ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

DEFENSE REFORMS

SASC: Almost 15 years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of these reforms, particularly in your assignments as Commanding Officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, during Operation Provide Comfort; as Deputy Director of Operations, U.S. European Command, and Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force Provide Promise; as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, Headquarters Marine Corps; as the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; and in your current assignment as Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

GENERAL JONES: I have consistently supported full implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The Goldwater-Nichols Act remains critical to promoting joint approaches and capabilities among the Services. It provides for an effective balance between organizing, training, and equipping our forces and employing them in pursuit of our national interests. Not surprisingly, over time, the implementation of this act also produced some unintended consequences that, in my view, should be examined. I also support the Special Operations reforms and have taken steps to insure that the Marine Corps and the Special Operations command become more closely affiliated.

SASC: Based upon your experience, what is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented and the impact that they have had?

GENERAL JONES: We have certainly come a long way toward realizing the goals of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but it remains unfinished work. Most of the Services struggle, to some extent, with the management challenge of the career patterns of our personnel. It is difficult to manage these careers through the multiple requirements of service qualifications and joint service requirements simultaneously. Each Service contributes unique, yet complementary capabilities to joint warfighting; yet, in order to comply with the Joint Officer Management Policy of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, we ask each Service to adhere to a restrictive “one-size-fits-all” personnel policy. The Senate has, over the years, indicated that the joint officer provisions need careful review, and Congress has, already made some necessary adjustments. In my opinion, each Service needs more latitude in managing personnel policy in accordance with its own unique needs, culture, and core competencies, all the while remaining in compliance with the spirit of Goldwater-Nichol’s purpose.
Nonetheless, we have made significant progress—the Services are providing combatant commanders—including the Commander, Special Operations Command—with the finest complementary capabilities and the best trained and equipped forces in our history. This improving capability began to reveal itself during Operation DESERT STORM, and reached new heights of effectiveness most recently during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). During OEF we demonstrated the ability to conduct deep maneuver from a sea-base, requiring minimal host nation support. The immediate tactical cohesion and military successes that resulted between all elements of the force is one of the long lasting “lessons learned” of our efforts in the war against terrorism to date. While we aren’t yet as interoperable as we would like in some areas, we are vastly improved over our capabilities demonstrated during Desert Shield/Desert Storm some 11 years ago.

SASC: What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

GENERAL JONES: The most important aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act were that it: streamlined the chain of command and increased the effectiveness of the Joint Staff, improved the quality of joint service, created an architecture that facilitated inter-Service cooperation and experimentation, and created a better process for identifying joint warfighting requirements.

SASC: Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

GENERAL JONES: As we transform the U.S. national security structure to meet current and emerging threats, I would anticipate some new legislative proposals to move beyond Goldwater-Nichols, as well as other laws that were enacted in a different era. Just as the Congress is currently crafting legislation regarding the Department of Homeland Security, more initiatives will be required to ensure inter-agency cooperation and a more inclusive approach to national security across several of the agencies of our government. More specifically, I would recommend that the following areas be examined:

1. Acquisition Reform: Though not resulting from the Goldwater-Nichols Act, our acquisition process is too cumbersome to be responsive in an environment of rapidly changing conditions, technologies, and requirements. Simply put, it takes too long to acquire the new technologies we need to maintain our advantage over potential adversaries. We should examine the impact of current law with regard to existing rules of accountability for the success or failure of our major programs.

   Acquisition laws/regulations seem to have been written under the assumption that, left unchecked, most people in responsible positions will choose the wrong/illegal course of action. My experience is quite the contrary. Service Chiefs are, in fact but not in law, held accountable for failures in their programs, particularly when those failures result in loss of life. This is as it should be. At the same time, current law severely restricts Service Chiefs from any participation in the acquisition process beyond the responsibility of requirement identification.

2. Personnel Policy Reform: In our effort to standardize how we treat service members across the Department of Defense, our laws increasingly limit the flexibility required to maintain individual Service competencies
and cultures. Four Services with unique and important cultures, organizations, demographics, and needs, require more effective management tools than a single, rigid set of personnel policies. Our young men and women join the armed forces to become a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Coast Guardsman, or Marine. That they will become members of our nation’s Joint Forces for operational employment is to be celebrated, but their identity will always be to their service culture. This fact remains the foundation of our strength and creative diversity. We should understand that our distinct service cultures are both necessary and will ultimately be responsible for any real transformation in our military capabilities.

3. Role of the Joint Chiefs: The roles and functions of the Joint Chiefs needs to be re-examined and appropriately redefined in order to continue the tradition and expectation of being able to provide the best military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The collective experience of this important body, the diversity of the Chiefs’ institutional perspectives, and the Goldwater-Nichols imposed spirit of cooperation and collective responsibility, provide for a needed partnership to complement the important missions of the Combatant Commanders. Today’s JCS finds itself immersed in Title 10 responsibilities at the expense of the equally important function of providing military advice on pressing global issues. I do not believe that it was the intent of the Congress to reduce this function at the time of Goldwater-Nichols passage.

4. Consolidation of Common Functions: We must find ways to continue to reduce or eliminate redundancy in logistics, intelligence, and medical services. Command and control, communications, and information management, are additional areas which are ripe for reform as well. Fifteen defense agencies and seven field activities provide support to the Defense Department, collectively accounting for over $65 billion in annual expenditures, or about 20 percent of the DOD budget. Insulated as they are from true competitive pressures, these agencies lack the incentives necessary to be efficient in today’s environment. Many of our agencies perform functions that are available commercially, frequently at less cost. In previous testimony, I have recommended that a comprehensive examination of the functions and organization of our agency structure be conducted as a matter of some priority. I continue to support such a requirement.

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ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

DUTIES

SASC:  What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)?
GENERAL JONES: The Commander of the U.S. European Command is responsible for coordinating and conducting all U.S. military operations and activities across the 91 countries in the European Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) in pursuit of U.S. national military objectives. This AOR includes all of Europe, two-thirds of the African continent, the Middle East, and the Caucasus Region. After 1 October, it will include Russia, Iceland, Greenland and approximately half of the Atlantic Ocean as well. He is also responsible for the health, welfare and security of the approximately 117,000 service members forward deployed within that AOR. Further, he coordinates the efforts of the Service Component Commands assigned to the European Theater.

The primary responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is to contribute to preserving the peace, and to assure the security and territorial integrity of the nineteen allied member states. In so doing, the SACEUR is responsible to the Military Committee for the overall direction and conduct of all Alliance military matters within Allied Command Europe. This includes the responsibility for providing military advice and maintaining close relationships with the military leadership of the member nations. The responsibilities of the Commander EUCOM and the SACEUR are complementary, and the fact that they have traditionally been vested in one officer allows for effective coordination between the U.S. and NATO military command structures.

SASC: What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

GENERAL JONES: I have been fortunate to serve in a number of assignments, which, I believe, have prepared me for these duties. As the Commanding Officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, I participated in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT’s JTF “Bravo” during the Kurdish relief effort of 1991. This operation represented the largest humanitarian peace operation the U.S. had participated in up to that time, and NATO’s first out of area operation. As the Deputy Director of Operations, U.S. European Command, and Chief of Staff, JTF PROVIDE PROMISE in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1994), I was exposed to the unique challenges of U.S. participation in coalition operations in the region, and in establishing our national presence in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. In my current capacity, I have become familiar with the challenges of providing the military forces employed by our Combatant Commanders. These assignments have given me an opportunity to acquire some of the operational and diplomatic skills that, I would imagine, are important for any SACEUR/CINCEUR.

On a personal note, I was fortunate to be able to spend my formative years in Europe (1947-1961). This experience provided me with a cultural education and an understanding of European perspectives from a very young age. My parents remained in Europe long after my return to the United States, and through my frequent visits and increased professional contacts, I was able to broaden and deepen my sense of European perspectives. If confirmed, my intimate and life-long association with Europe should be of assistance in executing my duties as CINCEUR / SACEUR.

SASC: Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform these duties?

GENERAL JONES: Key to my ability to perform the duties of CINCEUR and SACEUR will be early visits to the countries within the AOR, meeting the Chiefs and Ministers of Defense, and meeting with our ambassadors and their country teams. Gaining an immediate appreciation of their insights and perspectives
will be most important. I will need to meet with our commanders and our forces throughout the theater, particularly those involved in the ongoing operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, and Turkey.

**SASC:** In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the other combatant commanders, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Services?

**GENERAL JONES:** Regular and consistent communication with all of the leaders mentioned in the question above will be a priority should I be confirmed as the next Commander of EUCOM and as SACEUR. As political and military events and issues change, there is a corresponding necessity for timely consultations and decisions. If confirmed, I intend to seek the guidance and counsel of those mentioned in the question. I would intend to achieve the same spirit of cooperation with these leaders that I have enjoyed while serving in my current assignment.

**SASC:** In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, and the U.S. chiefs of mission to the countries in EUCOM’s area of responsibility?

**GENERAL JONES:** Engaging and maintaining close communications with each of these leaders is also very important to succeeding as the Commander, EUCOM and as SACEUR. Today’s “challenge” is an interagency and coalition one. Close cooperation between State and Defense Department officials is absolutely critical.

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**ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR**

GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

**MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS**

**SASC:** In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next CINCEUR/SACEUR?

**GENERAL JONES:** The next CINCEUR/SACEUR faces five broad challenges: the Global War on Terrorism; NATO enlargement; the transformation of alliance military capabilities; the stability and security of the Balkans; and the evolving relationship with Russia during this period of change. Each of
these issues also presents important opportunities for the United States and her allies.

NATO nations, as well as several countries throughout the EUCOM area of responsibility, are contributing to the Global War on Terrorism. Among NATO nations, this has not been limited to being a military effort alone. Numerous international government agencies are involved in the prosecution of the war. The next Commander, EUCOM and SACEUR will continue to cultivate and manage Allied and interagency support at the military level. Particular attention to the force protection requirements of U.S. and Allied service members, their families, and the infrastructure, will be a pressing requirement.

As the U.S. security establishment transforms to meet current and emerging challenges, the next CINCEUR/SACEUR must facilitate and manage the activities leading to military transformation within the theater. Service and interagency transformation efforts must be coordinated and integrated as they are implemented within the European Command. We must advocate truly new ways of combining the elements of military power, leveraging our strengths while denying our adversaries opportunities to gain any advantage against us. This will require bold action to modify and streamline command structures, develop relevant capabilities, and retire obsolete command structures and equipment. Our forces will become more capable, deployable, sustainable, and survivable in order to meet the needs of the future international security environment. The next SACEUR/CINCEUR must work to facilitate these changes.

Likewise, within NATO, the next SACEUR must provide the strategic leadership and vision to implement the political decisions regarding transformation at the military level. NATO enlargement; the enhanced Defense Capabilities Initiative; the NATO Command Structure Review; and new NATO relationships with Russia, Ukraine and many other nations are among the transformational efforts that will be at the forefront during the near future. A major post-Prague Summit challenge lies in ensuring that the new invitees stay the course, continue to invest in the collective security, and implement the key defense reforms required for NATO interoperability. The development of newly invited countries into contributing members of NATO security will be a long-term process. We will also be required to adjust the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. As new members join NATO, they leave the receiving end of the PFP program. Although PFP has been an extremely successful program, it must be updated to the needs of the remaining members.

Lastly, I am mindful of the value of stability and security in the Balkans to Europe and the United States. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the next CINCEUR/SACEUR will need to work closely with NATO, UN, International Community and local political authorities to facilitate restoration of the rule of law and public confidence in civil police. As progress continues in this area, we can continue to downsize both the NATO and U.S. military footprint as has happened during General Ralston’s tenure. Similarly, the next CINCEUR/ SACEUR will need to remain closely engaged with international efforts in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo. With continued vigilance, this mission will be a NATO success story of historical proportions.

SASC: Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

GENERAL JONES: In all the areas mentioned above, the key to success will be proactive engagement, vision, and clear direction. The next EUCOM Commander and SACEUR must establish clear priorities and provide a strategic vision to
guide transformation, foster relationships, and set the conditions for the successful integration of the new member countries. Constant assessment and the courage to adjust as required will be critical enablers as we address the security challenges ahead.

SASC: What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of CINCEUR/SACEUR?

GENERAL JONES: The most difficult challenges facing the next EUCOM Commander and SACEUR will be associated with helping NATO define itself as an alliance which should have a goal of being even more effective in the 21st century than it was in the 20th century, should that be possible. As an expanding alliance which brings the promise of future security and freedom to its collective members, it has the potential to do many great things in the years immediately ahead. That an American officer is privileged to lead this historically unique alliance, from the military standpoint, should continue to be a matter of national pride. The challenges to the alliance are many. Today, some even question its relevance, absent the threat of the former Soviet Union, and others do not embrace the investment requirement for “transformation” of the alliance’s military capability. Still others are concerned by the current perception of American unilateralism in the conduct of our national foreign policy. Clearly, we will also have to address the very real and very substantive intricacies involved in any future NATO enlargement. There also exists the perception of a widening gap in military capabilities between the United States and our NATO Allies. These are examples of the complexities of the relationships that the EUCOM Commander and SACEUR must recognize in the important relationships we have with our friends in an expanded Europe and a potentially emergent Africa.

SASC: If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

GENERAL JONES: I believe it would be imprudent for me to arbitrarily establish timelines or specific management actions without first taking the opportunity to confer with our national leadership and the political and military leadership of NATO, as well as that of the nations within the EUCOM region. If confirmed, I intend to address the many challenges which face the alliance and our U.S. presence in Europe in ways which are clear, unambiguous, and effective.

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ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

PRIORITY
SASC: If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the CINCEUR/SACEUR?

GENERAL JONES: If confirmed, my foremost priority as the Commander, EUCOM and SACEUR will be to ensure the readiness, interoperability and force protection of U.S. forces deployed within the Theater. This is critical if we are to be capable of executing military missions in pursuit of national objectives. I will work diligently with the Service Chiefs and Service Component Commanders to ensure that the weapons, training and equipment are appropriate to the mission, and that the supporting infrastructure in both the work and living environments adequately supports our service members and their families.

In both roles, my priorities will be consistent with my response to Question 3. In the Global War on Terrorism, my priority will be to promote and sustain allied and interagency support for military activities – not only in Europe, but also in Africa, the Caucasus and the Balkans where often fragile governments can sometimes unknowingly and/or unwillingly provide terrorists with operating bases and network support.

Leading the transformation of U.S. European Command and NATO forces to be better able to meet current and emerging threats will be a priority. This will require me to work closely and diligently with the leadership of the Service Component Commands, interagency leaders, Allied Chiefs and Ministers of Defense, and various organizations in the International Community. It will also require me to keep my leadership here at home and within NATO both consulted and informed.

Finally, facilitating those things that we can do on the military level to promote progress in reestablishing the rule of law and generating popular confidence in civil police institutions, so that we can eventually remove the NATO military presence in the Balkans, will be a continuing priority.

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ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

RUSSIA AND THE CASPIAN SEA

SASC: If confirmed, you would be the first CINCEUR to have Russia and the Caspian Sea assigned to your area of responsibility.

What do you see as the most significant issues that will have to be faced vis-à-vis Russia in the next year or so?

GENERAL JONES: The most significant issues we will face with Russia in the near-term are:
NATO-Russia Council: Russian President Putin has made an impressive and clear choice to seek greater integration with the West and this includes NATO. NATO, and in particular President Bush, has responded to that choice with a new mechanism for communication and cooperation, the NATO-Russia Council. In the next 12 months, we must capitalize on the historical opportunity to forge new military-to-military initiatives and programs focused on institutionalizing NATO-Russia interoperability at the tactical and operational level.

Deepening Cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): Russia is a geo-strategically important partner for the United States and for the West, in general. Under President Putin's leadership, Russia has been an important partner in the war on international terrorism. Russia is a country rich in resources and scientific knowledge and capability. We will need to capitalize on these factors, as well as Russia's strong connections to Central Asia and the Caucasus, to achieve our mutual objectives in the war on terror. At the same time, we need to continue to emphasize that some of the methods used by Russian forces in the name of the War on Terror (most notably the prosecution of the campaign in Chechnya and the bombing of sovereign Georgian territory) currently impede our ability to progress towards the achievement of our mutual goals.

Counter-proliferation: Russia must come to fully understand that its transfers of nuclear and other dual-use technology to unstable regimes or regimes tied to terrorism are just as dangerous to Russia as they are to the U.S. and other European nations. Russia’s current programs, while providing short-term economic and industrial benefits to Russia, threaten to undermine current regional stability and security and seed a complex and dangerous future security environment.

Military-to-Military Contacts: The U.S. should strengthen bilateral and multi-lateral military contacts with Russia at the operational and tactical levels to increase interoperability of U.S.-Russian forces. Our engagement strategy must be multi-dimensional, maximizing the unique engagement tools available to us in the European theater. Examples of such tools include the Marshall Center, the Warrior Preparation Center in Hohenfels, and co-deployment in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). We must take the valuable accomplishments from our common mission in SFOR and KFOR and apply this experience to advance our cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism. At the same time, our engagement strategy should be geared toward building enduring relationships at every level: investing in the future by working with tomorrow's leaders while simultaneously enhancing the quality of our relationship with today's leaders and commanders.

Unified Command Plan (UCP) Change: We must create new mechanisms for coordinating military-to-military cooperation directly with the Russian General Staff and identify and prioritize activities that directly support EUCOM missions and goals. In the past, the Russians have dealt with the U.S. Joint Staff for all military-to-military contacts. EUCOM will henceforth coordinate most of these contacts and this change will require the Russian General Staff to adjust accordingly. There are numerous direct benefits for Russia in this changing relationship. Russian forces and our European Command have a long history of interaction over the past seven years in the Balkans and in other EUCOM based activities. In addition, the Russian General Staff will now coordinate directly with the commanders and staff who control U.S.
military assets in Europe. This experience and command authority will benefit the overall military-military relationship.

SASC: What do you see as the impact of the development of the oil and natural gas resources of the Caspian Sea on United States’ relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey and Russia?

GENERAL JONES: Security cooperation is already a U.S. priority for this region, particularly as mutually beneficial relationships enhance our collective abilities to combat global terrorism. Development and transmission of energy resources in the Caspian Sea region only increases the importance of our relationships with these countries. More specifically, the commercial dimensions of energy development underscore the requirement that EUCOM's security cooperation initiatives be coordinated with non-military approaches. In the context of energy development, regional stability becomes an even greater priority.

Conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, internal strife within Georgia, and various cross-border flare-ups are inherently detrimental to economic development in this region. The interests of all parties -- the Caucasus nations, Turkey, Russia and the U.S. -- will suffer if the region is not stabilized. This region already presents a unique set of challenges. With the emergence of Caspian Sea energy development as a priority issue, the level of complexity only increases. To succeed in this environment, EUCOM will continue to pursue approaches that are based on a broad, all-encompassing vision for the region. Where possible, EUCOM would be well served to develop a consensus among these nations that cooperative efforts will reap long-term benefits, whether they are related to the GWOT or economic development.

SASC: In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next CINCEUR/SACEUR?

GENERAL JONES: The major challenges confronting the next Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR with regard to Russia and the Caspian Sea include fostering stability in the Caucasus region; establishing a foundation for regional cooperation as it pertains to Caspian Sea energy development; building on bi-lateral and multi-lateral relationships to enhance our capacity to combat terrorism; and supporting the voices of democratization and military transformation in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Russia.
SASC: In their Statement on Capabilities issued on June 6th, NATO Defense Ministers stated that "We recognize that the ability of the Alliance to fulfill the full range of its missions in the changing security environment will depend largely upon our ability to increase substantially the proportion of our combat forces and support forces that are available for deployment on operations beyond home territory or where there is no substantial host nation support." General Klaus Naumann, former chairman of NATO's Military Committee, writing in the Summer 2002 NATO Review, put it boldly that, "Unless the November meeting of Allied leaders in Prague, originally billed as the 'enlargement summit', is truly turned into a 'transformation summit', NATO will have outlived its utility and will fade away."

What are your views on the need for the transformation of NATO forces and the likelihood that NATO member nations will be willing to devote the required resources to bring that transformation about?

GENERAL JONES: The world’s security environment has and continues to change. NATO must transform to maintain its effectiveness as an Alliance in this changing environment - just as our own U.S. military must transform. The Secretary of Defense has proposed a new command structure to aid in NATO’s transformation, which was reviewed by the first meeting of the Senior Officials Group (SOG) on 6 September. The proposal would transform the current Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) from a strategic regional command into a strategic functional command specifically tasked for the transformation of the Alliance. Our Allies also recognize that transformation is needed, and many are proposing plans or preparing their positions on transformation for decision at the Prague Summit. Transformation will be the foremost agenda item at Prague, where the strategy is to pursue “new capabilities” (to include a new command structure), “new members” (potential enlargement), and “new relationships” (such as the new NATO-Russia Council).

As to our Allies’ willingness to devote resources, I can only speculate at this point. Much depends on the final transformation plan on which the 19 member nations agree and how that plan is supported by each nation. We must continue to push our view of a transformed NATO and for burden sharing that supports that transformation.

SASC: In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next CINCEUR/SACEUR?

GENERAL JONES: Breaking down resistance to change and providing a vision for NATO transformation will be major challenges in the coming years. The next Commander EUCOM/SACEUR will be at the forefront of sweeping changes in the NATO command and force structure. Allied Command Europe (ACE) will likely take on a larger area of responsibility as the only operational strategic command. To further streamline the command structure, NATO will need to consolidate 2nd and 3rd tier headquarters, and this will be difficult for some nations who highly value the current NATO headquarters on their territory. Force structure must also change to match the new command structure - a process which is now underway through the development of deployable, Graduated Readiness Force Headquarters. Forces need to be more capable, deployable, sustainable, and survivable to meet the needs of future international security environment. The next Commander EUCOM/SACEUR must work to facilitate these incredibly important, and necessary, changes.
SASC: The European Union is establishing – separate from NATO – its own military capability, centered on a rapid-reaction force that will consist of 60,000 troops drawn from the militaries of the European Union members.

How will the establishment of this force impact NATO’s military capabilities?

General Jones: The military capability that the European Union (EU) is developing is, in great part, not “separate from NATO.” In effect, the dual EU/NATO members have largely pledged forces that are now triple-hatted to support existing NATO missions, a sovereign national mission and the new EU mission. The impact on NATO military capabilities is not significant unless a situation arises in which the EU requires the dual-hatted forces. The EU and NATO have not yet worked through developing the arrangements for EU access to these assets and capabilities (also known as “Berlin Plus”). On the positive side, ESDP does have a civilian “peace support” capability that, as evidenced by the EU take over of the United Nations International Police Task Force in Bosnia, can complement military personnel who are less-suited to police operations. I am also hopeful that the European Union will prove more persuasive with respect to influencing the EU’s NATO members to invest more on collective security, resulting ultimately in improved NATO military capabilities.

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next CINCEUR/SACEUR?

General Jones: The EU’s relationship with the non-EU NATO members and the nature and complexity of that relationship as it affects NATO linkages will remain a challenge. Additionally, should EU and NATO enlargement occur, the resolution of Berlin Plus will take on added importance and urgency. Finally, there is the matter of the International Criminal Court and current efforts to sign bilateral agreements with nations in order to protect U.S. forces deployed abroad. The next Commander EUCOM/SACEUR will need to monitor each of these issues closely, and give his best military advice to U.S. and NATO political leaders on potential impacts as each of these issues develop.
ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

NATO ENLARGEMENT

SASC: NATO will be deciding what nations, if any, it will invite to join the Alliance at the November 2002 Summit in Prague.

Assuming further enlargement of the Alliance follows that Summit, what challenges do you foresee that would have to be addressed (1) on a bilateral military to military level and (2) on the Alliance level?

GENERAL JONES: On a bilateral basis, EUCOM will need to take account of enlargement decisions in its security cooperation program. The bilateral military-to-military exercises and other activities will support integration of the invited nations into NATO, while adjustments will be made to focus on the needs of those Partners not invited to join. This will be a seamless transition, based on EUCOM’s well-established cooperation with members of NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program.

On an Alliance level, NATO and the new invitees will need to work out specific action plans to prepare for accession. These plans, which will build on the current work under the individual annual plans for MAP members, will focus on the critical legal, security and interoperability objectives needed for integration as NATO members upon accession. Much progress has already been achieved through MAP, applying the lessons learned from the most recent accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. As in the case of those three nations, we must expect that effective integration of new members will require sustained efforts by those governments and their armed forces so that they can contribute to all Alliance missions. It should be noted that most MAP nations have already gained much useful practical experience through their participation in Alliance operations in the Balkans or in ENDURING FREEDOM.

SASC: Do you believe that a refusal by a candidate nation for NATO membership to agree to exempt Americans from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court would warrant U.S. opposition to such membership?

GENERAL JONES: No. While we should continue to pursue article 98 exemptions, linking the signing of such agreements with enlargement decisions would be an error. Other NATO allies would perceive that type of action as unjust unilateral pressure.

SASC: Based upon your experience as the EUCOM Deputy Director of Operations (J-3) and Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force Provide Promise, for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia and your dealings with various NATO nations and international organizations, would you favor streamlining the NATO chain of command and decision-making process in a post-enlargement era?

GENERAL JONES: Yes. NATO leaders have already launched a comprehensive review of the command and force structures. Streamlining the NATO command
structure is already a necessity and will be even more important in the post-enlargement era. This is an inherent part of the NATO transformation process.

SASC: The military operations NATO conducted in Kosovo revealed the problems inherent in conducting a military operation by consensus. At that time, agreement was needed only among the current 19 members. Would NATO be able to effectively conduct a military operation in the future with potentially 28 members?

GENERAL JONES: Increasing the number of NATO members from 19 to 28 should have very little impact on decision-making. The last round of enlargement, growing NATO from 16 to 19 members, had no noticeable effect on NATO decision-making. Today, NATO leads operations in Kosovo with the forces of 34 nations—and appears to be doing so with no problems with regard to decision-making. Our challenge will be to maximize the efficiency of the process by streamlining command structures and pushing decision making down to lower levels when reasonable.

SASC: In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next CINCEUR/SACEUR?

GENERAL JONES: A major post-Prague challenge will be ensuring the old and new invitees stay the course, continue to invest in defense, and implement the key defense reforms required for NATO interoperability. Turning newly invited countries into contributing members of NATO security will be a long-term process. Another challenge will lie in adjusting the PfP program. As new members join NATO they leave the receiving end of the PfP program. Although PfP has been an extremely successful program, it must be updated to the needs of the remaining members, many of whom will require more help than the invited nations.

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ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE MOBILE FORCE (LAND)

SASC: NATO has announced the disbandment of Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (LAND) (AMF(L)). The NATO announcement stated, in part, that "The concept of rapid deployment and flexible multinational forces, which was characteristic for AMF, is being incorporated into NATO’s new concept of graduated readiness forces. Therefore the command and control structure of AMF(L) can be dissolved.” It would appear that AMF(L), a force that was created by NATO as a small multinational force that could be sent on short notice to any part of Allied Command Europe under threat, is the type of force that is suited to today’s security environment.
What are your views on this NATO decision?

GENERAL JONES: I concur with NATO’s decision to move toward more rapid, deployable and responsive forces. The concept behind AMF(L) remains valid, but the new graduated readiness forces will be better at realizing the objectives of that concept than the AMF(L). What NATO gains with the new Graduated Readiness Forces is a rotational pool of air, land and maritime forces, available for rapid deployment. These forces will be capable of carrying out a full range of Alliance missions, from out-of-area crisis response to Article 5 actions. I believe this is a win-win concept for both NATO and the U.S. by improving the readiness and operational flexibility of Alliance forces.

SASC: In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next CINCEUR/SACEUR?

GENERAL JONES: First, I believe it is very important to recognize that not all of the challenges ahead can be conveniently categorized under the rubric of Ally “deficiencies”. Our Allies have developed superior capabilities and concepts of their own. We should recognize and incorporate the strengths they bring to the alliance, as well as the significant capabilities many are currently developing. Special operations forces are an example of a traditional strength for many NATO members, while increased investment in amphibious shipping by several members holds great promise for an increased out of area, expeditionary capability. Having said this, clearly there are areas where NATO must improve. For example, we have the continued challenge to assist NATO in implementing the Graduated Readiness Force Headquarters and streamlining the command and force structure, as well as the imperative to assist NATO in its transformation efforts. We should encourage our Allies to take on tasks and build capabilities for which the U.S. has been the sole available provider. This will require our continued assistance and demonstrated support to ensure the success of their efforts.

IRAQ

SASC: U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is presently commanding the forces operating from NATO ally Turkey in Operation Northern Watch to enforce the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in northern Iraq. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, you participated in EUCOM’s Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq under EUCOM. Iraq is within the Central Command’s (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.
If the United States should attack Iraq in the future and if part of the attacking force is based in Turkey, do you anticipate that EUCOM will exercise operational control over that part of the force that would operate from Turkey?

GENERAL JONES: Per direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the EUCOM and CENTCOM staffs have been conducting parallel planning since early July in regard to potential operations in Iraq. In this planning effort and during any actual operations, CENTCOM is the "supported" combatant command; EUCOM the "supporting" combatant command. Any EUCOM naval, air, land and special operations forces designated to support potential operations in Iraq – to include those forces that might be based in Turkey – will remain under EUCOM's operational control (OPCON) but under CENTCOM's tactical control (TACON). Both EUCOM and CENTCOM feel this is the appropriate command relationship in that it provides the CENTCOM commander with total authority, flexibility and control concerning the manner in which these forces would be employed in Iraq – without burdening him with the tasks of getting them into the Iraqi Theater of Operations and sustaining them once they are there.

SASC: If so, how would unity of command and deconfliction of the attacking force be accomplished?

GENERAL JONES: As mentioned above, it is envisioned that CENTCOM will provide the sole commander making all decisions regarding force employment for any future operations in Iraq. This is not militarily difficult, but it is an important question to resolve at an early stage. We have done so.

SASC: In your view, how important do you believe the cooperation and involvement of regional and allied nations would be to an attack on Iraq?

GENERAL JONES: The cooperation and involvement of regional and allied nations is highly desirable in such an undertaking. The combatant commander has more varied and robust response options at his disposal in order to accomplish the mission if a strong coalition is formed and maintained. Success, both during hostilities and during post-conflict stabilization, is enhanced by increased participation of others in the region, and by allied partners from across the international community.

SASC: What lessons, if any, did you learn from your participation in Operation Provide Comfort?

GENERAL JONES: Operation Provide Comfort demonstrated two important lessons to me. First, that humanitarian and peace enforcement operations, like combat operations, are bolstered by the combined efforts of coalition partners. 25,000 elite members of European armed forces worked closely with American military personnel to ensure that the Kurdish relief effort was successful. We accomplished our mission because of our teamwork and the resources found in our diverse strengths. Second, that military power can be used in a credible way to accomplish stability and security missions with minimal violence. Operation Provide Comfort allowed half a million Kurds to return to their homes without bloodshed because the actions of European and American forces sent an unambiguous message that we had both the will and the capacity to achieve our objectives.
SASC: In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next CINCEUR/SACEUR?

GENERAL JONES: Working as a member of the U.S. Government (USG) inter-agency team, garnering the complete and timely military cooperation of regional partners and complex alliances is a traditional and continuing challenge. Sustaining the war on terrorism by conducting Security Cooperation activities and deterring proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Enhanced High Explosive (CBRNE) weapons, associated technologies and delivery systems will remain critical objectives. Ensuring that current and future operations are adequately supported as we adjust NATO and coalition command and force structures in the months ahead will present ongoing challenges. Finally, expanding European regional stability and security south and east will remain a goal of any conflict resolution with Iraq.

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ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

AFRICAN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
formerly known as African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)

SASC: EUCOM is the DOD executive agent for the military aspects of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Some have suggested an expansion of the ACRI program to prepare African nations forces for peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping. Others believe that the ACRI program should be limited to preparation for peacekeeping. Still others believe the ACRI program should be terminated due to the strain on special operations forces and the limited returns from the program.

What are your views on the ACRI program?

GENERAL JONES: For the past five years, ACRI was a valuable tool in pursuing our engagement strategy in Africa. It not only built and strengthened partnerships with key African allies such as Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya and Ghana, it has also created a real capacity for African nations and organizations to deal with African problems.

African military leadership’s feedback about ACRI was that the program was not tailored to a partner nation’s unique capabilities and experiences. The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA, formerly ACRI) addresses this issue in the form of a Program Development Team (PDT) charged with creating a concept of training after consultation with the host nation military and civilian leadership. A comprehensive military assessment is critical for ACOTA to achieve its goals and objectives. A military assessment will provide the requisite objective analysis of
capability and then determine what training is required to address those capabilities.

We recognize that each African military is unique and, accordingly, the ACOTA program will be individually designed in coordination with each African partner country to address that country’s specific capabilities, needs and priorities. In turn, the partner countries can target the program narrowly or broadly across the full spectrum of ground, naval and air forces humanitarian relief and peace support operations skills and capabilities.

Participation in ACOTA can enhance unit readiness. As we continue to pursue the Global War on Terrorism, the role of Africa in this war will take on increased importance. Our best strategy in Africa is to work towards the long-term objectives of building stability and security to avoid near term problems. Programs such as ACOTA remain an integral part of this strategy.

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GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

QUESTION #12 is CLASSIFIED

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ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SASC: There is a strong consensus that the long-term stability of Bosnia is dependent upon bringing Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs), particularly Radovan Karadzic, to justice. On August 16th, the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) concluded a large-scale operation whose purpose was to pursue information related to Karadzic’s support network in southern Republika Srpska. Also on August 16th, the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, appointed a Senior Deputy High Representative to be the Head of the Rule of Law Unit. U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia, Clifford Bond, and the SFOR Commander, U.S. Lieutenant General John Sylvester, USA, both have called for
a professional, capable police, backed up by reformed prosecutorial, judiciary, and penal systems in Bosnia as the basis for an exit strategy for SFOR. In the meantime, the European Union (EU) is planning to provide an EU Police Mission (EUPM), comprised of about 550 personnel, to take over from the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) in January 2003.

Please describe your view of the basis for an exit strategy for SFOR and the role that you believe the Office of the High Representative can play in achieving it.

GENERAL JONES: As you have pointed out, any exit strategy for Bosnia must address all of the elements of the rule of law in Bosnia, including prosecutorial, judiciary and penal-system reform. On that point I am in full concurrence with Gen Ralston, LTG Sylvester, and Ambassador Bond.

The key challenge that we face in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the absence of an effective rule of law. It is manifested by the actions of an underpaid or sometimes unpaid police force, which supplements its income through graft and corruption; prosecutors and judges who take actions and make decisions based too often on ethnic backgrounds or political connections; a penal system which selectively implements, or which fails to implement sentences; and politicians who use the government bureaucracy to subvert various aspects of the legal system.

With this challenge in mind, I believe the new High Representative, Lord Paddy Ashdown, can play a very important role in facilitating SFOR's exit strategy. I am greatly encouraged by reports that he is following through on his promises made to the Bosnian people to fight corruption and create jobs. In his short tenure as High Representative, Lord Ashdown has already relieved many corrupt officials from their functions. His decisiveness in tackling corruption in the judiciary realm seems to indicate promise for his slogan: "First justice. Then jobs. Through reform." His progress in this realm can only help speed up the timetable for an eventual SFOR disengagement.

SASC: Do you believe that a EUPM of only about 550 personnel is sufficient to oversee the development of a professional, capable police force that is required for Bosnia?

GENERAL JONES: Yes, although the task before them will be challenging. The key will be for the EUPM to ensure that their efforts are well coordinated with the rest of the International Community. The EU is apparently of the opinion that the UN mission has largely fulfilled its mandate of police training, so the EU focus will be different. The EU goal is to wean the Bosnian police from a "cycle of dependence." The EU believes the local police will continue to defer policing to international monitors as long as they are available. Therefore, the EU plans to focus on mid- and upper-level management, not street policing. The challenge is to identify those mid- and upper-level managers who are corrupt or inept, then get rid of the corrupt ones and train the inept ones. This should tie in well with Lord Ashdown's ten-point plan to fight corruption and create jobs, and the shakeup of the judiciary that has accompanied his efforts.

I think the primary challenge that lies before the EUPM will be to get the local people involved in policing their own society and managing the rule of law without outside assistance or supervision. It is my hope that in
addition to cleaning up corrupt mid- and upper-level management the EUPM will likewise place a strong focus on training local people so that they can ultimately police themselves.

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ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

KOSOVO

SASC: NATO Defense Ministers on June 6th approved a restructuring of the command and control structure of SFOR and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) along regional lines and the attainment of full operational capability of Operational and Strategic Reserve Forces. This NATO decision also involves, by the end of 2002, the draw down to 12,000 troops for SFOR, while KFOR will reduce to 32,000 troops and, by the end of June 2003, further reductions to around 29,000 troops for KFOR.

Please describe the new command and control structure for SFOR and KFOR and what the troop draw down will mean for the U.S. forces in those NATO-led missions.

GENERAL JONES: The new command and control structure for SFOR and KFOR will reduce and consolidate headquarters and be supported by NATO’s development of an over-the-horizon reserve force, a concept which complements the Alliance’s in-place forces. Lighter, more mobile and more flexible forces will be cost effective, as well as better able to respond to security needs in the region. Relying upon mobility, these strategic forces will enable further force reductions commensurate with the security environment.

With respect to the draw down, improvements in the Balkan security environment have allowed for significant and continued reductions in the level of forces there. KFOR has already been reduced to 32,000 troops and, by the end of June 2003, will further reduce to approximately 27,000 troops. U.S. force levels will be approximately 15% of the overall force levels. There will be approximately 1,800 U.S. troops in SFOR by October 2002 and approximately 4,000 US troops in Kosovo by November 2002. The North Atlantic Council’s plan to further reduce NATO forces in Kosovo and Bosnia includes a proportionate reduction in U.S. forces.

SASC: What do you see as the road ahead for the eventual withdrawal of NATO forces from Kosovo?

General Jones: The law enforcement and civil administration programs initiated by the International Community are now taking root in Kosovo. These programs strengthen the domestic rule of law each and every day, thereby contributing to safety and security throughout the province. We must
also focus on economic developments in the region; crime and corruption, particularly reducing the influence of organized crime; and the return and incorporation of Serbian internally displaced persons. As domestic security strengthens, the need for KFOR diminishes, creating conditions for eventual NATO withdrawal, but this will depend on the eventual political decision on the final status of the province.

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ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

NATO-EU RELATIONSHIP

SASC: NATO has extended the mandate of Task Force Amber Fox in Macedonia, whose mission is to protect EU and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) international monitors, until October 26, 2002. That mandate will probably be renewed until the end of the year when the EU is expected to assume responsibility for the operation. Thus far, however, the inability of NATO and the EU to reach an agreement on the use of NATO assets and capabilities by the EU has prevented the EU from assuming responsibility for the operation.

Please provide an update on the effort to negotiate a NATO-EU agreement and the impact that a failure to reach an agreement will have on NATO-EU relations.

GENERAL JONES: My understanding is that NATO-EU discussions have been stalled because of disagreements regarding the participation of non-EU allies in EU-led military operations and other, more technical issues such as the role of the European Deputy SACEUR. The overall set of arrangements known as “Berlin Plus” has, therefore, not been completed. However, the absence of that agreement has not prevented NATO and EU cooperation in joint political actions to strengthen stability in such tense areas as the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia or in Macedonia. In the longer term, failure to establish the Berlin Plus arrangements would likely lead to the development of EU military doctrines, procedures and mechanisms that would be different from those of NATO, raising the risk of competitive rather than complementary institutions. Accordingly, the member nations of NATO and the EU need to intensify their diplomatic efforts to overcome the current difficulties and establish the arrangements for close and effective cooperation.

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SASC: EUCOM’s Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) has been described as one of the most successful of the CINC’s theater engagement programs.

Please describe the JCTP and give us your evaluation of the program, including its benefits to the United States.

GENERAL JONES: The JCTP remains a pillar of USEUCOM peacetime security cooperation activities in Central/Eastern Europe and the Trans-Caucasus region. The program supports the USEUCOM theater objectives of stability, democratization, military professionalism, closer relationships with NATO members and preparing new members for NATO integration. Over 7,750 military-to-military contacts, or “events,” have helped host nations address such fundamental topics as human rights guarantees for soldiers, civilian control of the military, establishment of military legal codes, and programs to develop professional noncommissioned officer and chaplain corps. Jointly staffed Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC) are the key to executing this program in concert with the other USEUCOM Security Cooperation activities.

JCTP conducts basic familiarization and therefore has limited value for the more advanced countries in USEUCOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). As a result, the numbers of JCTP events in many countries have been reduced to free up resources to expand to more fertile regions. Of particular note is the recent standup of the JCTP in Bosnia and Herzegovina. JCTP events are providing critical information to senior government and military leadership while also providing opportunities for a growing dialog among mid-grade officers from all ethnic groups. Seeds are being planted today which will bear much fruit in the years to come.

JCTP is also expanding in the Trans-Caucasus region. While the program has been active in Georgia since 1999, the repeal of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act enabled USEUCOM to explore expansion of the JCTP into Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The obvious benefits of the JCTP are increased regional stability and democratization, but the benefits go well beyond these. Over the years, USEUCOM has seen an ongoing transformation, restructuring, and downsizing of eastern European militaries. All of the NATO aspirants have benefited from JCTP and their progress towards achievement of their Membership Action Plan goals has been aided by JCTP events. U.S. military actions in Bosnia, Kosovo and, most recently, Afghanistan, have all benefited from access to airspace and resources in Central/Eastern Europe and the Trans-Caucasus. JCTP, as a visible presence, helps to assure this access. Also, many of our JCTP countries are active participants in the Global War on Terrorism and many JCTP events have been designed to provide necessary information in a timely manner.
In summary, JCTP remains a pillar of USEUCOM’s peacetime Security Cooperation activities. With a reduction in the more advanced countries, USEUCOM is able to redirect resources where they will provide the greatest return on investment.

SASC: In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next CINCEUR/SACEUR?

GENERAL JONES: Our challenge is to continue to ensure the relevancy of the JCTP in a changing world. New opportunities in the USEUCOM AOR provide opportunities to influence the development of military power, advance democratic principles and expand U.S. access to critical areas of the globe.

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ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

SASC: In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

GENERAL JONES: Yes, I do. I fully recognize and understand the importance of Congressional oversight. I have tried to be faithful to this pledge in the execution of my current responsibilities.

SASC: Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from those of the Administration in power?

GENERAL JONES: Yes. Although the President is my Commander-in-Chief, and he and the Secretary of Defense constitute my U.S. chain of command, I recognize that my oath is to the Constitution. That document clearly divides responsibilities with regard to defense between the Executive and Legislative branches. For both the Administration and the Congress to execute their respective responsibilities appropriately, it is incumbent upon me to be honest and forthright with both while offering my best military advice.

SASC: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the CINCEUR/SACEUR?
GENERAL JONES: Yes. That is an inherent part of my responsibilities as outlined above, and I will be happy to appear when called.

SASC: Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

GENERAL JONES: Yes.