Advance Questions for Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, USN
Nominee for the Position of Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command

Defense Reforms

More than 15 years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of those reforms, particularly during your tenure as Director of Operations, U.S. Atlantic Command and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

I fully support the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These reforms have clearly strengthened the warfighting readiness and operational performance of our Armed Forces.

What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

I believe the Department has embraced these reforms in both spirit and intent and we have vigorously pursued their implementation.

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

In my view, strengthening civilian control and the chain of command along with the clear delineation of the combatant commander’s responsibilities and authorities as they relate to the execution of his assigned missions are the most important aspects. These reforms have also led to vastly improved synergy between the Services and the combatant commanders in the strategic planning process, in the development of requirements, and in the execution of our operations during numerous contingencies in the last decade-and-a-half.

We have made significant strides in joint training and education as well. Our forces expect to be employed in a joint operational construct and hence, train and prepare accordingly.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.
Do you agree with these goals?

Yes, these goals have been critically important to the development of a more truly joint capability.

Recently, there have been articles that indicate an interest within the Department of Defense in modifying Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national strategy.

Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

In the simplest sense, the Goldwater-Nichols Act was fundamentally implemented to build a more joint military capability. It is important to assess how we might improve upon what’s been accomplished these last fifteen plus years, and if needed, address the need for possible changes.

Our experience to date, the evolving strategic environment and the need to transform our joint force capabilities continually may call for examinations, and if needed, proposed course corrections. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on such matters and will convey my views to the Congress.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command?

The duties, functions and responsibilities of all the combatant commanders, and the U.S. Pacific Command commander specifically, are delineated by statute, regulation and directive. These include exercising command authority over all commands and forces assigned to the Pacific Command, and prescribing, organizing and employing the subordinate commands and forces within the Pacific Command to carry out Pacific Command’s assigned missions.

Fundamentally, that mission is to deter attacks against the U.S. and its territories, possessions and bases, protect Americans and American interests and, in the event that deterrence fails, fight and win.

As a combatant commander, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the performance of these duties, the preparedness of its assigned commands and the execution of its missions.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

My previous experience as a naval officer and commander engaged in joint and combined operations, particularly in the Pacific, East Asia and in Southwest Asia, has prepared me to
serve as the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. My command assignments include the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Commander, Naval Forces U.S. Central Command/Commander, Fifth Fleet in the Arabian Gulf, Task Force SEVEN FOUR/ONE FIVE SEVEN/Submarine Group SEVEN in Yokosuka, Japan, and the USS SALT LAKE CITY (SSN 716) in the Pacific.

I have served in two joint-qualifying (JDAL) tours as a flag officer. First, as the Director for Operations (J-3) at the U.S. Atlantic Command from 1993 – 95, planning and directing operations for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994 and as indicated above, as the Commander, Naval Forces U.S. Central Command/Commander, Fifth Fleet in the Arabian Gulf from 1996-98. Additionally, I have had extensive joint interaction in my duties as both the Navy’s Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (N3/5) from 1998-1999, where I served on the panel of Operations Deputies (or “OpsDepts”) for the Joint Staff; and also as the Navy representative to the Joint Requirements Board while serving as the Director, Assessment Division (N81) on the Navy Staff in 1995-96.

My present assignment as the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and as the U.S. Pacific Command’s naval component commander has helped me develop important relationships throughout the region, familiarized me with joint, combined and naval planning efforts and operations, and has introduced me to the key U.S. Pacific Command military leadership.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command?

I believe I am well prepared to assume these duties if confirmed. I have been in contact with Admiral Blair, his other component commanders and key leadership within the Department as part of my current duties as the Pacific naval component commander and commander of a joint task force in the region. I’m sure there is a great deal more to learn and as with any new assignment I intend to pursue every opportunity to expand my knowledge and understanding.

In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Undersecretaries of Defense, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Joint Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chiefs of Staff of the Services, and the other combatant commanders?

If confirmed, I plan to work with them in the same fashion I’ve found effective throughout my career: clear, forthright and frequent communication. Further, my relationship with these leaders would be in accordance with the established laws, regulations and traditional practices and conducted in a manner that provides my best military advice, supports the execution of our duties and responsibilities and ensures the preparedness of my assigned forces. Specifically,

The Secretary of Defense

The chain of command flows from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. The Secretary is my immediate supervisor and I will report directly to him and provide the best possible military advice to execute my duties and responsibilities in the Pacific.
As is custom and traditional practice, I will communicate with the Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on occasion, serves as the acting Secretary in the absence of the Secretary. During these periods my relationship with the Deputy Secretary will be essentially the same as with the Secretary. I will endeavor to provide him with the best possible military advice and the same level of support as I would the Secretary. Otherwise, I will support, consult with, and coordinate with him in those areas and issues that the Secretary has assigned him to lead for the Department.

The Under Secretaries of Defense
Under current DoD Directives, Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DoD components, to include combatant commands, in the functional areas under their purview. If confirmed, I will respond and reciprocate. I will use this exchange of information as I formally communicate with the CJCS and provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
With three exceptions, Assistant Secretaries are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. Therefore, any relationship U.S. Pacific Command would have with subordinate Assistant Secretaries would be working with and through the applicable Under Secretary of Defense. Since the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for C3I, Legislative Affairs, and Public Affairs are principal deputies to the Secretary of Defense, the relationship with them would be conducted along the same lines as with the various Under Secretaries.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Title 10, Sec. 163 allows communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to be transmitted through the Chairman. I anticipate this policy will continue to be directed by the President in the forthcoming Unified Command Plan. If confirmed, I intend to keep the Chairman fully involved and informed by providing appropriate recommendations regarding requirements, strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the joint employment of Pacific Command forces.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
When functioning as the acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman’s relationship with the unified commanders is exactly that of the Chairman. Title 10, Sec. 154 gives the Vice Chairman rights and obligations as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, I would exchange views with the Vice Chairman on any general defense matter considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Vice Chairman also heads, or plays a key role on many boards and panels that affect readiness and programs, many of which directly impact the preparedness of Pacific Command. An important example is the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). I would anticipate exchanging views on matters before these boards and panels as they affect the Pacific
The Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Assistant to the Chairman represents the Chairman in the interagency process and works closely with the leadership of the Department of State. Combatant Commanders and their staffs also work in an interagency setting and maintain a heavy focus on international relations as they relate to politico-military concerns. While there is no command relationship between the Assistant to the Chairman and a combatant commander, informal exchanges of views are of mutual benefit. If confirmed, I would expect to engage in such exchanges.

The Director of the Joint Staff

The Director of the Joint Staff is generally the Joint Staff point of contact for soliciting information from all the unified commanders when the Chairman is developing a position on any important issue. On a day-to-day basis, the Pacific Command Deputy works with the Director of the Joint Staff to exchange positions and clarify direction. However, on occasion it is important for the Commander to deal directly with the Director of the Joint Staff to ensure that the Director correctly understands his position.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Title 10, Sec. 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned to combatant commands. This responsibility is routinely exercised within Service lines via the subordinate Service component commander. On occasion it is important to exchange views personally and directly with a Service Secretary on issues involving the preparedness of forces and their administration and support.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Service Chiefs are responsible, in accordance with Goldwater-Nichols, to organize, train, equip, and provide trained and ready forces for combatant commanders to employ in their area of responsibility. The full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs is important to the preparedness of assigned combat forces and the missions directed by the Secretary of Defense. Also, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense and President. Individually and collectively, the Joint Chiefs are a source of experience and judgment that can and should be called upon. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a full dialogue with the Chiefs of all Services.

The other combatant commanders

If confirmed, my relationship with the other combatant commanders will be one of mutual support, continued dialogue, and frequent face-to-face interaction. In today’s security environment, with special regard to the global campaign against terrorism, an atmosphere of teamwork, cooperation, and sharing is critical to executing U.S. national policy. As a supporting commander, I will do my utmost to assist other commanders in the execution of their assigned missions. As a supported commander, I would expect the same from fellow combatant
Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command?

The basic challenge facing any combatant commander is to maintain the readiness of his assigned forces and employ them in a manner that deters our enemies and dissuades potential strategic competitors from seeking military advantage, reassures Americans and our friends and allies abroad, and in the event deterrence fails, fighting and winning.

In the Pacific, I believe there are a number of fundamental challenges that need to be addressed. These include:

1. North Korea. The place where the stakes are highest continues to be on the Korean peninsula. North Korea poses a significant conventional threat on the peninsula and continues to be a major exporter of ballistic missiles and associated technology. As such, North Korea poses a risk not just on the peninsula, but also throughout the region, and across the globe.

2. Terrorism. There is real concern that Southeast Asia could become a haven for international terrorists as they are forced out of their current locations. It will take a concerted effort to find ways to help the region address this threat. The Pacific Command also supports other combatant commanders in the larger Global War on Terror.

3. Miscalculation. The potential for accelerated military competition or worse, gross miscalculation between India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, or some other strategic rivals.

4. Potential instability. A regional instability caused by a fractured or failed nation state which has come apart because of its own internal instability, ideological crisis or failed government or economic system. This also includes instabilities caused by piracy, international drug smuggling, illegal immigration, environmental catastrophe and similar transnational concerns.

5. Readiness. Maintaining a trained and ready force, the command and control, and the relationships capable of dealing with the range of missions that could result from the foregoing.

6. Transformation. Institutionalizing a culture of experimentation and innovation that recognizes the unique nature of the Pacific’s geography, the evolving threats and the robust capability that technology brings the U.S. armed forces.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

In many respects, meeting the challenges above is dependent upon the readiness of Pacific Command forces and the Service, joint and combined training exercises that enhance our ability to operate in a complex environment and execute our operations and contingency plans. More importantly, it means reinforcing the constants within the region and promoting change.
1. **Reinforcing constants.** The foundation for stability in the region has been our long-standing bilateral alliances, of which our alliance with Japan is our most important. This relationship is the cornerstone for U.S. security interests in Asia and is fundamental to regional stability and security. Australia remains our oldest ally and a special partner in the Pacific. They have worked hard to eliminate the potential technology barriers between our forces and have taken a lead role in East Timor’s security, and in the security and democratic development of nations in the South Pacific. Our relationship with the Republic of Korea has served as the keystone for security on the Korean peninsula for fifty years. The Philippines and Thailand remain important allies and key to stability throughout Southeast Asia. These critical alliances have served us well not only within the Pacific area of responsibility, but in the Global War on Terrorism as well.

If confirmed, I will continue to reinforce these important alliances and friendships.

The presence of U.S. forces is another constant that remains a force for stability and security throughout the region as well. Our forward capability brings great flexibility to the United States and deters and dissuades military competition in East Asia. A forward combat capability transcends any movement on the Korean peninsula and, if confirmed, I would continue to work to ensure their readiness, training and access to those areas vital to U.S. security in the region.

Lastly, we have long-standing relationships in the region, friendships like those with Singapore and Malaysia, that recognize our shared security interests and provide critical assistance in efforts like the Global War on Terror as well. I would seek to fortify these long-standing friendships.

2. **Promoting change.** There is much we can do to improve our security in this region we all recognize as critically important to the Nation’s future.

   Changing our operating patterns: to include a balance of time in Northeast Asia and the East Asia littoral. We should leverage the opportunity our growing military cooperation with India provides as well. Additionally, I would seek more frequent joint operating opportunities such as those recently conducted by the Navy and the Air Force in the South China Sea that exercise our long-range strike and expeditionary capabilities.

   Reviewing our force posture for the future that includes the kind of forward deterrence enhanced by a forward Theater Missile Defense capability, the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF), SSGN and others, the utilization of strategic assets like Guam, and the efficiencies gained by initiatives like the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) agreement in Korea. Our goal should be to improve our combat capability forward while achieving the necessary efficiencies in our support structure.

   Maturing Joint Task Force operations: to include rapid activation and minimum reinforcement, a clear and accurate operational picture, a secure, collaborative coalition network, and effective training in complex operational situations.

**What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command?**

The ability to command, organize and employ modern joint and/or coalition forces effectively within the vast Pacific Command area of responsibility is dependent upon robust,
collaborative information technology. Pacific forces require more bandwidth, higher speed, and frankly, better availability for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems in a more timely manner. We are a long ways from a common operational picture for our joint forces and we are ISR poor overall. Additionally, interoperability with our allies or in a coalition environment is an even bigger challenge.

If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

As Pacific Command’s executive agent for development of the Coalition Wide Area Network (COWAN), and having seen the Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) during my tenure as Commander of the Pacific Fleet, we are beginning to make strides in availability. However, we need to continue to acquire modern capability in a rapid manner. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Secretary, the Chairman, the Joint Forces Command and the Service Chiefs on efforts to improve our acquisition of timely, robust communication and collaborative technology. I will also continue to emphasize the development and efficient and effective use of appropriate ISR assets.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish in terms of issues that must be addressed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command?

If confirmed, I have five broad priorities for Pacific Command in the near term:
1. Sustaining and supporting the Global War on Terrorism.
2. Improving the readiness and joint warfighting capability of Pacific Command forces.
3. Reinforcing the strong relationships the United States has with our key allies, friends and partners in the region.
4. Improving the Quality of Service for our Sailors, Soldiers, Airmen and Marines.
5. Promoting change and improving our Asia-Pacific Defense posture.

Readiness

Do you believe that training constraints for OCONUS units are growing? If so, how important is it to develop a theater-wide strategy to protect military training opportunities? Will you develop and implement such a strategy?

Training constraints are growing for OCONUS units and are a fundamental readiness issue; after all, if we cannot train, we have no ability to defend the Nation. I think it is important that a theater-wide strategy be developed to permit all Services to conduct training in and/or around their assigned stations/ports.

This strategy must not rely solely on the support of our allies, but also include our need to train in and around Hawaii, Guam, Alaska and the continental United States. I know both the
Department and the Congress are actively engaged on this issue. The past decade has seen steady erosion to the ability to train at our OCONUS training ranges and operating areas. Our need for sufficient training ranges and basic operating conditions for our forward forces based overseas— the forces the Nation needs to be most ready – are critical. While the most visible loss of training infrastructure resulted from the loss of the Philippine training complex, other incremental losses are beginning to jeopardize our ability to maintain ready forces. Urban sprawl has significantly reduced the maneuvering and artillery training areas for both our Army and Marine forces in Japan and Korea. Civilian development has encircled our Naval Air Station in Atsugi, Japan; this “encroachment” restricts USS Kitty Hawk’s Carrier Air Wing Five ability to conduct night operations and to carry ordnance for training missions. Most recently, we have been sued and found to be in violation of the 1918 Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) over our training operations on the small (1.7 mi long), uninhabited island of Farallon de Medinilla in the Marianas. This could potentially halt Air Force, Marine, and Navy training at the only overseas U.S. owned training range in the Western Pacific. These are but a few examples of issues that are impacting us across the Pacific.

As Commander of the Pacific Fleet, I instituted Enhanced Readiness Teams (ERT) to address these kinds of encroachment issues within the Navy. These teams consist of operators, base infrastructure personnel, environmental lawyers, and facility planners brought together for coordinated action on these encroachment issues. My counterpart in the Atlantic and our Marine commanders in both AORs also adapted the concept - we now have a combined charter that establishes these teams across both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. Additionally, I have conveyed my concern with respect to encroachment to members of Congress and to appropriate Cabinet members. If confirmed, I intend to review the range of encroachment issues across all the Pacific component commands, and will assist the Department as necessary on its sustainable range initiatives efforts.

Forward Presence

Do you believe that our current forward presence in the United States Pacific Command area of responsibility is appropriate? What, if any, changes would you recommend in basing and agreements to promote access?

Our forward presence in the region is demonstrative of our commitment to its security and our interests abroad; deters aggression in areas like the Korean peninsula; reassures our friends and allies; provides a ready force capable of responding to security crises with credible combat power; facilitates security cooperation and coalition operations through periodic, combined training exercises; and preserves or enhances our access in critical areas.

The most important element of this forward deployed force is undoubtedly our combat capability; I don’t see any near term reduction to that capability forward. In fact, during my tenure as the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, I have taken action to enhance our forward combat capability by proposing and preparing for the forward basing of three attack submarines in Guam and preserving some of the infrastructure that supports our forward readiness. So in this sense, our combat capability may continue to evolve with the strategic environment in the region.
Of course, this combat readiness is dependent upon sufficient logistic infrastructure and access. My view is there are probably efficiencies we can gain in how we support this front line capability. Initiatives like the Land Partnership Program in Korea are important to both the U.S. and our allies in this regard. If confirmed, I intend to work with the Department and our friends and allies to ensure we provide the requisite logistic infrastructure and access in a way that leverages all that our information technology brings us and optimizes both our capability and our overseas support and tenant commands.

**Jointness and Transformation**

**What steps do you believe can and should be taken by the regional combatant commanders to enhance jointness and transformation? Are there opportunities in this area that are unique to the United States Pacific Command?**

All of the nation’s operating forces expect to be trained, prepared and employed in a joint operational construct. One of Admiral Blair’s important transformational efforts during his tenure has been the development of the Joint Mission Force (JMF). It leverages existing Pacific Command component commander infrastructure and relationships with the responsiveness and readiness of the Pacific’s forward deployed forces through web-centric technology. Its key objectives are to improve a Pacific Joint Task Force’s speed of response, precision and effectiveness across the full spectrum of missions should such force be required. I believe we can make early gains in both transformation and jointness by continuing to examine our operating concepts, force packaging, command and control and joint connectivity.

As the Navy’s component commander in the Pacific Command for the last two-and-a-half years I have seen this effort embedded in our operations planning, wargames, and exercises. There is more to be learned from this successful effort. If confirmed, I intend to continue this unique opportunity through the Pacific Command exercise program, leverage the lessons into our operations and planning, and improve the web-centric technology and networking that makes this command-staff-force model effective and enduring.

**Joint Experimentation**

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has taken an active role in experimentation, especially with regards to U.S. Navy fleet battle experiments.

In your view, what is the role of the combatant commands with regards to joint experimentation?

Every combatant commander has a need to continuously assess his own combat capabilities, the development of regional threats and the unique characteristics of his assigned area of responsibility (AOR) to ensure he is fostering the right operating concepts and validating requirements for the future. Most importantly, experimentation gives the Pacific Command’s warfighters an opportunity to validate experimental doctrine, technologies and joint tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) in the unique operating environment and geography in Pacific
Command’s area of responsibility. We need to foster innovation and prototyping in the field and then take the best of these ideas to Joint Forces Command and the Services for rapid implementation.

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has been designated as the Department’s executive agent for joint force experimentation. Our obligation in the Pacific Command is to support the larger goals of JFCOM and the Department by providing opportunities and venues to experiment and a constant stream of new thought on warfighting capability and concepts.

The Pacific Command has a legacy of innovation and experimentation; if confirmed, I intend to continue to pursue those operating concepts and technologies that will ensure the Nation’s readiness to deter attacks against the U.S., its territories, possessions and bases and, should that deterrence fail, preserve our capability to fight and win.

**What type of relationship should exist between PACOM and U.S. Joint Forces Command, with regards to joint experimentation?**

If confirmed, I will coordinate joint experimentation efforts with JFCOM in its role as the Department’s executive agent for Joint Warfighting Experimentation and will share the pertinent lessons to be drawn from the Pacific Command’s experimental efforts and JFCOM’s as well.

**Joint Requirements**

In your view, what is the role of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, in the formulation of joint warfighting requirements and the development of capabilities for the future?

I believe it is important the combatant commanders assert a strong role in defense requirements. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) strives to ensure that individual Service systems are interoperable and that choices among individual Service systems are made based on their value to joint warfighting. If confirmed, I will support JROC efforts in the requirements process. The vast geography of the Pacific, the absence of a broad treaty organization and the fundamentally expeditionary context of many of the region’s security scenarios make Pacific Command input to the requirements process an important voice in the development of our future force capability. As a combatant commander, I would have a number of venues available to influence joint warfighting requirements:

1. Review of joint requirements documents such as Mission Need Statements, Operational and Capstone Requirements Documents, and Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Support Plans for joint applicability and interoperability.
2. Development of an annual Integrated Priority List (IPL) to influence Service and defense agency Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) and the Future Years Defense Plan. The IPL provides Pacific Command’s personal assessment of capabilities and requirements needed to execute operations in Pacific Command. It is not all-inclusive but focuses on those significant theater shortfalls that require funding. Concentrating on major shortfalls provides a more meaningful and useful product.
3. Staff participation in JROC and Defense Resources Board (DRB) meetings to provide Pacific Command views on joint requirements and programs. Additionally, Pacific Command hosts the Joint Staff’s Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) team visits and prepares for JROC meetings. Combatant commander recommendations are incorporated into the Chairman’s Program Recommendations (CPR) to influence Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and into the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) memo to influence Program and Budget Review as well.

4. Participating in all phases of the Department of Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), including providing input to the DPG and reviewing POMs during Program and Budget Review cycles to determine if they meet Pacific warfighting requirements and IPL priorities. Program Review considers issues raised by the combatant commanders and the Joint Staff. Joint concerns may be reflected in Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs) or Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) as the President’s Budget is finalized.

5. Joint Experimentation and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). While the venues mentioned above usually address more mid-to-long-term issues, joint experiments and the ACTD process provide shorter-term approaches to joint requirements and capabilities. Joint experiments and ACTDs allow the warfighter to “try before they buy” in operational demonstrations and ensure new capabilities are “born joint.” If successful, warfighters can readily apply the technologies in actual operations while acquisition programs refine their use and develop their long-term support infrastructure. My understanding is Pacific Command is currently engaged in 18 active ACTDs, which along with experimentation serve as a cornerstone of theater transformation.

Korea

If confirmed, what do you anticipate your relationship will be with the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea?

This relationship is unique and vital. The Pacific Command commander’s responsibilities are regional in nature and include the security situation on the Korean peninsula. The Commander-in-Chief, U.N. Command/Combined Forces Command primary focus is on deterrence of a North Korean attack specifically on the Korean peninsula, and should that deterrence fail, the ability to fight and win against that threat. He is also a subordinate unified commander to Pacific Command in his role as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea.

The magnitude of this enduring threat both to the peninsula, and throughout the region requires close coordination. If confirmed, my relationship with the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command (CINCUNC/CFC) and United States Forces Korea (USFK) will be one of mutual support, continued dialogue on key issues, and frequent face-to-face interaction during periodic conferences and other meetings, as required. In today’s security environment, an atmosphere of teamwork and cooperation is critical to executing U.S. national policy. In each of my supporting and supported relationships with other combatant
commanders, I will do my utmost to assist them in the execution of their duties and responsibilities.

What is your assessment of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the role that it plays in promoting stability on the Korean peninsula?

The Agreed Framework (AF) is an important mechanism to stability on the peninsula. Although not a perfect agreement, conflict has been averted and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has remained at least a nominal party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

North Korea's long-standing aggression and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction makes it imperative that we obtain a verifiable end to their nuclear weapons program. If there are ways to improve upon the Agreed Framework to that end, we should consider them.

To what extent is North Korea complying with the Agreed Framework and with other agreements it has entered into to reduce the WMD threat on the peninsula, such as the 1991 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula?

North Korea is complying with some aspects of the Agreed Framework. The freeze on plutonium production and separation facilities appears to be holding and the construction on the graphite-moderated reactors (GMR) is halted. However, North Korea is not yet in full compliance with all International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) accountability standards; the AF makes clear that key components for the Light Water Reactors (LWR) will not be delivered until North Korea complies fully with its IAEA obligations.

What is your assessment of the threat posed by North Korean ballistic missile developments and exports to U.S. forces and allies?

Significant. North Korean development and export of missile technology and components is pervasive and continuous; its exported technology is a threat not just within Pacific Command’s area of responsibility, but throughout the world. Additionally, it has been estimated that North Korea could have the capability to strike the continental United States with ballistic missiles within five years.

China

How would you characterize the U.S. security relationship with China?

Too often, they perceive the relationship as a zero-sum game – our perceived advantage is their disadvantage. We should develop areas where there is common ground, but the foundation of this discourse should continue to be the Taiwan Relations Act and the three U.S./China communiqués. It is clear to me a frank, constructive discourse that’s clearly aimed at preserving peace and stability throughout the region should be the way ahead.
Do you believe that we should re-establish normal military-to-military ties with the Chinese military? If so, why?

Normal military-to-military contact with the Chinese military is dependent upon our laws and the interests of the United States. In general, such contact should be both transparent and reciprocal in nature. Under these guidelines, I am supportive of a modest military-to-military relationship. As the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, I have noted a lack of reciprocity with respect to the variety and types of ports Pacific Fleet ships have been allowed to visit in China as compared to the types and variety of ports the U.S. has allowed PLA(N) ships to visit in the United States. While this is just one example, I believe it is an indicator that our contacts are presently proceeding at an appropriate level and pace.

Taiwan

What are the priorities, in your opinion, for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

In my view, we should continue to focus our assistance on modernizing Taiwan’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability, improving their integrated sea and air defense capability, and assisting them in the integration of their components into an effective joint defense.

India/Pakistan

What initiatives or actions do you believe that the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command, can and should take to help try to reduce military tension between India and Pakistan?

Maintaining frequent and frank communications with military leaders in India is the most important action the Pacific Command can take to help reduce military tensions in South Asia. It is important for the Pacific Command to know and understand the senior Indian military leaders. Through these contacts and professional friendships, the Pacific Command can candidly discuss the results and repercussions of conflict with Pakistan. Along with this, Pacific Command should continue its coordination with U.S. Central Command to monitor actions along the international boundary and the Line of Control in Kashmir.

Southeast Asia

How do you plan to engage the states in Southeast Asia to cooperate in the international war against terrorism?

The Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia have all taken steps in the war on terrorism, with Singapore and Malaysia in particular successfully disrupting terrorist operations.

If confirmed, I will incorporate the wide range of theater security cooperation activities
designed to help each nation, as permissible by our laws, develop the skills necessary to defeat current terrorist threats and deter future ones. This will require coordinating our military activities with the myriad of international, interagency, diplomatic and economic initiatives to ensure we are providing the right level and mix of capabilities. These activities range from our current assistance program in the southern Philippines to combined seminars and exercises incorporating counter-terror themes to humanitarian assistance activities that dissuade the development of terrorism and terrorist support bases.

**Philippines**

**How does the U.S. training mission in the Philippines enhance U.S. national security?**

The Abu Sayyaf terrorist group (ASG) is a threat to stability in the Philippines, has ties to Al Qaeda, and has targeted U.S. citizens. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are challenged by both logistic problems and a lack of adequate training in the Southern Command in dealing with what has become an enduring ASG threat. The U.S. training mission is there to provide training and advice to the AFP on counter-terror tactics, techniques and procedures and to assist the AFP with the maintenance of their equipment and the logistic infrastructure needed to defeat this threat.

If the Philippine government and military can train with U.S. forces, and develop improved future military capabilities, our national and international security interests are served. Further, relevant security cooperation with the Philippines, a treaty ally and member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), contributes to our security posture in Southeast Asia both for regional stability and for addressing transnational security issues.

In the long run, the AFP’s ability to conduct self-sustaining, counter-terror operations will help protect U.S. citizens abroad and will discourage Al Qaeda elements from seeking safe haven in the region as they are forced out of their current locations.

**Do you believe that the agreement the United States has entered into with the Philippines on this mission clearly distinguishes training missions from combat operations?**

Yes.

**Are combat operations a part of this agreement?**

No. U.S. participants will not engage in combat, without prejudice to their right of self-defense.

If confirmed as Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command, do you anticipate taking any additional steps to minimize the likelihood that U.S. troops become drawn into combat, including as part of a medical evacuation or search and
rescue mission, with the Abu Sayyef Group or other terrorist or insurgency groups operating in Mindanao?

Our commanders in the Philippines and the intelligence community are continually assessing the threat to our troops, and if I am confirmed, my first trip will include a personal review of our counter-terror effort in the Philippines.

Will you ensure that Congress is informed in a timely fashion of any changes to the training mission (from battalion to lower echelons) or to the rules of engagement?

Yes.

Indonesia

Do you believe that we should resume military-to-military engagement with Indonesia?

The Armed Forces of Indonesia (TNI) is important to the stability, unity and future of Indonesia as it transitions toward democracy. In turn, Indonesia’s continued democratic development is important to U.S. interests in combating terrorism and the security and stability of Southeast Asia. In that sense, it would benefit our interests to interact with the generation of TNI officers so important to Indonesia’s future.

How would you balance our interest in developing closer ties with the government of Indonesia with concerns about past and future human rights abuses by the Indonesian military?

Clearly our military-to-military contacts with the TNI must be in accordance with our laws. Pacific Command activities like senior officer visits, subject matter information exchanges, and the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise phase that focuses on humanitarian assistance and anti-piracy is a start. The new Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program may be another way to an effective balance. If confirmed, I will examine these means carefully and give my best advice to the Secretary and the Chairman and will continue to explore the possibilities with the Congress.

Is the Indonesian Government fully cooperating with the United States in the global war on terrorism?

Indonesia has condemned terrorism and has approved overflight rights for U.S. aircraft supporting the war on terror. However, Indonesia has not aggressively investigated those domestic elements that are sympathetic to the objectives of Al Qaida.

Incidents at Sea Treaty
In light of the problems encountered during the EP-3 incident with China last year, would you recommend that we pursue with China an agreement to cover operations of ships and aircraft similar to the Incidents at Sea Agreement with the Soviet Union?

See below.

In your view, has the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement been useful in resolving such issues?

Unlike the U.S./USSR situation in 1972, the U.S. already has the 1998 Military Maritime Consultative Agreement with China, which established a forum for promoting safe maritime practices, communication procedures when ships encounter each other, and ways to avoid accidents at sea. This bilateral agreement provides an existing, functioning framework for reaching common understandings on the international legal principles governing the operations of maritime and air forces. I think the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement with China can work as a vehicle for the two militaries to discuss and promote issues relating to safety and navigation at sea and in the air without adding an INCSEA-type agreement between the U.S. and China.

Unified Command Plan

As you know, the Department of Defense is currently reviewing the Unified Command Plan and considering recommending the establishment of a “Homeland CINC.”

Please share with the committee your views with regards to the proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan.

It is an important step for our future. I support the creation of the proposed Northern Command and its assignment as the Commander for homeland defense planning and consequence management. Additionally, the refinement of the Joint Forces Command mission of joint transformation, experimentation and integration will be important to the continued development of our joint capability for the future. Lastly, the assignment of all countries to the regional unified commanders helps clarify our security cooperation efforts.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.