DEFENDING FREEDOM, FOSTERING COOPERATION AND
PROMOTING STABILITY

STATEMENT OF
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SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
FEBRUARY 28, 2002
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, it is my privilege to appear before you as Commander in Chief, United States European Command (USEUCOM), to discuss the posture of U.S. forces in our Theater. Since I last testified, USEUCOM has successfully promoted stability, strengthened ties with countries throughout the Theater and maintained its ability to fight and win in armed conflict against all types of enemies -- including asymmetric threats like terrorism. We have been able to do this because of your support in the past, and our ability to continue these efforts depends wholly upon your continued support in the future.

The USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses a vast geographic region covering over 14 million square miles of the globe. It includes 91 sovereign nations stretching from the northern tip of Norway to South Africa, and from the Atlantic seaboard of Europe and Africa to parts of the Middle East and beyond the Black Sea. Our AOR’s astonishing diversity encompasses the full range of human conditions: some nations are among the wealthiest of the world, while others exist in a state of abject poverty; some are open democracies with long histories of respect for human liberties, while others are dictatorships or failed states. Above all, USEUCOM's AOR is dynamic with new opportunities and new challenges regularly emerging.

USEUCOM's missions are themselves complex and dynamic. The men and women of the Command operate throughout Europe, Africa, the Levant, the waters of the Mediterranean, and in the skies over Iraq. They serve in the Balkans in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peace operations, and support the war on terrorism from locations throughout the
Theater. Through their presence, we maintain commitments to our regional friends and allies and clearly demonstrate our intent to preserve and protect our national interests. We do all of this with minimal force presence and a moderate level of resources.

We also represent the U.S. contribution to NATO and promote U.S. leadership within that vital organization. Far from a Cold War relic, NATO's prompt invocation of Article 5 for the campaign against terrorism demonstrated the strategic flexibility that makes it as relevant today as it was fifty years ago. USEUCOM supports NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program with active bilateral and multilateral relationships across Western and Central Europe, as well as the area formerly within the Soviet Union. This security cooperation contributes to the extraordinary democratic progress many nations have achieved both militarily and politically. This interaction also helps counter both conventional, coercive threats and international terrorism by helping to ensure that our respective strategies are complementary. By ensuring access, interoperability and intelligence cooperation, our efforts have dramatically expanded the range of options available to the President and Secretary of Defense. A similar process, adapted to subregional conditions, helps maintain stability in the Middle East and North Africa. All of these efforts depend on USEUCOM’s core capability – conducting rapid and decisive military operations across the spectrum of conflict. When called, USEUCOM stands ready to step up to a conflict and win it.

The horrific events of 11 September 2001 and shortly thereafter acutely remind us of the conventional, chemical, biological, and, potentially,
nuclear terrorist threats that exist throughout the world. At the same time, emerging opportunities within the Theater are allowing us to more effectively combat these threats to Americans both abroad and at home. Indeed, several nations within our AOR have provided intelligence, basing and overflight rights and other forms of key support in our global efforts to combat terrorism. Without an aggressive and continuous security cooperation program, many of these opportunities would not have been possible. The continued pursuit of these opportunities will allow us to more effectively accomplish our most important mission – the protection of the American people and our way of life.

To successfully prosecute the global campaign against terrorism in Europe and Africa while remaining postured to meet emerging threats across the spectrum of conflict, we particularly need your support in four critical and interrelated areas – all of which are closely tied to our supporting infrastructure. These four critical areas are force protection; the sustainment, restoration and modernization (SRM) of our existing infrastructure; new military construction (MILCON); and modernization of our outdated command, control, communications and computers (C4) infrastructure.

Force protection is a fundamental concern and takes on an added dimension in this Theater because our forces’ training, day-to-day operations and off-duty and family time are spent on foreign soil. We have realigned resources to assist in perimeter defense and reallocated intelligence assets to more aggressively pursue analysis of terrorist organizations and share intelligence with coalition partners and allies. But still more needs to be done, and we need your continued assistance in addressing force protection
shortfalls. We also need your support for continued, revitalized investment in the sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) of our existing infrastructure, as well as new military construction (MILCON). Our ability to project American power, protect our forces and provide our service members with an appropriate quality of life all depend on the health of our installations and facilities. Finally, we need your help in modernizing our woefully outdated command, control, communications and computers (C4) infrastructure. I will expand upon each of these needs later in this statement, but first I would like to update you on our Strategic Vision for the Theater, our ongoing operations and security cooperation initiatives, and some of the high-profile issues and unique challenges we encounter in our area of responsibility.

STRATEGIC VISION OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

Consistent with the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, USEUCOM envisions maintaining and posturing a force that will assure U.S. allies and friends in our AOR, dissuade potential adversaries, deter threats and counter coercion, and, if necessary, decisively defeat any adversary.

• ASSURE ALLIES AND FRIENDS: The presence of potent U.S. forces served as a visible guarantee of U.S. commitment during the long years of the Cold War. In today’s security environment, visible military presence lends credibility to U.S. policy declarations that would not otherwise be achievable. Because “we are here,” our allies and friends are assured that they can count on us and they take our national positions into account in their own political and military decision.
processes. Likewise, a potential aggressor is less likely to be deceived about U.S. commitment and resolve.

• **DISSUADE POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES:** Against the backdrop of continuing U.S. modernization and transformation, the forward presence and activity of U.S. forces is a powerful deterrent to potential aggressors who might contemplate a military challenge against us or our friends and allies. U.S. unilateral, Alliance, and coalition capability is so clearly superior that most potential aggressors are dissuaded from committing resources to a manifestly hopeless competition. However, there remain asymmetric threats in the world today that may not be influenced by our superior conventional military capability alone. To dissuade these potential adversaries we must continue to develop new, cooperative capabilities to deter, and if necessary, defeat asymmetric threats.

• **DETER THREATS AND COUNTER COERCION:** Despite our efforts to dissuade potential adversaries, a regime or group may convince itself that the U.S. will not respond to aggression because of a lack of will or interest, or commitments elsewhere. USEUCOM is ready to respond with actions to disabuse such actors of their mistaken impression and simultaneously prepare for conflict should a miscalculation be translated into action against us.

• **DECISIVELY DEFEAT ANY ADVERSARY:** History shows that periodically, at unexpected times and places, we are confronted with actual aggression. Whether military or non-military, conventional or
unconventional, proportional or asymmetric, these threats can be highly destructive. USEUCOM stands ready to face and defeat any aggression in our AOR.

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND STRATEGIC FUNDAMENTALS

To achieve the USEUCOM Vision, we focus on four strategic fundamentals: security cooperation, forward presence, readiness and joint training, and interoperability.

Security Cooperation

Our strategic vision is best achieved in concert with allies, partners and friends, and USEUCOM aggressively pursues a number of programs that create conditions for coordinated, combined military action. An example of this cooperative effort includes the commitment made by Turkey during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM to use its airspace, bases and Special Forces units to assist in the war against terrorism. Other NATO allies, as well as many non-NATO partners, have contributed personnel and equipment to the fight against terrorism, the closely associated humanitarian relief effort, or both. Our in-theater presence and day-to-day military interaction with both our NATO allies and non-NATO partners was key to bringing this commitment to fruition. Other security efforts in Theater include working with our friends throughout Africa to improve their peacekeeping capabilities, increasing military cooperation with Russia, and developing new relationships with countries of the Caucasus region. These efforts have protected and strengthened important U.S. economic and security interests, while assuring our European friends that the U.S. remains committed to European security.
Joint Training & Interoperability

Not only must we be concerned with our interoperability with our partners in the Theater, we must also be concerned with interoperability among our own Armed Services. By exploiting the symbiotic relationship between interoperability and joint training, we capitalize on the opportunities to improve our readiness. Accordingly, USEUCOM’s training program, based on established mission requirements and driven by training objectives, emphasizes both joint (multi-Service) and combined (multi-national) exercises within available resources.

Although we have made substantive progress in materiel and equipment interoperability among the Services, information interoperability remains a major challenge. As the technologies that allow us to exchange information improve, it is important that we be able to understand this information. We gain this level of information interoperability through common systems architecture and through practice in our joint and combined training and exercise events.

Forward Presence

Without a forward presence in Europe our activities in Africa, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus would be logistically and financially prohibitive. The forward presence of strike platforms; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; amphibious units; and Special Forces is vital to our ability to conduct timely and effective military operations. And, make no mistake, our ability to rapidly respond to crises is critical to the stability of our AOR. Our location, literally “one ocean closer” to many places of conflict, uniquely situates USEUCOM as a strategic platform from
which to rapidly project forces to protect American interests. In the past year, our forces have been used to both deter aggression and demonstrate U.S. resolve.

**Readiness**

The readiness of USEUCOM’s assigned forces is our most significant contribution to national security. Our security cooperation efforts help sustain readiness by providing valuable training opportunities while strengthening interoperability and relationships with those alongside whom we may meet future threats. These activities help shape the international environment by incorporating other nations and improving our multinational expertise in the region. They also improve our ability to respond unilaterally or in concert with other nations, and they prepare us for the uncertain regional requirements of the future. Thanks to the support of Congress, forces assigned to this Theater are well prepared for their current operations. The Command’s forces are fully engaged and continue to rely upon augmentation and reserve forces to carry out our many diverse missions. Dedicated young men and women valiantly executing a wide variety of operations to support our national strategy make up the heart of our theater readiness.

**CURRENT OPERATIONS**

Over the last year, the nation called upon USEUCOM to demonstrate its readiness by conducting a wide range of operations across the range of military operations.

*Operation ENDURING FREEDOM*
Following the events of 11 September, USEUCOM, in a cooperative effort with U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), has played a significant role in operations associated with the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Every USEUCOM Component has provided invaluable personnel, equipment and logistics support to this effort. Tons of supplies and pre-positioned equipment have been pushed rapidly forward to support operations at remote locations. Ramstein Air Base, Germany served as a vital staging base for U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) aircraft executing humanitarian assistance airdrop missions that provided approximately 2.4 million rations in 197 sorties over a three-month period. On 15 November, three C-17s operating out of Ramstein Air Base dropped over 105 tons of humanitarian supplies, including wheat, blankets and daily rations in Afghanistan – the largest single drop in history. Incirlik Air Base, Turkey also played a critical role, supporting these C-17 air mobility missions with a forward based KC-135 aerial refueling capability. Additionally, Incirlik served as a logistics hub for USCENTCOM bound humanitarian assistance missions coming through USEUCOM’s AOR, allowing those aircraft to deliver thousands of pounds of humanitarian supplies. Those missions engendered support within the population of Afghanistan for the U.S. cause and undermined support to the Taliban.

USEUCOM has received and coordinated critical support from our NATO allies in the war on terrorism. For more than 50 years, NATO looked east, perfecting plans to rapidly move forces to reinforce Europeans allies and halt aggression. It is an irony that the first time NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it was to send forces west to help secure U.S. skies in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks. NATO Airborne Early
Warning (NAEW) aircraft have been patrolling the skies over North America, replacing U.S. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) that have deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. NATO's Standing Naval Forces have also deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean. Germany and Canada provided cargo aircraft and the essential manpower and expertise to prepare and load cargo pallets for shipment. Berlin also provided additional force protection personnel from the German Army and National Police force to guard key U.S. facilities in Germany. The United Kingdom contributed directly to strike missions in Afghanistan, and several countries, including the UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Belgium, Canada, Greece and Turkey have indicated their willingness to assume prominent roles in the post-conflict stabilization effort.

Our non-NATO partners in Europe have provided similar assistance. Bulgaria's enthusiastic support of OEF serves as a case in point. Like Ankara, Sofia provided basing rights for our tanker aircraft that refuel the humanitarian flights. Romania, Sweden and Finland have also offered to assist in post-conflict stabilization. In short, while the capabilities of each European nation are different, all can contribute to this effort, and virtually all have. Some nations contributed directly to the military strikes in Afghanistan, while others extended over-flight rights, froze terrorist financial assets and detained suspected terrorists in their respective countries. USEUCOM has been, and continues to be, center stage in coordinating these efforts among our allies and friends in the AOR.

Operation NORTHERN WATCH
The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Operation NORTHERN WATCH (ONW), consisting of forces from the U.S., Turkey and the United Kingdom, continues to enforce the Northern No-Fly Zone (NNFZ) over Iraq and monitor Iraqi compliance with applicable UN Security Council Resolutions. These missions are dangerous and complex, and in the last year, Iraqi air defense challenges to these missions have become more frequent. Coalition forces have taken all available force protection measures. Saddam Hussein’s strategy of eroding international support for applicable UN Resolutions may be threatened by new international appreciation for the dangers of terrorism and rogue states. USEUCOM will continue to play a prominent role in enforcing the NNFZ and in ensuring Iraq’s compliance with UN resolutions.

**Balkan Operations**

One of the greatest challenges to peace, stability and democracy in Europe is the integration of the Balkan states into the rest of the continent, an objective the U.S. shares with our Allies. Prospects for regional stability have improved due to the International Community’s focused and unified efforts. Recent developments, like the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) parliamentary approval of the Framework Agreement and the peaceful provincial elections in Kosovo, have increased regional stability.

We continue to scrutinize both the size and structure of U.S. forces deployed to the Balkans, both unilaterally and as part of NATO’s Six Month Reviews (SMR). **Operation JOINT FORGE** continues to enforce the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) by providing military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina to deter hostilities, promoting a stable environment and
supporting a transition to civil authority. In Bosnia, force numbers have been reduced from 60,000 when the mission began, to just over 17,000 personnel. Europe as a whole has endeavored to live up to its personnel and financial commitments of support to Balkan operations. Thirty-two nations contribute forces to the Stabilization Force (SFOR), with the 28 European nations comprising 80 percent of the combined force. The U.S. has reduced its troop commitment from over 20,000 (33 percent of the total force) in 1996 to 3,100 (approximately 18 percent) today. The way ahead in Bosnia remains contingent upon the international community’s ability to build civil institutions, reduce and restructure indigenous armed forces, and promote the rule of law. A key provision is the establishment of a competent Bosnian Police Force. An international police presence is also required to assist Bosnian police and provide in extremis protection to international personnel. Further reductions in troop strength through the biannual NATO SMR are possible.

Apprehending the remaining war criminals is an important aspect of reestablishing the rule of law throughout the Balkans, and this remains among SFOR’s highest priorities. Within Bosnia, SFOR is continually on the alert for fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), or for information that might lead to their apprehension. By the ICTY’s figures, the effort to bring war criminals to justice has been successful. Since the Tribunal’s inception, 116 individuals have been publicly indicted with 30 still at large – the vast majority of whom have not been heard from in a number of years. There is little information available on the remaining few, but we do know those still alive reside outside SFOR’s mandated area; rarely, if ever, enter Bosnia; and take extraordinary,
potentially violent precautions to remain free. When actionable intelligence is available we act to detain these individuals. In addition to military action, some of the accused have also come into custody through the efforts of various national police forces and voluntary surrenders. Many of the accused known to be alive and at large reside in locations where the governments might be motivated to cooperate with the international authorities through political or economic inducements. This has arguably been successful in the past, with the most notable example that of the arrest, imprisonment and subsequent extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague.

**Operation JOINT GUARDIAN** remains the lynchpin supporting NATO military operations in Kosovo (KFOR). KFOR has just under 35,000 troops deployed in Kosovo which is 4,000 less than when I testified to this Committee last year. This force is drawn from 34 nations, including Russia, and, as in Bosnia, the Europeans have stepped up to this commitment with 31 European countries deploying over 80 percent of the total force. The U.S., with approximately 5,200 troops in Kosovo, provides around 15 percent of the force. Despite the cessation of active hostilities in the FYROM, sporadic violence still erupts throughout the region. Although the number of violent actions appears to be declining, KFOR continues to require a significant military presence for the foreseeable future to deter renewed hostilities.

The International Community has made substantial progress in laying the foundation for returning the rule of law to Kosovo, and, just as in Bosnia, this is where an exit strategy must begin. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) police force is currently supported by 51 nations.
Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) has graduated over 4,000 multi-ethnic officers since its inception in September 1999. The UN policing plan is on target and continues to put officer graduates alongside UNMIK veteran contract officers. The ultimate goal of this endeavor is to replace the UN contract police force entirely, turning law enforcement responsibilities over to the citizens of Kosovo. On the other side of the equation, UNMIK has published more than 100 regulations with the force of law. They have also appointed more than 400 local judges and prosecutors, with five district courts and some lower courts in operation. Finally, 11 international judges and five international prosecutors have been appointed to the district courts, and an international judge now sits on the Supreme Court.

The FYROM faces daunting new challenges with regard to its current political and security situation. The government of FYROM recently concluded a political settlement through a U.S./EU/NATO-brokered Framework Agreement (FWA) with the country’s four leading political parties. This FWA successfully met the NATO-established preconditions for facilitating the voluntary disarmament of the National Liberation Army (NLA), called Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST. NATO’s North Atlantic Council determined that a NATO mission, termed Operation AMBER FOX, would provide an in extremis extraction force to support OSCE and EU monitors following Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST. On 15 November 2001, the FYROM Parliament ratified the FWA, which institutionalized constitutional reforms. The return of FYROM security forces to crisis regions is proceeding in coordination with EU and OSCE monitors.
One dynamic at work that raises concerns for all U.S. and NATO forces in the Balkans is the presence of elements with ties to international terrorist networks. Although to date no U.S. forces in the Balkans have been attacked, the region has surfaced as a potential trouble spot in our war against terrorism. Accordingly, we have developed an aggressive, regional counterterrorism program that includes U.S. and Alliance military forces, our respective national agencies and, to the maximum degree possible, the local Balkan governments. We are using tactical counterintelligence and human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities to great effect in identifying terrorist network operations and curtailing them throughout the region. Continuing to invest in HUMINT and engaging the population to develop information on potential threats and their intentions is important both to peace and stability operations in the Balkans and to our global counterterrorism efforts.

**Operation FOCUS RELIEF**

Although now complete, Operation FOCUS RELIEF is a clear example of a USEUCOM success story in Africa. The impetus for Operation FOCUS RELIEF was the near collapse of the United Nations Aid Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in early 2000. The U.S. committed to train and equip military forces from West African nations in the essential skills required to participate in UN Chapter VII peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone. In the fall of 2000, Special Forces under the operational control of Special Operations Command, Europe, began training and equipping light infantry battalions from Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal to meet the challenges posed by antigovernment forces in Sierra Leone. UN officials have acknowledged the performance of the U.S. trained troops, and the situation in Sierra Leone has improved. Initiatives
like OFR train Africans to help themselves, reduce the potential need for U.S. troops to be deployed to the continent, and provide a valuable opportunity for military-to-military interaction and the promotion of democratic values in an area of increasing importance to U.S. global interests. OFR and operations like it are a worthwhile investment.

MILITARY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES

Beyond current operations, USEUCOM remains engaged in a wide range of cooperative security and military activities designed to strengthen our strategic partnerships and better prepare us to meet future crises.

Defense Cooperation and Security Assistance

Defense Cooperation and Security Assistance programs are vital to attaining foreign policy and national security objectives. These programs promote interoperability with U.S. forces and help to build professional, capable militaries in friendly and allied nations. Through 40 Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC), we are in partnership with U.S. embassies throughout the Theater conducting military security cooperation in support of U.S. objectives, to include promoting an international coalition capable of fighting terrorism.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides irreplaceable resources for modernizing the military forces of our friends and allies, and has been essential to U.S. influence during the dynamic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and key African partners. FMF assists nations without the means to acquire U.S. military goods, services and training and provides access to U.S. expertise in defense restructuring and management. These
programs, designed to promote interoperability, are essential to our coalition operations. A priority this year is restoring FMF to Turkey, an indispensable ally who has demonstrated the value of its geo-strategic position in virtually all of our on-going operations.

Likewise, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of $4.5 billion in FY01 to Europe demonstrate the continued primacy of Trans-Atlantic defense relationships to U.S. security interests. FMS encourages interoperability between U.S. and European forces, maintains a strong U.S. presence in the development and implementation of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), and helps modernize the militaries of new friends and partners in ways critical to our security interests. We have worked closely with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Services to ensure that USEUCOM’s priorities are reflected in the FY 03 Budget Request.

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

IMET is perhaps our greatest tool for promoting long-term beneficial change in foreign militaries, as foreign military and civilian leaders encounter firsthand the American civil-military culture. IMET focuses on professional development, the role of the military in a democratic society and English language training. In FY01, the program trained almost 1,450 military and civilian international students in U.S. military schools. In Sub-Saharan Africa, IMET is particularly important as it provides educational opportunities that emphasize and reinforce civilian control of the military, which contributes to domestic stability. The increase in IMET funding for FY02 is absolutely the right course of action, providing a great return for a relatively small investment.
**Partnership for Peace (PfP)**

NATO’s PfP Program continues to meet its goal of deepening interaction, extending stability in Eastern Europe, providing consultation mechanisms for participants who feel threatened, assisting in the pursuit of democratic reforms and preparing nations for possible NATO membership. Besides underpinning strategic stability in Central and Eastern Europe, the program provides a basis for cooperation with Central Asian states supporting our war on terrorism. By including partner nations in NATO combined joint task force (CJTF) exercises, we have increased coalition interoperability, which now allows Partner Nations to contribute to NATO operations in the Balkans and provide structure for regional security initiatives.

**Regional Centers for Security Studies**

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is at the forefront of our regional security cooperation efforts in Western and Central Europe as well as Eurasia. A jointly funded U.S. and German venture, the Center strengthens security cooperation among European nations and serves as an indispensable institution for bilateral and multilateral activities, and military and civilian exchanges throughout the region. The Marshall Center is an important part of our interaction with Russia. In fact, the Center’s largest participating nation is Russia (147 individuals), with Romania second (127), and Ukraine third (125). Over 6,000 military and civilian leaders from North America, Europe and Eurasia have participated in Marshall Center programs since 1994. As a result, the Center has helped nations develop National Security Strategy documents, restructure crisis management programs, improve their defense management resource processes, properly balance
military expenditures and undertake responsible defense reforms. Marshall Center graduates continue to move into positions of increasingly greater influence. They now include over 50 Ministers/Deputy Ministers of Defense, Chiefs/Deputy Chiefs of Defense, cabinet officials, parliamentarians, ambassadors and flag officers.

Building on the success of the Marshall Center, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was established in December 1999. ACSS provides a series of seminars, symposia, conferences and outreach programs designed to promote good governance and democratic values in the African defense and security sectors. The Center conducted two seminars in FY01, the first in Gabon during February and the second in Ghana during August. In the absence of a permanent site on the African continent, ACSS currently rotates the location of its seminars. Once ACSS is permanently located in Africa, it will be continuously and more effectively involved with the countries on the continent. The Center verifies America’s long-term commitment to work with our partners in Africa, while enhancing our national strategy through relatively low-cost, high-impact engagement opportunities.

The mission of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA CSS) is to enhance stability by providing an academic environment where regional strategic issues can be addressed, partnerships fostered, defense related decision-making improved and cooperation strengthened among military and civilian leaders from the region and the U.S. Located at the National Defense University in Washington, NESA CSS held its inaugural event 31 October 2000. Since its inauguration, the Center has conducted three Executive or Senior Executive level seminars, as well as a short seminar
focusing on National Missile Defense. After 11 September, NESA CSS initiated a "Washington Seminar Series" on counterterrorism to foster a coalition to deal with this threat. Like ACSS and the Marshall Center, NESA CSS provides a low cost, high-impact engagement opportunity that solidifies America’s commitment to work with Near East and South Asian partners in a way that supports our national strategy and objectives.

**African Crisis Response Initiative**

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is a security cooperation activity designed to enhance the training and operational capabilities of African militaries for increased participation in multinational humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations. The program is managed jointly by the Department of State and the Department of Defense (DoD), with USEUCOM designated by DoD as the executive agent for all military training. ACRI has trained militaries in eight African nations to date. The goal of ACRI is to institutionalize self-sustaining military skill sets and crisis response capabilities within African militaries. ACRI trained forces could be offered by their governments for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations upon request by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, subregional African organizations or other multinational coalitions. ACRI works to shape the African military culture by promoting professional and apolitical militaries, reinforcing respect for human rights and providing a strong example of democratic, civil-military relations. Because ACRI promotes stability and security in a volatile region, USEUCOM supports continuing the program to include adding new partner nations and assisting current partners in sustaining proficiency. We should also expand the relationship with
subregional organizations and increase crisis response capabilities at the multinational level.

**THEATER ISSUES**

Each unified command has its own high visibility issues within its geographic boundaries. This section addresses the most prominent of those in the USEUCOM area of responsibility.

**U.S. Support to NATO**

U.S. funding commitments to NATO are based on obligations agreed to at the North Atlantic Council (NAC), composed of representatives from each of the member nations. Shortfalls in U.S. funding for NATO have been chronic in the past and have only served to erode American credibility and thwart our national programs while forcing DoD to divert monies from other mission essential areas. I encourage Congress to recognize that full funding of our NATO commitments will help ensure the full execution of national programs, as well as the continued security and stability of Europe.

**NATO Enlargement**

NATO membership addresses a major preoccupation of Central European states with their national security by extending the common defense guarantee of Article 5. While NATO has successfully evolved into an organization capable of conflict prevention and management, the Alliance’s invocation of Article 5 following the 11 September terrorist attacks and the many contributions of NATO allies and aspirants to the counterterrorism effort, have demonstrated that NATO’s collective defense role maintains value. Indeed, the war on terrorism has provoked new thinking about NATO’s role in
the future, as well as the benefits of admitting new members given the
tremendous support of the aspirant nations in the wake of the attack. Nine
nations - Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia - all aspire to an
invitation to join the Alliance during the Prague Summit in November of this
year. President Bush affirmed strong U.S. support for the open door policy,
underscoring that the U.S. "will be prepared to make concrete, historic
decisions with allies to advance NATO enlargement" at Prague.

Ultimately, political factors and allied consensus will determine each
aspirant’s suitability for membership. As our military contribution to this
process, USEUCOM has provided detailed defense assessments of each aspirant’s
military readiness to the Pentagon. The nine aspirants have greatly
benefited from U.S.-funded defense reform studies and the NATO Membership
Action Plan (MAP) with its associated Partnership Goals in addressing these
challenges. These mechanisms have provided a valuable roadmap toward
democratic military reform and interoperability.

**Defense Capabilities Initiative**

The objective of the Defense Capabilities Initiative, launched at
NATO’s 1999 Washington Summit, is to ensure the effectiveness of
multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions. The
Initiative’s two primary thrusts, improving national capabilities and
exploring means to pool capabilities, allow our allies and partners to
enhance interoperability, take advantage of economies of scale and afford
participation to those countries that lack the resources to act alone. The
Defense Capabilities Initiative contains 58 classified objectives in five
broad categories: deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, effective engagement, survivability and command and control.

In June 2001, a North Atlantic Council Defense Ministers Session in Brussels acknowledged progress in some Defense Capabilities Initiative areas, but noted a number of critical and long-standing deficiencies in others. Emphasizing the political, diplomatic and economic advantages afforded by multilateral operational capability, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson has repeatedly encouraged improved capabilities by two means: more efficient use of available resources, and when necessary, increased funding.

**European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)**

The EU remains committed to developing a common ESDP among its members, and the 11 September attacks have enhanced that commitment. Clearly, this is a positive development. In our view, ESDP can strengthen Europe’s security posture as long as it is achieved in a manner that is complementary to NATO, not in competition with it. Both U.S. and NATO interests are best served by a relationship with the EU that results in transparency and cooperation. Accordingly, U.S. leadership must continue to assist efforts to harmonize NATO and EU policies and avoid duplication of command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) structures and processes. NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) should continue to play the central role in military planning to meet crises and contingencies. Likewise, if the EU were to create a duplicate planning headquarters, it would only serve to make it more confusing to develop coherent plans and hence, complicate the process of gaining the consensus needed to act. The EU should also seek to avoid investing limited resources in ESDP capabilities
that are redundant with, as opposed to complementary to, NATO capabilities. Equally important is avoiding the imposition of dual mission requirements on units and resources already stretched thin. The best way to do this is to give the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander a robust role as strategic coordinator for both NATO and EU-led operations.

**Missile Defense**

The evil of terrorism is a real global threat, with certain radical groups and nations willing to utilize any available weapon of mass destruction to further their cause. As potentially hostile states work to develop long-range missiles to coerce and threaten countries in North America and Europe, we must be prepared to respond to the worst possible threats. As the President has made clear, we must have a missile defense capability that protects not only the U.S. and our deployed forces, but also our friends and allies. As we develop missile defense, USEUCOM will continue to consult with our friends in the AOR. The argument that Europe would be more secure if the U.S. were less secure from a missile attack is unreasonable. An America less vulnerable to accidental or rogue attack will be less distracted from the issues associated with European defense and other common security interests. What we have found in discussions with our Allies is not necessarily an argument with the concept of a missile defense, but rather concern for the future relationship between the U.S. and Russia. These concerns have softened significantly following the discussions last year between Presidents Bush and Putin. NATO Secretary-General Robertson, in tandem with U.S. policymakers, also continues to develop this issue through NATO’s political structure.
REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Russia

Although not part of USEUCOM’s assigned AOR, Russia clearly plays an immense role in the Theater. U.S. and Russian forces maintain excellent working relationships within the two Balkan missions, SFOR and KFOR. Everyday, troops from our two countries conduct combined training and execute common missions side-by-side as we continue to strengthen stability in the region. In addition to the strong cooperation in the Balkans, USNAVEUR has taken a leading role in security cooperation between the U.S. and Russian Federation navies. The Russian Federation Navy participated in this year’s BALTOPS 01 exercise, and recent events between the Russian Black Sea fleet and the U.S. Sixth Fleet have shown that our respective naval forces can successfully operate together. Planning for future events continues, as a Russia-U.S.-U.K. working group conference hosted by the Royal Navy in London laid the groundwork for a five-day conference and wargame to be held in May 2002. The shared threat of international terrorism, particularly that propagated by Islamic extremists, offers the chance for further political, diplomatic and, potentially, military cooperation.

While there are several signs of improvement in the U.S.-Russian military relationship, the Russian military has not yet completely committed itself to a wider, long-term security cooperation program. Although President Putin currently supports U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, Russian defense officials remain cautious of U.S. motives and intentions, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Still, the Putin
Administration’s increased interaction with both the U.S. and NATO, offers us new opportunities to reduce suspicions and build mutual trust.

**Caucasus**

The importance of Caucasus oil and gas reserves and their ability to meet growing European energy needs, comes precisely at a time when Russia is still immersed in its yet to be completed social, political and economic evolution. It also comes at a time when China is emerging as a major regional economic and political power, with vastly increased energy requirements. With relief from the restrictions of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, USEUCOM can more effectively embark upon a program of military interaction in the Caucasus. Contacts with Azerbaijan and Armenia will ensure these countries are exposed to a long-standing democratic military model, and will also enable us to exploit the opportunities these countries, particularly Azerbaijan, offer the United States in support of the war on terrorism.

Azerbaijan is integral to the stability of Eurasia. Its geo-strategic position; pro-western economic, political and military orientation; and its abundant energy resources, have already proven to be high priorities for USEUCOM security cooperation efforts. Azerbaijan’s cooperation, as demonstrated through the offer of its airfields during OEF and its hosting of a NATO PfP exercise, sends a positive signal of its commitment to be a valuable and reliable ally. A stable Azerbaijan is necessary not only because of its vast energy deposits, but also because it can help forestall terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Armenia, historically a strategic partner with Russia, has also persistently and vocally pursued closer ties to the U.S. at the highest levels. Armenia’s motivation lies in its eagerness to enlist the U.S. to mitigate historically hostile relations with Turkey and attract potential economic development assistance and investment that Russia cannot provide. Armenia has asked for U.S. advice on establishing a program of instruction for a national military senior service college and for help in establishing peacekeeping units that could participate in international efforts such as the Balkans. With relief from the restrictions of Section 907, USEUCOM will be able to take advantage of these opportunities.

Our military interaction with Georgia has continued to increase since that nation was added to USEUCOM’s AOR four years ago. Georgia hosted its first multinational NATO PfP exercise with USEUCOM support in 2001, providing a good example of the kind of security cooperation opportunities we can achieve, not only there, but also potentially in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Based on Department of State guidance, USEUCOM is considering an ambitious program to assist in the reformation of the Georgian Armed Forces, from top to bottom, to provide the Government of Georgia the ability to better defend and secure its sovereignty. It is important to note that Georgia’s internal security situation has only recently begun to stabilize, and we remain concerned about the presence of terrorist-related activities there. We are addressing these concerns in our own counterterrorism campaign.

Middle East

Israel, Syria and Lebanon lie within USEUCOM’s area of responsibility, and, of course, this is an area where tensions continue to run high. Our
extensive military security cooperation with Israel continues. The U.S. is actively involved at all levels with the Israeli Defense Force in joint research and development projects, combined civil-military projects, joint commercial ventures, military-to-military discussions, military exercises and many high level military and civilian visits. The U.S. provides Israel with over $2 billion annually in Foreign Military Financing.

Due primarily to its position on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism, Syria currently receives no U.S. economic aid or support, is ineligible for any Security Assistance programs, receives few political visits from U.S. leaders and maintains no routine military-to-military contact with USEUCOM. Similarly, our aid to Lebanon is nominal, including only a small amount of IMET funding. While Syria and Lebanon condemned the al-Qaida attacks, they disagree with our identification of groups such as Hizballah as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. They instead view such groups as “freedom fighters” battling against foreign occupation. We must endeavor to persuade Syria and Lebanon to join us in actively combating international terrorist groups.

North Africa

Most nations of North Africa have condemned the 11 September attacks and have offered varying levels of support to our efforts to fight terrorism. Morocco and Tunisia remain two of our staunchest long-term allies on the African continent, and we regularly conduct exercises and other activities with their armed forces. Both traditionally have been moderate voices in the Arab world, and we will continue to rely on them to help stem the tide of terrorism and radical extremism.
Our current engagement strategy with Algeria is characterized by a slow, measured approach. While military security cooperation is closely tied to Algerian progress in implementing political and economic reform, the attacks on 11 September have brought about an interagency effort to increase cooperation with Algeria, specifically in those areas that will aid in countering terrorism. For example, small investments in border security will increase regional stability and reduce the threat of transnational terrorism emanating from Algeria.

Libya has long been a key source of tension in North Africa. Qadhafi’s traditional support to various subversive and dissident groups has been detrimental to regional stability and opposed to U.S. goals in Africa. Recently, however, as Qadhafi has attempted to reenter the world stage, Tripoli has made overtures seeking to normalize relations with the U.S. While it is too early to determine the legitimacy of these overtures, we should determine the best interagency approach to influence Libya’s policy against terrorism, while promoting regional stability.

**Sub-Saharan Africa**

Sub-Saharan Africa is a geographically immense and diverse region. Significant economic, ethnic, cultural, political and environmental differences have contributed to a climate of conflict and instability in which no fewer than three major conflicts rage and others continue to smolder. Although there are pockets of terrorist-related activities in this region of Africa, we also find examples of peaceful change. There is ample evidence of democratic governance and integration of former opponents into
governments and militaries earnestly striving for the advancement of the nations they represent and defend. Our challenge at USEUCOM is to accentuate these positive trends while helping to contain and resolve problems. USEUCOM has identified several objectives for its military cooperation activities in Sub-Saharan Africa, primarily based on the need to protect U.S. citizens or assets and support the global war on terrorism.

Finally, one cannot address Sub-Saharan Africa without considering the Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) epidemic. This human tragedy is characterized in some areas by infection rates reaching 40 percent. This will be a destabilizing factor for years to come. USEUCOM seeks to ameliorate this disaster by leveraging tools such as the Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program to support AIDS education and behavior modification efforts in African militaries. The goal is to prevent the spread of the virus when African armies deploy to support peacekeeping operations and respond to humanitarian crises.

**CHALLENGES AND SHORTFALLS**

USEUCOM faces a number of challenges as we seek to best posture our forces for success against present and emerging threats to U.S. national interests. This section describes some of those challenges and how we are meeting them, and requests your assistance in addressing some of our shortfalls.

**Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP)**

We view force protection in the accomplishment of our mission as a primary concern. The attacks on 11 September served as a painful reminder
that terrorism can strike anywhere and at anytime. As we weigh our current intelligence capabilities in theater against the layered deterrent imperatives required for this new operational environment, we need your support to improve several areas. I will focus on our needs regarding infrastructure later in this statement, but at this point, I would like to address some other aspects of force protection.

We are enhancing our security posture both through improved physical measures at our installations and by improving intelligence gathering and sharing with our coalition partners and law enforcement agencies to afford timely warning. Our programs and posture have increased dramatically in recent years to include public awareness, training, physical security upgrades and formal agreements with U.S. Ambassadors that clearly delineate force protection responsibilities for DoD personnel. In June 2001, we updated our USEUCOM AT/FP Operations Order to include recommendations from the Cole Commission. We also developed a program called the Vulnerability Assessment Management Program to track installation vulnerabilities and to take corrective actions when necessary. We trained 170 new unit level AT/FP officers in FY01. Over the last year, we began developing a database called the Joint Risk Assessment Management Program to capture intelligence, operational and logistical information and provide threat and vulnerability assessments for forces in transit in our Theater.

We have augmented these efforts with a new, complementary database that captures all local, USEUCOM-reported incidents and actions that might be related to terrorist activity. With these tools, we seek to improve the networked operations of warfighters in USEUCOM, other U.S. agencies and our
allies. We have broken new ground with DoD and non-DoD law enforcement agencies to integrate into our data networks their sensitive information and intelligence in order to gain a clearer picture of terrorist activity. Our law enforcement and counterintelligence elements provide access to foreign counterparts and serve as conduits for time-sensitive information exchange. As a result, we have been able to provide timely intelligence information to foreign law enforcement entities regarding suspected terrorist travel and activity, resulting in surveillance operations, arrests and detentions. Moreover, information provided to us by foreign law enforcement and counterintelligence counterparts has allowed us to refocus our own limited intelligence assets.

We are working closely with other U.S. agencies, like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and with our partner nations to eradicate support for global terrorism through a wide range of military, law enforcement and economic means. While we have witnessed many successes in this effort, I am still concerned that we do not have the most efficient and effective processes to attain information dominance and decision superiority in this war. We need to examine ways for new technologies and information exchange to enhance our success. For that reason, we created a Joint Interagency Coordination Group to strengthen the relationship with all government agencies and USEUCOM partners on terrorist activities in this theater. We received strong support from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in this effort. Several Ambassadors in the region have also been very supportive. In order to defeat terrorist networks, it is essential to improve coordination among all instruments of national and international
power that contribute to this objective. Your continued support of U.S. involvement in this and related activities is important and appreciated.

**Theater Basing**

Last August the Secretary of Defense directed that all combatant commanders review their overseas basing requirements and examine opportunities for joint use of facilities and land by the Services, consolidation of infrastructure, and enhanced training. USEUCOM will submit the findings of this Overseas Basing Requirements Study (OBRS) to the Joint Staff in March. In addressing the OBRS, we are seeking basing efficiencies through a detailed review of existing infrastructure utilization. By identifying potential excess installations and means of making more efficient use of our existing infrastructure, we are ensuring that our future military construction (MILCON) and sustainment, restoration and modernization (SRM) investments are focused on enduring installations.

Much of the groundwork for the OBRS was well underway over a year ago when USEUCOM established a formal theater basing working group in an effort to bring together the basing plans of each of our Service Components, address the issues that cross Service lines and best posture our in-theater forces to meet current and emerging threats. The release of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided the working group with the force structure information needed to pursue an appropriate basing strategy. The QDR does not cite any significant changes in force structure in the European Theater other than planning for an Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Preliminary planning for IBCT conversion is underway and is reflected in USAREUR’s efficient basing initiatives.
USAREUR’s Efficient Basing East (EBE) consolidation is currently in the design phase. In addition to the $25 million appropriated by Congress for the design phase, $68.7 million of construction funding will be part of DoD’s FY03 military construction (MILCON) request. Consistent with the objectives of the OBRS, EBE is an initiative to enhance readiness, gain efficiencies and improve the well being of 3,500 soldiers and 5,000 family members by re-stationing a brigade combat team (BCT) from 13 widely dispersed installations to a single location in Grafenwöehr, Germany. Executing this initiative will facilitate command and control, lower transportation costs, allow for better force protection, improve access to training areas, eliminate over 5 million square feet of excess inventory and reduce annual base operations costs by up to $39.5 million. USAREUR’s other major basing initiative, titled Efficient Basing South (EBS), is likewise consistent with the OBRS objectives. EBS, which consists of adding a second airborne battalion in Italy in the FY02-04 timeframe, will provide USEUCOM with enhanced early entry capabilities and increased flexibility. To reduce the total cost, USAREUR plans to base this unit at their existing facility near Vicenza. Approximately $120 million in additional MILCON funding in FY03 has been included for the expansion of barracks, child development centers and schools to support this efficient basing initiative.

USAFE is also working to consolidate its geographically separated units throughout the AOR to its enduring, major operating bases. Similarly, USNAVEUR is proceeding with consolidations at Gaeta, La Maddalena and London. Finally, in coordination with U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), we are investigating potential joint basing options for Special Operations
Forces (SOF) stationed in our AOR. This, too, will provide greater crisis response capabilities, enhanced joint training opportunities and improved efficiencies.

**Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Shortfalls**

USEUCOM requires an integrated architecture to collect, collate, filter and process data from disparate sources of information, allowing analysts to detect, identify, analyze and predict potential threats within our AOR. DoD initiatives to provide unified commanders with organic, multi-discipline intelligence collection capabilities – to include airborne collectors like unmanned aerial vehicles and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) capabilities – are particularly helpful in this regard. We appreciate your support for these and similar initiatives that enhance our ISR architecture.

**En Route Infrastructure**

En route infrastructure is critically important for strategic deployment and sustainment. Here again, the war on terrorism provides a useful example. Throughout Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, USEUCOM and USTRANSCOM have partnered together with our NATO allies to support USCENTCOM. The European En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee provided the framework for this successful partnership and is the mechanism we must leverage to improve deployment capabilities. Virtually all of the forces and supplies transported to USCENTCOM went through and were supported by infrastructure belonging to our NATO-southern flank allies: Portugal, Spain, Italy and Turkey. The Spanish bases, Moron and Rota, in particular, are essential to ensuring optimal force flow in contingency operations; but they are not as well developed as we would like. While our allies have given
their approval for our construction projects and all remaining construction is in the FYDP, we must maintain our commitment.

**Air Traffic Control**

The tremendous growth in the air traffic and communication industries in Europe presents increasing challenges for air traffic control agencies, civil air carriers and military aviation. At the same time, expansion of communication technologies is threatening to overtax a limited radio frequency spectrum. To address these challenges, many countries are mandating more efficient air traffic communications systems and avionics. Due to its current air traffic congestion, Europe is leading worldwide implementation in this regard. Accordingly, we need to equip our aircraft with the new communications capabilities they require for flight in European airspace.

**KEY SUPPORT IN THEATER**

Considering the scope of our mission, along with the size and diversity of our AOR, we rely extensively on support from several organizations. I would like to point out the contributions of a couple of those organizations in particular, upon which we rely daily.

**Reserve Units**

The variability of USEUCOM missions and requirements demands full access to the total spectrum of Service capability offered by the reserve components (RC). Quite simply the mission cannot be accomplished without RC assistance across the full spectrum of operations. In FY01, the RC provided
approximately 1.5 million man-days of support to the theater. This figure represents the equivalent of an additional 3,981 full time service members in Theater.

Over the past year there were on average 2,800 RC service members deployed in support of Balkans operations at any one time. They currently provide 60 percent of U.S. forces in SFOR and 10 percent of U.S. forces in KFOR. Since the start of Balkans operations, there have been over 14,000 Army Reservists and over 9,000 Army Guardsmen deployed to the Balkans. We also requested the mobilization of nearly 150 Reserve members to augment HQ USEUCOM for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. USEUCOM’s four Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity sites in the continental United States – another invaluable RC contribution – play an integral role in the Theater intelligence analysis and production architecture. The reservists at these sites provide 40 percent of the Joint Analysis Center’s (JAC) scheduled production, allowing the JAC the flexibility to reorient its production effort to support expanding contingency operations.

Reserve component contributions in support of USCINCEUR’s Theater Security Cooperation plans are also significant. RC forces are a primary source of manpower for USEUCOM’s Joint Contact Team Program and the PfP exercise program. RC forces and service members provide real world contributions through unilateral and combined exercises involving USEUCOM, NATO partners and PfP countries. This RC involvement is the primary way to lower the active force operating tempo and capitalize on providing Reserve expertise to enhance USEUCOM exercises.
Another important security cooperation program carried out by reserve forces is the **State Partnership Program (SPP)**, which assists partner nations in making the transition from authoritarian to democratic governments. This program matches emerging democracies in the AOR with partner states in the U.S. Currently there are 19 states partnered with 17 foreign nations in the AOR. This past year was extremely successful as National Guard soldiers and airmen conducted over 250 events with partner nations. Civic Leader Visits to SPP partner nations are particularly important. Relations that began as simple military-to-military contacts within the SPP have blossomed into associations encompassing nearly every facet of society - unit partnerships, sister cities, student exchanges, scientific collaborations and business ties. This ability to interact with our partner nations in all sectors of society is the key strength of the SPP. It has acted as a stabilizing influence throughout the USEUCOM AOR, and will continue to do so in years to come.

SPP has been so successful that USEUCOM is aggressively seeking funding to expand the program to Africa, starting with South Africa and Morocco. Although the challenges faced by African nations differ from those of Eastern Europe, many nations are ready for the opportunity that SPP provides. For a small investment, we can provide candidate nations access to the expertise of an entire state government infrastructure ranging from public health to wildlife management. A state government more closely resembles the government structure of a small African nation. The SPP will serve as a tremendous complement to our traditional African engagement activities.

**National Intelligence Support**
USEUCOM depends heavily on other government agencies for the intelligence and information needed to meet our mission requirements. The Defense Information Systems Agency - Europe (DISA-E) provides critical long-haul and other communications to USEUCOM, Service Components and coalition partners during peacetime, contingencies and wartime. DISA actively supports SFOR, KFOR, ONW and other USEUCOM missions by engineering the communications needed to transport intelligence data from multiple collection sources via processing points and on to the warfighters. DISA is also developing the Global Information Grid, which promises to enhance our ability to maintain information superiority on the battlefield by increasing information access and transfer rates. We also depend heavily upon the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA’s Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service - to include both the Defense Attaché System and the Forward Operating Bases - routinely provides critical information, and we strongly advocate expanding this program in the USEUCOM AOR. DIA’s resources are critical to our counterterrorism efforts as well as to our other ongoing contingency operations. Another DIA initiative, the Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), is providing a much-needed conduit for strong collaborative doctrine and interoperable databases to service the Unified Command customer.

Critical to these DIA efforts will be the release of data from the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency (NSA). NSA products and services continue to be force multipliers for USEUCOM, and we support NSA’s transformation to a distributed architecture that promises to enhance the synergy between national and tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets. Our SIGINT analytic capability must be robust and must keep
pace with technology. Finally, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) provides important geospatial information, imagery and imagery analysis to support USEUCOM operations. NIMA has repeatedly demonstrated its responsiveness to USEUCOM crisis operations; however, the geospatial resources required to support the global operations needed to meet today’s crises are limited. Moreover, NIMA, and the intelligence community in general, suffers from a lack of experienced imagery analysts which threatens our ability to provide timely and accurate indications and warning and to support ongoing operations throughout the Theater. We hope that you will look favorably upon providing DISA, DIA, NSA and NIMA the resources they need to effectively support us.

**U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)**

Recent operations, including OEF, well illustrate the unified commands’ critical dependence upon the strategic mobility afforded by USTRANSCOM. Quite frankly, without USTRANSCOM’s strategic lift support, we would be hard-pressed to execute OEF or virtually any other contingency operation. The recent QDR and defense plans indicate an increased demand for strategic airlift support, and USTRANSCOM merits your help in this regard.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: USEUCOM’S FOREMOST INVESTMENT NEED**

The quality of our Theater infrastructure impacts everything we do in USEUCOM. Sound infrastructure is critical to conducting our mission and to providing our service members and their families with an appropriate quality of life. Taking care of people enhances readiness, retention and, ultimately, mission accomplishment. To this end, the service men and women of USEUCOM should be afforded a standard of living equal to their
counterparts stationed at home. To be quite frank, we are not there yet, and we need your support to make this imperative a reality. To simultaneously contribute to the global campaign against terrorism, maintain our ability to rapidly respond to regional threats to U.S. interests and afford our forward-based forces a reasonable level of force protection and a suitable quality of life, we specifically need you to invest in four inter-related facets of our infrastructure. These four facets are improved force protection and antiterrorism measures; sustainment, restoration and modernization (SRM) of our enduring facilities; new military construction (MILCON); and command, control, communications and computers (C4) enhancement.

**Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Infrastructure Improvements**

USEUCOM components received $30.4 million in FY01 Emergency Supplemental funding following the 11 September attacks. We greatly appreciate the Congress’ efforts to provide us with this much-needed infusion of resources, which allowed us to significantly improve our secure communications capabilities, upgrade our physical security and generally increase the protection of our installations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Combating Terrorism Initiative Fund has also been instrumental in mitigating some of our force protection vulnerabilities. In FY01 the command received $5.8 million in these funds, which helped eliminate some weaknesses identified through vulnerability assessments.

While Emergency Supplemental funding and Combating Terrorism Initiative Funds are steps in the right direction, adequate resources continue to be a major challenge for AT/FP Service priorities. As mentioned earlier, we have taken several procedural steps to improve our force protection posture
through enhanced coalition intelligence and early warning systems, but we must still address physical installation vulnerabilities. Assessments at both the Theater headquarters and component levels by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment program have helped identify installation vulnerabilities and underscored the need for additional funding. We reviewed our most critical AT/FP shortfalls and prioritized our remaining unfunded requirements. These include strengthening U.S. facilities against chemical, biological and radiological threats and mass casualty-producing explosive devices, as well as improving the access control features at installation entry points.

Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM)

Sustaining, restoring and modernizing our work and living environments is critical to USEUCOM mission accomplishment. DoD has programmed full funding for USEUCOM housing SRM, but working areas and facilities continue to be a concern. Like barracks and family housing, the work environment is improving, but at a slower rate. Throughout the Theater there are still work environments that are overcrowded and have inadequate and inefficient lighting and heating systems. From runways to repair docks to billeting and housing areas, the infrastructure that supports our operations and people has been under funded for many years. As might be expected, this problem has compounded annually.

The average age of our facilities is now 32 years old, and our oldest facilities are 90 years old. Over 80 percent of the installations in USEUCOM are assessed as C-3, meaning that there are significant facility deficiencies that prevent performing some missions. Yet SRM to revitalize and modernize
USAREUR and USNAVEUR installations is currently underfunded by $1.3 billion dollars and is barely funded to sustain their present condition. The Air Force recently committed to fully fund sustainment for USAFE through 2007 and to start funding restoration and modernization towards the DoD goal with the intent of improving facilities to an acceptable level by 2010.

**Military Construction (MILCON)**

We have begun to make the significant investments needed over the next decade to enhance our support infrastructure and take care of our most valuable resource – our people. Positive results continue from the increased funding we have received over the past two years, to include the $360.9 million approved in FY02 (including $94.6 million for DoD agencies in the Theater). The Command’s service members and families see the positive trend in our infrastructure and are grateful to Congress for providing the funding needed to make this possible. However, a great deal of our infrastructure remains inadequate and our service members continue to work in dilapidated facilities spread over inefficient, geographically separated installations. In many places we are still working to replace temporary, container office space with quality construction. In short, we need your continued investment to replace some of our single service member and family living quarters, work facilities and quality of life infrastructure.

The majority of our FY03 MILCON budget request for non-family housing is comprised of barracks and similar quality of life requests, while 34 percent of the requested funding is dedicated to work environment facilities. This 34 percent constitutes eight projects with a value of more than $110 million. We greatly appreciate your prior approval for the planning and
design of the Efficient Basing East initiative. This initiative is one that will provide new and efficient workspace for service members while gaining installation management efficiencies that will save taxpayer dollars. The first two MILCON projects to support EBE are in the FY03 MILCON budget with a combined value of $59.3 million, along with $9.4 million for site preparation.

Funding to meet the DoD requirements for quality housing for service members and their families continues to be a critical element in attracting and retaining the high caliber personnel who make our military forces the best in the world. Our Components remain on track to meet the earlier DPG requirement for the year 2010, and are presently working with their respective Service headquarters to meet the current DoD requirement to eliminate sub-standard family housing units by 2007. Inadequate living conditions do not convey the message we want to send to the young, committed patriots who volunteer to serve their nation overseas.

Build-to-lease housing is an option that provides quality accommodations with no capital investment and no acquisition of land from the Host Nation. The largest in-Theater build-to-lease housing project to date will be the Residenza dei Marina complex to support the U.S. Naval Air Station, Sigonella. This complex is presently under construction and will provide 526 units of quality family housing with due regard for force protection measures. This area will be owned and maintained by the contractor and the lease is for ten years with extension options. If at some time in the distant future this housing is no longer needed, we will end our contract and walk away because we own and owe nothing. This same concept
will be applied to the build-to-lease housing presently planned to support
USAREUR’s families that move to Grafenwöehr as part of Efficient Basing East.
DoD has programmed full funding for USEUCOM housing through FY09 with a total
of $2.3 billion. We need your support to keep this critical quality of life
program on line.

Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) Infrastructure

Theater C4 infrastructure shortfalls remain another of our most
critical concerns. Our World War II-era C4 infrastructure continues to
compromise our ability to communicate within and outside of the Theater and
depreeses our posts, camps, stations and bases of the robust communications
foundation needed to transition to network-centric operations. Our forces in
Theater are experiencing connectivity speeds similar to a home computer
operating over a dial-up modem. Given the new strategic era and the internal
and external challenges we face, it is imperative for both force protection
and operational capability that we equip our people with the best
capabilities to collect, process and disseminate time-sensitive information
quickly and accurately.

OTHER QUALITY OF LIFE PROGRAMS

Beyond our infrastructure there remain a few other issues that impact
the quality of our service and family members’ lives. Schools and health
services, in particular, have a significant effect on our personnel
readiness.
Department of Defense Dependent Schools (DODDS)

The quality of programs provided by DODDS in Europe ranks very high as a quality of life indicator for both military and civilian members of the Command. Continued Congressional support for full-day kindergarten (FDK) and an optimal pupil-to-teacher ratio (PTR) for FY00 and FY01 has produced substantive improvements. However, planned and programmed upgrades, alterations and new construction in FY03 remain crucial for meeting successful, timely program completion. FDK and a reduction of PTR in the first, second and third grades provide services similar to those available to CONUS students. DODDS needs your continued support to implement FDK and PTR initiatives and to ensure adequate facilities are available for improving student achievement during the critical early stages of learning.

Children overseas lack the options available to CONUS families for remedial and enrichment summer academic programs. Parents in Europe continue to urge Commanders to offer no-fee school options for students overseas on par with what is available to students in the U.S. Funding and staffing have been the main impediments to offering these options, as Congress has not authorized DoD to use appropriated funds for summer school support. Congressional support for the DoD proposal to authorize a summer school program free of charge in overseas school systems would be greatly appreciated.

Health Care

USEUCOM health services are pursuing several initiatives and programs designed to optimize health care support to our beneficiary population. We continue to improve or replace our aging facility infrastructure (in line
with the Efficient Basing programs) with several major construction efforts. Our emphasis continues on improving our communications pathways to support state of the art medical technology, diagnostic digital imagery and automated medical information communications. We have improved health care availability for all beneficiaries with the TRICARE for Life and TRICARE Plus programs and the “Open Access” initiative. The Women, Infants and Children (WIC) program provides essential nutritional education and nutritious food support to young, needy mothers and their children within the military community. WIC was implemented at several pilot sites and efforts continue to expand this program across the European military community. Due to your support, health care is a positive contributor to quality of life in the USEUCOM community.

CONCLUSION

While we in USEUCOM are confronted by a vast array of challenges as we carry out our diverse missions, we have maintained our ability to respond to the full spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian assistance to major theater war and nuclear deterrence, and have done so with a moderate amount of resources and a reduced force presence. We are actively engaged today in the global campaign against terrorism and have developed a broad, multifaceted plan to defeat terrorism throughout our AOR. Our on-going operations, particularly with respect to the Balkans, have, thus far, been successful. While regional challenges remain and the risks of setbacks are ever-present, we remain optimistic that USEUCOM’s continued activities will bring about the desired military end-state sought by the U.S., its Allies and responsible regional entities. Security cooperation in the Theater continues to pay significant dividends, recently highlighted in the support provided by our
Allies in the war against terrorism. U.S. security cooperation efforts in the Theater help ensure continued cohesion between our traditional military counterparts, and sow the seeds for future cooperation in new areas such as the Caucasus.

Throughout this statement, I have outlined many needs for your support, but none is greater than the need to improve our long-neglected infrastructure, and this remains my foremost priority. To simultaneously contribute to the global campaign against terrorism, maintain our ability to rapidly respond to regional threats to U.S. interests and afford our forward-based forces a reasonable level of force protection and quality of life, we need your continued investment in our infrastructure. To this end, we invite you to come and visit our installations, and scrutinize our plans to ensure that we are wisely investing the American people’s treasure. Interact with our young service men and women as they perform their daily operations and view their work environment and living arrangements. They continue to be our best spokespeople, and I think you will be, as I am, immensely proud of them.

In closing, I would like to thank the Congress for its continued support, without which our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen would be unable to perform the tasks assigned to them by our nation. With your continued assistance, they will remain ready and postured forward to defend freedom, foster cooperation and promote stability throughout Europe, the Middle East, Eurasia and Africa. I sincerely appreciate this opportunity to outline the state of the U.S. European Command and will be pleased to provide the Committee with any additional information it may require.