STATEMENT BY

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

BEFORE THE

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EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

ON THE STATE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

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Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee, I am privileged to report to Congress on the state of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In early September last year, the nation was suddenly and brutally confronted with a new type of world war, waged on U.S. soil by terrorists. These terrorists, driven by an implacable hatred for Western conceptions of basic individual rights, and whose principal targets were civilians, have since had their own sudden, and yes, harsh awakening to U.S. resolve. The entire command is proud that Special Operations Forces (SOF) could play a part in their wake-up call.

The success of the campaign plan against this threat has been dramatic, but is not surprising. The superb team constructed at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) under General Tommy Franks demonstrated the quality, professionalism, and determination of U.S. Forces and our staunch coalition partners. The successes in the campaign in Afghanistan in the global war on terrorism demonstrate again the wisdom of the joint warfighting construct initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.
The recent action in Afghanistan is a prominent and exciting example of how joint warfighting has evolved from the Goldwater-Nichols legislation to a powerful and precise tool to support the nation's vital interests. This success is not isolated; the ability to win across the spectrum of military operations requires tight teamwork, and USSOCOM forces are privileged to team with the best warfighters the world has seen. From the European Command (EUCOM)-led campaign in Kosovo, to the Pacific Command’s (PACOM) support to counterinsurgency in the Philippines and combined training and exercises with our allies in the Republic of Korea, to CENTCOM’s combat during DESERT STORM and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, and Counternarcotics programs in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the range of operations we have effectively prosecuted bodes well for the future fight against transnational terrorists.

The support SOF gets from the functional combatant commanders has been first rate: Transportation Command’s (TRANSCOM) ability to get our warriors and equipment where they are needed fast, Space Command’s (SPACECOM) warning and Information Operations expertise, and Strategic Command’s (STRATCOM) absolutely vital help in cracking one of our most ambitious missions—counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and hard and deeply buried targets. Finally, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) provides a critical means to enhancing
this team’s ability to tackle enemies no matter their weaponry, tactics, or strategy. JFCOM’s leadership in joint experimentation has made the advancement in joint warfighting sustainable. 

The jointness of the current war provides a lesson in our dependence on all services for their crucial abilities. As you know, early in the prosecution of the conflict in Afghanistan, we had to stage Special Operations Forces from Naval Carriers off the Pakistani coast. On the ground in Afghanistan, Air Force trained combat controllers (CCT) provided the direct connection needed for Navy, Marine and Air Force pilots to accurately target Taliban and al Qaeda positions and assets. This direct link allowed our Army SF teams to integrate the anti-Taliban cavalry charges with precision bombing runs with devastating effect.

The close relationship between our Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) and the Joint Force Air Component Commander’s staff has allowed us to enhance allied combat effectiveness and minimize fratricide. The introduction of conventional Marine and Army forces with SOF strengthens U.S. capability and influence in the theater. The concept of combined conventional and unconventional units leverages the fact that they are trained for mutually supporting frameworks, significantly improving joint warfighting effectiveness. SOF’s complimentary
relationship with the Air Force and Navy conventional forces has already shown what a truly potent force a joint force is to reckon with.

The battlefield successes in the campaign against terrorism further reveal the insight of Congress in the creation of USSOCOM the year following the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols. That legislation, the Nunn-Cohen Amendment (codified in Title 10, Section 167, U.S. Code), created USSOCOM and consolidated all SOF under one command. Forces making up SOF include Army Special Operations Aviation, Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations forces; Air Force special operations aviators and special tactics teams; and Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) Teams and Special Boat Units.

The Nunn-Cohen Amendment also provides USSOCOM with its own Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11) funding. This legislation provides USSOCOM with the authority, direction and control of funds that allows us to develop and acquire Special Operations peculiar equipment to prepare SOF to carry out our assigned missions. In turn, this legislation provides the warfighter with the tools necessary to fight not only the most committed industrial age power, but also the means to fight entities that would and could wield influence through terror by any means.

USSOCOM’s Fiscal Year (FY) Total Obligation Authority (TOA) is $4.9 billion, just 1.3 percent of the overall defense budget.
This figure includes nearly $2 billion for our 47,000 military personnel (USSOCOM programs for these funds and the Services execute them) and $1.7 billion for Operations and Maintenance. Modernization, which consists of $777 million for procurement and $431 million for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, is $1.2 billion of the TOA and the remaining $63 million is for Military Construction (MILCON).

USSOCOM’s MFP-11 Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 request represents an $854 million increase over FY 2002, the result of additional funding to address USSOCOM’s modernization issues. This type of departmental support of Service and SOF resources greatly enhances the effectiveness of our nations’ SOF and our ability to meet the operational requirements expected. Yet these limited SOF resources greatly enhance the effectiveness of conventional military forces by providing essential leveraging capabilities while ensuring that “must succeed” special operations are completed with the absolute certainty and professionalism the nation demands. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 President’s budget makes important additions to SOF programs to begin meeting new challenges confronting SOF and the Nation.

Joint warfighting is not the only major success in this conflict: early in the planning process, CENTCOM planners were able to sort through the rush of international support to identify how best to use the variety of strengths offered by our
allies. Important to our planners were the offers of SOF from around the globe. The legendary capabilities of the British Special Air Service (SAS) and Australian SAS, as well as special operations forces from other nations provide a unique, but not unfamiliar, combined special operations environment for us. This cooperative engagement with the best the world has to offer in fighting asymmetrically will assist us in the long battle ahead.

**USSOCOM Support to the Secretary’s and Chairman’s Way Ahead**

USSOCOM is in full support of both the policy goals as voiced in Secretary Rumsfeld’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and of Chairman Myers’ goals as offered to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) in recent weeks. Chairman Myers presented three objectives to the SASC: to win the global war on terrorism, to improve joint warfighting capabilities, and to transform to be ready to face future challenges. In our view these objectives provide a temporal roadmap to the goals of Secretary Rumsfeld’s Defense Strategy as envisioned in the QDR. USSOCOM directly supports the defense policy goals of Assure, Dissuade, Deter, and Decisively Defeat across the spectrum of conflict.

SOF’s role as “global scouts” serves to assure allies and friends of U.S. Government resolve. Our participation in the Combatant Commander in Chief (CINC) Theater Security Cooperation
Plans, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Humanitarian, Mine action, Counterdrug and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) provides tangible training benefits while building rapport with our friends and allies.

SOF’s regionally-oriented, culturally aware forces provide a depth of expertise not available to the conventional forces. Through Civil Affairs (CA) operations and peacetime Psychological Operational (PSYOP) programs, U.S. interests are advanced at minimal cost in resources. As “warrior diplomats” and through recurring interaction with current and potential allies and friends they are able to influence situations favorably towards U.S. national interests.

SOF’s presence and unique capabilities dissuade potential adversaries by complicating their planning and providing the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) a wider array of options in dealing with them. By having the capability to operate “in the seam” between peace and war, SOF can address transnational and asymmetric threats by synchronizing the activities of the military and interagency partners.

SOF can help shape the pre-conflict environment to set conditions favorable to the U.S. and can also provide a strategic economy of force by covering areas of the world left uncovered by the commitment of conventional forces to other contingencies. Forces organized, trained, and equipped to
execute our highest priority principal missions of Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CP/WMD) and Combating Terrorism (CT) also provide an effective deterrent against other asymmetric threats. SOF operating in conjunction with conventional forces provides a mutually beneficial warfighting relationship. SOF provides increased security for conventional forces because of our ability to operate within the host nation environment, which offers a valuable source of intelligence and acts as an outer perimeter of security for conventional force operations. Conventional forces, in turn, provide a ready means to conduct large-scale combat operations if a greater commitment of U.S. military force proves necessary.

SOF’s clandestine insertion capabilities, specialized tactics and techniques provide additional means to our military commanders to allow them to set the time, place, and manner of victory and **decisively defeat** any adversary. Other SOF principal missions such as Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, Special Reconnaissance, and Psychological Operations contribute to the warfighters’ ability to achieve decisive victory by optimizing his forces’ combat power at the right place and time. The perfect example of this capability is the recent success that our Air Force Special Tactics and Army Special Forces units have had integrating close air support from allied aircraft with Northern Alliance ground force operations.
In this case, SOF is acting as the critical enabling link between the conventional forces and the mission at hand.

The current state of SOF capabilities is strong, but to meet the evolving weaponry and tactics of potential adversaries, we must invest now to remain a reliable support for the Defense Strategy. USSOCOM’s aim in pursuing transformation is to guarantee our forces remain relevant to any fight necessary, and ensuring we minimize risk to our nation’s vital interests. To do this, our intent is to transform to better support the Defense Policy Goals as described below.

**Assure Allies and Friends**

**Presence:** Forward presence of SOF pledges U.S. commitment to allies and friends; promotes access, improves interoperability and intelligence cooperation; expands the range of pre-conflict options to counter threats; deters aggression; influences positive behavior; mitigates the development of asymmetrical threat capabilities; and allows the U.S. to prosecute the war on its terms.

To provide presence in critical regions worldwide, USSOCOM depends on the securing of Status of Forces Agreements with new and potential coalition partners in order to enhance interoperability and build a combined force far stronger than its components. USSOCOM will accomplish this through an array of joint, combined, and interagency experimentation programs.
designed to simulate actual combat--the final result being a
global combat-ready “plug-n-fight” force. Participation in
Theater CINC joint training activities provides near term
benefits to our national security and also builds rapport with
our friends and allies to weather future challenges.

Anti-Access Environments: SOF’s global access is a capability
key to preserving national security. SOF must have the ability
to access and operate anywhere in the world, in any mission
environment, from overt to clandestine and from benign to
hostile (including Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
(CBR)). In much of the world, SOF maintains this access and an
understanding of local issues through regional orientation and
continued engagement, which is formalized in Theater Security
Cooperation programs. However, SOF must retain and improve the
capability to operate where U.S. forces may be unwelcome or
opposed. Potential adversaries are acquiring weapons and
developing asymmetrical strategies aimed at denying U.S. forces
access to critical theaters of operations during a crisis. As
the first responders, “door openers,” and spearhead for decisive
follow-on operations, “SOF access” sets the stage for assuring
allies and friends. As a strategic asset SOF derives its value
from its ability to operate independently or integrally as a key
component of a conventional Joint Task Force (JTF).
Force projection is another critical element to the Defense Strategy’s goal of assuring allies and friends. In a world of unpredictable and asymmetric security threats, low-intensity conflict has emerged as a pervasive mode of warfare. It is imperative that SOF remains a flexible, mobile and quickly deployable force able to react to, but more importantly, help mold the international environment. The ability to project power rapidly and to operate in small teams under austere conditions is a cornerstone of SOF operations. To enhance our force projection capabilities, DOD must continue to invest in programs to improve strategic mobility, sustainment, and information dominance.

Surrogate Warfare: A long-standing SOF mission that has received deserved new attention is Surrogate Warfare: “Great powers remain great if they promote their own interests by serving those of others.” Stemming and reducing Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO), limiting hazardous exposure of U.S. forces, smart utilization of low density/high demand (LD/HD) assets, and increasing the SECDEF's options are goals that can be achieved through a re-emphasis on a long-standing SOF strength: the training of surrogate forces to gain results favorable to our interests. In fact, the greatest contribution that surrogate warfare has had in Afghanistan is to achieve strategic
objectives that were unobtainable with any other capability in the Armed Forces today.

Al Qaeda is a worldwide trans-national terrorist group that cannot exist without some form of popular support. The strategic Center Of Gravity (COG) for al Qaeda is their relationship with the world's Muslim population. Without active support from a sizeable minority of the Muslim population and the passive support of a greater number, al Qaeda would fold. They rely on popular support for both their recruitment and freedom of action. If we ignore this strategic COG, all our tactical and operational success will be for naught.

Usama Bin Laden’s consistent message to the Muslim world has been that the U.S. intends to invade Islamic territory and slaughter Muslims in a new crusade. He wanted a confrontation with massive U.S. ground formations while U.S. airpower rained down on Muslim populations. Such a scenario would have justified his rhetoric and provoked the Muslim backlash he desired. We chose a strategy that didn't play into his hands. By working with a surrogate Muslim force, we neutralized his plans.

The most telling results of this campaign come from press reports concerning the hundreds of Pakistani youths who had flooded into Afghanistan to support the Taliban. Many of these “would-be martyrs” returned to Pakistan and turned on the fundamentalist clergy that had sent them off to war. They had
been told that they would be fighting a *jihad* against American invaders. Instead they saw no Americans and found themselves fighting "brother" Muslims in violation of the Koran.

Instead of helping al Qaeda increase its popular support, we have opened the first cracks of a rift between al Qaeda and the general Muslim populace and have demonstrated the President’s intent--that this is not a war on Muslims, but a war waged on terrorists who are using Islam as a ruse to justify murder. This is one of the most important strategic outcomes of our operations in Afghanistan to date, and the capability to conduct surrogate warfare resides in our country’s special operations forces.

The original foundation of the SOF approach to warfare was to organize and train friendly foreign forces to help them contend with hostile challenges. Increased emphasis in this area can multiply our influence globally without requiring a standing-force presence in a multitude of locations. The success of our JCET deployments, and support for the State Department's African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) are just two examples illustrating the effectiveness of a series of short-term education programs. They enhance the professionalism of third-world nations’ armed forces, foster the growth of responsible regional-based forces, and promote U.S. values and interests. These initiatives are popular with host nations. They provide
valuable training for our forces, enhance morale, and promote host nation stature within the region. Such programs increase U.S. influence and the likelihood that these new friends will be able to resolve crises peacefully, and in a manner advantageous to our national interests with minimal U.S. support.

Security Assistance: In assuring our allies and friends, SOF will continue to monitor, and if necessary engage, weak and failing states in Asia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere where there is an absence of responsible governments. Working in concert with State Department personnel on these Security Assistance missions improves the U.S. government unified approach to better address the security interests of these friends and allies and provides cost efficiencies in applying Title 22 funding.

We will project and sustain SOF in distant anti-access or area-denial environments. If we are to project SOF, we must invest in infrastructure in the continental U.S. (CONUS) to reverse the erosion of SOF training range infrastructure and ensure that ranges are sustainable, capable, and available. We must also invest outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS) and secure funding for host nations to build temporary facilities and training ranges for SOF conducting interoperability and security assistance training, FID and exercises within the host nation.
OPTEMPO: Assuring allies and friends through forward presence, and involvement in small-scale contingencies, combined with SOF support to National Mission requirements results in a heavy OPTEMPO. SOF can be consumed as quickly and completely by these missions as they are in major theater wars. To ensure that our LD/HD capabilities are available for urgent missions, we are working to mitigate force management risk, operational risk, institutional risk, and future challenges through OPTEMPO and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) controls. Tailoring forces to task, exploiting our Reserve and National Guard forces, transitioning non-SOF missions to the services, and outsourcing when the mission allows are just a few examples of actions we’re pursuing at this time.

Total Force: We are working to ensure SOF Reserve Components are properly resourced, trained, organized, equipped and postured. As an example, we are upgrading our PSYOP broadcast capability by transitioning it from older C-130s to new EC-130Js. This will strengthen these vital Reserve assets so that SOF will be available to assure our allies and friends as future challenges arise.

Dissuade Future Military Competition

Experimentation: Successes demonstrated in our current engagements make one thing certain: the adversary will work to find ways to circumvent SOF strengths on the battlefield.
CENTCOM planners, through a brilliant use of joint and combined warfighting doctrine, deftly avoided the expected quagmire of the Afghan battle. SOF must build on the lessons learned from this campaign to enable the creation of a range of capabilities and warfighting options. These enhanced warfighting methods dissuade competitors by forcing them to develop responses stretching their limited resources or choosing the high-risk option of focusing their efforts on a subset of SOF warfighting options, leaving themselves vulnerable to others.

Research and Development: We must continue to invest in making our SOF more capable in austere environments. One lesson of the recent Afghan campaign was that seemingly small investments in equipment could be devastating in the hands of a prepared SOF operator. Two such successes were the Multi-band Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) and the SOF Programmed Laser Target Designators. The MBITR, which enabled our operators to--with a single light weight device--replace several existing radios. This substantially reduced the combat weight carried by our Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen in the field and improved their ability to coordinate via radio. The SOF Programmed Laser Target Designators dramatically improved the precision of our aerial assaults on Taliban and al Qaeda positions.
We intend to work on an array of improvements from better body armor and chemical protection, to advances in gunship armaments, to developing and leveraging Information Operations (IO) tools. USSOCOM’s primary success has always been to ensure we select the best and train for innovation: we are equipping the warrior, not manning the equipment. We clearly recognize that the modern battlefield is comprised of land, air, sea, space and the virtual domains. IO has the potential to help SOF operators remain undetected and unlocated in hostile territory—a critical element for several of our principal missions. We intend to actively pursue IO capabilities and develop standing authority to employ these capabilities when needed. This will improve SOF effectiveness and access to previously denied environments, and dissuade potential competitors from engaging even if they perceive quantitative advantage.

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR): USSOCOM is continuously striving to leverage information technology and innovation concepts to develop an interoperable, flexible joint C4ISR architecture and capability that allows rapid sharing of analysis and time sensitive information between the joint, interagency, and international communities. Recently, the command established a new element within our Joint Intelligence Center, the Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration
Center (SOJICC), to provide data mining across multiple security classification domains and visualization tools to effectively display that information to support deliberate planning for all assigned SOF missions. By collaborating with national and theater intelligence organizations, as well as the Interagency Community, we hope to improve “knowledge discovery” and data sharing in combating trans-national and trans-regional threats. At the same time, we must also pursue and leverage a collaborative investment strategy and migration plan for integrated, cost-effective mix of intelligence collection platforms that are interoperable and responsive to future collection needs and challenges.

To foster an environment that lessens competitors’ proclivity to develop threatening capabilities and postures, we must leverage our allies' and friends' influence to strengthen and stabilize regimes vulnerable to both state and non-state coercion. In combating the evolving terrorist threat, one promising avenue is to enhance Department of Defense (DOD) and interagency coordination to provide a more pervasive understanding of the threat.

Role of Civil Affairs (CA): CA manages the civilian dimension of operations for the combatant commander, to gain support of the local government and populace, to provide legitimacy for
military operations and to accomplish required objectives in support of the National Military Strategy. The transformation of CA will require additional training and equipment to meet and defeat the critical demands of current and future asymmetrical threats and to ensure full spectrum dominance over all adversaries, in all civil-military environments.

CA transformation is critical to ensure their status as a ready and relevant SOF resource in any dynamic operational environment. We must continue to address training and sustainment of language skills and to refine issues that develop and improve collaborative interagency and multi-national efforts to ensure efficient and optimum use of CA assets. CA also possesses the unique capability to effect crucial components of the combatant commander’s campaign plan that help countries formally in conflict to establish or reestablish viable democratic institutions, capable of self-governance.

Role of Psychological Operations (PSYOP): USSOCOM is focusing on SOF PSYOP forces with the objective of further improving their capability to sew the seams between the national strategic and regional influence initiatives, and military operations. Today, PSYOP is playing a critical role in the success of Operation Enduring Freedom and our global war on terrorism (GWOT). Our PSYOP soldiers took radio programming that was
produced at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to support Operation Enduring Freedom, digitized those programs, and transmitted them to our EC-130E PSYOP platform, Commando Solo. As a result of this innovation, we are leveraging our robust CONUS production and analysis resources. These assets have minimized our deployed footprint and the corresponding logistics demands, and have provided hundreds of hours of “influence” oriented commercial radio broadcasts to Afghani target audiences. To continue such success, we are reevaluating the SOF PSYOP force structure and assessing future capabilities required to meet an increasing U.S. need to favorably influence behaviors, attitudes, and actions globally.

As a first step toward real transformation of the joint PSYOP forces, we are developing a clear joint PSYOP vision and operational concept which will soon provide a common framework for enhancing the joint PSYOP force structure and making key investments for modernizing PSYOP capabilities.

Our emphasis on PSYOP is a cornerstone of our nation’s Influence Operations strategy. From a USSOCOM perspective, it is not inconceivable that in the near future, the battle may be fought over television, radio or the Internet rather than the traditional linear battlefield.
Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests

Presence: Increased peacetime forward SOF presence establishes relationships which can later prove vital to gaining access to otherwise denied areas. This was recently demonstrated by the relatively smooth manner in which SOF were granted access to the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan early in the Afghan conflict. Within the last year, CENTCOM tasked SOF to conduct military-to-military contacts with some of the same decision-makers that sped this agreement. Forward presence also provides critical information on adversaries, strengthens deterrence in critical areas, provides rapid strike capability, augments global intelligence, and limits the complexity of infrastructure protection for follow-on forces.

Improved Deterrence Through Transformation: The Defense Strategy envisions an improved deterrent posture by ramping the capabilities of the forward-deployed forces to lessen the size of reinforcement required to counter even the more intense conflicts. These transformational initiatives improve the forward-deployed SOF and conventional forces’ deterrent effect and free forces now dedicated to reinforcement for other missions.

Operational Preparation of the Battlefield: USSOCOM is continually evaluating the potential for new technologies to improve the preparation of operational space. The command sees
this as one area that can significantly assist in combating asymmetric approaches. For USSOCOM our battle-space goes well beyond the traditional battlefield. The use of data mining and “links and nodes” analysis capabilities with multiple databases and multiple agencies in a collaborative environment provide a better assessment of the future battlefield. With the product of this effort we can campaign plan for effects-based targeting, not only of traditional targets, but, also more focused or discrete ones, and other asymmetric threats.

Seamless C4: USSOCOM shares the DoD vision for a Global Information Grid (GIG) that will provide all forces a seamless network to provide the uninterrupted exchange of information necessary to achieve decision superiority. Over the past several years, the command has created and refined the SOF Information Enterprise (SIE) as our part of the GIG.

The SIE provides a standard “enterprise” approach to not only our information infrastructure, but also the systems, applications, policies, processes, and knowledge required by our forces to prepare for and conduct special operations across the spectrum of military operations from daily staff functions to war. This enterprise approach has created standard tactics, techniques, and procedures on how we plan and execute missions in a collaborative way. The key to this has been our SOF Mission Planning Environment which is standardizing our mission
planning applications and the use of web technology to share common functional area information, such as intelligence, logistics, and deployment information. The Web Information Center or WIC has been very successful in providing a common web view to our warfighting forces at the theater SOCs.

Critical to our warfighting capability is our dependence on satellites. We strongly concur with the recommendations of the SPACECOM led Senior Warfighter Forum to synchronize the space platforms with our ground terminals and to get the mobile user satellites in place in the 2010 time frame. Our resource requests for information technology match our most critical needs, such as individual radios, tactical local area networks (TACLAN), continued sustainment and modernization of our garrison and deployed networks, and continual training of our information professionals—all of which are crucial to our capabilities in meeting the threat of global terrorism. SOF C4 systems greatly improve our warfighting capability and provide the foundation for our transformational efforts.

Targeting Speed: SOF units benefited greatly from the improvements over the past decade to surveillance assets. The War in Afghanistan illustrates that persistent surveillance, tracking and rapid engagement of adversary forces is critical to enable SOF to react to surprises and to help pre-empt “bolt from the blue” attacks.
Innovations in tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as oncoming technologies will allow SOF to exercise extreme time sensitive targeting. US SOCOM’s TACLAN program will enable deployed forces to receive the latest intelligence at all security levels down to the “last tactical mile.” The Special Reconnaissance Capability program (SRC) will provide the remote sensors and tagging/tracking capabilities to further enhance our ability for rapid targeting.

An increased overall DOD HUMINT program will enhance not only traditional force’s capabilities, but also SOF capabilities. The rapid response and pre-emptive capabilities made possible by these transformation initiatives provide a strong deterrent to our adversaries, serving as a means to impose the commander’s will rapidly to any threatening action.

Advertise: US SOCOM must ensure that the high profile SOF has enjoyed in its efforts alongside the conventional forces in Afghanistan is used to better its effectiveness. Our nation’s SOF are well known to most of our allies and our potential adversaries. SOF can be used to improve understanding of non-allied foreign governments in how improved relations with the U.S. can help their nation, improve their people’s lot, and enhance their stature in their region of the world.

Even more surprising is that many of our foreign friends, and many U.S. government agencies are unaware of what capabilities
SOF can bring to a collaborative effort through both DoD and Department of State avenues. USSOCOM expects to improve its combined SOF and interagency programs, benefiting both DoD and the interagency in accomplishing their objectives.

**If deterrence fails, decisively defeat an enemy**

Capabilities Based Transformation: As we look to the most critical capability, being able to defeat any adversary, transformation is not only important, it can be the difference. USSOCOM is intent on transforming SOF to a capabilities based force. To gain this objective, SOF will focus more on how an adversary might fight versus who the adversary may be or where the war might occur. Having the necessary capability to confront an enemy regardless of circumstances enhances the SOF ability to adapt to surprise.

Force Protection/Situational Awareness: As we commit our forces, one of our greatest responsibilities is that of their protection. Force protection demands a robust HUMINT program to provide the first line of defense. At the tactical level, exploitation of advanced signals of interest and the capability to receive analyzed and fused intelligence from national and theater broadcast systems is a critical requirement to provide credible threat warning. Our Joint Threat Warning System (JTWS) will provide this critical SIGINT capability tailored for all our components.
C4ISR: USSOCOM is pursuing an investment strategy that focuses on providing communications and intelligence in support of SOF missions deep in hostile environments. The C4ISR programs I’ve discussed have been programmed in the current POM. Operation Enduring Freedom has highlighted increased requirements for these programs and a need to accelerate their development and procurement. The command must provide our teams with interoperable global reconnaissance, special reconnaissance and command and control assets; making them globally available to receive real-time intelligence enroute to advise forward and surrogate forces.

Theater Security: The global war on terrorism demonstrates that the Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plans now under development provide an opportunity to address a transnational threat not engaged by the predecessor to the TSC, the Theater Engagement Plans. In the TSC process, the DoD can now synchronize the Theater Security Cooperation Plans, ensuring that transnational threats that straddle CINC theaters are addressed in a coordinated manner.

War to Peace Transition: SOF must revise “SOF-to-conventional-force” transition plans in order to relieve our LD/HD capabilities from non-SOF missions as soon as the threat allows. SOF expects to be called on early in the conflict to
provide a force that has trained aggressively for politically sensitive missions. Their capability to handle unforeseen missions will continue to make SOF a scarce asset; because commanders will always want to minimize the risk of a mission’s failure by employing such capable forces. When transition allows, we must ensure it is done smartly, to allow the employed SOF to reconstitute and prepare for the next challenge.

Improved mission capabilities: USSOCOM is working to improve SOF capabilities to prosecute Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense programs to better support friends and allies. The value of these programs, demonstrated in the Afghanistan campaign, can be particularly useful in stabilizing countries and regions vulnerable to terrorist infiltration.

Realignment: For the past several months, USSOCOM has been exploring the current posture of our Theater Special Operations Commands to find areas where we can improve our responsiveness, regional expertise, and training. This study has been conducted in response to the SECDEF’s Quadrennial Defense Review direction, and has uncovered some interesting possibilities for the future of SOF force structure, forward basing, and mission capabilities. We are still exploring the obstacles and advantages to these ventures, but will soon provide the SECDEF
with a set of recommendations to improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of SOF.

**Critical Issues for the Command**

As in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s statement, there can be only one number one issue for any commander. For USSOCOM, the “SOF Truths” drive what we consider critical. These SOF Truths are:

- Humans are more important than hardware
- Quality is more important than quantity
- Special Operations Forces can’t be mass produced
- Competent Special Operations Forces can’t be created after an emergency occurs

The message that we take away from these truths agrees with that of the Chairman’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee several weeks ago: People are the most important asset we have. Quality SOF are the toughest asset for this command to replace. Our primary concern echoes the Chairman’s: we need to take care of our people by improving pay and compensation, health care, housing, infrastructure, and base support programs. Our most cost- and mission-effective path is to keep the tremendous people we have as long as possible.

SOF, like the services, is experiencing shortages of personnel with critical skills, in both the officer and enlisted
ranks. The SECDEF’s call for a sweeping overhaul of longstanding Pentagon personnel policies to enhance retention will go far in correcting this downward trend. USSOCOM continues to pursue innovative recruiting and retention programs and reinforcing our efforts to improve morale.

Recruitment and accession of minority personnel into the Special Operations community continues to be a challenge for us. This issue is certainly considered relevant, given the nature of Special Operations missions and the value that people of different races, backgrounds, cultures, and language skills can bring to SOF units. During the period September 1994 to September 2001, minority representation in Army Special Operations Forces grew from 11.6 - 15.1 percent, with all groups more or less showing equal growth.

While women have made significant gains within the officer warfare communities, there was virtually no change in overall ethnic/race and female composition within Navy SOF over the same period. Gains within the Air Force SOF community mirror those of the Service, with the largest gains in the African American population. AFSOC minorities rose from 16.7 - 20.6 percent during this period. AFSOC has the highest representation of females in SOF due to their inclusion in fixed wing SOF aircraft.
It is important to note that not all military personnel can meet the stringent requirements for joining SOF, and women have been barred from most SOF units due to the restrictions of combat exclusion. However, both SOF personnel and minorities polled outside our community voiced strong opposition to the establishment of quotas or devaluation of standards to achieve greater diversity. We are keenly aware of this issue and monitor it closely. It remains an item of special interest for SOF component commanders. Gains in this area, though not significant, have been realized and show a positive trend.

Some other issues that continue to be of concern to SOF are addressed below.

Mobility: We must guarantee the SOF Air Force component rotary-wing capabilities remain secure until a replacement aircraft (CV-22) with the required capabilities is fielded. We recommend re-capitalizing our MH-53 helicopters with modifications to ensure airworthiness and defensive system capabilities to fly in the threat environments of the future, well beyond the currently scheduled retirement date of 2007.

CV-22: The CV-22 may seem like a long-range issue, but it is one we need to keep our eyes on. Extending the MH-53 helicopter force structure to fill the capability gap created by the CV-22 program slip is a temporary solution. The command is committed to the CV-22 and the unique capabilities it will bring to the
fight. The long-range, high speed, vertical lift CV-22 fills a long-standing SOF mission requirement not met by any other existing fixed or rotary wing platform.

MH-47E/60K. Our limited fleet of Army Special Operations Aviation assets must also be closely monitored. We are concerned about the battle-damaged and destroyed aircraft now missing from this fleet and how quickly they can be recapitalized.

ASDS: The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) is a specially designed combatant submarine that will provide clandestine undersea mobility for SOF personnel and their mission support equipment. The ASDS is capable of operating in a wide range of environmental extremes and threat environments, providing increased range, payload capacity, robust communications, loiter capability, and protection of SOF personnel from the elements during transit. The ASDS provides a quantum leap in our undersea mobility capability.

USSOCOM is closely linked with the Navy in support of the SSGN Trident conversions, which will provide a host platform for Navy SEALs to conduct their crucial maritime missions. SOF may also require afloat staging bases to provide operational presence in international waters during periods of potential conflict or in the initial phases of combat operations.
Transformation: USSOCOM’s approach to transformation is an integrated conceptual, organizational, and process based. It provides an effective yet efficient framework for SOF to institutionalize change and ensure SOF is prepared to meet future challenges.

USSOCOM is institutionalizing a Long-Range Planning Process (LRPP) which will provide the systemic programmatic methodology for applying resources towards transformation. The LRPP will provide the required cyclic senior level review and assessment of SOF transformation azimuths and power settings to ensure that SOF transformation is properly funded. USSOCOM is committed to transformation, the tenets of Joint Vision 2020, and to ensuring SOF remains a full spectrum force.

Transformation Roadmap. At the direction of the SECDEF, USSOCOM, the Services, and the Defense Agencies are developing Transformation Roadmaps that will establish the way markers for each respective transformation efforts. The USSOCOM roadmap will integrate the transformation efforts of Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF with emerging revolutionary technologies such as the CV-22, the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), the SSGN (Trident Conversion), and the SOF Information Enterprise (SIE). These integration efforts will ensure that USSOCOM always provides the best trained and equipped SOF in the world.
Additionally, this roadmap will be the keystone for linking SOCOM transformation efforts with the Services.

Military Construction Investment Program: Lastly and related to readiness, quality force, and effectiveness is our continuing need to modernize the infrastructure that supports our SOF capabilities. Our military construction investment program directly contributes to the training, readiness and operational capabilities of our Special Operations Forces. Separate from the SOF budget, the Services provide quality family housing, barracks and community support facilities for our forces and their families. We applaud the Congress' support for these programs to enhance the quality of life for all soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines.

**Conclusion**

As USSOCOM moves into the 21st century, we are evolving to meet future challenges and sustain the relative capability advantage we enjoy today. USSOCOM is already considering new and innovative methods of assessing and developing people; is debating possible changes in doctrine, roles, missions, and force structure; is preparing an investment plan for modernization and streamlined acquisition that leverage the Revolution in Military Affairs and Business Affairs; and is examining new operational concepts for the conduct of special operations in future environments. USSOCOM is meeting this
challenge; transitioning from a traditional military staff to an Information Age staff that is matrix-shaped around core functions—more flexible and better postured to resource and support global SOF requirements.

We cannot know with certainty who our foes will be or precisely what demands will be placed on us in the future. However, in a time of both uncertainty and opportunity, USSOCOM will continue to provide our nation with the special capabilities to protect our interests and promote a peace that benefits America and the democratic ideals that we cherish.