Defense Reforms

Almost 15 years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of these reforms, particularly in your assignments as Commander, Task Force 144 - U.S. Strategic Command and as Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

**ANSWER:** Yes. In my view, the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act was a watershed event.

Based upon your experience, what is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented and the impact that they have had?

**ANSWER:** In my view, the defense reforms begun in 1986 have been fully implemented to produce a more combat capable military further facilitating our evolution to a fully joint force.

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

**ANSWER:** I see two key achievements: the clarification of the chain of command in the operational sphere and the improvements in joint Warfighting capability driven by the joint input on requirements validation.

Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

**ANSWER:** I do not believe that legislation is required at this time, however, if confirmed, I will not hesitate to make legislative recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff if events cause me to alter my position on this subject.
**Duties**

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command (CINCJFCOM)?

**ANSWER:** The recent changes to the Unified Command Plan have appropriately focused the command on Joint Training and the transformation of our Armed Forces to prepare for the challenges of the future. With the transfer of responsibilities for the Atlantic Area of Responsibility and for Homeland Security and all of its aspects, the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) can concentrate the majority of his attention on Transformation.

The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command serves as the chief advocate for jointness and interoperability to champion the joint warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders. As such, he has four major responsibilities:

- First, USJFCOM is responsible for *Joint Concept Development and Experimentation.*
- Second, USJFCOM supports the development and integration of fully joint capabilities that are also interoperable with multinational and interagency capabilities—*Joint Force Integration and Interoperability.*
- Third, USJFCOM is charged with *Joint Force Training.* This includes training at the operational level, from the Combatant Commands and their staffs, to the Joint Task Force staffs to the staffs of the functional components that make up the Joint Forces.
- As a last major function, as the *Joint Force Provider,* USJFCOM has combatant command of a large portion of the conventional forces of the U.S. Armed Forces and provides them as trained and ready joint-capable forces to the other Combatant Commands when directed by the Secretary of Defense.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

**ANSWER:** First of all, I’m honored to be considered for this important position. I have been fortunate to serve in a number of roles in my military career, which I think prepare me to assume the duties of Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. First, I have had command experience from the ship to the fleet, NATO and joint level. Second, I have a background in experimentation and concept development while serving as a squadron commander in charge of those activities and as a branch head at the Naval Doctrine Command. Third, my background with the Navy staff firmly underpins my understanding of the resource and requirements process, the need for joint integration and the continuing need for joint interoperability. As the Deputy CNO for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, I had good insight into the requirements generation and validation process, up through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
Finally, my current assignment as the Secretary of Defense’s Senior Military Assistant has provided me a unique and invaluable experience in the joint and interagency process and the ongoing need for transformation of our military.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform these duties?

**ANSWER:** If confirmed, I am confident that with the recent changes in the Unified Command Plan and the momentum building for transformation I will be fully empowered and able to perform the duties as Commander of Joint Forces Command.

In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Director of the Office of Force Transformation, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Northern Command when that combatant command is established, the other combatant commanders, and the service training and doctrine commands?

**ANSWER:** As the Commander of United States Joint Forces Command, I will work directly with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I anticipate working closely with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), particularly given his role in the JROC. As a combatant commander, I will coordinate/collaborate with the Under Secretaries of Defense. The new Director, Force Transformation will be a key partner in transforming our military capabilities.

As directed by the Secretary of Defense, USJFCOM provides forces to other combatant commands; in that role Commander, USJFCOM becomes the *supporting Commander* to the designated *supported Combatant Command*. USJFCOM also has an extremely close partnership with the other Combatant Commanders in leading efforts to transform our joint forces. I see the Commander of USJFCOM as the chief advocate among the Combatant Commanders for assessing needs and pushing solutions for the Combatant Commanders’ warfighting needs.

The relationship between USJFCOM and NORTHCOM will be important. Besides the supported/supporting Combatant Command relationship for Homeland Security, in which USJFCOM will provide trained and ready forces to NORTHCOM (as with the other Combatant Commands), there will be a transition period while NORTHCOM becomes fully mission capable. I anticipate that during that period, USJFCOM will work closely with NORTHCOM to ensure the security of the continental United States in the land and maritime domains. Joint Force Headquarters – Homeland Security, which General Kernan established last January, will go far in facilitating the transition, but the rest of the USJFCOM staff will support NORTHCOM as they build up to Full Operational Capability.
Finally, I have had the good fortune to work closely with these fine leaders over the last year and look forward to working with them in meeting the challenges ahead if confirmed.

**U.S. Northern Command**

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is scheduled to be operationally effective October 1, 2002. As a result of the establishment of this new regional combatant command, USJFCOM will be divested of its existing geographic area of responsibility, much of which will be reassigned to NORTHCOM.

What are the major challenges that will be involved in the process of transferring these areas to NORTHCOM's responsibility?

**ANSWER:** I do not foresee any major challenges. USJFCOM and NORAD, through the NORTHCOM Implementation Planning Team, have crafted a plan for an orderly transfer of responsibilities. If confirmed, I intend to work very closely with General Eberhart and his staff to make this transition as smooth as possible without degradation to our capability to defend the nation.

Do you foresee a transfer of responsibility for all of those areas on October 1, 2002, and, if so, are you confident that the transfer can be accomplished without adverse impact by that date?

**ANSWER:** If confirmed, I will work closely with General Eberhart to ensure a smooth transfer of responsibilities, including the land and maritime defense and military assistance to civil authorities for the NORTHCOM area of responsibility. Where those decisions have not been made by October 1, 2002, current relationships will exist until new ones can be implemented. Regardless of the transfer of responsibilities, USJFCOM will work with NORTHCOM to ensure the security of the nation until NORTHCOM is fully capable of executing its responsibilities.

NORTHCOM will also be responsible for federal military assistance to U.S. civil authorities, including consequence management operations in response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incidents.

What are the major challenges that will be involved in the process of transferring this responsibility to NORTHCOM?

**ANSWER:** I do not foresee any major challenges. While there will be reorganization at the strategic level (combatant command), the operational headquarters will continue to
perform the roles and missions they currently execute. This mitigates the risk associated with the transfer of responsibilities to the new command.

Do you foresee a transfer of Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) and the responsibility for federal military assistance to U.S. civil authorities on October 1, 2002, and, if so, are you confident that the transfer can be accomplished without adverse impact by that date?

**ANSWER:** I expect Joint Task Force Civil Support to come under NORTHCOM on October 1, 2002, and I am confident the transfer can be completed without degradation in the Defense Department’s ability to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incidents.

In his confirmation hearing, General Eberhart indicated that he does not anticipate a large number of operational forces being assigned to NORTHCOM.

Since JFCOM will be the primary force provider for NORTHCOM, what challenges do you anticipate in ensuring that U.S. forces are prepared for operations on, over, or close to the United States?

**ANSWER:** Joint Forces Command will have to work closely with NORTHCOM, as with the other geographic combatant commands, to identify appropriate training and readiness objectives for forces required to execute military operations. Each of the Services will have to certify the mission readiness of these forces. Joint Forces Command will also continue to have a role in training the NORTHCOM forces, as with all combatant commands. This will assist in the transition.

**NATO**

NATO has agreed to release the current CINCJFCOM, General Kernan, from his responsibilities as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT).

Do you anticipate that the SACLANT responsibilities will be assigned to another U.S. four-star officer?

**ANSWER:** The Secretary’s guidance is to leave the SACLANT “unfilled” until NATO completes its review of the future structure and command and control arrangement for NATO’s military establishment. During that period, the Deputy SACLANT, Admiral Ian Forbes will stand in as SACLANT. Further, the close and continuous linkage that exists today will continue. USJFCOM forces will participate in and the headquarters will support NATO exercises. Alliance partners will liaise with both USJFCOM training and
experimentation activities and multinational experimentation, built around this NATO partnership, will increase in the future.

**Will the loss of the SACLANT "hat" have any impact on the performance of the duties of CINCJFCOM?**

**ANSWER:** The current Unified Command Plan rightly focuses the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command on the transformation of our Armed Forces. Given the current operational and functional responsibilities of Allied Command Atlantic, relieving the USJFCOM Commander of NATO responsibilities at this time is consistent with the intent of the Unified Command Plan. Where USJFCOM and ACLANT responsibilities intersect, I anticipate the two commands maintaining a very close relationship.

We are examining ways to enhance the linkages between NATO and the Joint Forces Command, so that American, European and Canadian militaries can transform together.

**Do you anticipate that CINCJFCOM will have a continuing role with our NATO allies relating to the transformation of U.S. forces?**

**ANSWER:** Without question. Future warfare will almost certainly be joint and often rely on our multinational partners. Multinational interoperability of our joint forces is a key part of transformation. NATO is a key U.S. multinational partnership, and the most well developed of our military alliances. As the command responsible for U.S. transformation, Joint Forces Command must work with other NATO members in establishing overarching architectures and protocols to assure continued interoperability. NATO offers the right venue to develop our capabilities to be interoperable with our multinational partners. Joint Forces Command will continue to work closely with NATO in the development of future concepts and capabilities.

**In a speech in Norway to NATO defense ministers last year, General Kernan stated that Concept Development and Experimentation was an ideal means for NATO to facilitate adaptive changes in doctrine, training, and operational concepts.**

**What are your views regarding the progress NATO must make in modernizing and transforming its forces?**

**ANSWER:** The Secretary General, Lord Robertson, has spoken out forcefully on this issue, however, much remains to be done. Greater effort is required on the part of many member states if our NATO allies are to become full partners in the execution of operations today and full participants in U.S. experimentation and transformation efforts. Where necessary increased investment must be made and where appropriate, Alliance nations need to creatively “pool” resources and find capability niches that add to NATO’s overall military effectiveness and relevance today and can be properly resourced. In
particular, NATO’s command and control capability must be transformed to be more interoperable and agile.

The U.S. and NATO allies will have to work closely in these areas to ensure that all forces modernize and transform to the maximum extent possible.

**Do you agree that the Concept Development and Experimentation process is the best means to accomplish this end?**

**ANSWER:** Yes. Given defense spending realities, the environment offered by Concept Development and Experimentation (CDE) is by far the most efficient way to effect transformation in my view.

**Without the authority of SACLANT, how will CINCJFCOM participate in the effort to modernize NATO warfighting capabilities?**

**ANSWER:** As a former ACLANT NATO commander, if confirmed, I anticipate that the productive partnership between USJFCOM and ACLANT will continue. The two commands share many common responsibilities, remain co-located and have a history of working together.

**Joint Warfighting Experimentation**

The September 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report stated, in part, that "Exercises and experiments are a critical phase in developing new types of forces and operational concepts that can respond to emerging operational challenges and dominate opponents who effectively exploit aspects of the changing security environment."; and, "The findings of this program of field exercises and experiments will feed back directly into the process for determining systems, doctrine, and force structure requirements."

Please describe the upcoming Millennium Challenge 2002 and explain how it could contribute to the development of new types of forces and operational concepts.

**ANSWER:** Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02), offers an opportunity to integrate the Services and their operational concepts into a joint experiment to identify and develop promising concepts for future joint warfare. The joint experiment will focus on the value of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) as enabled by a core Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), built around III Corps, and Operational Net Assessment to achieve rapid, decisive operations in this decade.
The experiment is designed to synchronize previously planned Service experiments, giving joint concepts additional influence in Service experimental activities. “Live” experimentation with forces in the field will be conducted at the Western U.S. training ranges, while a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) will be established at USJFCOM in Norfolk, Virginia. A human-in-the-loop computer-based simulation will incorporate the results of live play, and provide a wider strategic and operational context for the live elements of the experiment.

With all experiments, the lessons learned lie ahead. Likely areas for recommendations could include, but are not limited to, enhanced joint headquarters planning, command and control functions, concepts of joint warfighting in the next decade, testing how well various Service concepts for future operations work together, and recommendations for the highest-payoff interoperability initiatives that will enable the current force to conduct more coherent joint operations.

Please explain how information obtained from exercises like Millennium Challenge 2002 could feed back directly into the process for determining systems, doctrine, and force structure requirements.

**ANSWER:** Millennium Challenge 2002 is one of several types of experiments and events that comprise a continuous experimentation environment.

The purpose of joint concept development and experimentation, in this case Millennium Challenge 2002, is to provide additional information developed from joint and operational perspectives to support more informed decision making concerning force development and resource allocation. Recommendations to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) will potentially involve both near and longer-term force and/or program adjustments, and all mission areas and appropriation categories, and any level of resources.

Once USJFCOM’s recommendations are approved, implementation is the responsibility of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) who may choose to either implement through their own capabilities or appoint an executive agent that will implement changes for them. The Services, USSOCOM, or Defense Agencies could execute changes to materiel, personnel, and/or facilities. Any or all of these changes could require resource adjustments to support the desired action. Most importantly, acceptance and implementation of new joint concepts will provide a common joint context for developing future Service concepts, forces, and capabilities.

In particular, please explain the joint standing headquarters concept and how Millennium Challenge 2002 will test it.

**ANSWER:** The Quadrennial Defense Review dated 30 September 2001 directed the development of proposals for a prototype of a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). Additionally, the Secretary of Defense further directed a study for a prototype
SJFHQ. The standing joint force headquarters concept used in Millennium Challenge 2002 is the result of a lengthy concept development and experimentation effort by USJFCOM in coordination with the combatant commanders, the Services, Defense agencies and others. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters is functionally organized to provide command, planning, operations, knowledge management, information superiority and support to the Joint Force Commander. It is a warfighting headquarters operating in a collaborative environment to apply the full range of national power in a coherent manner. The SJFHQ operates and trains together on a daily basis year round, is fully engaged in theater planning and operations. Additionally, the SJFHQ can accommodate both interagency and multinational elements as required.

As part of the experimental scenario, the prototype standing joint force headquarters will be integrated into a Service-pure headquarters (Army, III Corps) that has been designated by the combatant commander as the Joint Task Force headquarters.

In his December 1999 Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of Joint Experimentation, Admiral Gehman proposed a Joint Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) to provide "jump-start" funding for promising new systems and technologies during experimentation and fielding that would otherwise not be available.

What are your views on Admiral Gehman's WRAP proposal?

ANSWER: I agree with the need for funding to support rapid procurement for "jump-starting" promising new systems and technologies resulting from experimentation, and efforts to address immediate Joint Warfighting interoperability and integration shortfalls. A number of potential vehicles for funding like USJFCOM’s Transition Fund or Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD’s) are designed to rapidly transition technologies and ideas to programs. All of these vehicles will be helpful in advancing the transformation of our military. As with all facets of experimentation, we must be prepared to fail on occasion in order to “push the envelope.”
Joint Requirements Oversight Council

In his formal testimony before the Committee on April 9, 2002, JCS Vice Chairman General Peter Pace stated that "The JROC now has front-end influence to ensure that major weapons systems are 'born joint.' With my seat on the Defense Acquisition Board and my role in the budgeting process I can help ensure that all major systems are validated as 'joint' before they are procured" and, "We've tasked United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to develop and evaluate joint operational concepts and architectures, conduct and evaluate experiments, recommend legacy system integration, provide feedback from the field, and recommend emerging operational concepts for evaluation."

Please explain the processes whereby JFCOM accomplishes the tasking described above and how it works with the Vice Chairman and the JROC to ensure that major systems are born "joint" and validated as "joint" before they are procured.

**ANSWER:** Joint Forces Command is addressing critical interoperability for the joint warfighter through the joint requirements process. To ensure new systems are born joint, the Command reviews all developing requirements documents for sufficiency of interoperability key performance parameters, information exchange requirements, and operational architectures. Joint Forces Command’s view of the system’s joint interoperability is included in the JROC process chaired by the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Forces Command also develops Capstone Requirements Documents (CRDs) to fill uniquely joint needs. CRDs provide a common joint vision in key future warfighting areas. These documents include detailed overarching joint architectures and provide up-front guidance to Services and Agencies to use when developing future individual systems. The JROC has approved four Joint Forces Command Capstone Requirements Documents to date—Global Information Grid, Information Dissemination Management, Combat Identification, and Theater Air Missile Defense.

Joint Forces Command also supports legacy systems by prioritizing warfighting interoperability requirements critical to the Combatant.

**In your view, what is the appropriate role of the CINCJFCOM in the JROC process and should the CINCJFCOM be a full, voting member of the JROC?**
**ANSWER:** In my view, the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command serves as the chief advocate for jointness and interoperability and the champion of joint warfighting requirements. This role empowers the USJFCOM Commander to address the sufficiency of interoperability in future acquisition initiatives. If confirmed as the chief advocate for jointness and interoperability, having a seat, when appropriate, at both the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) should afford me ample latitude to affect positive change throughout the requirements generation process. Once again, since I do not have sufficient knowledge of the details, I would like to reserve judgment pending confirmation.

**Transformation**

With the upcoming loss of its geographic area of responsibility, JFCOM will refocus on experimentation and transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces and strengthen its ability to be the trainer and provider of joint military forces.

**ANSWER:** As the President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and members of this committee have all made clear, we are in a period of great change. As such, there is a priority need to experiment, innovate and, ultimately, transform our nation’s military capability. Refocusing JFCOM on this core national priority as prescribed in Unified Command Plan 2002 will allow the men and women of this command to wake up every day thinking, worrying about, agitating for, and experimenting with combinations of new and old ideas from a joint warfighting perspective while strengthening the commands ability to be the trainer and provider of joint military forces. This is a very exciting prospect and one that I hope, if confirmed, we will all be proud of in years to come.

Building upon prior and ongoing joint and Service concept development and experimentation and leveraging the warfighting innovations from ongoing operations, JFCOM will strive to develop solutions that enhance the full range of joint warfighting capabilities needed to combat asymmetric threats such as terrorism and sustain our military strength in the 21st century. This comprehensive effort includes aggressive experimentation, joint force training, and integration of joint warfighting requirements necessary to meet future challenges, all balanced by the need to sustain a trained and ready force for today’s operations.

Joint Forces Command will work closely with the Services, Defense Agencies, and Combatant Commands, as well as with our interagency and international partners in these efforts. Joint Forces Command provides the joint context in which Service and Agency experiments can operate effectively.
Please explain your view of the role that JFCOM should play in the training of joint military forces.

**Answer:** Training provides the foundation for current warfighting readiness and for the transformation of the Armed Forces. USJFCOM has a multi-faceted joint training mission, specified in the 2002 Unified Command Plan, which is to serve as the lead agent for Joint Force Training. In that role, USJFCOM represents the Joint Warfighter perspective in the training process to ensure that training meets the needs of the combatant commanders. Training provides the integrating environment for the validation and refinement of joint concepts that contribute to joint capable forces and joint force capabilities in the near-term.

To the extent that previous answers do not cover how JFCOM will accomplish these tasks, please describe this process.

**Answer:** To facilitate Defense Department transformational efforts, USJFCOM develops and experiments on concepts, leverages operational lessons learned, identifies and documents solutions, and submits appropriate joint doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facility changes for implementation as directed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). These submissions, the product of joint experimentation, training, and operational lessons, include joint operational concepts, command and control structures, and capabilities that become joint requirements in support of transformation once approved by the JROC.

Secretary Rumsfeld has talked often about the urgent need to transform the force and has established an Office of Force Transformation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Office of Force Transformation?

**Answer:** I see the Office of Force Transformation providing a key bridging function between the security strategy and policy and acquisition and the effort to identify transformational operational warfighting concepts, requirements and capabilities.

In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between the CINCJFCOM and the Director, Office of Force Transformation?

**Answer:** The relationship between the Commander, USJFCOM, and the Director, Office of Force Transformation is key to overall department transformation efforts and should be one of coordination and mutual support, similar to that maintained with other senior officials in OSD. I look forward, if confirmed, to working with the Director, Office
of Force Transformation on these very important and challenging issues in the months ahead.

I believe that the Director, Office of Force Transformation will assist USJFCOM and the CJCS in translating established requirements into reality by working through the Service Secretaries to affect the Service budgets, programs, and transformation plans.

The Commander, USJFCOM will also coordinate with other principals in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such as the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, who has a key role in the transformation of training, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, who has a key role in the transformation of C4ISR.

Vice Admiral (Ret.) Cebrowski, Director of the Office of Force Transformation, stated in testimony to the committee this year that his small budget would enable him to be a "venture capitalist" wherein he could identify promising new technologies and quickly acquire them.

What is your view of the need for this type of "venture capitalist" approach?

**ANSWER:** Transformation involves fundamental changes in the conceptualization of war, organizational culture and behavior as well as materiel change. Fostering long term and continual transformation is a culture in itself. Technology is an essential component of transformation, but investment must be informed by and balanced with innovative operational and organizational concepts, training, leadership, and personnel imperatives. Experimentation is a key component of transformation. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Vice Admiral Cebrowski and his organization in the application of the venture capitalist approach.

**National Defense Panel Recommendations**

Many of the recommendations contained in the December 1997 Report of the National Defense Panel have come to be adopted by the Department of Defense, including the creation of a Joint Forces Command with a mission essentially the same as the one which JFCOM will have after NORTHCOM is fully operational. Some of the Panel's recommendations, however, have not yet been adopted.

What are your views on the establishment of joint national training centers, part of which would be a Joint Urban Warfare Center?

**ANSWER:** The Office of the Secretary of Defense has rightly identified the need for the creation of inherently joint training infrastructure that enables the integration and conduct
of joint and Service training across the full range of operational challenges, including urban warfare.

The Joint National Training Center concept offers a seamless joint training environment through a global network of live, virtual, and constructive enablers. The objective is to provide training venues that enhance our collective ability to improve Joint warfighting capabilities.

With the completion of *Millennium Challenge 2002* this summer, which will combine multiple live range activities with numerous simulation centers, we should learn a great deal about the key components of a Joint National Training Capability.

**What are your views on the provision of an MFP-11 type authority to ensure USJFCOM's ability to support the experimentation program?**

**ANSWER:** Experimentation and transformation are obviously very high priority issues for the President, Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as prescribed in Unified Command Plan 2002; therefore, I would like to reserve detailed comment on this question until I have had a chance to review the issue more thoroughly.

**Service Experimentation**

* A review of the defense budget reveals that the military services spend a substantial amount of money on "service-level" experimentation --- about $1 billion total each year for all four services. The JFCOM budget for joint experimentation is about $100 million.

* In your view, are service experimentation efforts satisfactorily coordinated with Joint Forces Command?

**ANSWER:** The Services have been very cooperative with USJFCOM’s efforts to integrate concept development and experimentation. Service experimentation efforts are satisfactorily coordinated with Joint Forces Command.

Joint Forces Command supports strong Service programs for concept development and experimentation because integrating service with joint concept development and experimentation efforts is essential to the success of both.

* What role should JFCOM play in the timing and content of service experimentation efforts?

**ANSWER:** Joint Forces Command has the mission to provide the coherent joint context for Service experimentation programs. The joint warfighting experimentation program aims at integrating those efforts into a “family” of experiments that support joint and
Service concept development while providing the Services the joint context for their experimentation initiatives in their core capabilities.

Are you satisfied that, overall, service and joint experimentation efforts are adequately funded?

**ANSWER:** I do not have the current knowledge to adequately answer this question. I would like to reserve detailed comment on this question until I have had a chance to review the issue more thoroughly.

**Interoperability**

A major component of any discussion about transformation and joint warfighting capabilities is the interoperability of equipment, especially communications and information technology systems. After action reports from every major conflict since the military operations in Grenada in 1982 have pointed out shortcomings in interoperability and recommended significant improvements, however, problems with incompatible systems persist.

In your view, why has achieving interoperability of systems proven to be such an elusive task?

**ANSWER:** We have many systems of a wide range of origins and ages operating currently which are driving interoperability. However, the establishment of a relevant common operational picture and the control of future interoperability through the JROC means that we will have an evolving capability over time. In order to get a better handle on existing incompatibilities, JFCOM is building a combatant commander shortfall list for presentation to and endorsement by the JROC.

What recommendations do you have for improving the interoperability of U.S. military systems?

**ANSWER:** I do not have the current knowledge from the Joint Forces Command perspective to adequately answer this question. I would like to reserve detailed comment on this question until I have had a chance to review the issue more thoroughly.

What challenges do you anticipate in the future with regard to interoperability with the military systems of friendly and allied nations?

**ANSWER:** The overall effectiveness of multinational operations is dependent on interoperability among organizations, processes and technologies. Effective command and control is the primary means of successfully extending the joint vision to
multinational operations. This requires interoperability of systems, common or complementary processes, and access to critical information and decision support capabilities. U.S. joint forces must train with allies and friends in peacetime in order to be fully prepared to operate with them in time of crisis and conflict. Technological developments that connect the information systems of coalition partners will provide the links leading to a common relevant operational picture and improve command and control.

Combined Experimentation

There has been much discussion in recent years about the role of joint experimentation in helping to transform our armed forces to meet future, emerging threats. Concurrently, there is frequent discussion about fighting with allied forces in coalitions and about the expanding technological gap between the U.S. Armed Forces and its closest allies.

In your view, how can the United States best prepare for coalition/combined operations?

**ANSWER:** Embedding our multinational partners in the concept development phase and including them in experimentation will set the stage for multinational operations. Current and future scheduled limited objective experiments will help prepare not only the US for coalition/combined operations, but our partners as well. Continued involvement with the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) and its various working groups at JFCOM will keep the US involved, preparing for and effecting transformation in coalition/combined operations.

What role can experimentation play in preparing U.S. and allied forces for combined operations?

**ANSWER:** Current and future scheduled experiments help prepare not only the US for coalition/combined operations, but our partners as well. By improving our common capabilities in the relatively inexpensive environment of experimentation, we will keep our allies and coalition partners engaged in our transformation efforts.

What recommendations do you have for mitigating the technological gap between U.S. forces and our closest allies?

**ANSWER:** Given current trends in allied defense spending, it seems prudent to define roles for our allies in areas where they have unique capabilities and are able to sustain those capabilities over time. Collectively, developing more effective C4ISR on a multinational level can be affordable to all close allies and will yield the largest and most significant returns. In this area and others, such as precision weapons, ensuring we have
open architectures and clear standards and protocols will be important to achieving necessary levels of interoperability and access.

**Goals**

**Please describe the goals you will set, if confirmed, for yourself and JFCOM to accomplish within the next two years.**

**ANSWER:** The President and Defense leadership’s intent and guidance establishes a clear goal of transforming our military forces to meet the needs of the future security environment. The Secretary of Defense recently outlined six transformation goals: (1) protect the U.S. homeland and our bases overseas; (2) project and sustain power in distant theaters; (3) deny enemies sanctuary; (4) protect U.S. information networks from attack; (5) use information technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces so they can fight jointly; and (6) maintain unhindered access to space. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified key areas for improving joint warfighting capabilities, including interoperability and joint experimentation, as well as transformational capabilities such as establishing standing joint force headquarters for the combatant commanders.

With that guidance and the guidance of Unified Command Plan 2002, if confirmed, I see refocusing U.S. Joint Forces Command on experimentation and transformation of our Armed Forces while strengthening JFCOM’s ability to be the trainer and provider of joint military forces as my primary goals.

Joint training is the foundation of any transformation effort. Operationalizing the concept of a Joint National Training Center will receive great attention. As well, I will ensure that my component forces remain trained and ready, and are the vanguard for joint training and operations.

Joint interoperability and integration remains critical to advancing transformation. I will make working with the JROC a priority to ensure that all new systems and critical legacy capabilities are fully interoperable, and new capabilities are born joint.

**Major Challenges and Problems**

**In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next CINCJFCOM?**

**ANSWER:** Time and focus. The process of transformation is a long and complex one. Maintaining the necessary focus and attention during a time of war while fostering and reinforcing a culture dedicated to transformation and experimentation is a great but necessary challenge.
Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

**ANSWER:** First, to vigorously pursue significant doctrine, organizational, training, material, leadership development and personnel improvements consistent with the Defense transformation goals in support of combatant commanders.

Second, conduct a rigorous joint experimentation program. In order to truly innovate and experiment, you have to risk failure and you have to tell the truth about what works and why. If nothing fails in your experiment, then you’re not experimenting with innovative ideas—you’re demonstrating proven concepts. There is a great temptation not to experiment. The threat of a failed experiment is too great for some to stomach. But as Linus Pauling said, “The best way to have a good idea is to have lots of ideas.” Obviously, the good ideas will emerge from the not so good ones if you rigorously experiment, over long periods of time. Finally, if confirmed, I will focus the energies of a very talented command squarely on these issues.

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of CINCJFCOM?

**ANSWER:** I do not see any serious problems but transition of the organization’s roles and emphasis naturally will provide challenges in the months ahead.

If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

**ANSWER:** If confirmed, my priority would be to conduct a complete review of the USJFCOM experimentation plan.

**Congressional Oversight**

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

**ANSWER:** Yes.
Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

**ANSWER:** Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the CINCJFCOM?

**ANSWER:** Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

**ANSWER:** Yes.