking about a whole system. We're talking about an intermediate or a short-range nuclear missile. We're not talking—

Professor Cordesman. No, I'm talking only about something like a nuclear device, whether it is a small tactical nuclear weapon or the kind of thing that might be used in a MIRVed missile. It would be a nuclear device, however, that had sufficiently low weight so it could still meet the very real constraints that Dr. Hamza raised, and some of these Russian weapons were not designed to be protected against intrusive arming.

Now, if you used a similar payload, got the weight and size exactly right, and then you started firing what they can logically fire, which are missiles with the range of 150 kilometers or less, you might be able to conduct the test of such a warhead without it
being detected. And, if you then put that warhead on a longer-range missile, and were willing to strike at a city-sized target, it is just possible that you might be able to create a missile launch capability without extensive testing or with that kind of testing although that would be at the absolute margin of risk.

However, Saddam did use chemical weapons that were manufactured in laboratories early in the Iran-Iraq war with no prior testing whatsoever. He went directly from the lab to the battlefield.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn’t that a difference, though, between testing a chemical agent and relying upon testing—I mean, using, without having tested at all, a nuclear warhead on a missile?

Professor CORDESMAN. As Ambassador Butler pointed out, what makes this man different from all other proliferators is his proven history of risk-taking. And the fact that the nuclear weapon might never get near its intended target——

The CHAIRMAN. Would be irrelevant to him?

Professor CORDESMAN [continuing]. Would not always be reassuring.

Let me just add one other point about biological and chemical weapons. It is extremely difficult to put useful biological and chemical weapons on a missile warhead. It requires exact fusing and a nondestructive mechanism to spread the agent. Nothing Iraq had—and I will defer to Ambassador Butler and Dr. Hamza—in 1998 that was discovered by UNSCOM came close to that. They were crude unitary warheads with contact fuses.

One caution. A lot of the necessary fusing is becoming commercially available, and the best nonexplosive dissemination device, unfortunately, is the air bag used in cars, so you can’t rule that possibility out.

The CHAIRMAN. If I can translate what you just said, it’s difficult, and it’s important.

I have one concluding question, and I’ll yield a longer round to each of my colleagues, as I have had.

If we operate on the premise—and I have been corralling men and women like you for the past year, who are experts in your field, and boring them to death with questions for hours on end in my office trying to gain as much knowledge and background as I can. And one of the things, whether people are, quote, “for moving or not moving,” one consensus I seem to get from whomever I speak with wherever they are in the equation of moving sooner than later or not moving at all or containing or whatever is that this is a different-breed-of-cat, this fellow, and that if, in fact, he is cornered, if, in fact, his regime is about to come to an end, that’s the place at which he is the most dangerous, that’s the place he’s most likely to use whatever it is that he has that can be the most destructive. And the thing that I hear most often stated is that the issue is whether or not he will preemptively use any weapon of mass destruction, whether he will use it only in response to an invasion, or whether he will use it as a last-ditch effort to save himself by either broadening this to a regional war or whatever.

What evidence do we have that contained and beyond we’ve provoked so far, unprovoked beyond this point, is that he would offensively, without further provocation, use a weapon of mass destruction, when, in fact, the rationale offered by all of you is that this
is a guy whose first and foremost desire is to stay in power? Explain that—what seems to me to be a bit of a conundrum here.

Why would he offensively—for example, the discussion now is we'd better move now, not because he'll have weapons to blackmail us as they get more sophisticated, but that he may very well deliver these weapons into the hands of terrorists to go do his dirty work, or he would preemptively strike Israel, strike American forces in the region, strike neighbors, et cetera. Why would he do that? What in his past would indicate he would do that knowing that, as one of you said, he would invite an incredible response? That seems certain to me he would invite an overwhelming response. A lot of innocent people would die in the interim, but—any comment on that? And then I'll yield.

Professor Cordesman. Let me, if I may, Senator—I felt exactly the same way after the Iran-Iraq war, which was the first time he showed he was willing to take incredible risks. But, he did invade Kuwait. He used chemical weapons against his own Kurds, admittedly not in the face of the absolute guarantee of retaliation or the risk of it that he would face in attacking us. But, the problem we all have is we're trying to read the mind of one person or those of a very narrow group of Iraqis and figure out how they might behave under stress or over time.

I would add that wars of intimidation in the gulf can be very, very important if he can use such intimidation to really lever the behavior of Saudi Arabia and other countries. We do have to remember that 60 percent of the world's oil reserves here and our own forecasts are that the world's economy will be dependent on the gulf for twice as many oil exports by 2020 as it is now.

Dr. Hamza. The whole idea that Saddam will use a nuclear weapon and just attack I don't think comes into play here. What happens here is that nuclear weapons at least will be the deterrence he needs to have a free hand in the region. That's the fear, not the fear that he will put nuclear weapons on a missile and shoot it at Israel or the United States. We know what kind of response he will get, and he knows it as well.

What will happen next is that if he gets the deterrence he needs to have a free hand in the region, what shape of action do we need to take against him, and what kind of situation would we be in in the future? That's the danger.

The Chairman. I appreciate the answer, because—I am not trying to make a case. I'm trying to understand a point, because my instinct, talking to so many people, is that the real concern is being able to leverage that capability, as opposed to him preemptively waking up one morning saying, "You know, I'm going to take out Riyadh," or "I'm going to take out Tel Aviv," or "I'm going to take out Ankara," assuming he had the range to do that, which he doesn't, not at this point. But, at any rate, do you want to conclude? I've really gone beyond my time.

Ambassador Butler. Just very quickly, Senator. I think one must acknowledge that it's extremely uncomfortable for us to know that he's there with these weapons. But one has to draw a distinction, I think, between that discomfort and a rational calculation of what he might do. And if you accept that one of his fundamental imperatives is to stay in power, then it's hard to think that he
would wake up one morning and decide this is the day that I'm going to go and attack the United States, because he knows that that would be suicide. So I think that's a very important distinction to draw. No one is comfortable with his weapons status. And why should we be? But one has to keep clear eyes about what he might calculate to serve his interest.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you.
And I thank Senator Chafee for his indulgence. Fire away, Senator.

Senator CHAFFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This panel is, the topic is “The Threat,” and I guess that’s probably the most important place to start, is the threat, and then in subsequent panels, we’ll talk about possible responses, regional considerations, the day after, and national security perspectives. But, of course, I do think the threat is the most important one, of course.

And there was a recent story in the Washington Post, a Sunday story, in which it says that, “Many senior U.S. military officers contend that Saddam Hussein poses no immediate threat, and that the United States should continue its policy of containment.” I know Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel have talked about containment. But some of the other quotes from the article are that, “This approach is held by some top generals and admirals in the military establishment, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” And some of the quotes are, “In my assessment, the whole containment and sanctions policy has worked better than it’s given credit for.”

And another quote is, “We’ve bottled them up for 11 years, so we’re doing OK.”

I do think that it would have been good to have that perspective on this panel, for better balance. I think we’ve got, from this panel, a perspective that the threat is very real, very immediate. And I maybe would ask you to comment on some of these senior military officials, including, according to the article, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their——

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will yield just for a moment. I apologize, but——

Senator CHAFFEE. Excuse me.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). The Senator from Florida is going to chair the hearing. I have to leave for a few minutes. And after this panel is over, we’ll recess for 45 minutes for lunch. I’m not suggesting you finish now. When the panel is finished, we’ll recess for 45 minutes.

I assure you, Senator, there are other witnesses coming along who think the policy containment is just fine. So I hope you’ll find this is extremely balanced when we finish the whole 2 days of hearings.

But I thank you for your letting me interrupt, and I turn the gavel over to the Senator from Florida.

Senator CHAFFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess I’ll put my question specifically to Ambassador Butler, because one of the quotes from this article was that senior officers believe the policy has been more effective than is generally recognized. And as evidence, the top brass said the approach has deterred Hussein from threatening his neighbors and from backing terrorist organizations.
And in your testimony, you said the opposite. You said, “We do know that Iraq has trained terrorists from around the region and has mounted terrorist actions of its own as far afield as Southeast Asia.” And I think you mentioned that you had some personal experience in that. So I’d maybe ask you to expound on that experience you have with Hussein training terrorists.

Ambassador Butler. Dr. Hamza gave more detail of that, and there was no prior consultation between him and me before we started work today. He referred to the terrorist training center at a place called Salman Park, outside Baghdad. There are detailed accounts available now of the throughput through that center of a variety of nationalities, most of them from countries in the Middle East. But the point is not just Iraqis, but a multiplicity of nationals have been that school trained by Iraq in techniques of terrorism.

The incident that I referred to in Southeast Asia, when I said I had one personal experience of the reach of Saddam, was that during the Gulf War, Saddam sent a terrorist hit group to Bangkok, Thailand, when, at that time, I happened to be an Australian Ambassador to Thailand. The existence of that group was identified by intelligence authorities, and their plan was to make an attack upon the embassies of the United States, Australia, and Israel in Bangkok. Australia got this happy mention because we were a participant on the coalition of 29 countries that then sought to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

There was a bit of a crisis in Bangkok. I had to ask assistance of the Thai Army. They lived in our embassy compound for a month, some several hundred soldiers and so on, until the threat abated. The end of the story is that the cell involved was found, it was heavily armed, and did, indeed, have detailed plans for a military attack upon those three embassies. Dr. Hamza referred to other instances where Iraq has conducted assassinations and so on well away from Iraq. Those were the sorts of activities to which I was referring.

Is there another part of your question that I’ve left out?

Senator Chafee. No, that was it. Your testimony was about that experience in Southeast Asia and——

Ambassador Butler. But I do, I just want to say I do——

Senator Chafee. It sounds like you’re taking great exception to the Washington Post article and some of the quotes in there.

Ambassador Butler. Sorry?

Senator Chafee. It sounds as though you’re taking exception to some of the quotes in that article that—the one I just read, “Senior officers believe the policy of containment has been effective—more effective than is generally recognized. And as evidence, the top brass said that the approach has deterred Hussein from threatening its neighbors and from backing terrorist organizations.”

Ambassador Butler. Yeah. No, I would like to address that. Saddam Hussein has backed terrorism in a general way. What we don’t know is the nature of his involvement, if any, in September 11. There is some circumstantial evidence that suggests there has been some involvement.

I don’t agree with what you’ve quoted. I think that—I already said this morning that a policy of containment was an essential weapon. It’s been well used. But by itself, it’s not enough. We had
other weapons, as well: arms control, inspections, and so on. And I think it’s not appropriate or complete to say that that will serve us well into the future. The continuing existence of Saddam Hussein with his weapons of mass destruction activities and his continually throwing petrol on the fire of political problems in the Middle East is something that I think is very dangerous in world politics, and that is not addressed simply by a policy of narrow containment of him.

Senator Chafee. Yes. I know my time is expired, but I want to say that I think that’s the key here, is the existence of the threat. And there’s some dispute. And yourself recognize, since we haven’t been able to inspect, we just don’t know. And I think that’s really the key. It would be great to hear from some of those officers or anybody else that has a different point of view on this what is the threat. I think the three of you have been very strong that the threat is immediate, and it’s real. I think, for the benefit of our study, it would have been good to hear an opposing point of view.

Senator Nelson [presiding]. Professor.

Professor Cordesman. I don’t believe you were here when the question was asked whether containment was exhausted, and I think the answer that both Ambassador Butler gave and I gave was no.

Now, I do have to say, Senator, that I get very disturbed when people quote the Joint Chiefs by anything other than name. And it is always easy to find somebody in the joint staff who will say virtually anything if you keep calling. So I do not deny that containment can go on. But, at least from my own view, one thing we have to understand is there will never be a point certain at which this risk reaches unacceptable levels, unless Saddam attacks or threatens somebody else very visibly.

The other thing to remember is what containment really means. It means a ruthless effort to stop arms imports, transfers of technology, the willingness to be in place and strike if he openly violates, in terms of weapons of mass destruction, as we have done in the past, and to go on with a low-level war with his air defenses. If that is sustaining containment, then we are doing a great deal. But there is not a neat dividing line between resting in place and throwing Saddam out of power.

Senator Chafee. Well, yes, I couldn’t agree more. And, in fact, you were the one that quoted Pliny and talked about body bags, and that’s why I think the key is the threat, and that’s what we’ve got to really get to the bottom of. And I believe I was here on the question about containment and that we haven’t exhausted it. But exactly what’s taking place in Iraq is, I guess, a mystery.

Senator Nelson. Senator Feingold.

Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As one of you referenced, on Monday Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that, “The Iraqis have a great deal of what they do deeply buried,” suggesting that air power alone might not be enough to destroy Iraq’s non-conventional weapons facilities. We hear a lot about these bunkers, and I want to just focus for a minute on the issue of the underground sites themselves.

Writing 4 years ago in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dr. Hamza suggested that the Iraqis, aware of the success of satellite
remote sensing in uncovering underground facilities, decided not to build underground facilities. Do we have reason to believe that the Iraqis altered their policy on this issue? And if so, why? And we'll start with you, doctor.

Dr. Hamza. Yes. Apparently, the nuclear facilities themselves are above ground mostly. But what happened is that now Iraq shifted—according to one civil engineer who defected recently, shifted into building smaller underground facilities. And to cover that, they understood the satellite angle quite well, that if you dig underground, this is a red flag and everybody will be watching. Every satellite passing by will be making tapes of what they are doing.

So what happened is they started doing that under existing bunkers and under bungalows, so they had a surface cover to do it, according to that engineer. And they do it also in duplicate, so that if one site is compromised, they can go back to the backup site.

So the policy has been changed, according to the defector, and this is very credible report he is giving us, and it's been verified here.

Senator Feingold. Either of you have a comment on that?

Professor Cordesman. I think, Senator one comment, first. I don't think the Secretary of Defense would say this carelessly, but it is a mixture of what you harden and how many things you harden, how many dispersed soft targets you have, how quickly you can move your assets when you feel you are about to be seriously under attack, and how well you can use decoys and deceive.

Now, we know the Iraqis use all four of those techniques. We know they have refined them steadily since the attack on Osirak. It is simply a reality that you are not going to be able to target a lot of their assets.

We flew, as I said earlier, some 2,400 sorties against Iraq's Scuds the last time. Suppressed them? Probably, at least in part. Killed any? No. The idea of having the perfect target mix to strike at just the right times seems to me to be simply impossible.

Senator Feingold. Thank you. Let me ask a different question. Some of the rhetoric about Iraq suggests that the primary concern is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the notion that the Government of Iraq is willing to provide such weapons or the means to make them either to the highest bidder or to groups that share some element of the Government of Iraq's world view. And, of course, the precise nature of the proliferation to a non-state actor scenario is not entirely clear. But if this is the case, then it seems to me that countering that threat means securing materials in widely dispersed sites, some of which we may know about, and some of which we may not. If an invasion were to begin, if the government were to be toppled, wouldn't there be some degree of chaos for some period of time, along with "use it or lose it" pressures? Can't we expect, perhaps, self-interested individuals to start selling off whatever they can to the highest bidder or taking materials of concern out of the country for purposes of such sales? In other words, isn't less control arguably even more dangerous than the current situation?
I’d also like you to address whether or not this scenario would argue against the so-called inside-out approach that was detailed in Monday’s New York Times?

Professor.

Professor CORDESMAN. I think you hit on a very real risk, just that striking some of these weapons might cause collateral damage. But several points to bear in mind: it’s going to get steadily worse, not better. And if it gets bad enough, then the ability to use these systems to intimidate or to be able to sort of sell or proliferate them, without credible retaliation, will grow with time, not again with any clear point at which this occurs.

My guess, and it’s only a guess, would be that this risk at this point in time is limited. Perhaps, in part, because those countries that wish to disseminate chemical and biological weapons, or wish to have them, are already doing pretty well on their own, and the incremental effect here might be limited.

But your last question, to me, is one of the most important. I think that you may be able to defeat the core of Saddam’s operation by focusing on the core of his power. But certainly you have to be ready simultaneously to go into other parts of the country and do what UNSCOM couldn’t finish. You can’t simply rely on the opposition to turn it over to you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Other responses, if I could, Mr. Chairman?

Senator NELSON. Yes. Ambassador.

Ambassador BUTLER. Yes, just very quickly, Senator, on your last question about things underground. When I heard the recent focus on that issue, I was utterly unsurprised, because our experience in UNSCOM was of, you know, elaborate use of underground facilities.

I just would add this additional concept, which is underground, but under buildings, because that prevents you from seeing the tunneling from the air if the tunneling is under buildings, including Presidential palaces. And that’s a concept that you will remember from a few years ago.

Now, I agree with what Professor Cordesman has said to you with respect to your last question. It is a very bad situation in Iraq. And were he to be removed, it’s possible, of course, that there could be a period of relative chaos or even a spot of anarchy and people getting stuff and selling it off and so on. It’s not necessarily a good situation. What that means is that we must know who would replace him, and hopefully a bunch of people who are free of the weapons of mass destruction mindset.

Before we stopped for the votes, the chairman put the question to us about the removal of Saddam, “Is it just about this person?” And remember, I’m one who argued that this country is unique in its present circumstances, and that uniqueness is indivisible from the fact that the President is Saddam Hussein. I think, in some measure, it is him. But it’s also a mindset, and we would need to be sure that the group that replaced him was not in possession of the same mindset.

Now, I would caution against the reasoning that says this is a very bad situation, and were we to try to deal with it, it’s going to create some bad circumstances, like hitting weapons which would then disperse them, chemical or biological, or a situation
where people are selling on the black market bad stuff that’s been made by Saddam and so on, and therefore we shouldn’t do it, because that just puts off the evil day.

I agree with Professor Cordesman. If we don’t find the solution to this soon, which ultimately must mean a group of people in control in Iraq who do not have his mindset with respect to these weapons, it’s going to be harder in the future.

Senator Feingold. Well, those are very helpful answers. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Nelson. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. I have nothing further.
Senator Nelson. Give us your opinion about the complicity of Syria in avoiding the U.N. sanctions. Who would like to start? Professor.

Professor Cordesman. Senator, I think that we have perhaps found ourselves in a position where, because Syria has cooperated in some aspects of dealing with al-Qaeda and certain types of Islamist extremists, we’ve been a little reluctant to point out the fact that there is an increasing flow, not so much of major arms, but critical parts. We know things like jet engines, tank engines, some aspects of armored spare parts are beginning to move through Syria in very significant deliveries. I think, however, to get down to the details is something that really only people in the intelligence community can tell you.

Senator Nelson. Any other comments?
Ambassador Butler. Not much to add to that except that Syria has increasingly been a willing participant in Saddam’s breaking of the sanctions and running a black market in oil and so on. So they’ve given comfort to him in financial terms. And a good deal of the money that he raises that way, outside of the U.N. escrow account and oil for food and so on, of course, fuels his military and other activities.

Senator Nelson. The first downed pilot, through a series of mistakes, we left down, Commander Scott Speicher. Since then, we have credible evidence of a live sighting of Commander Speicher being taken to a hospital. Do any of you have any information with regard to the whereabouts or the condition of Commander Speicher?

Professor Cordesman. No, sir.

Senator Nelson. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Butler. It would be pretentious of me to say that I do, in any positive way that would help those concerned about him. But let me say, Senator, that I am aware of his case and have formed the view, on the basis of information put to me—and there are no secrets there; it’s not complete information—but I’ve formed the view, and it’s only a personal opinion, that the possibility that he is alive is not small. And I, therefore, do not believe that we should give up on him.

Senator Nelson. And why do you come to that conclusion, that he might be alive?
Ambassador Butler. Well, I’m not referring to the idea of a live sighting. What was found and not found in the investigations of the crash site in the desert is one important series of factors, and that there wasn’t a body, that there’s not been any mortal remains of
the man—and some other anecdotal evidence of the kind that you've just added to by saying now there's apparently a live sighting.

I've got no possible way of assessing that. But there are individuals who are interested in his welfare and who keep a dossier on all of this, and I've seen some of those materials, and I think it behooves us not to give up on the possibility that he is alive.

Senator NELSON. Well, I take every opportunity to ask that question, whether I'm meeting with the King of Jordan or the President of Syria or the Prime Minister of Lebanon, meeting with various government officials here, because there's a family that's going through agony in Jacksonville, Florida, on not knowing what is the status of their family member. So thank you for your comments.

Are there further questions? Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I'd just ask this of this panel. Is there any evidence that Saddam Hussein is giving weapons of mass destruction information, parts, weapons themselves, to terrorists, broadly defined, whichever group? And if he was doing so, would there be any fingerprints of this? How would we know? Does anyone have a comment on that?

Professor CORDESMAN. I would just say, Senator, that you certainly hear other views, but all of my experience tells me this is one of the areas where you are coming to the absolute core of the intelligence community. One of the great problems you have is that when you have an extraordinarily unpopular man, you will have report after report of internal division, support of terrorism, whatever contributes to taking military action against him. Sometimes these will be real, and sometimes they need careful verification.

And one of the most disturbing things, not of what Dr. Hamza has said, but what I have heard from others, is the tendency to assert a conspiracy theory without citing the fact that there are many other equally valuable ways of doing it.

Finally, if you have a really good intelligence service, it doesn't take much to conceal something as small as, say, smallpox in a transfer to a potential agent, and you probably will never know until it happens.

Dr. HAMZA. According to Richard Sperzel, who is the chief inspector of the Iraq biological weapon program—I talked to him several times—he is of the opinion that the type of anthrax, especially the one that appeared in Senator Daschle's letter addressed to him, is a type that would have an Iraqi fingerprint on it and that the type of powder used and the technology used in loading the anthrax spores on the powder would indicate that Iraq is a possible source of this type of anthrax. He was not convinced that it is a single individual that did it, a loner somewhere. He thinks it is a joint effort, a large effort, of an expert team with a lot of technology under his disposal.

So that would be just about the only indication so far that there is a possible terrorism source from Iraq using its weapons of mass destruction under its disposal.

Senator LUGAR. Ambassador Butler.

Ambassador BUTLER. Senator, I've already said this morning that I think it would defy rationality for Saddam to supply WMD technology to terrorists or other groups. Those weapons are identi-
fied by him as his indelible source of power and authority, and I find it hard to think that he would behave in that way.

But on your direct question, is there evidence? No. What do I think? I think there will have been conversations between Iraqis and their various friends about the exquisite business of how to make certain biological and chemical weapons and so on, conversations of a technical character. But there is no evidence, that I know of, that they have actually transferred such weapons or technology.

Senator LUGAR. As Professor Cordesman has said, in ascribing these theories of conspiracy, we need to find evidence. I don't think you can base whatever action our government wants to take upon supposition, however well founded, as some have argued in the press, and this is why I raised the question with each of you, and I appreciate your responses.

Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Any further questions of the committee?

[No response.]

Senator NELSON. On instructions from the chairman, who will return at 2 o'clock, we will have a short recess, and the committee will resume with panel two at 2 o'clock.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, the chairman suggested, I think, a dispensation of 45 minutes?

Senator NELSON. Yes, but since then he has sent new instructions.

Senator LUGAR. Oh. all right.

Senator NELSON. And he will return at 2.

Senator LUGAR. Very well.

Senator NELSON. The committee stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee resumed, pursuant to recess, at 2:20 p.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Sarbanes, Kerry, Feingold, Wellstone, Bill Nelson, Rockefeller, Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, and Brownback.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order. I want to thank all of our witnesses for putting up with this unusual schedule. Most of you who have been around here understand it, and I know, Mr. Ambassador, you have. It is always dangerous to schedule serious hearings the last week the Senate is going to be in session for a while, but I felt these were so important, as did Senator Hagel, that we should move forward, so again I apologize for the interruptions.

Our second panel is an equally significant panel, and will shed a good deal of light on the issues we are discussing here. Our first panelist is Ambassador Robert Gallucci. He is currently dean of Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. I want you to know, dean, that I almost made a mistake when I spoke over at Georgetown. I was presented with a Georgetown chair that is sitting in my office, with a Georgetown seal on it, and as we were about to file my financial disclosure I was sitting on the chair and my secretary said, are you sure you filed everything, and I said, ev-
erything I know. She said, how about what you are sitting on, and it had not been, and so I might have been before the Ethics Committee had I not been sitting in that chair.

At any rate, he served as Ambassador at Large from 1994 to 1996, Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs from 1992 to 1994, and Deputy Executive Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission from 1991 to 1992 overseeing the disarmament of Iraq, better known as UNSCOM.

We also have Mr. Charles Duelfer, who has briefed me in the past, and I have been ungracious enough to mispronounce his name, but he is currently visiting resident scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, he served as Deputy Executive Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq from 1993 until its termination in 2000, and for the last several months of UNSCOM’s existence he served as acting chairman.

General Joseph Hoar, U.S. Marine Corps, retired. General Hoar served as commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command from 1991 to 1994. He was Deputy for Operations for the Marine Corps during Desert Storm, retired in 1994 after a 37-year career in the Marine Corps, and we appreciate you being here, general.

Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney retired from the Air Force in 1994. Prior to his retirement, Lieutenant General McInerney served as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. He is currently a consultant.

And Dr. Morton Halperin. Mort is currently a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Washington director of Open Society Institute. He was Director of the Policy Planning Staff for the Department of State from 1998 to 2001. He served as Special Assistant to the President, and Senior Director for Democracy at the National Security Council from 1994 to 1996, and was the Consultant to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He also, in an earlier incarnation, was the man who I went to most for advice relating to civil liberties issues.

Welcome to you all, and I would invite you in the order you have been called to give your statements, if you would. Welcome again, Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, DEAN, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador GALLUCCI. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagel, I am pleased, really, to have the opportunity to appear before you today and address the critical issue of American policy toward Iraq. I would request, please, permission to provide a written statement for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Ambassador GALLUCCI. I would begin with the premise that the only way Iraq poses a critical threat to the United States or our allies is through the use of weapons of mass destruction in one of two scenarios. First, if Iraq were to transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to a terrorist group, or second, if Iraq were to use these weapons against American or allied forces or homelands in order to impede an American-led invasion aimed at overturning the Iraqi regime.
Let me put this another way. If Iraq can be prevented from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and I say particularly viral, biological weapons or nuclear weapons, then Iraq poses no special threat to America or her allies. If Iraq does acquire WMD, the threat still does not rise to a critical level because our deterrent, our threat to retaliate in the event of Iraqi use of WMD is both credible and effective.

However, if Iraq acquires and clandestinely transfers WMD to a terrorist group, or if the United States should move to overthrow Saddam Hussein, then we should not expect our deterrent to be effective either in preventing terrorist use of WMD against us or Iraqi use against us in an effort to prevent regime change.

This line of reasoning leads us to ask about Iraqi WMD capabilities that were addressed this morning. I would submit that no one outside of Iraq knows with high confidence what those capabilities are today. However, based on 7 years of inspections and 4 years without inspections, the only prudent assumption is that Iraq has or will have chemical and biological weapons at some point relatively soon.

The nuclear weapons issue I think is more complicated, but since Iraq has already done the signature work to design and develop the triggering package for a weapon, and the acquisition of HEU or plutonium from the states of the former Soviet Union cannot be ruled out, we cannot have any real confidence that Iraq is not now or will not become soon a nuclear weapons state.

In light of the threat posed by Iraqi acquisition of these weapons, the unfulfilled requirements of the 1991 U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, the likelihood that Iraq will continue efforts to acquire such weapons, and the character of the Iraqi regime, I do not think it would be prudent for the United States to leave Iraq free to pursue WMD acquisition indefinitely.

This assessment stands even if we lack any intelligence that Iraq would, in fact, transfer WMD to a terrorist group. It is also an assessment that leads some analysts to favor military action against Iraq aimed at overturning the regime, which is one of the two circumstances in which deterrence could be expected to fail and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction used against America or her allies.

It seems to me, therefore, that if the United States is to block Iraqi acquisition of WMD, it should look for ways to do so short of such a war for this, if for no other reason, and the other reasons, loss of life, severe budgetary consequences, alienating friends and allies around the region and around the world, and avoiding the challenge of post conflict regime reconstruction and maintenance, are important as well.

The question is, then, can a politically plausible inspection regime be designed and put in place that would offer sufficient assurance of preventing Iraq from acquiring WMD over the long term, and could such a regime be forced upon the current Iraqi government in the near term without first going to war against that government? Fortunately, 7 years or so of UNSCOM inspections give us some insight into what a desirable regime would look like, and what pitfalls need to be avoided in designing one.

First, we can assume that any regime that appeared as though it would be effective in blocking Iraqi’s WMD acquisition would
also be resisted by Iraq. Therefore, the only way to impose such a regime, short of war, would be to pose to Iraq the credible alternative of a prompt invasion and regime change if the inspection regime is resisted. Just as clearly, Iraq must be convinced that accepting such an inevitably intrusive inspection regime permanently would, indeed, protect it from invasion, at least by the inspection regime’s sponsors.

Second, it should be clear to all by now that an inspection regime that fails to give us high confidence that it is successfully uncovering and blocking any serious WMD development is worse than no regime at all. Such a regime gives Iraq cover and gives it the initiative, protects it from invasion, and in some circumstances would supply it with hostages.

Third, it is probably true that an inspection regime that is too robust, that is, one accompanied by substantial supporting military units deployed to the region, would inevitably be taken by friends and allies, as well as Iraq, as a step to invasion, Desert Shield masquerading as UNMOVIC plus.

Fourth, we are, therefore, in search of the Goldilocks inspection regime, one that is balanced just right to be effective, acceptable, and sustainable. Some obvious elements of such a regime are the following:

Inspectors who have unrestricted, unlimited, and immediate access to any site in Iraq. There can be no sanctuaries or exceptions.
Inspectors must be chosen for their experience and expertise, without regard for geographic balance.
Inspectors must be free to receive, exchange, and discuss intelligence with governments as necessary to conduct their missions.
Inspectors must be able to take whatever steps are necessary to maintain the security of their communications and their operational plans.
Inspections must be undertaken in an environment free of Iraqi movements of any kind, air or ground, in the area of the inspection.
And here is a key element: Inspectors should have the option of conducting inspections supported by a specifically configured and prepositioned military unit to assist it in entry, prevent loss of containment at an inspectionsite, and to manage any spontaneous civilian opposition.

On the last point, the inspection regime thus must be capable of inspecting any designated site and overcoming any Iraqi non-cooperation or resistance, except that mounted by a significant military unit. In short, if an inspection fails, it must do so in a way that creates a clear casus belli.

There will be many with international inspection experience who would only participate in an inspection regime that presumed host government cooperation, and who would oppose a regime that had a military force organic to it, as I propose here. There are good reasons for adopting such a position as a rule, but our past experience with UNSCOM provides ample reason to treat Iraq as an exception to that rule.

This inspection regime would be designed to prevent Iraq from manipulating the inspection process. It would aim to strike the right balance, linking the inspection regime to an invasion if Iraq
fails to cooperate, without being so robust as to appear an inevitable move to overthrow the Iraqi Government.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Gallucci follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMB. ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, DEAN, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to address the critical issue of American policy toward Iraq.

I would begin with the premise that the only way Iraq poses a critical threat to the United States or our allies is through the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in one of two scenarios:

if Iraq were to transfer chemical, biological or nuclear weapons to a terrorist group; or

if Iraq were to use these weapons against American or Allied forces, or our homeland’s, in order to prevent or impede an American led invasion aimed at overturning the Iraqi regime.

Let me put this another way. If Iraq can be prevented from acquiring WMD—particularly viral biological weapons or nuclear weapons—then Iraq poses no special threat to America or her allies. If Iraq does acquire WMD, the threat still does not rise to a critical level because our deterrent, our threat to retaliate in the event of Iraqi use of WMD, is credible and effective.

However, if Iraq acquires and clandestinely transfers WMD to a terrorist group, or if the United States should move to overthrow Saddam Hussein, then we should not expect our deterrent to be effective, either in preventing terrorist use of WMD against us, or Iraqi use against us in an effort to prevent regime change.

This line of reasoning leads us to ask about Iraqi WMD capabilities. I submit that no one outside of Iraq knows with high confidence what those capabilities are today. However, we do know that Iraq had programs that successfully produced chemical weapons (CW), including VX, biological weapons (BW), including anthrax, and an implosion type nuclear weapons triggering package with some, but not enough, fissile material for a weapon. We also know what was destroyed over seven years of UNSCOM inspections, suspect some material that had been produced was not found, and that more has been produced during the last four years of no inspections. Furthermore, since clandestine manufacture of BW and CW agents could be accomplished by Iraq without high confidence of detection by allied intelligence agencies, and Iraq’s intention to acquire those weapons cannot be assumed to have diminished, the only prudent assumption is that Iraq has or will have chemical and biological weapons at some point.

The nuclear weapons issue is more complicated. Although the wish to acquire nuclear weapons must be assumed to continue in the Iraqi leadership, the facilities required to produce the necessary fissile material probably would be detected, even if Iraq attempted to clandestinely construct them, especially if plutonium was sought. That said, a clandestine centrifuge program, producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) could not be ruled out. What makes matters worse, however, is that the acquisition of HEU or plutonium from the states of the former Soviet Union cannot be ruled our either, in light of the well known inadequacies that persist in material accountancy and control in those countries. Since Iraq has already done the “signature” work to design and develop the triggering package for a weapon, we cannot have any real confidence that Iraq is now, or will remain, a non-nuclear weapons state.

In light of the threat posed by Iraqi acquisition of WMD, the unfulfilled requirements of the 1991 UN Security Council Resolution 687, the likelihood that Iraq will continue efforts to acquire such weapons, and the character of the Iraqi regime, I do not think it would be prudent for the United States to leave Iraq free to pursue WMD acquisition indefinitely. This assessment stands even if we lack any intelligence that Iraq would, in fact, transfer WMD to a terrorist group. It is also an assessment that leads some analysts to favor military action against Iraq aimed at overturning the regime—which is one of the two circumstances in which deterrence could be expected to fail and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction used against America or her allies. It seems to me, therefore, that if the United States is to block Iraqi acquisition of WMD, it should look for ways to do so short of such a war for this, if for no other reason. And the other reasons—loss of life, severe budgetary consequences, alienating friends and allies in the region and around the world, and
avoiding the challenge of post-conflict regime reconstruction and maintenance—are important as well.

The question is, then, can a politically plausible inspection regime be designed and put in place that would offer sufficient assurance of preventing Iraq from acquiring WMD over the long term? And could such a regime be forced upon the current Iraqi government in the near term without first going to war against that government? Fortunately, the seven years or so of UNSCOM inspections give us some insight into what a desirable regime would look like, and what pitfalls need to be avoided in designing one.

First, we can assume that any regime that appeared as though it would be effective in blocking Iraqi WMD acquisition would also be resisted by Iraq. Therefore the only way to impose such a regime short of war would be to pose to Iraq the credible alternative of a prompt invasion and regime change, if the inspection regime is resisted. Just as clearly, Iraq must be convinced that accepting such an inevitably intrusive regime—permanently—would indeed protect it from invasion, at least by the regime sponsors.

Second, it should be clear to all by now that an inspection regime that fails to give us high confidence that it is successfully uncovering and blocking any serious WMD development is worse than no regime at all. Such a regime gives Iraq cover and the initiative, protects it from invasion, and in some circumstances would supply it with hostages.

Third, it is probably true that an inspection regime that is too robust, that is, one accompanied by substantial supporting military units deployed to the region, would inevitably be taken by friends and allies, as well as Iraq, as a step to invasion: Desert Shield masquerading as UNMOVIC PLUS.

Fourth, we are, therefore, in search of the “Goldilocks Inspection Regime,” one that is balanced just right to be effective, acceptable and sustainable. Some obvious elements of such a regime are the following:

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- inspectors must be able to take whatever steps are necessary to maintain the security of their communications and their operational plans;
- inspections must be undertaken in an environment free of Iraqi movements of any kind, air or ground, in the area of the inspection; and
- inspectors should have the option of conducting inspections supported by a specially configured and prepositional military unit to assist it in entry, prevent loss of containment at an inspection sight, and to manage any “spontaneous” civilian opposition.

On the last point, the inspection regime must be capable of inspecting any designated sight and overcoming any Iraqi non-cooperation or resistance, except that mounted by a significant military unit. In short, if an inspection fails, it must do so in a way that creates a clear casus belli.

There will be many with international inspection experience who would only participate in an inspection regime that presumed host government cooperation, and who would oppose a regime that had a military force organic to it, as is proposed here. There are good reasons for adopting such a position as a rule, but our past experience with UNSCOM provides ample reason to treat Iraq as an exception to that rule. This inspection regime would be designed to prevent Iraq from manipulating the inspection process. It would aim to strike the right balance, linking the inspection regime to an invasion if Iraq fails to cooperate, without being so robust as to appear to inevitably presage a move to overthrow the Iraqi government.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, dean.

Mr. Duelfer.
Mr. DUELFER. Again, thank you for asking me to be here today, and I would like to have my statement entered into the record as well.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be.

Mr. DUELFER. My comments will draw upon my experience as Deputy at UNSCOM from 1993 until 2000. I came to know many Iraqis and their organizations quite well. They saw me both as a U.N. official and also as an American with whom they could talk, and sometimes quite candidly.

Let me state from the outset that I support the objective of creating the conditions where the Iraqi people can establish a new leadership in Baghdad. There is a strong case for this, when you consider the growing risks posed by the current regime, in contrast with what Iraq could be under normal leadership.

The talent and resources that can design and build nuclear weapons under Saddam can help Iraq be the leading economy and culture of the Middle East under new government. Until that happens, the Iraqi people will never achieve their enormous potential. Of course, getting there is the issue.

I have a differing opinion from Dr. Gallucci. In my opinion, weapons inspections are not the answer to the real problem, which is the regime, nor can they even fully eliminate in perpetuity Iraqi weapons of mass destruction so long as this regime is in power, and I would make another comment here in terms of terminology.

Earlier this morning, there was a lot of talk about arms control, but what we are discussing with respect to Iraq is coercive disarmament. Iraq initiated a war, they lost, and part of the terms of the cease-fire agreement were that it was supposed to get rid of a large part of its arsenal, and that was to be verified by UNSCOM. That is not really arms control in the classical sense, where two parties enter into an agreement because they think it is in their common interest. Iraq steadfastly does not believe that it is in its interest to get rid of these weapons.

Here I come to a key problem that I see in this whole dynamic, and that is that the forces are all wrong. The Security Council writes resolutions demanding Iraq give up weapons of mass destruction capabilities which the regime believes are essential to its survival. UNSCOM was created to attempt to implement this objective. We did a lot. Bob Gallucci did a lot. Richard Butler did a lot. All of our experts on the ground, they did the most, but ultimately Baghdad had vastly more resources than we did, and much more endurance than the Security Council.

Ultimately, the Security Council was not willing to commit the resources to enforce compliance. Saddam very cleverly divided the Council with threats, rewards, and ultimately by holding his own people hostage. He created a situation where Council members did not want to see more pain fall on innocent Iraqis as a consequence of support to inspectors.

This will no doubt happen again, and here again I would point out the same dynamic occurred after World War I. The Versailles
Treaty obligated the Germans to disarm. The international com-
munity created a bunch of inspection teams. They had the same prob-
lems, they lasted about the same length of time, and it ultimately failed.

But even if you can imagine a radically different approach to in-
spections with a sizable military force, I do not see how that would work over the long term. Can we keep forces deployed to support inspections forever? Are we really prepared to give back to this reg-
ime control of the oil revenues? And pursuing this approach does
nothing for the innocent Iraqis trapped under this government.

In essence, inspections in my opinion are only a short term pal-
liative, and do not address the fundamental problem. Saddam
knows this, and if he concludes we are really preparing for regime
change, he will offer the concession of allowing inspectors in under
some conditions. This will only be a tactical retreat on his part.

I want to make a second point now before I conclude. Finally—
and this has to do with regime change—there is a central point
that is simple, but it is a central point on regime change, and that is that it is fundamentally a political objective, not a military one.
Military commitment will be essential to convince various audi-
ences we are serious this time and Saddam's days are numbered.

However, creating the conditions for new leadership in Baghdad
demands a political strategy to guide potential military action.
Moreover, what we do in a nonmilitary realm before potential con-
flict will directly affect the extent of possible military conflict and
the amount of damage to Iraq and ourselves.

In this light, it is essential that Iraqis in Iraq know that their lot will only improve when the current regime is gone. Iraqis and
key institutions in Iraq should understand that their interests are not served by defending Saddam and his clique. We can make a
good case that intervention is justified, given the unique and dan-
gerous characteristics of this regime.

My guess is that with sufficient work and consultations we can build international support to create conditions for regime change,
and a consensus on characteristics we expect a new government to achieve. Moreover, we can make decisions about such matters as
relieving sanctions, establishing security relations, and debt relief,
based upon how the new government progresses toward higher standards, but I reiterate, our highest priority should be convincing
Iraqis in Iraq that they will be better off when Saddam has gone,
and that he will be gone.

Iraqis and their institutions will be making vital decisions about
their future without Saddam. The Iraqi people are the greatest
threat to Saddam's regime. If they are convinced Saddam and his clique are doomed, they will make decisions that are in their inter-
est and our interest, and any ultimate use of force can be mini-
mized.

Finally, let me just make a comment, a personal comment. I re-
member asking a senior Iraqi once whether he served his country or Saddam. It was not possible for him to answer, but he definitely
understood the difference. In essence, we need to make it possible
for the Iraqi people to act in the interests of their country and not
Saddam Hussein.

Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duelfer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES DUELFER, RESIDENT VISITING SCHOLAR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; FORMER DEPUTY EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ (UNSCOM)

Thank you for the opportunity to testify at such a critical moment with respect to relations and actions toward Iraq. My remarks will reflect my years investigating Iraq’s weapons programs as the Deputy Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. This gave me the opportunity to know Iraqi institutions and individual Iraqis high and low. I dealt with diplomats, technocrats, military, intelligence and regime officials as well as many Iraqis who have departed Iraq. While I was a UN official, my Iraqi interlocutors were always aware that I was an American familiar with Washington and its policies on Iraq.

As other witnesses have made clear, a key feature of the present regime is its dedication to all types of weapons of mass destruction. I can only underline the view that, all other things being equal, the current leadership in Baghdad will eventually achieve a nuclear weapon in addition to their current inventories of other weapons of mass destruction. For more than a decade the regime allocated billions of dollars and the efforts of thousands of individuals toward this end. That they were near success in 1991 is a tribute to the vast talent of the Iraqi people, the great resources of the country, and their misdirection by reckless, oppressive leadership. To me this highlights the enormous difference between what Iraq could be under different leadership and what it will be if the present regime continues.

Looking forward, the risk posed by the present regime will entail leverage of growing oil production (perhaps to 4-5 million barrels a day in a few years), the diminished effectiveness of sanctions as a restraining force, and the ultimate risk of a belligerent state in the region with nuclear weapons. The leadership in Baghdad knows that it was a serious blunder to invade Kuwait before they had a nuclear weapon. Regional states know this as well and recognize they will have to accommodate Saddam once a nuclear weapon is achieved. Even now they are very cautious not to antagonize the regime. So far, Saddam has proven to be a survivor and quite willing to exercise whatever leverage available to him.

In opposition to the accumulating dangers of the present regime, it is worth considering the opportunity cost to the world, and especially to the Iraqi people of the persistence of this regime.

In my experience, most Iraqis would like nothing more than to be reconnected to the rest of the world and indeed, the United States. Through the accident of birth, individuals with talent in the sciences, engineering and even military serve in a country under a miserable leadership. Exercising the option of not serving at the direction of the regime is to put themselves and families at great risk.

During my years at UNSCOM, working toward the elimination of Iraqi WMD capabilities, I often commented to colleagues in Washington that if I had 100 green cards to pass out, we could have the Iraqi program dissected and eliminated. This was meant to illustrate that the programs depend critically on a relatively limited number of people—people, who, given a choice, would rather be somewhere else. Of course no one provided them such a choice. Nevertheless many Iraqis left if they can. The constant drain of Iraqis illustrates the hopelessness in Iraq. A country with all the ingredients to be a growing regional economic power is, instead, a waste of great talent and squandered resources.

The long-term threat posed by this regime cannot, in my opinion, be addressed with weapons inspections. The experience of UNSCOM from 1991 to 1998 bears this out. While UNSCOM accomplished significant disarmament, it was not complete and it certainly wasn’t permanent. At best the inspections provided a temporary improvement to regional stability. However, the goal in UN resolutions is not temporary WMD disarmament but permanent coercive disarmament. This means the inspectors were ultimately supposed to monitor extensively and intrusively forever. Iraq was supposed to comply fully and verifiably. If they did so, sanctions were to be lifted.

Iraq offered tactical cooperation and worked to divide the Security Council and erode sanctions. The international community could not sustain its commitment to its own resolutions—especially when confronted with the impact on Iraqi civilians that were ultimately held hostage by the leadership in Baghdad. From the regime’s perspective, inspections were a temporary setback. They were correct. It is highly probable that if Baghdad becomes convinced that significant action to depose the regime is likely, they will offer the concession of accepting inspectors once again with the aim of buying time and dividing the international community.
A critical point we learned in the mid-nineties was just how important weapons of mass destruction were held by the regime. Senior Iraqi officials stated convincingly that the use of chemical weapons saved them in the war against Iran. It was their counter to Iranian human wave attacks. The use of long range missiles was also seen as vital to attack cities deep in Iran behind the forward battle lines.

Moreover, the regime believed that the possession of chemical and biological weapons contributed strongly to deterring the United States from going to Baghdad in 1991. They first described their pre-war actions to disperse weapons and pre-delegate authority to use them if the United States went to Baghdad in a long meeting with Iraqi ministers in September 1995. This discussion took place only after a surprising event during the history of UNSCOM's work in Iraq.

Saddam’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, defected to Jordan in August 1995. He had been the lead member in the ruling family directing much of the WMD effort. Following his defection, UNSCOM learned the WMD program was more extensive than had been declared and efforts were still underway—even as UNSCOM was operating its monitoring system. Moreover, we learned that a system for the concealment of these activities was run out of the Presidency. UNSCOM came close to having an inspection and monitoring system in Iraq where we would report Iraqi cooperation, but they would not be complying.

Prior to the defection, many members of the Security Council had been pressing UNSCOM to report favorably on its disarmament and monitoring work. They had tired of the long dispute that consumed long debates in the Security Council. Moreover, Iraq had been threatening to end its work with the UN unless UNSCOM reported favorably and the Security Council acted to end sanctions. Saddam Hussein himself declared such a threat in his National Day speech of July 17, 1995. The Iraqi Foreign Minister, in Cairo a few days later, set a deadline of August 31, 1995.

Finding Iraq intractable, many began, implicitly, to question UNSCOM. Maybe UNSCOM was simply too fastidious or worse, too much under the influence of the United States. Maybe Iraq would never be able to satisfy the technocrats in UNSCOM and then the Security Council would be stuck. These arguments and this predicament are not new.

The last time the international community attempted this sort of political solution to a military threat was following World War I when Germany was subject to strict disarmament limits set in the Versailles Treaty. An international body analogous to UNSCOM was created (called the Inter-Allied Control Commission) with virtually identical tasks as given UNSCOM and similar limitations. The dynamic was the same. An international body was directed by a victorious coalition to verify the coercive disarmament of a country that had not been occupied.

These earlier inspectors encountered all the same problems and deceptions as UNSCOM. I have looked up their reports in the British archives. Change some of the nouns and you would think you were reading UNSCOM reports. They were harassed, given wrong and misleading declarations, blocked from sites, accused of being spies, and pressured to give false positive reports, etc. Germany (particularly the Reichswehr under the direct guidance of General Hans Von Seeckt) worked to sustain capabilities and development work with the same strategies and techniques that UNSCOM found in Iraq. Development work was concealed in a variety of ways, including in civilian areas (e.g. hidden Krupp arms development, secret naval design efforts, like the pocket battleship, and civil aviation masking military training). Programs were located overseas (e.g. expertise in submarine work was offered overseas, tank and aircraft training took place in Russia as well as the sale of a chemical weapons production plant). Only when France reoccupied the Ruhr did Germany become, albeit temporarily, forthcoming with proper weapons declarations.

At the same time, Germany under Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann worked diplomatically to escape the constraints. The Allied coalition of 1918 eventually melted down in its purpose. Ultimately after six years of inspections, the Inter-Al lied Control Commission was removed from Germany—its work incomplete, but political momentum swept over its reports. The international community in 1926-27 halted the inspections with the artifice that Germany would join the League of Nations and be subject to the global disarmament actions under that body.

Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz was well aware of this disconnect between the inspectors categorical goals and the murky commitment of force behind them. He said on more than one occasion that we were not General MacArthur. We did not occupy Iraq. Therefore there were limits to what we could do.

Tariq Aziz was absolutely correct, although we did our best to escape this reality. UNSCOM tried very intrusive and imaginative methods to penetrate the security of Iraqi weapons programs (including techniques not usually associated with an international body accustomed to the virtues of transparency and diversity of membership). However, against the full resources of a nation-state, with thousands of
people and many intelligence and security organs, it was a hopeless endeavor. To illustrate, consider that while UNSCOM had hundreds of so-called “no-notice” inspections (where no information was intentionally provided to Iraq in advance), there were very few occasions when Iraqis were actually surprised when inspectors arrived at the intended site.

However, even if one could imagine the most extensive and intrusive system of inspections, accompanied by significant military forces, could the international community sustain this forever? It has been suggested that in the face of imminent invasion, the Saddam may finally give up WMD. But how long can the United States and the international community sustain the threat of imminent invasion? Will the sanctions also be sustained and at what price to the Iraqi people? Is the problem really the weapons or the leadership? Not being clear on this matter has left the Baghdad leadership. The Security Council’s inability to force permanent compliance by Iraq with the very intrusive and stringent disarmament and monitoring measures leads to the case for regime removal.

A rationale can be made that the unique risks presented by this regime constitute a rare occasion when the international community is justified in intervening in internal matters of another state. This is a circumstance where sovereignty does not reign supreme. The regime is a growing threat and has taken its own population hostage. Simply to say the Iraqi people should change their own leadership is disingenuous. Many have tried and died. The regime’s track record of using WMD, its ongoing defiance of cease-fire resolutions and WMD development provide grounds for a case justifying outside intervention. Such intervention would aim to create conditions whereby the Iraqi people can change their own government.

However, any proposed strategy to change the leadership in Baghdad must recognize two basic points. First, such an action is fundamentally a political action, not a military action. The second point follows from the first. The most important people in this endeavor are Iraqis in Iraq. They are the people who will make vital decisions about whether to assist in defending the regime or not. They, and the institutions they are part of, will make the decisions about how quickly the Saddam regime ends and at what cost. They are the people who will constitute the government that follows. In most ways the people of Iraq are the greatest threat to Saddam.

With this in mind, it is essential to present a clear coherent message about what the United States and the international community expect to see in any new government in Baghdad. It must be clear that new management in Baghdad will significantly improve the lot of the Iraqi people. The case must be made that forcing Saddam from power is not anti-Arab, but actually one of the most positive steps imaginable for the Arab world.

Decisions about such matters as sanctions, security relationships, and debt relief should be linked to on how the new government progresses toward agreed objectives such as pluralism, democratic elections, getting rid of WMD, cleaning up the financial system, etc. Indeed, for most institutions in Iraq, new management should be an enormous advantage.

Given a choice, Iraqis would not opt to live under the government of the Saddam regime. They will never achieve their vast potential under the current regime and implicitly senior Iraqis recognize this. They will only begin to reach their potential if they rejoin the world as part of a country with leadership that follows internationally accepted norms.

These messages of what is expected of a new government in Baghdad must be accompanied by a firm commitment by the United States and the international community to stay the course. Hence, agreement on objectives must be reached with due consideration of the views of Iraqis in and out of Iraq, regional states, colleagues in the Security Council, and our European partners. These are achievable political goals if the United States provides strong consistent leadership. For the United States to exercise such leadership, it should be founded on support within the United States itself.

Finally, the United States can and must be willing to act alone if it judges its vital interests are directly affected. However, it would be far better, and ultimately less costly, if international consensus can be achieved. It is easy to view the United States going to the United Nations Security Council akin to Gulliver going to Lilliput. Yet ultimately the Lilliputians may be willing and helpful participants. Indeed, consensus is not out of the question.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed circumstances when sovereignty does not reign supreme in a speech to the UN General Assembly on September 20, 1999. He was reflecting recent experiences in Rwanda and Kosovo, but took recognition of the fact that the world had changed and continued to change. His speech
touched upon a very sensitive issue for an assembly of sovereign states. If nothing else, he highlighted the possibility that under certain circumstances external intervention may be justified.

Such a case could be made with respect to Iraq under the current regime. It is a growing risk to all concerned, not least of which are the Iraqi people themselves. One certainty is that the situation is not static. Iraq is going to evolve one way or the other. Limited actions by the international community will have limited effects. The threat will continue to grow and in the meantime the opportunity for a positive Iraq continue to slide into the future. This is clearly an issue where the United States must lead one way or another. Mr. Chairman, you and your committee are raising an important subject that needs to be examined from many aspects. I hope my comments have helped illuminate some facets of this difficult issue.

I attach copies of two recent and relevant op-ed articles for the record.

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[From the Washington Times, Sunday, July 14, 2002]

PRELUDE TO A REPLAY OVER INSPECTIONS

(By Charles Duelfer)

Earlier this month U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri failed to agree on the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq.

This was not surprising. Baghdad agreed to begin such discussions in March when U.S. military action against Saddam Hussein’s regime looked imminent from its standpoint. Accepting inspectors in some fashion is a tactic Iraq will employ to derail international support for an American military buildup against the regime. When the U.S. actually deploys forces, international pressure for a peaceful “solution” will rise and the leverage of an Iraqi “concession” on accepting inspectors will be far greater. Baghdad now judges Washington will not begin such actions before the end of the year at the earliest. Hence, the inspection card will not be played until later. In this context, even if inspectors get into Iraq, their prospects are dim. The UN inspectors have been and will be caught between the conflicting goals of Baghdad, Washington, and other Security Council members. Their ability to succeed is limited by Iraq’s lack of cooperation and the council’s inability to force compliance. Baghdad views weapons of mass destruction as vital to the survival of the regime. Chemical weapons were instrumental in the war against Iran. Iraq believes its arsenal in 1991 helped deter the United States from proceeding to Baghdad.

The regime has every reason to associate these weapons with its own survival. Consider whether Washington would even be contemplating military action to depose the regime if Saddam had the capacity to detonate a nuclear explosive on U.S. forces or Tel Aviv.

U.N. inspections, at best, may delay or complicate Iraq’s weapons program. The former weapons-inspection team, UNSCOM, endeavored for seven years to account for all Iraqi programs. That tortured experience yielded partial compliance by Baghdad. Iraq gave up what it was forced to expose, and retained the rest.

The continuous cat-and-mouse game along with episodic U.S. and British bombing has given Baghdad excellent practice in concealing its weapons. The U.N. inspectors were instrumental in the war against Iran. Iraq believes its arsenal in 1991 helped deter the United States from proceeding to Baghdad.

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U.N. inspections, at best, may delay or complicate Iraq’s weapons program. The former weapons-inspection team, UNSCOM, endeavored for seven years to account for all Iraqi programs. That tortured experience yielded partial compliance by Baghdad. Iraq gave up what it was forced to expose, and retained the rest.

The continuous cat-and-mouse game along with episodic U.S. and British bombing has given Baghdad excellent practice in concealing its weapons. The U.N. inspectors have, on paper, the right to immediate, unconditional, unrestricted access—words that sound good in New York but are difficult to implement in Iraq.

Practicalities intrude. For example, is it reasonable to demand that Iraq turn off its entire air defense system so the inspectors may fly into Iraq anytime, and anywhere? Baghdad will reasonably point out that it has a legitimate air defense system and some accommodation must be made to provide information about U.N. flights. From this, the Iraqi government can derive warning information on inspections. Similar accommodations will sprout in virtually all inspection activities.

Iraq’s close monitoring of all inspection activities meant “no-notice” inspections rarely equated to surprise inspections. UNSCOM conducted hundreds of no-notice inspections. However, only a few were truly surprise inspections, and they developed into confrontations, delays and blockages.

Further, as the U.N. resolutions are now written, it is up to the inspectors how extensive they wish to make their system. Whatever is deployed will be worked out between the inspectors and Iraq. The Security Council has not stated any performance criteria for the system. The absence of concrete directives puts U.N. inspectors in a weak position to demand a system elaborate and intrusive enough to make credible judgements about Iraqi disarmament.

If the U.N.-Iraqi process proceeds, how will we know if a serious inspection regime is planned? One test will be whether there is serious investigation of Iraq’s
activities since UNSCOM left in December 1998. Credible defectors have reported
that Iraq has expanded its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs during
this period. The U.N. database includes the 200-300 key engineers, scientists and
technicians from Iraq’s prior WMD programs. If the programs have continued, many
of these individuals will be involved. Inspectors, must interview these people with-
out Iraqi government presence to verify their activities since 1998.
UNSCOM had agreed (mistakenly, in retrospect) to allow Iraqi government ob-
servers to be present at all interviews. Iraq was able to keep a complete record of
all information transmitted to the inspectors, and this facilitated its control of the
incomplete picture presented. It also allowed the intimidation of the interviewees
(who were often terrified of saying something contrary to the established line.)
Ultimately, pursuit of more intrusive, credible, inspections will lead to conflict be-
tween inspectors and the Iraqis. This will land in the Security Council sooner or
later, and the same messy debates from 1997-8 will recur. Does non-cooperation by
Iraq mean they are not complying? Is war justified simply because some stubborn
inspector was blocked from a sensitive security warehouse?
If the United States is serious about solving the Iraq problem, it should not center
its argument for changing the management in Baghdad on the inspection issue.
Washington needs to make a broader case. It needs to show that the threat is
broad and growing. Moreover, given the authoritarian nature of the regime, it is dis-
ingenuous to say the Iraqis should change their own government. Outside interven-
tion is needed to create conditions under which Iraqis can change their government.
The tremendous potential of the Iraqi people combined with Iraq’s resources will
never be realized under this regime. A country that should have a vibrant society
and be the engine of development in the Middle East will remain a contorted and
dangerous mutant threatening the region and beyond. And the people will continue
to suffer.

[From the Baltimore Sun, June 3, 2002]

PRO-ARAB POLICY IS TO GIVE IRAQIS A NEW REGIME

(By Charles Duelfer)

WASHINGTON.—The explosion between Israel and the Palestinians has not
changed the underlying logic for regime change in Baghdad. But it has greatly af-
fected the regional political context, making it essential that a compelling positive
case be made in the Arab world for such a pursuit.
So far, a strong, coherent public message has not come out of Washington. Cer-
tainly one can be made. Washington can make the point that there are two possible
futures for Iraq.
One is a continuation of the present regime led by Saddam Hussein, with its
growing threat to the region and repression of its own people.
The growth of Iraq’s weapons capabilities (eventually including nuclear), the le-
verage of growing oil production and the wasted potential of a vibrant population
all point to an inevitable future problem. This is unacceptable over the long term—
especially for the United States, whose military will ultimately be called upon.
A second possible future for Iraq is a more positive one in which its leaders sub-
scribe to international norms and its people can achieve their enormous potential.
Iraqis are energetic, assign great prestige to education, engineering and the arts
and, in my experience, would like nothing better than to be reconnected to the rest
of the world, including the United States. The combination of the Iraqi people and
their huge oil and agricultural resources should be the engine of development in the
Middle East.
The difference between these two possible futures is Mr. Hussein. Given the
unique authoritarian nature of his regime, it is disingenuous to say that the Iraqi
people on their own should change their leadership. Therefore, outside intervention
is needed to create the conditions under which the Iraqi people can change their
own government. They will never be able to achieve their potential under Mr. Hus-
sein.
Therefore, action against the regime is not an attack against Arabs, as Mr. Hus-
sein would say, but for Arabs. In fact, leaving Mr. Hussein in power is an anti-Arab
position.
Creating the conditions to permit a change of government in Baghdad requires
that the United States take the lead with an unquestionable commitment to bring-
ing about that change. This will force Iraqis and leaders in the Middle East and
Europe to evaluate what relationship they will have with the next Iraqi government.
Once this mindset is established, it will become apparent that a new Iraqi government is in their interest and that it would be shortsighted to act to preserve the current regime, despite Mr. Hussein’s attempts to buy support through oil contracts.

To this end, the message must be that the United States seeks both the greatest and the least change in Iraq—the greatest being the removal of Mr. Hussein, the least being retention of established institutions such as the civil service, the various civilian ministries and even the regular army. These national institutions will be essential in a post-Hussein government.

Success will depend entirely on making it clear that the United States is absolutely committed to following through on a regime change. This will mean preparing and being willing to deploy as many military forces as necessary.

Only this level of commitment can provide the incentive for the necessary switch in mindset among Iraqis (and the rest of the region). Once Iraqis become convinced that Mr. Hussein’s fall is inevitable, he will find himself very lonely in Baghdad.

A special element in this strategy is Russia. Washington must convince Moscow that it will benefit by a new government. For example, only if there is a new government in Iraq will Russia be able to exercise its contracts to develop Iraqi oil fields and receive repayment of $8 billion of debt.

The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians provides a political smokescreen for Mr. Hussein. Washington needs to reverse this by demonstrating that a new regime in Iraq is a pro-Arab policy. This diplomatic and political work needs to happen now, even if potential military options are delayed.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General Hoar.


General Hoar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to address the committee. I am in favor of a regime change in Iraq. What is at issue is the means and the timing. The issue has four key components, all of which deserve our discussion and, indeed, a national debate because of their implications.

First is a change of policy, after a period of over 50 years, in which we depart from the principle of deterrence to one of preemption.

The second is the need for support from countries in the Middle East, Asia, as well as our traditional allies in NATO, Japan, Australia, and elsewhere, as we contemplate combat operations against Iraq.

The third is the problems associated with mounting a military campaign against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and then finally, assuming success of this military campaign, the implications for war termination, most especially the requirements for nation-building.

First, the issue of deterrence and preemption. For more than 50 years, deterrence has served us well, up to and including Secretary of State Jim Baker’s warning just before Desert Storm in Geneva to the Iraqi regime about the use of weapons of mass destruction. Deterrence is still the best option until operations against al-Qaeda have turned the corner and major progress, with U.S. leadership, has been made on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

Let me now frame some questions about a preemption strike. How will we know that Iraq is planning to pass weapons to terrorist organizations? Poor intelligence remains a problem. In 1990, there were 1,800 technical and professional people working in the nuclear program in Iraq, and we did not know it.
Or is simply possession of weapons of mass destruction among the nations of the “axis of evil” sufficient? Will Iranian nuclear power plants be next? Does it apply just to nuclear weapons, or do chemical and biological weapons deserve the same treatment, because a number of Islamic and Arab countries possess chemical and biological capabilities.

What are the red lines? What will we need, and what process shall we use before a preemptive strike? I would hope that it would be based on more than the circumstantial evidence that we have available at this time.

May the President declare an intent to strike without a declaration of war from the Congress of the United States? What effect does this policy have on other countries with whom we might have disagreements in the future, for example, China?

Second, if you believe, as I do, that the United States has a moral responsibility, as the world’s only superpower, to provide leadership to at least assure stability, if not peace, why are we convincing virtually none of the European countries, let alone the Arab countries, of the need for an attack on Iraq? My sense is the Arab countries will not support a campaign of this type without significant movement toward peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

On a more practical level, we need bases, overflight, intelligence, search and rescue, support from Arab neighbors in the vicinity of Iraq, and from our allies, financial and troop support for nation-building that would follow a successful military campaign.

With respect to the military campaign, war in the Middle East, now as before, depends on logistics. Even with the astonishing technical gains exhibited in Afghanistan, logistics is still the most challenging aspect of this campaign. Strategic lift, both sea and air, was my No. 1 priority on the Integrated Priority List when I was the commander in chief at CENTCOM. It was at the top of Norm Schwartzkopf’s list before me, and I expect it is still high for his successors today.

Getting to the region with troops, equipment, and supplies, and most important, maintaining them through an operation of any size will be key. There is no doubt we would prevail, but at what risk? Risk in the military is simply the cost of American men and women serving in the military who would be killed or injured in an operation like this.

The Iraqi campaign is a risky endeavor. To think that you can support an operation of this type without control of ground lines of communications and support from the sea seems to me to be remote. For example, any logistics buildup would require an anti-missile defense for our troops. A Patriot missile battalion requires over 250 CE–141 sorties from the United States or from the European theater. The size of the force, how it will be deployed, where will the logistics buildup be located, and the timeframe needed are all critical to success.

Finally, assuming a successful military campaign, we need at the policy level in government a war termination plan. This is something that we did not have in Desert Storm. In short, how do we achieve a political status acceptable to our government. After the expulsion of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the requirement of war
termination will include the establishment of a new government, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, a newly reorganized armed force, and a police force, what has been basically described as nation-building.

Who will do this? Will there be a Marshall Plan for Iraq, a nation of 25 million people? Where is the analysis of that cost, the people and the funds and the equipment who will bear that cost?

All of these components need to be discussed both in open and closed hearing to be sure that a preemptive strike on Iraq is the correct course of action.

I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, general.

Lieutenant General McInerney.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS G. McINERNEY, U.S. AIR FORCE (RET.), FORMER ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE, WASHINGTON, DC

General McInerney. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this special opportunity to discuss the war of liberation to remove Saddam’s regime from Iraq. I will not dwell on the merits of why he should be removed. Suffice it to say, we must preempt threats such as those posed by Saddam Hussein. We face an enemy that makes its principal strategy the targeting of civilians and nonmilitary assets. We should not wait to be attacked by terrorists and rogue states with weapons of mass destruction. We have not only the right but the obligation to defend ourselves by preempting these threats.

I will now focus on the way to do it very expeditiously and with minimum loss of life on both the coalition forces, the Iraqi military, and the people themselves, and at the same time maintain a relatively small footprint in the region.

Access is an important issue, and we want to minimize the political impact on our allies adjacent to Iraq that are supporting the coalition forces. Our immediate objectives will be the following:

- Help Iraqi people liberate Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein and his regime; eliminate weapons of mass destruction and production facilities; complete military operations as soon as possible; protect economic infrastructure targets; identify and terminate terrorism connections; and establish an interim government as soon as possible.

Our longer term objectives will be to bring a democratic government to Iraq using our post World War II experiences with Germany, Japan, and Italy, that will influence the region significantly.

Now, I would like to broadly discuss the combined campaign to achieve these objectives, using what I will call blitz warfare to simplify the discussion.

Blitz warfare is an intensive, 24-hour, 7 days a week precision aircentric campaign supported by fast-moving ground forces composed of a mixture of heavy, light, airborne, amphibious, special, covert operations working with opposition forces that all use effects-based operations for their target set and correlate their timing of forces for a devastating, violent impact.

This precision air campaign is characterized by many precision weapons, upwards of 90 percent using our latest C2ISR command
and control intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets such as Jstars, Global Hawk, Predator, human intelligence, signals intelligence, et cetera, in a network-centric configuration to achieve less than 10 minutes for time-critical targeting.

Using the Global Strike Task Force, the naval strike forces composed of over 1,000 land and sea-based aircraft, plus a wide array of air and sea-launched cruise missiles, this will be the most massive precision air campaign in history, achieving rapid dominance in the first 72 hours of combat, focused on regime-changed targets.

These are defined as targets critical to Saddam's control. For example, his command and control and intelligence assets, his integrated air defense, his weapons of mass destruction, palaces and locations that harbor his leadership, plus those military units that resist or fight our coalition forces.

All the Iraqi military forces will be told through the opposition forces in our information operations campaign that they have two choices, either help us change regime leadership and build a democracy, or be destroyed. In addition, commanders and men and weapons of mass destruction forces will be told that they will be tried as war criminals if they use their weapons against coalition forces or other nations.

In a multidirectional campaign, coalition forces will seize Basra, Mosul, and most of the oil fields, neutralize selected corps of the Iraqi Army, and destroy the integrated air defense zone, command and control, weapons of mass destruction locations, and Iraqi air, using our stealth, SAM suppression, and air superiority assets. This will enable coalition forces to achieve 24/7 air dominance quickly, which is critical to our success.

The expansion of our beachheads in the north, south, east, and west regions, and the airheads, seized with alarming speed, will allow the opposition forces to play a very significant and decisively important role with our special covert operations and the Iraqi army and air force, to determine their status, i.e., are they friend, foe, or just disarmed.

The political arm of the opposition will communicate intensively with the Iraqi people, letting them know they are liberating them from 22 years of oppression, and that they are now controlling large amounts of territory. Humanitarian missions will be accomplished simultaneously with leaflet drops, et cetera.

U.S. and other coalition forces are helping us to liberate and change the regime, is the mantra. You, the Iraqi people, must help us to do this quickly, and with minimum loss of life. This IO campaign must be well-planned and executed, working closely with the opposition forces. This means that the administration must move very quickly now to solidify the opposition forces, to include the opposition military forces, and set up a shadow government with aggressive assistance and leadership from the United States.

In summary, the Iraqi forces we are facing are about 30 percent equivalent since Desert Storm, with no modernization. Most of the army does not want to fight for Saddam, and the people want a regime change. Let us help them to make that change, and liberate Iraq from this oppressor. President Bush has accurately said, inaction is not an option, and I am in support of his position.

I await your questions, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General McInerney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS G. MCINERNEY, LT. GEN. USAF (RET.)

A WAR OF LIBERATION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Thank you for this special opportunity to discuss a war of liberation to remove Saddam’s regime from Iraq. I will not discuss the merits of why he should be removed but will focus on the way to do it very expeditiously and with minimum loss of life on both the coalition forces, the Iraqi military and people themselves; and, at the same time maintain a relatively small foot print in the region.

Access is an important issue and we want to minimize the political impact on our allies adjacent to Iraq that are supporting the coalition forces. Our immediate objectives will be the following:

1. Help Iraqi people liberate Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein and his regime.
2. Eliminate WMD and production facilities.
3. Complete military operations ASAP.
4. Protect economic infrastructure targets.
5. ID and terminate terrorism connections.
6. Establish an interim government ASAP.

Our longer term objectives will be to bring a democratic government to Iraq using our post WW II experiences with Germany, Japan and Italy that will influence the region significantly.

Now I would like to broadly discuss the combined campaign to achieve these objectives using what I will call “blitz warfare” to simplify the discussion. Blitz warfare is an intensive (24-7) precision air centric campaign supported by fast moving ground forces composed of a mixture of heavy, light, airborne, amphibious and special/covert operations working with opposition forces that all use effects based operations (EBO) for their target set and correlate their timing of forces for a devastating violent impact.

This precision air campaign is characterized by many precision weapons (90%) using our latest C2ISR assets, Jstars, Global Hawk, Predator, Humint, Sigint etc. in a network centric configuration to achieve less than 10 minutes for time critical targeting. Using the Global Strike Task Force and Naval Strike Forces composed of over 1,000 land and sea based aircraft plus a wide array of air and sea launched cruise missiles, this will be the most massive precision air campaign in history achieving rapid dominance in the first 72 hours of combat focused on regime change targets. These are defined as targets critical to Saddam’s control i.e., C4I, IAD, WMD, palaces and locations that harbor his leadership plus those military units that resist or fight our coalition forces.

All the military forces will be told through the opposition forces and our information operations (IO) campaign that they have two choices either help us change regime leadership and build a democracy or be destroyed. In addition, commanders and men in WMD forces will be told that they will be tried as war criminals if they use their weapons against coalition forces or other nations.

In a multi-directional campaign, coalition forces will seize Basra, Mosul and most of the oil fields, neutralize selected corps of Iraqi army and destroy the integrated air defense zone, C4I, WMD locations and Iraqi air using stealth, SAM suppression and air superiority assets. This will enable coalition forces to achieve 24-7 air dominance quickly which is critical to our success. The expansion of our beachheads in the north, south, east and west regions and the airheads seized with alarming speed will allow the opposition forces to play a very significant and decisively important role with our special/covert ops and the Iraqi army/air force to determine their status i.e., friend, foe or just disarm. The political arm of the opposition will communicate intensively with the Iraqi people letting them know they are liberating them from 22 years of oppression and that they are now controlling large amounts of territory. Humanitarian missions will be accomplished simultaneously with leaflet drops etc. United States and other coalition forces are helping us to liberate and change the regime. You the Iraqi people must help us to do this quickly with minimum loss of life. This IO campaign must be well planned and executed working closely with the opposition forces. This means that the administration must move very quickly now to solidify the opposition forces and set up a shadow government with aggressive assistance and leadership from the United States.

In summary the Iraqi forces we are facing are about 30% equivalent since Desert Storm with no modernization. Most of the army does not want to fight for Saddam...
and the people want a regime change. Let’s help them to make this change and liberate Iraq from this oppressor. President Bush has accurately said “inaction is not an option and I am in support of his position.

Mr. Chairman and members again my thanks. I await your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Dr. Halperin.

STATEMENT OF DR. MORTON H. HALPERIN, SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. HALPERIN. Mr. Chairman, it is a great pleasure for me to have this opportunity to appear before this committee on this urgent subject. We have been asked to focus on options, and in my view there really are only two realistic options. One is what I have called containment plus, and the other is preemptive use of military force.

I start where we all start, with the proposition that we would be better off if we could have regime change, but I would insist that our critical national interest in terms of Iraq is to prevent the regime from using weapons of mass destruction or providing weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups. As we consider these two options, we need to ask ourselves which option will make it more likely that nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction might be used against American forces, against allies, or against civilian populations.

The strategy of containment plus would build on the new sanctions regime which the United States worked very hard to get the United Nations Security Council to adopt earlier this year. Its goal would be to tighten the embargo against Iraq, focused on materials which would assist the Iraqis in either building up their conventional military capability or further developing their capability to produce weapons of mass destruction, and it would seek to prevent them from getting hard currency, which they get by the increasing black market trade through the neighbors of Iraq.

At the same time, we would be working to strengthen the deterrence of Iraq’s use of weapons of mass destruction or transfer of those weapons to terrorist groups by seeking a consensus, an international consensus, that military action would follow swiftly if we had proof of either of those contingencies.

This option would also involve continued support to Iraqi opposition groups both inside Iraq and outside, and an effort to try to get them to come together and to articulate what a post Saddam regime in Iraq might look like. Rather than pressing the neighbors of Iraq, as we are now doing, for military bases to conduct combat operations, we would, under this option, be pressing them to make the embargo work.

We would be pressing them to end the black market trade. We would be pressing them to stop permitting the flow of oil outside the U.N. sanctions through their territory, and we would be using a small amount of the vast sums that a military operation would cost to compensate countries around Iraq for their financial losses for implementing the embargo, something that, in fact, states are obligated to do when there is a U.N. Security Council-imposed embargo.
The question is whether this will succeed. I think that if pursued vigorously, with the same kind of determination that other options are being considered, it will, in fact, succeed in preventing Saddam from using weapons of mass destruction or supplying them to terrorist groups. His primary goal is clearly to remain in power, and if he comes to understand clearly that he will not be attacked if he does not cross these red lines but will certainly be attacked if he does, that strikes me, as others on this panel have suggested, as a very powerful and effective deterrent.

Now, how long containment plus will take to bring down the regime, I do not think anybody can predict, just as it was not possible to predict when containment would work against the Soviet Union, but as long as we are strengthening this effort, I see no reason for us to put a time limit on it. We can afford to wait.

Let me turn briefly, then, to the alternative option of military action. It appears that every day we are presented with a new scenario, either by somebody inside the government who likes the scenario, or somebody inside the government who does not like the scenario. I would not presume to evaluate the possible effectiveness of any one of these, but what I would suggest is that we need to proceed with a sense of caution and conservatism, which means that we cannot assume that it is possible to have a short and immaculate war with few casualties which then miraculously puts in place a democratic regime which effectively runs the country and consolidates its power without a continued massive American military presence.

I would suggest that the opposite is very likely, and that the only responsible thing to do is to assume that if we adopt this option, that we are prepared to put in the region enough military force, including ground forces, to march to Baghdad, to fight the war in the streets of Baghdad, which may well be necessary, and to accept the risk of very substantial casualties, not only for American military forces and those of our allies who may join in the attack, but also on the civilian population of Iraq, on that of neighboring countries, including Israel. We must acknowledge that this attack may trigger precisely that use of weapons of mass destruction against our troops or civilians that the policy overall is said to be trying to avoid.

We must be prepared to occupy the country and stay there for a very long time, at very great expense in treasure, but also in risk to lives.

There can be no question that the military cost of this option will be enormous, and equally clear that Saudi Arabia and other countries will not pay for it, as they did at the time of the gulf war. I think we are entitled to know what these budget costs are, and whether the administration proposes to pay for them by running ever larger deficits, by increasing taxes, or by reducing domestic spending. We also need to acknowledge that the price of oil is likely to go up, and that this may well trigger another recession and a substantial decline in the value of the dollar.

Finally, in my view we need to consider the implications of implementing in Iraq this new policy of preemption which President Bush has announced. It is not clear to me whether the administration is arguing that somehow this policy is consistent with our obli-
gations under the U.N. charter, or whether the President is saying that we can no longer be bound by the restrictions that the U.N. charter puts on the use of force by all states.

If he is arguing the first, then I think the case needs to be made of how one squares the language of the charter, the interpretation that all of our Presidents have put on the charter, with the notion that we now can initiate the use of military force. If the President is saying that we no longer should be bound by the charter, then that is a profound change in American policy which I think needs a full debate.

I think all these costs and risks need to be put on the table. They may be worth taking, but certainly not before a full public debate, and certainly not, in my view, before Congress authorizes the use of military force.

Now, finally, I want to reiterate again my view that it is not at all clear that this option will accomplish the most important purpose of preventing terrorist attacks, both conventional and with weapons of mass destruction, against Americans. I think there is certainly a very grave risk, certainly if we move before there is a Palestinian settlement, that the very opposite will occur, that what we will stimulate is a large number of people in the Arab world who will be willing to take up a terrorist attack on the United States and on Americans around the world if they see us launching a military attack against Iraq.

Finally, I would ask that we consider the opportunity costs of this policy. This policy of military action against Iraq has already come to take a very substantial amount of the attention and energy of senior officials of this government. There is only so many things that the administration can do at one time. The attention of top leaders is a very scarce resource, but so is what we can ask our allies to do, and other countries, and the Congress, and the American public, and there are limits to how much money we should spend.

In my view, we should be devoting these scarce resources to nurturing the worldwide coalition against terrorism, to helping to settle disputes between Israel and Palestine, between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and to help countries like Indonesia and Nigeria cope with ethnic conflict.

We also should be staying the course in Afghanistan, and that means nation-building, and helping the security of that country, and we should be working to reduce poverty in developing countries in the world, and getting our own procedures at home right for how to deal with terrorism and how to improve our intelligence to deal with terrorism threats.

These are all daunting tasks, but I would argue that in terms of preventing terrorist attacks on Americans they are much more central, much more urgent, and much more important than launching military operations against Saddam Hussein. In my view, we should allow containment plus to keep Saddam in the box, while we pursue these more urgent tasks.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Halperin follows:]
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor and a privilege to be asked to be part of these historic hearings. I commend you and your colleagues for conducting them and for insisting that if we are to initiate military action this will require extensive public debate and a congressional resolution authorizing the use of force—absent proof that Iraq was involved in 9/11 or is planning an imminent military attack on another country. You have asked me and the others on this panel to focus on options. I will do that leaving it to others to discuss the equally serious issues of what we do the day after we win the war.

There are in my view only two realistic options given the nature of the threat and the realities of the situation. These are: what I would call, containment plus: and military operations against Iraq. Let me first discuss what containment plus would look like and what its pros and cons are and then comment on military options.

I start where we all start with the simple proposition that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous man and that the brutal regime, which he ruthlessly controls with unspeakable terror and total disregard for the well being of his people, is a threat to his neighbors including Israel and to the United States. The most serious threat is that he would use weapons of mass destruction against his people or neighboring countries or that he would supply them to terrorists who might attack anywhere in the world. Thus, we must ask about any option what is the likelihood that it would reduce the risk of such attacks, and at what cost.

CONTAINMENT PLUS

This strategy would build on the new sanctions regime which the United Nations Security Council adopted earlier this year at the strong urging of the United States. Its goal would be to tighten the economic embargo of material that would assist Iraq in its weapons of mass destruction and other military programs as well as reducing Iraq’s receipt of hard currency outside the UN sanctions regime. At the same time we would seek to strengthen the deterrence of Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction or their provision to terrorist groups by pressing for the return of UN inspectors and building international consensus for military action with UNSC sanction if Iraq crosses this line.

The option of containment plus would also involve continued support to Iraqi opposition groups inside Iraq and outside and a willingness to provide as much assistance as these groups can effectively use. It would also involve determined efforts to develop a consensus among Iraqi groups, including the Kurds, and the countries of the region about the nature of the future Iraq state and its relations to its neighbors.

Rather than pressuring states that border Iraq to provide base rights for unilateral military action against Iraq we would be pressing them to end the smuggling and trade in violation of the UN embargo and assist them in monitoring their borders and the flow of material into and out of Iraq. We would provide serious economic assistance to make up for the revenue that these states lose as a result of the embargo and we would work with them and the UN to ensure that humanitarian assistance flows to Iraq. We would institute a serious public diplomacy campaign with real resources so that publics around the world understand that it is the policies of the Iraqi regime and not the embargo which is causing humanitarian disaster in Iraq.

Paradoxically, the Bush Administration’s known inclination to initiate military operations would make it much easier to get the support that the United States would need to make this policy effective. Other states are likely to cooperate because of their fear that the alternative is war.

Will containment plus succeed? I think there is a good chance that the policy implemented vigorously will continue to deter Saddam from using weapons of mass destruction or supplying them to terrorist groups. Since the end of the Gulf War his policies have been aimed at maintaining himself in power in Iraq. He can have no doubt that crossing these lines would mean his swift removal from office.

How long it will take for containment plus to bring about regime change is impossible to say. At some point, despite the terror, Saddam will be removed from power as the Iraqi people act on the understanding that their lives cannot improve as long as he is in power. I see no reason for us to have to put a time limit on this. As

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1 Dr. Halperin is also Director of the Washington Office of the Open Society Institute and the Open Society Policy Center. The views expressed are his own. He served as Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department, 1998-2001.
long as the embargo is made to work and the alliance against Saddam is being strengthened we can and should be patient.

**MILITARY ACTION**

It appears that each day we are treated to another leak of a proposed military strategy to bring down the Iraqi regime. I do not claim the expertise to evaluate the alternative military proposals. I would argue, however, that in evaluating this option we must be ready to face the most serious consequences. We can all hope for a very short and immaculate war with very few casualties and an orderly transfer to an interim regime which runs the country with ease. However, it would be the height of irresponsibility to count on that and to choose this option with confidence that this scenario will come to pass.

If we choose this course we must deploy to the regime sufficient military forces to defeat the Iraqi army on the battlefield and in combat in Baghdad. We must be ready to accept substantial casualties on our own military forces and those of any allies that join in the attack and also on the civilian population of Iraq and of neighboring countries including Israel. We must acknowledge the risk that weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons will be used against our troops and against civilians.

We must also be ready to occupy the country and to stay for a significant period of time coping at great cost with a range of security and economic problems.

There can be no question that the financial cost of this option would be enormous. We are entitled to know what the budget costs are and whether we will pay for them with larger deficits, new taxes, or drastic cuts in domestic spending. We also must accept the risk that oil prices will escalate and that there could well be a sharp decline in the value of the dollar.

Finally, we need to debate the costs of actually implementing the new policy of pre-emption that the President has announced. It is not clear to me if the administration is arguing that the policy is consistent with our obligations under the UN Charter or if he is saying that we cannot be bound by that commitment. Either approach has very profound implications and moves us away from what has been the effort of every American president since Truman to explain how our use of force is consistent with the Charter and reinforces our efforts to prevent other nations from using force.

All of these costs and risks may be worth taking but I do not see that the case has yet been made. As we begin the public debate about this option we are entitled to insist that the administration calculate these costs and make those calculations public and that it explain why this price is worth paying.

In considering the pros and cons of the two options we must ask first and foremost about its impact on the likelihood of terrorist attacks on Americans (and other innocent civilians) in the United States and around the world. I think a very compelling case can be made that even the successful implementation of this option with relatively small direct costs would increase the risk of terrorist attacks directed at the United States. I think this is so for two reasons.

First, especially if there is no progress on the Palestinian issue, it is likely that an American military conquest of Iraq will lead many more people in the Arab and Muslim world to choose the path of terror and to be willing to take part in terrorist activity. Given that we do not have evidence of significant support by Iraq for terrorist plotting to kill Americans and given the likely reaction to an American attack we must insist on the administration explaining the rationale and the evidence for the belief that taking out Saddam reduces the risk of terrorist attacks.

Second, and in my view, even more important, is the opportunity cost of this focus—only with great effort do I resist saying obsession—on military action against Iraq. This administration, any administration, can only do so many things at one time. The attention of top leaders is the most scarce resource but there are also limits on what can be asked of allies and other countries and of the Congress and the American public. And there are limits on how much we can spend. In my view we should be devoting these scarce resources to nurturing the world-wide coalition against terrorism, to settling disputes between Israel and the Palestinians and between India and Kashmir, in helping Indonesia, Nigeria and other countries cope with ethnic and religious conflict, in staying the course in Afghanistan, in helping to reduce poverty in the developing world, and in altering our own procedures at home for dealing with terrorist threats.

These are daunting but urgent tasks much more central to reducing the risk of terrorist attacks than the early removal of Saddam. We should, in my view, allow containment plus to keep him in his box while we work creatively on these more urgent tasks.
Mr. Chairman, in a way these very hearings are a reflection of the way the administration's determination to go to war against Iraq has forced a distortion in the issues that we should be debating. However, given the administration's focus there was no choice. If we are to go to war we must first have the public debate and the congressional authorization which our constitution legally requires and which the health of our democracy demands.

I commend the committee for holding these hearings. I thank you for the honor of being invited to participate, and I await your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We have good attendance. We will try to keep this to 5-minute rounds the first time around.

Let me begin by asking you, Dr. Halperin, if you were still in the government and you had clear and convincing proof that Saddam had a nuclear capacity that was capable of being launched on a missile platform, would that change your view? In other words, the containment plus, I assume the containment plus is designed to diminish the prospect that he gains that ultimate capability. I think we would both say that was the worst capability. Assume that you were convinced that existed. Would that change your priorities?

Dr. HALPERIN. Yes, at least to the extent that I would think we should undertake military action to destroy those capabilities and the delivery systems.

The CHAIRMAN. Which leads me to the next question. Do you think that, were he able to build, buy, steal, possess that nuclear capability able to be delivered by a missile, do you have any degree of confidence that that could be destroyed, absent a military invasion of feet on the ground, troops on the ground?

Dr. HALPERIN. I think certainly the missile delivery system, certainly if it was long range missiles, could be destroyed without troops on the ground, but if troops on the ground were necessary to destroy an active nuclear capability, I would think we could get the support of the countries in the region and of the U.N. Security Council for action of that kind in the way that we were moving to get it against the North Koreans when they were moving in that direction. I think that is a different scenario than I think we are confronting now.

The CHAIRMAN. How would a successful containment plus policy solve or deal with the potential of Saddam giving weapons of mass destruction to terrorists?

Dr. HALPERIN. Well, I think it deals with it only by making it absolutely clear to him that if that line is crossed we will, of course, launch operations. I think if the President has evidence that he is linked to and supported al-Qaeda, then he has the authority to use military force both from the Security Council and from the Congress of the United States, and I think he should act on that. You cannot always be sure you will get the evidence of that, but my view is that he in fact is extremely unlikely to do that unless he concludes that we are going to try to take him out of power anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask any of you who wish to respond to this question. All of this discussion we are having today, we will have in the future, and we have had in the past comes down to relative risks and tradeoffs.

You all have said to one degree or another that it matters where we have a place from which to stage our invasion, if there is an
invasion, whether it is a relatively small number of forces or it is a 1/4 million forces, whatever it is.

You have all indicated that if, in fact, Saddam possess more capability relative to the weapons of mass destruction we know he has, and we are not exactly sure what he has, that presents a serious threat to us.

You have also indicated that it would be better if we had others with us than go it alone, either before, during, or after, and so it all comes down, it seems to me, to vastly oversimplify it, to tradeoffs here. If we go alone now, no one knows the cost, but we would succeed, we would ostensibly change the regime, we would hopefully be able to destroy the weapons of mass destruction that exist over a period of time in the country, but we may very well radicalize the rest of the world.

We may pick up a bill that is $70, $80 billion. We may have to have extensive commitment of U.S. forces for an extended period of time in Iraq, and if we do not do that, we find ourselves in the position where we increase the possibility he could destabilize the region preemptively himself, he could move and use the weapons of mass destruction as leverage for blackmailing actions in the region, and so on.

So in weighing the risks and the tradeoffs here, how important is it and to what degree do each of you feel you have to be certain he possesses the weapons of mass destruction that can be effectively delivered, whether it is a chemical weapon, whether it is a biological weapon, or whether it is a nuclear weapon? How important in each of your calculus is that question that he has, or is close to having, or it is not worth the risk of determining any longer, or waiting any longer, whether he has weapons of mass destruction that are deliverable and efficacious?

Because you heard the testimony earlier, and I know you all are very sophisticated. So, the mere fact you have the ability to produce a chemical weapon and/or a biological agent does not mean you can effectively disperse it, does not mean it can have the efficacy that it would in our hands, for example, so how much of your calculus is dependent upon your sense of his capacity to possess and deliver these weapons?

General HOAR. Mr. Chairman, during the gulf war we believed that he had the capability to deliver chemical weapons against us, and in fact in the run-up, General Al Gray and I went down to Quantico one Saturday to look at a simulation that had been done regarding the two marine divisions that were going to be in the attack into Kuwait, and there were some estimates of casualties that ran in the order of magnitude of 10,000 if artillery rounds with chemical weapons were used.

So the issue is, are these strategic weapons, or are they tactical weapons? Could they be used on troops in relatively short distances of, say, 30 kilometers, or are we talking the cities of Israel and the major cities in the Arabian area? I think there is a big distinction there.

I would also say that while in my mind it will always be murky, the degree to which the regime has acquired these kinds of weapons, particularly at the strategic level, that thus far we have not seen him use this. The current regime has boxed him in. I think
the possibility of him using it goes up considerably if, in fact, the regime is about to fall, and I think certainly that is a grave risk to take in the event of an invasion.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody else? Yes.

Mr. DUELFER. I would just briefly add that not all weapons of mass destruction are created equal. Chemical and biological agents present one level of concern, but when Saddam gets a nuclear weapon, and he has had this intent, he has devoted enormous resources over two decades to do that, then everything will change. We would not be sitting here talking about the potential of a military action against Iraq if we suspected he had a nuclear weapon.

He knows that. I have had this discussion with very senior Iraqis. They know that had they invaded Kuwait after they possessed a nuclear weapon, it might be a very different outcome. So, I think that it is a key inflection point when they get a nuclear weapon.

The other thing is, picking up a bit on your analysis of the dynamic of the issue, what we are seeing here is, it is very easy to quantify, identify near-term costs. It is very difficult to firmly identify long term benefits and long term risks. Budget analysts, politicians, go through this problem all the time, and the fact that we are here and my colleagues are here saying there is a lot of near-term risks, that is true, we can see those, but ultimately there is a very long-term concern which is very, very big and that is, I think, what characterizes much of the debate.

The CHAIRMAN. Dean.

Ambassador GALLUCCI. For me, there is a huge difference between, on the one hand, chemical weapons and bacteriological or biological weapons that are toxins, and on the other hand, viral biological weapons and nuclear weapons. That is where the break comes in terms of casualties and death and destruction, though you can have these overlap, depending upon a lot of manipulating assumptions.

I assume, notwithstanding the careful statements I tried to make here in writing, I assume that Iraq has—not will have, might have, has VX, a very serious nerve agent, certainly sarin, in a deliverable form. I assume it has both anthrax and botulinum toxin, as it did before. It had 4 years to regenerate, and I do not believe UNSCOM could be confident it destroyed it all, so I believe that is the extant right now. I do not know about the smallpox, and that to me is a huge, huge concern, and I think the nuclear weapons fall into that same category.

The problem is, of course, I think getting evidence of this is going to be very hard. We have to ask ourselves the question of whether we want to wait for that evidence, do we want to get on that slope that Charlie was just talking about, trying to figure out what this looks like in terms of long-term costs, when the near-term costs are so easy, or force themselves upon us.

When I try to net this out, I think I come down and conclude that we do not have, right now, an urgent need to act, as we might if we saw a facility under construction, or that missile you talked about with Mort before. That is not in front of us right now, nor do we have the evidence that they are complicit in 9/11. If we had such evidence, I do not believe this Government would have any
choice whatever but to act, so we do not have that kind of pressure on us. At the same time, we have no confidence that we will see anything like that before we are confronted with something we wish not to see.

So I end up thinking that this is not something we should try to live with for a long period of time. We need to get ourselves in the position to cut this off. That means we have got more time than just the next 6 months, year or 2 years that we might be thinking about with an invasion.

That is why I am looking for some option other than an invasion like this very aggressive inspection regime, which can only work if invasion is a viable option, to force Saddam to accept it. But I think you are right to try to push at the edges here to make us think through what would cause us to find it prudent to pay the cost and run the risk of action sooner rather than later.

The Chairman. The question for me is, do we have the time to do this right? Doing it right means we could, in my view, work out arrangements with Russia. We could, in my view, deal with the situation in the Middle East much better than we have now. We could, in fact, be much better situated if we did some very important things over the next 6 to 8 months that we do not have time to do now, and the question is, how much time do we have?

But at any rate, I have trespassed upon your time. I will move to the Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am struck, listening to the testimony this afternoon, by some parallels with our thinking after September 11. Many of us went into a crash course on Islam, and events in several countries of the world where not enough attention had been paid for a long time as to history and development. We sought to gain some idea of why people do the things they did, what the motivation was.

Beyond that, we have been involved in an effort, and the distinguished Senator from West Virginia is taking leadership in this, to determine what deficiencies we have in our intelligence systems. Why we do not know more, and why we were not better informed? Here we have a situation which clearly we need to know much more.

We are all saying today we have not found the evidence, but somebody will ask why not; given the resources of this country, extraordinary abilities that we have, and the imperative need. The same question, as Dr. Gallucci knows, from North Korea has been asked for a long time. The usual comment was that people did not understand the language. They could not insinuate themselves in the country. There were all sorts of dodges and weaves.

But here the life of the country is at stake. We are about to take very grave, important actions, and it just appears to me that—it is not entirely the role of this committee, but each one of us had best become much better informed about Iraq. I am struck by your comments, Mr. Duelfer, that it makes a big difference who succeeds, but I am even querying the question, what are the alternatives? Who knows that much about the internal politics of Iraq these days?

Now, there are Iraqi exiles who meet frequently in this town and elsewhere, and maybe among them are leaders that will have the
backing of the Iraqi people. In other words, to come to the conclusion that somehow or another, the Iraqi people are going to condemn Saddam and fight to re-take their country. But as we heard this morning from Dr. Cordesman, this was not always the case in the past. We were surprised by nationalism, feelings of patriotism, however despicable the leaders, because they did not trust us, either.

In other words on what basis do we believe, or what must we do to have a constituency in Iraq that really wants democracy in any remote form like the kind that we try to produce in this country, or in Western Europe? Who might have at least the backing in a way that Mr. Karzai, apparently through the loya jirga in Afghanistan has some consent? But even then he must contend with the war lords around him, and other people that seek to stop progress.

Now, absent some analysis of what the politics are, and who is there, then we really do have a rather long occupation. The thought of a parallel between Japan or Germany is a real leap in terms of the institutions that are available that might bring about some semblance of Western democracy, so I raise the question, how do we get up to speed? What are the resources academically and governmentally in this country that are likely to identify for an informed argument the post Saddam situation? How do we even gain a sense in terms of public diplomacy, of enlisting the Iraqi people to understand life will be better if, in fact, we intervene, or if we stay, or if we try to produce capitalism, democracy, or whatever we want to do there?

Mr. Duelfer, I will start with you. Would you respond to that?

Mr. Duelfer. Thank you very much. I think these are fundamental issues. In essence what needs to happen is, Iraqis and Iraq need to conclude that it is in their interest and it is patriotic for them as proud Iraqis to change their leadership.

Senator Lugar. How do we do that? What brings that about?

Mr. Duelfer. Well, I think the international community can make a case that this regime is a danger to the external world, it is also a danger to the internal world in Iraq. We should not be prescriptive as to whom should lead Iraq, but I think we can say that there are certain standards, ideals that we would expect a follow-on government to embody to a greater or lesser degree.

This also has the important advantage of avoiding identifying groups of people within Iraq who would very shortly fall into the list of Saddam’s most wanted people, but if we identify characteristics and ideals which no one can dispute, pluralism, elections, fixing the financial system, getting rid of weapons of mass destruction, these are ideals which the external community would support and patriot Iraqis could also support.

Senator Lugar. Why do we think they would? Why would Iraqis say, we need a strong government, Saddam is a bad leader, but on the other hand we need somebody who knows where to go? This degree of participation and vigorous debate is a large part of the process.

Mr. Duelfer. In my experience in talking with lots of Iraqis is that they recognize Saddam as their leader, but they also recognize his shortcomings. They would like nothing better than to be reconnected to the rest of the world. They see enormous benefit in that,
but I do not think they are going to be wanting to see someone impose a leader on them.

There are very delicate balances which you will hear from in the next panel within Iraq, the north, middle, south, clans, military, various institutions, but I think there is a solution set there. I think we should make it clear that we want to change as much in Iraq as possible, meaning the top leadership, and as little as possible at least from the outside. In other words, cause as little damage to the infrastructure as possible.

We ought to make it clear that most Iraqis have everything to gain and little to lose by a change in management.

Senator LUGAR. Does anyone else have a comment on the intelligence, or how we gain people in Iraq?

General MCINERNEY. I think clearly, Senator, there are 2 million Iraqis in the United States that have fled Iraq. They are a valuable source of understanding the people and the communications back there. The opposition forces are in daily and weekly contact with the military and other people in Iraq today. That is certainly a good starting point, and that is why I think we need to organize this opposition to understand the problem.

The forces I am talking about are enabling forces. Now, you can debate whether it is 50,000 or 250,000 or a million. We are talking about an enabling force to help the Iraqi people take their country back and understanding these people, who I think are probably one of the most sophisticated, if not the most sophisticated in the Middle East in education and understanding, and they had a middle class, and still do, it will be a lot easier than people realize.

I used the model of Japan and Germany after World War II. I was a boy there. We had in 1948, we had one division, one division in all of Germany, or at least in the U.S. sector, and the others had more. There was not a large predominance—once you got rid of the Nazi leadership and Hitler, then the people wanted to take this path. I think the people in Iraq will want to take a path. I think their neighbors will not want them to take a path toward democracy, and that will be one of our biggest challenges. Democracy does not flourish in the Middle East, and we must be sensitive to that.

Senator LUGAR. And the neighbors are a real problem, as you point out.

General McInerney. That is correct, who are allies and who are vital to this construct.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Let me just, in the chairman’s absence, thank him for these hearings. I was not able to be here this morning, but I do think that these are obviously very important hearings, and I think this is what this committee is supposed to do, and it is good, as a member of this committee for 18 years now, to see it in advance of decisions doing its work this way, and I think probably every committee member probably feels affirmative about that.

I think the way the chairman has constructed it is good. I think it is right not to have the administration here at this point, and that we sort of lay some groundwork here.
I was in the region earlier in the year and met at some length with Saudis, with the Crown Prince Abdullah, the Foreign Minister and others, with King Abdullah, with their intelligence agencies, President Mubarak, his intelligence people, and came away with a sense that most of them believe—at least they express this—that we are sort of overestimating and overly worried about some aspects of Saddam Hussein, though they do not like him. They acknowledge that, but they certainly interpret some of the threat differently, President Mubarak, I might add, quite dismissively believing that we sort of build him up in some ways.

I am not sure I agree with them. I mean, they live there, but if you assess what we believe he may or may not have, I do not think anybody believes he has a nuclear program today that I have heard with any great conviction. We know he had about 7,000 people that were working on the program once upon a time, but our estimates are today that he may have at least a couple of dozen top-flight nuclear scientists and engineers, but there is probably no doubt he is working on it, and I think most of us have to make the assumption that he is.

Second, he has got some continued shorter range missile development that he has been doing. That could help with a longer range missile, but it is not a direct, longer range missile program, and we estimate that he has somewhere up to two dozen Scuds or so, and obviously that has some potential for menace with respect to Israel, particularly if we were starting to engage in some way, but I understand from Israeli authorities not so much that they do not believe the overall value of changing the equation in the region is not worthwhile.

So there is a lot to sort of balance here. I am of the opinion that, under the right circumstances, it is not that difficult. I think I tend to agree with General McInerney, I think there are, according to the intelligence sources that I have listened to, without revealing any of it, capacities for significantly more internal activity than maybe some people anticipate, so I think it is achievable.

I think the question that we need to think about is sort of when and how, what is the process, what brings you to the point of pulling the trigger, what sort of makes you reach that point where you have made the decision that you have exhausted the doctrine of remedies, if you will, in the context of international law and of going to war?

Certainly one of the lessons of prior conflicts is that it helps to have the American people fully supportive, fully educated, fully involved, and clear about the objectives, and prepared to stay the course. There is nothing in what we have done to date that prepares the American people for that, or that even lays out on the international stage a sufficient level of rationale, evidence, public diplomacy that might bring you, I think to that legitimate trigger-pulling stage.

It seems to me that we are sitting—and I want to ask you particularly, dean, about this, but I would like others to comment about it. I mean, there is a process here that it seems to me has been avoided to date. The rhetoric seems to be far ahead of our capacity, and we seem to be ignoring and dismissive of the need for
friends and allies and understanding on a global basis of why we might ultimately choose to do this.

Now, there is in place a very forceful cease-fire agreement which Saddam Hussein signed and agreed to, and it includes the full destruction of these weapons and the full inspection. Does it not make more sense, in terms of all of these sensitivities that I have just laid out, gentlemen, in terms of gaining the legitimacy of the American people, the assent, the consent of the American people and the assent, gaining the support and understanding of the world as to why we would be doing this, to go back to that process, even though we know he will refuse to live up to it?

Certainly, if he has the things that he does not want us to find, he will not live up to it, so those who want the justification to go in will get the justification, but in the absence of that, we do not have a chance of having exhausted that doctrine of remedies in a way that I think answers the question to mom and pop in America as to why their young child may come home in a body bag.

Now, is there a process here that has been avoided, dean, beginning with you, that we should go through that would better position us with respect to the potentials of this, and the opposite side of that question is, we lived with Russia for almost 50 years with the capacity to destroy us many times over, and a policy of containment worked there. Why could not a policy of containment also work here, at least while you buildup to that point of legitimacy?

Ambassador GALLUCCI. Thank you, Senator. I would like to take a shot at a few of those questions, or observations that were in your statement.

First, I cannot help going back to the nuclear weapons observation, because it troubled me. I do not know that Iraq has nuclear weapons, but I do know for a fact that there was a workable design in Iraq in the days of UNSCOM, which we picked up, and it was an implosion system, a relatively sophisticated design, that they did more work on after that. I also know that we have a real problem with accounting for material, fissile material coming out of the former Soviet Union.

I think I also know that we should have no confidence, we should have no confidence that we will know if fissile material finds its way into Iraq from one of those countries. We might know, but we might not.

What I am getting to here is a very troubling sentence, and that is that I do not understand how someone fully familiar with all of our intelligence capabilities and our knowledge could say with high confidence that Iraq does not have a nuclear weapon now, or will not have one for 6 months or 6 years, not when they have done the work on an implosion system and there is fissile material to be had. I do not understand how one could say that, so that is point one.

Second, when we come to the question of time, do we have time, and would we want time to use it for something useful, for example, to build a necessary consensus domestically and internationally to make this a more politically plausible and successful operation. I think there is a risk there, because of what I just said about the nuclear issue, because for me the key issue here is, is Iraq plausibly capable of transferring a viral biological weapon or
a nuclear weapons capability to a terrorist entity that could not be deterred?

I do not know the answer to that, but I do not like sitting around a long time hoping it does not happen, so I think that is what makes me uncomfortable with simple containment, just wait and see. What we may next see is some devastating event in the United States that is traced back to Iraq, and I would then say, well, I guess that calculation was wrong, waiting and seeing, so I am uncomfortable with indefinite postponement.

However, if you were to say, but do we have time, I guess I think it is important enough to get this right, that we take some time, and for me, again, I think there may be an inspection option. It is not UNSCOM. It sure is not UNMOVIC. It is another kind of inspection that is much more aggressive, that could not be put in place unless the Iraqi regime saw an invasion as the alternative. So I like the idea of trying to find another way to grapple with this, and even, if you must do an invasion, to take the time to get it right.

The chairman referred to doing some missionary work, I think with other countries, particularly Russia, and we have had a concern for a period of time with the position of France within the Security Council. There is much to be done in the region, and you will hear more about that.

So yes, I think we can take the time, but I do not think indefinitely. I am troubled by the simple containment option in which you wait for something that would be a trigger. What the administration is talking about is not preemption, as I understand it. It is a preventive war. Preemption is the anticipation of an act by the other side. We do not see that. This would be looking way down the road and saying, we are not going to allow that situation to emerge. That is a very forward-leaning posture, and I think we have the time to get ourselves ready.

Senator Kerry. But there is a certain visible logistical period of time under any circumstances here, during which time you could certainly provide a sufficiently more powerful ultimatum than existed previously with respect to inspections.

Ambassador Gallucci. I think not only could you, but you have no hope of getting successful inspections unless you took the antecedent steps. The Desert Shield, if I can be allowed, a period of time in which we took some of those steps, and began to put forces in place, and began to take the political steps that made the invasion a very credible option that is something we intended to do, and I think we would be believed this time, where we were not believed 11 years ago.

The Chairman. Senator Hagel.

Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to our panelists, thank you. We appreciate your contributions today, and the contributions you made, each of you, to our country.

Senator Lugar focused on something, and that is, after we have heard your testimony and you have heard our speeches, and you might even hear an interview or two after this, we are all for virtue, democracy, good government, and all things right, but how do we get there, and that, I think, was Senator Lugar's point, and I
would ask each of you to focus on a couple of areas and if you would not mind responding to this question.

General Hoar and Dr. Halperin in their testimony asked a lot of questions back, and they each laid out a number of dynamics and factors that we should pay a lot of attention to if, in fact, the military option is the option, and as we drift along and containment is not particularly attractive, and we have gone through that for 11 years, and we still have Saddam, and we still have uncertainty, and we still have problems.

So therefore, what is the option, what should we do, and there are various versions put forward, and I would hope that General Mclnerney, when you respond, if you will deal a little bit with the opposition groups and forces that you keep talking about, which I am not aware of, but they may be there.

But what I would ask the five of you to focus on is the economic dynamics of this, the opposition dynamics, the allies, how all that integrates into something, or maybe it is not important, maybe a unilateral strike along the lines of what General Mclnerney is talking about, clean, crisp, sophisticated, go in and get it done, and maybe that works.

Then what happens afterwards? Who governs? Do any of you have any idea of an exiled government, of any individual, any groups that you could put forward to us today as to what happens after we take this bold strike in the interest of virtue and all mankind? Now, what follows on? I think General Hoar got into some of those points in his testimony.

So with that, each of you, thank you, and we are always grateful for your consultation and input, and we would start with you, dean.

Ambassador Gallucci. I think I have to go. I do not know, Senator, that I can add on the three points you made, economics, the opposition, and the allies, to what has been said. I liked General Hoar’s list of things we ought to think about, and particularly those things we ought to think about being able to do the day after, as well as the things we ought to put in place so that we do this in the most politically plausible way. That was, I thought, a very nice list, and I would associate myself with that.

I guess for my moment here I would say that I worry about the “lite” option, and I will be listening to General Mclnerney as well to learn more about that option. I have in my ears ringing the words of Tony Cordesman this morning about assuming too much about what the opposition might accomplish, about going in to a light, taking that risks. I do not know that he was speaking specifically about the blitzkrieg type operation, but it seemed that he was speaking to that, and worried about that being the concept of operations, rather than a heavier up, more traditional approach, and that troubles me.

So I guess I still remain to be persuaded that that option really is viable, and that you have got that kind of support, and that the regime is that fragile and can be overturned. It may well be true, but I think the point this morning was that is a hell of an assumption to make, or a risk to take, and right now I would not—based upon what I know, I would not be there myself in making that calculation.
Of all the things that I think in this list that I would worry about most at this point, if we were doing this mostly because we want to avoid the transfer of this capability to terrorist groups, we want to reduce the vulnerability of the United States of America today to suffering a 9/11 event with a weapon of mass destruction, then I want to ask myself, if we do this unilaterally, and we have not taken care with allies in the region, are we going to create a situation which worsens the situation? That for me that is the key question. Mort Halperin's comments went to this, and that to me is very, very important.

Unfortunately, it is a soft point, if I can put it that way. It is a hard one to assess, but if we do this the wrong way and we create, Senator Lugar, what you were talking about before, that situation in which we can ask ourselves, gee, I wonder why we are not appreciated the way we think we ought to be, then we will have really made a tragic error, so I think that is the kind of calculation, very hard to make, and we look to regional experts to help us.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Duelfer.

Mr. DUELFER. I tried to get a little bit at the point you were raising when I said what we need to do ahead of time is do our political groundwork, both with respect to Iraqis in Iraq, Iraqis outside of Iraq, the opposition, but also with some key capitals on this, and I think a discussion about the characteristics of a follow-on government that we would expect to see is one mechanism for involving a lot of important voices, some overtly, some perhaps not overtly, into putting forward a picture of what we expect Iraq will be on the other side, but without being prescriptive, in other words, not being in a position where we are trying to impose something on the Iraqi people.

But I think there is a delicate balance and delicate work that has to be done politically which includes people in Iraq, and that obviously is something that is not necessarily what we can be discussing in an open session, but none of this is guaranteed. There are enormous risks, economic risks, loyal interests, all of that sort of thing. There is a big risk that Saddam will be able to characterize what we are doing as trying to put in place a puppet, and nothing will solidify the Iraqi people to oppose us, nothing will cause more bodies to come back in bags, ultimately, than if the Iraqi people are put in a position where they see supporting Saddam as being the patriotic act.

What we need to do is carefully separate Saddam from patriotic acts for regular Iraqis, Iraqis in the army, Iraqis in the Republican Guard, even the Special Republican Guard, even the security services. We need to make Saddam feel very lonely. I think there is a strategy out there which can do this, both with our allies, with capitals. I think it rests on causing audiences in various locations, most especially in Iraq, though, to think about their relationship with the next government in Baghdad, and when they start doing that, Saddam will be very lonely.

Senator HAGEL. General.

General HOAR. Senator, I think you touched on some very complex issues. First of all, I do not believe that the Iraqi opposition can be depended upon. I think from my own experience in the region, that they were not worth anything during that time. Tony
Zinni, who followed me twice removed, felt the same way up to 2 years ago, and what the Iraqi opposition needs is a charismatic person that is doing something to make the case for a regime change, and that certainly is not Mr. Chalabi in Mayfair sending faxes to Iraq. That is the first thing.

Second, those people that have chosen to stand up and fight on two occasions, the Shia in the south and the Kurds in the north, have both been left in the lurch by the U.S. Government, so until we are on the ground and winning, do not expect any help from them, if that is what we are going to do.

How do we get allies into this game? I would say that pan Arabism as a political movement and as an economic movement is dead, but not as a cultural movement. From Morocco all the way across the Arab world there is still a good deal of sympathy for the Iraqi people, not the regime, but the people. We have to make the case as a government, through public diplomacy and otherwise, and we have not made that case to the Arab people, the Arab street, as it is frequently called, why the change has to be made and why it would be useful, and clearly, as Mort suggested, if there were some movement on the Israeli-Palestinian side we would move a long way, because most Arabs feel that is a far more pressing issue than the Iraqi issue.

With respect to cost, the sort of thing that is contemplated up to and including large numbers of people on the ground, assuming a military victory, would be very costly. Desert Storm, the Saudis paid $17 billion as their share of that bill. Prince Abdullah told me that he had been deceived, his word, by a senior administration official on how the bills would be split up. There is very bad feeling there. I am sure that the Kuwaitis, because of their special circumstance, would help any way they can if we put pressure on them, but it will not be easy.

I think that all of the things that we have talked about here need doing, but it requires a concerted effort on the Government’s part, and I do not see that that work is being done at this time.

I would finally add that bringing the Russians into the equation, and perhaps the Chinese, because that is the source of some of this weapons transfer of materials, would help indeed, and shutting down the oil that goes from Iraq through Turkey, $2 billion a year, and providing another source for the fuel that goes to Jordan at a reduced cost would also put greater pressure on the Iraqi Government.

Senator HAGEL. General McInerney.

General MCINERNEY. Senator, I think the important thing is, the opposition group must be developed. The fundamental tenet that we have got to operate from, and I will not personalize this, but there are people out there that our Government can actively work with. They will not meet the Boy Scout sniff test. They will not do certain things, but they will be part of a group that will have credibility within Iraq, and it has the right objectives and the right motives.

Nobody loves Saddam in Iraq. Every family, I have been told by Iraqis, every family has been hurt by this man, either in the Iranian war, the gulf war, or personal prosecution that he has made
against them, and so we need to capitalize on that, and there is a sweet spot.

I cannot give you that answer now, but I do know that thoughtful people can resolve that issue, and once you have that and have a credible one, then everything else starts to roll with it, and so that is to me extremely important, and I would just agree with the comments that General Hoar made on the allies.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Dr. HALPERIN. Senator, I think that is the critical question. I am extraordinarily skeptical that we have a clue of how to bring into existence a combined Iraqi opposition that could take over the country. We have been trying for a very long time under three American administrations now, and I do not believe that there is a solution to that problem.

Moreover, I would say that while many, and maybe most Iraqis, hate Saddam, I would say that it is extraordinarily unlikely that a group that came to power which was patriotic Iraqis would give up the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. They live in a world surrounded by nuclear states—Pakistan, Iran, Israel. That is not a Saddam policy. That is a policy, I believe, that most Iraqi leaders would follow.

Moreover, I think it is extraordinarily unlikely that the group that came into power in Baghdad would be for the kind of autonomy that the Kurds tell us is the precondition for their cooperating with us. I think we have failed to honor our commitments to them twice now, and to promise them that in the face of what is likely to be a government in Baghdad that has no interest in it is, I think, an extraordinary commitment to make. I would think whatever government comes to power, unless it is following a long American occupation, is not going to be anything like a democratic government. There are no others in the area. It is hard to imagine why this would happen overnight in Iraq.

I think we also have to be enormously humble about our ability to help friendly governments in the region do the right thing. It is not an accident that most of the terrorists came from countries deeply friendly to the United States that we have worked with for a very long time. I think the danger that if we have a friendly Iraqi regime it will become for the first time a breeding ground of people who go elsewhere and plot to kill innocent Americans is not only a risk, but in my view is extraordinarily likely.

A democratic Iraq of the kind that we talk about after Saddam will come about only if we are prepared to stay there for a very long time, accepting, in my view, very great risk of casualties, and a threat to the territorial integrity of Iraq. A democratic regime is not going to have the capacity to keep that country together unless there is an American military force in the country that insists that it stay together, and we have to think about whether we really want to be the instrument.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone disagree with that point? Does anyone disagree with the point just made? Repeat the last point, please.

Dr. HALPERIN. Keeping Iraq together, and democratic, will require American military forces dedicated and committed to that, in-
cluding denying the Kurds the kind of autonomy that they will demand and assert.

The CHAIRMAN. Stop right there, please. Does anyone disagree with that specific point, and if so, how?

General MCINERNEY. Well, I think that the opposition groups clearly want to keep, except maybe the Kurds, keep Iraq as Iraq. I mean, the Shias in the south, they do not want——

The CHAIRMAN. Except the Kurds. That is like saying keep the United States together, except the Southwest.

General MCINERNEY. And that will be one of the entry points, that because it is in our interests to have the Iraq that we have there today and not a fragmented society, and that is, I think, how we entered this argument and get our support, and that is extremely important.

Again, the size of the military, it is more the influence of the United States to keep than a large occupation force. I do not see that as the requirement. It is the influence and the staying power of our influence there helping to shape that democracy. Sir, I believe that in one sense the two principal leaders of the Kurds have made a deal with Saddam Hussein already. Both of them have gone on record recently as saying that they are fairly comfortable with the relationship.

I think that that could be done again, but Mort's point is well taken. There is no tradition of democracy in that area. Iraq is the instrument of post colonialism cut up by the British, cutting across ethnic lines.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make it clear, I am not trying to start an argument. I am trying to determine throughout these hearings where there are points of consensus on major, major questions, and a major question is, to me at least, what after? That is why I asked the question.

I would yield to Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask one of Mr. Duelfer and Dr. Halperin.

There are obviously a number of diverse points of view in the foreign policy community about the right course of action in Iraq. No one disagrees with the basic premise, though, that the Iraqi people have suffered terribly from years of deprivation, and that they have been consistently told that it is United States support for U.N. sanctions that is responsible for their plight. I think, Mr. Duelfer, you were already getting into some of this a moment ago, but I would like to hear a little bit more from you and then from Dr. Halperin about what kind of reaction can we expect from the Iraqi people if the United States moves to invade their country?

If widespread civil conflict threatens to break out in the wake of regime change, staving off chaos in Iraq may require, as we just talked about, a very significant American presence over a significant period of time. Aside from the obvious resentment this will provoke in other parts of the Middle East, is there any reason to believe that the Iraqi people themselves would tolerate such a presence?

Mr. DUELFER. Senator, it is for exactly those points that you are raising that I emphasize that we need a very well thought out set of political organizing principles. In a sense, there are national in-
stitutions in Iraq that hold the country together, the regular army, there are departments of agriculture, irrigation, there is a civil service, there are clans which span the length and breadth of the country, and they need to feel that their interests will be preserved in what comes next, but it is very important that whatever we do not be seen as imposing something upon them, but simply allowing them to replace their own leadership.

If they wind up in a position where Saddam is saying, here comes the Americans, they want to destroy the great nation of Iraq and put in place a puppet, then I think we are headed for a big mess.

Senator Feingold. Are you suggesting these institutions will be able to overcome the connection that people may feel between the humanitarian crisis and what has happened in the past?

Mr. Duelfer. I think if we posit that we will judge the next government in Iraq based on how it proceeds toward behaving more normally, toward pluralism, and say we are going to make our decisions about security relations, about debt relief, about adjusting the sanctions—we need to get out of this box that we are in, and I have no idea how we got in it, where the notion of changing the management in Baghdad is seen as something anti-Arab.

I mean, Saddam has done a great job in speaking to the Arabs in the street, as they are called, via al Jazeera and other mechanisms, saying the United States is against the Arabs because the United States wants me out of power. I mean, logically there is nothing better I can imagine for the Arab people that if Saddam left and the Iraqi people were able to achieve their enormous potential, and there is enormous agreement that they have enormous potential.

Senator Feingold. Again, Dr. Halperin, what I am getting at is the relationship between the humanitarian crisis and the reaction of the Iraqi people.

Dr. Halperin. Well, I think part of that, Senator, goes back to the spectacular failure of the United States so that we got to this point where the world believed that somehow we were responsible for the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, rather than Saddam Hussein. Secretary Powell came in, I thought, committed to changing that, both by more effective public diplomacy, but even more important, by changing the nature of the embargo. That is, by allowing Iraqis to import many more kinds of things than we had permitted in the past, by allowing them to rebuild their oil industry and export as much oil as they could, consistent with the economic situation, and focusing the embargo only on things which contribute directly to their weapons of mass destruction or conventional military capability.

We now have that resolution from the U.N. Security Council. As far as I can tell, having worked very hard to get it, we have done nothing to implement it. I think we need to implement that in a way that turns that tide so that we begin to demonstrate to the world that if there is a humanitarian crisis in Iraq, it is Saddam Hussein's fault, and not the fault of the U.N. embargo, and that is part of my proposed containment plus strategy.

If you talk about a regime that comes in afterwards, the natural course of events in Iraq in my view would be to a regime which
suppressed the Kurds, which denied political freedom to people, and which continued to develop weapons of mass destruction. It would still be better than Saddam’s in some ways, and not as crazy, and not as bad for the people of the country, but that is what it will be unless we are prepared to stay there for a very long time, in a very unnatural way, and actually try to change that country. I think we are talking about 20 years of many American troops in the country.

The alternative is that we will, in fact, not live up to the commitments we will make to the Kurds to get them to cooperate in this endeavor, and I think there are very serious moral and realpolitik issues of once again promising them something that we are not going to deliver on.

Senator Feingold. Thank you, doctor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Chafee.

Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of our witnesses have said that first we have to solve the Palestinian issue before we move here, and I suppose we could have weeks of hearings on that issue, but I am inclined to agree, and it seems to get worse every day instead of better.

I do have a specific question. It seems as though some of the Islamic fundamentalists are using to their propaganda advantage the presence of our military bases near the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, and technically, in relation to the value of those bases to us strategically in the gulf, and the disadvantage to us on the propaganda front, where does that fit in, these bases that we have, and both the generals have had experience with?

General Hoar. Of course, the bases in Saudi Arabia are a legacy from the gulf war. You will recall that King Fahd agreed to that when Mr. Cheney and Mr. Wolfowitz and Norm Schwartzkopf went over right after they briefed the President. With the requirement to conduct Southern Watch, the air campaign over Southern Iraq, we needed bases in the area, and those bases existed in Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia agreed to pay the vast majority of the costs associated with them, but this has been very difficult for many conservative Muslims in Saudi Arabia.

As you know, the Wahabi sect of Islam is very xenophobic, and so as a result there has been continuing pressure. Osama bin Laden used this theme in his program, but he has used a variety of themes directed at different populations in the Arab world that are not all consistent. I think the only place that you would find that problem is in Saudi Arabia with that particular group of people.

Senator Chafee. How critical are they to us, their presence in the region?

General Hoar. Well, the bases are being replicated in Qatar right now, so there are other options, but I would say in terms of contemplating military action in that area, U.S. military action, air space over Saudi Arabia is critical. If you were to not have the ability to use Saudi air space, the problem would become extremely more difficult.

Senator Chafee. General McInerney, anything to add?

General McInerney. No. I agree completely with General Hoar.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. Do you want to take a 5-minute break? Your constitutions are admirable.

The Senator from Florida.

Senator NELSON. I would yield to the Senator from West Virginia.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from West Virginia. He was here before everybody, and I was getting to him last, for which I apologize.

The Senator from West Virginia.

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am struck, I guess, by listening to this conversation this afternoon, about the enormous variety and range of uncertainty which is expressed by all of you, and it is not that people are keeping all options open, because you are all experienced professionals, and that is not your purpose, but the effect of what you are saying gives that impression, that we need to keep all options open, so the concept of uncertainty interests me.

For example, people talk about galvanizing the people in some way. Well, I mean, you know, they talked about that in Indonesia when Sukarno was in charge, and nothing happened, until something eventually did after decades, and Assad the same thing—was he a 7-year term, something of that sort—and now we have Hussein, and people are talking about, well, if we could only figure out a way to get the people going.

To me, the pan Arabism argument followed, as Senator Lugar indicated, our total inability to understand what Islam is, and getting off all the signals that we do not, and then even in conversations like this, where there is this sort of—where the sense of uncertainty about the development of American foreign policy, or potential American foreign policy, military or diplomatic, is just wrapped in uncertainty.

I mean, I think that one can speculate that it is a lot easier to use intelligence to find out, for example, what is going on in the chemical world with emissions and effluents than it is in the biological world, which is much more discrete. You say that the nuclear thing, if we were really sure about the nuclear thing I cannot imagine that we would not go in, and yet my understanding this morning was that there was a feeling that each day that goes by the threat gets greater, and then we get back to the threats, which are the subject of all of this.

The question I would ask you is that there is an extraordinary polemic involved in this, because the stakes are so high, the consequences Senator Kerry mentioned, are we preparing the American people, and that is as if Iraq existed by itself in the world, and of course it does not. They have their own nations, we have our own problems, and there are uncertainties everywhere now which encourage each other and compound, therefore, so I am just interested in what is a resolution process? I mean, if we are stuck with uncertainties, and then we can go from here to here, and we are rational here and we are rational here, we make sense here and we make sense here, and we are right here and we are right here, so we describe all the options, but time closes in, the dean said so, and every day that passes gets more dangerous.
And then this not insignificant point that if, perchance, we wait 3 days too late, and either from that country, through others—and some people say no, they will not do it through others, because they want to keep it for themselves because it gives them power, but who knows about that, too, and then some day all of a sudden some series of terrible things happens in this country, and then the whole concept of body bags takes on a very different concept.

So I guess the only question, certainly the only question I have time for, is that we can deal with uncertainties because we are an honest Nation and we tend to be very open in expressing our views and our concerns and our worries, and that is fair to the American people, part of the democratic process, unique in the world, I might say, we are that way.

But at some point there comes the point of a resolution of what you are going to do, and you cannot talk about uncertainties because you do not have all the answers, and you never will have all the answers, and we all know that we will never have all the answers, and so sort of a collective sense from you gentlemen of how one deals with the process of going from continuing uncertainties on very, very large issues to the point of decision. Obviously, it rests in the hands of the President of the United States.

Ambassador GALLUCCI. I would like to take a brief shot at that and go back to a point that was made earlier that the coalition fought a war against Iraq and won, and there was a resolution to the war, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. It is still outstanding and is not being implemented, and so as an opening proposition, Senator, your statement that we have this uncertainty, let us remember that there was a resolution that really deserves to be implemented. So we are dedicated to getting from here to there, which is to say, to an Iraq that does not have weapons of mass destruction.

So the question is, how do we get there? Well, do we have to invade immediately? I would say no. Is that something we want to leave alone for a long period of time? I would say no, too risky, for the reasons we have all talked about.

So in the near term it would seem to me one of the things we ought to do is build a consensus around the need for action. We should have hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this, and we should address all this, and the American people should be listening, and then we should start to do those things, some of which have been laid out by some of my colleagues at the table, that would build a consensus domestically and internationally, in order that we be in a position to take military action when either we are forced to because of some bit of information that is delivered to us by George Tenet, or some other way, or because we have come to the point where we think we now are in a better position in terms of our status with allies and friends and domestically. Finally, if you took the advice I was offering, you would also want to check the box of really trying to see whether an aggressive inspection regime could be put in place.

But there is a deliberate process, I think, that we can move and implement, but starting with the proposition that that U.N. Security Council resolution deserves to be implemented and has not
been for the last, you could pick the year, but certainly probably 5 or 6 years is not a bad number.

Dr. HALPERIN. I think that your premise is absolutely correct, what dominates this in uncertainty. It dominates almost all international problems. They are all much too complicated to have any real certainty about what to do, and if we think we have certainty, it is because we bring to it an ideology that filters out the things that produce the uncertainty.

The answer to uncertainty, in my view, is the American Constitution. I think the way to resolve this question is the way the Constitution intended. That is to say, if the President concludes that he wants to implement an option, particularly one that involves the initiation of the use of military force, I think he has an obligation to come to the Congress and ask for a resolution authorizing him to do that.

I think he has an obligation to lay out his understanding of the costs and gains, and how he resolves these uncertainties, and then I think the Congress has to debate those, and if it authorizes the President to go, then I think he has the ultimate responsibility to decide when to initiate it. You can do all of that without eliminating the tactical surprise of a military operation, and that is why I think these hearings are so important.

The consensus that seems to me to be developing on both sides of the aisle in the Congress and outside that this is a situation in which the Congress' authority is needed to use military force is an important step forward. I think this country will stand together whichever we decide to do, as long as we do it with our eyes open, understanding the uncertainties and the costs, and we follow the procedures of the Constitution.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panelists for your presentations, your thoughtfulness. Several of you I have had in front of panels where we were going through this exercise I believe 4 years ago looking at Iraq.

I want to go at one narrow question, one broad question. Several years ago, when we were looking at regime change, that was the terminology that was developed at the time on the Iraq Liberation Act, supporting outside groups, what we could do to remove Saddam Hussein, there was broad consensus that this is a bad actor, Saddam Hussein, we would be better off if he was not there, is now the time, and what are the means, and that is the same question we are here with today.

One of the issues that came up at that time was, it would not be a containment plus strategy as you described it, but one was described as saying we have a no-fly policy over certain portions of Iraq today that Saddam cannot enter air space, and we will enforce that. It was to expand that policy to a no-fly, no-drive policy, and try to allow opposition forces to buildup in further areas of Iraq, Kurds already control a good portion of the north, try to expand that in the south, and to have Saddam become more of a mayor of Baghdad than controlling the entire country.

I would like, perhaps if we could, one of the military members respond to the thoughts of trying to do something like that today,
and whether or not you feel like that is a meritorious type of policy
trend to support.

General Hoar. Senator, I do not think Tom and I are going to
agree with this, but I think Tony Cordesman’s thoughts this morn-
ing about encouraging resistance without direct affirmative assist-
ance on the ground is at best an unethical and perhaps an amoral
approach. Given what has happened in the south to the Shia be-
fore, I do not think that you can build that kind of support in the
south without a firm commitment on the part of the Government
to come to their aid.

Senator Brownback. On the ground?

General Hoar. On the ground.

General McInerney. I would agree with General Hoar. The op-
position must be developed outside the country, and it must be
credible, and then working covert operations back in, but only
when you put U.S. and coalition forces in harm’s way in that coun-
try in such an enabling force size that you can enable them to sur-
vive, because in the final analysis, the coalition forces will be the
ones that make this successful. It is not the opposition forces. The
opposition forces bring political to it, Iraqis retaking Iraq. You are
helping them do that.

Number 2, they also bring a dialog with the Iraqi people in the
Iraqi Army, and that is where we need to focus, but I would agree
100 percent with General Hoar and Tony Cordesman that, do not
let anything try to do it, them start by themselves.

Senator Brownback. Just with air superiority, using air superi-

General McInerney. I do not think air alone can do that.

Senator Brownback. Thank you for directly responding. The sec-
cond is a broader question. It may be a bit of a wild card, but it
struck me as an interesting point. A gentleman far more knowl-
dgeable than I am on these issues in the region was assessing the
war on terrorism—and I think to date the Bush administration has
done a marvelous job in the war on terrorism.

I think they have been so very focused, very intense, and going
sequentially, focused on Afghanistan. Next, they have been in-
volved in the Philippines where the troops are coming out, Georgia,
troops in Uzbekistan, building alliances up in Central Asia. I think
this has been to me a very good, solid, sequential strategy.

My question is now that in the war on terrorism, what is the ap-
propriate next target to go at? If you just back up and you ask
yourself, what is the best place to go at, and this person was as-
serting that if you look at that way, and you are trying to get
your biggest, most problematic targets first, an analogy to dealing
with cancer, where you go and you dig the big nodes out before
they metastasize, you go at Afghanistan, you have got to dig and
pull this one out, that your next big country that is supporting and
sponsoring terrorism, that is putting money into it, that is putting
troops into it, that is training, is Iran, that that is the country that
is supporting, that is sponsoring more terrorism, supporting Islam
Jihad, Hezbollah, Hamas, shipping weapons, providing training to
a number of countries in that region. Is that the more likely in-
tense focus that one should go at in a sequential battle in the war
on terrorism?
General McInerney. My feeling is, is that Iran will take care of itself once Iraq goes. Iraq has violated the U.N. accords. It has violated everything. It attempts to shoot down every day airplanes in the northern fly zone and the southern fly zone. If they hit one of them, that is an act of war, is it not? That does not seem to bother him, because I think he flat says, they just do not have it. They just do not have the guts to come after me, and every day, they fire at our planes, and every day we put them in harm’s way. Now, that is why I think Iraq should come before Iran.

What you said about Iran is exactly correct, although I think once Iraq goes, that Iran will self-correct.

Dr. Halperin. Senator, let me comment on that. Two points. I think the only way to stop Iran from supporting those terrorist groups is to settle the Palestinian-Israeli problem. I cannot imagine even a different regime in Iran which would not provide support to those groups as long as the Middle East problem is the way it is, so the solution to the Iranian terrorism, which as you say is focused on the Middle East and on Israel, is to settle the Middle East problem. You cannot settle it by regime change in Iran.

Second, I agree with you, we need to go through a sequence, but I think we have skipped the first step too fast. Afghanistan is not over. Afghanistan is still going to require for a very long time a very substantial American military presence, and I think before we look for another place to use American military force we had better make sure that we do not leave behind an Afghanistan which 2 years from now is supporting terrorist groups again, not from the central government, but from pockets around the country.

General McInerney. The only thing I would say to that, Afghanistan is not developing weapons of mass destruction, and that is why the priority must shift. We clearly must stay and work the Afghan problem, Mort. I agree with you 100 percent.

Ambassador Gallucci. Senator, I think Iran is a serious problem for us, but I hope it is not on our list of countries which we would plan to invade any time soon in a preemptive act.

Senator Brownback. I have not heard anybody suggest that.

Ambassador Gallucci. That is good. I think there is a question about how best to deal with Iran. I guess I would disagree with General McInerney. I do not think that addressing the Iraqi problem is necessarily going to help us with Iran. I think certainly, if the Palestinian-Israeli issue were resolved, that would go a long way in taking away one of the issues that causes difficulty.

Iran’s drive to weapons of mass destruction independent of its support for terrorism is, I think, a much more deeper rooted desire in Iran, and I do not think it is connected particularly to this regime. I think it is traceable to the Shah, and I think this is a strategic issue that only when we get a dialog with Iran will we be able to address successfully. Right now, I think the key to dealing with Iran is dealing with Russia rather than Iran, because we do not have much going on with Tehran.

To go back to your first question about where do we go next, I would be putting energy working on the Mort Halperin theory of governance, that governments of the United States only have so much energy. I would be putting energy on working on South Asia and Pakistan in particular, and I worry greatly about the stability
and coherence of that country and its relationship with India over Kashmir.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, I agree with what you have said about what after, and a good example of that is Afghanistan, and we are not even into the what after. We are still in the middle of it, and yet we are not going to have success for the long run in Afghanistan unless we have a major presence there to help them, and you have pointed out the distinction between Afghanistan and Iraq being the potential for weapons of mass destruction.

Now, if we got involved in Iraq militarily, what is that going to do to logistical and personnel support in other parts of the world, particularly in Central Asia? Is that going to stress us to the point that we are not going to be able to supply what we need to over there in Afghanistan, and in the surrounding area, and out there in the Arabian Sea? Give us your comments on that.

General HOAR. I think that what little I know about the plans that are contemplated about military action in Iraq, I think the problem is always scarce assets. The intelligence, the Jstars, the rivet joint airplanes, tankers, those things, I think there are adequate forces on the ground.

I think the carrier battle groups and that sort of thing, given the current state in Afghanistan, has slowed down from the early days. Whether or not you could sustain it, given the requirement for forward deployment and so forth, I think there probably would be some shortage. I read in the paper that some of the smart weapons were used extensively in Afghanistan, but now those supplies have been reestablished. I think there would be some problems, but I do not think they are showstoppers.

But I would again point out the much larger problem is, from where do you launch these operations, and with whose help, and so forth.

General MCKINNEY. I would agree with General Hoar, and the key thing is where we launch them. It would stretch us, but it is throughout the world, because this would be a major regional contingency, but it is within our capability.

Senator NELSON. Both of you were talking about the forces that would have to be brought to bear from the outside. Do you have a sense from your military experience as to how many troops we are talking about?

General HOAR. Well, I think from Tom’s comments he believes that a good deal more can be done with the new technology that is available to us than I believe. I think that as Tony Cordesman said this morning, you may be able to do this on the cheap, but in the event that it does not work, you need to be prepared with a fallback position.

The old military belief is, you make an assumption, and then you have an alternate plan to make sure that if the assumption does not work, that you can in fact have another choice.

It seems to me that at the end of the day you are going to have to put people on the ground. The Republican Guard divisions, their
loyalty to the regime, it seems to me that you cannot do that on the cheap.

Having said that, the very things that Tom has mentioned, particularly with smart bombs, the command control communications and so forth, has improved enormously, and it would be much, much easier than it was in Desert Storm, but I am afraid you would still have to put a fairly large number of folks on the ground.

Senator Nelson. And not doing it on the cheap, and putting large numbers on the ground, we are really talking about a 1/4 million troops, are we not, having the backups you are talking about if things go wrong. You have got to have that capability of backup.

General Hoar. I would be reluctant to put a number on it, because I do not know what people that are much closer to this problem than I—but I would say it is in that ballpark, yes, sir. It is certainly not the 70,000 we have heard from time to time.

Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the things we have to explore here is cost, and I am as much of a hawk as anybody, but let us get it out on the table. With what we had in the gulf war, roughly 1/2 million, the cost, the total cost was about, in today's dollars about $80 billion, so if you are going to have a force half that size, and you are talking about the same duration, in today's dollars that is in the range of $40 billion.

Now, maybe we have to spend that, but let us understand that, and let it be a part of the dialog.

General Hoar. I think you also have to consider, Senator, the cost to the economy. The price of oil went to $40 a barrel during the gulf war. There is every reason to believe that some similar disruption would take place to the American economy.

General McInerney. I would say, and I will not give a number, but it is a smaller force, and let me give you a few reasons why. No. 1, we have added certain technology in our bomber force that we did not have in the Jdam, where you can have a B–2 hit 16 targets at once, a B–1 can hit 24 at once, a B–52 can hit 12 at once, I think. It enables them to stay up over the target so the ground forces through binoculars lays, designate, and they have got a bomb on target in 10 minutes, all weather, and so that is a quantum jump.

The Global Hawk, the Predator, where you have 24/7, we had two Jstars in Desert Storm. One, they were prototypes. They would fly at night, and the contractors would rewrite the code in the daytime. Today, I think we are at 14 Jstars, which can sanitize a box on any movement.

The other things I would say, Senator, are, he does not train his divisions in a division-size exercise. Their readiness is so far down, and I think we all agree he does not have an air force. Whatever you say, if he takes off, he is going to die, because the AWACs will pick him up in the take-off mode, and our airplanes will be on them, so he is going to be under constant attack.

Now, we definitely need ground forces, and I say we need heavy, we need light, we need air mobile, but that rolled up with the opposition, the opposition talking—because the opposition forces know the division commanders. They have got their phone numbers. They know the corps commanders, and there is something there
that we need to do better on, and I will leave it at that, and I know we can.

Do we have it right now? I would agree with General Hoar, we do not have it right now, but all that rolled up in was a very important campaign which speed and the simultaneous—remember, we had 38 days, or whatever it was. Many would still like to have that. There is a powerful synergy between simultaneous land and air, because when you put ground in, he has to mass his forces, and if anything we have invested in, it was taking tanks out on the Central Plains of Europe, and that has got to be his main force.

And again you play back to the IO campaign, to the Iraqi people. We are not after you nor your military. That is an extremely powerful tool that we need to work on.

Senator Nelson. Clearly, we have the new systems. By the way, Joint Stars, Mr. Chairman, is built in my home town of Melbourne, Florida.

Mr. Chairman, I want to ask one more question, and this is a very delicate question. You were not here before, when you had given me the opportunity to chair the hearing, and I raised the issue of the downed pilot from Jacksonville, Florida, from the gulf war, and all of these folks were sitting in the audience and heard my questions to the previous panel, and my question to you all would be, if Commander Scott Speicher is alive, they are obviously going to use him in some way as a shield, as some kind of wedge to try to get us not to do certain things or go certain places.

That, of course, from a human standpoint, with a family that has gone through what they have gone through in Jacksonville, if he is alive, is just an awful contemplation. Can you all give to us, to me any insight into how we would have to go about that? Do we just have to be coldhearted and put the national interest first? What would you recommend?

General Hoar. Senator, there are several hundred Kuwaitis that were captured, and there is no trace of them as well. This is clearly a national policy. There have been just Iranians that have been repatriated recently from the Iraq-Iran war. I think we need to continue to press in every possible way, but it would seem to me that again, using the good offices of other countries, specifically the Russians, and maybe others could help as well.

In the long run, I do not think any of us could speculate about what role this particular tragedy would have in terms of national policy.

Senator Nelson. I could not expect you to answer any other way.

Mr. Dufeler. You raise a very important point, both with respect to an individual, but with respect to a general problem, and I have had over the years some serious conversations with Iraqis about how Americans target, and what they do, and so on and so forth, and it might be useful to just say what their impression is.

Their impression, their thing is, Americans cannot take casualties. This is part of the motivation for weapons of mass destruction. I had a discussion on September 18, 1995, late at night, with Iraqis, where Iraqis first discussed with us their concept of the use of weapons of mass destruction, and what they did prior to the commencement of the conflict in 1991, and it has been said before, but I think it bears on this.
They deployed weapons, they filled them, they predelegated the authority to use them if the United States went to Baghdad, and they believe that that contributed to the decision not to go to Baghdad. Again, the notion is, the United States cannot take casualties, but more than that, they also saw what happened at the end of the gulf war, when we ended the fighting after 100 hours. Why? Well, one of the factors which they saw was, here is television pictures of the Road of Death, so not only can Washington not stand to take casualties itself, they do not even like it when Iraqis are casualties.

And if you add to that the experience of the last decade, where as I mentioned in my testimony Saddam has taken his own population hostage, the international community cannot sustain its will because Saddam is causing his own people to pay an enormous price.

Now, all of this philosophy is going to weave itself into how they defend themselves against perceived attack, including collocating civilian and military targets, such that no weapon, no matter how smart, is going to be able to distinguish between the two, and we just have to be able to take that into course.

Senator NELSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You are an extremely valuable panel, and we have one more panel, but I cannot resist, I have two more questions, and I would ask my colleagues if they have one or two more. This is too important to let you go.

Each of you have a slightly different prescription as to how to proceed. To speak to the point made by Senator Rockefeller, there is necessarily uncertainty in all of the prescriptions. What I have gleaned from you all, that you all seem to have in common, although slightly different ways of approaching what you would propose to a President, for example, at this moment, is that none of you seem to think that the groundwork that is needed to be done thus far for your individual approaches, each one of you. They are all different, slightly different. They are different in degree.

But what I have gotten so far this morning and this afternoon is that whether it is containment plus, whether it is a robust regime with a ready force demonstrating that we need it, or what is in between, is that the spadework necessary to be able to successfully bring to fruition each of your suggested courses of action has not been done yet. Is that correct?

Any of you, for example, were Senator Lugar President, and tomorrow he turned to you and said, OK, I am about to implement full blown your proposal, any one of you, would all of you say, I am ready to go, we are ready to go right now, or would you say, by the way, we have got to do a lot more work, we have not done this with the Russians, we have not done this with the Kuwaitis, we have not moved this with the Europeans, we have not done this with the—I mean, am I right, or am I getting this wrong here? There is more that has to be done for every one of the prescriptions, right, in terms of spadework?

Ambassador GALLUCCI. It is a leading question, Mr. Chairman, but I think you lead us in the right direction.

The CHAIRMAN. It is intended to be, because I do not want to make any mistake here, not because I want you to reach the same
conclusion. I just want to make sure that I understand it, because
look, gentlemen, I want to make it clear this is maybe the best way
in simple terms that folks in my home town of Claymont will un-
derstand, I think, our obligation at the end of the day whenever
that is—I do not mean today—is to say to the American people,
here are the choices. You pay your money, and this is the chance
you take. The upside or the downside is clear.

If he has to take the one side, nuclear weapons. Today, tomor-
row, 6 months or 6 years from now, that is a very bad thing. If he
has the ability to deliver that over a range that is longer than a
couple of miles, that is even a worse thing, and because of his pre-
vious mode of action, because of what the perception on the part
of Iraqi military and civilian leaders around him is about, our abili-
ty to absorb pain and suffering, the consensus seems to be he
would likely at some point use either preemptively or in response
these weapons, and therefore we should do something about this,
and if we did something about it and were able to wipe him out,
in the sense of take him out and get rid of those weapons, it would
be a very good thing, because the potential for things in the region
to get better would be there. That is the upside, the danger and
the upside.

But don’t we have to say to the American people, and it may be
I am truly—I have not reached a conclusion about this, but if, for
example, we were struck with a weapon preemptively, we would re-
spond, and would we not have to say to the American people, these
are the likely consequences of our responding, or preemptively
moving. One would be, there would be loss of life, loss of American
life. It is not likely that we are going to be able to do this without
something between a couple and maybe 10,000 lives lost, depend-
ing upon the ability and the efficacy of the chemical or biological
weapons he may have.

The second thing we are going to have to say to them is, we are
going to have to mobilize on a grand scale, say goodbye to daddy
for Labor Day and mommy for Halloween, because the Reserves
and the National Guard are going to have to be mobilized. Does
anybody think we can do any of what we are talking about without
mobilizing the Guard and the Reserves to a degree beyond which
they are now? So we have to tell people that, so they are not sur-
prised about it. It seems to me we have to tell them that.

We spent months, and I spent hours with the President, literally
on one occasion 2 hours with the President in the Oval Office, and
the only discussion was, in Afghanistan about the Arab street, and
our concern about—we went through this tortuous process in Af-
ghanistan, which was cake compared to this, worrying about what
this means from Djakarta to Tunisia. What about our interest in
the rest of the world? We have to tell people we do not know, right?
We do not know what the response would be.

We would also have to tell them that there is going to be a spike
in oil prices. The idea that this could occur without a spike—maybe
we should pay all these prices, but we have to tell them that there
is going to be a spike in oil prices. It may be temporary, it may
be long lasting, but there is going to be a spike. It is going to have
economic consequences.
And third, if we do it by ourselves, we cannot expect the rest of the world to pick up 80 percent of the tab, whether it is $40 billion, $80 billion, $100 billion, whatever it is, right?

And we are going to have to say that it could impact upon, it will impact on, and we know, you may not, on the deficit. There will be a deficit, or some of my friends will have to give up a tax cut, right? I mean, those are the choices we have to make.

Senator BROWNBACK. Or spending increases.

The CHAIRMAN. And last, that there is at least a serious prospect that we are going to have to keep a lot of Americans in place for a long time in an area of the world that may mean they are not going to come home for Christmas, this Christmas anyway, and probably for a while. Is that a fair statement?

So I am not suggesting that we should not act at this point. I do not know enough to know yet, but I am suggesting one of the objectives, and the reason I am so thankful for you all giving us your time and the panels that will come, is I think we have an obligation to say to the American people—

I for one, if I knew he had these weapons, and the Lord came down and sat up here and said, Joe boy, he has them and he is going to move, I would say we have got to pay all of these prices, we have got to pay them all, but I have an obligation to tell the American people that this is going to be the cost, the parameters of the cost.

And so I hope that we can—and you will continue to be available to us, because I am convinced the President is taking this very seriously. I realize he talks a lot about regime change, and some people think he talks about it very blithely. I do not think he is unaware, the deeper he gets into this, that this is very consequential, and so I think that if we continue this, and I hate the word, particularly in the foreign policy context, dialog—that usually means saying nothing, but if we continue this discussion as a Nation, we will arrive at the right answer. We will arrive at the right answer, and we will have the consensus of the American people.

But the puzzle for me is, among other things, it sure would be nice if we got more people in on the deal. It sure would be beneficial if we had more cooperation. It sure would be useful if we could cut some of the risk, which I think if we have enough time and enough ingenuity we could, and so one of the things we are going to be exploring with the next panel, who are experts on the region and on the culture, and for example, and I will end with this, in Iraq, I mean, there are three centers of power.

There historically have been three centers of power in Iraq. They are based on tribal and ethnic differences. They have significant ramifications. It matters whether or not, how they react, and how neighboring countries react to them, and so we are going to get an opportunity to get into some of what Senator Lugar raised today about how much do we know, how much do we know about the culture? How much do we know about the consequences? How much do we know about the responses that are likely to come based upon certain actions?

But the reason I bothered to say that before you leave, and I will yield to my colleagues for questions for you, is, I just want you to know, which I hope is obvious to you, I think you are making a significant contribution here.
I think this is what we are supposed to be doing here, is going through this as methodically as we can within the timeframe, and we all think it is a slightly different timeframe. We have to be able to make as informed a judgment as we can make, and that ultimately the President of the United States is going to have to come to us, not because we are making him, but that is the system, come to us and say, here is what I have proposed, this is why I propose it, these are the potential costs, and I for one think that had we the time, we should and could make the case about weapons.

I mean, I guess—I will end with this. I do have one question, and this will be it. Why is it that the rest of the world does not sense the same urgency that we sense? Why is it that the Europeans, who are physically closer, who have—and maybe it is because they have more at stake in terms of energy. Why is it that they do not sense this urgency, and why is it that the Arab world does not? Is it because they doubt our resolve, and therefore they do not want to get in the deal?

What is it that, when I speak to European heads of State, Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, parliamentarians, members of royal families, members of governments in the Middle East, why is it that almost without exception they say we are exaggerating the threat? Is it because—but you said, dean, you said look, you were there. It was obvious. Everybody knew. At UNSCOM, they knew. They had the model.

Why is it that Europeans talk, when you say nuclear they say, oh, no, do not worry about that? What is the deal? Why are they not concerned?

Ambassador Gallucci. In my over 20 years of working on the nonproliferation problem, it has always been so, that we have always been making the case.

Less in London, but in Paris, and Bonn, and Rome, and Tokyo, these are without closest allies, that threat of the spread if weapons of mass destruction is something that affects us all, and they always have been closer geographically, but it is also true that we are the superpower, that our interests are everywhere, that we are expected, in fact, to take on this burden, and they do not see themselves, I think, as quite in harm’s way as we see ourselves and our interests, and indeed, I think one could make a pretty good case that we are more of a target.

The Chairman. We have the bull’s-eye on our back, they do not, is that the explanation?

General Hoar. Sir, may I offer an explanation? With respect to the Islamic world, there are three things going on simultaneously right now, our efforts in Afghanistan, our obvious concerns about Iraq, and the peace process, and those three are connected in the eyes of the Islamic world, and if we lose track of that, we lose track of the sense of justice, whether you believe it or not, or whether you feel it is justified, that all of these things are connected, and that, as Mort has said and I have said, if we were to make progress on the peace process, many things would be possible for us. For example, disarmament in the region after a peace process would be a much easier hurdle to vault than to try and do it now.

The Chairman. Some of the people I respect and do not necessarily agree with at the Defense Department make the opposite
argument that if you take care of Iraq the rest will fall in place, including Israel and the Palestinian issue.

General Hoar. I disagree with that violently, sir.

The Chairman. Does anyone agree with that proposition?

General Mcinerney. I think it will have a lot more significance if we take care of Iraq first. Saddam gives about $950 million this year to the PLO. He has bonded himself with that issue, where before he was not, but I also think, General Hoar, it has gotten to such a point over there that it is obscuring a lot of the other things Afghanistan and Iraq.

The only thing I would say about Europe, they had the same problem in 1939, Senator.

The Chairman. That is a good point.

Dr. Halperin. Senator, can I just make one comment? I go back to Senator Rockefeller's point about uncertainty. Remember, it was not too many years ago when we were the leading exponents of the notion that one could get along with Saddam Hussein. He was still developing nuclear weapons, he was still doing terrible things to his people, and we were arguing with our allies we can come to terms with him.

There are very great uncertainties, I think, that affect all of these decisions, but I just wanted to comment on the part that you started with. It seems to me it is very uncertain what we should do. There are no clear answers, there are no easy answers, and therefore it seems to me that—I come back to what you were emphasizing, is that the process is key to this. I would hope that we would not have from the administration what we had on the reorganization of the government, which is opposition, silence, and then a proposal and a demand that we do it in 2 weeks or 2 months.

If we are going to do this, we need a long period of debate after the President lays out the case. I think Congress not only has to insist it has a role to play, but it has a role to play that cannot be stampeded by a sudden announcement.

The Chairman. Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me try to offer a road map. What if we took the position that the panel this morning mentioned, especially Ambassador Butler, and many of you mentioned today, that essentially we fought a war militarily, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution, but unfortunately for a variety of reasons Iraq did not comply. In due course Iraq anticipated we would not enforce compliance, which we have not, but leaving aside whether Saddam is close to developing a nuclear weapon we go back to the U.N. Security Council friends and say we must take this threat seriously.

So whether it is containment light or containment heavy, we must try to enforce what Secretary Powell has negotiated. We must be pretty hardnosed about it and say, we are going to stop anything restricted from coming in and out of Iraq as far as we can. We are going to enforce the no-fly zones almost to the point that we occupy in the air those two zones, so you are squeezed.

In other words, leaving aside all of the speculation over intelligence we do not have, we do those things which are ordained now by the United Nations, by all of our friends.
Now, second, we carve out $80 billion for a potential operation. That is a large sum of money. That is twice the bill that we were debating today on prescription drugs for the elderly for 2 years, and so it is a big sacrifice, but we understand that that is what we are going to do. We carve that money out, but then at the same time we adopt, as President Bush did before, a United Way campaign to try to gain donations. Now, who is going to pay for $80 billion? We take for granted that we are all going to do this, this is what is required, and we are all in this together. We are in the United Nations, we fought a war, and we have a problem here.

We finally do the best we can intelligence-wise, either reform, or in some way really put an emphasis on this threat. Further we commit to educating ourselves about Iraq, internal political options, who is there, what might happen, so we have at least some reasonable idea, if something did happen to Saddam what the alternatives may be.

Now, at the end of the day Saddam is, pressured in all of these ways. We set aside the money. We begin thinking in terms of a force of hundreds of thousands of people. We begin to collect commitments of money, bases and forces. This is critical, as we heard from Mr. Cordesman, we overused 23 bases last time. So in order to be credible they have got to be available again.

So we put very great pressure upon everybody, now that we are credible, to open up these places. Now, maybe Saddam gives up, but probably he does not, and so in the course of all of this, ultimately something happens. Now, we have already come to a point where we have done a lot of planning, and we have people in motion. We have congressional support by this time. Some weeks have passed. We have had some more hearings.

The thing that I worry about at the end of the day is not that Saddam would fall in the process of all of this, not are we prepared for it but still this aftermath of what comes after Saddam. I am not discouraged today. Maybe this is sort of an enlightened aspect of this hearing, that there are not people in Iraq that may be prepared for democracy as we know it. Suggestions are, in fact, an enlightened democracy might even lead to more terrorists being spawned out of the process.

What if a liberal democracy is developed as we have in India, and they develop a nuclear weapon. In spite of all of our protests, and we say, well, they are friendly, unlikely to use that on us, but they might use it on someone else. Consequently a lot of our diplomacy will be focused on trying to prevent that. Why did they develop one? Why is Iran’s development any more benign, as Senator Brownback brought up?

The question that I have is, at the end of the day, what if we end up with a regime in Iraq that because of a sense of nationalism, or threats from Iran, decide to maintain weapons of mass destruction just like the same way India and Pakistan. Would we then just hope they are more friendly, and therefore unlikely to use it on us. That is a very, very queasy objective, much like the end of the last war with this resolution that was never enforced.

Now, that is why I think we need much more thinking, Mr. Chairman, on what is an alternative at the end of all of this. After we have sketched out how we win the war, how we get the allies,
what do we have left, we still have not heard what will happen. Some express hopefulness that there is a charismatic figure somewhere in Iraq today, or outside of Iraq, that might come in, or several of these people who somehow might bring about a different style of life for people.

Now, we are experimenting with this in Afghanistan. There are big changes there. Women are going to school and having basic rights. This changes the whole concept that half the population of most Muslim states are disenfranchised and out of the picture.

As you pointed out, if all this began to occur in Iraq, what would the neighbors think? How about the Saudis? How about anybody in the neighborhood? Do they accept this? How many years, and how many people do we have to have there to make certain those who are doing these incipient democratic things have time to do it? And so that is a part of the situation I think we need to sketch in some more, Mr. Chairman.

The military side of it is not complex. Most Americans are not prepared to spend $80 billion and several hundred thousand people in readiness and deployment, but that we can do. We have been through that before, and we still have not come to a successful conclusion in Iraq, or at this point certainly even in Afghanistan, and that seems to me to be critically important.

The CHAIRMAN. That is why I almost switched my registration and voted for you in the primary.

Senator LUGAR. I do not really ask for anybody to comment. This is sort of my own editorial, unless somebody has a thought about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to comment?

Dr. HALPERIN. Let me say, Senator, I am ready to sign up to the first part of your policy, which is a vigorous enforcement of what the international community already supports, with the notion that if Saddam resists that, we then push further with the use of military force.

Senator LUGAR. That is our entrée back into the international community.

Dr. HALPERIN. The only thing I would add is, let us take a little bit of that money you set aside and spend it to make the embargo work. If we are prepared to compensate the Syrians, the Turks, and the Jordanians for the consequences of honoring the embargo, and if we insist that they honor the embargo, I think we can make that happen, and I think that would have a very——

Senator LUGAR. That is interesting, compensating these people.

Dr. HALPERIN. The U.N. Charter entitles countries which enforce embargoes mandated by the Security Council to be compensated by the international community. We did it to some degree with the countries around Serbia, not fully, but to a significant degree, and we have not done that in this area, and that is a lot cheaper than a military operation.

Senator LUGAR. Good idea. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Gentlemen, do either of you have any more questions?

Gentlemen, I cannot thank you enough. This has been very helpful, the start of this undertaking, and I warn you, we are like poor relatives, when we are invited, we show up. You have invited us
to ask you again. I am warning you we may ask you back. I thank you very, very much. You have been very helpful. We have one more panel, a very important panel, and what I would like to suggest is that—I realize it is 5 o'clock, but it is going to take a little more time. Professor Telhami, Professor Ajami, Dr. Kemp, and Ambassador Parris are our next panel, and we appreciate their waiting so long. Please, gentlemen—I do not know where they put your name tags, but if you would pick a seat, and the tag will find you.

Professor Telhami is Anwar Sadat professor of peace and development at the University of Maryland, and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and has made himself available to this committee, to me and many members of the committee, and we truly appreciate his making himself available.

Professor Ajami is professor and director of Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and he has recently been elected to the board of the Council on Foreign Relations, again has been incredibly generous with his time and advice.

Dr. Kemp is director of strategic programs of the Nixon Center. From 1983 to 1985 he served as both Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council.

And last but not least, Ambassador Mark Parris served as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 1997 to 2000. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Near East and South Asia at the National Security Council from 1995 to 1997.

Again, I thank you all for being here, and I thank you for your patience. Maybe if you could proceed in the order you have been introduced, and then we can get to questions. You see we have an interested panel on this side, so I appreciate your time and hope we do not ruin your dinner.

STATEMENT OF DR. SHIBLEY TELHAMI, ANWAR SADAT PROFESSOR FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK, MD, AND NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. Telhami. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for inviting me. I would like to make some very brief opening remarks, and I would submit my written statement for the record.

The Chairman. All of your statements will be placed in the record to the extent that you do not do the whole statement.

Dr. Telhami. What I would like to do is instead just highlight a few points, and I would like to address more specifically the issue of regional impact on a possible war, and how the region broadly looks at policy toward Iraq.

I think it is clear from what you heard already that there is pervasive opposition to a military campaign toward Iraq in any foreseeable future, and it is very important to understand what the calculations are in the region that lead to this kind of opposition.

I would like to begin by saying that while a lot of that has to do with an assessment of public opinion in the region and the pressures they face from their own public, much of that calculation is
not based only on public opinion. Some of the calculation is based on very specific strategic calculations that these leaders and these governments make.

We have to first be clear, not each one of them has the same calculation. The calculations of Jordan, Iran, Syria, the GCC states are different, but they have some things in common. They all worry about the consequences of what happens after.

First, it is clear that they do not see the threat in the same way that we do. They do not believe that Iraq today poses a serious military threat that they have to worry about, and they see our focus on it as out of place. They have other priorities they would like to address in the region, and they see this as taking us and them away from other priorities, such as the Arab-Israeli issue, and in that regard they fear that this will disrupt very important priorities.

They also fear that after the war, first and foremost, there may be more instability than we are planning for. They think that we might be optimistic about our capability to bring about a desirable outcome in Iraq that would be a stable outcome for each one of them, especially Turkey, Syria, but even Iran and the GCC states, and in that regard they are not confident about our own assurances that we intend to spend the time and the money and the energy and the military clout to be there for as long as it takes to bring a desirable outcome about.

First and foremost, I think they fear instability at the strategic level. But consider even a happy outcome from our point of view, which is an outcome that says we will put the necessary resources to bring about a better government in Iraq, a stable situation in the region, so therefore they do not have to worry about the issue of instability. Then we can only do that by putting forth significant forces that would turn Iraq essentially into an American base and an American ally. In a way that clearly disrupts the strategic calculus for many of them in a way that is worrisome for many of them, even aside from public opinion. Not all of them, but many of them worry about it.

But ultimately it boils down to another factor, which is public opinion. They do worry about it. There is a pervasive resentment of the United States today in the region. There is a sense of public power that has not been exhibited before in the region, and much of it is directed not so much at the United States only. It is really a pervasive sense of frustration and humiliation with an existing order that many people in the region do not support, but they see the United States as an anchor of that order, and clearly the highlighting of the pain on the Palestinian-Israeli front over the last few months has exacerbated that resentment in a way that is putting pressure on these governments.

I do not want to exaggerate this and say that governments are weak and cannot be contained. Clearly, the Governments have been able to contain pressure before, and clearly, even in the recent crisis, they have done so in a way that diminished the impact of public resentment and public pressure.

The real issue for them is, at what cost? Even if they succeed, at what cost can they do it? I know that there is a school of thought that is dominant in some of the public debate today, which
says, who cares about public opinion in the region, or who cares even about the positions of these governments who are opposing the United States? The assessment is that we are powerful enough to do it on our own, and when they see that we are going to do it anyway, they are going to jump on the American bandwagon, and they are mostly authoritarian governments. They are going to find a way to bring the public along, and therefore, why should we care? Why should we pay attention to that? Let us do what we need to do, and they are just going to jump on a winning American bandwagon.

I am not going to address the military side of that. You have heard a lot about it. But the political side of it, I think it is a mistake to make that argument. I have no doubt that some governments will jump on a winning American bandwagon, no question about it. I think people do not like to be on the sides of losers, and they do not want to be on the wrong side of the United States, especially if they are sure that the United States is going to win, and I think militarily there will be no doubt.

The real question is at what cost and what are the consequences, but I think if the United States is willing to put a lot of resources into it, that there is no doubt about the military equation of it, and so there is no doubt that some will do it, but I will submit to you that the calculations have changed since 1991, and clearly we cannot be assured that all of them or even most of them, those that joined the coalition in 1991 are going to have the jump-on-the-bandwagon attitude.

Let me tell you why, and I will give you a couple of reasons. One is, the situation has changed not only in terms of the perception of Iraqi threat. In 1991, clearly they saw Iraq as a threatening state with military capabilities. Today, nobody really believes that Iraq is a serious threat, and they see it mostly as a victim, so the logic of the Iraq issue is different.

While in 1991 there may have been doubts, particularly by radicals in the region, about the U.S. military capability and staying power, that was made a reality after the 1991 victory. It is clear that today no one has doubts about the United States. Most American attitudes are really derived by a perception that America is actually very powerful, that America is perhaps too powerful for them, too domineering in regional politics, so the perception is not exactly the same perception that preceded 1991, and that therefore the logic of the psychology is very different.

From the government’s point of view, most of them probably will do what they have to do to resist public opinion if public opinion tries to disrupt a policy of supporting an American campaign in Iraq, or at least sitting on the sidelines of an American campaign toward Iraq. Many of them will probably succeed. Most of them do not have as much certainty as they did back in 1991 that they could succeed.

The absence of certainty is in part a function of a new reality, which is that they no longer control the flow of information. They no longer control perception, at least in that dimension.

There is a sense that the public will get information that is going to be disruptive to governmental agenda in a way that governments cannot control. That is new to them. They do not know
whether it means a lot, and they do not know whether it means a little, but they know that it presents some uncertainty about their ability to control, and second, there is a sense of empowerment in the region.

That is, I would say, a public disgust with states in general, with their own states, with the international system, with international organizations, and certainly with the United States, and in that sense to the extent that there is a public that is willing to be mobilized, it is not mobilizing behind a possibility that Iraq might have victory, or behind a government who is going to advocate their causes. It is the extent to which they are going to be able to do something on their own, or rally behind militants.

The source of inspiration today is not states, it is militants, anti-state, and the extent to which therefore they succeed is not a function of the strength of any particular state, including Iraq, and in that regard I think what we will have even in a successful campaign, and even if the governments do succeed in repressing the public, you are going to have two clear outcomes.

One is, they are only going to succeed if they are more repressive, and I am talking about governments outside of Iraq. They will succeed only through repression, and they have probably the capacity to do so. They will stretch themselves to the limit, but if we have any illusions about this then transforming the Middle East into a democratic place I think, let us think about that a little bit more.

And second, it is undoubtedly, in my judgment, going to increase the motivation for terrorism in the region. Maybe we can reduce some aspects, but clearly there will be more motivation. We have to understand that there are dynamics that will be out there regardless of what the outcome will be actually in Iraq itself, but let me end with a question pertaining to the nuclear threat.

I think it is interesting, we had the discussion before about whether or not the region sees Iraq’s nuclear potential, or potential in weapons of mass destruction as threatening to them. They are the ones who have to fear Iraq most, its neighbors. Why aren’t they worried about Iraq so much, and I think ultimately it is really a different interpretation of the threat.

Most of them first do not think Iraq is close to having a nuclear capability. They think we are exaggerating, but more importantly I think they have a different assessment of Saddam Hussein. They think he is a ruthless dictator, but not suicidal. They think he is sensitive to deterrence, and they think that he goes against weaker but not stronger opponents, and therefore, regardless of what he does, they think he is containable. They have a different idea about the sort of threat that he poses, and in that regard they see the choice as being a choice between our being willing to live with him and not being willing to live with him.

I think ultimately in our debate we have confused the two issues, frankly. If the issue is about terrorism, then we have to remind ourselves that this is not likely to eliminate the motivation for terrorism in the Middle East. It may even increase it.

If our aim is to limit Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, weapons of mass destruction capabilities, we may succeed in Iraq in particular. We will succeed militarily, but we might have a political option if our
aim is not also to overthrow the regime, and I think what we have
done is in essence linked the regime change option with the elimi-
nation of the weapons of mass destruction option.

That is, the political attempt to try to put controls in place that
would get Iraqi cooperation on weapons of mass destruction has al-
ways been linked to the idea that we also want regime change, and
so the Iraqi reluctance in part, at least—at least they have not
been tested enough—has been the assumption that we are after the
regime as well as minimizing their capabilities, and therefore I
think we have not tested the political option that splits the two,
that says, let us test the choice for the regime between survival
and having nuclear weapons, let us test them politically, and I
think it is very clear that for his survival Saddam Hussein is will-
ing to give up almost anything.

At the same time, if his survival is at stake, there is no doubt
that he is willing to do almost anything, and I think that is very
important to remember in thinking about how we might design a
policy that would be effective toward Iraq.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Telhami follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. SHIBLEY TELHAMI, ANWAR SADAT PROFESSOR FOR
PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND; NONRESIDENT SENIOR FEL-
LOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

THE REGIONAL SETTING OF POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

Dear Mr. Chairman, let me begin by addressing the regional calculations about
American policy toward Iraq. Even aside from public sentiments, one should not un-
derestimate the strategic reluctance of states in the Gulf to support an American-
led military effort for three reasons: They fear above all the possible disintegration
of Iraq, or continued instability emanating from Iraq, and they do not believe that
American assurances to the contrary are credible; they see the task of maintaining
Iraq’s territorial integrity and preventing meddling by other states to be potentially
overwhelming. On the other hand, even if the United States commits to a sustained
presence in Iraq and to the deployment of the necessary military, political, and eco-
nomic resources to assure Iraq’s stability, many of Iraq’s neighbors, and others in
the region, fear a possible American military/political dominance that would then
include Iraq in a way that alters the strategic picture to their disadvantage.

Governments in the region generally favor preventing Iraq from becoming a nu-
clear power, especially under Saddam Hussein. Even Gulf states such as the United
Arab Emirates, who fear Iran more than they fear Iraq and who worry about weak-
ening Iraq too much, support measures to limit Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, including
reinstating international monitors. But some states also worry about overwhelming
American power in the region. Their calculations are thus more complex: They don’t
want to see Iraq armed with nuclear weapons, but they also fear American domi-
nance, (and in Syria’s case, Israeli strategic dominance), especially a scenario of a
sustained American military presence in Iraq.

Ultimately, however, most states in the region do not see Iraq as now posing a
serious threat to them that warrants a war that could significantly alter the re-
gional environment and presents them with hard choices internally and externally.
They don’t see the status quo as being especially dangerous, and they don’t see hard
new evidence to convince them otherwise. Certainly not all of Iraq’s neighbors have
the same calculations, and the interests of the members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council are different from those of Jordan, Turkey, Syria and Iran, and there are
differences even within the GCC. Most, however, see American policy on this issue
as being driven by either domestic politics, or by strategic designs to consolidate
American dominance, and thus do not see an intended good for them. The real issue
is whether they have to accommodate the U.S., because otherwise they will be in
even worse shape if they don’t, and therefore whether or not they should find some
way to benefit if the American decision to go to war with Iraq became unavoidable.

One of the biggest reasons for regional reluctance to support an American military
effort to topple Iraq’s government is concern for public opinion. Although states in
the region remain very powerful in their domestic control, no state can fully ignore
the public sentiment in the era of the information revolution. Certainly one of the
major barriers to getting the support of Arab governments for a war option is public pressure. But much of the public in the Arab world is sympathetic to Iraq’s efforts in general; today, they see Iraq as victim, not as aggressor. It is important thus to understand how the public in the region, including the elites, views this issue. First, most don’t understand that the basis of the policy to prevent Iraq from acquiring WMD is UN resolutions, so they see the policy as a strategy intended to prevent only Arab states from acquiring such weapons. Second, those who understand the role of UN resolutions raise the question about “double standards” in applying UN resolutions, always with examples from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and they ask in any case, why it is that the U.S. not the UN, should make the ultimate decision authorizing a war. Third, while some almost wish for an Arab deterrent, even if possessed by Saddam Hussein, most don’t believe that it is likely in any case, see Iraq to be helpless, and see the entire focus on this issue as tactical, intended to justify keeping Iraq in a box, or intended to justify a possible war on it. This has become even more so in recent months, with the public in the region increasingly resentful of American policy, and seeing the U.S. as dominating the decisions at the UN. Fourth, there is continued empathy with the suffering of Iraq’s population and a prevailing assumption that the sanctions, not the Iraqi regime, are ultimately to blame for this suffering.

In our limited public debate about Iraq policy, one prevailing view is that we needn’t trouble ourselves much with public opinion in the region, or even with the current opposition to war by the region’s governments. The logic of this argument is that in non-democratic systems of government, public sentiment is unlikely to alter the ultimate calculations of governments, and that these governments will have no choice but to jump on the American bandwagon because they can’t afford to be on the losing side. It is true that the record of governments in the region justifies the belief in their ability to contain public discontent. Certainly in 1991 these governments were very effective in limiting the impact of public resentment, but it is important to note that both the resentment of the U.S. and the sympathy with Iraq at the public level are greater today than they were in 1991. And it is also the case that government control is more limited at least in the area of information flow, and thus governments are less able to shape public perceptions.

This is not to say that states do not remain capable of containing public anger; they remain central players in Middle East politics, as is the case globally. What it means is that they are less certain today about their capabilities, that they face more anger than before, and that we should have no illusions about how they will ultimately contain anger; only through more repression. So aside from the consequence for Iraq itself, it is likely that one outcome of war with Iraq and possible Arab governments’ cooperation in that war is that there will be more repression, despite the best of our intentions. As in our policy toward Pakistan today, we will be more willing to overlook measures of repression if governments will lend their support for what will be our urgent strategic priorities in bringing about a favorable outcome in Iraq.

We should also not take it for granted that all governments will swallow hard and jump on our bandwagon once a decision is made. This will be true for some, but not for all those who joined the coalition in 1991, in part because some fear both the failure of the war and also its success. The trade-off for them between facing the anger of their publics on the one hand, and facing the anger of the U.S. on the other, have also changed since 1991. Ultimately, governments will make their decisions on realpolitik calculations, but many of them are uncertain today where these calculations will lead them.

In the end, it is clear that if the U.S. puts enough resources into play, it will succeed in overthrowing the government of Saddam Hussein. But we have to remember that that specific objective is an instrument for the broader American objective of reducing the danger of terrorism and protecting American interests in the Middle East. An American military success could in fact have a short-term strategic benefit, assuming that the U.S. is willing to sustain the effort for an extended period beyond government change. But the consequence on regional psychology is likely to be different from the one that prevailed in 1991. Radicals in the region who wanted to see a change in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War pinned their hope on the prospect that Iraq would be a powerful state and that Saddam Hussein would be a new Bismarck who would overcome the pervasive sense of Arab weakness—in the same way that even more people pinned their hope on Gamal abd al-Nasser of Egypt in the 1950s and 60s. And moderates in the region envisioned that an inevitable Pax Americana could possibly help them transform the regional environment, especially in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, improve prospects of economic prosperity, and begin a process of political liberalization. At the end of the 1991 war, the defeat of Saddam Hussein certainly led to a sense of resignation by
radicals pinning their hopes on Arab leaders and states. And moderates gathered momentum in support of an American-backed process that was centered on peaceful efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and constructing a moderate coalition in the region. That coalition crashed with the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in July 2000, and the realization that neither economic prosperity nor political liberalization materialized. Today, there is a sense of utter mistrust, not only of the U.S., but of states and international organizations. And there is a sense of pervasive humiliation in the region at the public’s inability to affect any change, both internally and externally. This, unfortunately, has led many to find inspiration in non-state militant groups, perfect recruits for terrorism. The source of inspiration for them is no longer states like Iraq, as most people see it today as a helpless victim. Unlike the radicals in 1991, who had some doubt about America’s ability to defeat Iraq, today a motivating factor for the radicals is that the U.S. is too powerful and dominating in the region—not that it is weak, or that it lacks the will to exercise power. The net outcome of a successful scenario, of overthrowing the Iraqi regime and securing an American-backed new Iraqi government, will be to increase the anger, and thus the motivation, that terrorists readily exploit. It is good to remind ourselves that most of the terrorists coming from the region in the 1990s, including those who committed the horror of 9/11, did not come from Iraq, even though Iraq may have been a factor in their motivation.

As such, it is not clear that even a success of a military campaign in Iraq will reduce the terrorist threat, and it may even have the consequence of increasing it. Thus, we must ask the question about the ultimate strategic aim of a campaign, beyond the overthrow of Iraq’s government. Certainly, the central argument in the public debate has been about Iraq’s development of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. A war option would eliminate Iraq’s nuclear potential, although one wonders whether other states may not conclude that they should accelerate their own efforts to develop nuclear weapons as a way to deter perceived American unilateralism. Although some aspiring nuclear states may be deterred initially by the Iraqi example, the likelihood that American resources will be thinly stretched in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the global war on terrorism, will make it less likely that the U.S. will contemplate other major wars barring an urgent threat to American interests.

It is also important to consider why states who should fear Iraq most, its neighbors, are less troubled in the short term by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. There are two areas of difference: most of them do not believe that Iraq has serious nuclear potential, and therefore would need to see significant evidence to accept the proposition. Second, most believe that Saddam Hussein is a ruthless risk-taker, but not suicidal, and see him as being sensitive to deterrence. The latter point is especially important, because of the psychology in the region which goes like this: In the unlikely event that Iraq should develop nuclear weapons under the sanctions regime, it will refrain from using them because the consequences will be self-destruction; While Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons before, he has done so against weaker parties who could not seriously threaten him.

These differing views of Saddam Hussein also explain some of our own policy ambivalence. If we consider that our aim is not merely to prevent Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction, but also an active campaign to change the regime in Baghdad, then it is hard to see how we put ourselves on a path to war which preempts Iraq’s nuclear potential, since it will be more difficult to overthrow the government once Iraq is a nuclear state. But it should be clear to us that what would be driving such a course is not weapons of mass destruction as such, but overthrowing the regime.

To the extent that weapons of mass destruction remain an important issue, the pursuit of this objective could lead us to contemplate a number of other possible tracks that should become part of our national debate. One such track is the continued containment policy coupled with the reintroduction of a more vigorous international inspection regime in Iraq. It is clear that Saddam Hussein has put many obstacles before the international inspectors in the past and he refuses to allow them back. This may indicate that the same tactics will be pursued by him in the future. But it is also clear that he has been operating under the assumption that our objective is ultimately to topple him, in addition to limiting his capabilities in the meanwhile. The only way a strategy to get his full cooperation could have a chance of success is if his overthrow no longer becomes the objective; He will always choose his survival over all else. As such, our debate should consider how important regime change is as an objective to us, and whether it is worth the risks of a military option even if there is a chance that a non-military solution could be found.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, professor.
STATEMENT OF PROF. FOUAD AJAMI, MAJID KHADDURI PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. Ajami. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor to be here, and I commend you and the members of this committee on this hearing, and it is always kind of—when I came in in the morning I was confident of everything I was going to say, and by 5:15, by the time I am called on, I am less confident, but I have some things to share with you, and I think that when one is called upon before this kind of panel and with these kinds of talent that you have available to you, you always wonder what your comparative advantage is, and I think my comparative advantage is something of a knowledge—

The Chairman. I think it is your beard.

Dr. Ajami. But I have the Arabic experience, and had your rules permitted, there were a couple of times when you asked some questions, Mr. Chairman, I was nearly tempted to intervene from the back.

The Chairman. Feel free to respond to them now.

Dr. Ajami. It is like we now, if we go into this campaign against Iraq, we are clearly heading into a region which bears us ill-will. We understand that, and in all the months after September 11, and all the travel I did, and all the reading of the Arab world I have done in the last year, I came across something I want to share with your committee.

It is something that a friend of mine, a very talented Egyptian playwright named Ali Salim said to an American journalist about why is there such malice in the Arab world, in the Muslim world toward the United States, and it is interesting to note that in this decade behind us American power was used three times in favor of Arabs and Muslims, in favor of Kuwait in 1990, in favor of Bosnia in 1995, in favor of the Kosovars in 1999, and yet there was no gratitude there. Very few people spoke about the usage of American power in favor of these Muslim populations.

Now, I understand in the case of Kuwait it was complicated, because there is an argument possibly that Saddam would have won a free election in the Arab street in 1990, had he really contested an election, but the case of the Bosnians, in which you and Senator Lugar and a number of your colleagues were quite active in the case of the Kosovars I think is very interesting. So here is Ali Salim on this kind of anti-Americanism we are going to in many ways, I think, mop up and run into and face when we go there.

"History is cruel," he says. "It is trying to drag America backward. In this case, history is right. We here need to be more progressive"—meaning in the Muslim world—"but you need to take a step back. If the bureaucrats in your airport were just a little more paranoid, like us, it would be a different world. Really, America is a beautiful place. No one even asks why all these guys wanted flying lessons. You should learn to be suspicious. A little backwardness would be healthy."
People say Americans are arrogant, but it is not true. Americans enjoy life, and they are proud of their lives, and they are boastful of the wonderful inventions that have made life so much easier. It is very difficult to understand the machinery of hatred, because you wind up resorting to logic, but trying to understand this with logic is like measuring distance in kilograms. Measuring distance in kilograms.

These are people who are afraid of America, afraid of life itself. These are people who are envious. To them, life is an unbearable burden. Modernism is the only way out, but modernism is frightening. It means we have to compete. It means we cannot explain everything away with conspiracy theories.

Bernard Shaw said it best, you know, in the preface to St. Joan. He said that Joan of Arc was burned for no other reason except that she was talented. Talent gives rise to jealousy in the hearts of the untalented.

So we shall go into the Arab world, into the Muslim world. We should launch this campaign in the face of this kind of sentiment about America. Now, this will not be Desert Storm, I think we must understand that, because in Desert Storm there were even Muslim jurists, Muslim jurists in Saudi Arabia and Egypt who argued that Saddam was a menace to his world and a tyrant, and resistance to him is legitimate.

They issued a ruling opinion in that direction, so we went with that, and at the time there were jurists who even ruled that you could have Arab and Islamic, quote-unquote, other friendly forces. We got in under that loophole, 1/2 million men under the other friendly forces. It will not be this way this time around. We understand that.

So ideally for the regimes in the region what they want for the Desert Storm of a decade ago, I have written in the statement I have submitted to you, Mr. Chairman, is they now want the perfect storm, and this is really what they want. A swift war, few casualties, as little exposure by themselves as possible, the opportunity to be rid of Saddam without riding in broad daylight with the Americans, and without being brought to account by their people.

It would be great if they could get that, but the political world never grants these kinds of favors. The fog of war is what it is, and there will be risks run by these regimes, and there will be risks run by ourselves.

I agree partly with my colleague, Shibley, on one point that I think, and I would elaborate by saying this would be a war in the time of the satellite channels, and so a lot of this will be in the open, and I think this is the nightmare of these regimes, that we would call upon them to make commitments in the open.

So my feeling is that we would end up not with a very brilliant position, but not with a bad one if we choose to draw the sword, if you want your metaphor, to pull the trigger, that there would be people who would associate with us quietly in Kuwait, in Qatar, and there would be people who would associate with us even in Jordan, though the case of Jordan requires, I think, focus and discussion, but they will dread having to be brought out into the open.

Will the Arab street greet us warmly? It will not, but I tell you one thing, the one street that will trump all streets, and this, I
think, is a very important point to put on the record, the one street will be the street in Baghdad and Basra. We shall be mobbed. We shall be mobbed when we go there by people who are eager for deliverance from the tyranny and the great big prison of Saddam Hussein.

Some months ago, I did a piece on Al Jazeera television, and I watched very closely Al Jazeera television for hours and hours, and I thought one of the most interesting and one of the most difficult days for Al Jazeera came during the liberation of Kabul, when the Afghans who we thought would greet us, if you will, in this war that was going to frustrate us and we were going to be thwarted and they were going to do to us the damage that they had done to the Brits in earlier times and to the Russians, when in fact we were greeted with kites and boom boxes.

We shall be greeted, I think, in Baghdad and Basra with kites and boom boxes, and we should understand this, and the embarrassment, the embarrassment for those in Nablus and Cairo who were then protesting an American war or an Anglo-American war, or whatever label you put on that war, will be enormous.

The CHAIRMAN. You say the embarrassment will be enormous?

Dr. AJAMI. Yes, to them the embarrassment will be enormous. I think we now—and just in terms of wrapping this part of my intervention, we go into Iraq, and I think we should see Iraq for what it is. It is a tormented country. It has been violated by this despot. There are three communities as we know. There are Kurds, there are the Shia Arabs, who are the majority of the population, and there are the Sunni Arabs, who have believed that political power was their due.

A decade ago we were unkind to the Shia because we thought there would be a satrapy of the political regime in Iran. We do not know Iraqi Shias, and I will tell you one of the things, Mr. Chairman, I did a book called “The Vanished Imam,” on one Shia cleric in Lebanon, and studied the Shia clerical culture in Lebanon and Iran and Iraq.

These Iraqi Shia are Iraqi patriots, and we should do them the honor of understanding that when the wheel turns, that they just want a piece of the political life of their land. We paralyzed ourselves in 1991 by saying that there would be a regime that would emerge in Iraq that would simply be a replica of the Iranian revolution.

Well, the Iranian revolution has fallen on hard times. Its power to attract other people in the region is no longer what it used to be a decade or two decades ago, and we now can see, I think, Iraq in a whole new light, and we should understand one thing about Iraq. If we are really looking for a place where maybe American ideals could work, this place may be as good a candidate as any.

Thank you very much for your indulgence.

[The prepared statement of Professor Ajami follows:]
Saddam Hussein and his regime, and on some of the truths of Iraq itself and answer some questions the members of this committee might have.

There are rumors of war all around, and the rumors have, of course, been most widely circulated in the Arab world itself. That world has a fixation on America: Truth and legend about America are jumbled in that region. Our thoughts and second thoughts, the disagreements of our officials, the things we supposedly hatch for them over there, are the staple of the region’s politics.

By the appearance of things, Saddam Hussein must be convinced that war is on the horizon. His regime now promises to return Kuwait’s national archives; It promises to “discuss” the 600 Kuwaiti war prisoners—who in Iraq’s previous utterances, had never existed. In recent months the Iraqis have alternated threats and inducements. The newspaper of First Son Uday Hussein, the dictator’s oldest, has issued a warning that even the “spectators” to the war will not be spared; There have been the familiar warnings that the ground under pro-American Arab rulers would be set ablaze, that the political culture of the place would punish those who would cast their fate with the foreign power. Conversely, the Iraqis are now offering oil discounts, free trade zones, promises of commerce to practically all their neighbors. They have heaped on the Syrians the promise of turning over Syrian members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been granted asylum by Iraq.

The Iraqi despot is on the ground, he is of the place. It is a time of acute impasse between the Arab world and the United States. This would be a war in the age of the satellite channels and the news media. The Iraqis aim to scare us away, to suggest that we would be venturing into a region that bears us nothing but ill will.

It should be conceded right away that this is not Desert Storm, that we shall have to bring with the gear our own ideological and moral arguments. Eleven years or so ago, it was different during Desert Storm: That was a solar/lunar eclipse. The Iraqi ruler had run afoul of the rules of his neighborhood. His neighbors were menaced, and they were eager for protection. There were Muslim jurists, in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who issued fatwas, ruling opinions, against Saddam, sanctioned the presence of Arab and Islamic and “other friendly forces.” In the intervening decade, the man worked his way into the order of things. He knew the rules. He insinuated himself into the prevailing status quo.

This time around, the region shall be divided between those crying out against the Great foreign power’s war, and relatively silent subdued partners. A silent minority of liberal secularists will see the justice of this campaign and the need to rid the Arab world of Saddam’s power and Saddam’s example: We shall be hailed in Kuwait, for the Kuwaitis bear Saddam justifiable animus and know him for what he is. But it will be tougher going in other Arab lands. There shall be no demonstrations in Arab cities in favor of a strike against Iraq, it is safe to assume. If the mood of the region could be divided, it is as sure as anything that there will be demonstrations in Nablus and Casablanca, in Ramallah and Cairo, against America and its war. The campaign shall be seen as an Anglo-American war. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are on record against this resort to arms. It is safe to assume that these can not turn on a dime, and join us in full sunlight. Most likely, they will seek cover: They will get out of the way, offer what cooperation can be provided—passage through the Suez Canal, the use of command and control facilities, the Combined Air Operations Center at Prince Sultan Air Base—while in public maintaining their distance. The crucial help that would be needed from Saudi Arabia is its excess capacity of 3 million barrels of oil a day to replace Iraq’s production in case of a long interruption of Iraqi oil production. That sort of help can be relied upon.

Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia would risk its American connection in favor of Saddam. The truth must be known that there is no constituency for Iraq and for Saddam Hussein in Saudi Arabia. The kind of religious fervor that has moved opinion in Saudi Arabia on Islamic issues (Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan where every extended family had a son in that land, practically, and the issue of the Palestinians) is not there for the secular regime of Saddam Hussein. The dynasty in Saudi Arabia and the regime in Egypt can thus have a reasonable amount of prerogative and stay on the sidelines. The body politic in Bahrain and Qatar and Kuwait (let alone in Turkey, a case apart, and a country that can be fully relied upon for the prosecution of this war) will permit these lands enough latitude to support an American campaign. The country that will bear watching will be Jordan. Whether the young monarch, Abdullah ibn Hussein, decides to roll the dice and associate his country with an American campaign, If he does, there would be an irony here: Last time around when the two fathers, George Herbert Walker Bush and King Hussein, were there for the first campaign against Saddam, King Hussein opted for the street in his country, and reasoned that Pax Americana will forgive him his tilt toward Iraq, while the Iraqis and the pro-Iraqi sentiment in Jordan would be less forgiving. It was a variant of the choice that the late King Hussein had made in 1967, in the
Six Day War, when he rode with Nasser in the full knowledge that the Egyptians were doomed nonetheless. For King Abdullah this will be a big call, for his country's temper and opinion run in the other direction. He has just strongly criticized his uncle, Prince Hassan bin Talal, for attending a meeting with Iraqi oppositionists and anti-Saddam military officers in London. This is the stuff of which reigns are made and broken: The young King's burden—a large Palestinian population, a country of considerable poverty—is well known. But the weakness of the Jordanian state should not be overblown. The state could ride out the storm, and it could present what cooperation it offered the Americans as the price Jordan had to pay for its place in the American and Western order of things. In other words, it will have to be shades of Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan: staring down the street and the Islamists, insisting on the need to be with the winners, and with the forces of order and modernity.

The street that will matter of course, the street that will silence and trump all other Arab streets, will be the street in Basra and Baghdad. After liberation, Iraq is sure to erupt in joy. It is destined to embarrass the pro-Saddam demonstrators in other Arab and Muslim lands in precisely the same way the throngs in Kabul who greeted the Americans with kites and boom boxes embarrassed Al Jazeera television, and the pro-Taliban demonstrators in Karachi and Jakarta and Cairo. It will be hard for the street in Nabhis to make its fury felt when the Iraqis come out of their long captivity to tell the world of the nightmare they have endured in Saddam's great, big prison. It will be, if only for a moment, a bad day for anti-Americanism.

Ideally, for Desert Storm a decade ago, the regimes in the region would now want the Perfect Storm: a swift war, few casualties, as little political exposure by themselves as possible, the opportunity to be rid of Saddam without riding in broad daylight with the Americans, and without being brought to account by their people. But the political world will never grant this kind of good fortune. The fog of war is what it is: There will be risks run by these regimes, and there will be risks run by ourselves.

But those risks of war should be measured against the risks of the status quo. It is in the nature of human affairs that inertia often wins by default, that the costs of a particular status quo are hidden, while the costs of change are so readily apparent. Who for instance is to say that we would have endured the terrors of September 11 had we seen Desert Storm to its rightful conclusion back in 1991? Though no smoking gun has linked Saddam Hussein to September 11, the great simple truth must be known that the culture of Arab radicalism, which begot the furies of that day, was nurtured by his survival in power. After America spared him, a monitoring force was dispatched to Saudi Arabia to enforce southern Iraq's no fly zone, and it was precisely that American military presence in the Arabian Peninsula which became the rallying cry of Bin Laden and his soldiers of terror.

In the tug of war between containment and rollback—to use the Cold War imagery—the advocates of containment tell us that we can live with Saddam as we have lived with him for a long time now. But containment's advocates offer no assurance that the ruler in Baghdad will always play the containment game, and with weapons of mass destruction at his disposal, not strike at a moment of his own choice.

As I said before, along with the military gear we will have to take our own case for the war. Saddam's neighborhood will not supply the outrage and the concern with him. To read the region, the man is no serious menace, and few in his world are convinced that he has weapons of mass destruction at his disposal. A substantial body of opinion maintains that he is there at America's convenience—kept in place, his forces degraded, but used as a scarecrow to justify America's presence in the Gulf, its weapons sales programs and joint military exercises. We will have to cut through all that: the expedition will have to be justified by September 11 rules. America will have to insist on its right to retribution, on the generalized case that terror is indivisible and that a regime of this kind of malignancy in so vital and explosive a region will have to be changed. We will have to live with the doubts and the naysayers: After all this is a region where substantial majorities are yet to accept that it was young Arabs who flew into those towers, and into the Pentagon.

The second pillar of a strike against the Iraqi regime has to do with the vision we have for Iraq itself. We will have to be willing to stick around to help rehabilitate that polity. The real work will have to be done by Iraqis themselves, but we should not shy away from the task—even if it goes by the name of nation-building. We should read Iraq intelligently and sympathetically. This is a country with substantial social capital and the region's second largest reserves of oil after Saudi Arabia. It has tradition of literacy and learning and technical competence. It has a large diaspora of means and sophistication, waves of people driven out by the country's
turbulent politics and by the heavy hand of the rulers. We should be done with the bogeyman of a Shia state in Iran’s image emerging in Iraq, as a satrapy of the Iranian clerical regime. Such thoughts and ideas paralyzed American power in 1991, when the Iranian revolution was still in full swing. We should not fall for this. Iraq’s Shia community is a community of Iraq. They are Iraqis and Arabs through and through. Shi’ism was a phenomenon of Iraq centuries before Shi’ism crossed to Iran, brought there as a state religion—8 centuries to be exact. The great seminaries and the sacred places of Shi’ism are in Iraq—Najaf and Karbala. A healthy measure of competition was always the norm between the Shia seminaries of Iraq and those of Iran. It was only official terror in Iraq, and a crude theory of the folk and of race, of who is an Arab and who is not, that Iraq’s rulers unleashed on their country, that helped disinherit the Shia of Iraq. They are the country’s largest community, a majority of it, and we should understand this. They have endured the regime’s brutality yet fought its war against Iran. Precious few among them, I hazard to guess, dream of a Shia state. The great majority are secularists who know that the country will have to accommodate its largest three communities: The Shia Arabs, the Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds. (Part of the great silence in the Arab world is the discomfort of Arabs with the issue of Kurdish rights and Shia grievances; this has been the Ba’ath party’s and Saddam Hussein’s advantage all along.)

For American policy, this should be a straightforward call. We don’t do ethnic/sec
tarian imperiums. We can’t defend the right of 20% of the population, the Sunni Arabs, to maintain primacy over the land. In the decade behind us, the Kurds have come into a measure of autonomy in their ancestral land—10% of the country’s area now makes up the protected Kurdish zone in northern Iraq. The Kurds have ideas of federalism and decentralization—mixing both elements of geography and ethnicity. They are not eager to give up all that up and return to the ways of the past.

The best should not be the enemy of the good. We should not engage in a false specificity of what a future Iraq would look like after a military campaign. We should trust in the pluralism of the opposition—it has Shia and Sunni, constitutional monarchists, Kurds, people who have spent their adult lives in exile in Western democracies and know the terrible wages of political radicalism and are eager to give Iraq a new chance. Above all, we should trust in the innate wisdom of the Iraqis themselves who have lived on their nerves for decades now, and have seen the squandering of their country’s wealth and potential in pursuit of deadly foreign wars and weapons of destruction.

Of all the regimes in the region, this is the most malignant, its ideological roots go back to National Socialism that infected Germany in the 1930’s. This would be the place where American power can really function for the good. It has a secular culture—the religious prohibitions that limit and trouble the American presence in Saudi Arabia do not obtain in Iraq. It may, as well, have a greater readiness for democracy than Egypt—because it is wealthier, because it lacks the burden of Egypt’s poverty and numbers, and the steady presence of an Islamist current.

To govern is to choose. The resort to arms is never frivolous. To own up to one’s politics, we have a leadership and a national security team for whose judgment and skill I have tremendous regard. Before they pull the trigger, if they pull the trigger, they will have come to it after all other alternatives are exhausted. They will have done an enormous amount of quiet work, reached with the states in the region subtle accommodations that these states will abide by while maintaining official distance and reserve. We can’t win hearts and minds in the Arab world today. This is the sad fact of the Arab condition today. American power was used three times in favor of Muslims in the 1990’s—in favor of Kuwait in 1990-91, of Bosnia in 1995, of the Kosovars in 1999. We received no open gratitude for these deeds and accomplishments. It is often the fate of Great Powers to provide order against a background of those who take the protection and bemoan the heavy hand of the protector. This campaign, if and when it comes, would be no exception.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, professor.

Dr. Kemp, welcome.

STATEMENT OF DR. GEOFFREY KEMP, DIRECTOR, REGIONAL STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. Kemp. I would like to add my appreciation, Mr. Chairman, to you and your colleagues for hosting this extremely important set of hearings. I have been asked to talk about the likely response of
Iran to a war against Iraq, and I will try to do it in about 9 minutes.

Iran has a long agenda of unresolved problems with Iraq, including border disputes, the Kurdish question, religious quarrels, terrorist and liberation activity, Iraqi Shia refugees in Iran—there are hundreds of thousands of them—and, of course, the continuing aftermath of the brutal Iran-Iraq war.

Iran has a huge stake in the future of Iraq, and therefore is going to be watching very carefully what we do and what happens. Iran remains extremely suspicious of Saddam Hussein, and most Iranians hate his regime, I am certain, as much, as my colleague says, the Iraqis do.

However, and this is the point I want to stress, at this time the Iranian regime is more worried about a U.S. war that calls for a regime change and regards this to be inimical to its own interests. From an Iranian perspective the status quo, that is to say, a contained Iraq, suits their interests much better.

They acknowledge Iraq’s potential to reemerge as a regional threat, but the United States is seen as the greater threat, especially since the President’s State of the Union speech designating Iran as part of the “axis of evil.” Iran’s hardliners have taken this very seriously, including the frequent calls from the administration for regime change in the region, and they wonder at what point their Islamic republic, which is in trouble, will be a candidate for American action.

All Iranians, irrespective of whether they are hardliners, softliners, moderates, or conservatives, worry about a failed or messy U.S. operation that would leave the region in chaos. They would then be on the receiving end for possibly millions of new Iraqi Shia refugees, and they worry about the enormous disruptions a messy war would have on world oil markets and their very fragile economy.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, can you tell us how large the Shia population is in Iraq?

Dr. KEMP. It is about 60 percent of the population.

The CHAIRMAN. About 14 million, 15 million?

Dr. KEMP. About that.

Now, Iranian fears, which I have just articulated, are one thing, but what, in reality, is the Iranian Government likely to do in the event that there is a war? Some analysts, and very good analysts, I would add, believe that Iran has already embarked on a proactive policy to delay any U.S. attack on Iraq by stepping up support for terrorism against Israel, and stirring up trouble in Afghanistan. The greater the violence in either area, the more difficult it will be for the President to take on Iraq.

On the other hand, there is some evidence that the Iranian-based Shiite opposition group—this is the one that Dr. Cordesman was talking about this morning, the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, may be open to support from the United States, particularly air power to topple Saddam, provided we do not send in ground forces.

This would suggest the Iranian Government is at least prepared to blink or wink in the event of a limited U.S. operation that does not involve ground troops. In my judgment, Mr. Chairman, if the
United States has serious support for military action, including the U.N. backing, E.U. backing, some moderate Arabs on board, Turkey on board, and the Russians on board—this is very important; the Russians are moving in our favor—Iran is likely to keep its head down and not take a strong position against the United States during the war.

However, if international support is weak, Iranian protests will be loud. Much will depend upon how this administration approaches Iran in diplomatic channels. In my judgment, its current policies toward Iran suggest that the leaders of Iran are likely to be warned rather than wooed in the event that we decide to go after Iraq.

The problem here, I think, is that the Iranians could react unpredictably to what they would regard as a belligerent U.S. posture. The regime, for instance, might decide to place Iranian military forces on high alert. Under these circumstances, there is a danger that there could be military incidents between United States and Iranian maritime forces in the Persian Gulf, and that could lead to miscalculation and escalation.

Now, in thinking about Iranian behavior the day after the war, much will depend upon the nature of the new regime in Baghdad. It is not inconceivable that Iran might be willing to work closely with the new regime and reach an agreement to resolve outstanding issues relating to the Iran-Iraq war—the POW’s, for instance, and the longstanding dispute they have had over the demarcation of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. But if U.S. forces have to invade and occupy Baghdad, this will mean trouble for the hardliners and they will clearly be eager to exploit regional resentments if a new Pax Americana, of the kind that my two previous colleagues suggested, emerges.

Assuming no radical shift in the political balance in Tehran, it could be expected, that Iran will make greater efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. It is possible that a quick U.S. victory over Iraq could result in a new bout of pragmatism in Tehran, leading to a deal with Washington, but this outcome is by no means certain.

On the other hand, an arrogant, victorious America could well find itself disliked by Iranians who regard themselves as reformers and pro-West. Iranians are very proud of their independence, as well as their desire to have a more democratic system, and we should not be unaware of the fact that while a lot of them may hate their own regime and like us at this point in time, this attitude can change.

The fact of the matter is, Mr. Chairman, a number of geopolitical realities are going to face any new regime in Baghdad and ultimately better relations between Iran and Iraq will be very, very important. Iran will be Iraq’s neighbor long after U.S. troops have left.

Now, just 2 or 3 minutes on Europe. Direct European support for initial U.S. military action against Iraq is highly desirable, but not essential. However, cooperation with the United States would be essential if this war was protracted. We would conceivably have a major energy supply problem and working with the Europeans to resolve that is essential. Europeans’ support, in my judgment, is
going to be vital to make sure that the post Saddam Iraq and the Middle East remains stable.

Officially, cooperation between the United States and Europe on the Middle East is relatively close. That is to say, cooperation between the governments. The E.U., as you know, now has a common policy on the Middle East, and this makes coordination with Washington much easier than in the past, but the E.U. itself is not a state. As a consequence, its Middle East policy inevitably reflects compromise on contentious issues.

The key European Governments all share the U.S. view that Saddam Hussein is a menace, that he is determined to reconstitute his WMD, and that if he obtains nuclear weapons he will flaunt them and attempt to change the balance of power in the Middle East. However, regime change, a phrase now frequently used by the administration, in the context of the war against terrorism, is quite another matter for most European Governments and parliaments.

Indeed, without the cloak of U.N. legitimacy, European Governments will find it difficult to carry public opinion. Though this does not mean they will not cooperate with us if, in the last resort, the United States decides that war is the only alternative. Europe obviously worries about the cost of the war, as we do, particularly one that does not go well.

The Europeans tend to have a more gloomy prognosis as to the region’s susceptibility to a quick-fix American military option than many seem to have in this administration. They ask how long will the United States have to occupy Iraq for, how long, and with what size force?

When pressed, European officials are not prepared to say that they would contribute to a post Saddam Iraqi occupation, unlike, by the way, the situation in Afghanistan, when they volunteered more military forces than the United States thought necessary. While we are on the subject of Afghanistan, the Europeans do worry that the United States has no, “staying power,” therefore, absent a casus belli, a linkage between Iraq and al-Qaeda, or a deliberate, outright flaunting of WMD by Saddam, most European governments would argue it would be unwise to take on Iraq while Afghanistan and also the Pakistani regimes remain precarious.

I would conclude on these two points, Mr. Chairman. Iran will not be able to prevent a U.S. attack on Iraq. It will likely remain neutral during the war while intensifying its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Its greatest leverage will be during the post war period. Its population and geography assures its interest must be taken into account irrespective of who is running Tehran.

In the last resort, European governments will support the United States if it uses force. I doubt very much whether this will involve troop contributions, except in the case of the Blair government, which, as I understand it, shares all our concerns about Iraq except the issue of regime change as an objective.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kemp follows:]

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Introduction

Iraq borders on six countries—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. All have a huge stake in what happens to Iraq. Their response to a U.S. led war against the regime of Saddam Hussein will depend upon several factors. First, the level of international cooperation promised to the U.S. prior to the war. Second, the duration, conduct, and effectiveness of the military campaign. Third, U.S. proposals and plans for the “days after” regime change in Iraq.

At one extreme it is possible to envisage a broad based, U.S. led and UN supported, alliance including key Arab countries, Europe, including Turkey, and support from Russia. This would be followed by a quick decisive victory with few casualties and the emergence of a stable, humane, pro-Western democratic regime in Baghdad. Only token U.S. forces would be required to occupy Iraq; UN arms inspection would proceed and all WMD capabilities. A new era of reform would be unleashed throughout the Muslim Middle East and it will be easier to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This very optimistic outlook can be termed, “the best case.”

At the other extreme one must consider the “worst case.” One can imagine a U.S. decision to remove Saddam with minimal international or regional support, a protracted war that goes badly with many casualties, including Iraqi civilians. One can also postulate Saddam’s use of WMD against Israel and the Kurds, massive Israeli retaliation and mayhem and chaos in Iraq with no one in control. At that point, the U.S. would either have to occupy most of the country or witness Iraq’s descent into bloody civil war and a surge of refugees fleeing to the north, south, and east causing “regime change” in moderate Arab states such as Jordan.

In between these two extremes there are many other possible outcomes. Unilateral action could be very successful; alternatively, an alliance could flounder. The point is that both regional and European responses will clearly be linked to how the war goes.

Iranian Responses

Iran has a long agenda of unresolved problems with Iraq including border disputes, the Kurdish question, religious quarrels, terrorist/liberation activity, Iraqi Shia refugees in Iran, and the continuing aftermath of the brutal Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). For these reasons, Iran’s position on a U.S. war with Iraq is complex and its policy unpredictable. It has huge stakes in the future of its neighbor. We have two recent precedents to draw upon: Iran’s behavior during the 1991 Gulf War and its behavior during the Afghan war in the fall of 2001. In both cases, Iran had a strong interest in the outcome; it feared and hated both Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. For this reason, Iran did not play a spoiler role during these wars. It was quite cooperative on Afghanistan both during the war and in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. victory. Iran remains highly suspicious of Saddam Hussein; most Iranians hate his regime. They remember, with great bitterness, Saddam’s frequent use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War and Iraq’s deliberate targeting of Iranian cities with surface to surface missiles. Iran continues to worry about Iraq’s WMD and is as eager as the U.S. to see them removed.

Yet at this time, Iran is worried about a U.S. led war and regards the call for “regime change” to be inimical to its own interests. From an Iranian perspective, the status quo, i.e. “a contained Iraq” suits their interests much better. They believe that so long as Saddam is a pariah there are limits as to how far he can reconstitute his weapons programs. They are quite happy that American military power and international arms embargoes have kept Saddam in his box. They have benefited from economic sanctions on Iraq. Iraq’s oil production and exports have been limited and some Iranian groups, notably the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have made a great deal of money smuggling Iraq’s oil to the black market. So long as Saddam remains in power Iraq will be unable to reopen the contentious border dispute with Iran over the demarcation of the Shatt al Arab waterway.

Thus while Iran acknowledges Iraq’s potential to reemerge as a regional threat, now the United States is seen as the greater threat. President Bush’s State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002 designated Iran as part of the “axis of evil.” Iran’s hardliners have taken very seriously Bush’s frequent calls for “regime change” in the region and wonder at what point the Islamic Republic will be a candidate for American action. They notice that American military forces are now deployed in Turkey, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman. The U.S. Fifth Fleet patrols the Persian Gulf, the
Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Land based U.S. long range bombers can reach the Gulf from Europe, Diego Garcia, and even the continental U.S. They point out that Israel, their bitter enemy, has a military alliance with Turkey and that Jordan and Egypt have extremely close ties with the U.S. defense establishment. Hence an American invasion of Iraq would bring U.S. troops to their Western border and they will literally be encircled by American military forces.

Quite aside from concerns that they will be the next victim after Iraq, Iranian hardliners are fearful that a pro-Western regime in Baghdad will invariably increase pressure on them to relinquish power to Iranian reformers. All Iranians worry that a failed or messy U.S. operation would leave the region in chaos and they would be on the receiving end for possibly millions of new Iraqi Shia refugees and the economic disruption of world oil markets.

Iranian fears may be one thing but what, in reality, are they likely to do in event of war? Some analysts believe Iran has already embarked on a proactive policy to delay any U.S. attack on Iraq by stepping up support for terrorism against Israel and stirring up trouble in Afghanistan. The greater the violence in either area, the more difficult it will be for Bush to take on Iraq. On the other hand recent activity of the Iranian based Shiite opposition group based in Tehran (the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI)) may be open to U.S. help in toppling Saddam Hussein provided it is limited to air power and not invasion. This suggests that the Iranian government is prepared to be passive in event of a limited U.S. military operation. The assumption is that SAIRI's policy would not be articulated if the Iranian government was adamantly opposed to it.

If the U.S. has serious support for military action including UN, EU, moderate Arab, Turkish, and Russian backing, Iran will likely keep its head down and not take a strong position against the U.S. during the war. However if international support is weak, Iranian protests will be loud. Much will depend upon how the Bush Administration approaches Iran in diplomatic channels. Given the current nuances of the Bush policy towards Iran, Tehran is likely to be warned rather than wooed by this administration. The problem for the U.S. is that Iranians could react unpredictably to a belligerent U.S. posture. The regime may decide to place Iranian military forces on high alert. Under these circumstances, there is a danger that military “incidents” between U.S. and Iranian maritime forces could take place in the Persian Gulf with the danger of miscalculation and escalation.

Clearly this possibility would be greatest if the war itself went badly and either became bogged down or spread to a wider Middle East confrontation. The latter case could happen if Israel is forced into the war because Saddam, presumably with nothing to lose, launches terror attacks against Israel and creates havoc in Jordan.

In thinking about Iranian behavior “the day after”, much will depend upon the nature of the new regime in Baghdad (assuming there is not anarchy) and the degree to which the regime takes its instructions from Washington. A number of possibilities could emerge. An Iraqi military coup by anti-Saddam factions within the Republican Guard could happen soon after the U.S. begins to attack. Under these circumstances, no invasion would be necessary but the U.S. might have little say in the governance of the country. The new leadership could offer favorable deals to its neighbors and to the Kurdish and Shia communities in Iraq. It is not inconceivable that Iran might be willing to work closely with the new regime and reach an agreement to resolve outstanding issues relating to the Iran-Iraq War (POWs, etc.) and the demarcation of the Shatt al-Arab.

On the other hand, if U.S. forces have to invade and occupy Baghdad, the new regime will clearly be under the control of Washington. This will mean trouble for Tehran's hardliners and they will be eager to exploit regional resentment of the new Pax Americana if a formidable U.S. presence generates a major backlash. They will regard a pro-Western leadership as an American puppet and will be convinced that, sooner or later, they will come into the cross hairs of American military might. Assuming no radical shift in the political balance between reformers and hardliners in Tehran, it can be expected that Iran will make even greater efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability, even though they will assume the U.S. will successfully destroy all Iraq's WMD capabilities.

Their reasons for concern go beyond the putative threat of American military power. They will know that one of the priorities of the new regime will be to reinvest in Iraqi oil production to generate hard currency to pay for a huge reconstruction effort. This will mean that Iraq will be interested in maximizing its oil revenue and unlikely to conform to OPEC production quotas, thereby possibly lowering oil prices and reducing Iran's hard currency earnings.

A pro-Western Iraq could reopen the Shatt al-Arab dispute or could even proceed with a previous Iraqi proposal to build a canal from Baara to Umm Qasar thereby
Impact of a War on Iran's Domestic Politics

Iran's political struggles are often referred to as a life and death struggle between “reformers” led by President Khatami and “hardliners” led by the spiritual leader Khamenei. In reality, the picture is much more complex. Some hardliners on foreign policy are eager to reform the ossified economy. Some reformers are against market capitalism and support greater state control of the economy. And when it comes to the United States all would probably agree that the absence of relations with Washington though ideologically pure, hurts the Iranian economy. The reformers cannot afford to make a serious overture to the U.S. government for fear of a draconian backlash from their domestic enemies.

One issue on which most Iranians agree is that Iran must retain its independence from foreign domination. Over the past decade, Iran has become more nationalist and less enamored with revolutionary zeal. The new cooperation with Saudi Arabia is the most clear sign of this pragmatic nationalism. While the Islamic nature of the Republic remains the central component of domestic politics, a more “Persian” attitude to foreign relations has emerged.

It is possible that a quick U.S. victory over Iraq could result in a new bout of pragmatism in Tehran leading to a deal with Washington. But this outcome is by no means certain. An arrogant, victorious America could well find itself disliked by Iranians who today regard themselves as reformers and pro-West. This will matter because however quick and easy the U.S. military victory and however pro-American the new Iraqi regime is, a number of geopolitical realities will face the new regime and better relations with powerful neighbors, such as Iran, will be very important. Iran will be Iraq’s neighbor long after U.S. troops have left. Sooner or later the two countries will have to cooperate or descend once more into confrontational behavior. Iraq’s immediate neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Iran, all face enormous political and economic challenges in the years ahead. One reason they all fear a war against Iraq is that it could reek havoc on their already fragile societies. It is true that in the long run the region is well endowed with resources and could witness an economic renaissance. However, the short term effect of a war could be very bad.

Responses from Europe

Direct European support for U.S. military action against Iraq is highly desirable, even if not essential. However European cooperation with the U.S. would be essential to limit the dangers of an energy crisis during a war and assuring that a post-Saddam Iraq and the Middle East remains stable. At the inter government level cooperation between the United States and Europe on Middle East issues is close. The EU now has a common policy on the Middle East; this makes coordination with Washington easier than in the past. But the EU itself is not a state. As a consequence its Middle East policy inevitably reflects compromise on contentious issues.

The key European governments all share the U.S. view that Saddam Hussein is a menace, that he is determined to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction and that if he obtains nuclear weapons he will flaunt them and attempt to change the balance of power in the Middle East. Saddam Hussein must be forced to accept all UN Security Council resolutions, especially those relating to WMD. Europeans acknowledge that at some point the use of force may be necessary to implement the resolutions and to assure that UNMOVIC is dispatched to Iraq. However, “regime change,” a phrase now frequently used by the Bush Administration in the context of the war on terrorism, is quite another matter. Most Europeans governments regard this as an unacceptable policy goal. While regime change in Iraq would be welcomed and, indeed, might occur naturally in event of a military confrontation over WMD, it cannot be used as a causus belli. The Europeans insist that there must be international legitimacy for any military operation against Saddam Hussein and that this will require further efforts to resolve the inspection problem. Without the cloak of UN legitimacy European governments will find it difficult to carry public opinion, though this does not mean they will not cooperate if, in the last resort, the United States decides that war is the only alternative.

Europe worries about the costs of a war, particularly one that does not go well. This obviously also is a concern in Washington, but the Europeans tend to have a more gloomy prognosis as to the region’s susceptibility to quick fix American military operation than do many in the Bush Administration. They worry about the breakup of Iraq and the disastrous spillover effect this could have on the region, including the possibility that the Kingdom of Jordan could collapse and that Iran,
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, one way or another, would be drawn into a cauldron of instability in Iraq. On the other hand, when presented with the more optimistic scenario, namely that American forces could quickly defeat Iraq and that the remnants of Saddam’s support could collapse, Europeans are nervous about what then happens after the fall of the regime. Will the United States have to occupy Iraq, and if so for how long? When pressed, the European officials are not prepared to say that they would contribute forces to a post-Saddam Iraqi occupation, unlike the situation in Afghanistan when they volunteered more forces than the U.S. thought necessary. And on Afghanistan the Europeans worry that the U.S. has no “staying power” and that, absent a causus belli, it would be unwise to take on Iraq while the Afghan and Pakistani regimes remain precarious.

Conclusion

Iran will not be able to prevent a U.S. attack on Iraq. It will likely remain neutral during the war while intensifying its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Its greatest leverage will be during the post war period. Its population and geography assures its interests must be taken into account, irrespective of its leadership. In the last resort the European governments will support the United States if it uses force. Whether this support will include troop contributions is highly unlikely except in the case of the Blair government, which, at least at the highest levels shares U.S. concerns with the exception of regime change as a stated war objective.

In considering the pros and cons of a military campaign against Iraq, the U.S. must take into account the stability of both the Middle East and South Asia. No one doubts the ability of the United States to prevail in any military campaign against Iraq, but the cost may be high and may require a formidable commitment of manpower if the job is to be done properly. The Bush Administration openly talks about its wishes for regime change in Palestine and Iraq and hints that Iran and Syria could be next. What is less discussed is the problem of regime survival. At this point in time pro-American regimes in Afghanistan and Pakistan are in danger and our friendliest leader in the Arab world, King Abdullah of Jordan, warns that his regime may be threatened if events get out of hand. He may be exaggerating the danger, but he is clearly very worried. We would be foolish to ignore his concerns.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, doctor.

Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. PARRIS, SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, & CALDWELL, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador PARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join my colleagues in expressing my appreciation for the opportunity to appear before you on this very timely and important subject. The last time I sat in this chair was during my confirmation hearings, when you grilled me on Turkish policy toward Cyprus. All things considered, I think I would just as soon talk about Turkish policy toward Iraq.

I do not think that there is any question that Turkey’s attitude will be critical in the event the United States seeks to remove Saddam Hussein through the use of force. In the interest of time, I am not going to recite the many reasons why that is so. All one has to do is look at a map and consider the options to realize that you really cannot exercise any of them without Turkey.

What do the Turks think about the prospect of direct U.S. military action to topple Saddam Hussein? The short answer is, they hate the idea. The Turks’ dread of a new war against Iraq stems from their negative experiences of the last one. In security, economic, and strategic terms, Turkey emerged a loser from the last gulf war and its aftermath.

From a security standpoint, Saddam’s oppression of the Iraqi Kurds’ short-lived uprising in 1991 and the coalition’s subsequent
expulsion of Iraqi central authorities from the north had a profoundly negative impact across the border in southeast Turkey. PKK terrorists exploited the situation to expand their operations exponentially. It took most of the nineties, thousands of lives, lots of money, and frequent interventions into northern Iraq itself for the Turkish military to get the situation back under reliable control.

From an economic standpoint, U.N. sanctions against Iraq cutoff Turkey’s access to what had been its largest trading partner. The impact was on the order of what would happen here if the U.S.-Canada border were sealed from one day to the next. Turks estimate the cost over the last decade at between $40 and $80 billion, and that may be low.

From a strategic standpoint, Ankara saw the emergence in northern Iraq of local administrative organs to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Iraqi central authorities as a step toward the establishment of a de facto Kurdish state. Preventing such a development had long been and remains a cornerstone of Turkish regional policy, reflecting concern for its impact not just on Kurdish populations, but on the interests of up to 2 million Turcomen of northern Iraq, a people ethnically and culturally very close to the Turks.

Over the past decade, Turkey has found ways to cope with most of the consequences of the gulf war. It is not now uncomfortable with the status quo that has emerged in the area in and around northern Iraq.

Would it not be better for Turkey if Saddam were gone? No question about that. Turks are not insensitive to the potential advantages, especially from an economic standpoint, of Saddam’s removal, and of Iraq becoming a more normal neighbor, but for most of them the appeal of such gains is outweighed by misgivings over what could go wrong this time around.

Based on their experiences since 1990, the Turks lack confidence that the United States understands Iraq’s internal dynamics well enough to give meaning to our repeated commitments to maintain its territorial integrity. They worry that even if we do understand the situation better than they suspect, the process of replacing Saddam could at some point lead the United States to make tradeoffs at Turkey’s expense, and they remain concerned that if things do not go according to plan, the United States will not see the project through, leaving Turkey again to face a neighbor that is either hostile or in chaos.

Now, seen from this perspective, we should probably not be surprised that Turkey’s highest leaders, including its President, Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and senior military have publicly and repeatedly expressed deep reservations about the wisdom of seeking forcibly to remove Saddam Hussein, but Turks are realists, and in virtually all conversations I have had with the Turks on this subject, their bottom line is a realistic one.

It boils down to this. If the United States does go after Saddam, Ankara will not have the luxury of sitting this one out. There would simply be too much at stake in terms of Turkey’s interests. Turkey would want to be in on the planning and execution of any operation to ensure that those interests were factored in and that there was no deviation from an originally agreed concept once
things got started, and Turks who think about these things understand that the price of this kind of access and this kind of transparency is some degree of cooperation.

It is clearly in the interests of the United States, if we move against Saddam militarily, to maximize the extent of Turkish cooperation and to minimize the possibility of surprises once the operation begins. The key to making Ankara part of the solution rather than a potential problem is early and honest and detailed consultations.

What will the Turks be looking for in those consultations? At the most general level, they will want to see that whatever we have in mind is serious. Given the history, they will need to be convinced that we will finish the job this time around, that we can do it with dispatch, and that we will do whatever it takes to get their neighbor back on its feet in one piece and as a member in good standing of the family of nations.

But the Turks will also have more specific things they will want to see addressed. They will first of all want to be sure that they do not again pay an economic price for being on the right side in this war. I would therefore not be surprised to see Turkey seek to lock in before hostilities start concrete, specific commitments from the administration in terms of debt forgiveness or additional economic or military assistance.

I would also expect Ankara to seek assurance of continued U.S. support in the IMF and other international financial institutions to the extent action in Iraq adversely affects Turkey’s economic recovery program, but it is on issues relating to northern Iraq that U.S.-Turkey consultations will be most important, because what happens there very simply may well define Turkey’s role in the broader conflict.

There have been some provocative but I think ultimately fanciful things written in the U.S. press about what that role will be. I think you can forget about Turkish tanks rolling to Baghdad. It is simply not going to happen, nor is anyone in Ankara sitting around counting the revenue that Turkey might gain by seizing the oilfields around Mosul and Kirkuk.

My impression is the Turks are deadly serious about maintaining Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity. Indeed, I believe that seriousness underlies what will be Turkey’s primary goal in the event the United States moves against Iraq. That is, denying the Iraqi Kurds any gain that might enhance their ability in a post Saddam environment to press for independence or its functional equivalent.

Now, that imperative has certain practical implications that U.S. planners will ignore at their peril. One hears a lot around this town, for example, about how the United States will, quote, improve the military capability of the Peshmerga, the Kurdish militia, as part of an effort to topple Saddam. I suspect that a more capable Peshmerga force is not something most Turks will be wildly enthusiastic about, either now or on the day after.

Another area of potential tension has to do with the nature and mission of U.S. military and other personnel who may be deployed in the north. The Turks have spent a decade developing an ability to monitor and, to an important extent, to control developments there. They are likely to be suspicious of and may resist any pres-
ence that dilutes that ability by establishing direct links to the local Kurdish leaders.

And what about the Iraqi opposition? Turkey has traditionally been skeptical of Iraqi exile organizations, and has a notably rocky relationship with the Iraqi National Congress. To the extent the United States intends to rely on such groups, particularly in the north, Ankara might have other ideas.

Finally, what would the Turks really do if Iraqi Kurds attempt to seize Mosul and Kirkuk? The Turks clearly fear that possession of these politically important cities and their associated oil wells would put the Kurds in a powerful negotiating position on the day after. Turkey’s press in recent months has been full of credible reports that Turkey would itself seize those cities, rather than allow that to happen.

Mr. Chairman, I raise these examples not to suggest that they reveal irreconcilable differences between the United States and Turkey that would keep us from cooperating in an effort to change Iraq’s leadership. I do not believe that to be the case, but I think they do underscore the importance of honest, detailed discussions before any balloons go up.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Parris follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMB. MARK R. PARRIS, SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, & CALDWELL

Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to share my views on this important and timely subject.

My personal involvement with the problem of Saddam Hussein dates to the first Gulf War, when, as the number-two in our Tel Aviv Embassy, I was on the receiving end of thirty or so of his SCUD missiles. From 1992 to 1997 I held senior positions in the first Bush and the Clinton administrations, where I tried to make containment work. As Ambassador to Turkey from 1997 to 2000, one of my most challenging tasks was to keep this important front-line state on the same page as the U.S. on Iraq. Since my retirement from the Foreign Service in early 2001, I have visited Turkey frequently, most recently in late-June of this year. During those visits, and especially since last fall, I have had extensive discussions with Turkish officials and private citizens about Iraq.

Turkey’s attitude will be critical in the event the U.S. seeks to remove Saddam Hussein through use of force. In the interests of time, I won’t recite the many reasons why. All one has to do is look at a map and consider the options to realize you can’t exercise any of them without Turkey.

So what do the Turks think about the prospect of direct U.S. military action to topple Saddam Hussein? The short answer is: they hate the idea.

TURKEY’S MISGIVINGS

The Turks’ dread of a new war against Iraq stems from their negative experiences with the last one. In security, economic and strategic terms, Turkey emerged a loser from the Gulf War and its aftermath.

• From a security standpoint, Saddam’s suppression of the Iraqi Kurds’ short-lived uprising in early 1991, and the Coalition’s subsequent expulsion of Iraqi central authorities from the north, had a profoundly negative impact across the border in southeast Turkey. PKK terrorists exploited the situation to expand their operations dramatically. It took most of the nineties, thousands of lives, lots of money and frequent interventions into northern Iraq itself, for the Turkish military to get the situation back under reliable control.

• From an economic standpoint, UN sanctions against Iraq cut off Turkey’s access to what had been its largest trading partner. The impact was on the order of what would happen here if the U.S.-Canada border were sealed from one day to the next. Turks estimate the cost over the past decade at between 40 and 80 billion dollars. That may be low.
From a strategic standpoint, Ankara saw the emergence in northern Iraq of local administrative organs to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Iraqi central authorities as a step toward establishment of a de facto Kurdish state. Preventing such a development had long been—and remains—a cornerstone of Turkish regional policy, reflecting concern for its impact not just on Turkey's own Kurdish population, but on the interests of the up to 2 million Turcomen of northern Iraq—a people ethnically and culturally very close to Turks.

Over the past decade, Turkey found ways to cope with most of the consequences of the Gulf War. It is not now uncomfortable with the status quo that has emerged in and around northern Iraq.

Would it not be better for Turkey if Saddam were gone? Without question. Turks are not insensitive to the potential advantages—especially from an economic standpoint—of Saddam's removal and of Iraq becoming a more normal neighbor. But for most of them, the appeal of such gains is outweighed by misgivings over what could go wrong this time around.

Based on their experiences since 1990, Turks:

- Lack confidence that the United States understands Iraq's internal dynamics well enough to give meaning to our repeated commitments to maintain its territorial integrity;
- Worry that, even if we do understand the situation better than they suspect, the process of replacing Saddam could at some point lead the U.S. to make tradeoffs at Turkey's expense;
- Remain concerned that, if things don't go according to plan, the U.S. will not see the project through, leaving Turkey, again, to face a neighbor that is either hostile or in chaos.

Seen from this perspective, we should not be surprised that Turkey's highest leaders, including its President, Prime Minister, Defense Minister and senior military, have publicly and repeatedly expressed deep reservations about the wisdom of seeking forcibly to remove Saddam.

TURKEY'S BOTTOM LINE

But Turks are realists. And in virtually all conversations that I have had with Turks on this subject, their bottom line is a realistic one. It boils down to this: if the U.S. does go after Saddam, Ankara will not have the luxury of sitting it out. There would be simply too much at stake in terms of Turkish interests. Turkey would need to be in on the planning and execution of any operation to ensure that those interests were factored in and that there was no deviation from an original, agreed concept once things got started. Turks who think about these things understand that the price of access and transparency is some degree of cooperation.

It is clearly in the interests of the U.S., if we move against Saddam militarily, to maximize the extent of Turkish cooperation, and to minimize the possibility of surprises, once an operation begins. The key to making Ankara part of the solution, rather than a potential problem, is early, honest, detailed consultations.

INCENTIVES AND RED LINES

What will the Turks be looking for in such consultations?

At the most general level, they will want to see that whatever we have in mind is serious. Given the history, they will need to be convinced that we will finish the job this time around, that we can do it with dispatch, and that we will do what it takes to get their neighbor back on its feet in one piece and as a member in good standing of the family of nations.

But the Turks will have more specific things they want addressed as well.

They will first of all want to be sure that they do not again pay an economic price for being on the right side. Some have even suggested that this may be an opportunity to make good some of Turkey's losses from the last war. I would therefore not be surprised to see Turkey seek to lock in, before hostilities start, concrete, specific commitments from the Administration in terms of debt forgiveness or additional economic or military assistance. I would also expect Ankara to seek assurance of continued U.S. support in the IMF and other international financial institutions, to the extent action against Iraq adversely affects Turkey's economic recovery program.

But it is on issues relating to northern Iraq that U.S.-Turkish consultations will be most important, because what happens there may well define Turkey's role in the broader conflict.

There have been some provocative but fanciful things written in the U.S. press about what that role might be. Forget about Turkish tanks rolling to Baghdad. It
is not going to happen. Nor is anyone in Ankara counting the revenue Turkey might gain by seizing the oil fields around Mosul and Kirkuk. Turkey is serious about maintaining Iraq's unity and territorial integrity.

Indeed, that seriousness underlies what I believe will be Turkey's primary goal in the event the U.S. moves against Iraq: denying the Iraqi Kurds any gains that might enhance their ability in a post-Saddam environment to press for independence or its functional equivalent.

That imperative has certain practical implications that U.S. planners will ignore at their peril:

- One hears a lot around this town, for example, about how the U.S. will "improve the military capability of the peshmerga" as part of an effort to topple Saddam. Now, I suspect that a more capable peshmerga force is not something most Turks will be widely enthusiastic about, now or on the Day After.
- Another area of potential tension has to do with the nature and mission of U.S. military or other personnel who may be deployed in the north. The Turks have spent a decade developing an impressive ability to monitor and, to an important extent, control developments there. They are likely to be suspicious of, and may resist, any presence that dilutes that ability by establishing direct links to local Kurdish leaders.
- And what about the Iraqi opposition? Turkey has traditionally been skeptical of Iraqi exile organizations, and has notably had a rocky relationship with the Iraqi National Congress. To the extent the U.S. intends to rely on such groups, particularly in the north, Ankara might have other ideas.
- Finally, what would the Turks really do if Iraqi Kurds attempt to seize Mosul and Kirkuk? Ankara clearly fears that possession of these politically important cities and their associated oil wealth would put the Kurds in a powerful negotiating position on the Day After. Turkey's press in recent months has been full of credible reports that Turkey would itself seize those cities, rather than allow that to happen.

Mr. Chairman, I raise these examples not to suggest that they reveal irreconcilable differences between the U.S. and Turkey that would keep us from cooperating in an effort to change Iraq's leadership. I don't believe that to be the case. But I think they do underscore the importance of honest, detailed discussions before any balloons go up.

Judging from press reports, that process seems to have started in earnest during Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz's visit to Turkey last month. Even though we are repeatedly told that "there is no plan on the President's desk," and even though most people in Turkey wish the issue would just go away, it is not too soon.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Let me ask you, Mr. Telhami, how would you test the choice between regime change and nuclear weapons? You drew what I think most Americans would think is a false distinction here that in fact everyone we have heard from so far, almost everyone you hear is reputed to be informed, says that there is no way of separating Saddam from his nuclear, or weapons of mass destruction, and it is a foolhardy exercise to attempt to do it, and therefore regime change is the only alternative.

What you are suggesting is the possibility that Saddam stay in power but not have his weapons of mass destruction, a deal that I think you would find an awful lot of people ready to accept, probably, but I mean, I do not quite understand.

Dr. TELHAMI. Let me just put it this way. There is clearly a difference in terms of how people in the world in Europe and the Middle East see the priorities in Iraq. To the extent that the priority is eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, they see that as being more important than the issue of regime change.

I think in our debate it is clear that we have articulated a policy of regime change from the very beginning, even when it was not an explicit policy, it was an implicit policy. The real question is, if, in fact, our priority is eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruc-
tion potential above regime change, one of the avenues we certainly have not explored is whether that tradeoff will lead us to more intrusive international presence that would assure Iraq’s compliance.

The CHAIRMAN. But during the Clinton administration, where there was not at the front end an explicit judgment made on regime change, there was virtually no cooperation from Europe on tougher inspection, and tougher—well, inspection regime to deal with weapons of mass destruction.

I mean, I have had repeated discussions all during the nineties with European leaders who always had some, from our perspective, quite frankly lame excuse why it really was not a problem, so I am wondering why you think that there is any prospect that if we went back to the Europeans, and assume the President said to the French and to others, look, here is the deal, you help us get rid—you get full-blown inspections in there that are real, robust, genuine, allow us to go, and the international community go wherever, and if we are convinced that we have gotten rid of the weapons of mass destruction, we are out of there.

Dr. TELHAMI. Well, I think the question is, we really have not tested it, because if the tradeoff, if they are truly fearful of the military option and they see that as an alternative to the military option, and the Iraqis see it as an alternative to the military option, it is worth testing at a minimum. If it does not work, we will be in a better moral position to make a different kind of argument.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that different from what Senator Lugar and myself and I think to some degree Senator Hagel had been saying, that we should be, for reasons relating to diplomacy, if not substance, pushing as hard as we can for a more robust inspection regime and put the Iraqis in the position where they resist, it is clear they are resisting and it is clear why? I mean, is there a difference in what you are saying? Am I missing something?

Dr. TELHAMI. It is essentially in the same spirit of what you are saying. I think the difference is, we have to be very explicit in our own thinking that ultimately what we then would be advocating is, essentially we can live with the regime if it does not have weapons of mass destruction.

That does affect the strategy, because one of the fears that we have had in terms of the level of intrusions when we went into Iraq and said, well, but if we remove the economic sanctions he is going to be able to have more political power in Baghdad, or in Iraq. Well, unfortunately that may be the case if you pursue this strategy. That is one consequence that we have to think about.

I am not suggesting that is a strategy to pursue, but I think that that is the implication of this kind of strategy.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kemp, if you were in your old job down at the White House, what advice would you give the President about what signals he should send to the Iranians now, if any, about any move against Iraq on our part?

Dr. KEMP. Well quite frankly, I am not quite sure what the current policy toward Iran is, Mr. Chairman. As I understand it, in the period leading up to the war against the Taliban there were multilateral meetings with the Iranians in the six plus two forum, and the Iranians were relatively cooperative during the war against the Taliban. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the
State Department people who were in Bonn acknowledged that the Iranians were useful in putting together the Karzai interim government.

Then things went downhill very badly, climaxing with the smuggled ship that was caught moving arms to the Palestinians and the President’s State of the Union speech, and so now the problem is we do not have the sort of relationship with the Iranians we had last fall.

My own personal view is that if we contemplate a major war against Iraq, we at least have to make an effort to resume some dialog with the Iranian Government, however unpleasant its activities are in other theaters.

I happen to believe that what the Iranians are doing in the occupied territories, their support for Hamas and Hezbollah, is linked to their fear that we are going to go after Saddam Hussein and that they have got to know that if we are truly determined to get rid of him they are going to have to make a calculation that they can either cooperate with us in a passive way during that campaign, or they can be against us, and if they are against us, then they are likely to be very much in our cross-fire.

So my advice, if I had my old job, and assuming I survived for more than a week down there in this climate, I would essentially suggest we rethink our Iranian strategy as we get closer toward a war with Iraq.

The Chairman. A last point. Professor Ajami, you indicated that if we move against Iraq, the people in the region, who are looking for this perfect storm, but the people in the region, heads of state in the region will associate with us but not want to be seen with us, not want us to kiss them in public.

What does that mean as that relates to the use of what you heard in the last panel the two military guys saying, without Qatar, without Bahrain, without Kuwait there is no reasonable way in which we could sustain a massive U.S. military engagement? Does your note about, will associate with us but very quietly, does that mean they will not be able to give us access?

Dr. Ajami. They can give us access. I think sometimes people underestimate the power, the coercive power of these governments and their power, I think, to live with a certain cognitive dissonance, shall we say. They will have to, some of these states, maybe even Jordan, it may have to have shades of the Musharraf situation.

President Musharraf, give him credit, he stared down the Islamists, he stared down the street, he associated himself with American power in the face of all kinds of arguments that this regime was destined to fall if it were actually to associate itself with us, and if it were to be a base for the war against Afghanistan. He did it, and the way he did it was to say, look, this is the choice for Pakistan’s majority, that either we are a pariah among nations, or we actually join this coalition, and he sustained his case.

I think it will come to this, for example, for the King of Jordan. Imagine now the nightmare of this young King of Jordan, Abdullah II. Now, it is kind of interesting, if you will, if you like historical ironies, last time around it was the two fathers, Bush Senior and,
of course, King Hussein, and that time those two men went separate ways.

King Hussein decided that he feared the street in his own country more than he feared the United States, and he actually bet right, that when the guns fall silent we would actually rehabilitate him and we would give him a seat at the table. We invited him, as we did to Madrid, and we forgave him the choice he made, because we understand the difficulty that the Hashamites have in the realm, so I think we can sweeten the pot for some of these rulers.

In the case of the King of Jordan, we will have to aid Jordan economically. There has already been talk of compensating Jordan on this panel today for what Jordan may have to do. Some other countries have an easier call to make. In the case of Qatar, clearly everybody knows, and the Qatari regime seems to have this amazing ability in many ways to do things in broad daylight. It even has Al Jazeera there, and it just does it its own way, and we are building a presence in Qatar, and I think that presence could be easily used.

Bahrain, that could also be easily used. I think the Bahrainis, the domestic situation is not as acute, for example, as the case of the Jordanians.

In the case of the Kuwaitis, it is easiest of all. They know the bandit for what he is. He has their national archives. He has 600 of their people, incidentally, about whom he is now saying, well, we are willing to discuss them, even though they did not exist a few months ago, or a year or so ago, so I think in the case of the Kuwaitis the body politic could bear this kind of presence and could bear this kind of war, so we should not exaggerate the weakness of these states.

There shall be demonstrations against us, to be sure. We shall not convince anyone, Mr. Chairman, that we are there to deliver the Iraqis out of their misery, and one point I want to make, already there are large numbers of people in the Arab world who believe that we are keeping Saddam there because he is convenient for us. He is convenient for us. That is why we never removed him, because he allows us, if you will, this extensive presence in the gulf, and he allows the Americans to get these joint exercises in the gulf and to have these extensive weapons sales, so there are all these kinds of conspiracy theories.

The Chairman. By the way, I have heard that when I was in Bahrain. Anyway, you have clarified for me your statement about, they would be willing to associate but not want to be seen.

Senator Hagel.

Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you to our panel this afternoon, after a long wait. We appreciate you hanging in there with us. I apologize for missing some of the opening statements, so I may ask a question here that some of you developed in some detail.

But Dr. Kemp, I heard it said recently on the Iranian dynamic, if we should invade Iraq, or liberate Iraq, however we phrase it, that the two options for Iran would be a negative neutrality or a positive neutrality, and I think that is not a bad way to say it.

I would ask each of you if you could give me your opinion on what has been suggested in previous panels today that there is a
very clear and defined link between the Arab Palestinian issue and Iraq. Is that true or not? If it is, how deep is it part of the dynamic if we would go into Iraq, and I heard some of you mention it, but I would very much like each of you to give me your thoughts on that.

Ambassador Parris.

Ambassador PARRIS. Well, I think there is no question that it complicates any assessment by the administration of how you would implement a policy of regime change, which they have declared to be the policy. There is a question in my mind whether it is a showstopper, as some of the other witnesses have suggested. I think we sometimes underestimate the ability of some of our friends in the Arab world to deal with issues arising from discontent in their streets. These have proved to be pretty robust regimes when they need to be, regimes who understand the dynamics and have been able to dominate them over the years.

My guess is that if the administration were to do this in a way which provided adequate consultation which satisfied many of the concerns that have been expressed here and in previous panels that those governments have shared with us, and are likely to share with us in the consultative process, that it would be possible to carry out the kind of operation that we are talking about without resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute first, which after all is going to take a long time. There is a real question whether or not, based on some of the earlier testimony today, we have that kind of time.

Senator HAGEL. So you do not see it as a serious impediment?

Ambassador PARRIS. I think it is certainly serious, and it is certainly an impediment, but I am not convinced that it would stop this effort in its tracks if it were done properly and intelligently, and with full concern for the sensitivities that our potential partners have expressed.

Dr. TELHAMI. I think it clearly is, Senator, a complicating factor in some places. I mean, I think that Mr. Ajami's point was right about 1991, 1990 and 1991, when the King of Jordan decided essentially that the pressure from his public was too much to bear, that he had to stay it out, even though he was one of the friendliest leaders toward the United States of America. He made that choice, and obviously he made it because he felt the heat from his public. I think that the link is not direct. I think that what is at issue is the resentment toward the United States, which is broad-based and is linked to a lot of issues, but it is highly focused on this issue because of the escalation that we see, and therefore there will be an automatic link about an American design for Iraq.

I agree with the idea that these states are robust. I think they have proven to be robust before. They calculate on a realpolitik basis. They have to do what they have to do to survive, and if that means they have to go with America, they ultimately do. Even if they do not like it, they ultimately do, but I think we should have no illusions about the points that I tried to make earlier, one of which is that now they have more uncertainty about their ability.

They have been stretched to the limit in the last few months because of this pressure, and because they do not have control over this information, that they are scared of it. It does not mean they cannot do it, but they have more uncertainty.
But the more important point is, they can only succeed in containing the public discontent through repression, and the net outcome will be that we are going to end up with a Middle East that is more repressive, and we cannot, and we should not have any illusions about it, and I would argue—and here Mr. Ajami may have a disagreement. He has not addressed it, but it is about the extent to which this would be a factor in additional motivation for terrorism.

I happen to think that that is an issue. I happen to think it is very important. Even aside from whether the public has the capacity to overthrow regimes, I think revolutions are scarce in history, and they clearly have been scarce in the Middle East. It is still a state system. We often forget that.

But even authoritarian governments have to be sensitive and responsive to their publics, and there are new channels and avenues available to the public to express the discontent in ways that—unfortunately through militancy, and I think it would be very easy to conceive an argument that the militants would exploit and would be able to do more of it than before a war with Iraq.

Senator HAGEL. Dr. Ajami.

Dr. AJAMI. On the issue of terrorism and the connection between—and I will get to your point, Senator Hagel, but on the issue of terrorism and the connection with the Palestinian question, it is interesting to note that the trail of terror, the trail of terror that dogged America throughout the nineties, that is the World Trade Center truck bombing in 1993, the bombing in Riyadh in 1995, the Khobar Towers in 1996, the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in the summer of 1998, and the attack on the USS Cole in October of 2000, they all happened during one of the most accommodating American diplomacy toward the Palestinian question under the Presidency of Bill Clinton, where Bill Clinton was quoting Yassar Arafat and the terror paid the Palestinian question no heed. Indeed, the master minds of al-Qaeda paid the Palestinian question in every statement they made no heed.

Two men came together in 1998, Osama bin Laden and a physician much more interesting for the purposes of terrorism, Ayman Zawahiri, who is an Egyptian and a foe of the regime of Mubarak, that came together and gave us this trail of terror. The Palestinian question was the issue de jour just recently for the bin Ladens in the region, and so that is the connection to terrorism. Terrorism paid no regard for the peace of Oslo, and when Yassar Arafat had more visits to the White House than any head of state in the world during the Clinton years the al-Qaeda people thought he was of no relevance to the kind of grievances that they had.

So we come now to Iraq, and it is still a question of linkage, can we do Iraq without doing Palestine. There is a kind of view of the Arab world I do not share that all issues that Palestine is the end all, be all of Arab politics. I do not agree with this. I think the gulf is very important. I think Iraq is very important. I think the fate of 22 million Iraqis is extremely important, and I think the idea that we cannot do anything in the region short of solving, quote-
unquote, solving the question of Palestine, whatever that term means, is not very persuasive to me.

I think what we can say, we are in this war because of September 11. We have to make a linkage between September 11 and Iraq, and I think the linkage is indirect, but we must make it, and we have to insist on our right to prosecute this war, and we can also say that the President has in place his plan for regime change as well not only—and we are using regime change in Iraq, but regime change in the Palestinian territory, and there is a promise to the Palestinians that they can have a state provisionally in 3 years if the terror comes to an end, and that ultimately the Israelis and Palestinians are doomed to an accommodation west of the Jordan river, but the issue of suspending the liberties and the reform of the Arab world and keeping it hostage to the question of the Palestinians is not persuasive.

I think the Iraqis have their claim on us, and I think this is the kind of claim we have to pay attention to.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Dr. Kemp.

Dr. KEMP. Well, the one clear linkage, it seems to me, between Iraq and the peace process or the Arab-Israeli conflict, whatever you want to call it, is Saddam Hussein. What did Saddam Hussein do in January 1991? He launched SCUDs against Israel with the sole purpose of bringing Israel into a war that would then disrupt the alliance that George Bush Senior had put together. It did not work, because the SCUDs were not effective, and the Israelis showed remarkable constraint.

Saddam more recently has, of course, been upping the ante by paying bounties to the families of suicide bombers in the Palestinian territory. These scenarios that you have been hearing about this morning and read about every day in the paper include the possibility that in extremis Saddam Hussein will launch his WMD directly or indirectly against Israel in order to bring the linkage into effect.

And perhaps the most disturbing possibility of all, which there is now quite some speculation about, is that Saddam Hussein in extremis would do whatever he could to destabilize the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It is interesting that though everybody on this panel has slightly different views—all seem to agree that the Saudis will ride it out, the Egyptians will ride it out, the Qataris will, but we are all worried about the King.

In other words, we talk a lot about regime change, but actually what we have to worry about is regime survival, particularly the survival of King Abdullah. If anything happened to Jordan under his rule, promoted by the Iraqis—and they can be very, very unpleasant—this would be an immediate threat to Israel, and Israel will respond. That is the linkage that worries me.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBAINES. Mr. Chairman, I regret very much that my schedule was such that I have not been able to be here with you through the day, but I want to commend you for scheduling these hearings at a very busy period just before the recess. I think it is extremely important that you have undertaken this effort, and we
are having another full day tomorrow, as I understand it, and that you are also contemplating resuming the hearing process when we come back in September.

I think it is imperative that we have launched on this enterprise. Every day we get a new report in the national press about U.S. policy toward Iraq and its implications. We had a headline in the Washington Post, “Some Top Military Brass Favor Status Quo in Iraq. Containment is Seen Less Risky Than Attack.”

Another in the New York Times just yesterday, “Profound Effect on Economy Seen in a War on Iraq, U.S. May Bear Most Costs, Experts Weigh Likelihood of an Oil Price Shock, Another Disruption of Markets,” and then even today the Times had its lead story, “Air Power Alone Cannot Defeat Iraq, Rumsfeld Asserts, Secretary Side-steps Question of Sending in U.S. Ground Forces to Oust Hussein,” which then, of course, draws you into the debate, can you do it with air power alone, or can you not do it with air power alone, etcetera.

Now, it seems to me imperative that there be a broader examination of all of these questions, and you know, this term, brutal regime in Iraq, raises major and complex questions for U.S. policy, and how they are answered will have consequences for the region, for our own country, and more broadly around the world for a long time to come, and obviously we need to embark on the process you have launched sooner, I think, rather than later. We have to have well-considered, well-informed policies, and we have to take into account the full measure of potential benefits and risks, and it has to be fully explicable to our people.

In that regard, I was very much taken by the op ed piece that you and Senator Lugar have in today’s New York Times, and I am very strongly supportive of the approach contained therein, including your statement, “without prejudging any particular course of action we hope to start a national discussion of some critical questions.” I think that is extremely important, and I therefore again commend you for undertaking this careful examination of the situation.

You and Senator Lugar set out there some questions which I think form the framework for these hearings. What threat does Iraq pose to our security? How immediate is the danger? What are the possible responses to the Iraqi threat? Third, what are our responsibilities if Saddam is removed? Fourthly, what would it take to rebuild Iraq economically and politically?

I know you are trying to do these panels I think focused on particular aspects of that question, but if I could go outside of that——

The CHAIRMAN. Believe me, these guys can go anywhere you want them to go.

Senator SARBANES. Let me close by putting a question or two down: What would we have to undertake afterwards with respect to Iraq; and how long are we talking about being present; and what kind of resources would we have to commit?

And as you answer that question, could you put it in the context of our staying power; what we have reflected on that question in Afghanistan. Now, you know, we went into Afghanistan, and we did an important military operation with considerable success, but we’re left with problems afterwards.
Now, how adequately are we addressing that, and how commensurate has our commitment been? And as you look at the Afghanistan situation, what questions may that raise about the Iraqi situation, post Saddam Hussein? That’s the question I would like to leave at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s a very good question. I’m anxious to know that.

Dr. KEMP. Can I start?

The CHAIRMAN. In any order you’d like.

Dr. KEMP. As I understand it, the U.S. Army began preparations for the occupation of Germany in 1942. Currency was being printed for the occupation.

I think we’ve got a long way to go in thinking about this problem of occupying Iraq. I gather tomorrow morning, you’re going to have some very good people who have looked at this in great detail. So I wouldn’t want to preempt anything that they say.

But if you’re talking about the occupation of Iraq, you are talking about tens of thousands of U.S. troops for a long period of time. Kabul is, you know, the only area that we’re protecting in Afghanistan and that is a relatively small city. It is not Bagdad. It is not a city of six million.

The idea that we can just win the war and go away would be extraordinarily irresponsible. The idea that there will be a government in waiting ready to take over the administrative tasks of Iraq is wishful thinking.

And, furthermore, there may be people cheering us on, and I’m certain there will be, but there are also going to be a lot of recrimination, and a lot of violent acts will be committed in revenge. The southern Bagdad suburbs is predominantly Shia. They have been suppressed for years and years by this regime. They are not going to kiss and make up the day after. This is going to be worse than Paris in 1944 where, as you know, more people were killed in the 3-weeks after the liberation than there had been killed for many years before.

So I think it is a very serious problem, and I am delighted that you are going to have a special panel on this, because it is the least thought through element of this extremely political debate that we see in the press that has been so oversimplified and has so underestimated the complexities of the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. With the permission of my colleague, if I can add a complicating factor, to the extent that you spoke about Iran, the degree to which we settle the matter and keep peace in Bagdad and other places by being in place and occupied does not that raise the ante in Tehran that we, in fact, are seeking a permanent—basing a permanent station there.

Dr. KEMP. Yes, it does. And some people, of course, would argue that’s all to the good, because that will put the fear of God into the bad mullahs and the good mullahs will take over, but I’m not quite so confident that that’s what will happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Please, doctor, if you would follow through with your—

Dr. AJAMI. Well, first of all, let me just take this opportunity to thank Senator Sarbanes, because he’s been looking after my pension. And for his great work on corporate reform, we really com-
mend you. You’re a great figure, and I think that if you can handle corporate reform, you can handle Iraq very easily.

Now, I agree with everything that Jeff Kemp said. And I teach a class with Jeff Kemp, and I have been doing it for many years, and this is probably one of our first agreements in a long time.

I think that we are going to be there in Iraq, but I don’t think we should be frightened necessarily or we should think that it will be drawn out or that it will be extensive or that we’re going to take the plunge into imperialism in a very deep way.

There are several things, just in echoing some of what Jeff said, we want to know about Iraq. This is a country that has the second largest reserves of oil after Saudi Arabia. It has enormous social capital; it’s not Afghanistan. It has an educated and technically competent middle class. So making a stand there will not necessarily be bad for us.

I think Jeff is right; there are these grievances and historical accounts to be settled in Iraq. There will be things that we should be good at. There will be truth and justice commissions. There will be war criminals. There will be people we can’t protect, and maybe even we shouldn’t protect.

So it won’t be easy, but I think we operated on the assumption, I think, again, the chairman has given us good marching orders. And I think Senator Luger was very clear on that, as well. We have to take this and say, is this worth doing? Is this worth doing?

And that’s what every one of us, I think, really has to make—that’s the decision that has to be made, whether it’s in Wisconsin or Maryland or Connecticut or anywhere. You have to really argue the case and sustain the case if it’s really worth it, that this is a very volatile part of the world. It is the oil supplies of the world. It is a very notoriously bad man, and that even though we’re a reluctant empire—you know, we are reluctant about imperial burden. We don’t undertake imperial burden willingly, and that’s good. And when sometimes people say that they heard from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and they’re against this military intervention or that military intervention, one is reassured that we don’t have a military ready and eager to go everywhere and pull the trigger.

So it’s really all—that’s what the national discussion is all about. That’s what you’re hearing, and that’s what this debate is all about.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you talking about the same numbers Dr. Kemp is? Are you talking about tens of thousands? And if you are, we’re obviously talking about billions of dollars. Tens of thousands of troops translates, over a short period of time, as billions of dollars.

Dr. KEMP. Right, but as my colleague Fouad said, there are ways for the Iraqi Government to pay for these troops. They have a lot of oil.

The CHAIRMAN. What period of time do you envision?

Dr. KEMP. I would think years.

The CHAIRMAN. Five years, 10 years?

Dr. KEMP. A minimum of 5 years, I would think.

Dr. TELHAMI. Senator, first of all, let me thank you for looking after my interest too, as one of the constituents.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you guys didn’t thank us for anything——
Dr. Telhami. Well, you've got a problem, if you've got a disadvantage.

So I'm one of the constituents——

The Chairman. Nobody pays attention to the chairman of the Banking Committee, you know——

Dr. Telhami. No, no, banking is not my——

The Chairman. I'm joking. It's a bad joke. I'm sorry.

Dr. Telhami. Maryland is in this case.

I do worry about the consequences. I think it's a major issue to be concerned about. I don't think that any of us knows how the public is going to react. There is no question that the regime is despised; that we have no doubt about. But we should have no illusion that it's going to translate into a love for America; we should have no illusion about that. In some instances it may, and others it may not.

We should also be very careful not to miscalculate in the early days when people do face liberation from repression and when they do celebrate their liberation, we may translate as a welcoming mat for us, and that could become a real problem. The Israelis made that mistake in South Lebanon, when they thought early on that the fact that they undermined the PLO influence in south Lebanon translated into a welcoming mat. And, clearly, that turned out that some of the same people who were happy to see the PLO go were then among their fiercest enemies.

So I don't think, first of all, we know exactly how the public is going to react. And clearly, we could find ourselves in a situation where we overstay our welcome.

Second, I think it is clear that everyone in the region is going to have a stake in what happens in Iraq. And those are people who live right next door and have resources and conflicts far better than we do. Be it the Turks, as Mark pointed out, if we don't coordinate with them, they can make our lives miserable. And that is true about the Iranians, and it is certainly true about others in the region.

And, so, it is clear that they have resources. They have the interest and obviously the abilities. And therefore, depending on whether we coordinate, we cooperate, whether it works with the rest of the region in terms of coincidence of interest, it matters a lot.

And finally I want to say that I do think that no matter what happens, even if we do have a relatively successful outcome in Iraq, which we all pray for, and if even—and I agree, by the way, with Fouad about Iraq's potential. I mean, clearly Iraq has tremendous potential. It is a country with an infrastructure, industrial history, a secularized country, oil resources. Clearly in 1980, actually, when it started the war with Iran, it stood on the verge of greatness in the region. And unfortunately it has been taken on a disastrous route that lasted for two decades and killed hundreds of thousands of its own people. So it has suffered a lot, but it certainly has potential.

At the same time, even if the Iraqi people have a happy outcome, I believe that most people in the region will see this as American imperialism. Most people in the region will see it as imperialism. And whether we can live with that is a question.
I mean, it may be true that the sentiment is we’re powerful; we can do it; they’re going to have to do what we want regardless. I think most will, undoubtedly, but think if you apply that same strategy and principle to your own lives in your social relations or domestic relations or relations with other people or business relations, how long that can serve you, if you take that attitude as a strategy of winning, that—where you don’t take the people’s wishes and considerations and calculations into account, where you do things unilaterally because you’re powerful enough to think that they’re just going to have to see it your way and they will, and how much resentment builds up awaiting the right moment. And unfortunately there will be a right moment. I am not so optimistic about the Musharraf model in Pakistan, as some people have suggested earlier.

I think I applaud Mr. Musharraf for taking the position he took. It was tough to do, to stand out and tell people that they have a choice. I agree with that. That was the right thing for him to do.

I am not sure he will succeed. I am less confident he will prevail. And I am worried about what is going to happen 5 years down the road in Pakistan in relation to us and in relation to militancy pertaining to us. And I’m worried about Afghanistan.

And, so, looking at that, I say to myself, do I want more of that in the region or should I follow a different route? That affects the motivation of people, that affects the interest people, that makes sure that my policy coincides with the interests of others not goes against them because they have to follow my lead.

And they’re a different approach, different philosophical approach, and I am less certain about the unilateralistic approach that relies on a group force as a way of getting through in the Middle East.

Ambassador Parrish. My colleagues have made excellent points, and I’m not going to try to belabor them by repeating them, other than to underscore what Jeff said, which is that this is the part of the problem that deserves the most attention, and you’ll be doing that in detail tomorrow.

So much of it is scenario dependent, and I think you’ll find there is enormous opinion as to what we can expect when and if we finally get in there.

But I would like to make one point and to play off something that Mort Halperin said.

The Chairman. Thank him for your pension.

Ambassador Parrish. No, I’m a Virginia resident.

The Chairman. OK, good.

Ambassador Parrish. It is to play off something that Mort Halperin said in the previous panel which is, to be sure that there will be a democratic regime in Iraq over the long term, we’ll have to stay there for 20 years.

And, you, Senator, asked, I think, the panel if there was anybody that disagreed with that statement. It’s a profound question, and basically nobody was prepared to take it on.

I think it merits parsing because what Mort said was to ensure a democratic regime over the long term. And that suggests that, you know, there is one quality of democracy.
If our objective is to create the Federal Republic of Germany in Iraq, we may very well have to stay there as long as we did in Germany. But there are shades of democracy around the world, many of which represent close friendships and allies of the United States, and would be remarkable improvements over the status quo in Iraq. And I think it would be presumptuous of us to sit here and suggest that, you know, unless they meet the standard that we do in this country, we shouldn’t—the game is not worth the candle.

It seems to me that if you take a different approach, if you accept the proposition that there may be a different standard than ours, you may take less time. It may be less resource intensive. Some of the down sides that have been discussed here might be less acute.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman very much.

Mr. Kemp, you mentioned that there is a worst-case and a best-case scenario, and your worst-case scenario, I’m wondering if there is something even worse than what you might have suggested.

Dr. KEMP. Oh, probably.

Senator CHAFEE. I think Dr. Telhami was kind of going down that road in talking about the power of the public, and if there is, you know, public resentment then comes repression, and there is a spiral that leads to something that did happen in 1979 in Iran. The Shah was toppled so quickly that we didn’t even get our embassy people out and took over our embassy and kept them hostage. It can happen so fast.

And is it possible that this conflagration, this spontaneous combustion, can take place where these regimes are toppled and the neighboring countries, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, of course, you’ve mentioned, and even those that aren’t neighbors—I mean Turkey is a neighbor—or even those that aren’t neighbors, we talked about Pakistan a little bit, is that possible just a spontaneous combustion of anti-Americanism and a toppling of regimes, which ultimately—if you want to talk about a worst-case scenario, is the entire oil—or the majority of the oil production for the world.

Dr. TELHAMI. Well, there are a lot of worst-case scenarios but even beyond that, obviously, even in the conduct of war—I mean, if we’re right, that if some of the panelists that you’ve heard before were right about the fact that there is uncertainty about the degree to which Iraq may even have nuclear weapons, and if we are right about the ruthlessness of the leader if he knows he’s going to go down the drain in an American attack, if he knows that this is going to be a war against him, it’s certainly the case that he’s going to use whatever is at his disposal, because there is not going to be a deterrence issue anymore. He knows he’s going down, and he’s going to use everything at his disposal.

I have no doubt that in a war, in a full war, where our aim is to bring down the government—and, obviously, that’s going to be the aim of the war—that he will use everything at his disposal. I don’t know what that is, but I have no doubt. And one can paint scenarios as to what these are. Maybe he doesn’t have much, but the issue is if we think that there is uncertainty—there are scenarios of this sort, there are scenarios of preemption of attacks even prior to the American attacks if war is imminent. That could be done.
But the public uprising and the revolution, it’s always possible. And I think we have to—we have to remind ourselves that at the time of the overthrow of the Shah, many of our own government officials as well as academics argued that the Shah is very stable. In fact, that same year, the famous professor at the University of California at Berkeley, an Iran expert, wrote a book making the argument that Iran was one of the most stable countries in the world. And then we had happen what we witnessed.

I don’t think that that is a highly likely scenario, in part, because I do think that revolutions are scarce in this day. They just don’t happen very often.

States have learned a lot to—unfortunately, mostly through repressive mechanisms, but you can’t rule it out. You can’t rule it out.

And I think none of these governments are ruling it out as a potential in their dealings with the contingencies that they have to deal with, and that is why I’m even more worried about the after—what happens within these countries, which is what is likely to be the case. It’s their worry about such a scenario, which is going to lead to a lot more repression than we have seen.

And if our aim, in part, is to popularize democracy, we should have no illusions. And today in the tradeoffs in relation to Pakistan, when we ask what do we want more, is to see less repression on Pakistan or corruption on the war on terrorism, because we have a priority of national security pertaining to Afghanistan, it is clear what our answer is. And it is likely to be the case when our priority will be to maintain stability in Iraq, to worry about what happens in Iraq, that we’re going to put a lot of other priorities on the sideline to get the maximum corporation to be able to succeed, at least in an intermediate period up to 5 years or whatever it takes to do so.

So we should go in with open eyes about what actually is likely to happen in the region in terms of dynamics when—if we go that route.

Dr. Ajami. Senator Chafee, just one—I mean, on the issue—an issue has arisen that has kind of great difference to the street. I’m reminded of the slogan of Kamalism. The Kamalist project in Turkey, the principle of it was for the people despite the people. Sometimes you just do things for the people, despite the people. You modernize them. You tell them the truth. You tell them about the world. So now, to the issue of whether these—none of the governments in this neighborhood that we’re talking about, none of them—I repeat none—has a genuine modernizing project today.

So they offer the people, if you will, this kind of road rage, the anti-Americanism, the anti-zionism, and they just get away with it. Now, there is a good answer to the question that Senator Chafee asked about whether these regimes could survive, could there be a revolution, and I think the Muslims have a great, great answer to that. They always would say about something that is completely unfathomable, only God knows. We don’t know. We don’t know. We do know the record. Here is the record. Al Sayad have been around now since the middle years of the 18th century. You’ll always get the Saudis to tell you about that.
The Sabas in Kuwait have been around for approximately the same time. The Hashamites in Jordan, in a very, very truncated volatile realm, have been around since 1921. And even Khaddafi has been around since 1969.

And the Egyptian revolution of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak has been in the saddle for now half a century, and there is no evidence that anyone could overthrow these governments. They know. That’s the one thing they know is how to stay in power.

The combined GDP, we are now told, of the Arab world is $60 billion less than Spain, less than Spain, twenty-two Arab governments.

So they don’t know how to develop their population. We know they don’t like to give them maturity, but they know how to stay in power. We should trust them. You know, that’s what the game is all about.

Dr. Kemp. Just on this, Senator Chafee, an even more worse case, we were worried about Soviet Union nuclear threat in both the 1967 war, that’s gone. So to me the worst case would be a nuclear war in the Middle East, which is possible under certain circumstances. That, I think, would have a devastating impact on the oil markets, and then I think these regimes that up to now have been extraordinarily resilient would be facing a day of reckoning, because what we have not really discussed, because it wasn’t their mission, but there is a demographic bulge moving through this region of young people who cannot be employed because they do not have jobs, and it’s getting worse by the year.

The Arab world, Iran, Pakistan, are entering into this window of where they have to create more jobs a year than they possibly have the resources to. And that’s where I think you could get an explosion. I don’t think it will be a single explosion. It won’t be like 1848 in Europe when all the rotten monarchies collapsed, but sooner or later some of these regimes have to crack, whether it’s Iran first or Egypt, I don’t know, but they cannot keep going at this rate of degregation.

The Chairman. Gentlemen, I hate to do this to you, but just a couple of more quick questions.

Do you have another question?

Senator Chafee. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the panel.

The Chairman. The premise that the question—the question as to if Saddam is taken down, how long do we have to stay. The way you answered was premised upon the notion that we had no cooperation from anywhere else in the world, we didn’t have the Europeans in the game, no one else got in the deal here.

Can you give me your best educated guess, as quickly as you can, as to whether or not given that circumstance, that is, Saddam has been removed, American forces are in the region in large numbers where it may be part of the calculus of our European friends in the EU that they be part of the process. And would it make a difference if they not—it would, obviously, make an economic difference to us, but would it make a difference if they were part of the process in terms of the reaction in Iran, the reaction in Turkey, the reaction in other parts of the world, of that part of the world?
As quickly as can you, it's an awful long—I mean, a profound question——

Dr. Kemp. It would make a very important difference if part of the occupation force also includes bringing in UNMOVIC, the U.N. inspectors that you had discussed this morning, that would also give more legitimacy to it.

The more this is seen as an international operation with cooperation from the U.N. and the Europeans, the less the chance that we will be pigeonholed as merely imperialists, but we've got a lot of work to do.

The Chairman. Now, the second, I think more difficult question that, at least, I haven't resolved, is what do you believe would be the calculus that our European friends would engage in to determine whether or not it was in their interest to participate?

Dr. Ajami. I think, you know, their logic would be if we succeed, we succeed together; if we fail, we fail alone. I mean, I'm reminded of, like, soon after September 11, Le Monde had this famous headline, "Tous Americains"; we're all Americans. And a few weeks later, it became Tous Americains with a question mark. All Americans, not quite, that they believe that we were using September 11 as a way of expanding our authority in the world and in the region.

I think Iraq is rich; we go back to that. Iraq is a good market. And I think when we go in, a lot of these countries will come with us, because they'll want to be part of the reconstruction of Iraq.

I mean, this will be fundamentally important for the French. It would be important for the Russians. It would be important for the Brits, and for others, and for the Germans, so I don't think we will necessarily be alone.

It's just the fate of a great power sometimes to be alone when the hard work has to be done.

The Chairman. Quite frankly, if I had a choice of being alone after the hard work was done, the way you phrase it——

Dr. Ajami. Yes.

The Chairman [continuing]. Or being alone, getting the hard work done, I would rather be alone getting the hard work done, because I think the really hard work is done after.

Dr. Telhami. But let's have a little word of warning, though, Senator, which is that these are democratic countries we're talking, about——

The Chairman. Right.

Dr. Telhami [continuing]. We're not talking about the Middle Eastern countries.

The Chairman. I agree.

Dr. Telhami. We're talking about countries that are differentiated, that have their own domestic considerations, and in that regard, if you look at public opinion so far, only in Britain is the public about evenly divided on Iraq. There is not a single country in which there is a majority support for entering Iraq. Most countries——

The Chairman. I would suggest that was the case in Bosnia and they all came along after the fact. I remember pushing President Clinton very hard, as hard as I politely—well, as hard as I could, politely or otherwise, about moving to bomb in Kosovo. And he said
what about the French? I said, I promise you if you go, they’ll come.

Quite frankly, I’m more uncertain about it as it relates to Iraq. My instinct is that—and, again, I'm not the expert, that's why we have you here—but my instinct Professor Ajami, is that if we succeed, they will be willing to take a piece of this.

Dr. Ajami. Yes.

The Chairman. I would—let me ask you if there is any parallel here.

I was very disappointed, and I have been public about this, in the failure of this administration to expand ISAF in Afghanistan, especially on what I believe are not completely accurate grounds that the Europeans weren’t ready to.

The Europeans—and I spent time there. I spent time with the Europeans. They were totally prepared to, until we said we wouldn’t be part of it. And as one European said, “if the big dog’s not there, the little dogs don’t want to play.”

And, so, I was under the distinct impression in everything, and I have followed this very closely, that had we been willing to lead, to expand ISAF, not even with numbers, just lead with commitment, that ISAF—we would have gotten significant support from Europe to expand ISAF in raw numbers.

Is that able to be—can you extrapolate from that that a similar—assuming a military success in Iraq, is there any relevance to the willingness in Iraq—I mean, in Afghanistan and what they may be able to do in Iraq?

Dr. Kemp. Well, I would just say that if we’re not prepared to go much further in Iraq than we have gone in Afghanistan, we’re doomed from the start.

The Chairman. I agree.

Dr. Kemp. So that I think the Europeans would argue you’re going to have to get in in a big way, and we ultimately are going to have to help you. And one important reason is they would see this as a way to help diffuse the Arab/Israeli conflict, which in the last resort, the Europeans worry about primarily because of migration and the whole string of European issues which we haven’t gotten into today. So if we don’t lead in Iraq, then it’s all over. It’s a hopeless case.

Ambassador Parris. Unfortunately many of them will be worried about the splitting of the spoils of war. I have no doubt about it. I think that the issue of the oil contracts is going to become an issue in the thinking of a lot of them, and I think, you know, that is going to be part of the calculus.

The Chairman. I argue that’s the way—I don’t know why this isn’t a win/win situation with the Russians. I mean, I actually had a conversation that he has not dissuaded me from mentioning with President Putin. You know, they think they’ve got tens of billions of dollars waiting in the bank in terms of developing those oil fields, which they can’t develop. They’re also owed about $11 billion. I thought it was nine. When I said nine, he looked at me and he said 11.

It’s a little bit like having a very rich aunt that you don’t like, and you know she has $40 million in the bank. You may not have
a relationship with her, but you’re not going to give up on her knowing she has it in the bank.

These folks have it in the bank. And there was even a feeler put out by Gazprom and—what’s the other oil company—

Dr. Kemp. Lukoil.

The Chairman [continuing]. Lukoil that they would be interested in a consortia with U.S. companies.

One of the things I found the Russians were worried about is we go in, take out Iraq, they lose their contracts. I can’t imagine why this isn’t a win/win situation if we were smart about this. But I don’t get any sense that there is any movement on this by anyone in the administration.

Ambassador Parris. I think one of the problems is a structural one. And it’s certainly the case with Turkey up until very recently, which is that if you’re talking point is there is no plan on the President’s desk, and you’re not prepared to go beyond that, you can’t get very deeply into conversations with people who would just as soon, frankly, not accept the premise in the first place. I mean, the Turks and others, I’m sure, are not standing in line to talk about the day after.

And you’ll only get their attention when you’re prepared to describe, in some detail, what you’re going to do, in what timeframe, and what your vision of the day after is.

The Chairman. I kidded the President when he asked what I would do. I said Mr. President, part of this is the vision thing, and I’m not sure what the vision should be.

Gentlemen, with your permission, I have, rather than take more of your time, it’s almost 7 o’clock, you’ve been so patient and helpful, I have about two or three questions I would like to submit to each of you in writing. There is no urgency in terms of getting them back, and I would ask you publicly, to embarrass you into having to say yes, would you be willing to come back if we continue this process?

Dr. Kemp. Yes.

Ambassador Parris. Be glad to.

Dr. Ajami. It would be a great honor, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I thank you all very, very much, and we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:50 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., August 1, 2002.]
HEARINGS TO EXAMINE THREATS, RESPONSES, AND REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING IRAQ

THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 2002

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Feingold, Wellstone, Boxer, Bill Nelson, Rockefeller, Lugar, Hagel, Frist, and Brownback.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

Yesterday, the Foreign Relations Committee began what I hope will be a national discussion on Iraq. Let me say, again, how pleased and grateful I am for the cooperation of my Republican colleagues, starting with Senator Helms, in absentia, and his staff, and Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel, for putting these hearings together. This has been a team effort. This is not me sitting down with a witness list and saying here we go.

As with yesterday we have coordinated these hearings with the White House. Let me explain what I mean by coordination. We’re a separate and equal branch of the government. We are not asking permission of anybody to have any hearing, but we did ask them for their input. We asked them for their input as we debate and discuss this very difficult question the President has to resolve, and they have been very cooperative.

We are honoring their desire not to testify at this time, but I do not want to put the President in the position of having to make any of these critical decisions prematurely. I take him at his word, their word, the administration, that this is a process that’s entrained and hopefully our hearings can help them elucidate their discussions and their decision process, as well.

Yesterday, we addressed three critical questions, among others. First, what is the threat from Iraq? Second, depending on the assessment of that threat, what is viewed as the appropriate response to the threat? And, third, how do Iraq’s neighbors and our allies see the problem in Iraq?

We had excellent, excellent testimony from our panels yesterday, but the one area in which I think we need considerably more discussion, as well, is how Iraqi’s neighbors and our allies view the problem of Iraq. We heard a wide range of views from an excep-
tionally thoughtful group of witnesses spanning the spectrum of points of view. I'm not sure we reached many definitive conclusions, but I am convinced we're asking the right questions. And to get the answer, you have to ask the right question first.

We are, I hope, shedding some light on an important and complex problem that the President faces, as well as the Congress and the American people. Again, I'll reiterate, I truly believe, and I think all of my colleagues do, that a foreign policy will not be sustained, particularly if it calls for the expenditure of American treasure and blood, potentially, without the informed consent of the American people.

Today, we'll address a fourth question, and that's not to suggest that our incredibly qualified panel of witnesses is not free to speak to any other issue, as well. We've attempted to ask the panels to come to address a specific question, not because we think that's the only question they're competent to respond to, but because we want to order this some way at the outset.

And one question that I think is the least explored—and, as a matter of fact, spontaneously to it, and this is yesterday, said they thought it was the least explored, as well, and perhaps the most important. If we participate or if we are the only participant in the departure of Saddam, what are our responsibilities, if any, the day after? This is an issue we've already been grappling with, and you heard discussion in the Executive Committee meeting, on Afghanistan. We are openly discussing it after a successful military action in Afghanistan.

As I've said many times before, our military did a remarkable job in prosecuting the war in Afghanistan. But, as you could hear from the discussion here today and the vote here today, there is at least a consensus that, in some part, we may be falling short—maybe falling short of the mark in winning the peace. The peace is a lot harder to win than the war.

We're not doing nearly enough, in my view, to secure Afghanistan so that it can be rebuilt and so that it does not again become a haven for terrorists. I'm pleased to announce, however, that what you've just noticed just a few minutes ago, that I think we've got a pretty strong consensus here to encourage the President, knowing that he has our support, to go beyond Kabul with an international security force.

In Iraq, we can't afford to replace one despot with chaos. The long suffering Iraqi people need to know the regime change will benefit them. We heard that from every witness yesterday. So do Iraqi's neighbors. And the American people will want that assurance, as well.

Already yesterday many of our witnesses talked about the critical importance of thinking through the day after well in advance of the day of, and even the day before we act in Iraq. Today we'll look at this issue in greater detail. We want a better understanding of what it would take to secure Iraq and rebuild it economically and politically. I don't mean all by ourselves, but that may be the position we put ourselves in.

So what does it mean if it's all by ourselves? We need to know how many U.S. forces will be required to stay, how long, and for what purpose. We should consider the prospects of establishing a
stable and democratic state, but maybe a stable and not-so-democratic state, and a democratic political order in Iraq, and what role the Iraqi opposition might play in that, and what role might, as I've had the great pleasure of having some of the witnesses here today brief me privately over the last month, as I did the—several panels before, and I know there's some discussion among them and among experts in the region as to the prospect of participation with the civil servants that exist within Iraq, the military that exists within Iraq, how willing they'd be willing to—some argue that this could be done very readily, because we'd have overwhelming help. Others suggest that it would not be done very readily at all. Others suggest that it didn't have to be paid for by us. Iraq's a wealthy country; they could fund this themselves—our presence, they could fund there, and so on.

So these are all questions that are vitally important to our interests, and we have, I think, put together, with the help of Senator Helms, his staff, and the White House, requests from them, as well as our staff, some very, very significant witnesses today.

So I welcome them, and I would now ask Senator Hagel if he would like to make any opening statement. And after that, I would move to introduce the witnesses and begin discussion.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I do have a statement, which I will ask to be included in the record. And since we are on a limited track here with votes coming, I would suggest we go right to the witnesses.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

I would like to congratulate the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding these timely hearings on Iraq. I agree with my colleagues that we need a national dialogue on what steps we should take to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Americans need to be informed about the complexities and consequences of our policies in Iraq.

I look forward to listening to and learning from the distinguished witnesses before us today about the nature and urgency of the threat we face from Iraq, including their evaluations of what the best policy options may be for meeting this threat; the prospects for a democratic transition after Saddam Hussein; and what the implications of our policies in Iraq may be for the stability of the Middle East and our security interests there.

Much of the debate by those advocating regime change through military means have so far focused on the easy questions. Is Saddam Hussein a ruthless tyrant who brutally oppresses his own people, and who possesses weapons of mass destruction that have the potential to threaten us, his neighbors and our allies, including and especially Israel? Yes. Do most Iraqis yearn for democratic change in Iraq? Yes, they do. Can Saddam be rehabilitated? No, he cannot.

In my opinion, complicated and relevant questions remain to be answered before making a case for war, and here is where these hearings will play an important role. What is the nature, and urgency, of the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States and Iraq's neighbors? What do we know about Iraq's programs of weapons of mass destruction? There have been no weapons inspectors in Iraq since December 1998. Is Iraq involved in terrorist planning and activities against the United States and U.S. allies in the Middle East and elsewhere?

What can we expect after Saddam Hussein in Iraq? What do we know about the capabilities of the opposition to Saddam inside Iraq? While we support a unified and democratic opposition to Saddam Hussein, the arbiters of power in a post-Saddam Iraq will likely be those who reside inside, not outside, the country. And these individuals and groups we do not know. Who are they? And where are they? These are the Iraqis we need to understand, engage, and eventually do business with.

What will be the future of Iraqi Kurdistan in a post-Saddam Iraq?
How do we accomplish regime change in Iraq given the complexities and challenges of the current regional environment? The deep Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues; our relations with Syria are proper though strained; we have no relationship with Iran; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan have warned us about dangerous unintended consequences if we take unilateral military action against Iraq; and Afghanistan remains a piece of very difficult unfinished business, an unpredictable but critical investment for the United States and our allies.

I can think of no historical case where the United States succeeded in an enterprise of such gravity and complexity as regime change in Iraq without the support of a regional and international coalition. We have a lot of work to do on the diplomatic track. Not just for military operations against Iraq, should that day come, but for the day after, when the interests and intrigues of outside powers could undermine the fragility of an Iraqi government in transition, whoever governs in Iraq after Saddam Hussein.

An American military operation in Iraq could require a commitment in Iraq that could last for years and extend well beyond the day of Saddam’s departure. The American people need to understand the political, economic, and military magnitude and risks that would be inevitable if we invaded Iraq.

There was no such national dialogue or undertaking before we went into Vietnam. There were many very smart, well intentioned professionals, intellectuals, and strategists who assured us of a U.S. victory in Vietnam at an acceptable cost. Well, eleven years, 58,000 dead, and the most humiliating defeat in our nation’s history later we abandoned South Vietnam to the Communists.

Let me conclude by saying that I support regime change and a democratic transition in Iraq. That’s easy. The Iraqi people have suffered too long, and our security and interests will never be assured with Saddam Hussein in power. The tough questions are when, how, with whom, and at what cost. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses over the next two days on these critical questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, a couple of our colleagues indicated, because they weren’t able to be here yesterday, they’d like to make a, quote, “brief statement,” and I would yield to any colleague who feels they want to do that right now.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Well, Mr. Chairman, I’ll be very brief, because I’m, along with everyone else, anxious to hear these witnesses.

I just want, again, to commend you for scheduling these hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. You can take more time, then.

Senator SARBANES. I know this is a very busy period before the recess, but I think it’s extremely important that we’ve undertaken this effort. The New York Times, only a couple of days ago, had an editorial entitled “Filling in the Blanks on Iraq,” and it began with this sentence, “With the Bush Administration openly threatening to overthrow Saddam Hussein, a public airing of the pros and cons of intervention is long overdue. Thanks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has planned hearings about Iraq this week, that national discussion may finally commence.”

And it has, indeed, commenced, and that editorial concluded—and I just want to read this into the record, because I think what’s being done here is very important, and I think your efforts in bringing this about are extremely significant—“Wisely, Senate Republicans have worked closely with the Democratic committee chairman, Joseph Biden, in planning this week’s hearing. The White House has been similarly cooperative. Further exploration of these issues will be needed after the Senate returns from its August recess. Before any major decisions are taken, the Nation needs to learn as much as it can about the available choices on Iraq and their likely consequences.”
And these hearings which you’ve launched are obviously intended to do that. In fact, you and Senator Lugar had an article in the New York Times yesterday—just yesterday and, in the course of which, you said, “Without prejudging any particular course of action, we hope to start a national discussion of some critical questions,” and I think it’s very important to have that national discussion. I think the way you’ve structured it, in terms of the questions that have been outlined to be addressed, provide a structure and a format for this discussion. I’m very happy to participate in it, but I’m particularly pleased to acknowledge, the very significant leadership you’re exercising on this very important issue.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, Senator.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I just want to make sort of the same comments. I’ve been on this committee 21 years, and this is what this committee was designed to do. And, unfortunately, we haven’t done it enough over the years. And the fact that we’re doing it here is tremendously worthwhile and valuable. It’s the reason why there is a committee process. It’s the way that foreign policy ought to be conducted, in a partnership with the Congress. And so I want to add my voice to that of Senator Sarbanes in thanking you and Senator Lugar and others, the administration, for allowing this to go forward and doing it in such a cooperative fashion.

And it was tremendously instructive yesterday. I found the hearings—I couldn’t attend, unfortunately, some of the afternoon, but the ones that I watched on television or the ones I participated in I just think were tremendously worthwhile and already is having, I think, a very worthwhile and beneficial impact on the decision-making process.

But just—while some of the conclusions—obviously we haven’t formed any firm ones, but I thought some conclusions about how we ought to approach this were tremendously worthwhile. And, just very briefly, I wrote down some of them.

First, that we shouldn’t underestimate the capability of the Iraqi military. I think we all agree with that today. Then, second, we should understand that the undertaking of any effort to oust Hussein will be extremely difficult without the support of the international community. I think, again, we all sort of agreed, that’s a given. Third, that the U.N. inspections, when it was functioning, was successful and having some effect on the quality and quantity of weapons of mass destruction that are accumulated. That efforts to contain Hussein through the reintroduction of U.N. weapons inspectors is still worth trying, particularly of Russia and the French, but particularly if Russia would be involved. That seriously exploring the reinstatement of the inspection option may build in national support. We shouldn’t abandon that idea. Don’t necessarily have to jump to it, but I thought that was very worthwhile and tremendously helpful. And, finally, once the inspections option is no longer perceived by our allies to be a viable response to Saddam Hussein, then the international community would be more amenable to come together and support the use of force if that’s the decision.
So I just want to thank you and than others, thank our witnesses, as well. We had terrific witnesses yesterday. I'm assuming nothing less than that today from the panel that's here, and I think the question we're raising about the day after is very, very important. And the debate and discussion that preceded this, I think, makes the point, as you've done already.

The CHAIRMAN. Knowing this panel, I can assure you that they are as confident and as good.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I want to thank, again, in absentia, Ambassador Butler for getting on a plane and flying 24 hours from Sydney, Australia to testify at yesterday's hearing, which was very worthwhile. He has been always—sometimes controversial, always incredibly straightforward. I thought his testimony was a good lead-off yesterday.

Today, we have a very significant panel. Dr. Phebe Marr has spent 40 years as a scholar and analyst of Southwest Asia and is a leading U.S. specialist on Iraq. Until 1998, she was senior fellow at the Institute for International Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. She retired from the U.S. Government in 1997. She is the author of "A Modern History of Iraq." I recommend it to you. I have not read it all. I have read giant chunks of it. I must tell you, there's nothing like an appointment to focus one on the mission. She was kind enough to come in to brief me with others last week, and I spent time trying to make sure I knew what she had written before she came in. And I didn't get all the way through it, professor, but I got close—or doctor.

Ms. Rend Rahim Francke is a founding member and the executive director of the Iraq Foundation, a nonprofit organization that promotes democracy and human rights in Iraq, and we thank her for being here, as well.

And Dr. Al-Shabibi—am I pronouncing it correctly? You can call me Bidden if I'm not, doctor—is an expert on the Iraqi economy, currently serves as an advisor to the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. He served in Iraq's Ministry of Planning from 1997 to 1980, and in Iraq's oil ministry from 1975 to 1977. Dr. Al-Shabibi has traveled from Geneva, Switzerland, to testify, which puts him right up there with Butler for having made the long-distance effort to be here. We appreciate your traveling such a distance and to share your experience and your thoughts with us, doctor, and we're anxious to hear you.

And Colonel Scott Feil, he served in Desert Storm from 1990 to 1991. He received a Purple Heart. He was chief of the Strategy Division of the Joint Staff from 1999 to 2000. He's now executive director of the Role of American Military Power Program at the Association of the United States Army. His responsibilities include co-directing a program for post-conflict reconstruction.

I welcome you all here today, and we have just—actually, gentlemen, we just had a 15-minute vote start. Rather than us doing this piecemeal, in respect to the witnesses, maybe we should all go and vote and then come back. It'll take us about 7 to 10 minutes to do that, and then we won't have you seeing us get up and in and out and it's—we're like Pavlov's dog. When that bell goes off, we have to go and vote.
So we will recess for 10 minutes, be back, and we'll start with you, Dr. Marr, when we come back.

The committee is in recess.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Thank you for your indulgence. Hopefully we won't have many interruptions, as we did yesterday.

Dr. Marr, again, welcome, and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, FORMER PROFESSOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. Marr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the committee, for the invitation to testify. I would like to add my voice to others in thanking you for this wonderful opportunity to generate a public discussion on the issues involved in this critical foreign-policy decision.

Our panel has been asked to examine what we can expect in Iraq after Saddam if the United States should be successful in achieving his fall. I would like to focus on two key issues that will be critical for U.S. planning in post-Saddam Iraq. The first is the potential for fragmentation or fracturing once Saddam's regime is decapitated and, along with it, the potential for outside interference from Iraq's neighbors. The second is the issue of providing alternative leadership for Iraq.

Let me say at the outset that I regard the replacement of Iraq's leadership as a serious and very ambitious project. The decision to do so is difficult because the potential benefits to Iraq, to the United States and to the region are substantial. But so, too, are the possible costs and unintended consequences. If the United States embarks on this project, it needs to be prepared to see it through to an acceptable outcome, including, if necessary, a long-term military and political commitment to assure a stable and more democratic government. If it is not prepared to do so, the intended benefits could vanish.

Let me turn to the issue of fragmentation. Incidentally, in my prepared remarks, I have included a map of Iraq which might be helpful, together with a great deal more information than I'm going to give you here. As we know, Iraq is a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian country with boundaries that were imposed by foreign powers at the time of its formation in 1921. It has three main demographic components consisting of the Kurdish-speaking population in the north, about 17 percent, the Arab Shia in the south, about 60 percent, and the Arab Sunnis in the center, somewhere between 15 and 20 percent. These are sketched on the map.

For over 80 years, these communities have coexisted and, to varying degrees, have participated in the process of building a state and a nation. That process, while well underway, is still incomplete. Under the current regime, a narrowly based Arab Sunni community uses repression to enforce its rule over all communities; hence, the fear that if the regime is removed, the country will fragment into its ethnic and sectarian components.

How accurate is that assessment? First, in my view, it is very unlikely—indeed, inconceivable—that Iraq will break up into three relatively cohesive components, a Kurdish north, a Shia south, and
an Arab Sunni center. None of these communities is homogenous or shows any ability to unite. Moreover, in many cities—Baghdad, Mosul, Basra—the communities are thoroughly mixed. Most important of all, the overwhelming majority of the population, except possibly for a few Kurds, has consistently shown a strong desire to keep the state together and profit from its ample resources.

However, the removal of the regime, under certain circumstances, could result in a breakdown of the central government and its ability to exercise control over the country. There are two dangers here. The first is short-term. If firm leadership is not in place in Baghdad on the day after, retribution, score-settling, and bloodletting, especially in urban areas, could take place.

On a broader scale, without a firm government, parochial interests could take over both in the north and the south and the center. The Kurds, for instance, could seize Kirkuk with its oil fields, establishing a new reality in the north. The Arab Sunni clans, who control military units, might struggle for power in Baghdad. The Shia party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI, located in Tehran, could send units of its militia across the frontier and attempt to gain control of areas in the south.

Such a collapse of authority could trigger interference from neighbors. Turkey could interfere in the north, as it’s done before. Iran, through its proxies, could follow suit. There could even be a reverse flow of refugees, as many Iraqi Shia exiles in Iran return home, possibly in the thousands, destabilizing areas of the south.

And, over the long term, if a new government in Baghdad fails to take hold, if it is not more inclusive of Iraq’s communities and acceptable to the population, Iraq could gradually slip into the category of a failed state unable to maintain control over its territories and borders. This is not the most likely scenario, but it is a little more likely than a decade ago. While most Iraqis do want the unity and territorial sovereignty of their state, their sense of identity as a nation has eroded under the Ba’th, and, in my view, is weaker than at any time since 1945.

In some respects, the state is already in the process of failure and needs revival. The Kurds have been governing themselves for over a decade, for example. While the Kurdish leadership is realistic about its prospects for independence—they are nil—and willing to live in Iraq under some federal identity, their Kurdish identity and aspirations for self-government have increased.

In a post-Saddam Iraq, it’s going to be more difficult to integrate the Kurds into Iraq proper. The Shia population has been in a constant state of decline for over the past two decades from wars, revolution, and government repression. The 1991 rebellion, which was widespread in the south, showed the extent of Shia alienation. And since that time, a sense of Shia identity has increased.

However, despite considerable alienation from the government, the Shia have no discernible leadership or organization inside Iraq, unlike the Kurds. Moreover, there’s no real Shia desire for separation. Rather, the Shia want a greater—indeed, a dominant—share of power in Baghdad commensurate with their numbers.

While the Shia are not likely to break away, holding Iraq together will require new leadership in Baghdad capable of incor-
porating all communities into the decisionmaking body in Baghdad. How likely are they to get it?

Now, I'd like to turn to the “center” and the issue of alternative leadership. It's generally assumed that if new political leadership emerges inside Iraq, it will have to come from the center. That's a term used to denote the central government in Baghdad, but it's also employed in a geographic and demographic sense to refer to the Arab Sunni triangle stretching from Baghdad to Mosul in the north and to the borders with Jordan and Syria in the west, the region from which the regime recruits its leadership. It's this center and this Arab Sunni minority that has dominated Iraq for decades, a pattern that is difficult to break.

I think the issue of alternative political leadership is critical, probably the critical issue in post-Saddam Iraq. At the moment, there is no visible alternative leadership inside Iraq. There may be potential leaders, but they cannot emerge or demonstrate their leadership for reasons that are obvious. So we can only speculate on the sources of such leadership and the constituencies they could mobilize.

One problem is already clear, however. If this leadership emerges from inside the regime or its support system, through a coup, for example, will this new leadership bring a real change in orientation, political culture, or even foreign policy? Will it be sufficient to get support from the bulk of the population or even to meet U.S. requirements? Or will they simply bring us a modified version of what we already have?

The outside opposition has a multitude of leaders vying with one another, they've been doing so for years. The key figures and groups are fairly well known to you, I think. They include Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraq National Congress, the Hashimites, Sharif Ali bin al-Husain, the Iraq National Accord, presumably closest to the Ba’thists, SCIRI, the main Shia contender in Tehran, numerous generals who have defected, and the two main Kurdish parties in control of real estate in the north of Iraq.

The main problems with the outside opposition are also clear. They're fractious, they've been unable to coalesce around a mainstream candidate, and they have little or no organization inside Iraq. The Kurds do have an organization inside, but they are unwilling and unable to take a leadership role in Baghdad. Their interest is self-government in the north.

The main constituency of the outside opposition, as has been often remarked, is Washington. This raises a paradox. Many of these outside leaders have demonstrated leadership skills. They're Westernized. They generally support U.S. aims, and they are the most likely to bring change to Iraq, but they will have to be put in power by the United States and supported by us over some considerable time if the changes they, and we, envisioned are to be maintained. And as Western-supported elements, their legitimacy may soon be questioned.

I would like to turn to the “inside” leadership. In order to give us some sense of what we may get, I'd like briefly to describe the three current pillars of the regime from which this leadership could emerge.
The first is the kin and clan network that dominates most institutions, particularly the security organs and the military. Saddam, as we know, has maintained power by putting his kin and clan in these functions. Together with neighboring clans from the Sunni Arab triangle they have developed an ever-thickening network of kin and clan relations in these leading institutions. Even when Saddam’s immediate family is removed, these clan groups will remain, and so will the kinship ties that bind them.

Alternative leadership may, indeed, arise from these related clans. The key issue here is whether such a leader would be able or willing to go beyond clan politics or whether such a change would be acceptable to the non-Sunni population and even the educated urban Sunni middle class that functions outside this system.

The second pillar of the regime rests on the institutions of state, the Ba’ath party, various components of the military, the bureaucracy, and the educational establishment. These are recruited from a broader base and include Shia and Kurds as well as Sunnis. At secondary levels, these institutions are peopled by an educated middle class. Some are potential sources of leadership.

The Ba’ath party is one. It may not survive Saddam’s collapse, but the party cadre will. The problem here is that amongst this group is a deeply ingrained attitude toward power and authority that will persist. And so, too, will the strong nationalist attitudes that have been the party’s backbone.

The military is the most likely source of change, although the military is not a single institution. The regular army is probably the military component with the greatest sense of independence and distance from the regime. Unfortunately, it’s also the weakest.

Republic Guard units, though presumably more loyal to the regime, may welcome a regime change, as well. Both the Republic Guard and army officers may provide alternative leadership. But here, too, the question is, how much change will they bring. How willing will they be to embrace U.S. requirements?

The bureaucracy and the education establishment will inevitably provide leadership for any new regime, but only at secondary levels. These institutions are unable to provide the leadership at top political levels. They do not have the muscle to affect a change, and they both represent a cadre that is used to obeying orders, not giving them. The education establishment, in particular, has been Ba’thized. The bureaucracy can be used by whatever leadership is installed. Indeed, it will have to be used. But it may need several years of reeducation and redirection.

The regime is also supported by an economic elite often referred to as an economic “mafia.” It is the product of the state’s control of oil and other resources which the regime distributes through a patronage system. While this group may provide some support in reviving the economy, it cannot be expected to provide alternative political leadership. In fact, it’s not a true private sector, independent of the state. Indeed, one of the best changes that could be introduced would be to separate this economic class from the state and move toward the creation of a true and more independent private sector.

This survey of Iraq’s current political direction leads me to several conclusions. One is that after years of repression, the Iraqis
are ready—indeed, eager—for change. They seek the preservation of their state and its future development as a nation, but they have had no experience of democracy, only of a police state, hence the building blocks of democracy will have to be created, including a reorientation of attitudes and practices. This will take time.

I suggest that there are three potential options open to the United States in bringing about leadership change. The first is to pressure those inside to change the regime themselves. The most likely source of change, if Iraqis are left to accomplish the deed themselves will be the center—from kin and clan groups, from the military, or, less likely, the party. This will be the least expensive option for the United States in terms of troops and political investment, but it will probably bring the least change. It is also likely to be the most destabilizing. It could lead to a struggle for power in Baghdad, the erosion of central control, and a gradual breakdown of national unity.

Inside leadership is most likely to move against Saddam if it decides the United States is serious about occupation, but the United States will need to support this new leadership to prevent fracturing. If the United States is unsure of the new leadership, if it cannot give it immediate support, the United States could lose control of the situation. Identifying potential inside leaders now and making U.S. requirements clear and public beforehand would help avoid this slippery slope.

The second option is to introduce the outside opposition as alternative leadership. This would produce the most change inside Iraq in the directions desired by the United States. But this is the most difficult and costly option. The United States would have to install and support this opposition with troops over some considerable period of time.

There is a third option. If the United States occupies Iraq, it will have the best opportunity, in the short-term, to provide law and order, prevent retribution, and begin the processes by which Iraqis inside and outside can refashion their political system and move toward democratic reforms. Most Iraqis would welcome that prospect, but it represents a considerable commitment by the United States over several years and some troops on the ground, preferably in conjunction with allies. And before too long, the United States will be viewed as a foreign occupier. Thus, the institution of new leadership and the procedures for establishing a new government need to be fairly expeditious—say, within 6 months—and the U.S. military greatly reduced thereafter.

Nevertheless, if the United States is determined to replace the regime, it’s better to take a firm hand in the beginning to help in providing the building blocks for a new and more democratic regime. In this case, the United States will have to keep some forces on the ground and strong advisory teams in place to assure that the new regime gets a solid footing.

Iraq has a military and a bureaucracy which can be used to defend and administer the country, but it will require effort to reorganize and reshape these institutions in the desired direction. This is no small task.

If the United States is going to take the responsibility for removing the current leadership, it should assume that it cannot get the
results it wants “on the cheap.” It must be prepared to put some troops on the ground, provide advisors to help create new institutions, and, above all, spend time and effort in the future to see the project through to a satisfactory end. If the United States is not willing to do so, it had best rethink the project.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Marr follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, FORMER PROFESSOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY; AUTHOR, SPECIALIST ON IRAQ

IRAQ AFTER SADDAM

The purpose of my testimony is to provide a snapshot of what we can expect in Iraq after Saddam, should the US be successful in achieving his fall. Obviously, the means and manner of removing the regime will affect the aftermath: a relatively quick transition with a minimum of bloodshed and destruction will provide one set of circumstances; a more prolonged and destructive military operation will produce a less favorable outcome. It also matters whether the change is accomplished from within, by Iraqis, or requires a direct US military effort. Rather than dealing with the means, however, which is not my area of expertise, I would like to focus on a general political and social picture of Iraq: what we should be prepared to find in Iraq the day after, and, in particular, two key issues that will be critical for US policy and planning in post-Saddam Iraq. The first is the potential for fragmentation of the country, once Saddam’s regime is decapitated, and, along with it, the potential for outside interference from Iraq’s neighbors. The second is the issue of providing alternative political leadership for Iraq, the nature of that leadership, and the implications of the choice for Iraq’s future and US policy aims.

Replacement of Iraq’s leadership is a serious and ambitious project. It is a difficult foreign policy decision for the US, in part, because its potential benefits, both to Iraqis at home and to the security of the region, are high. But so, too, are the possible costs as well as unintended consequences which cannot be calculated. If the US embarks on this project, it needs to be prepared to fulfill its responsibilities, and see it through to an acceptable outcome, including a potential long-term military and political commitment to assure a stable and more democratic government. If it is not prepared to do so, the intended benefits could vanish.

Fragmentation

Iraq is a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian country, with boundaries imposed by foreign powers at the time of its formation in 1920. Its three main demographic components, the Kurdish speaking population in the north (c. 17 percent); the Arab shi’ah population in the south (c. 60%) and the Arab sunnis in the center (c. 15-20%) have coexisted over the past 80 years, and, to varying degrees, have participated in the process of building both a state and a nation. As with most such states, that process, while well underway, is still incomplete. Under the current regime, the state is controlled by a narrowly based Arab sunni minority, using the mechanism of repression to enforce its rule over all communities, except for a portion of the Kurdish population in the north, where its rule does not run.1 Hence the fear that if the regime is removed, the country will fragment into its ethnic and sectarian components. How accurate is that assessment?

First, it is very unlikely, indeed inconceivable, that Iraq will “break up” into three relatively cohesive components: a Kurdish north; a shi’i south; and an Arab sunni center. None of these three communities is homogenous or shows any ability to unite under any leadership. Second, there is substantial mixture of these communities in many cities—especially in Baghdad and the center—but also in other cities in the north and south, making separation difficult. In some areas, other minorities such as Turcomen and Christian communities form substantial components of the population. Third, while some Kurds may have aspirations for independence, they are unlikely to achieve it, and many others would be comfortable in a more democratic Iraqi state. The shi’ah have never expressed separatist aspirations. Indeed, both Arab shi’ah and Arab sunnis, as well as some Kurds, have a strong desire the keep the state together and to profit from its ample resources.

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1In the mid-1990s, for example, the Regional Command of the Ba’th Party, consisted of 17 members; 12 were Arab sunnis; 4 Arab shi’ah, and one a Christian. Of this group, 3 were from the Begat clan; 5 were from allied clans, and two were from Mosul. (Faleh A. Jabbar, From Storm to Thunder (Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economies, 1998), p.17.
However, the removal of the current regime in Baghdad, under certain circumstances, could result in a "break-down" of the central government, and its inability to exercise control over the country: to maintain law and order; and to move the country and its institutions in the direction desired by the US. There are two dangers here. The first is short term. If firm leadership is not in place in Baghdad "the day after" Saddam is removed, retribution, score settling, and bloodletting, especially in urban areas, could take place. For example, the shi'ah in the poor Baghdad townships of al-Thawrah and al-Shu'alah, recent migrants from the south and over a million strong, could cross the Tigris and attack the more affluent Sunni districts, such as al-Adhamiyah, a fear often expressed by the Sunni residents of Baghdad. One a broader scale, without firm government, parochial interests could take over, both in the north and south and in the center. The Kurds, for instance, could seize Kirkuk, with its oil fields, establishing a new reality in the north. Arab Sunni clans, who control military units, might struggle for power in Baghdad. The Shi'ah, particularly since the rebellion of 1991, could seize Kirkuk, with its oil fields, establishing a new reality in the north. Arab Sunni clans, who control military units, might struggle for power in Baghdad. The shi'ah party, SCIRI (The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), located in Tehran, could send units of its Iraqi Badr brigade across the border and attempt to seize the initiative in southern Shi'i towns, repeating the mistakes made in the 1991 rebellion. Such a collapse of authority could trigger interference from neighbors. Turkey could intervene in the north to prevent refugee flows and to exert control over events in Kurdistan. Iran, through proxies, could follow suit. There could be a reverse flow of refugees, as Iraqi Shi'ah exiles from Iran return home in the tens of thousands, destabilizing areas of the south.

Over the longer term, if a new government in Baghdad fails to take hold, if it is not more inclusive of Iraq's communities, and more acceptable to its population: if a uniform rule of law cannot be established, Iraq could slip into the category of a failed state, unable to maintain control over its territory and its borders. The situation in the north of Iraq is an example. The Kurdish area is not unified; it is divided between the two major Kurdish parties. Neither has real control over its borders, and in the northeast, one party has lost control of an enclave along the Iranian border, dominated by Islamist parties and penetrated by Iran and other influences, possibly including terrorists. While the situation is not yet a serious problem, it serves as a metaphor for what could happen to Iraq as a whole, in the absence, over the long term, of a stable, legitimate government in Baghdad.

Iraq has been a state for over 80 years and for most of that time has had a tradition of strong, central government. The chief thrust of every government since its founding has been state formation and the creation of a nation from the diverse elements within its boundaries. In the process, a sense of Iraqi identity has developed among the majority of its population, particularly in relationship to their neighbors; most Iraqis, with the possible exception of some of the Kurdish population, want the unity and territorial sovereignty of their state maintained. At various times within Iraqi history, the central government has been more inclusive of its various communities, with a better balance among ethnic and sectarian components. But that sense of identity has eroded under the Ba'ath, particularly since the rebellion of 1991, which was a defining moment for Iraq's ethnic and sectarian communities. The sense of Iraqi identity is still there today, but it is weaker than at any time since 1945.

The Kurds:

The Kurdish community in the north has been governing itself for a decade, in an arc of territory which runs from Zakhu in the north to Hajj'Umran in the east to Sulaymaniyyah in the south. Much, but not all, of this territory is protected by US and UK overflights in the No Fly Zone north of the 36th parallel. (Kurdish self-rule is also due to the withdrawal of Iraqi government troops and administration from the zone.) While the Kurdish leadership is realistic about its prospects for independence (they are nil) and willing to live within Iraq under a federal arrangement which gives them a large measure of autonomy, their aspirations for self-government and their Kurdish identity have increased over this period. In the post-Saddam period, it will be more difficult to integrate the Kurdish community into Iraq. For example, Kurdish, naturally enough, is now the language used in administration and taught in schools in the north. As a result, the Kurdish facility in Arabic, taught as a second language in the schools, has weakened among the younger generation and may make it more difficult for them to participate in national life. Despite numerous trials and tribulations, the Kurds have managed to establish a fairly respectable level of government in the north, far freer than that which exists in the south. But they have not done so without consistent support, intervention, and prodding from the West, and Western military protection.

Moreover, the problems of the Kurds may provide a metaphor for Iraq as a whole after Saddam. After Saddam's withdrawal from the north in 1992, the Kurds held
portions, with its headquarters in Sulaymaniyyah. Both have weak
western region, with its headquarters in Irbil; the PUK in the southeastern
of the US was required to end the fighting. The KDP is now in control of the
conflict ended by splitting the area they governed in two. Indeed, the interven-
parties were engaged in a virtual civil war, which lasted for several years, resulted
in several thousand deaths, and substantial displacement of the local population.
The conflict ended by splitting the area they governed in two. Indeed, the interven-
tion of the US was required to end the fighting. The KDP is now in control of the
northwestern region, with its headquarters in Irbil; the PUK in the southeastern
portion, with its headquarters in Sulaymaniyyah. Both have weak—almost non-ex-
istent—control over their borders with Turkey and Iran. In the interim, the more
radical PKK (Kurdistan Workers party), the Kurdish nationalist movement of Tur-
key, intruded its presence into Iraq along the northern frontier with Turkey, form-
ing a force hostile to Turkey, as well as the KDP. While the activism of the PKK
has subsided since the imprisonment of its leader, “Appo” Ocalan, Turkish military
incursions across the Iraqi border, have been frequent, and sometimes massive and
prolonged, over the past decade. Indeed, Turkish political intrusion into northern
Iraq, and its manipulation of the Iraqi Turcomen community, as well as other Kurd-
ish groups, indicate Turkish concern for the Kurdish issue and its ability and will-
ingness to intervene to protect its interests. Meanwhile, the east, the PUK has been
challenged by various Kurdish Islamic groups, especially the IMIK, who had estab-
lished a foothold in territory along the Iranian border, particularly in the towns of
Halabjah, and Panjwin. These groups fought with the PUK, which was eventually
pushed out of this territory. It is this area which has recently been in the news as a
“no man’s land”, home to newer Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as the Jund
al-Islam, which have been accused of ties to terrorist groups and of recent attacks
on the PUK leadership. The absence of firm PUK control over this territory, on the
border with Iran, provides a sanctuary for forces hostile to the Kurds—and the
West—as well as for Iranian meddling. Like Turkey, Iran has intervened across the
border on numerous occasions in the past decade. It has supported the PUK, with
forces, in its struggle with the KDP, including the conflict which resulted in an at-
tack by Saddam Husayn on the north (in support of the KDP) which helped put an
end to the INC stronghold in the north. It has supported Islamic groups in the bor-
der areas and elsewhere in the north.

The two Kurdish parties are reconciled to coexistence, at the moment, but this
could break down in the future under pressure. In the absence of clear direction
from outside, or from Baghdad, competition for resources and power could invite
conflict, with potential for intrusion once again from Turkey and Iran. It should be
noted that there are other potential political players in the north, including some
tribal leaders, who were once part of Saddam’s militia. Recently some have formed
a loose alliance with Arab tribes in and around Mosul, with a view to helping in
regime replacement. The Kurds also have a professional middle class, capable of ad-
ministration, but without clear direction in terms of where the Kurds are going in
the future, the parties have not been able to entice their exile community home. In
fact, there has been a considerable brain drain. Moreover, although the Kurds have
a local militia, the peshmerga, possibly numbering from 50,000 to 70,000, they can-
not maintain border security, or defend against Baghdad or their neighbors. They
are dependent on the restraint of their neighbors and protection, ultimately, from
the US. The Kurdish model in the north, while containing many salutary features,
has succeeded only where the US has been willing to intervene and exercise some
responsibility. When the US has stepped back, the Kurdish experiment has faltered.

Shi’ah

The shi’ah population of the south has been in a constant state of decline over
the past two decades. It was hit hard from the Iran-Iraq war which saw major fight-
ing near a number of cities; the shelling of Basra; the shut down much of its oil
industry and its ports; and the closure of the Shatt al-Arab, its main artery to the
Gulf. It then took the major brunt of the Second Gulf War, which was fought in
the area. Even more important was the shi’i rebellion of 1991 and its brutal repression by the regime. This rebellion, which spread through all of the major shi’i cities and towns of the south, revealed the extent of shi’i disaffection for the regime, and the fear and distrust of the regime for the shi’i population. (The same was true for the Kurdish rebellion in the north.) The death toll in that rebellion has been estimated at at least 30,000. While the central government has restored control over the cities of the south, constant unrest and continuous, though ineffective, attacks on roads and government and party installations indicate a cowed but sullen and alienated population. There has been some economic revival under the oil-for-food program, but in general the south has been neglected, while Baghdad and the “suni center” has benefited. One evidence of this is the decline in the population of Basra. Once Iraq’s second city and its major port. Basra is now fifth in size and greatly reduced in influence. Another evidence is the growth of the Iraqi exile population in Iran, variously estimated at anywhere from 250,000 to 1 million, many of them forcibly deported from Iraq by the regime, and still others who have fled repression. The draining of the marsh areas of the south by the regime in an effort to remove a refuge for dissidents, is another indication of the depth of distrust between the shi’i community and the government.

Nonetheless, despite this alienation, the shi’ah inside Iraq, unlike the Kurds, have no discernible local leadership or organization to support their efforts. The most notable shi’i opposition organization is SCIRI (The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), but it is headquartered in Tehran and is largely controlled by Iran. This organization, established in 1982, was originally intended to be an umbrella for various Iraqi shi’i organizations committed to an Islamic government in Iraq, but despite its organizational growth since that time, it has suffered from splits and defections, and has essentially become a vehicle for the leadership of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, a cleric from a well known Iraqi clerical family. SCIRI has a military arm, the so-called Badr Brigade, of about 4,000 or 5,000 foot soldiers ready to cross the border. However, SCIRI suffers from serious difficulties. It labors (indeed chafes) under the domination of Iran, and the suspicion and distrust this engenders among shi’ah in Iraq. Moreover, the main constituency for SCIRI is the Iraqi exile community in Iran; it is not clear how much support SCIRI or its shi’i Islamic agenda has among shi’ah in Iraq. In 1991, when SCIRI sent forces into Iraq during the rebellion, raising Hakim’s picture and shi’i Islamic slogans, the move backfired, turning a number of potential supporters against the revolt. The clerical leadership of the shi’ah, centered in Najaf and Karbala’ is usually its strongest source of leadership, but the regime has systematically executed or assassinated most of its leading members in the last decade, greatly weakening the shi’i religious establishment. While the pilgrimage traffic with Iran has been reopened, it is carefully controlled by Baghdad. In fact, the shi’i seminaries have declined and the repression visited on these cities during and after the 1991 rebellion, where fighting was fierce, has been severe. The emergence of charismatic clerical leadership among the shi’ah cannot be ruled out in the future, but at the moment there is none on the horizon.

In recent years, the regime has strengthened tribal influence and leadership in the south (and elsewhere) especially among the Arab tribes and clans from which it might expect support in return for benefits. While this support is thin and based on calculations of interest, tribes or more properly clans, with their built-in kinship constituencies, may provide a potential source of leadership among the shi’ah in the future. While tribal leaders are good at rebelling, however, they are notoriously poor at constructing governments.

The Arab shi’ah of Iraq are a large, diverse and heterogeneous population. A substantial educated middle class lives in Baghdad and other cities and many work for the government. This population has never unified behind a shi’i cause, and there is now no leadership or organization in Iraq which could accomplish anything this purpose. However, the repression of the past two decades; the deepening alienation from a sunni dominated government; and economic deprivation and neglect have unquestionably deepened a sense of shi’i identity. There is, however, no expressed desire for separation or self-government; rather shi’ah clearly want a greater—indeed dominant—share of power in Baghdad, commensurate with their numbers. In any future government, they are unlikely to accept continued sunni dominance. Their problem will be their inability to field domestic leaders and organizations to further their interests and their aims in any new political dispensation.

The Center: The Issue of Alternative Leadership

It is generally assumed that if new political leadership is to emerge inside Iraq, it will have to come from the Center. That term can be construed as political, to denote the central government in Baghdad, but is it also used in a geographic...
of over 4 million, has an Arab shi'ah (often with strong tribal and clan ties) from which the regime recruits its leadership. (Baghdad, with a population north and west of Baghdad, dominated by Arab sunnis includes the small, but growing, cities and towns of the Tigris and Euphrates valley.)

This region is to come from inside Iraq, it is fair to say that there at present there is no visible alternative leadership. There may be a number of potential leaders—from within the military, the clan structure, the educated elite—but they cannot emerge and demonstrate their leadership under this regime. Numerous coup attempts have been made but all have been cut down. Hence we can speculate on sources of leadership, but it is not clear what capacity putative leaders would have or what constituencies they could mobilize. One conclusion may be drawn, however. If leadership emerges from inside the regime—or its support system—the change this leadership will bring—in orientation, political culture and even foreign policy—may be too little to be supported by the bulk of the population or to meet US demands and expectations. For example, will a sunni general, raised and trained under the Ba'th, be willing to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction? Will he and the centrist coalition he may assemble be friendly to the US government? Above all, will such leadership be acceptable to Kurds, shi'ah, and even educated sunni civilians who are hoping for real change and more inclusiveness? Will he be able to mobilize sufficient support to keep law and order, or will a struggle for power erode his control at the center?

The outside opposition, on the other hand, has a multitude of leaders who have been vying with one another for years. The key figures and groups are fairly well known in Washington. These include Ahmad Chalabi, leader of the Iran National Congress, originally an umbrella group that included a number of opposition organizations, but is now mainly a vehicle for his leadership; Sharif Ali, a member of the Hashimite family, advocating a constitutional monarch; the Iraq National Accord, led by Ayad Allawi, and composed of many ex-Ba'athists claiming to have ties and contacts with army officers and Ba'athists inside; SCIRI, the main shi'ah component, already mentioned; various individual generals who have defected over the years, and the two Kurdish parties who are already in control of their own real estate in the north. The main problems with the outside opposition are clear. They have been competing and squabbling for years, and have been unable to coalesce, even around a mainstream candidate such as Ahmed Chalabi. Most have narrow constituencies, and little or no organization inside. The Kurds, the strongest component, do have organization, some military force, and a strong constituency in the north of Iraq. But the Kurds are unable, and unwilling, to take on a leadership role in Baghdad. To the contrary. The two Kurdish parties, and in particular the KDP, have illustrated time and again that their main aim is self-government in the north; not greater control, or even change in Baghdad. The weaknesses and political liabilities of SCIRI have already been dealt with. As for the other groups, their main difficulty is that they are outside Iraq, and it is not clear what, if any, constituencies they have inside. Their main constituency is, in fact, in Washington.

This raises a policy paradox. Many of the outside opposition leaders have demonstrated leadership skills (Ahmed Chalabi, for example). They are westernized, and generally support US aims, including the elimination of WMD. They are more familiar with western democratic processes and are more likely to bring change in Iraq. But they will have to be put in by the US, and will likely have to be supported by us over some considerable period, if the changes they—and we—envision are to be maintained. And as western supported elements, their legitimacy will soon be questioned.

The outside leadership—its benefits and pitfalls—are accessible and well known to us. It is the potential “inside” leadership that is most uncertain. To understand where this leadership may emerge, it is worth taking a look at what we will find, once Saddam and his inner circle are removed.

The Iraqi regime today is supported by three pillars: a kin and clan network that dominates security, the military and the decision-making apparatus; broader based institutions (the Ba'th Party, military organizations, the bureaucracy): an economic “mafia”, backed by state controlled resources.

**The kin and clan network**

Saddam has maintained power largely by placing his own tribe and clan (the Albu Nasr/Begat) in key decision making, security and military positions. (For all intents
and purposes these two groups are synonymous). The Albu Nasr, hailing from the area around Tikrit, probably number only about 25,000, with several thousand active members available for political recruitment, but they have gradually come to occupy the strategic heights of the political system. Allied with them are a numerous, neighboring clan and tribal groupings—the Duris, the Tikritis, the Juburis, the Ubaidis, and the larger tribal confederation of the Dulaim. Almost all are Arab sunni and overwhelmingly come from the cities and towns of the Arab sunni triangle. Numerous studies have focused on this phenomenon, charting the numbers and kinds of positions occupied by these clan groups; intermarriage between and among key political families; and the relationship of various members to Saddam’s own extended family. All point to one overwhelming trend. Beneath a facade of modern institutions—a political part, a military and a bureaucracy—an ever thickening network of kin and clan relations has governed the country. deeply penetrating leading institutions, especially the military. One author has posed a hierarchy of clans, led by the Begat, and followed by the Tikritis, the Duris, and the Dulaimis, and shown how they dominate the military.2 As kin and clan relations have grown, these primordial ties have come to replace ideology and party organization as the glue that holds the regime—and the government together. In the countryside as well, tribal leadership and organization has come to play an increasing role in providing local government services. This network has been referred to as ahl al-thiqah (the people you can trust).

Even when Saddam’s immediate family and the core of his supporters are removed, these clan groups will remain, and so too will the kinship ties that bind them. Alternative leadership may, indeed, rise from related clans—some of whom have already attempted coups—imbedded in the military or even the security system. In this case, the leadership is bound to be Arab sunni, and a key issue is whether such a leader will be willing or able to go beyond clan politics; whether we will simply get another clan in power; and above all, whether such a change will be acceptable to the non-sunni population and the urban, educated middle class that functions outside the clan system.

The Institutions of State

The second pillar of the regime rests on the institutions of state: the Ba’th Party, the various components of the military, the bureaucracy and the educational establishment. These are recruited from a broader base and include both shi’ah and Kurds as well as other communities. At secondary levels, these institutions are peopled by educated professionals; they constitute the ahl al-khibrah (the people with expertise) or the technocrats. Some are potential pools of future leadership.

The Economic Elite

The third pillar of the regime is the economic elite, often referred to as an economic “mafia”. It is a product of the state’s control over oil and other resources, which it distributes through a patronage system, controlled by Saddam’s family and clan. But the largesse is spread into all communities, tying important Kurdish, shi’ah, and sunni elements to the regime. Most are contractors who owed their wealth to government patronage; a smaller number are industrialists. While this group can provide the support, the contacts and some of the know-how to revive the economy, it cannot be expected to provide alternative political leadership. In fact, it is not a true private sector independent of the state. Indeed, one of the best changes that could be introduced would be to separate this economic class from the state, and to move toward the creation of a true, and more independent, private sector.

This brief survey on what we can expect in Iraq the day after, leads to the following conclusions, albeit tentative:

• In the past decade, Iraq’s sense of national identity has eroded, but it has not disappeared. Kurdish aspirations for self government, shi’ah self-awareness and even Arab sunni identity have increased. In any new political order, few Iraqis will be willing to tolerate a continuance of rule by a narrowly based Arab sunni minority, like the present regime. The good news is that after years of repression, Iraqis are ready for change; they seek preservation of their state and its future development as a nation. However, they have had no experience of democracy; only of a mukhabarat (secret police) state, which has created distrust, corruption and bitterness among communities. The building blocks of democracy will have to be created, including a reorientation of attitudes and practices, and this will take time.

Without firm authority at helm the “day after”, and a clear enunciation of future constitutional procedures pointing to new directions, retribution and a struggle for power are likely in the short term. Erosion of the central authority could, in a worst case scenario, allow parochial interests to emerge in the north and the south. This will induce meddling and interference from neighbors, most likely Iran and Turkey.

Providing alternative political leadership, and the process by which it is installed, is the most critical and difficult problem faced by the US as an outside power.

A “coup” or change of government from within—absent US forces on the ground—is the scenario most likely to be destabilizing. While this is the least expensive option for the US in terms of troops and political investment, it could lead to a struggle for power in Baghdad and the erosion of central control, and a gradual “break down” of national unity. Inside leadership is most likely to move against Saddam if it decides the US is serious about occupation but it will need US support to prevent fracturing.

If the US is unsure of the new leadership or unsatisfied because it appears too close to the previous regime, a period of probing and exploration could ensue, during which the US will have to make demands before providing support and recognition. In the interim the US could lose control of the situation. Identifying potential inside leaders and making US requirements clear and public, before hand, would help avoid this slippery slope.

Introducing the outside opposition as alternative leadership would produce the most change inside Iraq in the direction the US desires. But this is the most difficult and most costly option. This opposition lacks clear indigenous support; the US would have to be prepared to install and support this opposition with considerable investment of time, money, and effort.

If the US finds itself in occupation of Iraq, it will have the best opportunity, in the short term, to provide law and order, prevent retribution; and begin the processes by which Iraqis (both those outside and those inside) can refashion their political system and move toward democratic reforms. Most Iraqis would welcome that prospect, but it represents an expensive, long term commitment by the US over several years, and some troops on the ground, preferable in conjunction with allies. And before too long, if the US is not careful, it will be viewed as a foreign occupier by those inside and outside. Thus, the institution of new leadership and the procedures for establishing a new government, need to be fairly expeditious. After a short period (six months) a US—even and international presence—could be greatly reduced. Nonetheless, if the US is determined to replace the regime, it is better that it take a firm hand in the beginning to help in providing the building blocks for a new, more democratic regime; support its efforts; and plan to keep some forces and a strong advisory team in place to assure the new regime gets a solid footing.

Among the steps needed will be:
- Removal of the security system and the training of a new police force.
- Establishing a new system of justice.
- Re-education and redirection of the bureaucracy.
- Assembly of a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution.
- Developing the building blocks of civil society (a free press, civic institutions, reform of education).

Iraq has a military and a bureaucracy on which the US can rely to provide defense and help develop the country, but as this list of tasks indicates, it will require considerable effort to reorganize and reshape Iraq’s institutions in the desired direction. This is no small, or short term task. If the US is going to take the responsibility for removing the current leadership, it should assume that it cannot get the results it wants “on the cheap”. It must be prepared to devote some troops on the ground, advisors to help create new institutions, and above all time and effort in the future to see the project through to a satisfactory end.
The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, thank you very much for a very clear statement.
I'm going to, for the rest of my colleagues, put your entire statement in the record so it's made available to all Senators. And I thank you.
Ms. Francke.

STATEMENT OF REND RAHIM FRANCKE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IRAQ FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Francke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a longer written statement, and I will simply highlight some areas of it.
The CHAIRMAN. The entire statement will be placed in the record.
Ms. Francke. Thank you.
First of all, of course, I would like to join my voice to all those who have thank you for starting this national debate on Iraq, and I would like to take the liberty, Mr. Chairman, to say that I admire your stamina. I was listening yesterday all day, and I got exhausted, but you did not. So congratulations.
Now, I think this panel——
The CHAIRMAN. I should say, when you become a chairman, as Senator Sarbanes will tell you, it entitles you to two things. One, you get to turn the lights off, because you're the last one—well, the
staff is actually the last to leave. And, second, you have to be the one at the hearing.

Ms. FRANCKE. Well, it’s very good of you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I enjoyed it.

Ms. FRANCKE. Thank you for this particular panel, because, very sadly, my impression is that not enough thinking has been going on in Washington, to date, about the issue of the day after. It appears, from the press, that there’s a great deal of thinking going on about military operations, but what to do after is not thought about much. And whether it is a question of lack of interest or lack of people, I don’t quite know, but I think this situation has to be remedied, and remedied quickly.

I’m an Iraqi-American, and my ambition is to see my native Iraq free and that there are good relations between Iraq and the United States. This is what I fervently hope for.

In the event of a military campaign to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein, the United States will have a unique opportunity to influence the political outcome in Iraq in a way that is good for Iraq, good for the region, and good for the United States. I might say that the United States will not have had such an opportunity since the end of World War II. This will be probably the first time that the United States will really be able to have leverage. I would like this leverage to be for the good.

I have spoken to Iraqis over the past 10 years. It is my business to speak to Iraqis every day. And there is a unanimous desire for pluralism, representation, participation, accountability in government—in short, all the things that we call democracy. The United States should seize this opportunity in the event of the removal of the regime to press for sweeping change of the political system and a new foundation for democracy in Iraq.

I would like to say, at this point, that the subject of Afghanistan was mentioned earlier today, and I would not like to see Afghanistan as a model, by which I mean—and to put it crudely, and you’ll excuse me—I do not think we should have a hit-and-run operation in Iraq.

Historically, Iraq has set the tone for the Middle East, and Iraq’s future political shape will affect the region either in a positive or a negative direction. Intervention and regime change should not be the beginning of U.S. commitment to assist and support Iraqis, but should be the beginning of a commitment toward nation building in Iraq. And U.S. involvement should be sustained. I do not mean necessarily, just a military involvement, but at all levels. The U.S. commitment to see Iraq through this difficult period should be made up front and should be held to.

The day following a regime change in Iraq will be largely determined by the message the United States sends to the Iraqis now, before military action, about U.S. intentions and about U.S. vision for Iraq. I have to tell you, Iraqis desperately want to be free of Saddam Hussein, and they also know that the only country that can help them with this is the United States. And they are ready to welcome the United States as liberators.

But equally because of the history of the gulf war and because of its aftermath and because Iraqis believe that the United States
abandoned them, in 1991 and later, there is, unfortunately, a deficit of trust among Iraqis of U.S. intentions.

I have spoken to Iraqis who were in Iraq only in the past few months. They are apprehensive. First of all, they understand that there is a real likelihood of the United States conducting a military campaign in Iraq with the purpose of changing the regime. And I can tell you many Iraqis that I’ve spoken to have said that regime change is often discussed in Baghdad as a likely possibility. But they’re apprehensive about the destructiveness of the war that will come, and they are apprehensive about what the United States will do after the regime is gone.

We must make clear that the United States comes to Iraq as a friend and not as an occupier, and that the United States will help Iraqis rebuild the country from the devastation of 20 years of war.

Mr. Chairman, what is likely to happen on the day after, specifically? First, we will not have a civil war in Iraq. This is contrary to Iraqi history, and Iraq has not had history of communal conflict as there has been in the Balkans or in Afghanistan. Second, I would agree with Dr. Marr, Iraq will not fall apart and will not be dismembered. The Kurds have spared no words or effort in explaining and stressing that they want to remain part of Iraq. The Shia, far from wishing to secede, see themselves as quintessential Iraqi patriots. But what both of these groups want is a bigger role in Iraq, a bigger role in Baghdad and in the center of government, not separation from Iraq.

Third, provided the United States has put forth a reassuring message, Iraqis will join U.S. forces in dismantling the regime, and Iraqi military forces, in particular, will defect and cooperate with U.S. troops. There will be a measure of confusion, but I do not believe that there will be chaos. And particularly, there will not be chaos in those parts of Iraq where there are American troops.

I do believe, by the way, that there is a very likely chance of an 11th-hour military coup. Once military officers and army generals are aware that the U.S. troops are, in fact, in Iraq and they are advancing on Baghdad and that the intention is, in fact, to remove the regime, there is a very strong likelihood that some group of army officers will stage a coup.

Fourth, the humanitarian situation will deteriorate badly because of war casualties, population displacement, the disruption of systems of distribution of food and medical resources.

Fifth, the system of public security will break down because there will be no functioning police force, no civil service, and no justice system.

Sixth, there will be a vacuum of political authority and administrative authority. Surviving senior officials from the old regime will have fled or will remain in hiding. Meanwhile, military officers who have cooperated with U.S. forces will be vying for recognition and privilege from the United States. The United States must be very cautious about who it gives authority to in this situation of a vacuum.

This is on the very first day after the regime change. But within a few weeks, there will be other problems that will emerge. One, there will be a need to eradicate the remnants of the old regime. There will be a need to develop the administrative structure and
institutions of Iraq. The infrastructure of vital sectors will have to be restored. An adequate police force must be trained and equipped as quickly as possible. And the economy will have to be jump-started from, not only stagnation, but devastation.

In other words, a very large number of U.S. and international civilian groups will be needed alongside any military troops that are in Iraq—not only from the United States, but from the European Union, from the United Nations, from the NGO community. There will be a great need for expertise and resources to build Iraq, and this has to happen quickly, not on day one, but perhaps on week five or week six or week seven. But, no matter how many troops and civilians there are, there will be a dire need for Iraqi participation in this effort. I believe an Iraqi partnership is indispensable, both for political and for practical reasons.

Therefore, who are the likely candidates for an Iraqi partnership with the United States? And, for a further question, who are the successors to Saddam’s regime who might emerge from this partnership?

Again, I agree with Dr. Marr, that after 30 years of repression, there is no political life in Iraq outside Saddam’s leadership and Saddam’s family. The urban middle class’s professionals and intelligentsia have been crushed, and it is unlikely that on day one or week one a new leadership will emerge from outside this tight circle of existing power now.

I believe that, in the aftermath, there will be, in fact, two circles that might emerge as possible—or who will certainly clamor for partnership with the United States. The first circle, of course, is the military officers, the defected military officers who will have cooperated with the United States. And the second circle will be the Sunni provincial clans of central Iraq.

But, as I explain in my written statement more thoroughly, there is almost a total overlap between these two circles. The Sunni clans of central Iraq were the power base that Saddam used. And, in fact, they supplied the manpower to, not only the military, but the military and the security apparatus of the states. And so to talk about a separation between this clan system and the military security complex is, in a way, a false differentiation. The military security complex identification with the clan system of central Iraq was precisely the model that Saddam Hussein used for his regime. And the question is, if we actually choose our partners from these two circles, we will be replicating the model that was used by Saddam Hussein.

I should also mention the Ba’th party, because there is a notion that perhaps the Ba’th party could come up with potential leadership. I do not believe there is such a thing as a functioning Ba’th party in Iraq. It’s been eviscerated. It was never a good institution, in any case, and it was a chauvinistic ultra-nationalist institution. But, even so, the regional commander of the Ba’th party really is a tool and instrument for Saddam Hussein. And without Saddam, there is no such thing. We are not likely to see a leadership emerge from that.

In the confusion of the first few weeks, there will be a great deal of temptation for the United States to rely on military army generals and perhaps this clan system. And I want to suggest why this
would be a great mistake. To begin with, many of the military officers who have achieved sufficient seniority in Iraq are probably implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity. I am not sure that we should be partnering with people who have other people’s blood on their hands.

The clan system has no acknowledged hierarchy, and none of them can command alliances of all the others. Each clan believes it should inherit power after Saddam. The competition for power among these clans will be intense. And if there is a nascent warlord class in Iraq, it is, in fact, these clans of the center who are actually much more fractious, have much more rivalry among them, and, because of their association to the military security complex, have access to arms.

Next, a military regime will establish the logic of force as an instrument of gaining power and keeping power in Iraq, and, therefore, it will start the rationale of cycles of military coups and counter-coups which will, in fact, return Iraq to the way that the Middle East functioned in the 1950s and 1960s, and this is hardly a stable model.

And, finally, and importantly, the Iraqi people will simply reject a military regime or a regime that is modeled on Saddam’s paradigm of Sunni clans plus military security complex. They will actively resist it. They will raise—this will raise the level of dissent and instability, and it could encourage foreign intervention and centrifugal forces. I believe it’s essentially to break this pattern of militarization and regressive government by ensuring that Iraq has a modernizing civilian government and that the military stays out of politics.

I’m almost done. In due course, Iraqis will gain confidence that a new order is taking shape, and candidates for leadership will emerge within the country, especially from the urban educated classes. However, I submit that the United States can’t afford to wait that many months until this happens. It must find an Iraqi partner sooner rather than later, and it must find an Iraqi partner before a war is launched.

And I will here make a bold and controversial proposal. For the past 11 years, the United States has been working with the Iraqi opposition groups in northern Iraq and in the Diaspora. It is fashionable to disparage this opposition and say that they are useless and worth nothing and represent nothing. And yet these groups have shown tenacity and vibrancy, and they represent a wide spectrum of political opinion in Iraq. They not only represent Kurds, Shias, and Sunnis, they actually represent political opinion and political currents and political beliefs. Without exception, they have a modernizing, democratizing outlook however imperfect this might look in Western eyes. Their relations with the United States and with each other have not always been smooth, I grant that, but I would say, by the way, that this has not always been exclusively their fault. In any case, I think it is time to change all that.

I would suggest that the United States take the bold step of partnering with this opposition and creating at least the nucleus of a future political structure. This structure should be prepared and enabled to take charge immediately of administrative and management needs of the country on the day after a regime change.
I am not, by any means, suggesting that this opposition can be the whole story of Iraq’s——

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, would you say that again, please, about taking administrative—I didn’t catch the first part of your——

Ms. FRANCKE. I’m saying that this nuclear political structure should be prepared and enabled to take charge of immediate administrative and management needs of the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain what you mean by prepared and enabled?

Ms. FRANCKE. Would you like me to explain now or when I’m done?

The CHAIRMAN. Whenever it’s convenient for you. Whenever you think it fits best in your statement.

Ms. FRANCKE. If I may at least finish this paragraph?

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Ms. FRANCKE. I am not suggesting, by any means, that this opposition can be the whole of Iraq’s political structure. Quite the contrary, it should form no more than an open circle to be augmented and completed as leaders emerge within Iraq in the months after regime change. Without such a partnership, and without such a partnership being built right now or beginning right now, the United States is likely to find itself with no civilian framework to rely on in Iraq for a long period of time.

Mr. Chairman, my idea for an administrative and management structure is that the Iraqi groups in the opposition have to be able to come into Iraq with U.S. troops and at least put together the remnants of the civil service in Iraq, come in with perhaps a core group of people who are trained in policing by the United States so that this core group can go into Iraq and work with the remnants of the police force. In other words—and also, by the way, be in charge, or at least create a sort of an overall structure for managing humanitarian services, because——

The CHAIRMAN. Can I say it another way to make sure that I understand it? Because the Iraqi National Congress coming to see me not long ago—and I apologize to my colleagues for the interruption, but I hope this is clarifying, not disruptive—made the same statement to me that you’ve just made.

If I can give an example so that I—to see if I understand it, assume American forces went in. You are suggesting that the U.S. Government work with members of the Iraqi National Congress here in the United States or——

Ms. FRANCKE. The Iraqi opposition.

The CHAIRMAN. The Iraqi—well, OK, there are several different opposition groups. They don’t fit into your little scheme, all of them, but let’s assume, whatever it is, that we essentially come in with a police commissioner who is an Iraqi from abroad in the Diaspora. We essentially come in with a water commissioner. We essentially come in with a commissioner—think about running the city of Chicago—you know, we come in with someone to run the Department of Public Works, someone to come in—so we have—in a sense, what you’re suggesting is as we come in, instead of having—in addition to NGOs, in addition to American civilians who are helping set up the infrastructure or maintain it, you’re sug-
gesting that there be an Iraqi in the Diaspora who comes in who is named, at least temporarily, by us as the person who's going to run this police department, that's going to run the water department, who's going to be the commissioner of electricity. Is that the kind of thing you mean? Is that literal?

Ms. FRANCKE. Senator, you are putting it rather, and maybe it should be put that starkly. My idea is that there should be Iraqis who come in with the United States who are in these functions as at least the liaison between whatever is left of the civil service in Iraq and the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I ask that, I have gotten so deep in the weeds in Bosnia, then in Kosovo, and now in Iraq—which is not the usual role a Senator should play, but I've actually taken scores of hours to go there myself—and what I find is, unless you are literally literal, none of this matters much. This is about making practical things happen. In Kosovo, without someone who turns on and off the street lights, you have a problem. And I'm just wondering if that's what you're talking about.

Ms. FRANCKE. And precisely, I'm afraid that in the first few weeks, certainly, and perhaps even for a few months, that all the senior people who are in charge of turning the lights on will be in hiding or will have fled Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, thank you. I apologize for the interruption.

Ms. FRANCKE. I have one final point, which I'll make very brief, because, in fact, my esteemed colleague, Dr. Al-Shabibi will take it up. My final point, Mr. Chairman, is that the Iraqi economy has been devastated, and the Iraqi people have lived in deprivation for at least 12 years. It will be extremely important, both politically and operationally, to jumpstart the Iraqi economy as quickly as possible and create opportunities for employment and to raise the standard of living in Iraq in a visible way. I cannot stress enough how important it is for Iraqis to see that their lives are better and not worse in a tangible, material way.

An important message the United States can send now and confirm the day after a regime change in Iraq is that the United States is prepared to put together an international Marshall Plan for Iraq and help Iraq overcome its heavy financial burden and rejuvenate its economy.

The final message is the United States must stay the course. This should not be a campaign to change the regime. It should be a campaign to rebuild Iraq. And unless we understand that and are prepared for it, then our preparations are really very feeble. It's not simply a military operation.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Francke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REND RAHIM FRANCKE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IRAQ FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC

IRAQ ON THE DAY AFTER

Three premises underlie this paper:

1. That the U.S. will have a decisive role, unprecedented since World War II, to influence the outcome in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and has a corresponding large responsibility to use its power for the good.

2. That what we achieve or fail to achieve in Iraq will have a profound and enduring affect on the region.
The situation on the day after

It is impossible to predict with precision what will happen on the day after the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, what some are calling D-Day-plus-one. Nevertheless, certain factors will derive the situation in the country:

First, Iraqis will welcome the United States as the liberator, and many will join U.S. forces in dismantling the regime’s edifice. Iraqi military officers, once they are certain of the regime’s demise, will want to show that they too are on board, and will defect with their troops. But the welcome will be coupled with a sense of apprehension and expectation: What will the Americans do, and what do they intend for Iraq? It is essential to assure Iraqis that the United States come to Iraq as a liberator and friend, and not as occupying force, and that the United States bears the message of freedom and democracy.

Second, the humanitarian crisis will become acute, as the disruption of distribution systems, population displacements and destroyed infrastructure leave people without access to food, water, and medical resources. There will be civilian casualties to take care of at a time when hospitals, roads and electricity are unavailable. Oil production may be interrupted for weeks, causing shortages inside Iraq and affecting the international energy markets.

Third, the system of law and order will break down, endangering public safety and putting people at risk of personal reprisals. There will be no police force, no justice system, no civil service and no accountability. In this confusion, people will be inclined to take justice into their own hands.

Fourth, there will be a vacuum of authority and an intense jockeying for power. Senior officials who fear retribution will take flight or remain in hiding. Others, including military officers, clan leaders, mid-level civilian officials, and scattered remnants of the old regime will vie for positions, and will want to ingratiate themselves with the U.S. forces to obtain political recognition and secure a role in the aftermath.

Fifth, several of Iraq’s neighbors may attempt to influence the process of change and to pre-position themselves to take advantage of the outcome.

It is equally important to know what will not happen, and to dispel some common myths about Iraq. One myth is that Iraq will break apart into mini-states, that the Kurds and the Shia will secede, and that parts of Iraq will be taken over by, or join, Turkey and Iran. This myth was spun in 1991 principally to keep Saddam Hussein in power and indeed Saddam may be the biggest perpetrator of this falsehood. Iraq will not split apart. Iraqi Kurds have spared no effort or words to reassure the world that they see themselves as part of Iraq and have no intention of seeking independence. The Shia identify themselves as quintessentially Iraqi, as Iraqis first and everything else second. All Iraqi groups have publicly committed themselves to the territorial unity and integrity of a future democratic Iraq.

A second myth that needs debunking is that Iraq will irrupt in civil war. Iraq has never had a civil war on the Balkan or Afghan model. With the exception of sporadic Kurdish conflict in the mid-1990s, inter-communal fighting among Iraqis is virtually non-existent in Iraqi history. The established pattern in Iraq is for the government to oppress communities and individuals, and for communities to retaliate against the government, and not against each other. Furthermore, there is no tradition of warlords and armed private militias in Iraq’s history, as there was in Afghanistan or in Lebanon. To anticipate civil war in Iraq is to ignore or misrepresent modern Iraqi history.

For 30 years, Saddam Hussein’s regime has inflicted wounds on the Iraqi people. Saddam has been liberal and equitable in his oppression. It is not only the Kurds and the Shia who have been persecuted; Iraqis from all social and political groups have suffered injustice and disenfranchisement. Iraq’s urban middle classes, its professionals, and intelligentsia, have been crushed, and no forms of civil society exist in Iraq. All these groups, and every individual Iraqi, seek restitution, recognition and participation in a new political order after the fall of Saddam Hussein. There is an overwhelming desire for freedom among Iraqis. They want justice, representation, accountable government, freedom from fear, freedom to speak out, and security.
for themselves and their families from the thugs of a lawless state. Iraqis want every-thing that is summed up in the single word democracy.

First priorities

Iraq will need everything in a post-Saddam period, and the United States must be willing to accept a nation-building role, assisted by other countries and national and international organizations. In some respects, Afghanistan is a case study in what not to do. The United States cannot take the path of least resistance and regard Iraq exclusively as a military campaign, to be quickly wrapped up. For both Iraqis and the United States, this must be a fight not just against Iraq’s past, but also for its future.

The immediate, day one, priorities in Iraq will be:

(a) restoring law and order and preventing vigilantism,
(b) addressing humanitarian needs, and
(c) dismantling the old regime’s weapons of mass destruction.

In a slightly longer time-frame of no more than a few weeks, there will be additional priorities:

(a) eradicating the remnants of old regime institutions, including the several security and paramilital organizations created to safeguard the regime,
(b) ensuring the capture of leaders of the old regime, with the expectation of indictment and prosecution,
(c) restoring the infrastructure of vital economic sectors,
(d) training an Iraqi police force,
(e) restructuring the civil service, and
(f) kick-starting the economy.

These tasks will present formidable challenges of manpower, organization and command responsibility. With the collapse of the institutions of the old regime, the civil service and the police force necessary for dealing with emerging crises will be dysfunctional. For a country of 22 million, tens of thousands of people have to be mobilized to carry out the functions of distribution, communication, management and law enforcement. The old security apparatus of Saddam’s regime must be neutralized and put out of commission. In its place, an adequate police force will have to be trained or re-trained. The old power structure that ran the country can no longer be allowed to continue, and the civil service will have to be reconstituted under new authority. There should be preparations of the prosecution of leaders of the old regime.

The Iraqi economy has been devastated, and Iraqis have lived in deprivation for the past 12 years. Per capita gross domestic product in Iraq is estimated between $1,500-2,500 per year, having dropped from over $15,000 in 1990. In moderately developed countries, this figure is $25,000. An important task for the U.S. from the start is to regenerate the Iraqi economy, create employment opportunities and provide a visible improvement in the standard of living as quickly as possible. To this end, the United States should announce a Marshall Plan for Iraq even before the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and proceed to put it in place once there is a change of regime as an inseparable part of the reconstruction of Iraq. This is the single most important gesture of good will that the United States can offer, and will win the trust of Iraqis desperate for economic relief.

The United States must take a major role in addressing these immediate and medium-term needs. The United States will have troops at hand, but will also need a large contingent of civilians both from the United States and other countries who are experienced in crisis situations and institution-building. With the passage of time it will be vitally important for Iraqis to perceive the United States as a benign presence, a problem-solver and guardian of their interests, rather than merely as a military police.

Still, no matter how many American and foreign troops and civilians enter Iraq, Iraqi participation will be indispensable and decisive. For political and practical considerations, the United States will need to work with an Iraqi structure of authority to meet public security and humanitarian emergencies effectively. Therefore, the US should not allow an Iraqi vacuum of authority to endure, but must ensure that an Iraqi governing structure emerges rapidly. By necessity, the US will have to identify and deal with Iraqis who can step in to manage the country in partnership with the United States, its allies and international organizations. The sooner the United States identifies its Iraqi partners, the easier it will be to deal with the challenges of the day after. Who can the Unites States turn to in Iraq?
Traditional options for succession

The United States will have the responsibility of determining which Iraqi partners it can work with, and who can best govern and administer the country through a transition period. The choices that the US makes will reflect several factors: how well the US understands Iraqi political society; what the US thinks about Iraq’s future and the future of the Middle East; how the US calculates its long-term interests in the region; and how strong a commitment the US is prepared to make towards helping Iraqis build their future.

In the months following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the options for leadership within Iraq will be limited. After 30 years of repression, execution or flight of political figures, indeed the cessation of all political life in the country, there will be no political parties or prominent leaders outside the perimeter of the old regime. Inside Iraq today there are only two circles of power which see themselves as candidates for succession: the military/security complex and the clans of central Iraq who supply manpower to this military/security complex and have been co-opted and exploited by Saddam Hussein for his own ends. The fact is that the extensive overlap between the two circles makes them almost identical. The Ba’ath party is a hollow and compromised institution reviled by Iraqis. Without Saddam Hussein, it has no authority and no credible candidates can step forward from its ranks. As a result, in the immediate period after regime change, and for many months after, few visible and credible candidates for political leadership will emerge from within Iraq.

Once US forces enter Iraq with the explicit aim of removing the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi troops will defect and cooperate with the United States. In the ensuing confusion, it is probable that a general or group of generals will stage an 11th hour coup against Saddam Hussein, giving them an immediate claim to political leadership. At this point, the US can choose the easy and quick way out of Iraq by installing in power the group of generals, and consider its task done, more or less.

The United States must resist falling into this trap. Replacing the regime of Saddam Hussein with a military regime means a continuation of exclusionary politics and repression, a return to zero-sum game politics practiced by Saddam Hussein. A military government will be divisive for the country and lead to conflict, even to raising the specter of Iraq’s dismemberment. For a start, most of the Iraqi generals who have achieved a degree of seniority will be vulnerable to charges of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, whether against the Kurds in the 80s, in Kuwait in 1990-91, or against the uprising in 1991. Moreover, the military is heavily dependent on the clans of central Iraq, and, absent Saddam Hussein and his family, these clans have no acknowledged hierarchy. Each believes it is the rightful heir to power in Iraq, and none is ready to grant loyalty to any other. Competition for supremacy will be fierce. With access to weaponry and a kinship network through Iraq’s armed forces, these clans may well become the future warlords of Iraq, setting in motion a string of successive military coups as they fight for political control.

Long disenfranchised Iraqis, hoping for representation and inclusion, will simply rebel against a military government, discontent will gather momentum and invite foreign intervention. To maintain control, a military government in Iraq will have to resort to the tactics of Saddam Hussein, using military means and repression to quell opposition and challenges. The inexorable logic of militarism and violence as a tool to gain and stay in power will take hold of Iraq yet again. This will not serve Iraq or the United States well, and the negative repercussions will resonate throughout the region.

Founding a new order in Iraq

The view, unfortunately popular in the West, that Iraq should be governed by military and tribal strongmen, is a regressive (not to say racist) view that takes us back to the 1920s and ignores political and social developments in Iraq over the past 80 years. It condemns Iraq to live under an authoritarian, militarist system that has brought Iraq nothing but disaster. But by extension it also condemns the whole Arab world to archaic political autocracies that have turned the Middle East into an economically and socially stagnant swamp. At a time when the US is calling for accountable government and representation in other parts of the Middle East, there is no better place to start than in Iraq, where the US will have the best opportunity of showing that it will practice what it preaches.

Another common error is to look at Iraq solely through the prism of ethnicities and religion. From this perspective, Iraq is divided into Kurds, Sunnis, Shi’a, Turkomans and Assyrians, as if these groups were static, homogeneous and uni-dimensional. This is only half true. For within these broad and simplified categories is a richer reality of multiple constituencies within each of these groups, often deter-
mired by political, not primordial, definitions. Thus it is equally valid to say that
Iraq is divided into Pan-Arab nationalists and pan-Kurdish nationalists, Iraq-centered nationalists, Sunni Islamists and Shi'a Islamists, leftist and socialists, and increasingly, liberal democrats of a global outlook who span all ethnicities and religions.

Saddam Hussein and his regime thrived on a paradigm of Iraq as an ungovern-
able society torn by ethnic and religious differences, which requires the brute force
of a powerful ruler to hold it together. It would be fatal if the United States went
into Iraq with the intention of perpetuating this sick model of Iraq.

We have to look for a different political paradigm in Iraq, one that takes into ac-
count the diversity of political interests brought about by social, educational and po-
itical developments over the past 80 years. Once Saddam’s regime is overturned,
Iraqis need to see that the old order is truly swept away, that a new beginning is
made, and that the United States is a partner and a nurturer of this new beginning.

Regime change in Iraq has to be change to democracy, and a transitional govern-
ment supported by the United States has to demonstrate that it represents the new
Iraq, and that is responsive to the political demands of Iraqis as citizens, and not
merely to their religious and ethnic identities. The United States will be uniquely
placed, and will have the power, to be the midwife for a new order in Iraq that will
succeed Saddam Hussein.

The transitional government most likely to hold Iraq together and gain credibility
and support is a national coalition that is inclusive and pluralist, and reflects Iraq
social and political diversity. It alone will be able to draw the country together, give
the various Iraqi constituencies, including the military establishment, a stake in the
center, and ease anxieties about the future. The national coalition should not stop
at ethnic and religious diversity, the regressive paradigm of Iraqi politics, but must
tap into more contemporary systems of social and political identification, and in-
clude urban professionals and Iraq’s intelligentsia. Such a coalition may not produce
the strongest type of government in traditional Middle Eastern terms, but it will de-
rive its strength from the political balance, rely on consent rather than coercion, and
minimize distrust. The national transitional government should be held to a high
standard of conduct by the United States and the international community, not to
mention Iraqis themselves.

The time to start assembling this national unity government and planning oper-
ating mechanisms is right now, before the bombs start falling. For the past 12
years, the US government has been dealing with a vibrant and determined, if often
fractious, Iraqi opposition in northern Iraq and in the Diaspora. This opposition en-
compasses many segments of Iraqi political society, including traditional and mod-
erizing elements. The Kurdish parties, for example, represent a majority of the
Kurdish population in a very tangible sense. For the others, they stand for political
currents in Iraq, such as Shi’a Islamists, Arab nationalists, and liberal democrats.

Relations between these groups have not always been easy, yet to a remarkable de-
gree, they all agree on the fundamental need for democracy, rule of law, representa-
tion and pluralism. And all of them have sought the assistance and support of the
United States in changing the regime in Iraq. To date, it is they who have sought
a partnership, and it is the United States that has withheld it.

The United States should aim to forge the nucleus of a transitional government
in Iraq with the help of this opposition. Clearly, any opposition outside Iraq cannot
be the full story: on the contrary, it will have to be augmented by individuals and
groups from within the country as these emerge to the foreground. For the present,
it provides a base to build on, and should only form an “open circle”, to be completed
once change occurs and as the internal situation develops. Such a project pre-
supposes close work with the Iraqi opposition in the period leading up to regime
change. Prior planning is particularly important for the purpose of providing a
framework for civil administration, management of vital sectors, and policing.

U.S. Partnership with Iraqis

The mandate and duration of the transitional unity government should be clearly
defined. It should work closely with the United States and other countries to
achieve the common objectives of training a police force to ensure public safety, at-
tending to humanitarian needs, and rebuilding Iraq’s civil service and administra-
tive structure. Once these conditions are satisfied, it should have the further respon-
sibility of preparing for its own dissolution and the establishment of a permanent,
elected government. It must therefore:

(a) address the issue of accountability for the previous regime’s crimes,
(b) establish mechanisms for the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons,
(c) convene a constitutional assembly to draft a permanent constitution,
(d) prepare for a constitutional referendum,
(e) prepare for national elections, and
(f) negotiate with the UN and Iraq’s creditors for relief of financial obligations.

This is a tall order, and throughout the period of transition, Iraq will need United States and international assistance and support. Again, Afghanistan should not be the model. The issue should not be merely ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein, but rebuilding Iraq as a modern, democratic state that redefines the standards of political conduct in Iraq, and set an example for the Middle East region as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Doctor, I want to make it clear, you were in the Ministry of Planning, not the Minister. I want to make that clear.
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Thank you very much, Senator.

STATEMENT OF DR. SINAN AL-SHABIBI, CONSULTANT TO THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

Dr. AL-SHABIBI. I really thank you for inviting me to speak at this August meeting——

The CHAIRMAN. You have to speak almost directly into the microphone so people in the back can hear you.

Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Thank you very much for inviting me to participate in this hearing to speak about what I think is needed for the Iraq economy. I am going, actually, to be brief, despite the fact that actually the subject is not at all brief. And what——

The CHAIRMAN. I’m sorry, doctor. You really have to keep your mouth almost on the microphone. You have to pull it very close. As the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, Senator Thurmond says, “You’ve got to talk into the machine.” Thank you.

Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Thank you.

I just actually want to give an idea about the characteristics of the Iraqi economy today. I mean, I’m not going to actually go into detail on this, but I’m going to enumerate certain characteristics in order to move on a certain actually strategy what is needed to be done in the short term and—in the longer terms and the short term, which is actually medium and long term.

There are Iraqis now actually living under a situation where there is a huge resource deficit due to sanctions. There is actually, to a certain extent, negative or low growth rate, despite the fact that the growth rate has increased, but this is basically due to the increase in oil production, which is actually not real, because, I mean, what we mean here is the growth in the non-oil sector.

There is actually a deteriorating social situation and human development, in general, and they’re characterized basically by the disappearance of the middle class, once vibrant middle class. There is a collapsing exchange rate. There is rampant inflation and huge external debt and a big bill of war reparations. All these things are—I mean, we can, of course, speak in detail about these things, but they are actually the characteristics of the Iraqi economy.

Those characteristics did two things to the Iraqi economy. First, they made the Iraqi economy unstable—unstable in economic terms, because, I mean, my colleagues are talking about political instability. I’m talking now about when you have inflation, when you have deficit, when you have all these things, we are actually talking about economic instability, and they are actually retarding
the growth. And, of course, the political situation is a constraint—is a general constraint on all these things.

So what is actually needed to be done? In order to grow, you need to do certain things immediately and, as you say, the day after, but immediately and in the very short term. And in order, actually, for Iraq—and I’m going to read part of things which I have done before. For Iraq to resume growth, it must first restore economic stability and create the conditions to sustain this stability.

Restoring economic stability. Top priority must be given to raising the external value of the dinar—of the Iraqi dinar, the national currency—and controlling high inflation because of the adverse effects, social and political, consequences of this. In other words, the immediate priority is to restore microeconomic stability.

If inflation is not reduced, it is likely that political protest will take place. Repressive measures must not be used to quell those protests in a new setup. A resolute effort to address that question of inflation as explained below should help stabilize the situation.

So what is needed in this regard? Basically, what is needed, mobilization of substantial volume of financial resources. This mobilization has two dimensions, international and regional and domestic.

What is needed on the international and the regional level? After the lifting of the sanctions, Iraq should be allowed to reach or approach its maximum oil export capacity. Its reentry into the oil market should be accommodated without adversely affecting the oil price level. This will require maximum cooperation by OPEC members, even though many of them are suffering from budget deficits.

These countries are certainly aware of the suffering Iraqis have gone through and should also be aware that the economic and political stability of Iraq will have favorable repercussions on regional security. Agreement on a new oil production level in Iraq should be a process of dialog and negotiation with other OPEC members, a process by which Iraq can reintegrate into the region and the international community.

Second, a standing should be granted to Iraq on the payment of debt reparation. Actually, Iraq is not paying its debt now, but, if conditions arise, probably there will be some questions in order to pay that debt.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, can you tell us if you know what the total amount of reparations owed is, roughly, by Iraq? In other words, what is the nature of the debt and reparations you’re referring to, the magnitude, roughly?

Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Well, the debt actually is divided in two parts. I mean, there is actually a debt owed to gulf countries, which is interest free, and there is also a debt which is to non-gulf creditors. And, I mean, estimates vary. All the official estimates about this is actually—an Iraqi statement in 1991 submitted to the United Nations, which says it’s about $42 billion.

The CHAIRMAN. Forty-two billion.

Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. AL-SHABIBI. But, of course, I mean, because if it is not paid, it is accumulated.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. So reparation, of course, is a different thing. I mean, they are—the statistics are there, and there is a Web site, a very good Web site, in—that claims there is about $300 billion. But, of course, these are verified, and what is paid is very much less. But the claims are still there.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. So there should be a standstill on these things. If this is not done, then Iraq may remain in deficit.
While sanctions are currently causing their resource deficit, payment of debt reparation may later become its principal cause. The question is, of course, is that even when you lift sanctions and you get all oil exports back to the country, but there is a payment of debt reparation, then, of course, there is another leakage in the economy. Therefore, actually, you might go back to a deficit situation, and it is the deficit that is causing inflation and causing the lower value of the dinar. So it's actually a package.
What Iraqis need is lifting of the sanctions coupled with relief from debt and reparation. Experience shows that high debt-service payment engender economic instability and fuels inflationary pressure.
Third, the regional and international community should extend substantial financial assistance to Iraq. This assistance should be on concessional terms or preferably in the form of grants, would assume particular importance in the event that the reentry of Iraq into the oil market was only partially accommodated or if there was actually—no standstill agreement arrived at in terms of debt reparation.
Those three measures actually are related to the fact that they are part of financing. They do not relate—they are measures by the international community. They do not relate to production—to actual production or trade. A lot of countries, I mean, go to financing before they start their growth policies and investment policies. And the situation is no different in Iraq.
So these measures will actually indicate that there is a commitment, and there should be a commitment on serving all these—the debt problem and the reparation problem. And, of course, the financial assistance will depend—volume of financial assistance will depend on the extent to which these problems are solved.
I have an estimate here—I mean, the question of financial assistance depends on the deficit of resources. I have, actually, an estimate which—in the next 5 years, the annual deficit could be about $7 billion—depending on the payment of debt, depending on how much the country will get in terms of exports.
And, as you know, all these variables are subject to many assumptions. Therefore, this is one of the estimates, and this will indicate how much the international community should actually make available to Iraq.
But if there is a solution to the other problems, like debt reparation and the reentry of Iraq into the oil market is guaranteed, the picture would be changed. Therefore, the question of actually negotiation of a question, studying the figures very well—but this is actually something of the order of magnitude.
These measures, if undertaken, would indicate good will, of which Iraq needs, on the part of the international community toward and would contribute in an important way to assist ability. Success in the mobilization of resources depends on Iraq creditors in the region and/or outside the region, the U.N. and other exporting—other oil-exporting countries.

What I mean to say here is, actually, that it’s a process of dialog, a process of negotiation which actually brings Iraq back into the international—into the regional and international—it’s not only actually the financial merit of it, but the fact that Iraq will again sit down with all those stakeholders and actually discuss all these issues.

This is actually on the international and regional scale, which is very important, extremely important in the beginning. And, as I said, it doesn’t require production or trade, because Iraq doesn’t have the capability to go into—in the first 6 months, let us say, into production and trade. And then this will help, giving Iraq a breathing space, in order to proceed for growth policies.

But still, on the domestic level, Iraq should compliment the actions of the international community by refraining from money printing to finance its expenditures since it does not have, at this stage, the short term, the productive capacity to back this additional money supply. Money printing can, however, be tolerated if foreign exchange flows into the country. But it should be carefully synchronized with the growth in the domestic production on foreign exchange.

Now I want to jump to—where should we use these resources—the resources which are mobilized from the relief from the obligations, from financial assistance, from oil exports—what are actually the outlets they are used for? First, they should be used for imports, especially for consumer goods and food, as a matter of priority. This is not inconsistent with the policy of supporting—because I suggest this—the latent demand for agriculture products and food in Iraq is almost certainly so huge that supply from imports and domestic production will be needed during the short term for the provision of social services, especially in the fields of health and education. Your reports stressed the poor state of hospitals and the shortage of medicine and medical equipment and school materials, for the construction and rehabilitation, especially of power and water plants, sanitation, sewage facilities, and telecommunications.

And I want to give you an idea about actually some figures which I saw about reconstruction bill. There is an official figure written in Arabic—one of the Ministers mentioned that. It’s about $400 billion. If we want actually to estimate—this is very difficult to estimate it while you are not on the ground. The question is, of course, in the oil sector, the lost output of oil from 1980—since the war with Iran—up to now, it was estimated to be about $150 billion. I mean, we had to take actually—what would Iraq have produced if there was no problems, no wars and these things, and then what—this is as far as the oil sector—as far as the forgone oil output, which actually needs to be recouped.

The CHAIRMAN. Good luck.

Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Huh?
The CHAIRMAN. I said good luck.
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Yes, well, I mean, this is actually—it needs to be—well, that’s why I’m mentioning about the reintegration of Iraq into the oil market and the cooperation from other oil-exporting countries. Then, of course, the non-oil sector, which is almost the same level, because it represented about 50 percent of output in Iraq.

We are talking about a reconstruction bill estimated in a methodological way, not actually the actual way, about $300 billion. But, of course, this needs actually to be verified on these things.

So the other outlet for the spending of the resources, for a new program of human development and technological rehabilitation so that Iraq can abridge the technological gap as far as access to information technology in concerned. This gap has been caused by sanctions and government policies which prevents access to information, in general. Information technology will be an essential requisite for growth in the next decade.

Of course, when you restore—this, we hope—these measures should restore economic stability. Then we will have actually—when we restore the economic stability, we will have to maintain that stability, and this will depend actually on actions basically by Iraqis. The first phase action by the international and the regional community is a phased approach, is a sequenced approach. Is it a cooperation by the regional and the international community. Now actually it is basically a proactive policy by Iraqis.

Here in this phase, which is a phase to maintain the economic stability, is—Iraq should cooperate with OPEC—should initiate cooperation with OPEC to maintain a stable price level that guarantees good level of revenues but yet doesn’t hurt actually the consumers of oil.

In the first phase, we agreed on a standstill, then Iraq should propose negotiation of the claims, whether it is debt or reparation, which means actually negotiation with the creditors and negotiation with the U.N. And this, of course, you need a very well-integrated government in order to discuss all these issues.

Then, of course, after you maintain stability, economic stability, you have the preconditions now and the conditions to resume an orderly growth. And this, of course, not related to the short term. And in this case, you have to—in Iraq before—because of the availability of oil revenues, the government and the authorities were not actually using and relying on economic policies to mobilize resources. We are suggesting here the policies first to create stability, but we are suggesting policies, macroeconomic, like monetary, fiscal, and these things, to mobilize resources for growth.

And in this way the government should rely on macroeconomic policies, because—in the past, because of the fact that oil revenues are available if you—the thinking that if there is oil—if there is resources, why should you need policies to mobilize resources? And this is wrong, because mobilization of resources through policies is a capacity-building process in Iraq.

And then, on redefining the priorities both in terms of production structure and ownership. And, of course, here we are suggesting that Iraq use its agricultural potential. It should concentrate on human development, it should concentrate on telecommunication...
and telecommunication sector, because at least actually our sectors which help Iraq integrate into—from a development point of view to integrate it into the globalization process.

Last, Mr. Chairman, is that this program, which I haven’t actually explained totally, but the thing is, this program really runs counter to a war against the Iraqi people. I mean, this is very important. All of us actually would like to end dictatorship and end oppression. There is definitely no question about that. But all these assumptions, all these proposals will break down if we have a scenario where there is war against, eventually, the Iraqi people or a war that destroyed the infrastructure. So actually this is very important, because we don’t want to increase all the bills which we need to mobilize in order to get economic stability and economic development.

I thank you very much, and I will be very happy to respond to any questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Al-Shabibi follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SINAN AL-SHABI, CONSULTANT TO THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

The current state of the Iraqi economy is characterized by the following:

- Huge resource deficit due to international sanctions.
- Deteriorating social situation.
- A very weak exchange rate.
- Rampant inflation.
- Big bill of war reparations.
- Huge external debt.

These characteristics created an unstable economic and social situation under which growth has been retarded.

SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES NEEDED

For Iraq to resume growth it must first restore economic stability and create the conditions to sustain it.

A. Restoring Economic Stability

Top priority must be given to raising the external value of the dinar and to controlling high inflation, because of the adverse economic, social and political consequences of this. In other words, the immediate priority is to restore macro-economic stability.

What are the actions needed to reduce inflation?

(I) The mobilization of a substantial volume of financial resources. This mobilization has two dimensions: international and regional, and domestic.

(a) On the international and regional level:

- Iraq should be allowed to reach or approach its maximum oil export capacity. Its reentry into the oil market should be accommodated without adversely affecting the oil price level. This will require maximum cooperation by OPEC members, even though many of them are suffering from budget deficits.
- A standstill should be granted to Iraq on the payment of debt and reparations. If this is not done then Iraq may remain in deficit. (While sanctions are currently causing the resource deficit, payments of debt and reparations may later become its principal cause). Experience shows that high debt service payments engender economic instability and fuel inflationary pressures.

(b) The regional and international community should extend financial assistance to Iraq. This assistance, which should be on concessional terms or preferably in the form of grants, would assume particular importance in the event
that the re-entry of Iraq into the oil market was only partially accommodated and/or if no standstill is granted on the payment of debt and reparations.

These measures, if undertaken, would indicate goodwill on the part of the international community towards Iraq and would contribute, in an important way, to its stability. Success in the mobilization of resources depends on Iraq's creditors in the region and/or outside the region, the UN and other oil-exporting countries.

(II) On the domestic level, Iraq should complement the actions of the international community by refraining from money printing to finance its expenditures, since it does not have at this stage (the short run) the productive capacity to back this additional money supply. Money printing can, however, be tolerated if foreign exchange flows into the country, but it should be carefully synchronized with the growth in domestic production and foreign exchange.

While government expenditure should be tightly controlled, support for agriculture and other essential services will remain important during this period. Agriculture, for example, is a labor-intensive sector and employment will be a serious problem facing Iraq, especially when a large part of the army is demobilized. The support by Iraq, regional states and the international community should be undertaken rapidly in order to arrest any sources of economic or political instability.

(III) The resources thus accumulated should be used immediately:

- For imports, especially of consumer goods and food as a matter of priority.
- For the provision of social services, especially in the fields of health and education. UN reports stress the poor state of hospitals, and the shortages of medicine and medical equipment, and school materials.
- For reconstruction and rehabilitation, especially of power and water plants, sanitation, sewage facilities and telecommunications.
- For a new program of human development and technological rehabilitation so that Iraq can bridge the technological gap as far as access to information technology is concerned.

Those policies and measures, especially the import of essential goods, should help stabilize the economic, social and political situation, and put the country back on the path of development and growth through the implementation of macroeconomic policies and development strategies. The package suggested above can indeed be initiated rapidly because it does not depend on production or trade. In correcting their external payments position, many countries resort first to external financing, which provides a breathing space to start adjustment policies.

B. Maintaining Economic Stability

Once the situation is relatively stable, Iraq should exert every effort to maintain this stability. If the deficit recurs, it will again lead to a lower value of the dinar and inflationary pressures. Maintaining stability will depend more on domestic effort and macroeconomic policies than on financial resources, as in the period of restoring stability. Maintaining stability will require the following measures:

- Iraq should cooperate with other oil producers to bring about stable and predictable price level.
- Having agreed with its creditors and the UN on a temporary standstill on the payment of its obligations, Iraq should propose their renegotiation.

If a situation of resource deficit returns, then inflation will also return together with macroeconomic instability. History provides many examples of deficits accompanied by inflation. Many Latin American countries experienced hyperinflation be-

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1. The financial assistance will depend on the evolution of the Iraqi balance of payments (BOP). This in turn depends on the extent to which Iraq will be relieved from the external claims. Iraq's external debt is estimated at $100 billion, $60 billion of which belongs to non-Gulf creditors. If this debt is to be paid in 20 years then the country needs to allocate $3 billion. Interest payments for the next five years is around $2 billion annually (on the assumption that interest rate equals 4 percent). Gulf-debt payments equal about $2 billion annually. Thus debt service amounts to $7 billion. Reparation (25% of petroleum exports) will be $3 billion at the minimum. Thus external claims excluding reconstruction cost will amount to $10 billion, on average two thirds of petroleum exports. If the country needs about $12 billion of imports (very modest) then the deficit will be $7 billion a year. This is more or less what Iraq needs annually if nothing is done to the external claims. But the situation will greatly improve if Iraq is relieved from debt and reparations, under which case the need for assistance will be less. There is no estimate concerning the cost reconstruction. But Iraq lost about $155 billion in terms of oil exports since 1980 and a similar amount in the non-oil sector taking into account that this sector represents on average half of the economic output. The package suggested will go along way to help Iraq in recouping those losses.
cause of debt crises in the 1980s. Germany’s hyperinflation period in the 1920s was partly the result of it having to lower exchange rates to generate a huge trade surplus to meet reparations payments.

The above shows that a solution to the problem of external obligations of Iraq must be found. It can come through negotiations and agreements with the international community and the UN. It is not in the interest of Iraq to take unilateral action.

Although the immediate objective in the short run is to restore and maintain economic stability, a lot of work needs to be done to design policies for implementation at a later period. There should also be an initiative to draft a new constitution and laws to ensure democratic rule, including electoral and press-freedom legislation. Also, work should be done to provide solutions to the huge social problems caused by wars, sanctions, displacement and re-allocation of the military workforce to the civilian economy. While these programs must be vigorously implemented once economic stability is regained and maintained, this does not preclude the provision, at this stage, of financial resources to agriculture and the social sector, because of their obvious contribution to stability. However, the real, and the most efficient solution to the displaced population and the released military workforce lies in achieving high growth in the civilian economy, since this will determine its capacity to absorb additional labor.

In the short run, therefore, while stability is a priority, designing policies and programs and paving the ground for building institutions is also important.

C. Resumption of Growth

When the economy attains economic stability, is able to maintain it, and gets reintegrated into the world economy and community, it can proceed to implement an orderly development strategy that ensures faster growth.

There is a pressing need to increase the efficiency of the non-oil sector so that its contribution to overall output and growth is increased. Based on this, the emphasis of the new orientation should be:

- On the intensive use of economic policies to mobilize resources for development, not merely to attain and maintain economic stability.
- On redefining the sectoral priorities both in terms of production structure and of ownership.

DIRECTION OF MACROECONOMIC POLICIES

The use of macroeconomic policies in economic management of the non-oil sector will involve a different relationship between the state and the private sector. In the past, state intervention in Iraq was driven by ideological motivations, which led to a confrontational relationship with the private sector. Finally, the state was unable to realize the advantages that could be reaped through combining ample resources with good macroeconomic policies.

The objective of fiscal policy is, in the long run, to diversify the structure of government revenues in order to reduce the dependence on the oil sector. On the revenue side government will have to reform tax system. Government expenditure will have to be rationalized and the ratio of military to total expenditure substantially reduced.

Monetary policy needs the right infrastructure, in particular reform of the financial and banking system and, more importantly, independence of the Central Bank. Otherwise, the Central Bank will end up financing the budget deficit. But the independence of the Central Bank should not prevent the adoption of a development-friendly monetary policy.

Regarding the policy of exchange rate, an oil-dominated, overvalued rate may be detrimental to the growth prospects of the non-oil sector. A realistic exchange rate for this sector may improve its competitiveness, given that the diversification of sources of foreign exchange assumes a high priority.

SECTORAL PRIORITIES

Sectoral policies have two dimensions, ownership and productive structure:

As far as ownership is concerned, the private sector should play a leading role in the development process. Apart from efficiency considerations, emphasis on the private sector will be a matter of necessity. The government has limited choices in this respect, since it will be burdened by the payments of debt (which is public in Iraq’s case) and of reparations, if relief did not materialize. Privatization is one way of encouraging and developing the private sector. However, privatization schemes undertaken in Iraq in the second half of the 1980s were driven by the need to finance the war with Iran, and efficiency considerations were secondary. In addition,
many of the state enterprises were sold at book value to the government-linked private sector. The strategy governing the reliance on the private sector will have to be reconsidered and reevaluated with a view to putting efficiency considerations first.

With respect to the productive structure, the priority should be on human development and agriculture. Iraq, at present, is not well placed to reap the benefits of globalization and meet its challenges without serious efforts to enhance its technological base in these areas. Development of the agricultural sector should save the country substantial amounts of foreign exchange, a precious resource in a future Iraq. In the industrial sector, light industry, especially food processing, should receive priority because of existing domestic demand and its export potential. Development of other sectors should be based on careful market studies that take into account domestic and foreign demand conditions and existing supply capacities in the region. The development of these sectors and any other sectors, which can generate in a short time the required foreign exchange, can also be financed by foreign direct investment (FDI) by Arab and multinational corporations because domestic resources may not be sufficient for consumption and development purposes. FDI, which can be undertaken within the development strategy of the country, is a source of finance and technology. Another source of finance is Iraqis resident abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, doctor.

Colonel.

STATEMENT OF COL. SCOTT R. FEIL, USA (RET.), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ROLE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER, ASSOCIATION OF THE U.S. ARMY, ARLINGTON, VA

Colonel FEIL. Mr. Chairman, thank you and members of the committee for providing the opportunity to comment on potential post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the wake of a U.S.-Iraqi conflict.

While I’m co-directing a project concerned with this issue, jointly conducted by the Association of the U.S. Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the parent organizations or my colleagues or our commission, which has several Members of Congress on it.

I have a statement for the record, sir, and I’d like to make a few brief comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will be placed in the record.

Colonel FEIL. Thank you, sir.

Any post-conflict reconstruction effort taken in the wake of an American-led conflict with Iraq will require broad international support, significant human and material resources, and an unwavering political commitment over time. As you’ve heard, the United States has a number of national interests at stake in Iraq that would require significant and sustained involvement.

First and foremost, the United States must make certain that Iraq no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or the world. We cannot tolerate weapons of mass destruction possessed by a regime that operates outside the bounds of civilized behavior.

Second, the United States must prove its commitment to securing peace in the region. Iran’s perceptions of U.S. objectives and the reactions to having U.S. forces engaged within both Iran’s eastern and western neighbors must be seriously considered.

And, third, the Iraq that follows a conflict must be both viable and capable of self-determined behavior in consonance with generally accepted norms of international and domestic order. It must neither be a basket case nor a bully.
I think the international community will hold the United States primarily responsible for the outcome in the post-conflict reconstruction effort, but we can expect significant international involvement in any post-conflict situation in Iraq. Due to the vacuum expected to exist at the end of an Iraqi war, the notable centrifugal tendencies in several regions of the country and the significant economic potential which may be realized in the successful reconstruction of the country, the coordination of international actors is extraordinarily important. The international community should begin now to implement planning mechanisms and align tasks, actors, and resources to accomplish this effort. The key tasks should be clearly delegated to various actors based on their relative comparative advantages. I note that we began to discuss the situation in Germany and what it would like after the end of World War II beginning as early as 1942.

The United States needs a strategy for Iraq that integrates post-conflict reconstruction efforts with the political and military campaign to accomplish regime change. U.S. planning efforts should avoid the false dichotomy of conflict and post-conflict operations, and our strategy and operational plans must define a seamless progression of tasks, responsible actors, and the resources applied to those tasks that accomplish the national objective. The planning for post-conflict reconstruction must commence now rather than after hostilities have commenced or, worse, ended.

I think Iraq will need international support in four major areas—security, governance and participation, justice and reconciliation, and social and economic well-being. I'd like to provide a little bit more detail on the security requirements.

First, there are indications, which are arguable, that removal of the current security forces and apparatus without significant capabilities to immediately replace them may result in reprisal and retribution killings in Baghdad and other large cities. Public order and the protection of the populace and the humanitarian relief effort is paramount in this regard.

A second important aspect of security will be obtaining guarantees from the neighboring states to refrain from trying to control or unduly influence events in Iraq. This leads to a requirement that the Shatt al-Arab and the Iraqi oil fields must be protected.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts will demand special attention. With the Iraqi forces, including their reserves, equaling about 700,000 personnel and another 60,000 in the various security services, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts will dwarf anything that we have previously attempted. Iraqi's large and organizationally diverse security forces will require integration into organizations that are visible, transparent, and responsive to a legitimate government.

And, finally, and one of the most important tasks, control of the weapons of mass destruction and their facilities associated with production and storage must be a top priority.

I would propose the following security force, and I posit this in, U.S. force equivalents, because I think that we will be the “lead dog in this pen.” Mr. Chairman, and I think that if we get coalition partners to add to this effort, that is additional capacity that may allow us to leave or reduce our presence at an earlier rate, but I
don’t know that it’s a substitute for a core American presence in the country.

The requirements are: providing the core security for the largest cities, about 10 million in population in the largest eight, which is about 40 percent of the total population, and the humanitarian effort; securing the WMD and their associated facilities; patrolling the Iranian border areas and the Kurdish areas; protecting the Shatt al-Arab and the oil fields; monitoring the regions of the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the Syrian border; the Tigris and Euphrates contain the bulk of the population; and then conducting an integrated disarmament and demobilization process that is coordinated with the reintegrations efforts.

You’ve heard my colleague, just previously, talk about the economy; releasing some several hundred thousand people back into the economy as a result of a demobilization effort it has to be integrated well with efforts to provide employment and useful things for idle hands to do; and, last, a reform of the security sector.

These missions place a premium on intelligence, mobility, maneuverability, and boots on the ground, quite honestly. And, therefore, I would propose a post-conflict security force of about 75,000 personnel. This does not, as I said, count coalition contributions, and I would also point out that for many of the things that are called for in this type of a situation, the United States may be the only provider of that capability.

I would organize this, and this is a notional sort of force list, with a corps headquarters—and I think that the entire force has to have a significant aviation capability so that you can retain your mobility and with a small number of soldiers—make your presence felt around the country using a mobility advantage—a corps headquarters, two U.S. divisions, one of which I think should be the 101st Airborne Division because of its aviation capability.

The second division is situation-dependent as to whether the neighbors, especially Iran, are—how their behavior is evaluated. If the evaluation of their behavior and their attitude toward what we’re doing is relatively complacent, then I think a light division with more infantry to use within Iraq is probably appropriate. If, on the other hand, the Iranians are threatening or there is a problem with the brigade of the Iraqi Diaspora that’s coming back into the country, then perhaps an armor division or a mechanized division would be more appropriate to help secure Iraq’s eastern border.

Two U.S. cavalry regiments. They have a significant aviation capability, and they’re organized, trained, and equipped specifically for a role that would allow them to do border surveillance and patrolling in certain areas.

A corps aviation brigade—one again, to plus-up the aviation. I think a special operations forces group, an SF group, would be required initially for securing their weapons of mass destruction, and then they could transition into what they’re also very, very good at, which is security sector reform and training of a new Iraqi military.

A corps Support Command for logistical support, an additional engineer brigade to help work on the infrastructure, and then 4,000 police monitors. The standard that has been used ever since the
end of World War II and is adopted by the UNDP is about one policeman for every 450 to 500 citizens. And then the standard that we’ve arrived at in the Balkans is that you have about one monitor for every ten policemen in order to achieve round-the-clock monitoring capability. And so that winds up being about 4,000 international police monitors, and I would strongly recommend that those come from the moderate Arab states and those along the North African littoral that we might be able to encourage to participate in this.

There will be a requirement for some limited U.S. Air Force tactical air lift, but I think that that can—a lot of that can be based in Turkey, Kuwait, and perhaps some of our other partners as time goes on and we reduce our presence within Iraq.

The total cost of this force—once again, based in U.S. equivalents, and there’s wide variation in counting—could range up to about $16 billion for that first year for a force of 75,000 to operate within Iraq.

And, last, the duration of that force. I think that in the past, we have probably been a little bit overly optimistic. I think that force would have to stay within Iraq performing its functions for approximately a year. As Professor Marr pointed out, a national constituting process that could take place within 6 months and that was legitimate might reduce some of that requirement, and we might be able to begin drawing that force down a little bit earlier. But I would see a significant force, one above the level of 5,000 people, with some sort of reduction in that force going on, but I would see a significant force of about 5,000 people remaining in Iraq for a good 5 to 6 years.

We would try to reduce that presence consonant with the progress in developing Iraq’s legitimate security sector and also with progress in the other four areas of reconstruction—or the other three areas of reconstruction, which are economic and social well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation.

I have included in my statement, for the record, some policy recommendations that we’ve made for those three areas, but I’ve made it to the bell, and so, sir, I will now be happy to answer any questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Feil follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COL. SCOTT R. FEIL, CO-DIRECTOR, AUSA/CSIS POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ: STRATEGY AND RESOURCE CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Any post-conflict reconstruction effort taken in the wake of an American led conflict with Iraq will require broad international support, significant human and material resources, and an unwavering political commitment over time. The size of the country, the “tough neighborhood”, the scope of the human needs, and the potential additional damage to infrastructure combine to make rebuilding Iraq an immense challenge. The ongoing war against terror inside and outside Afghanistan also complicates the task for the United States, as does Iraq’s proximity to the Arab-Israeli situation, both geographically and conceptually. While the United States may prefer to de-link actions in these three areas, strategic outcomes result from interaction,
and our adversaries and allies have a view which must be considered in planning and execution.

Past post-conflict reconstruction efforts around the globe can illuminate potentially effective and efficient mechanisms to undertake this challenge. As part of a larger inquiry into the capacities and gaps that exist in the U.S. ability to respond to complex emergencies, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction project has developed a framework to help understand the key challenges to rebuilding a country following conflict. This paper seeks to distill some of the lessons from previous efforts and apply them to the case of Iraq, with an emphasis on the security requirements that must be established as a foundation for integrated efforts to reconstruct capacities in economic and social well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation. Our goal must be a minimally capable state that can order its internal and external affairs according to generally accepted norms of behavior.

The United States has a number of national interests at stake in Iraq that would require significant and sustained involvement over time. First and foremost, the United States must make certain that Iraq no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or to the world, either through its military capacity, or through its political and ideological make-up. Weapons of mass destruction coupled with a regime that supports terrorism cannot be tolerated. Second, having gone to war in Afghanistan, then following with an effort in Iraq, the United States must prove its commitment to securing the peace, not only in those states, but also in the region. In this situation, Iran’s perceptions of U.S. objectives and reactions to having U.S. forces engaged within Iran’s eastern and western neighbors must be considered. Third, the Iraq that emerges from the conflict must be both viable and capable of self-determined behavior in consonance with generally accepted norms of international and domestic order. It must be neither a basket case nor a bully. If the United States and the international community fail to improve the situation of people living in the region, many will believe that the United States’ war is indeed against Muslims—a conclusion that would have chilling consequences for U.S. interests.

The United States must evaluate its own comparative advantages and allocate significant resources accordingly. It is absolutely essential that the United States play a constructive role in a number of areas, not just in the military arena. If the United States does not definitively debunk the myth that it “destroys but does not build,” pursuing national interests and maintaining a global system to the benefit of all will prove progressively more difficult.

STRATEGY

The key to bringing transformative change to Iraq is to establish a sustainable political process by which various factions develop and continuously refine a common national agenda. This political constituting process must offer opportunities for broad and widespread participation of various Iraqi groups at all levels, and must realistically account for current power realities in the country. The introduction of the exiled military and political leaders poses significant challenges in the absence of any viable presence within the country of organized opposition to the current regime. "Vacuum filling" must not be a random process.

The centerpiece of the international strategy to assist in these constituting processes will be striking the right balance between establishing responsive and effective central governing institutions and enhancing citizen participation. For the international community to focus exclusively on one at the expense of the other would be shortsighted. Whereas international support will pay greatest dividends in the security and justice sectors when applied to create national institutions, support for governance and social/economic needs will be required at both the local and national levels. Decades of war, economic diversion, deprivation and misrule have weakened the ability of the society to mobilize and develop legitimate political voice. The assisting international community must encourage and develop the capacities for grass roots political action while supporting and guiding the establishment of a strong government that can deliver needed goods and services.

REGIONAL STRATEGY

Any strategy for Iraq must be integrated into a broader approach to the Central Asian and Middle East regions. Iraq’s neighbors have their own vital national interests to pursue—the pursuit of those interests can either contribute to a successful outcome or provide the centrifugal forces that result in disintegration, additional conflict, and escalation to a set of regional wars. International attention to Iraq and its neighbors should be calibrated to maintain strategic balance in the region and to minimize threats to stability and security emanating from the territory of any state. Diplomatic initiatives must establish the conditions in on-going regional con-
...conflicts, (Afghanistan and the Arab-Israeli situation) which will not exacerbate the challenges arising from a conflict and post-conflict reconstruction effort in Iraq. Of the security front, the United States and its friends must support a regional strategy to address the arms flows and political meddling that have undermined social well-being, good governance, and stability in the region.

Regional planning and cooperation for mutually supportive development has an important role. Iraq's economic potential, consisting almost exclusively at present of oil revenues, when properly developed and channeled to investment in productive sectors, can become an engine of diversification and growth for the region. Given high debt burdens and severe governance challenges throughout the region, addressing economic and political development in both a regional and bilateral context is imperative.

INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR

Leading an effort to remove the current regime in Iraq will confer special responsibilities upon the United States. In many post-conflict situations arising from ethnic/tribal situations or failed state capacity, developing indigenous ownership of the process and sensitivities to American presence often mitigate against a large U.S. footprint. The United States thus properly assumes a low profile and limitations on presence, preferring to support the effort with more indirect methods of financial and advisory resources. However, the U.S. can expect to be held by the international, Arab, and Muslim community to persevere in a public way in Iraq. In some ways reminiscent of post-WWII in Germany and Japan, the U.S. will be expected to be the lead, visible, and very responsible agent in Iraq.

However, while the international community will hold the U.S. primarily responsible for the outcome, we can expect significant international involvement in any post-conflict situation in Iraq. Due to the vacuum expected to exist at the end of an Iraqi war, the notable centrifugal tendencies in several regions of the country, and the significant economic potential which may be realized in the successful reconstruction of the country, the coordination of international actors is extraordinarily important. Indeed, the dangers and needs will be so great that the international community should begin now to implement planning mechanisms and align tasks, actors and resources. Key tasks should be clearly delegated to various actors based on their comparative advantages, keeping competition among donors to an absolute minimum. We began to discuss the missions, roles and composition of a security force for post-war Germany as early as 1942.

A key step to effective coordination will be ensuring a comprehensive, joint assessment of Iraq's needs. This would not only help create a common understanding of the challenges ahead among donors and potential Iraqi leaders, it would also spare a traumatized society from a succession of many repetitive and competing assessments. Although a joint assessment would help establish a division of labor with respect to specific responsibilities, some of the general comparative advantages of the various donors are already quite evident.

The UN should play a leadership role in three areas in particular: managing support for the political process in Iraq; overseeing donor coordination efforts; and managing humanitarian assistance programs. On the humanitarian side, UN agencies such as the World Food Program (WFP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) are already administering and disbursing humanitarian aid flows to vulnerable populations. In addition, UN agencies such as UNHCR, the World Health Organization (WHO), UNDP, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have comparative advantages in everything from refugee repatriation, provision of key health services, community based social and economic development, and integration of the Iraqi diaspora.

Similarly, the World Bank, UNDP, and ADB should provide leadership in the economic rejuvenation of Iraq. They are sufficiently resourced and experienced to provide assistance in the areas of employment generation, infrastructure, and agriculture reform that will lay the foundation for trade, investment, and sustainable economic activity. The World Bank’s economic recovery programs should stress good governance practices in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally, the World Bank, in cooperation with the UN special representative of the secretary general and UNDP, should administer and coordinate reconstruction funds through the establishment of a multidonor “trust fund,” and should take the lead in ensuring that oil revenues are managed in such a way as to support reconstruction and legitimate government activities.

In addition to refraining from meddling in internal Iraqi affairs, regional actors should also be prepared to play a helpful and supportive role by offering diplomatic and financial assistance for Iraq's emerging political reorientation. On the diplo-
mation, a group, consisting at a minimum of its neighbors (Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait), plus the United States, Russia, the EU, and Japan, should be assembled to provide political stability in the region, guarantee Iraq’s borders, and prevent spoilers from jeopardizing success. Assistance to regional actors in dealing with their own internal development needs should be considered part of the larger vision of post-conflict reconstruction in the region.

Recommendation: The United States must develop and implement a strategy for Iraq that integrates post-conflict reconstruction efforts with the politico-military campaign to accomplish regime change. The U.S. must avoid succumbing to the false dichotomy of conflict and post-conflict operations and the strategy and operational plans must define a seamless progression of tasks, actors, and resources that accomplish the national objective. The planning for post-conflict reconstruction must commence now, rather than after hostilities have commenced, or worse, ended.

SUBSTANTIVE PILLARS OF RECONSTRUCTION

Iraq will need international support in four major areas: (1) security; (2) governance and participation; (3) justice and reconciliation; and (4) social and economic well-being. Each need will be analyzed below, with special attention to what the U.S. role could and should be.

SECURITY

While permanent security institutions are reconstructed, transitional security arrangements will be necessary. The U.S. can expect requirements for a significant security force to remain in Iraq to continue for some time. Cessation of hostilities may come at a distinct point in time, or conflict may simply decline in intensity and geographic scope. In either event, the provision of security by the U.S. and the international community will be a continuing requirement if the reconstruction effort is to succeed. Internally, there are indications that removal of the current security forces, without significant capabilities to immediately replace them, may result in reprisal and retribution killings in Baghdad and other large cities. The largest cities of Iraq (Baghdad, Al Basrah, Mosul, Kirkuk, Irbil, As Sulaymaniyah, An Naj if, and Al Hillah) contain about 40% of the population, with most of the rest also concentrated in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley system. This is a population that has both labored under a repressive regime for decades, but also contains a significant youth population that has only known one form of government and one leader.

A second important aspect of security will be obtaining guarantees from all neighboring states to refrain from trying to control or unduly influence events in Iraq. Many of the population centers are close to the Iran-Iraq border, scene of devastating war in the 1980s, and Syria and Iraq have had significant security and resource differences exacerbated by feuding over the Ba’th Party, whose ideology they both claim. The Shaat al Arab region and Iraqi oilfields must be protected. Past Post-Conflict Reconstruction efforts in other countries with regional rivals suggest that a “lead country” with significant resources, prestige, and acceptable impartiality and objectivity is required to provide “space,” and general direction and coordination for a successful effort.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegaration efforts will demand special attention. The structure of the Iraqi Armed Forces, with units such as the Republican Guard having political, as well as military functions, requires a plan that can accommodate different types of “soldier,” based on security needs at the time. As in Kosovo, it may be a priority to keep the most potentially active military leadership in some form of visible unit control, rather than dispersing them back into the population. With the Iraqi forces estimated at 400,000+, reserves bringing the total to 700,000, and another 60,000 in various security services, DDR requirements will dwarf previous efforts. Many of the regular (non-Republican Guard) forces may create minimal demand for disarmament and demobilization—as in the Gulf War they may simply be “paroled.” However, they will create significant strains on a fragile economy if transition and reintegaration programs are not in place immediately to process them. The need to create opportunities for learning a new trade, schooling, and farming will be huge. Ultimately, the success of these efforts will depend on reestablishing an economy capable of providing a significant number of jobs.

Iraq’s large and organizationally diverse security forces will require integration into organizations that are visible, transparent, and responsible to a legitimate government. Building a national army and responsible internal security forces/police must be a top priority for the new government during the medium- to long-term. The control of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the facilities associated with their production and storage must be a top priority.
Recommendations for U.S. Involvement

1. Post-Conflict Security Force:

- **Requirements:**
  - Providing the core security for the largest eight cities, (10 million + population) and the humanitarian effort.
  - Securing WMD and associated facilities.
  - Patrolling the Iraqi border areas and the Kurdish areas.
  - Securing the Shaat al Arab and major oil fields.
  - Monitoring the region of the Tigris and Euphrates and Syrian border.
  - Conducting integrated disarmament and demobilization; coordinating with the reintegration efforts.
  - Security Sector Reform.

These missions place a premium on intelligence mobility/maneuverability, and “on-the-ground” capability.

- **Force size:** 75,000 personnel (based on missions, terrain, and capabilities and calculated in U.S. forces. This does not count coalition contributions, some of which may be used in later phases as off-sets. For many of these capabilities the U.S. is the sole provider).
  - One Corps Headquarters.
  - Two U.S. divisions, one of which should be the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). (With a stable Iranian border, the other division could be a light division. If Iran were to adopt a more threatening posture during the conflict or after, then a heavy (armored or mechanized infantry division would be the second). The 101st Division has a significant aviation component.
  - Two U.S. Cavalry Regiments, one of which is heavy. These ground units have large aviation capability and are organized, equipped and trained for reconnaissance and combat operations that are suited for border operations.
  - One Corps Aviation Brigade in addition to the one normally part of the Corps.
  - Special Operations Forces Group (initially for WMD security, then for DDR/SSR).
  - Corps Support Command for logistic support.
  - Engineer Brigade.
  - 4000 international police monitors. (Predicated on historically proven ratios of one policeman for every 450 to 500 citizens and one monitor for every 10 policemen).
  - Limited USAF tactical airlift.

- **Cost:** The total cost of such a force is based on a per soldier cost estimate of $215,000 per year, yielding an annual security cost for the force in country of approximately $16.2 billion per year. (While there is wide variation in estimating the costs/soldier, Western European nations’ cost factors are about $120,000 per soldier per year, and UN forces cost about $103,000 per year).

- **Duration:** The force would stay in place as described for at least one year. Based on progress in reconstructing and reforming the security sector and in the other issue areas of well-being, justice and governance, the force could begin to turn over functions to either replacement units from other nations or the UN, or to the indigenous security force. The duration for a significant, (above 5,000) U.S. presence in Iraq would be for 5-10 years, based on an estimate of how long it would take to achieve sustainable reform in the security sector.

2. Reinforcement Capacity: This capacity should be constituted primarily from already existing forces in the theater, (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and at sea), and from allies.

3. **Iraqi National Army:** Among the key challenges for the new government will be building a well-trained army under unified, civilian control. Although leadership of the force will have to be carefully balanced along tribal, regional, and religious lines, the force will also need to recruit a number of young Iraqis who have not participated in prior conflicts. The United States and its NATO allies are well positioned to respond to requests to design, train, and develop this army. Even limited military assistance programs, such as recently provided in East Timor and Central European countries (Poland and the Czech Republic) have tremendously shaped the foundations for legitimate security institutions. Cultural issues will require joint training with other regional forces, perhaps from Egypt or other North African Muslim nations.

4. **Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR):** DDR will stand a much better chance of success if one single strategy integrates the efforts of the Security Force, the civilian UN agencies (especially UNDP), the World Bank, IOM, and
bilateral donors. A clear division of labor should be agreed on at the earliest possible opportunity. The United States can and should take a lead in pressing for an integrated DDR strategy. U.S. technical expertise in this area is well developed, and should be applied in the context of the integrated strategy. The United States should also be prepared to provide substantial support through financial contributions in the reintegration phase, a key part of the process that is often insufficiently supported.

5. Regional Security: Given the volatility of the region and competing agendas of Iraq’s neighbors, the United States should provide leadership and support for regional security measures. A multilateral cooperation council organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the UN could improve regional security.

GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION

Given the ethnic and religious cleavages and the historic development of the country, finding the right balance between centralized authority and local control will pose an enormous challenge. The ultimate goal will be creating a national Iraqi identity and a capable, viable state. The international community should work through local structures, wherever possible to stimulate regional and local participation in the formation of the future government, as well as to assist in providing services to the population.

In order to help Iraq move toward a system of good governance and widespread citizen participation, fundamental questions of the state’s relationship to the individual, ethnicity, religion, and other states, must be addressed up front. International donors must let Iraqis set the agenda and pace for their own future. Especially during the initial stages, in the absence of indigenous capacity, the international community must guide the integration and rationalization of interests of the returning diaspora and the locals who emerge as potential leaders. To foster inclusiveness and compromise, however, it must be vigilant about providing support to constituting processes and rights-based rules.

Recommendations for U.S. Involvement

1. National Constituting Process: The United States should provide political and financial support to a national constituting process, at both the national and local levels. Determining the participants and the nature of this effort and how to integrate those who may only be able to join after the current regime is changed, must be determined now. The United States should also support the work of other bilateral and multilateral organizations in working to revitalize political participation by all Iraqis.

2. Transitional Administration: In the short run, the interim government will require immediate support from the international community. The United States should contribute money on an urgent basis to a UNDP Interim Authority Trust Fund, and be further prepared to respond to post-conflict Iraqi requests for financial and technical assistance.

3. Civil Service: Iraq’s civil service system must be completely overhauled. This initiative should start in Iraq’s five largest cities and in those offices that deal with the oil industry. If control is to be wrested from the bureaucracy that has operated at the behest of and behind the shield of the current regime, the new central government will need support from the international community to begin paying a reasonable number of civil servants. The United States should contribute money to a trust fund set up by the special representative of the secretary general for this purpose, and should leverage this money to attract other donors as well on a priority basis. Over 2-4 years the financing of this civil service structure must ultimately be transferred to the Iraqi government. Revenues will be generated through sale of oil and the establishment of a transparent trading and customs system.

4. Civil Society: The development of civic associations, independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), free media, and religious institutions is absolutely essential. A key part of this will be establishing a “civil society forum,” as has been done in Guatemala and other post-conflict situations. The United States should support other bi-lateral donor nations’ leadership in this process, and should provide some funding to help seed the initiative. Equally important will be the support needed to restore technical capacity for national and regional communication.

5. Political Participation: The United States should support citizen participation through programs that reinforce national values and human rights. Although large-scale U.S. democracy promotion programs are not feasible, targeted technical support for legislative strengthening, transparency and other participatory activities
could be provided through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy constituent organizations.

JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

Consistently overlooked by the international community in reconstruction efforts, significant progress on justice and reconciliation needs will be absolutely essential to the prospects for peace and stability in Iraq. Justice and reconciliation will play out on two separate levels, one relating to the current regime and those who have supported Saddam Hussein, and another dealing with intra-Iraq conflicts.

Iraq will require significant support to build a justice system and develop reconciliation processes for intra-Iraq grievances—an immense challenge, as the formal rule of law mechanisms have functioned for decades in an arbitrary manner. The relationship between the executive authority and the judicial authority must be revamped, and an entire generation of prosecutors, judges, and court administrators must be educated and trained.

The scope of the challenge necessitates a comprehensive approach to rebuilding the justice system. The experiences of numerous post-conflict cases suggest that piecemeal efforts, however extensive, will produce inferior results.

In some instances, the fledgling Iraqi justice systems may not be appropriate to address crimes that may threaten the viability of the peace process and the stability of the country. In such cases, whether war crimes, organized crime, or terrorism, international actors should assert jurisdiction and investigate and prosecute crimes. Which actors should take responsibility for these crimes, however, and which procedural codes should be applied must be resolved.

Establishing a multiethnic, multireligious Iraqi police force will be a fundamental part of securing law and order and will facilitate the territorial stabilization of the country. Along with maintaining order in a country that has been repressed, a functioning border patrol system will be essential to regulate and curtail the flow of refugees and drugs. Iraq’s policing institutions must be rejuvenated and reoriented with the help of the international community. Western European and other moderate Arab/Muslim states with traditions of responsible national police institutions have great capacity in this area. These international actors should also participate in developing an acceptable police monitoring system to sustain a professional and unbiased Iraqi police force.

Recommendations for U.S. Involvement

1. Deployable Justice Package: The United States should make significant support for a unified justice package a top priority. Preparation in this area should proceed in parallel with the assembly of military resources for the conflict and after. The U.S. should engage other countries that, regardless of their position on the conflict itself, will be willing to help establish justice in the aftermath of such a conflict.

2. Police Development: The United States should work with other donors to be prepared to support and respond to Iraqi needs and requests. Police will be needed in urban areas immediately. The United States could assist in the design, development, and training of a viable indigenous police force (through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and other U.S. programs). The United States must coordinate these efforts with the UN and other key actors.

3. Judicial Development: The reform of the overall justice, legal, and corrections system will require significant international assistance. Legal professionals from the Department of Justice (Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training) and the American Bar Association (Central and East European Law Initiative) could be seconded as advisers to teams of an international coalition of experts to provide technical assistance. This must be done in close consultation between indigenous actors and the international community to ensure a comprehensive approach that is culturally sensitive.

4. Rebuilding Community: In order to support reconciliation, individual empowerment, and the development of long-term rule of law, USAID programs should emphasize community involvement in the identification and implementation of projects.

5. Human Rights: The United States should encourage the UN to deploy human rights monitors to deter extrajudicial reprisals. Conflicts should be channeled into the justice system or local dispute resolution structures. In order to support these initiatives, the United States should be prepared to provide modest voluntary contributions.

6. Diaspora Engagement: The United States should help facilitate the return of Iraqi legal professionals living within the United States by linking them to existing international diaspora return initiatives. These individuals could work with the in-
Social and economic well-being

In addition to the need for immediate humanitarian assistance in the wake of a conflict, numerous essential issues of economic and social well-being deserve the attention of the international community and the U.S. government, including the transparency of oil revenues, improvement of the agricultural sector and transportation networks, education, the role of the diaspora, and human rights.

Oil is the keystone of the Iraqi economy. The PCR effort must re-establish the oil industry in a manner that contributes to immediate needs and is structured to provide the revenues and hard currency necessary to sustain long term development. Monitoring of production and revenue generation and disbursement will be required until a legitimate government, acting through a transparent budgetary process, can execute those tasks. Iraq will need foreign investments to redirect its trading role in the region and the world, which has been skewed by the effect of sanctions. Current estimates are that oil exports, under the sanctions regimes reduced in 1996 and 1999, have reached about 75 percent of their pre-Gulf War level.

Agricultural markets must be reestablished. Iraq is still a net food importer, and although per capita food imports have increased with the relaxation of sanctions, the agricultural sector is still hampered by the sanctions. The establishment of local food and commodity markets will require the repair and construction of transportation networks. Significant damage can be expected to the transportation and communications infrastructure and the United States should work with the multilateral development banks to accelerate and establish now the process to rebuild both systems. The U.S. may be able to defeat the Iraqi Air Force without doing wholesale damage to runways at the 100 airfields around the country. This will provide some capacity to support mobility not only for the security force, but also for humanitarian and economic aid.

Education must be a top priority, with focus on several key areas. First, educational opportunities must be provided as an option to help demobilize and reintegrate soldiers and security personnel who are released. Second, about half of the women in Iraq are illiterate and the education system must be expanded to meet their needs. The United States can help provide means for the large and highly trained Iraqi diaspora to have access and immigration rights to return to support reconstruction.

The potential of Iraq’s professional diaspora living all over the world must be tapped to contribute to a strengthening of the socioeconomic sector. The positive effects of the return of a committed educated and skilled diaspora, such as increased investment and the opening of trade channels, are needed to reverse the effects of decades of violent conflict and sanctions. Expecting negative consequences of diaspora returns, including reprisals and loss of remittances, is reasonable. These problems must be taken seriously and mitigated through integration of returnees into the local communities.

Recommendations for U.S. Involvement

1. Humanitarian Assistance and Repatriation: The United States should continue to respond in a generous and timely manner to appeals from UN humanitarian agencies, such as WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP, IOM, and FAO. The U.S. military should help to secure key routes to enable a rapid expansion of emergency aid to the most needy parts of the country.

2. Employment Generation and Absorptive Capacity: USAID, through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives, should develop and fund high-impact and visible employment generation projects to jumpstart the economy, restore social tranquility, and build political momentum. Drawing on recent experience in East Timor and elsewhere, a similarly structured program in Iraq should utilize U.S. resource capacity and UN managerial oversight while encouraging strong local participation in the decision making process.

3. Agriculture and Food Security: The United States should provide significant support for multilateral initiatives that address both short-term and long-term food production and rural development needs of Iraq and its neighbors. This support should be both financial and technical. The activities of international organizations, NGOs, regional actors, private donors, and indigenous entities should be coordinated to ensure that local needs are met.

4. Diaspora Engagement: The U.S. government should facilitate investment from, and the possible return of, the Iraqi diaspora living in the United States. This can
be accomplished through supporting existing programs such as UNDP's Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals initiative, and IOM programs, as well as through offering a variety of protections and guarantees for would-be returnees. Key among these would be offering visa guarantees for those who may go to Iraq, but who may wish to return to the United States. Opening a coordination office to legally channel diaspora funds and investments would also facilitate diaspora involvement in the rebuilding process.

5. Social Development: The United States should be prepared to provide assistance to foster long-term social development in areas including health, food security, social safety nets, HIV/AIDS, gender equity, and the environment, through various international organizations (e.g., the World Bank, WHO, UNDP, the UN Development Fund for Women, the UN Environmental Program).

6. Economic Development: Similarly, the United States should be prepared to provide technical and expert assistance in economic development areas such as infrastructure, micro-enterprise loan programs, narcotics control, investment, trade, banking, regulatory reform, and finance through the World Bank’s Economic Recovery Strategy.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND CRITICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

To maximize the effectiveness of U.S. intervention, the above recommendations must be consistent with the following guiding principles: (1) Iraq’s long term needs and preferences should drive the provision of international resources; (2) whenever possible, indigenous capacity should be reconstituted; (3) long-term sustainability must be fostered; (4) U.S. actions should reflect and emphasize U.S. interests; (5) because reconstruction and development is a long-term and uncertain process, Iraqi and international expectations must be realistic. In addition to these guiding principles, four basic functional recommendations could help frame U.S. government involvement.

- **Planning:** The United States and the international community should build a unified, integrated planning process based on an ongoing integrated joint assessment of all post-conflict reconstruction sectors. The findings of the assessment will serve as an essential common analytical baseline for setting priorities and promoting cooperation between often disparate and disconnected international and U.S. actors. This should build on, but not be limited to, an initial joint assessment done by the U.S. the World Bank, UNDP, and ADB.

- **Coordination:** New staff structures being implemented in the U.S. Department of Defense at the regional combat commander level (the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group, JIACG) and for field deployment (the Joint Interagency Task Force, JIATF), should be activated as soon as possible within U.S. Central Command to begin the process of integrating the military plans for the conduct of the conflict with plans for post-conflict reconstruction. These structures, guided by the appropriate national level counterparts in the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Council, must work now to integrate the other agencies of government in that planning process (Department of the Treasury, Department of Justice, USAID, etc.).

- **Predeployment training:** The opportunity to conduct training at several levels should be seized immediately. The SENSE simulation at the Institute for Defense Analysis should be scheduled for training and mission rehearsal exercises in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq. Additionally, the Combat Training Centers at Fort Irwin, Fort Polk, and in Germany should begin the process of conducting integrated mission rehearsals that not only replicate combat in likely situations in Iraq, but move units directly from conflict to post-conflict training, and integrate the range of expected IGOs, NGOs, local people, and other actors who will influence the accomplishment of the overall mission.

- **Funding:** The U.S. government should be prepared to provide at least $1 billion annually to satisfy the reconstruction needs outlined in this paper. Estimates of the non-security related costs in reconstruction in Afghanistan range from $15 to $25 billion over the next decade. Iraq, even after a large scale conventional conflict against the United States, would start from a better baseline and have, in oil reserves, a better resource base to assist in financing reconstruction. Given U.S. interests and the amount of activity and resources invested in the war against terrorism, the United States must be willing to provide ongoing assistance to meet both expected and unforeseen needs. The administration should actively engage the Congress to design a coherent, strategically sound package of U.S. support for post-conflict reconstruction as part of the larger policy approach to the region, and this package must be integrated with the plan
to prosecute any campaign in Iraq. With an explicit, bipartisan, executive-legislative compact in hand, the United States will be able to more effectively leverage an expenditure of blood and treasure and secure its national interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, colonel, I think it’s a very thoughtful and very detailed statement.

And my first question to you, as a professional—now obviously you are not speaking for CSIS, you’re not speaking for the military, but you have had considerable experience in the military in these planning processes. Do you have any reason to believe that this kind of detailed planning that you have submitted to us as your—I’ll oversimplify it—your ballpark estimate—it’s more than a ballpark estimate of what would be needed—do you have a sense that, as we speak right now, in the Pentagon there’s someone crunching similar numbers? Do you think that, at the Pentagon, at this moment, there is a team—and we have incredibly qualified people—there is a team over there saying to the Secretary, “Look, this is what we think the bottom-line number is for you, for us, when you make your recommendation to the President.” Do you think the planning has gone that far? Do you have any reason to believe that?

I’m not asking for any access, because you don’t have any, to classified information. I’m just trying to get a sense of where you think it is.

Colonel Feil. From my knowledge of the planning processes—and, sir, I’ve got to say, you know, once you retire, your access seems to go up, but your credibility may be suspect, because you get farther and farther away from things and get staff. I would have to believe, knowing my colleagues in the military, that people are taking a look at this effort. I cannot say, with any reason to be confident at all, that they would necessarily come up with the same number that I did.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I’m not suggesting that. I’m trying to get a sense that—one of the things here is—that I discussed privately with Dr. Marr in my office, was—and others—is us trying to get a handle on how far along the process is and the detail is in the administration for—before the President is presented however many options there are. Were any of us sitting there as President, we would want to know the answer to these questions.

Colonel Feil. The formal planning process does call for an annex to a contingency plan to have a post-conflict sequence of events and resources and tasks, et cetera. So I would have to assume that in the generation of the plan for whatever options are out there, that each one of those options would contain an annex that would have this type of analysis in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you all approached this from a slightly different perspective, but you all approached it thoughtfully from your area of expertise and interest as to what would be needed the day after and in subsequent days. And I would like you, any one of you, to correct me if I misrepresent what seems to be a consensus that has emerged on this panel—and others, I might add—and that is that there—in order for any of the scenarios you all—you individually suggested are preferable or possible, international support for the effort is important. And some of you, I think, would argue it’s critical.
How important is international support—i.e., the region, the European Union, the Japanese, others—whether it relates to—and we're not talking about relating to force structures going in, but we're relating to force structures afterwards, relating to economic cooperation afterwards.

You said, colonel, that you believed—or one of you said that there would be a—it would be clear that the international community would want to come in after the fact, because they'd see opportunities, but they'd also see the necessity to stabilize. I mean, how certain are you that if we successfully initiated a military operation that caused the present government in Iraq to be ousted regardless of what immediately followed, how certain are any of you that the international community would respond to what you've all identified in varying degrees as minimum needs that would present themselves the day after that occurred?

Doctor.

Dr. Marr. I have one thought before I respond to whether we're going to get a lot of burden sharing from other folks, which is, I think, your question. I think many people will want to go into Iraq and get the benefit of Iraq's oil resources and that might be the hook. If anyone wants future benefits, they're going to have to contribute something initially. So I think there's a good deal to be made there. But getting contributions from International folks is going to be difficult in Iraq, because Iraq is considered a rich country.

And I do agree with my colleagues here, that, there will be a need for some "up-front" money before Iraq can get the economy going. In Iraq's case it may be a little more difficult to persuade people to come in.

I would like to say that—money aside—if United States troops are involved at the level and for the time that we're talking about here, we had better have some Arab regional states with us, because there will be a downside for us. The more presence we have, the longer we're there, the more anti-Americanism is going to increase among a portion of the population. That should concern us.

The Chairman. That was to be my next question. I mean, in other words, how important is it that this be internationalized, including Arabs? And when you gave us your very useful testimony and your map—

And by the way, the bell went off at 5 minutes. We had agreed we were going to go to 7 minutes, which means 10, probably. Oh, no, I didn't tell you that. That's not your fault, it's mine. And so I'm going to just continue for a few more moments here.

Let me back up. The map you gave us—and I wish we had had it up here behind us for everyone—for the television audience to see—essentially divides Iraq—or characterizes Iraq as sort of three distinct regions.

You talk about how it was—I'm trying to find it here—how it was a consequence of putting together a country after the fact, after World War—thank you. Actually, I was looking for mine, but—the one you gave me. It doesn't matter now. And I want to make sure I understand—I do understand, but I want to make sure

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1The map referred to can be found on page 177.
it’s on the record—that we’re talking about Kurds who are Sunni. We’re talking about Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds are not Arabs. And we’re talking about Shia Arabs. So two out of three of these regions are Arab. Two out of three are Sunni. But they are not the same. All Arabs aren’t Sunnis.

And the question is, is the religious tie tighter than the ethnic tie? In other words, in terms of putting together a government that encompasses, necessarily, all three sectors participating, at least to the degree that they think their share of participation is commensurate with their impact on the country, is there a closer tie between the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs, because they’re both Sunni? Or is there a more ethnic and cultural tie between the Sunni and Shia Arabs? And does it—or does it matter? Is it at all relevant?

Dr. Marr. Personally, I think the religious element may be increasing a little bit. But, my own sense is that the ethnic tie, the Arab and the Kurdish feeling is stronger than the religious ties between the Sunni Kurds and Sunni Arabs.

But I wish we could get away from regarding the map as controlling, because—

The Chairman. I’m not suggesting it is.

Dr. Marr. No. Yes, I realize that. The identity that must be encouraged is Iraqi.

The Chairman. I understand.

Dr. Marr. There is an Iraqi identity. And, to a very large degree, if it is encouraged by new leadership, these ethnic and sectarian divisions as ways in which people identify themselves—Arab versus Kurd, Shia versus Sunni—will be reduced. There will be a better chance of getting a viable state.

The Kurds are a problem, in a sense, because they do speak a different language. And the language distinction, I think is, of course, a very important one.

The Chairman. I will end with this, because I’ve gone over my time, and because I want to get back to the larger question I asked in the second round or if others don’t cover it.

The reason I asked is that the Kurds have another unifying factor, that they’re Kurds. That’s also a factor of division. There has not been a willingness—or the kind of unity one might expect. And you cannot see this map, but this map is colored. The border of Iraq ends here as you all know better than I do. This pink color is where Kurds live—people who call themselves Kurds. A whole bunch of that pink is in Turkey. A significant part of it is in Iran.

Every Kurdish group that has come to see me over the 30 years I’ve been a Senator has not talked about Iraq—has talked to me and others about Kurdistan, about the Kurds. And so can we—and I’m not being facetious now—can we easily dismiss the notion that we are seeing, right now, and hearing explained from northern Iraq as we speak—the newspaper articles, the television programs, and American television, and American news—where the Kurds are basically saying—so it’s being portrayed—“Whoa, hold up a minute. This is as good as it’s ever gotten for us right now. We essentially have our autonomous region here in the north, which is doing just fine. The economy’s starting to boom, we’re starting to move, nobody’s being shot or killed, things are working out pretty well. So,
United States, what do you have in mind here? Explain to us before you come what our rights are going to be before we get here."

Now, that's what's being projected. It's really a question rather than a statement. As an expert in the area, do you believe—and I think I've accurately characterized the essence of the newspaper and television articles and programs Americans have seen over the last two, three, 4 weeks as discussion of Iraq has sort of ratcheted up—does that play any factor that the Kurds, at the moment, think things are better than they've been at least in the last 20 years, and maybe are OK? I mean, could you all speak to that for a second?

Dr. Marr. I know Rend will want to say something about this. Yes, it is a factor. I think there's no doubt about it. This is an ongoing factor, which is why I said it's going to be more difficult to integrate the Kurds into a post-Saddam Iraq than it would be otherwise.

The situation is not bad up there, but without being Cassandra, I'd like to point out that it's not quite as good as the Kurds may say. For one thing, they're not unified. The area is split in two, divided between the two main Kurdish parties because they couldn't agree on a unified government. They cannot maintain their position without American support and protection and U.S. mediation of their disputes. They are not in control of their borders. And, hence, as I've indicated, the Turks have to keep coming across.

Although I'm not totally informed on the situation, I understand that on the eastern border with Iran, there's a no-man's land which the PUK does not control and, from our perspective, is open not only to Iranian influence, but other outside influences, even terrorist influences. That is precisely the kind of situation that we don't want.

And even though they like what they have, the Kurds don't have a future in northern Iraq, and they know it. They have difficulty in getting the middle class to come back. So the Kurds understand that, within some framework, they have to stay within Iraq, and they've said they'd do so.

And, Senator, I would like at some point to send you and your staffers, a couple of Kurds who may have a little different perspective.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to overstate what I've been told for the last 30 years.

Dr. Marr. No, I understand. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. I'm trying to get a sense that basically what some have suggested to us—not Kurds—some have suggested to us that in order to make this all work, we're going to have to make some commitments to the Kurds, but make some commitments to the Turks, as well. I'm way over my time. I'll come back to that. Let me yield to Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Francke, you point out that the Iraqis would welcome the United States as liberators initially. But then, ominously, in your second paragraph, the humanitarian crisis will become acute and the system of law and order will break down, there will be a vacuum of authority, intense jockeying for power, and several of the
neighbors may attempt to influence the process and preposition themselves to affect the outcome. That’s sort of a logical sequence, but all pretty dismal.

Both you and Professor Marr have suggested that the identification of leadership will be extremely difficult. If it’s imposed by the United States without roots in Iraq it will present a set of difficult problems. But there’s not much experience—in fact, very little experience with democracy or liberal institutions, and it would be a difficult time for institution building and all of this.

And all of you, including—Colonel Feil, go into this in much more detail trying to outline exactly how many American troops and/or civilian personnel are likely to be required to meet the problems of law and order, humanitarian distress, general disestablishment in all of this.

The importance of this hearing is really for this testimony to begin to sink in. Whether you are accurate to the last paragraph or not, the fact is that our experience in American foreign policy in Somalia after Americans were attacked and dragged through the streets was to get out. That was a debate on the Senate floor—immediate withdrawal, no sense of nation building. In fact, “nation building,” in quotes, became something we definitely, as a policy, were not going to be engaged in.

Tremendous debate then when we tried to intervene in Bosnia with our NATO allies, because this was perceived, once again, as sort of the thing end of the wedge of nation building. Likewise, the debate on this in Kosovo.

And, finally, of course, we have some experience in Afghanistan. It’s instructive that, at the time of our military operations in Afghanistan, we simultaneously began preparing an plan what was going to happen in the future. After, we had a national emergency, and we moved rapidly. Fortunately, Chairman Karzai was available, a good number of able people used a lot of agility in trying to think through how the loya jirga could be supported, and we’re still at that point.

But just before the testimony today, as you perceived, we had a business meeting in which we adopted a very significant resolution with regard to assistance to Afghanistan—$3.5 billion over 3 years. Now, that’s a fairly modest sum, given what we’re talking about today on Iraq any way you parse the figures. And this is just a bill coming through the Foreign Relations Committee. It has not passed the Senate as a whole. The administration may or may not support such an idea. And, in fact, this appears to be a debate as to really how extensive American forces, either military or others, ought to be in Afghanistan. And this is a war in which we have been engaged, as opposed to one in which we might be engaged.

So I mention all of that to say that as the public focuses on your testimony through this hearing they will discover this is a very daunting process. Any way you look at what is being suggested today, there is enormous expense and commitment of people as well as treasure for a number of years. And it’s one country in the middle, as we heard yesterday, of a neighborhood of countries that may, in fact, feel very threatened by democracy if it did evolve in Iraq, and that democracy won’t necessarily prevail all around this
new Iraq. And it’s not clear to me where the leadership is going to come from.

Now, some of you have suggested a coalition of forces, and that makes sense. And, in a way, the Afghan government is based upon that idea. But it’s not clear to most of us who are not scholars in the politics of Iraq, as you are, as to who conceivably might be in that coalition.

Now, you can think of various factions and parties and elements. But physically, do any of you have any idea about personalities—people, individual leaders—in Iraq now or outside of Iraq that might, in fact, be a part of a coalition? If you were asked, in the midst of hostilities with Iraq, who should the United States back in terms of trying to put together a coalition that might work, that might be this transition, do any of you know who it is and who has experience at doing this sort of thing?

And if not, what do we do? In other words, do we try to identify persons in advance? Do we sort of hope that someone from the military or from the Ba’th party or from the opposition to the Ba’th party or from anybody, people may emerge, identify themselves, coalesce?

In other words, I don’t see how this happens, even though I see the daunting circumstances that you describe. Can any of you give an idea as to who physically might offer leadership? Or if you don’t want to name somebody for fear that person would be jeopardized, can you give some sense of confidence that there are such persons who might understand democracy, some semblance, finally, of our foreign-policy objectives, which—after all, we got into this war to get rid of weapons of mass destruction. Who is going to lead us to the caves or the laboratories or whatever it is so we can destroy it, as opposed to somebody in Iraq who says, “Now, I have a second thought about this. As a matter of fact, Iraq may need some of those weapons to deal with Iran or to be a great power or what have you.”

We will have fought a war to get to these weapons of mass destruction, and while we’re trying to rehabilitate Iraq, we suddenly have a government that says, “Iraq first. We’re nationalists. And, as a matter of fact, we want to progress with weapons of mass destruction.”

Now, is there anybody in this picture that can give us some hope that a war is worthwhile if, in fact, our objective is to get rid of the weapons of mass destruction, in that a government would be consistent with our policies sufficient to at least achieve that one basic item of foreign policy. Does anyone want to respond to that?

Dr. Marr.

Dr. Marr. I think Rend has addressed it, and I’ve tried to address that in my written paper. I have to say that I think this is the most critical unknown in the whole issue. And if we don’t have some good answers to that, we should go back and rethink.

We do know who’s available outside. The outside opposition is clear. They will go all the way in fulfilling our objectives, weapons of mass destruction and so on. But as has been made perfectly clear, we have to bring them in militarily. Others may disagree, but I also believe we have to support them militarily.
Now, when it comes to insiders, it’s anybody’s guess, because leaders cannot emerge inside. That’s what we pay an intelligence establishment for, and, of course, there are other intelligence establishments overseas that might have some indication. We should have contact with people. We should be working through the outside opposition to identify people who will come over to our side. I don’t imagine we’re going to have trouble, once we undertake action—if we’re serious—getting people to come over to our side. But, as I—and Rend—have pointed out—the folks that are in charge now who might, provide potential leadership raise real questions. They are Ba’thized. Do we want that? Army generals? We really don’t want a general in charge of the political system, and we don’t know whether this individual may be a member of the clan, the family, a Ba’thist. However, there may be plenty of generals and others who are fed up with the regime and have some democratic instincts.

There’s an education establishment producing doctors, all sorts of scientists and so on. They, too, have been Ba’thized. So we have a problem here not getting people who will be willing to change. That kind of change is not a military job, and it’s going to take time.

One last word that hasn’t been mentioned here. Among the things we need to think about is the constitutional—the political—mechanisms that need to be put in to identify this leadership, the mechanisms by which the process comes together. We need to start to think about this. If we have a direct administration that is, the U.S. military picks some people, the Iraqi bureaucracy, I think, can do its job. But a political process, by which you bring the people together, is necessary not only to identify leadership, but agree on a future process. I would suggest a constituent assembly, maybe in 6 months time, which can draw up a constitution and get ready for some kind of an election.

Iraqis are a sophisticated people. They do not have warlords, like Afghanistan. They can handle this, but we’ve got to think now about processes which will identify the leadership for the future.

Senator LUGAR. Well, from that answer, I gather, first of all, that the Iraqi exiles with whom our government is meeting outside, you believe, would solve this foreign policy problem. That’s going to be a very strong argument for our administration to back those people.

But what you’re also saying is you need almost a Douglas McArthur to impose a constitution and regime once we get there, and that is well beyond the bounds of most American thinking at this point.

Now, after McArthur gets there, or his substitute, in the Iraqi sense, then, hopefully, the constituent assembly begins to identify indigenous leaders. I’m trying—in terms of a program that the American public might understand—to set these challenges out in stages as you have identified them. Now, we need to apply some dollar figures and troop levels to these issues so we have a fuller understanding of what is required.

This is a whole lot more, in response to the chairman’s question, than I hear anybody in our administration talking about. Now, there may be, as the colonel has said, an annex to the overall plan that, in a hopeful way, suggests some things that might occur.
But what you’re testifying about is a lot of people, a lot of money, and quite a bit of risk. If the plan works and we are successful there will be many in the neighborhood who don’t agree or support our efforts. Given what we’re doing in Afghanistan, we are talking about a very modest amount, as opposed to the amount that would be needed in Iraq. At some point, the administration has to come to some policy conclusions in Afghanistan, which may be a predictor of what would occur in the much more complex country we’re discussing today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me overrun my time.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, this is obviously very important.

Ms. FRANCKE. Mr. Chairman, can I answer also some of the Senator’s questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Ms. FRANCKE. Senator, you raise a whole number of issues, and I wish I had a long time to address them, but I will try and address them quickly.

I’ll go back to your seminal question about—the question of—that the United States is not in the nation-building business and hasn’t done it well, you know, we had—Somalia was a bad experience, and so on. My answer to that really is that we have no option but to do it right in Iraq. If ever there was a country which was of vital interest to Iraq and a vital security concern to the United States, sorry—it is Iraq.

I’m not saying that we shouldn’t have done the right thing in Afghanistan and so on. In fact, I’m a supporter of exactly what went on this morning in this room. But the sense—in Afghanistan almost—we almost have the luxury, apart from the security and the terrorism. In Iraq, we will not.

And the other thing about the region is, yes, there isn’t much of a tradition in the region for what we’re asking for, for kind of democracy. But, first of all, at some point this region is going to have to join the rest of the world. We cannot condemn it forever to the darkness of the pre-Middle Ages. That’s one thing.

The other thing is—the good point is that Iraq is, in fact a trend setter in the Middle East. And, therefore, what we do in Iraq, whether right or wrong, is going to impact the Middle East; and, therefore, let’s do it right. This is on the issue of, you know, are we going to do it right? Why should we bother, et cetera, and so on? And I do think that Iraq is central to U.S. interests in the region.

The question about finding leadership and so on—in fact, I addressed it very briefly in my oral statement, and it’s addressed more extensively in my written statement. And that is where I think I mentioned the question—or the issue of a transitional government of national unity, a coalition.

What I was arguing earlier this morning is that, first of all, you do need this coalition that represents a myriad political and social interests in Iraq, but that, given the fact that there is going to be a period of time when leadership within Iraq will have to emerge, we have to start somewhere. And I’m suggesting that the kernel that we use is the opposition that is now in northern Iraq—in other words, the Kurds—plus the opposition, which is outside Iraq. And that is only used as a kernel to be added to—I’ve called it the “open
circle”—to be augmented, to be added to—as leadership comes from within Iraq. And I don't want to suggest that we do not—we should not include in that leadership elements from the army, the military, the Sunni clans. Indeed, we should. All I want to guard against is that all authority and all the power be given to that old model.

Also in my written paper, I have talked about the responsibilities of this transition unity government. And certainly—and we have to have markers, milestones for this transition government. It must do the following—this, that, and the other. One of the things that I mention is that it must prepare the ground for a constituent assembly. In fact, it should prepare the ground for its own dissolution by organizing elections for a constituent assembly, by having a referendum, by, in fact, then overseeing free and fair elections, and then getting out and allowing a permanent constitution and a permanent government to take place. All of this needs to happen, and I would like to see this engagement by the United States and by the international community throughout this process.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by joining in the high praise for you and, of course, Senator Lugar, not only for your stamina, which was praised, but for these very thoughtful hearings. I've been here for all, or at least the majority of each panel. These are very thoughtfully, well-planned, very important hearings.

I do want to say on the record that I don't believe these hearings can replace subsequent hearings when we hear from the administration, nor do I think anyone can argue that this can be sufficient to make it unnecessary to have a full debate on the Senate floor and a vote on whether to authorize any such action.

I take strong issue with the statements of the minority leader of the Senate yesterday, who indicated that he thought that the congressional debate apparently would not be necessary, citing, apparently, his belief that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq. Now, that may well be true, but I have not seen that evidence.

And I believe that Senate Joint Resolution 23, which authorized the appropriate actions we’ve taken with regard to Afghanistan and al-Qaeda does not permit an invasion of Iraq without that kind of evidence.

But having said that, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely believe that these hearings are an exceptional basis for what Congress should do, and you’ve really produced a very fine moment in the history of this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you, Senator. And I can assure my—I think my colleague agrees with me—these aren't the only hearings we're going to have.

Senator LUGAR. No.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the beginning of the process. It's not intended to be the end of the process.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd ask the panelists, could you estimate the scope of the humanitarian crisis within Iraq that would have to be addressed in the
post-conflict period? What kind of commitment would be required to address a crisis like that?

Ms. Francke. Can I just say very quickly—and I may not be the most competent person to answer this—a great deal is going to depend on the conduct of the military campaign. We have a humanitarian crisis in Iraq right now. But, in a way, it’s sort of stable. It’s horrible to use these words about what are—the suffering of human beings, but it is stable.

But when we talk about another military campaign, and we ask what the humanitarian crisis is going to be, it’s difficult to—it depends very much on the level of destruction that goes on and whether the military campaign will target infrastructure that affects civilians, such as water, electricity, and so on and so forth.

But I guess I will cede the point that—to my colleagues, who might know much more about this.

Senator Feingold. Yes, doctor.

Dr. Al-Shabibi. Thank you, Senator. Well, actually I mentioned in my presentation about the resources that need to be mobilized to address the very one of the outlets of these—the resources are used—to use them for alleviating the humanitarian situation. Of course there is in Iraq now—I mean, there are problems relating, of course, to availability of medical services. There is—I mean, all—the reports abound about these issues.

But, of course, what might emerge also, there will be a lot of Iraqis who wish, probably, to return to Iraq from neighboring countries and all these things. And, of course, there will have to be provisions to address all those problems. They will create, of course, a lot of humanitarian consequences.

So definitely this is one reason to pay close attention to the fact that the international community should help Iraq to mobilize their resources to address this very important question.

Senator Feingold. Colonel.

Colonel Feil. If I may, sir, I don’t have any particular knowledge on the level of the humanitarian crisis that exists, but clearly the one that’s ongoing now is obviously a baseline. And then, of course, the creation, as the doctor pointed out, of any additional humanitarian requirements based on the type of campaign that is conducted clearly is a consideration.

I would go back to something that the chairman also said, and Senator Lugar, and the idea of trying to find out exactly what all the ramifications are and the fact that there’s a post-conflict reconstruction annex, or a similar document, that’s appended to military plan. We are currently—or the military is currently conducting some exercises and simulations down at Joint Forces Command, the Millenium Challenge exercise, which is trying to come to grips with a better process of integrating both the military and the inter-agency processes. And I would argue that more needs to be done in that area.

So, as an example, you could run a military simulation of a campaign, and then not let anybody leave the room—put them all on a bus, take them down to the Institute for Defense Analysis and run a simulation that they have down there called SENSE, which is Synthetic Environment for National Security Estimates. That particular game is something that we have run in the Balkans and
in some of the former Soviet republics to bring people back and show them how market economy with all its ramifications, works, so that if you do something to try to reduce unemployment, it causes a repercussion in another area that you have to balance out.

Linking all the disparate parts and all the capacity that we have in our government together is really the key to getting a handle on the cost and bringing together people who can integrate those efforts so that those unforeseen circumstances are acknowledged and accounted for in the plan.

I noticed that the amendment that was proposed today about doing an assessment in Afghanistan—looking at the transportation system—clearly a combination of what damage existed before, what damage we did during the campaign. Our assessment could have been done earlier. We would have a better handle on what the cost of that is. The idea of bringing together all the disparate players to address this—the entire issue of a conflict and what comes after in an integrated, coherent fashion, I think would yield some answers.

And the day after, as opposed to 6 weeks—or 6 months for a constituent assembly and some of the security force implementation that would take place in weeks, I think that a lot of those things could begin on the ground immediately if civilian agencies, both from the U.S. Government and our NGO and international partners, had planning development capacity similar to the military.

My experience in the military—there are 23,000 people in the Pentagon. That’s what those guys do all day. They plan. There are no parallel organizations—only small little sections that are way overburdened—in many of the other significant Cabinet agencies that have a responsibility to bring the resources to bear and integrate their stuff with the military. And so, therefore, the military, which has standing capacity and a great ability to plan, moves in, attempts to do the right thing, often does very well, fills the vacuum, and then has to be, you know, massaged and part of that filling of the vacuum is why there’s a perception that the military doesn’t like to do these things, because they feel they get sucked into those sorts of things.

The CHAIRMAN: Well.

Colonel FEIL: And, once again, the costs that I listed, and the number of troops, clearly with the ability to deploy police monitors, et cetera, et cetera, you could change the slope of your withdrawal if civilian agencies were prepared to pick up the execution of those tasks.

Senator FEINGOLD: Thank you. Let me ask—just because my time’s running out, I want to ask you a different type of question. How realistic is it to believe that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and the means to make such weapons can be secured by either an occupying force or post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi government before those weapons are moved out of the country?

And part of the question involves thinking about what kinds of reprisals people close to the Iraqi regime or people close to the WMD program might expect from a successor government. Are these people likely to flee out of their own interests? Isn’t it likely that those people will take valuable and dangerous materials as well as knowledge with them?
Colonel Feil. I hesitate to—the committee heard from other witnesses that are probably better qualified than I am to speak to that specific eventuality, Senator. I would say that you’ve got a range. And so I think part—of possible outcomes—part of the initial campaign, and probably—and I have no prior knowledge of this, but thinking logically, as you point out—clearly, one of our first efforts has got to be to get a handle on all that stuff and all those people, and then that cannot be allowed to sort of slip away into the general population of Iraq.

It is—in microcosm, much more important task—it has to be a very tightly focused effort to do that, the same as we would not allow some of the general officers and some of the other leaders from some of the clans and the military to just sort of—go through the demobilization line and then be released into the general populace. But I think that’s got to be a top priority in our plan.

Senator Feingold. Yes. Doctor, if you—if it’s all right to have the doctor answer the question. Do you want to make a comment?

Dr. Al-Shabibi. Well, I would like to come back about to the question of governing Iraq on these things. And, of course, I mean, we are Iraqis—we Iraqis, we speak always about the future, about Iraq and the government and these things. But the question here is Iraqis are very much aware and cognizant about the fact that they have really lost a lot of opportunities in terms of simple economic development and growth. This is since the beginning of the 1980s and even before. And if they compare this with their potential, I mean, they realize how much loss they have incurred.

The question here I wanted to allude to is, I don’t think, apart from, actually, the defense—legitimate defensive means, that Iraq would like to concentrate on the future on things which are a part from its economic development aspirations. Basically, I mean, they would like probably to look at a smaller scale, the example of Germany and Japan after the Second World War. And they have the potential to do that.

This brings me to the question, is—I know that politicians actually are very much concerned about the government of Iraq, and the fact that we have to find people that govern Iraq from the groups that exist. But the question here is actually that Iraq should give unfortunately to the people, specialists in various fields, actually, to give higher say to the future development in Iraq—technocrats in the field of legal system, constitution, health. I know the—I mean, of course, they’re—one can say that these are, of course, management, but they have to actually have a stronger say, and their opinions should be heeded by the politicians in future Iraq. This is the only way where all the resources that may emanate or will emanate to Iraq will be put into economic development, which actually we lost in terms of decades the case of this development and we will have to recoup all these things.

Senator Feingold. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Let me followup with a few things, if I may. No. 1, I don’t think any of us should lose sight—even though we didn’t ask you to do this—any of us should lose sight of what the rationale for going into Iraq is in the first place.
If Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, if the President of the United States, the Pentagon, the CIA, the Congress, everyone thought they had no weapons of mass destruction, all you'd like to see done in Iraq would not be done. We would not be going anywhere in Iraq. I respectfully suggest, notwithstanding the fact there would be equally as strong an argument for the economic development of Iraq and the prospects of a prosperous democratic Iraq being a—not a panacea, but opening a gate in a way to the part of the world that needs to, at some point, on their own come into the 21st century. But notwithstanding that, we would be doing nothing.

So let's everybody make sure we understand one thing. If there is not a way and a hope, a prospect to secure those weapons of mass destruction, this is an exercise in futility. So that's the place from which I think all this begins.

Now, one of the things we heard yesterday from several panels—we had three panels of people like yourselves with slightly different expertise—was the concern raised that if Saddam saw himself—using an American euphemism, "going down"—if Saddam saw his regime coming to an end and his physical safety in jeopardy, that he would use these weapons of mass destruction, not only against an invading international or American force, but it was raised as the overwhelming possibility in the minds of some of the witnesses that he would use them against the Israelis to make this a regional war, but also use them against his own people, that he would destroy the Iraqi infrastructure—he would destroy the Iraqi infrastructure—not unlike he attempted to in Kuwait when he was withdrawing with the Kuwaiti oil fields.

And one of the things that I think the average American listening to this—presumptuous of me to say what I think the average American—every time I say that, my wife points out—you know, when I say "as the American people think," she says, "Don't presume to think for the American people." I don't. But I suspect, in my experience, anyone listening to this is saying, Now, wait a minute. We just heard the following. We heard that we have an obligation, if we go in, to stay. We were given estimates that it would cost about $16 billion for the first year based on 75,000 troops. We heard another witness say that Iraqis have an opportunity to recoup $150 billion they lost because of their own government. We have to make sure that oil prices stay stable and that there is no windfall for the United States that oil prices drop. We have to make sure that we rebuild whatever we may have to damage in order to go in and take out Saddam, because we will be told, they know, "You blew up this facility. You blew up our airport. You damaged our highways. You ruined our water system. You knocked out our electric grid. You owe us. You owe us."

And Americans are home, I think, thinking, Now, wait a minute. We're going to risk American lives. We're going to risk American money. We're going to risk American prestige. And we're going to go in and try to take out this thing we view as a threat to us. And, in the process, we're going to be told by the world, which it always tells us, by the way, you did this bad thing to us, and now you should rebuild us. You should, out of the American treasury, take what will amount to several hundred billion dollars before it's over,
because that’s—we’re costing—we’re talking about just the operation would cost roughly, if we did it alone, $75 billion, if it replicated Desert Storm.

Colonel Feil Yes, sir.

The Chairman. It doesn’t take us quick to get to $100 billion here, and it doesn’t take much, if we do all—doctor, you want us to do to get us up to a couple of hundred billion dollars.

And so one of the things that brings me—the reason I bother to say all that is that I think we have to be able to explain what we’re going to do to the American people here. Not what we’re to do to them; what we’re going to do and how it will impact on them.

And it may be, in the minds of some, what we’re going do “to.”

So that leads me, believe it or not, to this point. I think Senator Lugar is correct. We need to find a McArthur that’s on the outside, a Thomas Jefferson that’s hiding somewhere inside, a new bank account that we don’t have yet, and a degree of tolerance on the part of the American people that exceeds what we’ve ever asked any other people to have. That’s kind of the worst-case combination.

But let’s set out what, as these hearings go on, are beginning to emerge in my mind—and as my young daughter would say, we get a get-out-of-jail-free card in this one, because I’m not sure yet of this—but why does it not make sense for us to—as much as you don’t like the comparison to—or any references to Afghanistan—and it is a fundamentally different circumstance, I acknowledge—why don’t we have a Bonn meeting now, essentially, where, professor, we get all of the disparate groups outside and smuggle some of those who are inside out to have the Bonn meeting before the first American bomb or military person is launched?

Why should we not, or should we, be insisting or asking, cajoling our allies to be part of that process, as well, now, where we begin in a much more earnest fashion to identify who we will turn to? Does that make sense now, if you were—if Senator Lugar were President and you were his National Security Advisor, would you be suggesting that to him now, or what would you—what about that idea—those two ideas, a Bonn now—the equivalent of a Bonn—you all know what I mean—you all know, but for the public.

After we went into Afghanistan, what we did is, we and our allies gathered together the various warlords, representatives, et cetera, in Bonn. We kept them there until they hammered out an interim government. Fortunately, I think, we got a guy named Karzai, who was able to traverse the differences. He was acceptable to all, at least in the near term, and we set up a process—they set up a process for a constituent assembly being elected within a timeframe, benchmarks, which you’re talking about, Ms. Francke—benchmarks that had to occur within a time certain with an international commitment of dollars, which hasn’t been kept, but an international commitment of dollars to accommodate this interim government’s capacity to move to the next step.

Should we be doing something that detailed now, before we move on Iraq, assuming the military situation doesn’t change drastically and we don’t find tomorrow that he’s hoisted a—you know, a longer-range version of a Scud with a nuclear weapon on tops of it? I mean, should we be doing that kind of thing now?
Ms. FRANCKE. Yes, if you could. And, in fact—the point is you can do this with the opposition which is outside. Good luck on getting them together, but certainly you can do that.

The problem that we have is that the vast number of people are inside. It's not easy to identify them. It's not easy to get them out, for—you know, Saddam's security system is pretty unparalleled. And at the end of the day, you can try to identify those people, you can try to have links with them.

I'm a little less optimistic than some of my colleagues on the platform here, because I think that what you've got inside is going to be more entrenched than we think—the clans, the military with their own specific interests, this economic mafia, maybe not the party, and so on. And when you've got your Bonn meeting, which is going to be mainly outsiders, you're still going to have to bring them inside, which is one of my suggested scenarios. But you're going to have people with entrenched interests and different ideas, some of whom may want to keep a nuclear weapon in tow and may not be quite so friendly to the United States and so on.

And whoever it is comes out in Bonn is going to have to deal with that inside situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we've had some sort of escalating experience in this area in the last 10 years, starting with Bosnia—very different situations, but escalating experience of the role of international communities, our role, what we have—and I would, if I had to, and I don't—but if I had to, I would predict that what will happen here is—if we do not do a heck of a lot of this ahead of time, what will happen is we will find exactly what you don't want, Mrs. Francke. We're going to go in, and you're going to find that—the most organized faction that's available after we walk in, secure the streets, will be military.

We're going to find—we will have had the cooperation from some of the military, maybe even a few in the Republican Guard, possibly, and we will find that the military, who gets dropped on them all the time everything from setting up the hospital tent to making the lights run to writing the constitution de facto on the ground, they're going to turn to the people with whom they can cooperate with and work with the quickest and the most rapidly, and then we're going to have—it doesn't mean it can't be undone or it can't be made better after that, but I—I don't know—I've not heard anything yet, in practical terms——

Ms. FRANCKE. Senator, can I——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. As to how that gets avoided.

Ms. FRANCKE. The idea of a Bonn meeting is, of course, an excellent idea, and I would endorse it. And, in fact, I have discussed it with a number of people in Washington. The important thing is to make sure that whoever comes to Bonn—and there are going to be necessarily only people who are in Iraqi Kurdistan, northern Iraq, or people who are outside Iraq—that they do not form this sum total of this transitional authority or government, that there is room left for people emerging from inside.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as you recall—again, it's not the same thing, but the model which was very difficult to put together, but nonetheless easier than what we're talking about here—the Bonn model in Afghanistan did, in fact, insist that that be left open, and
it was left open. It was left open so the loya jirga, in effect, filled
in the pieces here.

But let me just—there’s two more questions I wanted to—well,
there’s many more, but I have gone beyond what should be your
patience.

Oil. Yesterday, we heard significant testimony—a significant
amount of testimony that if, in the process of dealing—quote/un-
quote, “dealing with Saddam,” we had the acquiescence or coopera-
tion of the Russians, the acquiescence and the cooperation of the
French, that are the two mentioned, that a whole lot of other
things that created problems and dilemma would be marginally or
significantly easier to deal with down the road as we went through
this whole process.

And I raised yesterday, as some of you may have heard, the
question—and it related to reparations, and it related to debt, as
Dr. Al-Shabibi has mentioned—that the Russians believe they are
owed somewhere around $11 billion by the Iraqis, and they assume
that had contracts—they had contracts that they assume are
worth—I’ve heard various number put on it, but I—that are in the
range of $30 billion, in terms of contracts to develop and—do you
know where the oil fields are in—mainly in the south, in the Shia
region, I’m told. There’s one or some in the north, but the bulk of
it is in the south—and that they believe that this is a contractual
obligation that they have. And they believe—it is a contractual ob-
ligation they have with Saddam—and that they are owed money
from the past.

Now, if, in fact, we were to work out, with the Russians, a deal
that said basically—the development of those oil fields, that the
new government—we will insist the new government, whatever it is,
honors those contractual commitments with you and that it be
done in some consortia where you play a significant part or not the
only part. Would that be viewed by the Iraqi people, who are ini-
tially going to embrace us, as a matter of grand larceny, whereby
we, the United States had orchestrated an agreement whereby the
Russians are able to, along with us, I suspect, in consortia, develop
those oil fields?

I realize I’m being very precise. I realize I’m being almost
pendantic about how I’m approaching some of these things. But, at
the end of the day, I’ve found, whether I’m standing in a Pristina
or Sarajevo or wherever I am, or in Kabul, it gets down to a mili-
tary guy standing with a gun on a corner, a diplomat sitting in an
office, an indigenous person making a demand, and someone hav-
ing to make a decision on things like this.

So what happens? What happens in that—would you think that
a fair thing, doctor, or do you believe that the contractual obliga-
tions of the Russians, for example, is, in fact, null and void, be-
cause made by Saddam, who is already ravaged and raped that
country economically?

Dr. Al-Shabibi. Well, Senator, this is, indeed, a very specific
question. The question, of course, will have to be studied to see
whether it will have to be compared with the Iraqi oil capacity or
whether the two countries should be involved in the development
of the oil sector. And, of course, in my presentation, I put, as one
of my points whereby the resources to be mobilized is that Iraq will
have to reach its maximum capacity of oil. Because, you know, Iraq is one of the countries which actually did not produce a lot of oil, because a lot of past conflicts and these things. And I think, I mean, these things will have to be looked at where different countries, of course, can be evaluated in order to raise the capacity of Iraq on these things.

I don't know, of course, politically what will be the situation. I mean, this, of course, will have to be decided. But I think that the Russian are—if they want—I mean, probably—they want to trade their debt with their investment, this is another question. I mean, the question is, of course, there will be a situation where Iraq can win, if, for example, Iraq can get foreign investments, which actually brings technology and, at the same time, I mean, the debt is relieved because the country is allowed to——

The Chairman. I'm not talking about the debt being relieved. The debt being paid. That's the point they would want. It won't be relieving the debt. That's the very point I'm making. The Russians have——

Dr. Al-Shabibi. Well, then this——

The Chairman [continuing]. Made it clear they want the debt paid.

Dr. Al-Shabibi. Yes. This is a matter of, of course, for negotiation. This is what we call——

The Chairman. No, see, that's my point, and I'm going to end with this. It is not a matter of negotiation. It is not a matter of negotiation. No President of the United States can sit and say, "By the way, we're going to figure this out after the fact. We're going to negotiate this after the fact." If a deal had to be made to get Russia in, then a deal is a deal, and no one is negotiating it. It's being imposed. It's being imposed.

My point I'm trying to raise here is that there's a lot of things that cannot be negotiated. If we wait to negotiate all of these things, then we find ourselves in a situation where we are imposing upon the parties involved at least a temporary chaos, and little likelihood of anything happening.

One of the things we found from Bosnia to Kosovo to Afghanistan is the greater degree you allow the warring factions you were trying to liberate to have a say in the outcome, the less successful it was, that the closer you came to imposing at the front end, "This is how it's going to be. We're going to do this if we go the following way," we've had the greatest success. To the degree to which we internationalize and say, "We'll talk about it afterwards," like we did in Bosnia, the degree to which they still are not together in Bosnia—Kosovo is actually further along than Bosnia is, in my opinion.

But, at any rate, and so I just want—again, this is about going in with our eyes wide open. I'm not proposing this. I'm trying to make sure that we understand that there are certain things—the idea that the United States is going to march into Iraq, save itself by doing away with the nuclear and chemical and biological weapons, liberate the Iraqi people in the process, stay, to the tune of tens of billions of dollars a year, until the Iraqi people sort it out for themselves as to how they want to get things going, and do it all without having to have—make agreements with the inter-
national community before we went in, I think, is not likely to happen.

It would be nice if it would, but I've gone way over my time. And—but I can't resist one last question.

What about Iran, what about Turkey, and what about Saudi Arabia, in terms of their reaction to overwhelmingly and primarily U.S.-led invasion of Iraq? And, at a minimum, a requirement that a significant—you've all agreed that there's going to be required an American presence—military presence required, minimum of a year, for 75,000 to a maximum of 20 years for a whole lot of people.

By the way—that was the argument—yesterday, the argument was 20 years. I believe that was Mort Halperin who made that argument, 20 years, and he just happened to be sitting where you're sitting. I pointed to something in between. And what we're also told is that the one thing the Iranians are most concerned about is a permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq. And we're told that the likelihood that Tehran will make a distinction between whether we think it's temporary and they think it's permanent is not likely, that they will presume, if there are large——

And, by the way, as Scott—as the colonel can tell you, if we move in temporarily with 75,000 people, meaning a year or more, we're building Bondsteels—we're building—we're building major, major U.S. military installations in the context of that region of the world even if we only intend to stay there a year or 18 months or thereabouts.

And so how is that going to be viewed? You all are familiar with Bosnia and Kosovo. We have this place called Bondsteel. It's a fort. It is a base. It is significant. And it sits there. And we invested—I imagine it's a couple of billion dollars for the whole process. And this administration, and the last one, has no intention of staying there permanently, doesn't want to stay there permanently, has no vital interest to stay there permanently, and yet we still did that.

What happens when you put up a Bondsteel? Do you think the footprint—we keep talking about the footprint—I mean, that's a pretty big footprint if we're going to have to have 75,000 people, even for a year or two in there. There's going to be a footprint. And if we do what I think Scott is saying—excuse me—the colonel is saying—and I haven't heard anybody say something fundamentally different—and that is, what is the mission of those people?

The mission is providing core security for the largest eight cities. The mission is securing WMD and the facilities. We're going to be going around looking for them. The mission is patrolling the Iranian border and the Kurdish areas, securing the oil fields, monitoring the region of the Tigris and Euphrates along the Syrian border—because there's a lot of smuggling and a lot of things going on there—conducting integrated disarmament and demobilization—which I've never heard anyone suggest we can fail to do—and security sector reform. Forget that. It's not like we're going to have a force sitting outside of Baghdad in one fort. We're going to have people on the Iranian border, down in the oil fields, up in the Tigris and Euphrates, on the—you know, on the—well, maybe not the Turkish border.

We're going to be all over the place. That's a pretty big footprint, even if it's only for a year. How does that get—and that's my last
question—how is that viewed, if it is predominantly American and even though we announce ahead of time all things working—we're only going to be there with this kind of footprint for a year or so. What reaction—what happens in Syria? What happens in Iran? I mean, what is the—is there any predictable response from those countries?

Dr. Marr. I would like to take a crack at the gulf. I've been out in the gulf for the last 5 or 6 months and listening to their views. And what I'm hearing is that people would like to see a change of regime if it could be done quickly and easily. Their greatest fear is that we're going to go in and change the regime and then get out. They'll be stuck with the follow-on—a mess.

But the kind of presence and bases, that we've heard about today will certainly arouse anti-American feeling in the area. This feeling is about the worst I've heard in 40 years, I think it has definite repercussions on the potential for terrorism.

I assume this presence will be viewed with suspicion by Iran, but I don't know what Iran can do about that. Frankly, I don't see Iran playing a major role. Iran might interfere and try to destabilize Iraq and to do some of the things I suggested with the Shia, and the Kurds if the presence looks permanent. Instead we should rely on a reshaped Iraqi military, which would be my way to go. It has to be retrained; its officer corps has to be somewhat different, but Iraq does have a military. Its job is to guard the border with Iran and the border with Syria.

So I would prefer that our presence be pretty substantial initially because they need to keep things together. How long this visible presence would have to be there is a question. And any visible presence of the U.S. military in the region bothers me, because I think inevitably it does encourage terrorism.

The Chairman. Well, that's the conundrum the President is going to have here. All the folks in the region say, “Don't come and go. Don't come and get out.” And they say, “And by the way, don't stay.” “Don't come and leave it a mess, but don't come and stay.” And then we leave guys and women wearing uniform sitting there and saying, “Whoa, what's my job here?”

Anybody think we can come put Humpty Dumpty back together and get out of there in months? Anybody? Anybody think we can do it in 1 to 2 years? Anybody think we're in the 3-to-5 year range?

Colonel Feil. Sir, I guess, speaking—as I think I said at the beginning—sort of the benchmark—first of all, referring to the nation building, as my colleagues have pointed out, Iraq is a nation, so it is a qualitatively different problem than Afghanistan or putting together a Bosnia, that sort of thing. The—

The Chairman. Do you consider Germany nation building after World War II? Or Japan—

Colonel Feil. There was a German nation there. It—

The Chairman. I'm not being argumentative.

Colonel Feil. No, sir. I—

The Chairman. I want to make sure—

Colonel Feil [continuing]. I would not consider that nation building. I considered that—

The Chairman. Good.
Colonel Feil [continuing]. A defeat in a conventional war and a reconstruction of the civil administration, the governing processes, and the security sector and the economy, clearly through the Marshall Plan.

The Chairman. I'm just trying to define the terms.

Colonel Feil. Absolutely, because there is wide variation. And each—although we try to draw some generalizations, each case has its own very significant sort of gradations.

I think that, unfortunately, what we’ve done in the decade of the 1990s a lot of times is try to look for the 50th percentile, plus one, and just nudge a process over the edge. And what we’ve wound up doing—I hate to say it—is, I think, in some instances, is low-ball-ing that effort. And then you’re in the problem of we can’t put more in, because we had a bad experience with that in the 1960s in Vietnam.

And so, therefore, we hope and we try to cobble together and patch something that will get us farther on down the road where we know, I think—at least I feel—in the depths of our gut, if we had gone in there hard—or large, I guess—Secretary Perry’s statement when we went into Bosnia, “We’re going in as the lead dog. We’re the toughest guys on the block. Don’t mess around with us.”

We got a response—the response that we wanted at that time.

I think that applying that kind of logic in post-conflict reconstruction, has some compelling aspects to it—it looks bad at the outset, but if you can demonstrate—if you went in with—if you took my figures and went in with 75,000 and you had a Bonn-like process and a Tokyo-like process and got the national constituting process together and got the donors together and figured out who’s going to do what to whom, and are we all at the start line appropriately, based on our comparative advantage, when the thing tumbles, then that slope would be very steep—you know, if you’re there for 6 months, and then all of a sudden you say, “Look, I came in with 75,000 guys—or I came in with whatever the campaign called for, and because the civilian agencies were with them, I withdrew down to 75,000, and then 3 months later I’m pulling out 10,000 guys, and 3 months after that I’m pulling out 10,000 guys.” If you can demonstrate progress, I think that may allay some of the fears my colleagues have stated and the concerns that the regional nations might have.

The Chairman. In direct proportion to how well you plan going in and who you’ve got on the—

Colonel Feil. I think absolutely.

The Chairman. Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the testimony has led me to believe, first of all, that the need for planning in other parts of our government, in addition to the Defense Department, is extremely important. I say that because I suspect—from the testimony we heard yesterday, we identify Saddam Hussein as a unique menace. There are bad leaders all over the world, but this is really, by far, the worst. He has successfully brutalized the country, created enormous problems in terms of nutritional deficiency for the children, lack of income for most of the population. In essence, by trying to maintain power, he has created a lot of
problems for the Iraqi people, quite apart from the menace that he presents to the neighborhood.

So having established this as an extraordinary circumstance that might justify authorizing the President of the United States to go to war, it seems to me we must try to identify the fact that it would be best if we went to war with a lot of other countries, including the neighbors, including NATO allies, and including the Russians, as a matter of fact.

Now as I have heard the testimony today—we’ve identified the fact that Iraq has great resources—among them, oil. What if, in our planning, the United States Department of Commerce or the Treasury Department has thought through why some of our allies have been lukewarm about our military planning. Namely, that they have either debts that Iraq owes or oil concessions. In other words, even while we’re doing the difficult work, business as usual might be created, not only for the Iraqis, but for them.

We would say that’s not really the way that it’s going to work. This is not economic imperialism, but, in fact, as a part of our plan for Iraq, in addition to identify the political leadership and the coalition and building democracy, we’re going to run the oil business, for example. We’re going to run it well. We’re going to make money. And it’s going to back to help pay for the rehabilitation of Iraq, because there is money there.

Now, furthermore, if you want to be involved in that business, whether you’re Russians or French or whoever, you must be with us in the beginning of this business. We’re going to set up the business together. We’re going in together. Because once we get there, we’re going to control the oil business.

I take that as a good point of departure, because that gets people’s attention.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator LUGAR. But there is no point whatsoever in our going to rescue all the people of Iraq, the Russian debt, the French oil concessions, if our efforts are met with opposition and criticism. As the chairman has identified, our efforts in Iraq cannot stop after the threat has been removed. It is in our national interests that a stable, peaceful Iraq emerges.

I’m suggesting, to be provocative today, that we do have a plan. It must be more than a military plan, and it must result in attracting a broad coalition. If our statesmanship is adept, we will have the Russians aboard, the French will be with us, so will a lot of other people, and we will deal with the Iraq problem together. This will ensure a much greater chance of success, rather than being identified as the unique invaders, the unique enemy.

Now, it may be that Arab sentiment will end up disliking the Russians, disliking the French, disliking the Germans, the English, all of us. But it could be, as a matter of fact, that if the oil business makes money, and we pump 5 million barrels a day, as opposed to two, and the Iraqi people begin to thrive. Some people might like this idea, in fact, this new incipient democracy will have something to work with, as opposed to poverty and destruction and rehabilitation that may or may not occur.

Now, given that provocative idea, does anyone have a comment?
Ms. F RANCKE. Senator, yes. I would suggest that a lot of hard horse trading go on prior to any military action. And it has surprised me, actually, that none has been going on. And the advantages of it can be seen in the smart sanctions issue where, in fact, we did do some hard bargaining and some horse trading, and we got the thing through the U.N. Security Council.

And I think your suggestion is perfect, that one should encourage the administration to go and bargain hard and say, “We’ll give you this if you’ll give us that,” and so on and so forth.

Now, the other issue is that lifting sanctions on Iraq and getting oil flowing and getting business in Iraq is actually going to have an enormously beneficial economic impact in the region, not just Turkey. We hear about Turkey only. But there are many, many companies in Jordan, in Syria, in the gulf that can benefit from this economic opening up in Iraq.

It’s actually going to be a bonanza in the region, to be honest, and there is plenty of room for everyone to benefit, not just from developing the infrastructure of the oil industry, but from building roads and hospitals and so on and so forth. There’s everything to be done, and Iraqis can’t do it all on their own. So there is that economic benefit.

But I want to address another issue that the chairman also raised, and that is the perception of the United States in the region. And to this extent, I think the colonel was absolutely right. If we can show that we are diminishing gradually, there will be a great sense of relief.

However, I don’t want to open a new subject, but we have to be honest. There are many other reasons—other problems in the Middle East that we need to be addressing. It is not just U.S. policy toward Iraq that makes Middle Easterners angry. In fact, this is very much of a secondary issue, and it’s byproduct of other issues.

And so we should not simply look at U.S. presence in Iraq as being the one that inflames Arabs and so on. There are many issues that are older, broader, and more entrenched in the Middle East that we need to look at.

So after the first gulf war, there was an opportunity to—particularly, the Madrid Conference on the Middle East, and I wonder whether, in fact, Iraq will present such another opportunity for a global look at the Middle East and its problems.

Senator LUGAR. It might, and you make a very good point. My only thought would be that it is conceivable that there are issues in the Middle East, including Israel and Palestine, that might take many, many years. One reason we’re having these hearings is that we may be on the threshold of a war now. So ideally, it would have been desirable to have cleared everything up before military action—

Ms. F RANCKE. Yes.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. But that, I suspect, is not really in the cards.

The CHAIRMAN. In our generation, there was a guy, who was a rock singer—I think his name was Clyde McPhatter—and he sang a song called, “Timing.” “Ticky-ticky-tock, timing is the thing.”

This is all timing. We don’t control this timing. We don’t control the timing. We’re talking about, as the Senator said, we’re here be-
cause the administration and others are saying “in the very near term.” I don’t know anybody who thinks in the very near term we are going to find a solution that will satisfy the region relative to Israel and the Palestinian question.

But you’ve been very, very kind with your time. We’d like to, with your permission—some of our colleagues may have some questions to submit to you in writing. We’ll not overburden you. We’re not going to make this a summer project for you—an August project, but—and we’d also like to know—I would like to know if you would be available to the committee in the future, as well.

As I said, this is not the end of this process. This is the beginning, and you’ve helped us get off to, I hope, an auspicious start. I hope people view it—I think it is in beginning to delve into, for the first time, at least, in the fora like this on some of the really difficult questions. But because they’re difficult does not mean that they are not answerable. Because they’re difficult and because this presents us with great problems—we’ve faced more difficult problems before, and we’ve overcome them.

And so I’m optimistic. I have a view that if we, in fact, discuss it and debate it and reach a consensus, that there isn’t anything we can’t do, including dealing with Saddam Hussein.

I thank you all very, very much for your indulgence, and we are recessed until 2 o’clock, when we have a second panel. As a matter of fact—well, 2 o’clock.

[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Boxer, Bill Nelson, Rockefeller, Lugar, and Hagel.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

I’m told that we are going to have one vote around 2:30.

Senator BOXER. I think it’s been pushed back to 3.

The CHAIRMAN. Good, I hope that’s true.

This will be the last panel we have today, and the most distinguished panel that we’ve had, two men with a considerable amount of service to the country. The first is former Secretary of Defense, among other things. I served here when you were running the Office of Management and Budget. I’ve wanted to always ask you which was more difficult.

But, at any rate, Caspar Weinberger was Secretary of Defense from 1981 to 1987. Secretary Weinberger has served a number of public positions, including Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission in 1970, Deputy Director and then Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 1970 to 1973, and Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, which is what it was called then, from 1973 to 1975, and since 1993, has been chairman of Forbes Magazine. It’s an honor to have you back here, Mr. Chairman, thank you for taking the time to be with us.

And we also have with us Mr. Samuel Berger. Mr. Berger served as the National Security Advisor to President Clinton, from 1997
to 2000. Mr. Berger served as the Deputy National Security Advisor from 1993 to 1996, and Deputy Director of the State Department Policy and Planning staff from 1977 to 1980. Mr. Berger is currently chairman of Stonebridge International, an international strategy firm, and also a good friend, and I am pleased to have you here, as well, Mr. Berger.

We are in the midst of the last—I know you both know this drill incredibly well—this the second to the last day before we recess to go home and campaign and be with our constituents for a month, and it is always the busiest time. But, quite frankly, we concluded, Senator Hagel and myself and other, that there was no—we could not defer these hearings any longer. And so I apologize—you’re the only two I probably need not apologize to, because you’re so experienced—but Senators are going to be in and out today, because there’s a number of major issues on the floor as we speak. But there is no lack of interest.

Mr. Secretary, with your permission, why don’t you begin——

Mr. WEINBERGER. All right.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And then we’ll go to Mr. Berger, and then we’ll go to questions.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; CHAIRMAN, FORBES MAGAZINE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. WEINBERGER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your very kind words. It’s always an honor to testify for a committee of the U.S. Senate, and I am grateful for that.

The question before us really is, should the United States depose Saddam Hussein? And my answer is clearly yes. We could do it, and we must do it quickly and decisively and with a firm commitment to a just and democratic future for Iraq and the Iraqi people.

I have heard several reasons articulated as to why we should not remove Saddam Hussein from power. If you will let me engage in a little of what we used to call in the law “anticipatory pleading,” I’m going to try to refute some of these arguments for inaction.

One is quite frequently made, and that is that there’s no proof that Saddam Hussein continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. I think this is plain wrong. I should begin by noting that the Rumsfeld report submitted in July 1998 made clear that the ability of American intelligence agencies to predict timelines and time lines for weapon development to rogue states is eroding, both because of gaps in our human intelligence-gathering capabilities and the whole nature of security these days in the security environment in this world. In other words, Mr. Chairman, I think we should not remove Saddam Hussein from power. If you will let me engage in a little of what we used to call in the law “anticipatory pleading,” I’m going to try to refute some of these arguments for inaction.

One is quite frequently made, and that is that there’s no proof that Saddam Hussein continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. I think this is plain wrong. I should begin by noting that the Rumsfeld report submitted in July 1998 made clear that the ability of American intelligence agencies to predict timelines and time lines for weapon development to rogue states is eroding, both because of gaps in our human intelligence-gathering capabilities and the whole nature of security these days in the security environment in this world. In other words, Mr. Chairman, I think we should not assume that we can be comfortable simply because someone has told us we have 10 or 12 years before we have to worry.

On the question of whether Saddam Hussen is developing weapons of mass destruction, just from open sources alone I can tell you that he has been diverting trucks from the United Nations oil for food program to use as small missile—mobile missile launchers. He has acquired new surface-to-air batteries and is using them to target allied flights over the no-flight zones in the north and south,
that he agreed to. And just last week it was reported that he was attempting to import the stainless-steel tubing that is used uniquely for gas centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

According to The Times of London, Iraq used the cover of a recent disaster in Syria to ferry so-called flow-forming machines into that country. These are used, again, in the centrifuge and its components for uranium enrichment. And a mass of other reports indicates that he's reconstituting his chemical and biological weapons programs and has been working steadily since 1998, which is when the last of the U.N. inspectors was thrown out by him, to rebuild chemical weapons plants.

And I would like to quote to you the words of Rolf Ekeus, who was the first director of the United Nations weapons program inspection teams. He said, “The systematic pursuit of the proscribed weapons and the funds thrown into their development points singular mind and extraordinary insistence. The present leader of Iraq,” he said, “has demonstrated that he has ambitions for his country reaching far outside the borders of Iraq. And these grand designs of extended influence presuppose access to weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery.”

Well, then another reason for inaction, it is said that Saddam Hussein has given us no real reason to depose him. Well, he's in violation of several United Nations Security Council resolutions. He has been for almost 4 years. And there must come a point in cases such as this when the international community recognizes a rogue who will break every promise he's made in his surrender at the end of the gulf war and he refused to accept the standards of the civilized world.

More importantly, perhaps, we must recognized that, if unchecked, there's every possibility that he will again use these weapons of mass destruction on his own people, as he did in the Kurdish north a few years ago, or against his neighbors, or provide them to terrorist organizations with which he has ever-deepening ties.

And that brings me to the third point as to why we shouldn't do anything. It is said that unless he can be tied directly to the events of September 11, the United States has no reason to depose him. Or the idea that he must be tied to the attacks on the United States is a strawman I think that's constructed solely in order to be torn down.

The United States doesn't need to sacrifice and didn't need to sacrifice 3,000 of our innocent citizens in order to justify defending our national security and that of our allies against a proven purveyor of evil such as Saddam Hussein. And I hope that we have not forgotten the brutal invasion of Kuwait and all the suffering that caused and for which there has been very little recompense.

Saddam Hussein is developing significant links with terrorist groups such as the popular front for the liberation of Palestine, their general committee, Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Abu Nidal. We know he's cultivating operational ties with each of these groups, and he's doing much more than simply supplying them with cash for the families of the so-called martyrs.

In addition, there have been persistent reports of a growing al-Qaeda presence being inside Iraq. We know that Iraq permits known al-Qaeda members to live and move freely about in Iraq.
And, again, I understand this is a lot more than just the limited tales that we heard awhile back of small cells attacking Kurdish up in the mountainous border regions near Iran. Al-Qaeda members move freely around Baghdad, and they use their Saddam-granted liberty to coordinate their operations worldwide. And Secretary Rumsfeld, of course, has confirmed this as well as their presence in Iran. While I think no one should assume that this situation poses acceptable risks, we cannot risk the possibility that Saddam Hussein will share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists.

I don't know what measures of proof we're going to require, nor what degree of certainty that we would insist upon. Are we actually to wait until we're attacked by these most lethal weapons before we agree to respond? If people are looking for an excuse for inaction, they can say we must have positive proof that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons or even nuclear weapons but that only the real proof that we had—really accept under this terminology is if we are attacked. It reminds me of some medical diagnoses. You only get the proof that they were correct in the post-mortem examinations. I think it's the presence, actually, and it's the essence of the Bush doctrine of preemption, that we should not wait for that.

Finally, there is an assertion that I read regularly in the papers that is attributed to all manner of reliable sources, and that is that Saddam is contained now. Containment works. He will die of old age eventually, so no action is needed. We used to say of the Ayatollah Khomeini, that—not when he dies, but if he dies, and that might well be applied here. This is the kind of vision I think—of vision less foreign policy that's called "let them attack first."

I must note that these rumors and leaks about war games and war plans and the like are basically a disgrace to whoever's perpetrating them, and I certainly commend Don Rumsfeld for going after them. It also strikes me as the height of irresponsibility for the New York Times and others to publish these rumors. Anyone who had been charged with the care and safety of the United States troops, as I was for 7 years, would, I'm sure, feel the same way. I'm glad that no one published the location of Omaha Beach before our landings in World War II despite a mass of rumors as to where we would land circulating at that time.

Well, then taking perhaps a little of that back, the suggestion has also been made that all of these leaks are a deliberate disinformation and deception campaign. If that is the case, then I would say it's very good of the New York Times and others to cooperate so fully with this campaign of deception. But I would say, in all seriousness, that, at best, disinformation campaigns are a very risky business.

And then this assertion about Saddam being contained is basically probably untrue. Containment is not working. He is exporting upwards of $3 billion in illegal oil and using the profits for whatever he wishes to. We don't know. He has a reason to keep out the arms inspectors that he promised to let in, and it's not hard to guess that reason.

In this day and age, containment means more than preempting the expansionism of a weird dictator. It means containing the dan-
gers that they pose and hunting their access to weapons and instruments and persons who assist them in carrying out their threats.

Mr. Chairman, Saddam is not contained, and he cannot be contained. He's violated all of the promises which were accepted when we crushed his military in the cold war. He cannot be believed, he is an implacable and a permanent foe of the United States, and that’s why I think he must be removed. We can have no peace in that most volatile of regions until he is gone.

In conclusion, I'd like quickly just to address two other important issues. The first is the role of the United Nations. It seems odd to me, as it must to many around the world, that some in the United States persist in supporting renewed negotiations for weapons inspections inside Iraq. Kofi Annan has come to the end of his rope after three failed rounds of negotiations with Baghdad. The President of the United States has said that he will see Saddam Hussein removed, and yet, notwithstanding, we continue this odd charade in New York of seeking to secure more worthless promises from Iraq that could grant inspectors the right to come in.

I note that President Chirac of France a couple of days ago said that he will not support us unless the United Nations does. Well, given the rules of unanimity in the United Nations, this makes it the quite safe harbor in which to shelter France’s potential inaction.

The rules of weapons inspectors have also become looser and looser over the years. There’s no point in sending in some team to rubberstamp Saddam’s cooperation. Those who advocate that we persist in seeking a solution to the problem of Iraq through the United Nations, I believe, are basically simply advocates of inaction.

Finally, and, to my mind, most importantly, I've heard it said by influential people that an a priori commitment of tens of thousands of troops for many years is the required prerequisite for removing Saddam Hussein from power. This seems to me to be an attempt to set the bar so high that any operation in Iraq will be deemed to be the President’s failure. We must remove Saddam, yes. Then there needs to be a determination and a democratic transition committed to a united and decent future for the Iraqi people.

There are many ways to accomplish this. Not all of them require thousands of U.S. troops. As Secretary Rumsfeld pointed out, if the Iraqi military could be persuaded to rise against the regime, we would have very little to do.

The Iraqi people are perfectly capable of governing themselves if they are allowed the chance. Representative leadership in Iraq must have the full faith and credit of the United States and our commitment to help them secure democracy. But we don’t need a GI on every street corner for the foreseeable future. Nor is the predicted chaos in Iraq, if Saddam is removed, a real argument. After all, what was needed was a strong leader in Iraq, these people say, and if that’s what we did need, we shouldn’t have bothered to fight the gulf war. We had a strong leader in Iraq.

Now those who oppose a regime change in Iraq say that we must keep that strong leader to avoid chaos. Well, regime changes in most of the wars that we have fought did not produce chaos, and
it need not be so in Iraq. We changed several regimes after World War II. And in each case, the result was a vast and a major improvement.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding these hearings. I think this debate is a vital part of our democracy. I just hope that in discussing how to remove Saddam Hussein, we will recognize and realize that the boundary between the people’s right to know and the enemy’s right to know is a very thin one and we would ignore it at the peril of our troops.

Thank you very much, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinberger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; CHAIRMAN, FORBES MAGAZINE

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your inviting me to be here today. The question before us is should the United States depose Saddam Hussein. The answer is clear: yes.

We must do it quickly, decisively, and with a firm commitment to a just and democratic future for Iraq.

I have heard several reasons articulated as to why we should not remove Saddam from power.

1. There is no proof he continues to develop weapons of mass destruction

I should begin by noting that the Rumsfeld Report submitted in July 1998 made clear that the ability of U.S. intelligence agencies to predict timelines for weapons development in rogue states is eroding, both because of defects within those agencies and the nature of the security environment in the world today. In other words, Mr. Chairman, we should not assume we are sitting pretty simply because someone in Virginia tells us we have ten years to do so.

On the question of whether Saddam Hussein is developing weapons of mass destruction—from open sources alone, I can tell you that Saddam has been diverting trucks from the United Nations Oil for Food program to use as missile launchers. He has acquired new surface to air batteries and is using them to target allied flights. Just last week, it was reported that Saddam is attempting to import stainless steel tubing used uniquely in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

According to the Times of London, Iraq used the cover of a recent disaster in Syria to ferry so-called flow-forming machines into the country. Similar machines were used by Iraq in the past to produce components for uranium enrichment.

Other reports indicate that Saddam is reconstituting his chemical weapons programs, and has been working steadily since 1998 (when the last UN inspectors were kicked out) to rebuild chemical weapons plants.

Finally, I should cite to you the words of Rolf Ekeus, the first director of the United Nations weapons inspections team in Iraq: “The systematic pursuit of the proscribed weapons and the funds thrown into their development points to a singular mind and extraordinary insistence. The present leader of Iraq has demonstrated that he has ambitions for his country reaching far outside the borders of Iraq. These grand designs of extended influence presuppose access to weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery.”

2. Saddam Hussein has given the United States no reason to depose him

Saddam is in violation of several United Nations Security Council resolutions, and has been for almost four years. There must come a point in cases such as this when the international community recognizes a rogue who will not comply with the demands of the civilized world. More importantly, perhaps, we must recognize that if unchecked, there is every possibility that Saddam will use those weapons on his own people, his neighbors or provide them to the terrorist organizations with which he has ever deepening ties. Which brings me to excuse number 3:

3. Unless Saddam can be tied to September 11, the United States has no reason to depose him

The idea that Saddam must be tied to the attacks on the United States is a straw man constructed solely in order to be torn down. The United States does not need to sacrifice 3,000 of its innocent citizens in order to justify defending our national security and that of our allies.
Saddam Hussein is developing a significant relationship with terrorist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command), Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Abu Nidal. I have been told he is cultivating operational ties with each of these groups, doing much more than simply providing cash to the families of so-called “martyrs”.

In addition, there have been persistent reports of a growing al Qaeda presence inside Iraq. Again, I understand this is more than the initial tales of small cells attacking Kurdish groups, operating in the mountainous border area near Iran. Apparently, al Qaeda members are moving freely around Baghdad, using their Saddam-granted liberty to coordinate operations worldwide.

Surely no one would assert this situation poses acceptable risks. We cannot risk the possibility that Saddam will share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists.

Finally, there is an assertion that I read regularly in the pages of the newspaper from leakers at the Pentagon.

4. Saddam is contained now; containment works and he will die of old age eventually

This is the kind of vision-less foreign policy that makes me thank our Founding Fathers for civilian control of the military. First, I must note that these leaks of war games, war plans and the likes are a disgrace to the United States Armed Forces. I commend Don Rumsfeld for going after them. It also strikes me as the height of irresponsibility for the New York Times and others to publish these rumors. Anyone who has been charged with the care and safety of U.S. troops as I was for seven years would, I am sure, feel this way.

Second, this assertion is palpably untrue. Containment is not working. Saddam Hussein is exporting upwards of $3 billion in illegal oil and using the profits for who-knows-what. He has a reason to keep out arms inspectors. What is it?

In this day and age, containment means more than pre-empting the expansionism of loony dictators. It means containing the dangers they pose, and limiting their access to instruments and persons who can assist them in carrying out their threats.

Mr. Chairman, Saddam is not contained, and he cannot be contained. He has violated all of the promises which we accepted when we crushed his military in the Gulf war. He cannot be believed and he is an implacable foe of the United States. That is why he must be removed.

I would like to quickly address two other important issues. The first is the role of the United Nations. It seems odd to me, as it must to many around the world, that the United States persists in supporting renewed negotiations for weapons inspections inside Iraq. Kofi Annan has come to the end of his rope after three failed rounds of negotiations with Baghdad. The President of the United States has said that he will see Saddam Hussein removed, and notwithstanding, we continue this odd charade in New York.

The terms of weapons inspections have become looser and looser over the years. There is no point in sending in some team to rubber stamp Saddam’s “cooperation”. Those who advocate that we persist in seeking a solution to the problem of Iraq through the United Nations are advocates of inaction. They’re just afraid to say so.

Finally, and to my mind, most importantly, I have heard it said by influential people in this town that an a priori commitment of tens of thousands of troops for many years is the required prerequisite for removing Saddam Hussein from power. This seems to me to be political in the extreme—an attempt to set the bar so high that any operation in Iraq will be deemed the President’s failure. We must remove Saddam, yes. We must also have in place a democratic transition committed to a united future for Iraq.

The Iraqi people are perfectly capable of governing themselves if allowed the chance. Representative leadership in Iraq must have the full faith and credit of the United States, and our commitment to enforce unity and democracy. But we don’t need a GI on every street corner for the foreseeable future. After all, if what we wanted was a strong leader in Iraq, we shouldn’t have bothered to box him in during the Gulf war. People say there will be chaos. I disagree, but I must confess that even chaos would be better than Saddam.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these hearings. This debate is a vital part of our democracy, and I know our Commander in Chief is grateful for the Congress’ support as he works to defend our national security.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Berger.
STATEMENT OF SAMUEL R. BERGER, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR; PRESIDENT AND CEO, STONEBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL LLC, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BERGER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I welcome this opportunity to participate in the beginning of an important national discussion on how we deal with a threat to peace posed by the regime of Saddam Hussein.

That it is a threat is the essential starting point. Saddam Hussein is a menace to his own people, to the stability of a combustible and critical region, and a potential threat to the United States. He has demonstrated his intent to seek hegemony in the gulf. He has demonstrated his intent to develop weapons of mass destruction and his willingness to use them. He has demonstrated his contempt for the international community and his implacable hostility to the United States. A nuclear-armed Saddam sometime in this decade is a risk we cannot choose to ignore.

But let's be clear. All these things were true before September 11. While the President is right to underscore the potential nexus between hostile regimes, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorists, viewing the Iraqi threat primarily through the prism of the war on terrorism distorts both.

Is it conceivable that Saddam will link up with extremist Islamic terrorists? Yes, but that has not been his history. And removing Saddam Husseen does not eliminate the danger that terrorists will obtain chemical or biological weapons from any of the more than dozen states that have the capacity to produce them or acquire dangerous nuclear material from inadequately safeguarded storage facilities in the former Soviet Union.

This is not to minimize, Mr. Chairman, but to clarify it. Saddam Hussein and the fight against terrorism may one day intersect, but we lose our focus and our credibility on both fronts if we reflexively lump them together.

What, then, is the right policy? Containment, in fact, has stopped Saddam from attacking his neighbors since 1991. But when he expelled U.N. inspectors in 1998, he substantially undermined the ability of the international community to track his weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. Simply keeping him in the box carries higher risks when his WMD programs are unchecked and he can break out with such lethality.

But concluding, that regime change is the necessary goal is to begin the discussion, not to end it. It is just as foolhardy to underestimate the challenges involved in ousting Saddam Hussein as it is to underestimate the threat he poses.

There are different approaches to a regime change. One is to provide tangible support to those around Saddam who can take matters into their own hands. We have learned that achieving success in this manner is easier said than done, but it now an avenue we should abandon. We can enhance those possibilities to some degree by increasing international efforts that de-legitimize Saddam and defining more clearly what a new Iraqi government can expect from the international community if it accepts international norms.

Another option is the so-called Afghan model, arming the Iraqi opposition to march on Baghdad, supported by U.S. air power, but
limited manpower. Clearly there is an important role for the opposition, both internal and external, but I am deeply skeptical of a surrogate strategy in Iraq. The Iraqi opposition is weaker than the Northern Alliance and fractured by internal rivalry. At the same time, the Iraqi Armed Forces are significantly stronger than the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein’s grip is tighter. We should be very wary of turning the U.S. military into an emergency rescue squad if Saddam Hussein loses tanks against insurgents we are backing. America does not need a Bay of Pigs in the Persian Gulf.

That leaves a U.S.-led military invasion, which ultimately may become our only option. But we must define the necessary objective more broadly than simply eliminating Saddam’s regime. Our objective must be removing that regime in a way that enhances, not diminishes, our overall security. Our strategy should bring greater stability to the region, not less. It should contribute to ending Israel’s isolation, not compounding it. It should not come at the expense of the support we need in the fight against al-Qaeda or the stability of friends in the region. It would be a pyrrhic victory, for example, if we get rid of Saddam Hussein only to face a radical Pakistani government with a ready-made nuclear arsenal.

We must approach this challenge with sharp focus, but also with peripheral vision. That is why we need to do more than simply plan a military invasion. We need to put in place the building blocks that can make long-term success possible, and we need to proceed on a timetable dictated not by elections or emotions, but by a hard-nosed intelligence assessment of the trajectory of Iraq’s capabilities, especially its nuclear program.

What are those building blocks? First, the United States must be engaged consistently in trying to reduce the violence and tension in the Middle East. If there is not progress on the ground in ending the violence and improving people’s lives or we are not seen at least working energetically to change the dynamic, I believe support from the region for action in Iraq will be scarce, and an invasion very well break along an already precarious Arab-Israeli fault line.

Second, we need a sustained strategy to make evident to others the legitimacy of our actions. Today even many of our closest allies do not share our sense of the threat. Some in the United States say that doesn’t matter in the end, that our allies are weak militarily and soft strategically. As for those in the region, others say, in effect, if we do it, they will come.

But the fact that America can do it alone does not mean it is wise to do it alone. We don’t need to recreate the gulf war coalition. We acted essentially unilaterally in Afghanistan. But the world saw our actions as a legitimate response to a terrible provocation. Power by itself does not confer legitimacy. It is the widely perceived purpose to which that power is applied and the manner in which it is used. If we are right about the threat Iraq poses, we ought to be able to build a solid case for the world and take the time we have to do it.

Third, and crucially, we need to have an honest discussion with the American people about what’s involved, consistent with the Secretary’s very important admonition about operational surprise and secrecy. From the gulf war to Kosovo and Afghanistan, our
men and women in uniform have performed superbly, securing impressive victories at impressively low costs.

But our pride in them should not blind us to the very real challenges of war in Iraq. Our objective here is not to drive Saddam Hussein back to his own country. It is to drive him out of power. The American people must be prepared for a more challenging mission—urban combat, chemical weapons attacks, Saddam’s use of human and civilian shields, an American presence in Iraq measured in years when we succeed.

It is time to start asking and answering, as you have been doing in this committee for the past 2 days, tough questions before we launch our country down the path to war. What impact will our actions have on key governments in the region, such as Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey? What allies do we need, from both a military and political standpoint? What kind of successor do we see for Saddam Hussein? How do we keep the country together and avoid a Balkanized outcome? What kind of assistance—economic, political, and military—can a new Iraqi government expect from the United States? Do we see this as Korea, where we helped build a thriving democracy from the debris of war but maintained a military presence there a generation later, or Bosnia, where we seem impatient to leave even before the conditions warrant? And who will pay for Iraq’s recovery, with current estimates of the cost of rebuilding its economy ranging from $50 to $150 billion?

Mr. Chairman, there is no question that the world will be a better place without Saddam Hussein’s regime. As you’ve stated in the past, if he is around 5 years from now, it means we haven’t done something right. But if we don’t do this operation right, we could end up with something worse. We need to be clear and open about the stakes, the risks, and the costs that genuine success—meaning a more secure America and a more secure world—will require.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SAMUEL R. BERGER, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR; PRESIDENT AND CEO, STONEBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL LLC

SADDAM IS A THREAT

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I welcome this opportunity to help open an important national discussion on how we deal with the threat to peace posed by the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

That it is a threat is the essential starting point. Saddam Hussein is a menace to his own people—to the stability of a combustible and critical region—and a potential threat to the United States. He has demonstrated his intent to seek hegemony in the Gulf. He has demonstrated his intent to develop weapons of mass destruction and his willingness to use them. He has demonstrated his contempt for the international community and his implacable hostility to the United States. A nuclear-armed Saddam sometime in this decade is a risk we cannot choose to ignore.

But let’s be clear: All these things were true before September 11. While the President is right to underscore the potential nexus between hostile regimes, weapons of mass destruction and terrorists, viewing the Iraqi threat primarily through the prism of the war on terrorism distorts both.

Is it conceivable that Saddam will link up with extremist Islamic terrorists? Yes, but that has not been his history. And removing Saddam Hussein does not eliminate the danger that terrorists will obtain chemical or biological weapons from any of the more than a dozen states that have the capacity to produce them, or acquire dangerous nuclear material from inadequately safeguarded storage facilities in the former Soviet Union.
This is not to minimize the threat but to clarify it. Saddam Hussein and the fight against terrorism may one day intersect, but we lose our focus and our credibility on both fronts if we reflexively lump them together.

U.S. POLICY CHOICES

What then is the right policy? Containment in fact has stopped Saddam Hussein from attacking his neighbors since 1991. But when he expelled UN inspectors in 1998, he substantially undermined the ability of the international community to track his WMD programs. Simply keeping him “in the box” carries higher risks when his WMD programs are unchecked and he can break out with such lethality.

But concluding that regime change is the necessary goal is to begin the discussion, not to end it. It is just as foolhardy to underestimate the challenges involved in ousting Saddam Hussein’s regime as it is to underestimate the threat it poses.

There are different approaches to regime change. One is to provide tangible support to those around Saddam who can take matters in their own hands. We have learned that achieving success in this manner is easier said than done, but it is not an avenue we should abandon. We can enhance those possibilities to some degree by increasing international efforts that de-legitimize Saddam and defining more clearly what a new Iraqi government that accepts international norms can expect from the world.

Another option is the so-called Afghan model—arming the Iraqi opposition to march on Baghdad, supported by U.S. airpower but limited manpower. Clearly, there is an important role for the opposition, both internal and external—but I am deeply skeptical of a “surrogate” strategy in Iraq. The Iraqi opposition is weaker than the Northern Alliance and fractured by internal rivalry. At the same time, the Iraqi armed forces are significantly stronger than the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s grip is tighter. We should be very wary of turning the U.S. military into an Emergency Rescue Squad if Saddam Hussein moves his tanks against insurgents we are backing. America does not need a Bay of Pigs in the Persian Gulf.

That leaves a U.S.-led military invasion, which ultimately may become our only option. But we must define the necessary objective more broadly than simply eliminating Saddam’s regime. Our objective must be removing that regime in a way that enhances—not diminishes—our overall security. Our strategy should bring greater stability in the region, not less. It should contribute to ending Israel’s isolation, not compounding it. It should not come at the expense of the support we need in the fight against al Qaeda, or the stability of friends in the region.

We must approach this challenge with sharp focus, but also with peripheral vision.

BUILDING BLOCKS

That is why we need to do more than simply plan a military invasion. We need to put in place the building blocks that can make long-term success possible. And we need to proceed on a timetable dictated not by elections or emotions, but by a hard-nosed intelligence assessment of the trajectory of Iraq’s capabilities, especially its nuclear program.

What are those building blocks?
First, the United States must be engaged consistently in trying to reduce the violence and tension in the Middle East. If there is not progress on the ground—in ending the violence and improving people’s lives—or we are not at least seen as working energetically to change the dynamic—I believe support from the region for action in Iraq will be scarce and an invasion very well may break along an already precarious Arab-Israeli fault line.

Second, we need a sustained strategy to make evident to others the legitimacy of our actions. Today, even many of our closest allies do not share our sense of the threat. Some in the United States say that doesn’t matter in the end, that our allies are weak militarily and soft strategically. As for those in the region, others say, in effect, “If we do it, they will come.”

But the fact America “can” do it alone does not mean that it is wise to do it alone. We don’t need to recreate the Gulf War coalition. We acted essentially unilaterally in Afghanistan, but the world saw our actions as a legitimate response to a terrible provocation. Power by itself does not confer legitimacy. It is the widely perceived purpose to which that power is applied and the manner in which it is used. If we are right about the threat Iraq poses, we ought to be able to build a solid case for the world and take the time we have to do it.
Third, and crucially, we need to have an honest discussion with the American people about what’s involved. From the Gulf War to Kosovo and Afghanistan, our men and women in uniform have performed superbly—securing impressive victories at impressively low costs. But our pride in them should not blind us to the very real challenges of war in Iraq. Our objective here is not to drive Saddam Hussein back into his own country; it is to drive him out of power. The American people must be prepared for a far more challenging mission: urban combat, chemical weapons attacks, Saddam’s use of human and civilian shields, and an American military presence in Iraq—measured in years—when we succeed.

TOUGH QUESTIONS

It’s time to start asking and answering tough questions, before we launch our country down the path to war.

- What impact will our action have on key governments in the region—such as Jordan, Pakistan and Turkey?
- What kind of successor do we see for Saddam Hussein? How do we keep the country together and avoid a Balkanized outcome?
- What kind of assistance—economic, political and military—can a new Iraqi government expect from the United States? Do we see this as Korea—where we helped build a thriving democracy from the debris of war but maintain a military presence there a generation later? Or Bosnia, where we seem impatient to leave even before conditions warrant?
- And who will pay for Iraq’s recovery—with current estimates of the cost of rebuilding its economy ranging from $50-150 billion?

Mr. Chairman, there’s no question that the world will be a better place without Saddam Hussein’s regime. As you’ve said in the past, “if he is around five years from now, it means we haven’t done something right.” But if we don’t do this operation right, we could end up with something worse. We need to be clear and open about the stakes, the risks and the costs that genuine success—meaning a more secure America and a more secure world—will require.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much.

Before we begin, or as we begin, one of the statements that you made, Mr. Secretary, maybe in a different context or in a closed hearing or a closed circumstance, you can tell us, but the line that says, “I understand there is more than initial tales of small cells acting—Kurdish groups operating in the mountain borders of Iran. Apparently, al-Qaeda members are moving freely around Baghdad using their Saddam-granted liberty to coordinate operations worldwide.” I have not heard that from any source in the U.S. Government that I’ve kept close tabs on, but maybe at some point in another context you can share with us the source of that.

But in the interest of just general fairness, Senator Rockefeller has been patient and at the end of the line here. I get to stay throughout the whole hearing. I can ask my questions at the end. Why don’t we begin with you, Senator Rockefeller, we’ll go in order, and I’ll question last.

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I have a Confucian temperament, Mr. Chairman.

A couple of things come to mind. In the days of these hearings, there’s been just an enormous array of thoughts and suggestions. And yesterday I sort of concentrated on the uncertainty factor. And, you know, you—Mr. Berger, you talked about removing Saddam does not do it all. And that brings up a question which I’ve actually sort of wanted to ask. We’ve been talking a lot about nation building here. And you say, well, that could be $100 to $150 billion for Iraq alone.

Americans tend to be kind of episodic, you know, crisis oriented when we—obviously, 9/11 is a little bit more than episodic, but—
and what we’re in is profoundly dangerous, but we jump from sort of country to country, and then we will take Iraq and we’ll sort of isolate Iraq and say, well, what are going to be the repercussions of this?

Are we talking about, in fact, removing Saddam Hussein because he is Saddam Hussein, alone, or because of the weapons of mass destruction? And is it not really what we’re talking about, the removing the threat to this country of—weapons of mass destruction—of which he is the dictatorial keeper and decisionmaker?

So if it’s the removal of weapons of mass destruction, and if you accept that al-Qaeda is in 60 other countries, that South America has not yet bubbled up, Africa, in many ways, hasn’t bubbled up, well, Southeast Asia is all yet before us, perhaps, or probably, and many other places in the Middle East—Iran—who knows? You can’t do it all. You can’t go in and say, well, here’s Afghanistan—and that’s kind of more of a futile warlord thing and that history—but Baghdad is much more of a stabilized middle class. Perhaps we can make a democracy out of that, and so let’s nation build. And, oh, by the way, that may cost $100 to $150 billion. Then you go down to the Indonesian archipelago and you’re talking about thousands of islands—and, who knows, the largest Muslim country in the world, which is not to tie Islam into this in any greater than is appropriate. But you start stockpiling an inventory which becomes absolutely out of the question for this country.

You talk about educating—I’m not questioning you, Mr. Berger, I’m just questioning the proposition—we talk about educating the American people to what we’re doing, leveling with the American people. Well, if we’re going to level with the American people, we’d better tell them that this—that we’re talking about, you know, and $8 or $10 trillion project here worldwide, in all probability, unless we think that 9/11 was isolated, and it surely was not, and nobody even pretends to think that.

Isn’t it really our security that we’re talking about? And if it’s really our security, isn’t it keeping ourselves safe from weapons of mass destruction from wherever they might come? And, you see, that doesn’t have to just be a nuclear bomb. That can be a suicide bomber. That can be a plane into the World Trade Tower. That can be, you know, something else into a chemical plant, a power grid, whatever it is, but it’s the combination of the intelligence, the preemptive intelligence, as opposed to the—as well as the tactical, but particularly the preemptive—and keeping ourselves safe—and, therefore, as much as possible, the world, because we’re the largest target, and if we’re keeping ourselves safe—but we’ve gotten into this enormous discussion on nation building.

And I would just like to, sort of, get both of your thoughts on that. If you’re suggesting—and I don’t disagree that—to stay the course and that—we had some witnesses this morning that said, no, you only have to have about 5,000 troops in Iraq for 3 or 4 or 5 years or less—a couple of years, I think one of them suggested. That doesn’t seem very probable to me if they’re talking about nation building.

And what it seems to me that you started off with is making America secure, removing the means of destruction of us and other
parts of the world from different terrorist groups, of whom Saddam Hussein obviously is a classic definition.

But I'd like your response to that, because it just seems to me we've kind of run away, let the wagon get out of control here in terms of what it is that our responsibilities are as a nation and what we can possibly afford to do without having our people rise up on us, because we won't—if we tried to do all of it, we would do a lot of it unsuccessfully, because there's not any tradition for democracy in a lot of these places.

Mr. Weinberger. Senator, let me respond in a few ways to what I think are very important comments you've made. In no small measure, what I'm saying is that, as we look at how we deal with a real threat, Saddam Hussein—Saddam Hussein, plus—with weapons of mass destruction; I'll come back to that—we have to do it within the constellation of our overall security. We can't simply pull this out and look at this divorced from the consequences of acting and the consequences of not acting, the risks of acting and the costs—the opportunity costs that may have elsewhere.

So, yes, I do believe Saddam, plus—with weapons of mass destruction, is a threat. We can't deny that. To me, it's the combination of both. It is the capability and the intent, together.

To me, the greatest threat is Saddam with nuclear-weapons capability believing that that capability is essentially deterrence against us acting if he then seeks, once again, to take aggressive action against his neighbor. I think that's the single most dangerous threat of this threat.

But I think the importance of this dialog that you've begun here is to look at this in the context of American security. Can we do this in a way that, in the end of the day, not only is Saddam gone, but we're more secure? We're not isolated—less isolated. He's out of the picture. And I think that's—you know, that is a risk calculation which begins with these hearings and which I think is very important for the administration to join with.

Senator Rockefeller. Sandy Berger, do you include nation building as part of our obligation? Because the question I would pose to you—isn't there a point at which there is an inverse correlation between our determination to nation build after we remove the bad guys and our ability to remove both weapons of mass destruction wherever they exist in the world and the whole threat of terrorism as it surely does exist in the world?

I mean, at some point you—if you do one, you can't do the other. And our first obligation, it seems to me, is to make sure that there is a security factor for our country.

Mr. Berger. I think, Senator, that if we engage in a military action against Saddam, and it's successful, that it requires us to be prepared to stay there for a considerable period of time. That's part of the calculation I think we need to make at the outset. The centrifugal forces in Iraq are substantial—the Kurds in the north, the Shia in the south, Turkey, Iran. And simply extracting Saddam Hussein and all the rest of his Ba'athist colleagues and leaving a situation which could unravel in which the Kurds, for example, could declare some kind of independence, the Turks feeling threatened by that, would move in against the Kurds, you can imagine a number of scenarios here—I think it's unrealistic to think that we can go
in somehow, parachute in, grab the bad guys, leave a couple of AID people behind, and that America will be more secure as a result of that.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, that certainly is not my idea of what we would do if we changed regimes, Senator. I think if we change regimes, you will get rid of Saddam Hussein, of course. You also, if it's done properly, as we would hope to do it, would remove a substantial amount of the threat of the development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, because presumably the changed regime, the new regime, would be a regime that would be installed in power and would not have that as part of its agenda.

I think the very precision of Mr. Berger's estimates of between $50 and $150 billion indicates a lack of clarity as to precisely what it is we're going to be doing.

I don't think we have to rebuild the nation of Iraq. I think we have to set up a framework so that the people themselves can cover themselves. And there is no doubt that there will be some assistance needed, perhaps, for that regime. There's not reason for us to bear it alone. I would think that there—the ideal arrangement would be to have a number of the moderate Arab countries and anyone else who wishes to join become part of an army of occupation that would stay while the regime was being changed.

We had considerable experience with this after World War II. We changed regimes in every single country that we fought against, very much to their improvement, and with the result that we ended up with some very warm, close allies who formerly had been bitter enemies. And I don't see any reason why that can't be done. We didn't have to rebuild those countries. We had the Marshall Plan, which was correctly described as the most altruistic act in history, and it helped a lot, but it helped us, too.

So I think that a lot of this is a sort of set of strawmen that are set up as a basis for arguing for inaction. We all agree that the regime is terrible, that Saddam Hussein is a beast of the worst kind and most go, but then everybody starts pointing out the enormous difficulties afterwards.

The departure of Saddam Hussein doesn't guarantee chaos in the region. And I would think that a victorious group of armies or group of nations that participated in his being eliminated in a regime change would also want to participate in whatever is necessary to keep the situation basically stable and secure. And so I don't think that any of these boogeymen that we're hearing about are necessarily that is going to happen, certainly not some of these wild estimates of how much it's going to cost. That's a good way to frighten off the American people, but I don't think it has very much accuracy.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Senator Biden has asked me to preside, and I recognize Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Senator Lugar, thank you. I add my welcome to our distinguished witnesses and also thank you each for your many contributions to our country. And this is in line with your continued contribution, so thank you. We value each of your wise counsel and we will probably be talking with you often in the days ahead.

Mr. Berger, you, in your testimony, ended by laying out a number of, as you state, "tough questions." And yesterday we heard
from many distinguished witnesses who, as a matter of fact, dwelt in some detail on your questions, your first one being, what impact will our action have on key governments in the region, such as Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey?

I would ask each of you if you would respond to that question, your question, Mr. Berger, in this way. What is your opinion as to if the United States would find itself, as it essentially does today, alone, and if we would move in a military action to destroy Saddam Hussein unilaterally, or essentially unilaterally? Is that wise? Would there be consequences? What, in fact, consequence might there be for the Governments of Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey?

You mention, Mr. Berger, Iran and the Middle East. I'd be interested in getting your thoughts on whether you think there is any connection between the Middle East situation today and Iraq if we would unilaterally take action against Saddam Hussein. Would that have any effect on our other interests?

And, I might add, included in that interest, which we passed this morning a bill out of this committee, framing up a focus for economic, diplomatic, democratic institution building in Afghanistan. We seem to kind of glide by that, and it was referenced this morning by one witness. I think a “hit and run” is what she said—a hit and run effort in Afghanistan, and that witness acknowledged that this might be a more difficult undertaking in that we would not want to model, in fact, our efforts in Iraq if we went into Iraq after Afghanistan.

Now, I've thrown a lot of pieces out there, but I would welcome your thoughts on any of those or all of them.

And, Mr. Secretary, thank you again for coming today.

Mr. Weinberger. Well, Senator, I think if we go in alone and remove Saddam Hussein, we'll find that success has many allies. I think one of the reasons that you're hearing a lot of warnings and complaints and criticism of the possibility are from countries who fear that we would not stay the course. They live in the neighborhood. They know what this man is like, and they don't want to be put out on a limb by a false start by us, so to speak, or a rapid winding up.

If they are sure that we're going to stay the course and finish the job and eliminate Saddam Hussein, I think you'll find a great many people swarming around wanting to join the team. And I think that would be a very good thing.

I think we need help. We need all the help we can get. It will not be an easy task. But I think that the important thing is to do it and to have it as our clear objective that it is going to be done.

I do wish that there would be less discussion of the how and when and where of the actual operation, because I think that imperils the troops, and that's my primary concern.

I think that when it happens is not nearly as important as to the fact that it winds up successfully. And if it's a few months off or if it's a very short time off or if it's a little longer than that, I don't think it's nearly as important as our resolve to do it and our building steadily the preparations necessary to do it.

After he's gone, I would hope and believe that the nations in the region, the neighbors who have been sort of terrorized by Saddam Hussein, who fear him as well as hating him, would, after a brief
period of dancing in the streets, be very glad to join in any kind of a regime or to assist a regime that would provide a Saddam-less Iraq.

So I think the important thing is for us to decide what we have to do, and that is regime changing, and to do it, and to do it well, and to stay with the groups that are there and not feel we have to lead it or be the only one there.

If we're alone in the actual removal operation, so be it. But I would be very certain that a successful operation by us alone would produce a very substantial number of allies very, very quickly.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. If the Senator would yield for just a moment in a housekeeping matter. There are two rollcall votes back to back, and so I'd suggest we stay until toward the end of this and then, with the permission of my friend from Florida, I'll go to the Senator from California, and we'll kind of do reverse this time. OK?

I'm sorry. Go ahead, Senator.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Secretary, thank you.

Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER. Senator, all hard decisions, in terms of America's role in the world, are balancing the risks, and that's ultimately the job the President or the Congress is going to have to do. I would not rule out, under any circumstances, the fact that we might have to act unilaterally if we believe that there was an imminent and direct threat to the United States. But I think doing so alone would greatly increase the risks of such action. I think that it is possible that we could militarily do this by ourselves, although we do need a base somewhere, we do need overflight rights.

But the reason I talked earlier in my remarks about building blocks, it seems to me how we do this is very important. And I think that, No. 1, to address your point in terms of the Middle East, I think if we are not seen as engaged in an energetic, proactive, consistent way in trying to end violence and create a better dynamic in the Middle East, we will go into this by ourselves, and many of the Arab countries will simply hunker down. They may not try—they may not be able to stop us, but they will not support us.

Second of all, I think we have to make our case to the world. We see a threat. We see a threat to the United States, we see a threat out at some timeframe. The Secretary is certainly right. We have no precision about being able to estimate those timetables. You have to take the best intelligence, the best information we have. I don't think it's measured in months. I think it's measured in years, and I think we have the time to make our case to the world.

And to make simply one point, I agree with the Secretary that a victorious coalition would want to help us participate in anything that needs to be done in Iraq. But if it's a coalition of one, it's a bill payer of one. So I think we need to take the time we have here to try to build, as I said, not necessarily the gulf war coalition, but a common sense of threat, a more broadly shared sense of threat internationally so we're not acting alone.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Rather than begin, Senator—do you want to begin now?
Senator BOXER. So quick, I have one question.
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, OK. Well, fire away.
Senator BOXER. I have one question, prefaced this way. This has been so fascinating. I want to thank you Mr. Chairman and also Senator Lugar, and our people here.

I want to say that under George Bush the first, the decision was made not to get rid of Saddam, because, as I understood it—I was in Congress then—there was a fear as to what would come after.

If Secretary Weinberger reflects the new thinking of that—those days, apparently the new thinking go ahead and do it and don't worry. I think that leads to what Senator Rockefeller said is, are we committed to doing what it takes afterwards? And, frankly, I don't know the answer, because I haven't heard it from this administration.

I know I'm feeling a little troubled that we're not doing enough in Afghanistan, as much as this committee would like to do. So that's one point.

Now, the question I have is this. I am very afraid of the weapons of mass destruction combined with the new world that we face of people who don't care about this world and this life and are willing to give up their own life for some cause. I'm very worried about that. So here's my question. We have a U.N. resolution that is very clear, 687, that says that Iraq must, must, allow in the inspectors. Why don't we start from that point? If we are going to build any credibility in the world, I don't think we start from the point that, you know, we think Saddam is terrible. Yes, we do. And then to say, therefore, we should go in whatever it takes and do what it takes.

I think we need to start at the beginning, which is to build support for our feeling that this is a dangerous situation. And I don't know why we don't hear more from this administration—and maybe I've missed it; maybe I have—about how we ought to go about building support for a regime of inspection that is foolproof that can be designed. And one of your witnesses, Mr. Chairman, did lay out, I think, a terrific outline of what that should be.

So could I ask you, Mr. Berger, particularly on that point of the U.N. resolution, if you feel we have enough there to build our case and to demand an inspection as a first step to build a worldwide support.

Mr. BERGER. Senator, I think that—I see the process of going back to the United Nations, in tactical as well as strategic terms. Is it possible to construct an inspection regime that can give us absolutely certainty? Probably not. Is it likely that Saddam Hussein would agree to a totally intrusive regime? Probably not. Is it useful in my judgment to use the forum of the U.N. to say, "Why won't Saddam Hussein let us back in?" Yes.

The problem I have with the "axis of evil" speech is that has focused the world on us, not on Saddam. We're talking about what do we mean by the "axis of evil," what has that got to do with terrorism, are we becoming unilaterists? I want to get the subject back on Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction.

It seems to me that if we went to the United Nations, we stood as firm as possible, 100 percent firm, for a totally invasive, intru-
sive inspection system—you’re talking, I think, about Mr. Gallucci’s testimony—maybe even with some military capability—do I think we’ll get that? Probably not. Do I think the exercise of having Saddam and his surrogates and others in the U.N. have to explain why he will not let the world come into Iraq to see what’s there is helpful in building the sense of legitimacy that I’m talking about? Yes, I do.

So I think that—I know there’s concern that that will be—become essentially—deflect us, and we certainly know that Saddam can manipulate an inspection regime. But if we are not tough enough to hang firm in the U.N. for a 100-percent invasive, intrusive inspection regime, then I’m not sure we’re tough enough to go through with an invasion and everything that entails.

Senator BOXER. Well——

Mr. BERGER. It seems to me it is a useful vehicle for building legitimacy and explaining to the world why even if we don’t act pursuant to a U.N. resolution, we are acting with legitimacy.

Senator BOXER. Well, I thank you for that, because I really—in my mind, that was a tough resolution. They agreed to it. And I don’t know how—he can do whatever he wants about it, but common sense—the average American is going to look at that and say, “You’re hiding something, buddy.” And so is the world.

And I think the world fears those weapons of mass destruction, and I say that’s a first step, and I would like to see us get behind something very strong and do it soon.

I thank you.

Mr. Chairman, are you chairing? Senator, are you chairing?

Senator HAGEL [presiding]. Anything you want me to do, Senator. I’m here.

Senator BOXER. Well, you’re up there.

Senator HAGEL. Do you want to go vote?

Senator BOXER. I think so.

Senator HAGEL. Well, let’s recess and go vote, and we’ll come back. In the absence of the chairman, I’ll take control. This is revolution here, Mr. Secretary.

Senator BOXER. Yes, and I let you do it, the Boxer rebellion.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. The hearing will resume, please.

Gentlemen, the leadership said there may be a third vote immediately, but I’ve been here 30 years, and I know that that’s likely to take probably another 30 minutes for the third vote, so I’ve come back and I’ll ask my questions now. The reason others aren’t back yet is because I think they believe there may be a vote. But I don’t believe it. So we’ll start, and if I turn out to be wrong, we’ll have to interrupt again. And I do apologize to both of you for the interruptions.

Let me ask the question that we spent a good deal of time dwelling on in the three panels yesterday. And in both the classified briefings we have sought and gotten as well as the so-called outside experts we have all here privately consulted with, the question has been constantly raised, and that is that, is the circumstance different this time, from Desert Storm, 1991, in that, since the avowed purpose of using force against Saddam would be to change the regime, meaning go to Baghdad, unless we saw him on a, you
know, helicopter heading to someplace, that, in light of that, most of the people—well, I won’t say what they said—I’ve asked the question, is Saddam more likely to use chemical or biological weapons—and I limit it to that, because I’ve not heard a single voice suggest that, at this moment, they believe he has nuclear—is it more or less likely he would use chemical or biological weapons in one of three circumstances—one, against the invading U.S. forces moving on Baghdad of wherever; two, against the Israelis to widen the war into a regional war as one of his hopes for salvation; or, three, against his own people in a scorch-the-earth policy not unlike he did with, not chemical or biological weapons, but with conventional weapons, setting the oil fields of Kuwait on fire as he left?

So what probably do each of you assign to the likelihood of him using whatever weapons of mass destruction he has available to him this time? And if so, when and how do you think that would most likely occur? Either one of you and in whatever order.

Mr. Weinberger. Well, Senator, it’s pure guesswork, of course, as you know. Not only that, but I’m long out of office, and so I would be guessing.

First of all, you ask if conditions are different. One thing is different, and that is he has a lot fewer troops. He has a lot fewer tanks and a lot fewer infantry and a lot fewer artillery pieces than he had at that time. Sadly, we didn’t destroy the whole thing, but he’s left with a fair amount, but it’s a very much smaller amount. Roughly, I’d say 30 percent now of what he had at the start of the gulf war. So that’s one significant difference.

I don’t think there’s any predicting what a person like Saddam Hussein would do. I think we have to assume he’s not going to engage in useless acts. I think he would undoubtedly perhaps feel that if he’s being invaded and that there’s any kind of realistic sense of what’s going to happen, he would know that he probably couldn’t win. Whether or not he would use chemical or biological weapons, I, frankly, don’t know.

I think we have to assume that he’s not going to be held back by any of the normal restraints that a civilized person would be under. He’s used a gas against his own people up in the Kurdish north about 4 or 5 years ago—didn’t hesitate for a moment, because he felt they were in revolt against him, and they can’t tolerate any kind of revolt.

Whether or not he would try to do what he did in Kuwait is hard to say. On his way out of Kuwait, he set fire to all the remaining oil wells. I happened to be over there. I did go over there somewhere within about 5, 6 days after that war ended, and it was a—it just looked like every picture of purgatory you’ve ever seen painted, and it was all completely useless as far as the military was concerned, and he’s never made any effective compensation for it. So we’re dealing with a person who’s not bound by any normal restraints, and that’s why it’s hard to estimate what he would do.

He has far fewer resources, and I—it is at least possible that a campaign against him would go well enough so that he would not have very much time to engage in any nastiness. He’s got a lot of very, very unpleasant weapons. The VX explosives and chemical and various other things are very nasty pieces of equipment.
I don’t think I can help you by guessing, but I would guess that if we are successful, he wouldn’t have time to do very much damage. I doubt if he would use these weapons to widen the war, because I think he knows he would find very little support for that. I think the support that he thinks he’s amassing now is very chimerical and is based upon simply a feeling that if his neighbors, who uniformly hate him, speak loudly enough against our doing any invasion, that we may be discouraged from doing it. But whether he would try to widen the war or not, I don’t know. There would be no particular gain to him for doing it, but that might not necessarily stop him.

I think you’re dealing with a very unpredictable person who has no civilized restraints, and that argues even more strongly for getting rid of him as quickly as possible. Frankly, I wish we had done it at the end of the Gulf War.

The Chairman. Mr. Berger.

Mr. Berger. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Secretary Weinberger that Saddam is not likely to be bound by normal restraints in circumstances such as this, which he would see as essentially existential to his regime. So I think in devising a war plan—and I also agree with Secretary Weinberger, there’s been entirely too much babble in the press about various war scenarios—I think we would certainly have to anticipate this potential. It would, obviously, take you in the direction of trying to disrupt command and control as quickly as possible.

The dilemma here, of course, is how do you maintain even tactical surprise if you have to have a substantial buildup in order to accomplish your mission. But I think any war planning here would have to anticipate the potential or the possibility that he would use or threaten to use biological or chemical weapons against American forces, potentially against Israel in order to turn this into an Israeli-Arab war, and perhaps against his own people. I think that would have to be very much a part of our calculation in developing a war plan here.

The Chairman. One of the things that the first President Bush did that we’ve learned after the fact, is spent a lot of time with his top people talking with the Israelis and getting a commitment that if they were attacked, they would not respond. And I assume the reason for that was their concern that even though we had even stronger case in the region that he had invaded a country, occupied a country, violated every norm of international law, that if, in fact, Israel did respond in its own self interest, that there was a risk that it would turn from Saddam versus the coalition forces liberating an innocent country to the Israelis and the Arabs—or at least complicating matters.

And so I hope—as a matter of fact, I’m sure, we must be considering that possibility. I can tell you without revealing any war plans or anything—I don’t have any—is that the Israelis have spoken to me about that. The former Prime Minister spent 3½ hours with me talking about that. And that is, what happens if Israeli is attacked with chemical or biological weapons.

So I guess my question is this. Is it an important part of the planning process for a National Security Advisor or a Secretary of Defense to be recommending to the President, if he’s going to move,
what the President should or should not be saying to the Israelis or should or should not be planning relative to the use of these weapons—the potential use of these weapons?

Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Chairman, ordinarily, I don’t think the Secretary of Defense would get into that field. I was always accused of practicing foreign policy when I was Secretary of Defense, but we didn’t get to the—

The Chairman. I remember that.

Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. Basic point of telling the—or suggesting to the President that—

The Chairman. That’s a legacy I don’t think you’ve left.

Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. How he would respond to things of that kind.

The military’s job would be—and I assume that’s what’s going on now, but I don’t know—it would be to plan for an operation with a number of different contingencies. And they would plan to do essentially what would be quite normal, and that would be to assume that all kinds of options would be chosen against us, and that to make sure we had the material and the troops and the plans ready to deal with that, as well as the intelligence.

But whether or not that would include a guess as to what Saddam Hussein would do with whatever weapons he’s got, as far as recommendations to the President is concerned, I would think that would not be done. I think that what would be done would be that any war plans that might be developed would certainly include the ways to respond to whatever it was Saddam Hussein might decide to do. That would be part of the normal planning. I don’t think it would go beyond that. But in the course of doing that, if the President wanted to know what would happen if they used certain weapons of if they threatened to use certain weapons, I assume the military would tell him the basis on which they were planning to deal with a contingency like that, but I doubt if they would advocate a course of action.

Mr. Berger. Mr. Chairman, any war carries with it the potential of unexpected contingencies. You’re talking about an expected contingency, one that we can foresee, not as a certainty, but certainly as a possibility. And it would seem to me that it would be incumbent upon us to engage in very serious discussions with the Government of Israel quietly in advance of any such action.

I know there is a debate in Israel that took place after 1991 about whether Israel made the right decision in not retaliating against Scud attacks which were not associated with chemical weapons. And I can imagine it would be a very difficult decision for any elected Prime Minister of any country to not respond to a chemical-weapons attack on his own country.

So it is certainly not—if that were to happen—not out of the realm of possibility that Israel would respond. And I think that, again, this suggests the complexity of this operation. It doesn’t necessarily dictate whether we should or shouldn’t do it, but I think it would be surprising if we did not have a serious discussion with the Israelis about how that contingency would unfold.

The Chairman. I think one of the responsibilities I have as chairman of this committee is—and the reason why the administration is not here now—not demand they be here now—is that we not dis-
cuss operational plans here. And that has not occurred, and as long as I'm chairman, will not occur, although I don't think I'm going to admonish any member of this committee. They all agree, both sides of the aisle on that.

But one of the things it seems to me is our responsibility, because it is my sense—I could be wrong, but it's my sense that this President and his administration understand—whether or not they understand the constitutional responsibility, they understand the political value of having a Congress “with them” as they take off on an effort.

And from my discussions, although I want to make it clear I've got no firm commitment from anybody in this administration, but I have, at the White House, discussed the issue of whether or not authorization would be required in the absence of an al-Qaeda connection related to 9/11, in the absence of evidence of an imminent attack by Iraq, and the need for our participation, the Congress' participation and authorization. And so it's my distinct sense—I could be making a fool of myself here if it turns out wrong—my distinct sense that there will be no significant movement against Iraq, absent consultation with the Congress, and, like his father, a request for authorization.

I might note, parenthetically, if the right case is made, I think he'd get an overwhelming response, positive, to it if he demonstrated that there were certain things put in motion that would answer some questions for members.

The reason I bother to say that is this. It seems to me that part of our function as a committee, and the reason why we're seeking your advice and help, is that we should be laying out the nature of the threat and a range of opinions relative to the nature of the threat, and not only the nature of the threat, the timing of the threat, the timeframe in which we have to respond to the worst case, and then lay out for the American people what—not the certain costs are, but what the probable costs are in terms of everything from our treasure as it relates to life as well as it does to property and cost.

And so that's why I'm about to pursue a couple more questions with you—again, not—understanding that none of us know for certain what will happen once this is undertaken or even prior to it being undertaken, if it is undertaken.

The last gulf war, as a coalition, which went extremely well—a significant coalition, significant participation in the military undertaking as well as the aftermath—cost, in today's dollars, about $76 billion, I'm told. Is that about right? I think it was $60-some billion in Desert Storm. And, in today's dollars, I'm told it's in the $75 to $80 billion range. And of that, 80 percent of it was paid by the Japanese, the Europeans, and others.

Now, I want to make it clear, for me at least, that if I am convinced that Saddam has and is likely to use weapons of mass destruction, including the nuclear capability, I think we have to be prepared to pay any price—$70 billion, $100 billion, $150 billion, whatever it would take—to protect our interests. But if we have to go this alone, do either of you think—that is—when I say “go it alone,” the military action—do any of you think there is a likeli-
hood that the cost, in just dollar terms, would be significantly less than what it cost in Desert Storm?

Now, Mr. Secretary, you've indicated that they have—and I think it's a fairly wide consensus—considerably less conventional military capability than they had before. Does that translate into, if we pursue this as successfully alone as we did in conjunction with our allies last time, if we get basing rights, overflight rights, et cetera, that it could cost us considerably less?

Mr. Weinberger. Well, I think it's a function of, largely, Senator, as to how long it lasts. The costs of the military are there. The increased operational tempo that is required by a war is a very substantial exponential increase. And so that it depends entirely on how long it lasts.

Desert Storm lasted less than a hundred hours, and it was an expensive operation, of course, because we had to move troops so far and so many and—but, as you pointed out, a very substantial portion of that cost was picked up by grateful allies and very helpful allies.

So it obviously is to our interest in every way to try to assemble, if not the same coalition, at least as many as we can. And I suggested earlier, before the recess, that we would have less trouble doing that once those nations are assured that we are there to stay the course and that we intend to see it through.

I would suspect that, just on the basis of ordinary planning aided by some guesswork, of course, that an operation of the kind we may be talking about—and we don't know the extent of it, of course—I certainly don't—would be considerably less cost. But you're dealing with a reduced military on his part. You're dealing with assets that we have, and you're dealing really—basically, it's going to depend on just how it lasts, how long you have to keep this enormously increased operational tempo.

Mr. Berger. Mr. Chairman, I don't know how to estimate, at this point, the cost of the operation itself, but I do think that being able to convince, particularly the neighbors, that we're prepared to stay the course is extremely important. But I think staying the course, in this case, is not simply pushing the Iraqis back into Iraq in a very successful—an operation that all Americans were proud of that lasted, as the Secretary said, a hundred hours.

We're going to need to reassure the Turks and others in the region that staying the course means that they're not going to find the Kurds declaring independence or moving to get oil assets, that staying the course means that Iran is not tempted to take advantage of a weak American-imposed government.

So staying the course here, I think, is more than the buildup and the hundred-hour war. I think staying the course—and I—these are arbitrary figures when you try to say what that will mean—means convincing the region that our objective is to remove Saddam Hussein in a way that maximizes the prospects of stability in the region. And that's going to be important to their being willing partners—or at least acquiescing partners in this coalition and ultimately being willing to help pay the cost that it will take.

The Chairman. Well, that's sort of what I'm getting at here. Granted, it is possible that instead of us assembling and being responsible for assembling almost half a million men, not all Amer-
ican, pre-positioning them over a long period of time, and then conducting what was a very successful hundred-hour war, and then, in relatively short order, beginning to draw down those forces, this is premised upon, in the best-case scenario—I would call the best-case scenario—articulated by Secretary Weinberger that it would be better to go with others and not alone, but if we go alone, we go alone.

And if we do it as successfully as we did Desert Storm—that is, we meet the objective—the objective, a different objective this time, not just merely pushing Iraq out of Kuwait, but taking down a regime, which means somebody's got to go to Baghdad, in all probability, another 400 miles and a few other small problems—that then, if we did this successfully, we would find willing allies and assistance in helping us maintain the cost after the fact. After the fact, which could be—we've heard testimony today from serious people—and yesterday—that the costs could—and I'm not suggesting either of you agree, but the testimony we've heard from serious people, including—Colonel Feil, but that was yesterday—the military guy—my mind's blank here.

Thank you very much. I can rely upon the reporter. The Senate reporter points out Cordesman was the one who was a very serious guy, as well as today—Colonel Feil, with less experience, but still very, very knowledgeable.

They're talking about 75,000 troops staying and so on and so forth. Even if you don't get into those numbers, if you expect other forces—everybody—does anybody believe that it's possible to go in, take down Saddam and not have some foreign military presence, whether it's ours or not, in Iraq for at least the near term, meaning months, not a hundred hours, not a hundred days, but—well, that's a hundred days, in months, but months? I mean, aren't we at least signed onto that, just to literally physically assemble and order the forces from our allies who might, after the fact, be willing to come in—I mean, is that not—well, just logistically?

Mr. Weinberger. Again, it's a guess, Senator, but certainly some time would be required of us to demonstrate our consistency and our resolve.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Weinberger. I don't know how long that would be, and I don't know how many people would be involved. It would depend entirely on how well the military—

The Chairman. The reason—look, I'm not trying to—

Mr. Berger. Mr. Chairman, maybe I could add—

The Chairman [continuing]. Pin you guys down. I'm just trying to get—

Mr. Berger. Right, if I can just add one dimension to that. The task of forging some sort of government going forward, which has the support of Iraqis, strikes me as doable, but difficult. You have a wide variety of external opposition groups, a wide variety of internal opposition groups, all of whom I would think you'd want to draw upon in an exercise as part of at least the Iraqi piece of the coalition. They have not had a great record of staying together, even the two Kurdish groups, let alone all the others.

So there's going to be a period, it seems to me, when there is a vacuum of power, even though we may have installed some other
general, in the absence of some stabilizing presence. And that, it seems to me, has to come from——

The CHAIRMAN. The only reason I pursue this, again, in terms of sort of a full disclosure to the American people here, we are talking about more than several billion dollars, in terms of the cost of such an operation, and we are talking about tens of billions of dollars—I mean, granted, there’s probably less of a—assuming chemical and biological weapons aren’t used, which could greatly escalate the cost, in terms of human life and other ways, but there is also the requirement this time to stay longer, whatever that means. It could be weeks, it could be months, it could be, in some people’s minds, years, but it’s longer.

Mr. Weinberger. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. Weinberger. I think a great deal depends on our intentions. And I want to call your attention to a much smaller scale—not a replica of this operation, but Grenada. We went into Grenada with more troops than everybody thought we needed, and we had a very successful operation and prevented the kidnaping and detention of American students, and we got out, and we got out in something under a month. And a couple of months after that, there was a free election, and we have not been back.

Now, that is obviously a much smaller scale and it had different kinds of aspects to it, but the intention was very important, because the intention was to do just that——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. To get in and get out.

And I think that given that kind of same sort of intention, we could—depending on how success the military aspects are, we could not have to remain as long as some people are talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that may be a good jump-off point. If Grenada had sunk into the bottom of the Caribbean, the events of the world would not have changed, God love the Grenadians, if that’s the correct way to pronounce it. If Grenada had signed a security pact with the Soviet Union, it would not have made a whole lot of difference. Iraq is so fundamentally different in terms of this regard. You said, Mr. Secretary, I thought, that we have to demonstrate we have the staying power, that—not only to take Saddam down, I assume you meant, but to not walk away with the region more destabilized than when we arrived.

Mr. Weinberger. Now, that certainly is true, and I don’t know how long that would take, but a lot would depend on how many allies we had and how successful the military operation had been and what kind of conditions were left. And if you start from—if you have a complete military victory, then I would suggest that the rebuilding phase and the length of time for us to stay would be lessened.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I—by the way, I’m not disagreeing—that if we did it right, we could—I’m just trying to get broad parameters here. I would—I mean, look how long—I mean, some have compared the need here to be the kind of commitment after the fact we made to Japan and Germany. That’s one extreme. The other extreme is Grenada. And in between are experiences we had, like Kosovo and Bosnia, where we had broad coalition support, where
we had a significant success, where we routed the opposition, and where we still have 7,000 forces. But——

Mr. BERGER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BERGER. We learned the hard way in Bosnia that artificial deadlines are a mistake in a situation like that. We said we would be out in a year. I think that was an honest judgment at the time.

It was wrong.

And basically, we have to be prepared to stay as long as it takes until the conditions are such that a stable Iraq that is not threatening to its neighbors can exist. And I don’t think we’re ever going to be able to put a finer point on it than that, except “as long as it takes.”

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, again, I’m not looking for a very fine point. But we do know, in just broad macro terms, to have even the minimum number of forces that anyone has suggested in anything that’s been leaked or discussed that I’ve heard, we’re talking about tens of thousands of forces going in. We may not be talking about a quarter of a million. We may be talking about 75,000, but we’re talking a lot of forces. We’re talking about it taking more than a hundred hours—not the victory, but before we can leave.

And so, again, to give some sense of proportion to the American people when we ask them for their permission, through their Congress, to go in, if we ask them that——

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. I think we have an obligation to tell them this is going to cost a lot of money. I’m not suggesting we shouldn’t pay it, but it may cost a lot of money.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think that’s true, but I also think we should be pointing out the benefits——

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, by the way, I agree.

Mr. WEINBERGER [continuing]. Of a Saddam-free world. And I think that they have to be ground into the equation, and I think that’s a very major factor.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. I’m sorry, I thought I said at the outset—as I said at the outset, if we can make the case, which I think—well, I won’t say what I think yet; the hearings aren’t finished—but if we can make the case that the threat is real and dire, that a free and democratic Iraq, if it could be accomplished, could have a cleansing impact on that part of the world and make our life easier significantly down the road, which I think could be made in an ideal circumstance—not even an ideal, in a—if we do things right—that it is worth the price.

So I’m assuming we wouldn’t vote to give the President the authority to do this unless we thought that the price—or the potential damage to us was so significant, and the price of victory was worth it. But we then ultimately have to tell them what the price is. And I don’t mean in literal dollar terms; I mean in terms of reasonable things we could anticipate.

But I can anticipate, since my staff just said there’s 1 minute left in the vote, that my colleagues were more correct than I was about how certain the next vote was going to be. They’re probably literally on their way back. The first one in, please authorize them to begin the hearing. We’re not going to trespass on your time.
much longer, but I am going to have to go vote. So we'll recess until the first Senator, Democrat or Republican, returns, and we'll begin the questioning with them.

Thank you.

[Recess.]

Senator NELSON [presiding]. The committee will resume. Chairman Biden is just finishing up voting on the floor and will be here momentarily and asked me to go on. And we apologize to our witnesses, but when they call the votes—when the roll is called up yonder, one has to respond.

I wanted to ask both of you about your opinion with regard to the influence of radical fundamentalist groups operating in northern Iraq. Mr. Secretary?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, without certain knowledge, Senator—and I would disclaim that at the beginning—I think it is common knowledge that there are a great many of these groups in Iraq. I don't know if that's especially limited to the north—but the climate that is encouraged by Saddam Hussein is one that encourages them to gather.

Many of the Arab countries, particularly the moderate Arab countries, like Egypt, for example, are very worried about these people, and they take every step they can to make sure that they don't have undue influence on either policy or presence in the country.

I think Iraq is quite the contrary. I think they welcome them, because I think they do—as far as I know—they used to do a substantial amount of training of these people and preparing to unleash them on the world. So I would think that there is a substantial infestation of radical Muslim groups and know that the country is hospitable to them and that they can operating with more freedom they can in countries that are opposed to them.

Mr. BERGER. Senator, I obviously don't have access to the same—the same degree of access to the intelligence as I had a little more than a year ago. So ultimately this obviously was a question that has to be posed to the intelligence community.

Iraq, historically, has supported terrorist organizations, primarily PKK, directed toward Turkey, the MEK, directed toward Iran. I know that there is some evidence of support of late for groups involved in support of the Palestinians against Israel.

Historically there has not been a close relationship between Saddam Hussein and his regime and Islamic Jihadist fundamentalists. They see Saddam—have seen Saddam as a secularist. He's killed more Islamic clerics than he's killed Americans. They have, of course, at this point, a common enemy, and that's why this is something we have to be very attentive to and certainly be very vigilant about.

But historically there has not been close relationship the Saddam Hussein regime and the al-Qaeda, bin Laden, Islamic Jihadist movement.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Secretary, you had stated, I think, in your actual remarks that you thought that there was a connection with al-Qaeda. Would you elucidate and expand on that?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes; well, the initial reports were that there were some small groups of al-Qaeda wandering around up in the
northern area, in the mountain area, working across the border with Iran and so on. There is a lot more than that now. They have been welcomed to the country, officially. Some of them are being paid as martyrs by Saddam Hussein. And the information about al-Qaeda in Baghdad that I’ve been told when I inquired is from senior intelligence officials who did not wish to be otherwise identified but, of course, would testified at a closed hearing. I am told it’s reliable by people with whom I have great confidence. And I think that it might well be a good idea to have a closed hearing on the subject. I would not be able to contribute more than I already have, but I am told that that is the case, that the al-Qaeda groups are welcome and that they are being supported, their families are being supported, on the theory that they—some of them are martyrs from Palestine and Afghanistan and that they will continue to be found useful by Saddam Hussein for the people with whom he deals.

Senator Nelson. Do you think that Saddam Hussein would share weapons of mass destruction with such groups?

Mr. Weinberger. Well, I don’t know if he’d share them or not. I think he would—he would not be above allowing them to help in the delivery of them or in the construction of them or as part of his general plan. I know there’s a theory around that he wouldn’t share them because he wants to have them all to himself, but my belief is that he would utilize anybody that he could find, and he doesn’t have very many outside allies, and he has quite a few inside enemies. But I think he’d share the use of them and allow them to participate in his—whatever plans he has. I don’t think he would hand them the weapons and turn away, no. But I don’t think that that’s—I think that’s a technical distinction that isn’t very relevant.

Senator Nelson. I’m quite interested in exploring this question of connection with al-Qaeda, because we haven’t seen a lot of commentary about that.

Mr. Berger.

Mr. Berger. Senator, first of all, in terms of connection to al-Qaeda, I can’t speak to that directly. I know that the intelligence community has been looking rigorously at the issue of whether there is a connection, over the last 10 months. And obviously it would be important to hear from them as to what they’ve established.

With respect—to me, the greatest threat Saddam poses—and you can’t rule out, obviously, the possibility of his sharing weapons of mass destruction with terrorist organizations. He has had chemical weapons for over a decade and has not taken that course. To me, the greater threat is his own use of weapons of mass destruction as a deterrent or directly. And specifically what I worry about most is his obtaining a nuclear capability and believing that the possession of that capability would dissuade the United States, therefore, from responding to an aggression by Saddam Hussein in the gulf to seek to extend his influence, his hegemony, in the gulf. So there, obviously, is the potential of his sharing weapons of mass destruction with terrorist groups. It has not been his pattern to date. I think we should—I suspect the intelligence community is looking
under every rock for a connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, and I encourage that. But I can't speak to it directly.

Senator Nelson. Is it your understanding that his threat of chemical and biological warfare was one of the reasons that we did not move on Baghdad 11 years ago in the gulf war?

Mr. Berger. Well, I—Secretary Weinberger could speak to this—you know, I accept President Bush—first President Bush's explanation at face value on that, whether, in hindsight, we agree or not, which is that he had a coalition—he had constructed a coalition around a purpose, which was to expel—to defeat the aggression of Iraq into Kuwait. Having accomplished that, President Bush has said he felt that, in a sense, the mandate of that coalition no longer existed.

I think, obviously, with hindsight, had we continued on for several more days and at least eliminated the Republican Guard units, we might not be facing this problem at this point. But I don't know that I've ever heard this articulated in terms of fear of use of chemical weapons. In fact, as you know, of course, there was a very explicit warning issued to Saddam Hussein with respect to use of chemical weapons against third countries—Israel, Saudi Arabia—which obviously had a deterrent effect in that context.

The Chairman [presiding]. Will the Senator yield on that point for a just a moment?

Senator Nelson. I would yield to the chairman.

The Chairman. We heard testimony yesterday from one of the witnesses saying that they thought that the reason—-they thought, in their discussions with Iraqis, that Iraqis believe and Saddam's cadre believed that the reason we stopped was because they had chemical and biological weapons. I have not heard anyone assert that the reason President Bush decided to stop was his fear of concern about or thought that chemical weapons would be used against American forces. And so—but I've not heard anybody make the assertion that President Bush, one, stopped because of concern about chemical or biological weapons.

Mr. Weinberger. I was not in office at that time, Senator, but I agree with you, I have not heard that, and I think if you look at the timeframe, it's not at all credible, because the war was over in such a short time, and there were a number of people who felt that the televised pictures of the road into the southern part of Iraq had been littered with all of the equipment and tanks and everything that we destroyed and that this might look a little too bloodthirsty and we would have a chance to get an acceptable peace.

I think the fatal error was in believing you could trust Saddam Hussein. And you can't, you couldn't, and you never can in the future. But I don't think that it had any connection between the chemical warfare capability, whatever it was at that time.

The Chairman. To beg the indulgence of my colleagues just a minute more, the context in which this discussion took place yesterday was whether or not deterrence worked. And it was argued by one of the witnesses that deterrence worked, the threat of annihilation essentially issued by Bush, one, to Saddam was the reason why Saddam did not use his chemical or biological weapons. Another witness responded and said, "Well, in Iraq they say the reason we didn't keep going was a threat that Saddam would use
them.” Deterrence doesn’t work, deterrence does. If we believed that threatening him and his very existence of his regime with massive retaliation were he to use them, then obviously it alters the equation of whether or not there is a requirement to move, whether containment works, and so on. That was the context of the discussion.

Mr. BERGER. I think there is some evidence that deterrence worked in the context of the 1991 gulf war with respect to Israel. Obviously, the equation is different in a situation where the purpose of the exercise is the removal of Saddam. And I think that we have to do—would have to do our planning and calculations based upon less than certainty that under those circumstances deterrence would work or at least define some device by which deterrence is consistent with the removal of Saddam Hussein.

Mr. WEINBERGER. He was not above a lot of those things, but if you look at what he did on the way out of Kuwait, all of that had no military value whatever, but it was pure beastliness and resulted in a very, very large amount of damage long after there had been an agreement that the war would end.

Senator NELSON. We’ve asked the following question of other witnesses, and I’d like to get your opinions. Do you think that weapons inspections would satisfy the concerns that we have about Iraq’s weapons-of-mass-destruction programs?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I’m sorry, I didn’t get the first part.

Senator NELSON. Would weapons inspections—

Mr. WEINBERGER. Oh, yes.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Satisfy our concerns about their WMD program?

Mr. WEINBERGER. No, I don’t think so, because I don’t think we ever would be allowed any kind of intrusive inspection of the kind that’s necessary, and that’s why I think it’s so silly to keep talking about relying on the United Nations. We’ve been there 4 years ago. We got all the fine resolutions that we wanted, but nobody pays any attention to them.

And you have to bear in mind that a great deal of what they do is underground, and we have splendid satellites and all kinds of good equipment, but they can’t look underground. And in the absence of being allowed to go wherever we want based upon whatever intelligence reports or rumors or anything else we pick up, in the absence of that, no inspection is going to be, in any sense, adequate, and any inspection is subject to having the actual things that he wants hidden, and 4 years have gone by. So I—without any inspections—so I would imagine that anything that was at all useful or interesting has long since been hidden or moved to what they consider to be a secure location.

No, I think U.N. inspections is an idea that has been tried and doesn’t work and we shouldn’t feel that it would give us any kind of security whatever.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER. I think there’s one other dimension, however, to this issue. I am skeptical that we could achieve a weapons inspection regime—let’s say the one outlined by Ambassador Gallucci yesterday that was robust, that actually had some military pop behind
it, unfettered, that would alleviate our concerns about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.

However, I do think that the process of seeking that kind of robust, unfettered regime is a useful device in focusing the world back on Saddam Hussein and away from us. He would have to explain why he doesn't want the world in, why he won't accept this. And the moral balance here shifts from whether we're acting unilaterally, whether we're acting legitimately, to what does he have to hide? Why won't he let the world in? So as a tactical matter, I do believe that we can use an absolutist position in the United Nations, an uncompromising, absolutist position, to serve our purpose of gaining some greater support in the world for an action we may have to take.

Mr. Weinberger. Well, I would have to disagree, Mr. Chairman. You're never going to get an absolutist position out of the United Nations.

Mr. Berger. No, I'm talking about an absolutist position by the United States.

Mr. Weinberger. Yes, I know, and——

Mr. Berger. I believe——

Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. We can be very insistent, and they will do what they've always done. If Saddam knows that that's what we want, he'll say yes, and then when we go in, he'll say, "Oh, yes, but," and you haven't focused world opinion any more than you have now. He's had 4 years in which he has succeeded in throwing out an absolute U.N. resolution. And asking for it again is asking for more useless promises from him.

Mr. Berger. Well——

Mr. Weinberger. And that's essentially what you're doing, that he may give a useless promise, and then all you've done is given him more time to develop these weapons.

Mr. Berger. Well, I assume that we have the control of our own vote, and I assume that if we have the tenacity to go to war in Iraq, we have the tenacity to stand out ground in New York.

And, therefore, if we say we will only accept a regime which we define as being an absolutist regime, one of two things will happen. He will say no, in which case I believe we're in a stronger position internationally, or he will say yes, in which case the inspectors will go in, and he will play games with them, and a very clear causus belli will have been established.

So I don't see inspections as a very probable way of solving the WMD problem. I do see it as a useful mechanism for focusing the world back on Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction, and the threat that he poses.

Mr. Weinberger. If I disagreed again, I'd simply be repeating myself, so I won't take your time for that.

Senator Nelson. Well, I'll ask you this final question. Then I'm going to turn it over to Senator Feingold.

Give us your opinion if the President should consult with Congress before taking military action in Iraq.

Mr. Weinberger. Well, I think it's always desirable to have congressional support, and I think there certainly would be and should be consultation. I think that we have to have in mind the Executive capabilities, the Executive prerogatives under the Constitution.
And while I realize that doesn’t involve declaring war, it does have
the idea of giving the President very substantial freedom to do the
things that he considers necessary in foreign policy.

I think Madison perhaps said it best in the Federalist, “In for-

eign policy, the President is all.” But I think there should be con-
sultation. I think there would be. I think it’s very desirable to have
a full discussion of it. I think these hearings are very useful. I con-
gratulate the chairman and you on holding them.

I think that—I said some time ago, in setting out some criteria
as to when we should our forces, that it is desirable to have as
much support, certainly including congressional support, as you
can, because I don’t think you could fight a war against an enemy
and against public opinion or congressional opinion, and I don’t
think you should try to do it in a democracy.

So, yes, I think there should be consultation. I think there would
be.

Mr. BERGER. I’ve discovered, Senator, that your view on—what
one’s view of this subject depends on which end of Pennsylvania
Avenue you happen to be sitting on at the time.

But I do think that this is a major undertaking. The United
States, in a sense, would be initiating a war, not without provo-
cation, not without—necessarily without justification, but that has
not generally been the way we’ve been—we’ve fought wars. It’s not
unique. I do believe this is a major undertaking, and I believe it’s
important for the American people to be supportive.

You know, when I speak publicly, I often ask audiences, “Should
we get Saddam Hussein?” And 75, 80, 90 percent of the hands go
up. But I think that that question ought to be asked after people
have had a lively and informed consent in the sense that they un-
derstand this is not easy, this is a risky proposition, but the threat
is also a serious one.

So I think Congress becomes, as always, the vehicle for express-
ing American public support. And we’ve learned in the past that
without sustained American public support, we can get ourselves in
trouble.

Senator NELSON. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
the courtesy of Senator Lugar, as well. I’ve had a chance to attend
each of the five sessions here, and I’m really glad I had chance to
hear some of this.

I particularly appreciate the last exchange. I certainly come
down on the side of Mr. Berger with regard to the issue of whether
or not the Executive can simply go forward with this. In fact, I—
to me, it’s not just a question of whether it’s advisable for Congress
to do this. I think it’s—all the arguments about how airing this
with the American people and through Congress is very important.
But I also believe it is constitutionally required that the U.S. Con-
gress pass a resolution in the—under these circumstances, given
the kind of operation that’s being discussed.

There is, in my view, no authority or evidence, to this point,
that’s been presented to me, as a Member of Congress, that—under
Senate Joint Resolution 23, that we can act against Iraq without
actual proof that Iraq was involved with September 11. I also be-
lieve that the 1991 authorization simply cannot be used as a jus-
tification for the kind of operation that Mr. Berger was just referring to.

But I do appreciate your being here, and let me just ask a couple of questions. What would be the cost to the multilateral coalition against terrorism if the United States were to begin a major military operation in Iraq tomorrow, sort of in concrete terms? What diplomatic work would need to be done to reduce the costs? Would our allies, or even states that are not allies, need certain commitments from us? And is it possible to significantly reduce those costs? For either one of you.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, I would say that you certainly should expend a great deal of time and effort in trying to rebuild a major coalition. I think that this involves a considerable degree of consultation ahead of time. I think that it's important for those nations to be with us, and I think those consultations can continue what has actually been started, as I understand it—that is, the persuasion that we are serious, that we do make—plan to make a major commitment, and we plan to win. And I think that that needs to be done and emphasized in whatever way it can be done consistent with security of the operation, with all of our potential allies, including the existing ones.

And obviously some of the moderate Arab nations should be brought in, as they were last time. We had—I think we had 31 nations in the gulf war coalition, and I think that it worked extremely well, and I think we should certainly try to reconstitute as much of that as we can.

Senator FEINGOLD. How much success do you think we will have? How many of those countries do you think we can get?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I think, as I said earlier, I think before you were here, that success has many allies. And I think that if it's quite clear we're going in with the resources that we have and the resources necessary to win, that we'll pick up quite a few.

And I think we have to realize the hatred that is felt for Saddam Hussein in the region. And his neighbors know him. And what they're afraid of is being caught out on a limb in which we've started down a road and turned back. They live there. They're there all the time. We're not.

So I think that's a real fear that they have, and I think that has to be overcome, and I think it can be done best by consultation, by discussions ahead and by major efforts made to reconstitute as much of the coalition as we can.

I don't have any idea how many we would get. Probably not 31 at the beginning. But as things went on, and if the military operation showed signs of success, I would dare to venture that we'd pick up quite a few.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Weinberger.

Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER. Senator, let me first make a distinction I made in my earlier remarks. I think the fight against terrorists and the threat of Saddam Hussein, while they are related, are not identical. We had a—Saddam was a threat before 9/11, and he's a threat whether or not he links up with terrorists. Therefore, it seems to me, one way to look at your question is what is—what is the cost,
in terms of the fight—the clearest and present terrorist threat—that is, the al-Qaeda, the Islamic Jihaddist militants?

We’re now in a phase of that, which I believe is a continuing threat. I believe the President is right, that we will be struck again. And I think he’s right to say that and to press that to the fullest.

We are now at a phase where military action is only one dimension, and may be a dimension of diminishing returns, in terms of the fight against—we’ll call it al-Qaeda, the militant Islamic Jihaddist extremists. This now requires cooperation. It requires intelligence cooperation, it requires law-enforcement cooperation, it requires political cooperation to take down al-Qaeda cells as we did in Singapore, as we’re doing in the Philippines and in Indonesia and elsewhere.

So how do we preserve that support as we go into Iraq? And it seems to me a few things are important. No. 1, as I’ve said before, I do believe that it is important that the international community see us engaged in trying to end the violence and bring a new dynamic to the Middle East, because, at least with respect to potential support from the Arab countries that neighbor on Iraq, it will be more difficult if we are seen as not deeply engaged, not actively, energetically, consistently trying to stop the strategy of terror on the part of the Palestinians and to end the violence in the region.

Second of all, I think we have to make our case—I agree with the Secretary that power does have a magnetic pull, and the exercise of power is, in some ways, self-reinforcing, but is it not, in my judgment, sufficient.

It is important, I believe, that the world see what we’re doing as a legitimate act. That doesn’t mean—we’re not going to get a U.N. resolution passed to do this, but I don’t believe that we can be seen as acting on old business. And, therefore, we have to make our case to the world. And it seems to me, if we can make the case to the Senate and Congress and we can make the case to the American people, we ought to be able to make the case to our friends and allies. And if we can’t make that case, then, we—acting alone is going to be, perhaps under extreme circumstances, necessary, but much more difficult.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thanks to both of you.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we’ve taken you longer than usually, but, as I said, you’re pros, you’re not surprised, I guess.

I want to make it clear, which I hope it’s clear—I know it’s clear to both of you that—we’ve completed two days of hearings. There’s much more to explore and—as I said, and Secretary Weinberger implied, I fully expect the administration will consult with this committee and with the Congress as a whole. And this is just the beginning of the process here.

The debate, discussion, and decisionmaking goes on at the White House now, and it will continue to occur here. Both the Congress and the President have some difficult decisions to make here. Ultimately, whatever course of action is taken will be proposed by the President, and we will respond. And it is my hope and expectation that we have at least shed some light on the complexity of the problem, but I do not leave after 2 days concluding that it is not
a soluble problem, that it is not a problem—that is, Saddam Hussein—that we can succeed in our objective, which I said at the outset, either we separate him from his weapons, or him from Iraq. And I think the latter is the more likely thing to happen, but I think it does matter how we do it, when we do it, and that the American people are fully informed and we have their fully informed consent.

So you’ve been, as usual, both very good, and I cannot promise you I will not ask you back again. My expectation is I will be asking you again. I hope you will be as accommodating with your time as you have been in the past when we resume these hearings.

I want to congratulate the staff—Tony Blinken, the new staff director, as well as the Republican staff director, and all the staffs for putting together what I hope everyone understands was a truly bipartisan and thoroughly balanced discussion of the problems that we face and the opportunities we have.

And so we will—I leaned back to you a moment ago and indicated that I hope they will—not hope—I have asked them, so I do hope, since I’ve asked them, that they will summarize what we have learned here for us and put together a proposal for Senator Lugar and me—and hopefully, by then, Senator Helms and me—to consider as we proceed in the fall with further discussion of the issues relating to Iraq.

With that, gentlemen, unless you have a closing comment——

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I would like to thank you and thank the committee and thank you, first of all for having the debate and thank you for the very fair and decent manner in which it’s been conducted and in which we all had, not only an opportunity, but a very ample opportunity, to explain all of our views. So I congratulate you. I’m glad you had the hearings, and I will look forward to whatever comes out of it.

Mr. BERGER. And I certainly share that view, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you all very much. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS BENNIS, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES

Nelson Mandela was right when he said that attacking Iraq would be “a disaster.” A U.S. invasion of Iraq would risk the lives of U.S. military personnel and inevitably kill thousands of Iraqi civilians; it is not surprising that many U.S. military officers, including some within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are publicly opposed to a new war against Iraq. Such an attack would violate international law and the UN Charter, and isolate us from our friends and allies around the world. An invasion would prevent the future return of UN arms inspectors, and will cost billions of dollars urgently needed at home. And at the end of the day, an invasion will not insure stability, let alone democracy, in Iraq or the rest of the volatile Middle East region, and will put American civilians at greater risk of hatred and perhaps terrorist attacks than they are today.

PURPORTED LINKS TO TERRORISM

It is now clear that (despite intensive investigative efforts) there is simply no evidence of any Iraqi involvement in the terror attacks of September 11. The most popular theory, of a Prague-based collaboration between one of the 9/11 terrorists and
an Iraqi official, has now collapsed. Just two weeks ago, the Prague Post quoted the director general of the Czech foreign intelligence service UZSI (Office of Foreign Relations and Information), Frantisek Bublan, denying the much-touted meeting between Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, and an Iraqi agent.

More significantly, the Iraqi regime’s brutal treatment of its own population has generally not extended to international terrorist attacks. The State Department’s own compilation of terrorist activity in its 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism, released May 2002, does not document a single serious act of international terrorism by Iraq. Almost all references are either to political statements made or not made or hosting virtually defunct militant organizations.

We are told that we must go to war preemptively against Iraq because Baghdad might, some time in the future, succeed in crafting a dangerous weapon and might, some time in the future, give that weapon to some unknown terrorist group—maybe Osama bin Laden—who might, some time in the future, use that weapon against the U.S. The problem with this analysis, aside from the fact that preemptive strikes are simply illegal under international law, is that it ignores the widely known historic antagonism between Iraq and bin Laden. According to the New York Times, “shortly after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, Osama bin Laden approached Prince Sultan bin Abdelaziz al-Saud, the Saudi defense minister, with an unusual proposition. . . . Arriving with maps and many diagrams, Mr. Bin Laden told Prince Sultan that the kingdom could avoid the indignity of allowing an army of American unbelievers to enter the kingdom to repel Iraq from Kuwait. He could lead the fight himself, he said, at the head of a group of former mujahideen that he said could number 100,000 men.” Even if bin Laden’s claim to be able to provide those troops was clearly false, bin Laden’s hostility towards the ruthlessly secular Iraq remained evident. There is simply no evidence that has changed.

Ironically, an attack on Iraq would increase the threat to U.S. citizens throughout the Middle East and perhaps beyond, as another generation of young Iraqis come to identify Americans only as the pilots of high-flying jet bombers and as troops occupying their country. While today American citizens face no problems from ordinary people in the streets of Baghdad or elsewhere in Iraq, as I documented during my visit to Iraq with five Congressional staffers in August 1999, that situation would likely change in the wake of a U.S. attack on Iraq. In other countries throughout the Middle East, already palpable anger directed at U.S. threats would dramatically escalate and would provide a new recruiting tool for extremist elements bent on harm to U.S. interests or U.S. citizens. It would become far more risky for U.S. citizens to travel abroad.

THE HUMAN TOLL

While estimates of casualties among U.S. servicepersonnel are not public, we can be certain they will be much higher than in the current war in Afghanistan. We do know, from Pentagon estimates of two years ago, the likely death toll among Iraqi civilians: about 10,000 Iraqi civilians would be killed. And the destruction of civilian infrastructure such as water, electrical and communications equipment, would lead to tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of more civilian deaths, particularly among children, the aged and others of the most vulnerable sectors. We can anticipate that such targeted attacks would be justified by claims of “dual use.” But if we look back to the last U.S. war with Iraq, we know that the Pentagon planned and carried out knowing and documenting the likely impact on civilians. In one case, Pentagon planners anticipated that striking Iraq’s civilian infrastructure would cause “Increased incidence of diseases [that] will be attributable to degradation of normal preventive medicine, waste disposal, water purification/distribution, electricity, and decreased ability to control disease outbreaks. . . .” The Defense Intelligence Agency document (from the Pentagon’s Gulflink Web site), “Disease Information—Subject: Effects of Bombing on Disease Occurrence in Baghdad” is dated 22 January 1991, just six days after the war began. It itemized the likely outbreaks to include: “acute diarrhea” brought on by bacteria such as E. coli, shigella, and salmonella, or by protozoa such as giardia, which will affect “particularly children,” or by rotavirus, which will also affect “particularly children.” And yet the bombing of the water treatment systems proceeded, and indeed, according to UNICEF figures, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, “particularly children,” died from the effects of dirty water.

The most recent leaked military plan for invading Iraq, the so-called “inside-out” plan based on a relatively small contingent of U.S. ground troops with heavy reli-

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...ance on air strikes, would focus first and primarily on Baghdad. The Iraqi capital is described as being ringed with Saddam Hussein's crack troops and studded with anti-aircraft batteries. What is never mentioned in the report is the inconvenient fact that Baghdad is also a crowded city of four to five million people; a heavy air bombardment would cause the equivalent human catastrophe of heavy air bombardment of Los Angeles.

THE U.S. AND OUR ALLIES

There is no international support, at the governmental or public level, for a U.S. attack on Iraq. Our closest allies throughout Europe, in Canada, and elsewhere, have made clear their opposition to a military invasion. While they recognize the Iraqi regime as a brutal, undemocratic regime, they do not support a unilateral preemptive military assault as an appropriate response to that regime. Yes, it is certain that if the U.S. announces it is indeed going to war, that most of those governments would grudgingly follow along. When President Bush repeats his mantra that “you are either with us or with the terrorists,” there is not a government around the world prepared to stand defiant. But a foreign policy based on international coercion and our allies’ fear of retaliation for noncompliance, is not a policy that will protect Americans and our place in the world.

In the Middle East region, only Israel supports the U.S. build-up to war in Iraq. The Arab states, including our closest allies, have made unequivocal their opposition to an invasion of Iraq. Even Kuwait, once the target of Iraqi military occupation and ostensibly the most vulnerable to Iraqi threats, has moved to normalize its relations with Baghdad. The Arab League-sponsored rapprochement between Iraq and Kuwait at the March 2002 Arab Summit is now underway, including such long-overdue moves as the return of Kuwait’s national archives. Iraq has now repaired its relations with every Arab country. Turkey has refused to publicly announce its agreement to allow use of its air bases, and Jordan and other Arab countries have made clear their urgent plea for the U.S. to abjure a military attack on Iraq.

Again, it is certain that not a single government in the region would ultimately stand against a U.S. demand for base rights, use of airspace or overflight rights, or access to any other facilities. The question we must answer therefore is not whether our allies will ultimately accede to our wishes, but just how big a price are we prepared to exact from our allies? Virtually every Arab government, especially those most closely tied to the U.S. (Jordan and Egypt, perhaps even Saudi Arabia) will face dramatically escalated popular opposition. The existing crisis of legitimacy faced by these undemocratic, repressive, and non-representative regimes, monarchies and president-for-life style democracies, will be seriously exacerbated by a U.S. invasion of Iraq. Region-wide instability will certainly result, and some of those governments might even face the possibility of being overthrown.

THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

We claim to be a nation of laws. But too often we are prepared to put aside the requirements of international law and the United Nations Charter to which we hold other nations appropriately accountable.

When it comes to policy on Iraq, the U.S. has a history of sideling the central role that should be played by the United Nations. This increasingly unilateralist trajectory is one of the main reasons for the growing international antagonism towards the U.S. By imposing its will on the Security Council—insisting on the continuation of economic sanctions when virtually every other country wants to lift them, announcing its intention to ignore the UN in deciding whether to go to war against Iraq—the U.S. isolates us from our allies, antagonizes our friends, and sets our nation apart from the international systems of laws that govern the rest of the world. This does not help, but rather undermines, our long-term security interests.

International law does not allow for preemptive military strikes, except in the case of preventing an immediate attack. We simply do not have the right—no country does—to launch a war against another country that has not attacked us. If the Pentagon had been able to scramble a jet to take down the second plane flying into the World Trade Center last September, that would be a legal use of preemptive self defense. An attack on Iraq—which does not have the capacity, and has not for a decade or more shown any specific intention or plan or effort to attack the U.S.—violates international law and the UN Charter.

The Charter, in Article 51, outlines the terms under which a Member State of the United Nations may use force in self-defense. That Article acknowledges a nation’s “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” [Emphasis added.]
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The Charter does not allow military force to be used absent an armed attack having occurred. Some administration spokespeople are fond of a sound-bite that says “the UN Charter is not a suicide pact.” Others like to remind us that Iraq (and other nations) routinely violate the Charter. Both statements are true. But the United States has not been attacked by Iraq, and there is simply no evidence that Iraq is anywhere close to being able to carry out such an attack. The U.S. is the strongest international power— in terms of global military reach, economic, cultural, diplomatic and political power—that has ever existed throughout history. If the United States does not recognize the UN Charter and international law as the foundation of global society, how can we expect others to do so?

**HOW DO WE GET SERIOUS ABOUT MILITARY SANCTIONS?**

Denying Iraq access to weapons is not sufficient, nor can it be maintained as long as Iraq is surrounded by some of the most over-armed states in the world. An immediate halt on all weapons shipments to all countries in the region would be an important step towards containing military threats. We should expand our application of military sanctions as defined in UN Resolution 687. Military sanctions against Iraq should be tightened—by expanding them to a system of regional military sanctions, thus lowering the volatility of this already arms-glutted region. Article 14 of resolution 687 recognizes that the disarmament of Iraq should be seen as a step towards “the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons.”

**WHAT ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS?**

We are told we must attack Iraq preemptively so that it can never obtain nuclear weapons. While we know from IAEA inspectors that Iraq’s nuclear program was destroyed by the end of 1998, we do not know what has developed since. We do know, however, that Iraq does not have access to fissile material, without which any nuclear program is a hollow shell. And we know where fissile material is. Protection of all nuclear material, including reinstatement of the funding for protection of Russian nuclear material, must be a continuing priority. We should note that U.S. officials are threatening a war against Iraq, a country known not to possess nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, the administration is continuing appropriate negotiations with North Korea, which does have something much closer to nuclear weapons capacity. Backed by IAEA inspections, the model of negotiations and inspections is exactly what the U.S. should be proposing for Iraq.

**INSPECTIONS**

There has been no solid information regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction since UNSCOM and IAEA arms inspectors left Iraq in December 1998 in advance of the U.S. Desert Fox bombing operation. Prior to their leaving, the inspectors’ last report (November 1998) stated that although they had been stymied by Iraqi non-compliance in carrying out some inspections, “the majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with Iraq’s cooperation.” The IAEA report was unequivocal that Iraq no longer had a viable nuclear program. The UNSCOM report was less definitive, but months earlier, in March 1998, UNSCOM chief Richard Butler said that his team was satisfied there was no longer any nuclear or long-range missile capability in Iraq, and that UNSCOM was “very close” to completing the chemical and biological phases.2

Since that time, there have been no verifiable reports regarding Iraq’s WMD programs. It is important to get inspectors back into Iraq, but U.S. threats have made that virtually impossible by setting a “negative incentive” in place. If Baghdad believes that a U.S. military strike as well as the maintaining of crippling economic sanctions, will take place regardless of their compliance with UN resolutions regarding inspections, they have no reason to implement their own obligations. If the United States refuses to abide by the rule of international law, why are we surprised when an embattled and tyrannical government does so?

Throughout the 1980s Baghdad received from the U.S. high-quality germ seed stock for anthrax, botulism, E.coli, and a host of other deadly diseases. (The Commerce Department’s decisions to license those shipments, even after revelations of

Iraq’s 1988 use of illegal chemical weapons, are documented in the 1994 hearings of the Banking Subcommittee. It is certainly possible that scraps of Iraq’s earlier biological and chemical weapons programs remain in existence, but there is no evidence Iraq has the ability or missile capacity to use them against the U.S. or U.S. allies. The notion that the U.S. would go to war against Iraq because of the existence of tiny amounts of biological material, insufficient for use in missiles or other strategic weapons and which the U.S. itself provided during the years of the U.S.-Iraq alliance in the 1980s, is simply unacceptable.

WHAT ABOUT THE OPPOSITION?

General Zinni has described an opposition-led attack on Iraq as turning the country into a “Bay of Goats.” Nothing has changed since that time. Almost none of the exile-based opposition has a credible base inside the country. There is no Iraqi equivalent to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to serve as ground troops to bolster a U.S. force. Some of the exile leaders closest to the U.S. have been wanted by Interpol for crimes in Jordan and elsewhere. The claim that they represent a democratic movement simply cannot be sustained.

WHAT HAPPENS AFTER “REGIME CHANGE”?

There is no democratic opposition ready to take over. Far more likely than the creation of an indigenous, popularly-supported democratic Iraqi government, would be the replacement of the current regime with one virtually indistinguishable from it except for the man at the top. In February 2002 Newsweek magazine profiled the five leaders said to be on Washington’s short list of candidates to replace Saddam Hussein. The Administration has not publicly issued such a list of its own (though we should note they did not dispute the list), but it certainly typifies the model the U.S. has in mind. All five of them were high-ranking officials within the Iraqi military until the mid-1990s. All five have been linked to the use of chemical weapons by the military; at least one, General al-Shammari, admits it. Perhaps we should not be surprised by Washington’s embrace of military leaders potentially guilty of war crimes; General al-Shammari told Newsweek he assessed the effect of his howitzer-fired chemical weapons by relying on “information from American satellites.”

But the legitimacy of going to war against a country to replace a brutal military leader with another brutal military leader, knowingly promoting as leaders of a “post-Saddam Iraq” a collection of generals who have apparently committed heinous war crimes, must be challenged.

And whoever is installed in Baghdad by victorious U.S. troops, it is certain that a long and likely bloody occupation would follow. The price would be high; Iraqis know better than we do how their government has systematically denied them civil and political rights. But they hold us responsible for stripping them of economic and social rights—the right to sufficient food, clean water, education, medical care—that together form the other side of the human rights equation. Economic sanctions have devastated Iraqi society—and among other effects, the sanctions have made the U.S. responsible for the immiseration of most of the entire Iraqi population. After twelve years, those in Washington who believe that Iraqis accept the popular inside-the-Beltway mantra that “sanctions aren’t responsible, Saddam Hussein is responsible” for hunger and deprivation in Iraq, are engaged in wishful thinking. The notion that everyone in Iraq will welcome as “liberators” those whom most Iraqis hold responsible for 12 years of crippling sanctions is simply naive. Basing a military strategy on such wishful speculation becomes very dangerous—in particular for U.S. troops themselves.
Perhaps even more important than these relief and development efforts has been MCC’s focus on relationship-building. In addition to having MCC staff present in Baghdad since 1998, MCC has sponsored numerous learning trips to Iraq. As director of MCC’s Washington Office I traveled to Iraq twice, in October of 1998 and again in May of 2002. In my most recent trip, we met with church leaders and U.N. and Iraqi government officials.

TESTIMONY

From our tradition as an historic peace church and out of MCC’s experience in Iraq, we strongly urge the Senate to oppose military action against Iraq. The consequences of a military invasion are many, and there are compelling nonviolent alternatives to war. Many points similar to those below were issued in a 20 April 2002 statement by the MCC Executive Committee.

1. War will cause enormous human suffering

For more than 20 years, ordinary Iraqis have suffered from the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars and from the impact of comprehensive U.N. sanctions intended to contain and control the Iraqi government. According to UNICEF (May 2002 figures), one in eight Iraqi children currently dies before their 5th birthday and one in three suffer from chronic malnutrition. The UNICEF director told our delegation that, in 1989, Iraq ranked 3rd out of 16 Middle Eastern/North African countries on the Human Development Index. By 1999, Iraq ranked 13th and perhaps ranks even lower today. One-fifth of Iraqi children weigh less than 5.5 pounds at birth, making them more vulnerable to diseases.

While the U.N.’s oil-for-food program has halted the decline in most sectors, the director of UNICEF told our delegation that the education sector has not yet hit bottom. Some 3,000 to 4,000 schools need to be rehabilitated and another 5,000 new schools are needed. With the lack of a cash component in the oil-for-food program, teachers in Iraq are paid only $5 per month.

A U.S. invasion of Iraq will only make a bad situation worse. The likely and foreseeable consequences of another war include the deaths of thousands of innocent Iraqi children and civilians, in addition to significant U.S. casualties.

Furthermore, war will divert critical development resources toward emergency relief. CARE International—who has been rebuilding Iraq’s water infrastructure, damaged in previous wars—told our delegation in May 2002 that they are already making contingency plans to refocus on emergency relief if the United States declares war on Iraq.

2. War will make the United States and the Middle East less secure, not more

War against Iraq will increase anti-American sentiment in the region and around the world. One Iraqi told our MCC delegation that a whole generation of Iraqi youth are growing up with “bitterness in their bellies” toward the United States. Whereas many Iraqis of the previous generation were educated in the West, the current generation of Iraqi youth know only of U.S. bombs and sanctions.

War will provide yet another example that the world’s superpower is unilaterally able to impose its will and wish on less powerful countries. One Iraqi evangelical church leader told our delegation, “We hope that someday your country will stop doing everything with force.”

War will increase the divide between the United States and the Arab world, and will strengthen the view that the United States has a strong anti-Muslim bias. By some estimates, there are up to one million Iraqi Christians, 3-5% of the population. A U.S.-led war may well make their situation more vulnerable, to say nothing of the increased difficulties it will create for Muslims in the United States.

War will also destabilize the region by fueling the more radical elements of society. Furthermore, war could well lead to internal fragmentation in Iraq, creating long-term uncertainty and instability. The longstanding divisions within Iraqi society are well-documented in books like Sandra Mackey’s, “The Reckoning.”

3. There are no compelling moral grounds for declaring war

As an historic peace church, Mennonites and other Anabaptist groups oppose all war. But a war against Iraq fails to meet even the more popular “just war” criteria—e.g., just cause, likelihood of success, proportional to provocation, all alternatives exhausted, no significant collateral damage, etc.

By failing to uphold even these minimal standards for launching and fighting a war, the United States will certainly develop a moral laryngitis to speak to other situations of conflict in the world. If the United States so readily resorts to war to settle its differences, what voice will it have to encourage peacemaking between Indians and Pakistanis or between Israelis and Palestinians?
4. There are no compelling legal grounds for declaring war

The United States has established no credible link between Iraq and the events of September 11. Military action against Iraq would be a preemptive strike based on speculative threats, not a matter of self-defense. As such, it appears to violate the UN Charter and raises serious questions about U.S. respect for and commitment to international law. It sets a dangerous precedent of preemptive military attacks for other countries who may feel threatened by their neighbors.

5. There are good alternatives to war

At a minimum, the United States should have direct face-to-face conversations with the Iraqi government before going to war. One Iraqi minister appealed to our MCC delegation to encourage such face-to-face dialogue and, specifically, invited members of Congress to visit Iraq.

It is more productive for the United States to address specific objectionable behaviors in face-to-face conversation than to trade harsh rhetoric through the media or to paint, with broad brush strokes, a whole country as evil.

The United States should also work in good faith with other countries to reintroduce U.N. weapons inspectors. Iraq has no incentive to cooperate with weapons inspectors when the United States has publicly declared its intentions of overthrowing the Iraqi government. Furthermore, a regional approach to disarmament holds more promise than simply shining the spotlight on Iraq. Indeed, the cease-fire agreement ending the Gulf War called for a “Middle East zone free from weapons of mass destruction.”

Finally, international tribunals provide opportunities to adjudicate allegations against perpetrators of crimes against humanity without subjecting entire populations to the devastating effects of war.

CONCLUSION

Responding to a question about a possible U.S. invasion of Iraq, an Iraqi evangelical Christian told our MCC delegation two months ago, “The United States will do what it wants to do. We will trust God.”

What will the United States do?

More than a decade ago, the United States went to war with Iraq because of its aggression against Kuwait. Now the United States is considering its own military aggression.

The U.S. Congress can help cast a more compelling vision and choose a more hopeful path. We are at a critical juncture in human history. If the United States does not in this moment of crisis demonstrate a resolute commitment to the rule of law, show respect for the international will and vigorously uphold human rights, how will it encourage the development of these values around the world?

There is a more positive path forward. War is not the answer. It should be a strong word of caution that our European and Arab allies are steadfast in their opposition to declaring war on Iraq.

I urge you to carefully calculate the costs of war and to seriously consider the alternatives.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PETER L. PELLOT, EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF NUTRITION, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS IN AMHERST AND DR. COLIN ROWAT, LECTURER IN ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

POTENTIAL CIVILIAN CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASED U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ

Introduction

This note outlines some potential consequences for Iraq’s civilian population of increased U.S. military action designed to topple the Iraqi regime. These depend substantially on the actual conduct of any such action which is, at present, unknown.

Thus, this note combines information from Iraq’s experience in the Gulf war with more recent information on civilian vulnerability.

Nutritional considerations and vulnerabilities

In 1990-1991 widely varying estimates of Iraqi food reserves were cited. One month after sanctions imposition, on 13 September 1990, Marjatta Rasi, chair of the Security Council’s Iraq Sanctions Committee, estimated Iraqi food stocks to be

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Nutritional considerations and vulnerabilities

In 1990-1991 widely varying estimates of Iraqi food reserves were cited. One month after sanctions imposition, on 13 September 1990, Marjatta Rasi, chair of the Security Council’s Iraq Sanctions Committee, estimated Iraqi food stocks to be
“enough to last anywhere from two months to more than six months.”1 The previous week, U.S. officials on the Sanctions Committee had blocked Bulgaria’s bid to ship food to Iraq, arguing that “there is enough food stockpiled in Iraq and Kuwait to last a year”; U.S. officials had previously estimated Iraqi stocks to last three months.2

By February 1991, vegetable oil, sugar, tea and dairy products were reportedly depleted by February; wheat shortages were possible before the May-June harvest; rice supplies were short, livestock were being slaughtered. Fruit and vegetables were scarcer, but severe shortages were not expected.3

Estimates of current levels of preparedness are also speculative. There are some indications that Iraqis are hoarding supplies but, having depleted their savings over the early 1990s, and they may not be in a position to build up substantial personal reserves. It is rumored that the Iraqi government has been stockpiling food-stuffs in preparation for war. The 1990s have eroded health as well as savings.

Despite significant increases in the food ration since the “oil for food” programme began in 1996, child malnutrition rates in the South/Centre of the country do not appear to have improved significantly and nutritional problems remain serious and widespread.5 Wasting in under five-year-olds is unacceptably high at around 10%. The indication of high levels of malnutrition supports UN findings that infant and child mortality have more than doubled since the end of the 1980’s.6 Classical recognizable signs of severe malnutrition such as marasmus and kwashiorkor continue to be observed in hospital pediatric wards. The nutritional status of school children aged five to eight years based primarily on stunting and those aged nine to 15 years based on low BMI (Body Mass Index) is a cause for concern especially for those from rural areas and poor households. Micronutrient deficiencies are common and iron deficiency anemia is high. The existing food rations do not provide a nutritionally adequate and varied diet. Although, since its effective implementation in 1997, the “oil for food” program has halted further deterioration in the nutritional situation, these activities have not by themselves been able to reverse this trend. In spite of the fact that the ration is reasonably adequate in food energy and total protein, it is lacking in vegetables, fruit, and animal products and is therefore deficient in micronutrients and animal protein.

The monthly food basket has lasted up to three weeks depending on the type of ration.7 This deficit has to be made up by food purchases, further straining resources. Many households cannot afford to supplement their diet with an adequate variety of non-ration foods and intakes of micronutrients such as iron and Vitamin A remain far below requirements. Adequate amounts of items such as meat, milk and vegetables are too costly for many families to purchase to supplement their diet given the parallel decline in the economy and the residual effects of the recent drought on the availability of crops and horticultural products. Consequently a significant portion of the population requires special attention, particularly the most vulnerable population groups of women and young children whose coping strategies are quickly being eroded. As is now well recognized, even mild malnutrition leads to greater susceptibility to infectious diseases with increased mortality as a consequence of the poor water quality and deficient sanitation.

Against Iraq’s vulnerable nutritional status, the sanctions on Iraq are looser in theory than they were in 1991. In practice, the humanitarian program’s escrow account is almost $2.1 billion in deficit, preventing the ordering of new supplies.8 Orders awaiting delivery mean that the consequences of this shortfall are likely to be felt in the coming months rather than immediately. As the Sanctions Committee remains deadlocked over oil pricing formulae,9 optimism is not warranted. In fact, suggestions that the deadlock may deepen as the U.S. administration seeks to deny

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7 FAO 2000.
the Iraqi government access to oil revenues are grounds for pessimism.\textsuperscript{10} In the event of military action, most civilian trade is likely to be interrupted. A 20 February UNICEF brainstorming exercise imagined that interruption of food distribution is possible. Pregnant and lactating women as well as young children are the most likely victims. Chaos would be the immediate effect. Very rapid intervention by the [World Food Program] (in the midst of chaos) would be required to avoid further deterioration of malnutrition and even famine on a large scale.\textsuperscript{11}

It asked: “Does the WFP have the capacity to rapidly distribute 350,000 metric tons/month [the current Government food ration] in S/C Iraq if required?”

\textbf{Damage to civilian infrastructure}

Iraq’s electrical grid is likely to be one of the first targets of U.S. military action. In 1991, “electrical power was the most severely damaged component of the whole Iraqi target system” with Baghdad losing power 10 minutes into the air war, and not regaining power until after the cease-fire, nearly three months later.\textsuperscript{12} This quickly caused “the loss of perishable foods, such as frozen meat and refrigerated produce.”\textsuperscript{13}

Orders were given that “electrical targets will be targeted to minimize recuperation time”\textsuperscript{14}, including by the use of carbon-fiber warheads to short-circuit facilities. Nevertheless, post war assessments estimated that it would take five to nine years to restore Iraq’s electrical power system.\textsuperscript{15} There is some evidence that initial repairs were conducted more quickly than expected,\textsuperscript{16} but the most recent evidence suggests that Iraq’s electrical supply is still at 38\% of installed capacity during peak summer load.\textsuperscript{17} Iraq is “dependent on electrical power for water purification and distribution, sewage treatment, and the functioning of hospitals and health care centers”\textsuperscript{18} as well as for the refrigeration of food and storage of medicines.

Damage to water treatment plants had removed some 2.5 million Iraqis from the government water supply and left those still connected to it receiving one quarter their pre-war levels in quantitative terms; water quality had declined. This led directly to an outbreak of diarrheal diseases, typhoid and cholera as well as decreasing the ability of Iraq’s medical system to maintain public health.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Mortality estimates}

U.S. estimates of the direct casualties of the Gulf war are as low as 10,000 deaths. The Iraqi government has reported a figure of 20,000 deaths, 1,000 of which were civilians, and 60,000 wounded.\textsuperscript{20}

Studies of post-war Iraqi child mortality have sought to identify indirect deaths as well. A 1991 international study of 16,000 Iraqi households in 1991 concluded that the Gulf war and trade sanctions caused a threefold increase in mortality among Iraqi children under five years of age”, estimating that “an excess of more than 46,900 children died between January and August 1991.”\textsuperscript{21} Subsequent correspondence noted that the largest rises had occurred in regions affected by the 1991 uprising, leading to the suggestion that as few as 21,000 excess under five child deaths may have been caused by the “Gulf war and trade sanctions alone”.\textsuperscript{22}

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\textsuperscript{13}Epstein.
\textsuperscript{15}Freedman and Karsh, p. 322.
\textsuperscript{16}Gordon and Trainor, p. 519 note 18.
\textsuperscript{19}17 July 1991. “Report to the Secretary-General dated 15 July 1991 on humanitarian needs in Iraq prepared by a mission led by the Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General for humanitarian assistance in Iraq”, Sadruddin Aga Khan, S/22799, para. 16-17.
\textsuperscript{20}Freedman and Karsh, p. 408.
\end{flushright}
This discrepancy may also reflect greater damage done in southern Iraq by Desert Storm itself and greater vulnerabilities both there and in Iraqi Kurdistan.

A 1998 study of Iraqi child mortality that examined associated social indicators concluded that the rise in under five child mortality in Iraq “mainly associated with the Gulf war” was, at minimum, 25,000 but more likely to be around 56,000.23

Iraqi Kurdistan

Iraqi Kurdistan is generally held to enjoy better living conditions than does South/Central Iraq. Its inhabitants receive a higher per capita allocation under the “oil for food” program; its climate is more amenable to agriculture, receiving more rain; KDP-controlled regions have benefited from the Iraqi-Turkish diesel trade; the UN distribution system may be more efficient than the Iraqi government system. At the same time, it is subject to particular vulnerabilities. Unlike in South/Central Iraq, the ration in Iraqi Kurdistan is distributed by the UN, and stored in warehouses in South/Center Iraq. As UN staff are likely to evacuate rapidly upon the escalation of hostilities, the ration system can be expected to collapse. It is not known whether Kurdish regional authorities have stockpiled reserves. Against this, winter rainfall was good this year, leading to an expected wheat harvest of 500,000 metric tons.24 Nevertheless, in February, Save the Children UK, an NGO working in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991, warned that Iraqi Kurds were highly dependent on the ration system for their food and that its diminution could, “send Kurds living in Northern Iraq over the edge into a humanitarian catastrophe.”25

In 1991, nearly two million Kurds fled to Iran and Turkey. The conditions of those in Turkey were sufficiently appalling to generate an international uproar; during the worst period, the U.S. State Department and relief agencies estimated the refugees’ daily death toll at 500-1000.26 A withdrawal of UN staff may suffice to trigger a similar exodus. The Turkish authorities may now be more hostile to Iraqi Kurds, having been surprised and disturbed by the establishment of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. Iran may already be preparing to accept refugees from Iraq,27 but the ability to provide for them may be complicated by the U.S. administration’s harsh stance towards Iran in spite of the latter’s assistance during the Afghan campaign.

Co-mingling of civilian and military targets

In 1991, Iraqi assets were exposed to systematic destruction by Coalition forces. While their positioning away from civilian centers likely reduced civilian casualties, it is unlikely that they will be so deployed again. It is possible that the increased accuracy of U.S. munitions will be sufficiently able to discriminate between military and civilian targets to hold civilian casualties low. At the same time, U.S. forces have no recent live experience in the co-mingled environment that they may face in Iraq.

Contingencies

It is feared that, if the Iraqi government is faced with its overthrow, it will not hesitate to use any non-conventional resources at its disposal. Given its record of harsh measures against the Iraqi population, it is possible that these will not only be deployed on the battlefield or against Israel and other neighboring countries supporting military action, but against U.S. forces in Iraqi urban centers. Iraq’s civilian population is unlikely to be equipped for such a possibility and may suffer substantial casualties. Some international NGOs working in Iraq are aware that they have no experience operating in environments contaminated with non-conventional weapons.

Armed conflict uncoordinated by the U.S. may also occur. As previously mentioned, a large proportion of child deaths following the Gulf war may have owed to the civil war. While an uprising of this sort may not be repeated, there is the new possibility of Turkish military action, both in Iraqi Kurdistan, and possibly reaching as far in as Kirkuk.28

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Concluding remarks

As a team leader of successive FAO missions in Iraq, one of us must emphasize the reality of the human tragedy in Iraq caused by the sanctions. These have had a major effect on food availability, nutrition and health, especially for children. From a country that was edging towards Western standards in health and nutrition, Iraq has, since 1990, experienced a precipitous decline towards poor Third World status. Thus, the potential civilian consequences of new military action are enormous for the vulnerable majority of the population. These are likely to be far greater than in 1990 because of the continuous decline in the overall infrastructure and the consequent deterioration in health status that have both occurred as direct and indirect effects of the economic sanctions over the last 12 years.