Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the FY 2003 President’s budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) with a focus on our weapons work and the budget needed to ensure that we can meet our commitment to provide the nation with a safe, secure and reliable stockpile. The FY 2003 NNSA budget request for defense programs weapons activities totals $5.11 billion, representing an increase of $305 million over the FY 2002 enacted appropriation, which includes $25 million supplemental appropriation for Secure Transportation Asset. I would like to begin my testimony here today by setting a policy framework and discussing the issues faced by NNSA.

Transforming the National Security Strategy

President Bush is transforming U.S. national security strategy to meet the threats of the 21st century. The NNSA is intimately involved in the formulation of the Administration strategy through participation in the Strategic Review and Nuclear Posture Review. We responded swiftly and comprehensively to the terrorist events of September 11th, protecting our valuable national security assets and employees, and offering our unique capabilities to the national response. We have contributed directly to the Homeland Security needs of Governor Ridge with our technology and scientific staff. Work such as this will extend into FY 2003 and beyond.

While the policies and priorities established by the President, the Secretary, and the Congress will determine the scope of our work over the years to come, nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of our national defense strategy. The NNSA will make significant contributions to the Administration’s new capabilities-based national security strategy that requires us to maintain our military advantages in key areas while developing new capabilities.

The NNSA faces major challenges during the next five-year period in responding to evolving customer requirements while maintaining and improving the health of the nation’s national security enterprise. The expanded focus on international terrorism following the September 11th attacks underscores the importance of maintaining a strong capability in the science and technology of national security.

NNSA’s ability to perform its national security functions depends upon revitalizing our scientific and engineering expertise to ensure the reliability, safety, and security of the Nation’s nuclear weapons. Much of the physical and intellectual infrastructure of the national security enterprise was built during the era of underground nuclear testing, and has eroded to the point that we are no longer able to perform some essential tasks. It is imperative that we address these issues during the upcoming five-year period. NNSA’s program and budget planning emphasizes
maintaining an adequate workforce of scientific, technical and business skills, and building a 
diverse, multi-talented leadership. We must be able to recruit, train, and develop highly skilled 
employees throughout our organizations in a highly competitive employment environment. We 
must implement our plans to renew the physical infrastructure to ensure adequate capability and 
capacity, as well as compliance with environment, safety, health and security standards.

Another key element to NNSA’s ability to perform its national security functions is an 
organizational plan to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency. On February 25th NNSA 
submitted its “Report to Congress on the Organization and Operations of the NNSA” describing 
our accomplishments to date and our strategy for operating an integrated national security 
enterprise.

Budget Summary

By way of summary, the NNSA FY 2003 request supports the recommendations from the 
Nuclear Posture Review to assure the continued safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile 
without underground nuclear testing, develop a stockpile surveillance engineering base, refurbish 
and extend the lives of selected warheads, and maintain the science and technology base needed to 
support nuclear weapons. The request protects the operational readiness of the nuclear weapons 
stockpile through surveillance, experiments, and simulations for individual weapons and weapon 
systems, and investment in advanced scientific and manufacturing for the future.

The President’s FY 2003 budget request for Defense Programs was developed based on two 
primary resource drivers. First, the strategic reviews of national security-related activities 
conducted this past year. The NNSA actively participated in the President’s Strategic Review of 
deterrence and missile defense policy and was a key participant in the Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) which lays out the direction for this nation’s nuclear forces over the next five to ten years. 
These reviews reaffirmed NNSA’s stockpile refurbishments and the need for a robust, responsive 
research and development and industrial base of which the nuclear weapons enterprise is a key 
element. The NNSA Laboratories are on the cutting edge of technology and have a vital national 
security role to play in combating terrorism. The other is the President’s Management Initiatives 
on the human capital management and competitive sourcing initiatives which serve to focus our 
FY 2003 activities, particularly in the NNSA restructuring of the headquarters and field offices 
and in the Federal Program Direction budget. Recruitment, retention, and skill mix are critical to 
NNSA’s success in the future and are key to our plans for re-engineering the workforce.

Stockpile Stewardship

In spite of the many challenges we are facing, the NNSA has continued to meet the core Stockpile 
Stewardship mission – that is, to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear 
stockpile to meet national security requirements.

As I stated earlier, the NNSA actively participated in the strategic reviews of national-security
related activities conducted by the Administration. Participation by NNSA ensured that the choices, plans, and requirements being developed were within the realm of the technical and production capabilities of the NNSA. It also increased the awareness of our issues and technical capabilities within the Administration’s national security senior management team.

While there are many important points and conclusions in the NPR including the goals to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 by calendar year 2012 and the maintenance of a “responsive force” for use as a hedge against unforeseen problems, several points are of particular relevance to the NNSA.

First, **nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, remain a key element** of U.S. national security strategy. The NPR reaffirms that NNSA’s science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program is necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. This includes surveillance of our aging weapons, weapon refurbishment, chemistry and metallurgy of materials aging, detailed understanding of weapons physics, reestablishment of warhead advanced concepts teams, and development of additional diagnostic and predictive tools for long-term stewardship. The NPR revalidated the stockpile refurbishment plan previously developed and approved by the NNSA and the Department of Defense. The FY 2003 budget request for Directed Stockpile Work is $1.2 billion, an increase of $190 million, or about 18 percent over last year. Principally, this increase allows us to support life extension activities for the W80, W76, and B61 warheads, including supporting research and development and additional hydrodynamic testing for assessment and certification. Also, $2.1 billion is requested for the 16 scientific and engineering campaigns that provide the knowledge, technologies and capabilities to address current and future stockpile issues.

Second, more than any previous review, the NPR’s concept of a New Triad emphasizes the importance of a **robust, responsive research and development and industrial base**. This calls for a modernized nuclear weapons complex, including contingency planning for a Modern Pit Facility, which would provide the nation with the means to respond to new, unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner. The FY 2003 budget request supports our industrial base through: a request of $1.7 billion for Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, a 10 percent increase supporting the operations of weapons complex facilities. In addition, the NNSA has requested $243 million for the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization program to continue this important multi-year initiative into its third year. This program is managed by Mr. Ralph Erickson who serves as the Associate Administrator for Facilities and Operations.

Third, a study examining the aspects of **reducing test readiness lead time** below the existing 24 to 36 month requirement for a fully diagnosed test. The NPR states that the lead time needs to be shortened out of prudence, not because there is a current need to test. In FY 2002, the NNSA and the DoD will study the optimum test readiness time that best supports the new triad, as directed by the NPR. Pending the outcome of the study, the FY 2003 request includes $15 million for Enhanced Test Readiness activities at the Nevada Test Site.

It is NNSA’s judgment, at this time, that a resumption of underground nuclear testing is
unnecessary, because Stockpile Stewardship is working and is on track to deliver scientific tools needed for certification into the future. Since the end of underground testing, the U.S. successfully certified the B61-11 and has re-certified several warheads with components that have been modified, replaced, or in some cases redesigned. A number of problems uncovered by the surveillance program have been solved without recourse to nuclear testing.

The NPR calls for increased emphasis on the reducing the time required for a nuclear test, if directed by the President at some future date. This may call for NNSA contractors to recruit and train new staff to become skilled to support fielding and performing nuclear experiments and or tests. Additionally, NNSA would acquire specific long-lead-time equipment needed for testing, such as field-test neutron generators and certain test diagnostic equipment. Another important aspect of enhancing test readiness is to revise testing procedures to make them compliant with current safety and environmental regulations. Finally, high-fidelity field exercises would be conducted to demonstrate the ability to field a nuclear test.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the number, composition, and character of the nation’s nuclear forces ought to reflect the reality that the Cold War is over and that required capabilities may now need to be different. For example, current weapons in the stockpile cannot hold at risk a growing category of potential targets deeply buried in tunnel facilities, possibly containing chemical, biological, nuclear, or command and control facilities. As a result the NPR endorsed NNSA’s Advanced Concepts Initiative that could provide the Nation with options that could be considered for future production and deployment. Also, as required by the NPR, it would provide an opportunity for NNSA and its contractors to exercise critical skills necessary for the long-term sustainment of the nation’s defense.

By direction of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and in response to an Air Force requirement, the initial focus of the Advanced Concepts Program will be the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), for which $15.5 million is requested in FY 2003 as part of the Directed Stockpile Research and Development activity. The three-year RNEP Feasibility Study will assess the feasibility of modifying one of two candidate nuclear weapons currently in the stockpile to provide enhanced penetration capability into hard rock geologies and develop out-year costs for the subsequent production phases, if a decision is made by the Nuclear Weapons Council to proceed. This work complies with existing legislation, including section 3136 of the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act. The FY 2003 budget contains no other funds for Phase 6.X advanced concept study activities.

Finally, the NPR calls for a stable, adequately funded Future-Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP). The NNSA’s costs will not be reduced in the immediate future as a result of NPR, since near-term costs are driven by restoring production capabilities and revitalizing the infrastructure, not by the number of warheads in the stockpile or even the number to be refurbished. However, we do expect that cost savings from refurbishment of a smaller number of weapons will be realized beginning about FY 2010. Also, workload analysis shows that the NNSA enterprise’s capacity will be stretched, approaching maximum capacity while our systems
are on the process line for refurbishment, thereby limiting our ability to dismantle significant numbers of weapons over the next ten years. The FYNSP for the NNSA was provided to the Congress on March 26, 2002.

A less obvious, but significant result of the NPR is the improved cooperation and coordination between the NNSA and DoD. The Nuclear Weapons Council is working, policy levels between the agencies are effective, and the DoD has offered strong support for needed programs in NNSA.

I would now like to turn to several specific programs that make up the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The success of these programs will be central to our ability to continue to support and certify the stockpile in the years to come.

**Stockpile Life Extension Program (LEP)**

Our most important responsibility is to deliver on our commitments to our customer, the Department of Defense. The NNSA have a validated requirement from the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) to extend the service life of the W87, W76, W80, and B61. This requirement was revalidated by the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review. The life extension work will involve the entire weapons complex. The Kansas City Plant will manufacture the nonnuclear components; Y-12 National Security Complex will refurbish the secondaries; Savannah River Tritium Facility will supply the gas transfer systems; Sandia National Laboratory will produce the neutron generators and certify all non nuclear components. Pantex Plant will serve as the central point for all assembly and disassembly operations in support of the refurbishment work. Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore will continue to certify the nuclear package.

**W87**

The life extension program on the W87 warhead was authorized by the NWC in FY 1994. The program achieved First Production Unit (FPU) in the second quarter of FY 1999. The ongoing work at Pantex enhances the structural rigidity of the warhead and is increasing the service life by 30 years. The warhead will be mated to the Minuteman III missile following deactivation of the Peacekeeper missile. The NWC accepted the refurbished W87 as a standard stockpile item in the first quarter of FY 2002. NNSA has completed work on over half of the W87 inventory and the remaining W87 stockpile will be refurbished by the first quarter of FY 2004.

**W76**

The NWC approved the Block 1 refurbishment plan for the W76 in March 2000. The Block 1 refurbishment of the warhead (about one quarter of all W76 warheads) will focus on the high explosive, detonators, organic materials, cables and addition of a new Acorn gas transfer system. The Block 1 refurbishment will also add a new arming firing and fusing (AF&F) system. The FPU of Block 1 will be available by the end of FY 2007, and Block 1 production is planned for
completion in FY 2012. During the Block 1 production, a decision will be made to either continue Block 1 retrofits on the entire W76 stockpile, change to a Block 2 retrofit that could include other options, or stop the retrofit altogether. The Block 2 effort, if approved by the NWC, would continue from FY 2012 to FY 2022 to refurbish the remaining W76 warheads.

**W80**

The NWC approved the refurbishment of the W80 in the beginning of FY 2001. The Block 1 refurbishment of the warhead (about one third of the warheads in the stockpile) will focus on replacing the current gas transfer system with an Acorn design, new neutron generators, redesign of the warhead electrical system, addition of improved surety features and replacement of other associated components. The need to perform refurbishment work is driven by several factors including: age related effects that must be addressed to ensure the continued performance of the warhead, minimizing weapon movements between DoD and DOE, and infrastructure and capacities issues within the weapons complex. The FPU of the Block 1 design will be available in the second quarter of FY 2006, and Block 1 production is scheduled for completion in FY 2010. During the Block 1 production, a decision will be made to either continue Block 1 retrofits on the entire W80 stockpile, change to a Block 2 retrofit that could include enhanced surety options, or stop the retrofit altogether. The Block 2 effort, if approved by the NWC, would continue from FY 2011 to FY 2017 to refurbish the remaining W80 warheads.

**B61-7/11**

NNSA and DoD are working to identify refurbishment options for the aging B61-7/11 Canned Subassembly (CSA) and associated cables, connectors, some limited life components, and foam components. The study effort is expected to be completed in late FY 2002. Development Engineering will begin following Nuclear Weapons Council approval in late FY 2002. This program will use systems engineering approaches, and the planned FPU of the refurbished B61-7/11 will be in the third quarter of FY 2006. Production of these refurbished CSAs is scheduled to continue to the end of FY 2008. The plan also calls for some selective non-destructive evaluation (NDE) and screening of CSAs as a risk mitigation effort for other warheads during FY 2003 and FY 2004.

I would like to note that, for the first time in a number of years, weapons systems cost data is included in the FY 2003 budget request, as requested in the conference report accompanying the FY 2002 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (107-66). The weapons systems cost data for FY 2003 are provided in the Directed Stockpile Work section of the budget. In addition, we have resumed reporting for nuclear weapons acquisition costs for weapons systems in Phase 6.3 and beyond (W87, W76, and W80 Life Extension Programs) in a separate, classified document.
Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign

The reestablishment of a plutonium pit manufacturing capability, a capability that the United States has not had since the cessation of manufacturing at the Rocky Flats Plant in 1989, is a key national security challenge that the NNSA must meet. The W88 pit is a primary focus of NNSA’s pit campaign because an insufficient numbers of W88 pits were produced to support pit surveillance activities prior to the closure of Rocky Flats.

The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign is focused on the near-term development of manufacturing processes at Los Alamos and a certification methodology applicable to the W88 pit, with a long range goal of reestablishing the capability to manufacture all pit types within the stockpile. The program remains on track to deliver a certifiable W88 pit in FY 2003. Over the last year Headquarters and Los Alamos staffs have worked aggressively and have been able to accelerate the date for a certified pit to FY 2007. The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign budget request for FY 2003 is $194 million.

Program Accomplishments in FY 2001 include:

- Accelerated the certification date for a manufactured W88 war reserve pit from FY 2009 to FY 2007.
- Manufactured three development and three standard W88 pits in FY 2001; one of the development pits was completed more than a year ahead of schedule.
- Projectized W88 activities are on-track, with all major milestones for FY 2001 accomplished.
- Reorganized W88 Pit Manufacturing and Certification Activity at Los Alamos to increase management attention and resources on the project.
- Provided documentation required to support an FY 2002 decision on Mission Need for a Modern Pit Facility.

The FY 2003 budget will allow the program to:

- Manufacture a development pit and the first certifiable pit in FY 2003.
- Conduct two integrated physics tests and pit engineering tests in FY 2003.
- Establish production controls and quality infrastructure in FY 2003 to support the manufacture of the first certifiable pit in FY 2003.
- Establish and implement a peer process that includes at least one technical data exchange between Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in FY 2003.

While the Los Alamos facility (TA-55) for making W88 pits is adequate for the task at hand, it lacks the capacity and flexibility to manufacture pits in sufficient quantity to support the NPR requirements. Therefore, the NNSA is working on a longer term solution for a modern pit manufacturing facility. A project team is in place and has undertaken the required preconceptual planning work. During this phase we will carefully examine a number of issues, including technology development to ensure that the facility will meet both current and future requirements.
NNSA’s next decision point for the Modern Pit Facility will be later this spring when we will decide on whether to proceed with conceptual design.

**Tritium Campaign**

In addition to restoring the Nation’s ability to manufacture plutonium pits, the NNSA is proceeding with plans for producing new tritium to support the stockpile. Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen which decays at a rate of about 5 percent per year. All weapons in the stockpile must have tritium to function as designed. The United States has not manufactured new tritium since 1988 and has been relying on recycled tritium from retired weapons to meet stockpile requirements. To manufacture new tritium, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) will be irradiating tritium producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARS) in the Watts Bar and Sequoyah 2 reactors. Irradiation of the TPBARS remains on schedule for the fall of 2003. The rods will remain in the reactors throughout the plants’ normal 18-month operating cycles. The FY 2003 request for the tritium campaign totals $126.2 million.

In order to irradiate tritium-producing rods, the TVA reactors must have approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The TVA submitted formal requests in August-September 2001 asking that the reactors’ operating licenses be amended to permit tritium production. In December 2001 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a Federal Register notice proposing to issue a “no significant hazards consideration determination”, which means that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can issue the license amendments without first holding hearings. We expect that the Commission will issue the license amendments by this fall.

While the recent Nuclear Posture Review reduces the number of active, deployed nuclear weapons, it also requires that NNSA support a responsive reserve of warheads. This support would include maintenance of tritium inventories for the reserve. When all these factors are considered, the impact is small on the date when new tritium will be needed.

While the civil/structural portion of the Tritium Extraction Facility is well along, it is several months behind schedule. In addition, the bids on the Rest-of-Plant (installation of all the equipment) contract came in well above the baseline estimate. As a result of these and other factors, NNSA is currently reviewing and revising the cost and schedule baselines for the facility. We expect to be coming to the Congress with a reprogramming letter following the completion of these cost and schedule reviews. We have asked the Department’s Inspector General to review this program and ensure that we have taken all the necessary corrective actions to get this program back on track. We are still aiming for its completion in FY 2006.

**Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign**

The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) campaign is developing the simulation capabilities, based on advanced weapon codes and high-performance computing, that incorporate high-fidelity scientific models validated against experimental results, past tests, and theory. The
FY 2003 budget request for the ASCI Campaign is $725 million, which includes $55 million for line-item construction projects at LLNL and SNL. This is an increase of $8 million from FY 2002.

The long term ASCI objective is to provide the validated three-dimensional, high-fidelity physics, full system simulation codes required for engineering, safety, and performance analysis of the stockpile and to develop the computing resources with sufficient power (speed, memory and storage capacity) to support stockpile analyses.

The schedule for developing three-dimensional weapons simulation capabilities is tightly integrated with the certification of the refurbished W87, W76, W80 and B61 warheads. Requirements for predictive weapons simulations determine the acquisition strategy for increased computing capability and capacity. University partnerships have also been developed through five Alliance Centers at leading research universities.

Program Accomplishments in FY 2001 include:

• Three dimensional simulations of key mechanical responses of a re-entry vehicle system to normal flight environments, and of the performance of a full weapons system. Being able to simulate a complete weapon system allows laboratory researchers to examine key physics issues through a combination of simulation, precision experiments, and analysis of data from past nuclear tests. These codes are playing a major role in the plans for the remanufacture of the W76 AF&F.

• Completion of the Strategic Computing Complex at Los Alamos National Laboratory in December 2001 provides the facilities necessary to accommodate the 30-teraOPS Q supercomputer. The Q machine is now being delivered to Los Alamos. We expect to have the first portion of the machine running by June 2002 and the full system will be running by the end of the 2002.

• A comprehensive external review of all five Alliance Level 1 Centers was completed in October 2001. Accomplishments include the development of scalable, multi-physics codes, successful advanced degree programs and graduates, as well as world-class science measured through peer-reviewed publications.

The FY 2003 budget will allow the program to:

• Release enhanced ASCI 2-D primary design capability,

• Demonstrate three-dimensional safety simulation of a complex, abnormal explosive-initiation scenario,

• Demonstrate three-dimensional coupled electrical response of a weapon system in hostile (nuclear) environments.
**High-Energy-Density Physics**

The High Energy Density Physics Campaign advances U.S. capabilities to achieve high-energy-density physics (HEDP) conditions, including inertial confinement fusion ignition and thermonuclear burn in a laboratory setting, to support Stockpile Stewardship Program science and engineering requirements. The capability to achieve physical conditions nearing those produced during nuclear weapons detonations, including extremely high temperatures and pressures, is critical for conducting experiments to verify physics theory underlying nuclear weapons design code predictions, to validate advanced computer models being developed for stockpile stewardship, and to more accurately characterize the performance of materials exposed to a nuclear environment.

The FY 2003 budget request for HEDP is $452 million, which includes $215 million for NIF line-item construction and $76 million for NIF Demonstration and Operations. These funds will maintain the NIF project schedule. Because of overall NNSA budget priorities, only $161 million is requested for the HEDP Core Research and Operations account. This is a reduction of $26 million, which will delay the some long-term aspects of the NIF experimental program including progress toward ignition. However, our assessment of program impacts across all budget elements indicates that this is a necessary decision this year.

The program is carried out at the three weapons laboratories as well as the Laboratory for Laser Energetics (LLE) at the University of Rochester, and the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). Existing major facilities for conducting HEDP research are the OMEGA laser at LLE, and the Z pulsed-power facility at SNL, the Trident laser at LANL, and the Nike laser at NRL.

The most important new facility for the HEDP is the National Ignition Facility (NIF), under construction at LLNL. NIF will provide the capability for weapons scientists to undertake experiments to address high-energy and fusion aspects that are important to the primaries and secondaries of nuclear weapons. Several important milestones for the NIF program were met on, or ahead of, schedule, including completion of conventional construction and positioning and seismic tie down of the target chamber. The program remains on track to begin Stewardship experiments in 2004 with 8 beams, and by the time all 192 lasers beams are brought up in 2008, some 1,500 stewardship experiments will have been performed on this important, one-of-a-kind tool.

The FY 2003 budget will allow the program to:

- Operate the NIF Optics Assembly Building
- Demonstrate multiframe backlighting capability on Z,
- Install the NIF target positioner in support of first light to the target chamber center and start of stewardship experiments in FY 2004
- Utilize radiation transport experiments on Z and OMEGA for validation of specific aspects of Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) radiation transport and hydrodynamics

-10-
modeling,
• Demonstrate filling of prototype NIF indirect-drive ignition capsules and quantify key characteristics.

NNSA Organization Standup

NNSA’s organizational objectives are to improve effectiveness and efficiency. We approached the NNSA organization standup by implementing a two-phase plan. The first phase, essentially complete, focused on creating an integrated Headquarters organization, and defining the structural relationship between the Federal elements at Headquarters and the Field locations. The second phase focuses on realigning our field structure and improving efficiencies by eliminating overlaps in responsibilities within the Federal structure and reducing unnecessary administrative burdens placed on those performing the mission.

The recently released report summarizes our first-ever NNSA Strategic Plan, provides a detailed plan for assigning roles and responsibilities between Headquarters and field elements, and discusses our objectives for FY 2002 and beyond. We will eliminate a layer of management and oversight over the nuclear weapons complex by removing the Operations Offices from the NNSA chain of command and converting these offices to service centers that provide support services such as, procurement and human resources. Each of the eight NNSA M&O contractors will report to its respective site offices which will, in turn, report to the Administrator. This locates NNSA support, decision making and oversight close to the contractor, consolidates service functions, and allows staff reductions downstream.

Local contract and project management will rest with each NNSA site office. Integration of weapons production activities will be performed for Headquarters from the Albuquerque, New Mexico NNSA office. Headquarters staff will continue to be responsible for program planning, budgeting, policy development, and management of weapons research and development and nonproliferation activities.

NNSA will launch a systematic re-engineering effort to reduce the number of separate offices and layers of Federal management, reduce the overall number of Federal employees, and identify and correct skills mismatches. Federal staff not performing core functions will be redeployed and retrained as necessary. We intend to use incentives to encourage higher-than-average attrition, career development, and retention of highly skilled employees to right size and reinvigorate our staff.

NNSA has instituted an Administrative Workload Reduction Initiative using comprehensive input from the laboratories and plants, with task forces identifying specific improvements and reducing administrative burdens. As a result, NNSA contractors will be given clearer and more consistent responsibilities and authorities. They will also continue to comply with all environment, safety, and health, and security policies.
When these changes are fully implemented, we will realize the goals set by Congress in establishing the NNSA. By clearly defining roles and responsibilities, we will increase accountability and reduce duplication. By reducing administrative burdens on the NNSA contractors, we will operate more effectively and efficiently.

Conclusion

This concludes my written testimony on the policy framework and issues that shaped the formulation of the unified NNSA budget request for FY 2003. The continuing support of this committee and the entire Congress is essential as this program continues to move forward. Additional information on all aspects of the Stockpile Stewardship program are contained in the FY 2003 budget request, the Future Years National Security Program and the classified Nuclear Weapon Acquisition Reports which have been provided to the Congress. Now, I will be pleased to answer your questions.