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U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: THE VIEW FROM PACIFIC COMMAND

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2002

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James A. Leach [Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific] presiding.

Mr. LEACH. On behalf of my colleagues, I would like to warmly welcome Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, to this joint hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, as well as the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.

We deeply appreciate the cooperation of the Admiral and his staff for agreeing to appear before us today and for expediting review of the U.S. Pacific Command's fiscal 2003 posture statement, which forms a basis for the Admiral's testimony.

The purpose of today’s hearing is to review the priorities and challenges for U.S. security policy in Asia and the Pacific as assessed by America’s ranking military commander in the region. As Members are aware, the Asia-Pacific region is looming larger in our national security policy. The reasons are self-evident. The U.S. has fought three wars in Asia over the past century, and great powers and aspiring great powers, each with substantial increasingly sophisticated military establishments, rub shoulders there.

In this context, it is widely appreciated throughout the region that the U.S. bilateral treaties and security partnerships, backed by capable forward stationed and deployed Armed Forces, remain essential for deterring aggression and promoting peaceful development in the region.

Having said that, the threat of international terrorism now confronts the United States with a unique foreign policy and national security challenge. We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge the sacrifice of so many young American men and women serving with the Pacific Command and elsewhere around the world who are doing so much in so many ways to provide for our security.

Likewise, as Admiral Blair knows as much as anybody, success in the campaign against terrorism crucially depends on the intensity of an ongoing multilateral cooperation between the United States and a broad coalition of other countries. Here it should be
noted that America is deeply appreciative of all the assistance we have received from so many in the Asian region.

In the wake of our engagement in Afghanistan and the deployment to the Philippines, some are asking what comes next, particularly in Southeast Asia. In this regard, one has the sense here in Washington that we are wrestling with novel and awkward judgement calls that have yet to be explicitly articulated in a public setting, although there are some historical parallels. That is what happens when we are dealing with an imperfect government, or, let us put it little bit different, in an imperfect movement in an imperfect society.

Should the U.S. be actively involved in military intervention either in conjunction with that government or preemptively based on compelling exigencies, or are U.S. interests better served, generally speaking, emphasizing appropriate intelligence in law enforcement cooperation coupled more broadly with economic and cultural engagement?

Obviously it is not always an either/or, and one has to reserve flexibility for differentiating judgements. I raise this philosophical perspective because this hearing affords the Committee a unique opportunity to engage the same kind of wide range of exceptionally important issues touching on U.S. interest in Asia and the Pacific.

Before turning to my colleague if he has any opening comments, let me also just say personally that it has been my experience that the most professional people engaged in foreign policy in Asia have been over a long period of time the United States Navy. Admiral Blair symbolizes with his command the best that the Navy offers. We are very appreciative of his testimony today.

Mr. Issa?

Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very, very briefly, Admiral, I just want to note that when we were together in August for a briefing on the risk and the readiness you did not tell us what we wanted to hear. You told us what we needed to hear.

The events of 9–11 and the activities afterwards have certainly borne out the areas in which you were ready and able to react extremely well and some of the challenges that you faced from a logistics standpoint and from past indiscretions perhaps by us of not fully funding some of your needs.

I look forward to hearing what you have added to the list as a result of 9–11 and the world as it has changed and commend you on your foresight in August to tell us a lot of what I am sure we are going to still need to work on today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Leach. Admiral Blair?

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS C. BLAIR, U.S. NAVY, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral Blair. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Issa, the men and women of the Pacific Command have been busy this past year. The USS Carl Vinson carrier battle group from San Diego actually reported into the U.S. Central Command on the 11th of September, 2001.

The USS Kitty Hawk and the John C. Stennis battle groups, patrol aircraft, the USS Peleliu amphibious ready group with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and later the USS Bonhomme
Richard amphibious ready group with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked, quickly joined this force. Air Force bombers deployed across the Pacific to the Pacific Command base in Diego Garcia from which they conducted combat sorties. Reserve Components rapidly mobilized to augment our forces throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

Our allies, together with a broad range of regional security partners, quickly offered over flight rights and the use of facilities for Operation Enduring Freedom, and several countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Korea, and in a very new way Japan, provided forces which assisted us either in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the theater.

Now, our mission in the Pacific in support of the international effort against terrorism is to eliminate al-Qaeda and its support in the Asia-Pacific region, and then we want to make it a very inhospitable region for any terrorists seeking a new home. We have reorganized our staff to take on this mission. We have created links with U.S. Government agencies and foreign counterparts.

This gets to the point that the Chairman was making. We are working to pursue this campaign effectively and relentlessly. We measure our success in terms of elimination of cells, but also in terms of attacks that do not take place like those that were planned for last December in Singapore.

Looking around my region of the world, I do not see any Afghans. However, we do have groups that are willing to support al-Qaeda, and we have areas of lawlessness where terrorists can operate. The key to success against terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region is relentless pursuit of terrorists and unprecedented cooperation both within our government and among governments of the Asia-Pacific region.

We have had some initial successes. Malaysia had eliminated a militant cell that targeted U.S. forces before September 11, and since then arrests in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines have eliminated other parts of this network, which were cooperating with al-Qaeda.

On the military front, we are providing advice, training and some material assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines in their efforts to eliminate the Abu Sayyaf Group, which holds two American missionaries as hostages and also has links to al-Qaeda.

Our joint task force there is the largest U.S. operation which is currently ongoing in the Pacific region. These operations, although they are assistance and support, are inherently dangerous. Last Thursday, we lost eight soldiers and two airmen in a crash of a helicopter which was supporting this effort.

Overall, I can say that the U.S. Pacific Command's forces have never been more ready, and I want to thank all the Members of Congress for the support for the men and women of the Armed Forces in recent years. Thank you for the largest pay raise in the last two decades, which is continuing to decrease the pay gap between the Armed Forces and the private sector. You have let our people know that you care. We need to keep this trend moving by working on other financial stress points that affect particularly our families.
We do require continued sustained funding for operations and maintenance especially of selected forces which we “rode hard and put away wet” over the last several months here. I am talking about Navy and Marine forces, Special Operations Forces, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance forces, airlift and certain other selected units.

We also require replenishment of ammunition stocks, especially of precision munitions. Our global war on terrorism is going to be long and sustained, and to conduct that campaign we need to keep up our force protection, improvements to our bases, and we need to have more people.

Reserve components have stepped in and performed superbly, but over time there are about 5,000 additional billets which we need to address the full range of anti-terrorism, protecting our forces, going against terrorism throughout the Pacific Command area of responsibility (AOR).

Since this campaign will continue for a long time, we have to look at the tradeoffs between the use of the mobilized Reserve forces, which we have relied on here in the short term, and the combination of active forces and technology in order to do these jobs.

Theater Security Cooperation, both with our allies and with partners, has never been more important. In this world that we face after the 11th of September, new initiatives like the regional defense fellowship program will allow us to extend cooperation to Armed Forces, such as Indonesia’s Armed Forces, that are essential to defeating international terrorism over the long term and promoting security and peaceful development.

Sustained interaction with the Armed Forces of the region improves the readiness for coalition operations against our common enemy, and it also provides the use of facilities and forces which is of use to the United States which helps the United States when shared interests are at stake.

Now, I have spent most of my opening remarks here talking about combating terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region, yet extremely critical defense and policy questions that we were dealing with before the 11th of September. We have kept our day jobs at the Pacific Command.

The Taiwan Strait military balance and the rhetoric across the strait, North Korea that has been continuing to starve its population while selling missiles, and continued tensions between nuclear neighbors, India and Pakistan. These problems still keep me awake at night, and they keep my forces extremely busy maintaining deterrence and keeping up their readiness and promoting theater security cooperation.

In general, it seems to me that cooperation which has come from this war on terrorism has improved these situations in the Pacific Region. They have shown the nations of the region that we have more in common. They have caused unprecedented cooperation across the Pacific. We are looking for opportunities for security and peaceful development in our part of the world, not simply reacting to threats.
Mr. Chairman, it is good to have a chance to appear before this Committee, which plays such an important role in Asia-Pacific relations. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Blair follows:]
resources. We appreciate the many military contributions of our allies and regional partners, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty immediately following 11 September for the first time in the 50-year history of this treaty. In addition to its ongoing naval contribution to Maritime Interdiction Operations supporting UN Security Council Resolutions against Iraq, Australia provided additional ships to the Arabian Gulf and aircraft to Diego Garcia. Australia was one of our first allies to deploy ground troops to Afghanistan. New Zealand has provided a contingent of its Special Air Service for operations as well.

The Government of Japan has implemented major policy and legislative changes to allow Japan to provide force protection and logistical support to U.S. installations in Japan. The Japan Air Self Defense Force has flown relief missions to Pakistan and lift missions for our forces in the USPACOM AOR. For the first time since World War II, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force is at sea far from Japanese waters, providing fuel and other support to coalition naval forces.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is providing air and naval logistic support to OEF. Several other countries have given overflight rights and seaport and airport access to our aircraft and ships.

The bottom line is that our previous bilateral and regional cooperation with the countries of the APR has paid off in valuable cooperation with regard to the war on terrorism.

**Antiterrorism Efforts—Defense**

USPACOM’s Force Protection Program has effectively protected our armed forces and supported civilian authorities throughout the Asia-Pacific region since the 11 September terrorist attacks. We activated Joint Rear Area Coordinators (JRACs) to counter the threat and accelerated the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program.

JRACs integrate the defensive measures by all the military units in the same location—Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Japan and Korea. In addition, they coordinate Department of Defense (DoD) efforts with federal, state, and local agencies. JRACs have written and exercised plans and are fielding the Area Security Operations Command and Control (ASOCC) system. Over the past year, we have made significant progress identifying and protecting critical infrastructure by making CIP part of all major exercises and using JRACs to protect critical assets. We are also accelerating the fielding of the Pacific Mobile Emergency Radio System in Hawaii and Alaska to improve coordination efforts between civilian authorities and their JRAC counterparts. USPACOM’s JRACs and CIP program are widely recognized as the model for interagency coordination, combined scenario-based training events, and unprecedented cooperation and information sharing.

Following the attack on the USS Cole, USPACOM began a full reassessment of vulnerabilities at foreign ports we visit. We have established plans and increased deployable security measures at all these ports. To date, we have completed 25 force protection memoranda of agreement (MOA) with U.S. embassies, including MOAs with embassies in India, Russia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and China. These agreements clearly delineate U.S. responsibilities for all our military forces in Asia-Pacific countries.

A major challenge is to sustain these intense efforts over the long-term. Substantial resources are required to maintain higher Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) that will be a way of life for many years to come.

As long as we are engaged around the world, terrorists will look for soft spots for further attacks. On every deployment, every exercise and especially now at home stations, force protection is an essential mission.

**Counter-terrorism—Offense**

USPACOM forces—USS Kitty Hawk, John C. Stennis, and Carl Vinson battle groups, patrol aircraft, and USS PELELIU Amphibious Ready Group with the 15th and 13th Marine Expeditionary Units—played major roles in the successful Afghanistan campaigns. At the same time, we have gone on the offensive in the Pacific region.

We have already deployed personnel to U.S. embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and India to better integrate our operations with interagency country teams. We have established a Directorate for Counter-Terrorism to fuse all sources of intelligence, to plan and coordinate operations, and to begin true interagency integration across the region. We have sent equipment and an assistance team to the Philippines. Our Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) has rapidly improved its support to the counter-terrorism mission. Analytical depth and breadth
of the terrorism threat in the AOR has significantly improved, with increased collection, analysis, and reporting in this area.

To build coalition support for our offensive efforts since 11 September, I have visited the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Singapore, Japan and Korea, and met with each country’s U.S. ambassador, and key senior government and military leaders to discuss our intentions, and how their support can help. The response to our plan has been positive, and we are building capability to act with other countries against terrorism.

We continue to foster interagency participation in our planning and operations. While our counter-terrorism cell includes a Joint Interagency Coordination Group to seamlessly interconnect with the national architecture as it is established, a Joint Interagency Task Force with direct tasking authority that transcends agency stovepipes would be a more effective organization.

USPACOM Requirements for the War against Terrorism

Manpower

Legislation mandating a 15 percent headquarters manpower reduction over 3 years was passed before 11 September. As we launched the war on terrorism, we brought additional Reserve Component (RC) personnel on board to handle the increased workload. On 12 October 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense waived the FY01 10 percent headquarters manpower reduction. As long as the war on terrorism continues, there will be more requirements for intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and planning officers on USPACOM combatant headquarters staffs.

The war on terrorism has created new manpower requirements. Over 5,000 additional billets are needed to address the full range of force protection, antiterrorism, and counter-terrorism missions throughout USPACOM. Examples of additional manpower requirements include increased shore and harbor security patrols in response to enhanced Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs), additional teams to assess security of foreign ports and airfields we visit, and around-the-clock manning of JRACs and crisis action teams. We are working to address these manning and management challenges from within existing endstrength levels.

Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CBT RIF)

Funding obtained through CBT RIF continues to play a major role in addressing emergent requirements. This initiative provides the geographic CINCs additional avenues for resourcing against emerging threats. Some examples of USPACOM funded CBT RIF projects include weapons/metal detectors and explosive vapor detectors for Marine Corps Base Okinawa and blast mitigation windows for Yongsan Base in Korea. USPACOM received $3.95 million in CBT RIF funding in FY01. USPACOM received nearly $3.9 million more in the first allocation of FY02 funding, including $850,000 for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). However, USPACOM still has over 1,070 unfunded Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP) projects totaling nearly $1.5 billion to achieve full compliance with current standards. Service funding will meet some of these requirements, but the CBT RIF program fills the gaps.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

FMF is an essential tool for our allies and partners to improve their capabilities against international terrorist groups and their supporters. A detailed discussion of FMF funding requirements, with particular emphasis on FMF for the Philippines, is included at pages 34–35.

OTHER REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Australia

Australia remains America’s oldest ally in the Asia-Pacific region. Last year we celebrated the 50th anniversary of our defense treaty. Australia’s steadfast support has been a key facet of our counter-terrorism campaign in the Asia-Pacific region. Australian armed forces remain in the lead role in East Timor and in the shaping of East Timor’s new defense force. In addition, Australia maintains an important presence in Papua New Guinea, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, ensuring peace and security in these problematic areas. The Australian government has been active in promoting the return of democracy in Fiji and security and peaceful development throughout the archipelagic states of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Our relationship with Australia is mature and as strong as it has ever been. USPACOM works hard through bilateral and multilateral fora to keep the ANZUS Treaty relationship with Australia healthy and looking forward. We are currently conducting a strategic top-down interoperability study with Australia’s armed forces.
It will return great long-term dividends in acquisition, information technology, operations, research and development, and further strengthening the relationship with this trusted ally.

Japan

Japan hosts nearly 41,000 U.S. armed forces personnel and 14,000 additional sailors afloat with the Seventh Fleet. It contributes $4.57 billion in host-nation support, the most of any U.S. ally. These forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces are key to the U.S. commitment to defend American interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia and fundamental to regional security and peaceful development.

Over the past year, Japan and the United States have made steady progress in strengthening our alliance. We signed the first bilateral defense plan under the 1997 revised Defense Guidelines. It incorporates additional Japanese support for U.S. operations, and opens new areas for defense cooperation.

After 11 September, Japan passed historic legislation to assist U.S. combat operations. For the first time since World War II, Japan sent its Self-Defense Force (JSDF) overseas to support a combat operation and work with other countries in a U.S.-led coalition.

JSDF roles and capabilities are evolving to meet future challenges. In addition to Japan's military contribution in support of OEF, the JSDF will deploy a 700-member engineer battalion to East Timor in March 2002, and will continue to provide a 45-man transportation unit as part of the Golan Heights UN Disengagement Observer Force. The JSDF has also worked closely with USPACOM components in restructuring bilateral exercises to develop skills for humanitarian assistance; search and rescue; non-combatant evacuation; consequence management for chemical, biological and nuclear incidents; and complex contingency operations likely to occur in the future. I am also encouraged by the increased attention the JSDF is giving to cooperating with regional armed forces—the ROK in particular.

We successfully completed the search and recovery effort on the Ehime Maru last October with the recovery of eight out of nine missing crewmembers. The U.S. Navy's intense efforts and our two nations' exceptional cooperation overcame the effects of the tragedy, and even strengthened the ties between our two countries in many areas.

We continue to work to be good neighbors on our bases in Japan. Japan closed the industrial waste incinerator next to the U.S. Naval Air Facility Atsugi, ending an environmental hazard. Because of steady progress made under the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), a relocation site for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has been selected in northern Okinawa, and detailed discussions have begun over the type and scale of the facility.

Japan's timely, meaningful and visible contribution to the campaign against terrorism is a new stage in our alliance relations. This lynchpin relationship is vital for security and peaceful development in Asia.

Republic of Korea (ROK)

Encouraging events on the Korean Peninsula in 2000 appeared to indicate a new era. However, progress stalled last year. Since March 2001, the North has canceled events and refused to meet regularly with the ROK. At the same time, North Korea's "military-first" policy remains. Its training cycles in 2001 were at normal levels, but the ongoing 2002 winter training cycle has featured unusual corps-level activity. North Korea continues to maintain more than 60 percent of its forces within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The North remains a formidable force that we must guard against and deter.

During 2001, the U.S. and the ROK successfully negotiated several important alliance issues. Our military relationship is on a stronger footing every year.

The Special Measures Agreement (SMA), once completed, will significantly increase contributions to the maintenance of U.S. troops on the Peninsula. Under the SMA, the ROK will cover 50 percent of the non-personnel stationing costs for U.S. forces by 2004. The Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has also reached a tentative agreement with the ROK government on a Land Partnership Plan (LPP) that will consolidate U.S. force presence. The plan will reduce the number of major U.S. bases in Korea from 41 to 26 while enhancing training and combined warfighting capability. Commander USFK and the ROK Ministry of National Defense have agreed to review the 1990 agreement to relocate Yongsan Army Garrison, the home of USFK, from its location in downtown Seoul.

We must continue to enhance the quality of life for our troops and their families stationed in Korea. The ROK provides critical Host Nation Funded Construction (HNFC) support. However, HNFC, coupled with the current level of U.S. Military
Construction (MILCON) funding, is inadequate. Many of the facilities, including unaccompanied personnel housing and family housing, are of Korean War vintage. Personnel live in inadequate barracks, apartments, even Quonset huts and “temporary” Vietnam-era buildings that we have maintained at increasing cost as age, infestation, and Pacific weather have taken their toll. The FY03 funding shortfall for facility construction and modernization across Korea is estimated at $315 million. Congressional support of MILCON funding for Korea in the FY01 supplemental and FY02 MILCON Appropriations bills was sorely needed and very appreciated. We seek your continued support for MILCON and sustainment, restoration and maintenance funding as provided in the President’s FY03 budget.

The ROK increasingly contributes to regional security by deploying over 400 troops to the peacekeeping mission in East Timor, in addition to its other peacekeeping commitments in Western Sahara, the Republic of Georgia, Cyprus and the India-Pakistan border region. ROK forces participate in exercises such as RIMPAC (a major, multilateral naval exercise), PACIFIC REACH (a submarine rescue exercise involving naval forces from Japan, Singapore and the United States), and COPE THUNDER (a multilateral air exercise in Alaska). Most recently, the ROK and USCINCPAC co-hosted a Multilateral Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) workshop in Korea. Hosting an exercise with over 20 non-U.S. participants, including Japan, was a significant first for the ROK.

Following the 11 September tragedy, the ROK aggressively supported our efforts to combat terrorism. They have dispatched forces to support Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, currently deploying four C–130 aircraft, a naval tank landing ship (LST) and a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) unit. The ROK has also sent liaison officers to the headquarters of USCINCPAC and Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command to coordinate ROK government support for the Afghan campaign and continuing war. The ROK has worked closely with USFK to fully ensure the highest levels of protection of U.S. forces on the Peninsula. This is in addition to the $45 million pledged for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

By joining the coalition to combat global terrorism and participating in peacekeeping missions and USPACOM’s regional exercises and cooperative initiatives, the ROK plays a very positive role in the region. Although there has been little or no substantive progress toward normalization and reunification of the Peninsula, the United States and the ROK have strengthened our alliance, and the ROK has continued its contribution to regional security.

Philippines

Our relationship with the Republic of the Philippines (RP), a long-time U.S. ally, had major developments last year. The RP continued to be a strong partner in regional security initiatives—hosting various conferences, the annual bilateral BALIKATAN exercise linked to the regional TEAM CHALLENGE exercise, and numerous Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCETs).

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are challenged by budgetary constraints, logistical problems and a lack of adequately trained personnel. These factors hamper the AFP’s ability to deal with internal insurgent groups, like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) that also has ties to al-Qaida and poses a threat to both the United States and the Philippines. President Arroyo has championed Philippine and regional support for the international counter-terrorism campaign. During her November 2001 visit to the United States to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the U.S.-RP Mutual Defense Treaty, she and President Bush agreed that the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States, and the terrorist activities of the ASG (which now holds Filipino and American hostages in the Southern Philippines), underscore the urgency of ensuring that the two countries maintain a robust defense partnership into the 21st century. The two leaders agreed to strengthen the military alliance on a sustained basis, through increased training, exercises, and other joint activities. Finally, they declared that the American and Filipino people stand together in the global campaign against terrorism.

USPACOM has deployed a Joint Task Force (JTF) to the Southern Philippines and has organized a substantial program to improve the maintenance of AFP equipment. The JTF package includes: a training/advisory team of Special Operations ground, naval and air personnel to train the AFP from their Southern Command Headquarters potentially down through company level. Training will focus on effective counter-terrorism campaign planning, intelligence/operations fusion, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil-military operations (CMO) and field tactics. Additionally, civil affairs (CA), maintenance, medical, and other support personnel round out the Special Forces team.

The JTF initial deployment of advisors was approved during implementation planning in January 2002. The recently concluded Terms of Reference (TOR) provided
both governments with the necessary framework for executing our deployment to the Philippines.

The war against the ASG will not be won by military operations alone. Improvements in law enforcement, intelligence, economics, business, information, media, academia, community leadership and religion will have enduring and important roles in the battle. A solid, sustainable socio-economic program by the Government of the Philippines in the affected areas is also essential. USPACOM is working on a civil affairs assessment to support the JTF operation. Our training, assistance, and maintenance package will improve the AFP's CT capabilities. Continued U.S. support to the Philippines through the FMF program is critical to the success of the AFP's campaign against terror.

**Thailand**

Thailand is one of the nations in Asia most committed to building regional approaches to the future challenges of counter-terrorism (CT), counter-drug (CD) interdiction, peacekeeping operations (PKO), humanitarian assistance (HA), and other transnational concerns. The TEAM CHALLENGE multilateral training event to improve multinational capability/interoperability is held in Thailand.

Thailand has taken a leading role in Southeast Asia in support of peacekeeping operations (PKO) by maintaining battalion strength forces in East Timor and again supplying the UN military commander there. Thailand has also sponsored several multilateral PKO seminars. We have supported humanitarian demining in Thailand and are transferring that program to Thailand in FY02. USPACOM continues to respond to Thailand’s request for U.S. assistance to the Royal Thai Army in combating drug traffic across the Burma-Thai border. Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W) is the standing task force for all CD issues in the theater and has the lead in training, equipment, and organizational coordination initiatives to assist the Thais with their CD mission. Full funding of FY02/03 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Thailand is critical to our efforts to help Thailand sustain its CD and PKO over the next 2 years.

Since 11 September, Thailand has coordinated fully with the United States in combating terrorism by supplying access to Thai military facilities, granting overflight permission, making formal public statements of support, and cooperating in information sharing and in investigation of terrorists using Thailand for a transit point and for other support. During a December 2001 trip to Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Thaksin offered the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Thai security contributions to multilateral presence in Afghanistan.

Our effective military-to-military cooperation with Thailand meets the security concerns of both our countries. Our attention to Thai political and military priorities supports our ability to call for access to military facilities. Thailand will continue to be our key ally in Southeast Asia.

**Singapore**

The March 2001 completion of the deep-draft pier at Changi Naval Base, constructed entirely at Singapore’s expense, will support continued U.S. presence in the region for many years to come. USS Kitty Hawk was the first aircraft carrier to berth pierside at Changi. Though not a formal treaty ally, Singapore is a solid security partner in the Asia-Pacific region, a vocal proponent for U.S. access, and strong supporter of U.S. counter-terrorist efforts. Additionally, Singapore supports and hosts many significant multilateral activities. Last year, it hosted Exercise PACIFIC REACH, participated in Exercise COBRA GOLD and numerous anti-piracy regional conferences, and hosted a Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) regional Mine Counter-Mine exercise.

Singapore seeks greater interoperability with the U.S. armed forces. It views high technology and advanced hardware as a deterrent and is increasing its cooperation with the United States in several projects. Singapore participated with Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and is active in other developments such as the Joint Mission Force (JMF) and Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN).

Singapore has worked against terrorist groups in the country who were targeting U.S. interests. Immediately following the 11 September attacks, Singapore was unwavering in its support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, allowing our aircraft to use its airfields and increasing protection to vital shipping in the Strait of Malacca.

Singapore’s arrest of 13 al-Qaida-linked terrorists in December led to additional arrests in Malaysia and the Philippines in January. Information sharing between these countries provided unprecedented insights into the al-Qaida network in the Asia-Pacific region.
Singapore has rapidly matured into a solid regional partner in a strategic location.

**India**

U.S. military relations with India have greatly expanded over the past year. India offered rapid and valuable assistance to the United States in conducting military operations in Afghanistan. USPACOM officers have met with their Indian counterparts and agreed on programs and exercises for the next 6–18 months. The primary areas of cooperation focus on peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, special operations training and naval activities.

We are closely following India’s current confrontation with Pakistan. Throughout our interaction with our Indian counterparts, we continually stress the importance of a peaceful negotiated long-term solution to the Kashmir issue.

India and the United States have many common interests and our growing military cooperation will support this increasingly important security relationship.

**Indonesia**

Indonesia continues to go through a complete transition toward a modern democracy and a market economy. A key factor influencing Indonesia’s political transformation and the prospects for its stability and unity are the Armed Forces of Indonesia, or TNI.

Military reform made some progress last year, but more remains to be done, especially in the areas of accountability and professional conduct. Separatist and sectarian violence in Aceh, the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya, and inadequate TNI resources and capabilities have slowed the momentum of reform. TNI’s future course is central to Indonesia’s development and important to U.S. interests in combating terrorism, maintaining freedom of navigation on important trade lanes, and supporting regional security.

The Indonesian government has condemned terrorism and approved overflights of U.S. aircraft supporting the war on terrorism. It has improved security for our citizens and the U.S. embassy in Jakarta. However, Indonesia’s very geography makes it vulnerable to terrorist penetration. With many challenges on its plate, and diminishing TNI resources and capabilities it does not have full control of its borders. Moreover, Indonesia has not aggressively investigated domestic elements that are sympathetic to the aims of al-Qaeda. We need to strengthen cooperation with Indonesia on terrorism. Current restrictions on our interaction with the TNI limit our effectiveness. However, the newly established Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program may offer us a valuable tool to provide TNI mid-grade officers non-lethal training focused on counter-terrorism and combating transnational threats. We look forward to exploring this possibility with the Congress.

USPACOM activities with TNI include inviting some officers to multilateral conferences, subject matter information exchanges, senior officer visits, and the annual naval Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise focusing on humanitarian assistance and anti-piracy. CARAT 2002 will now include a counter-terrorism element.

A responsible, developing Indonesia is key to the security and development of the Southeast Asia region; it is in our interest to help ensure the security of this important country.

**East Timor**

East Timor is preparing for independence in May of this year. UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) support has been successful in assisting and guiding East Timor toward independence. USPACOM forces in U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET) played a vital role in supporting this monumental international effort. USGET has provided a significant U.S. presence, vital civic actions, humanitarian assistance, and regular ship visits. Today, East Timor is generally secure from the militias, and ready to face the challenges of a democracy.

After East Timor’s independence, USPACOM will transition from civic action orientation in East Timor to a more traditional military cooperation program. This program will support an international effort, led by Australia, to further develop the East Timor Defense Force into a viable self-defense force.

**China**

Many important political, economic, and military developments occurred in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) last year, and Chinese actions affected U.S. military relations with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Last year’s military exercises in the PRC showed a measurable increase in quality, as the PLA continued to modernize its forces, with an emphasis on integrating
ground, air and naval forces into a viable joint capability, and on creating a more professional officer and noncommissioned officer cadre. In addition to basic maritime combat skills, the 2001 exercises demonstrated efforts to conduct joint amphibious operations combined with missile and air strikes against key targets, such as airfields, naval ports and command centers.

China continued to build and exercise its force of short-range ballistic missiles ranging Taiwan. It still seeks to develop a range of military options to influence and intimidate Taiwan, and has not abandoned the option of using force to resolve Taiwan's status.

Across the Strait, Taiwan's armed forces continue to restructure and modernize. They are reorganizing and modernizing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). The U.S. government last year approved the sale of naval, ground and air equipment to maintain Taiwan's sufficient defense in the near term. Taiwan still needs to focus on developing and modernizing C4ISR, integrated air and sea defense, and the ability to integrate its armed forces to conduct effective joint operations.

The PLA is still years away from the capability to take and hold Taiwan. Continued improvements in Taiwan's capabilities and development of USPACOM capabilities will be necessary to maintain sufficient defense.

The April 2001 EP-3 crisis was eventually resolved—the crew and airplane returned. However, the aggressive behavior of the Chinese pilot who caused the collision and the detention of the crew for 11 days damaged China's relations with the United States.

Military-to-military relations are resuming slowly, and in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act. It is in the interests of the United States to interact with the PLA to address common interests, such as combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, search and rescue, counterdrug, counterpiracy, and humanitarian assistance. These interactions should be reciprocal and transparent and serve to reduce misunderstandings and the risk of miscalculations on both sides.

POW–MIA EFFORTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) continues progress on the fullest possible accounting of Americans unaccounted-for as a result of the war in Southeast Asia.

The risks of this noble mission were sadly underscored by the helicopter crash on 7 April 2001. Seven American service members and nine Vietnamese tragically died in Quang Binh Province, Vietnam, while conducting advance work for the 65th Joint Field Activity (JFA). We may never know the exact details of the accident, but a report by the U.S. investigator indicated that deteriorating weather conditions, poor visibility, and pilot error were factors. This tragic incident was a deep loss for USPACOM, the task force, and the American and Vietnamese people.

During FY01, JTF-FA conducted nine JFAs—three in Vietnam, five in Laos, and one in Cambodia where 211 cases were investigated and 37 sites excavated. One JFA in Vietnam was canceled due to the tragic helicopter crash. JTF-FA continues to maintain its pace of operations in FY02, with 10 JFAs scheduled—4 in Vietnam, 5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia.

Last year, 44 sets of remains were identified and returned to their loved ones. JTF-FA recovered and repatriated 27 remains still to be identified, but believed to be Americans unaccounted-for (16 from Vietnam, 10 from Laos, and 1 from Cambodia).

We remain committed to obtaining the fullest possible accounting of Americans still missing in Southeast Asia and to the return of all recoverable remains. We seek continual support for funding of this mission.

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION

Theater Security Cooperation Overview

Ready forces are the foundation for USPACOM's cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region. They reassure our friends and partners, and dissuade our potential enemies. During 2001, we maintained a strong program of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) designed to maintain coalition warfighting skills for deterrence, and build regional coalition capabilities to carry out common missions, from peacekeeping through combating terrorism.

The three primary goals of TSC—influence, access, and competent coalition partners—led to an active program that proved its worth after 11 September. All countries in the Asia-Pacific region declared support for the global war on terrorism, and contributed in many ways.
Seminars, simulations and multilateral exercises are inexpensive and powerful ways to develop the capabilities to work effectively—as coalitions in complex contingencies (such as East Timor); as partners in countering terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, and piracy; in managing the consequences of chemical, biological or nuclear attacks, natural disasters and accidents; in evacuating citizens caught in the path of violence; in search and rescue of mariners and airmen in distress; and in providing humanitarian assistance. TSC develops a cadre of competent coalition partners able to contribute when called upon.

Such a call came 11 September. Under the banner of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, many of our partners in enhanced regional cooperation stepped forward to make significant contributions to the emerging OEF coalition. We have also focused on building long-term, strategic relationships necessary to plan and execute the protracted theater campaigns to eradicate terrorism. Many of our efforts with key allies and friends, such as Australia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, are expanding on strong foundations nurtured by TSC to improve our counter-terrorism capabilities. With other strategic nations in our theater, such as India, the events of 11 September are the catalyst for accelerating more meaningful regional cooperation on a threat that affects all Asia-Pacific nations.

We will continue to cultivate and maintain the necessary operational access and coalition cooperation (diplomatic/financial/military) to plan and execute current and future operations. For all these purposes, USPACOM should maintain a baseline of multilateral conferences and International Military Education and Training (IMET) for every country.

Coalition Exercises

TEAM CHALLENGE 2002 links the multilateral COBRA GOLD exercise in Thailand with the bilateral BALIKATAN in the Philippines to address bilateral and multilateral training objectives, and to improve the readiness of regional armed forces to contribute to multilateral operations. Singapore will participate again this year alongside Thai and U.S. forces in COBRA GOLD. Observer nations (with an eye toward possible participation in future years) will include Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, France, ROK, Mongolia, Russia, China, India, Cambodia, Tonga and Sri Lanka; Vietnam has been invited. In TEAM CHALLENGE, we will exercise elements from the full spectrum of missions that our combined forces may be called upon to do together, from complex contingencies to humanitarian assistance. TEAM CHALLENGE continues to be our largest multilateral exercise in theater, while serving as our premier Combined Joint Task Force training exercise.

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

IMET is the cornerstone of our Theater Security Cooperation Program. It provides education opportunities for personnel from foreign armed forces to study U.S. military doctrine and to observe U.S. commitment to the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values. It is the best means for promoting professionalism within foreign armed forces, and exposing foreign armed forces to the principle of a military responsive to civilian control. IMET is an effective tool for assisting armed forces to develop in ways that meet their own and U.S. objectives. Indonesia is a case in point, where officers from the Indonesian armed forces have not attended professional U.S. military education courses since 1992, with an attendant loss of U.S. influence on an entire generation of Indonesian company/field grade officers.

Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program

The Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program complements the IMET program. DoD funding will be used to send foreign military officers to U.S. military institutions and selected regional centers for non-lethal education. This program will provide the regional CINCs with additional flexibility in executing our security cooperation strategies, and it will have an immediate and positive impact in encouraging reform, professionalism, and regional cooperation in addressing counter-terrorism and other transnational threats.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

FMF for acquiring U.S. military articles, services and training enables key friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities and improve their potential contributions as a coalition partner. In response to our original FY02 FMF request, three USPACOM countries were granted FMF funds: Mongolia ($2 million), the Phil-
ippines ($19 million), and [c2]East Timor ($1 million), which gains its independence 20 May of this year.

To prosecute the global war on terrorism, it is in the U.S. interest to provide equipment to select countries facing threats. The administration is reviewing potential threats and options.

Philippines FMF Maintenance Program

The Philippines FMF Maintenance Program is the foundation for effective security assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their campaign against terror. We are in the first year of a 5-year, $68 million FMF plan to sustain critical AFP military capability while promoting clear and positive actions to correct budgetary and logistics deficiencies. We have developed courses of action to improve AFP readiness rates for specific systems such as C–130 aircraft, UH–1 helicopters, 2½-ton trucks, and 78-foot Fast Patrol Craft. We have also developed a statement of work to implement contractor management assistance and ways to track improvements in readiness rates. Full funding over the 5-year program will enable the AFP to sustain higher readiness levels for key weapons systems. This funding is essential for the AFP to achieve a self-sustaining capability.

As the efforts in the Philippines evolve, possible opportunities to maximize effectiveness of counter terrorism operations may require additional resources. FY03 FMF funding for the Republic of the Philippines Maintenance Program remains key to achieving one of our long-term goals of improving AFP readiness.

Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)

EIPC programs promote standards for peacekeeping doctrine, training, and education at the institutional level. In FY01, five USPACOM countries (Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines and Thailand) received a total of $2.227 million to achieve this goal. In FY02, we hope to add Fiji, Madagascar, Tonga and India to this list. While EIPC programs are not as visible as IMET or FMF grants, EIPC plays a key role in developing host country self-sufficiency to train its forces to be effective players in worldwide peacekeeping efforts.

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)

NADR funding supports U.S. efforts to reduce threats posed by international terrorists, landmines, and stockpiles of excess weapons, as well as by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their associated technologies. We have received limited funds in the past, primarily for demining activities in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, India and Vietnam. Our war against terrorism could benefit by any expansion of these programs. We will work closely with U.S. Country Teams to ensure we use these limited funds wisely.

Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA)

OHDACA appropriation provides the critical ability to respond to humanitarian needs in the Asia-Pacific region and is the primary source of DoD financing for foreign disaster assistance, demining, excess property donations and other humanitarian projects. While other federal agencies also have responsibilities to respond to man-made and natural disasters, armed forces are frequently called upon first. Additionally, our annual assistance programs provide important access to some countries where other means of security cooperation are inappropriate. These non-threatening programs demonstrate the peacetime capabilities of DoD to our Pacific neighbors without impacting readiness. Approved FY02/03 Humanitarian Assistance requirements for construction projects and property donations total approximately $5.1 million.

East Timor Defense Force (ETDF)—Logistics System/East Timor Engineer Plan

The U.S. armed forces continue to conduct operations in East Timor by providing liaison officers, engineers and humanitarian assistance during ship visits. FY02 engineering priorities include water plant, electrical system, and health clinic projects. The State Department programmed $4.8 million in FMF funds in FY01–03 to assist in developing the East Timor Defense Forces (ETDF) logistics support system and to conduct training to develop the skills necessary for self-sufficiency. We will need to look at avenues to provide the ETDF the support they need to provide for their own security. There should be no haven for terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region, in countries with histories old or new.

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS)

The APCSS regional study, conference, and research center continues to do great work. Graduates from its 3-month executive course total 764 from 41 countries, in-
including Pakistan. I meet many of the outstanding graduates when I travel, and all are convinced that the regional approach works.

**Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI)**

The APRI program increases USPACOM access, regional readiness and U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region. APRI funding supports a wide range of exercises, programs, and training symposiums such as Exercise TEAM CHALLENGE, the PACIFIC REACH multi-national submarine rescue exercise, the annual multilateral Chiefs of Defense conference, and search and rescue and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief exercises.

**Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN)**

Funded by the APRI program, APAN provides information exchange throughout the region that directly supports Theater Security Cooperation. It functions as an interactive Web-based network that is attracting ever-widening attention and participation. APAN’s membership has grown from about 300 users from 17 countries in June 2000 to more than 4,000 self-registered users (by 1 January 2002) from every country in the Pacific region except Burma and North Korea. APAN has also attracted users from over 20 other countries outside the region. The Web site supports regional exercises and conferences, and provides information resources to functional areas such as peacekeeping operations, disaster management and counter-terrorism. More importantly, it has been a catalyst to the creation of multinational information-based relationships and collaboration. Since APAN’s operational capabilities and information are entirely unclassified, they are available to government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are important as participants in complex humanitarian emergencies and as partners in any combined military effort. After 11 September, APAN began a commercially secured Web site for Hawaii’s Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) effort, a multi-agency effort comprising 17 federal state and local agencies in Hawaii responsible for critical infrastructure. APAN is working with the U.S. Coast Guard to develop a similar commercially secured operational network capability for multinational collaboration in the Northwest Pacific and with the Department of State for similar collaborative sites to support ASEAN Regional Forum Confidence-Building Measures in Counter-Terrorism and possibly Maritime Security. Part of the international experience of 11 September has been overcoming resistance to new operating methods and information-based relationships. APAN has encouraged regional countries and United Nations organizations and NGOs to use and contribute to building experience in network centric operations that will pay off in future multinational force operations.

**Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) Program**

The MPAT Program, also funded through APRI, brings together expert military planners from nations with Asia-Pacific interests that can rapidly augment a multinational force headquarters. Using standardized skills, they would plan and execute coalition operations in response to small-scale contingencies in the region. Through a series of workshops and planning exercises, MPAT members have developed a knowledge base of the various national crisis-action-planning procedures in the Asia-Pacific region and strong working relationships with each other. MPAT members have also begun developing common crisis-action planning procedures that any lead nation could use during a crisis.

We have successfully completed three MPAT workshops each involving over 25 countries, co-hosted by the Philippines, Thailand, and Korea respectively. We have also completed six concept and standard operating procedures (SOP) workshops. The strength of the MPAT program lies in its ability to foster the development of a consensus on multinational responses to crises in a region with only a strong bilateral tradition.

**The Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE)**

COE plays an important role in our pursuit of key strategic objectives in USPACOM. COE engages countries in the Asia-Pacific region, builds burden-sharing relationships among our friends and allies, and prepares U.S. forces to perform effectively in complex contingencies. COE’s mission in disaster management, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations offers a low profile tool to engage civilian and military communities throughout the theater that might otherwise be hesitant to work with us. COE’s support of our peace operations capacity building efforts in the Asia-Pacific region have helped improve capabilities in the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Malaysia. Finally, by promoting broader collaboration among nontraditional partners, COE contributes to the creation of an environment less hospitable to terrorism.
READINESS AND RESOURCES

Personnel

The war on terrorism along with ongoing commitments throughout the Asia-Pacific region place heavy pressures on our troops and their families. It is especially important today, that our young men and women in uniform feel the support of our country. The quality of life (QoL) initiatives included in the FY02 National Defense Authorization Act are welcome and let our people know their elected representatives value their hard work and sacrifices.

Thank you for supporting the Administration’s request for the largest pay raise in two decades. Competitive pay is essential to attract and retain the highly skilled personnel critical to our national defense.

There are areas where compensation has failed to keep up with the times. For example, most American families today own two cars for parents’ jobs, school, and children’s extracurricular activities. This is a necessity, not a luxury. At present, our military families are only allowed to transport one vehicle when transferred to and from overseas duty stations in the United States. Developing programs to meet the needs of today’s military families will go a long way toward improving retention.

Another much-needed improvement is reducing Permanent Change of Station (PCS) out of pocket expenses. We calculate the average military family pays $1700 above reimbursements when moving to Hawaii. Legislation like that in the FY02 Defense Authorization Act, to increase partial reimbursement of mandatory pet quarantine fees incurred by members transferred to various overseas locations within and outside the United States, helps reduce this financial burden. The removal of entitlement limits that previously excluded junior personnel from receiving proper reimbursement for expenses incurred during their first PCS move is also a standout. Even a seemingly small gesture, like helping our volunteer Reserve or Guard members deal with excess accrued leave as they move from hot spot to hot spot, sends a message that we care.

In past conflicts, Reserve Component (RC) personnel have mobilized to serve in and around combat zones. For the war on terrorism, we have mobilized thousands of reservists and guardsmen to protect our military bases and civilian facilities like airports. The President has clearly stated that the war on terrorism will continue for years. RC support will be a vital part of the war effort. In USPACOM, our reservists have done a magnificent job. The flexibility and support of their employers has been a key element of this successful mobilization.

We need to reexamine RC polices and programs to sustain the war on terrorism over the long term. Cold War-era regulations and public laws still sometimes prevent RCs from providing the responsive and flexible capability they are so eager to deliver. I applaud the efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff to push for improvements to law, policy, and regulations. I support ways not only to increase funding but also to modernize the rules that govern RC support. To do this, we need more full-time support to perform tasks like managing manning documents, pre-screening medical records before recall, and providing support at the locations where the RC personnel are frequently mobilized.

While we are fortunate to have many eager and talented volunteers willing to make sacrifices to serve their country in times of crisis, I am concerned about the long-term impact of reliance on recalled reserve augmentation forces. Given the nature of our protracted war on terrorism, we need to take a hard look at active duty force levels required in the next 5–10 years to combat terrorism, because now is the time to make recruitment and force authorization adjustments.

State of Housing, Family Support

Military family housing remains one of our top QoL priorities. We are working to replace or renovate substandard military family housing by 2007. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) will meet this goal with their current master plans and programs. We must continue to restore and increase funding to ensure that our military family housing is safe, modern, and secure. Congressional efforts last year resulted in a welcome and much needed increase in attention to overseas MILCON in USPACOM. I applaud your efforts to fix the grossly inadequate housing in Korea and other deficiencies throughout the AOR. There is still so much to do.

People are our most important resource. Recognition, adequate compensation, and housing are the foundation of a decent quality of life for our people and their families.
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Funding

The second important component of readiness is sufficient operations and maintenance funding for training and maintaining equipment.

Last year I testified that with regard to our funding for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) "news is not positive" and, "accordingly the readiness of our component commands is not expected to reflect any significant increase this fiscal year."

I am happy to report this year, due to supplemental funding, our readiness picture is more optimistic.

Funding for training and maintenance across Service components has been adequate to keep units trained and their equipment in good repair. This readiness was proved in combat as USPACOM carrier battle groups (CVBGs), amphibious ready groups (ARGs), and marine expeditionary units (MEUs) deployed on short notice to Afghanistan and were effective in combat immediately.

Let me highlight my current readiness concerns.

Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)

Ongoing support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) has significantly reduced the already limited worldwide stocks of precision munitions across all services, especially the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The President's FY03 budget request contains aggressive programs to restore inventories to adequate levels. Sustained funding to restore/increase PGMs stockage levels to support the spectrum of military operations—counter-terrorism (CT) operations, small-scale contingencies (SSCs), major theater wars (MTWs), training/testing expenditures, theater positioning and combat-sustainment requirements—must remain a priority.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Aircraft

Our AOR requires more ISR aircraft coverage to meet operational demand. While I cannot provide exact numbers in this forum, our collection rates of required intelligence information is dangerously low. Recent funding of ISR aircraft as part of the counter-terrorism (CT) supplemental will help, but this projected increase must be realized in increased surveillance units in this theater. New aircraft must also be developed to replace aging ISR assets. The projected retirement of aircraft over the out years puts at risk Service commitments to maintain a minimum number of operational ISR aircraft.

Aircraft Readiness

Mission Capable (MC) rates for Pacific Fleet (PACFLT)/ Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) aircraft and cannibalization of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) aircraft continue to be major readiness concerns in USPACOM. Availability of repair parts is a significant contributor to aircraft readiness shortfalls. Although funding for repair parts for Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aircraft has improved in the past two years, shortages still exist, causing cannibalizations on PACAF aircraft and cross-decking/temporary equipment loans in PACFLT. Of PACAF aircraft tracked from January to December 2001, 80 percent did not meet the aircraft standard for cannibalization rates.

Infrastructure, Logistics Inventories, and Related Support

The final component of readiness is infrastructure, logistics inventories, and related support. This component still requires attention.

Facilities: Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM)

The combined effects of aging facilities and years of under funding have produced an enormous backlog of restoration and replacement projects. The current recapitalization backlog was caused by a combination of factors. Funding intended for facilities sustainment has often been diverted. When bases closed in the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii, SRM funds were not redistributed for remaining facilities but were reduced as part of the "peace dividend." Rising utility costs and higher costs to accomplish base-operating support by contract further reduced funds available for SRM. As a result of inadequate funding, bases, camps, posts and stations across the Asia-Pacific region are shabby and deteriorating to a point we can no longer ignore. Our people deserve much better than this; they deserve to live and work in a quality environment.

At current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) funding levels, the $5.3 billion USPACOM recapitalization backlog will nearly double over the FYDP. USPACOM requires an additional $8.4 billion over the FYDP to eliminate the backlog and prevent future backlog growth through proper sustainment.

SRM funding shortfalls not only affect quality of life, but also impact readiness, operation plan (OPLAN) execution, retention, and force protection. Unfunded backlog projects affect OPLAN execution in Korea, Guam and Wake Island. Without ad-
ditional funding, recapitalization backlogs will continue to grow if we do not realign or close any installations or facilities, and will further deteriorate, jeopardizing critical functions throughout USPACOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR).

New Pacific Command Headquarters

Construction on the Nimitz-MacArthur Pacific Command Center at Camp Smith is underway and going vertical. Completion is scheduled for December 2003. We appreciate the restoration of $3 million included in the FY02 MILCON Appropriations Act to fund critical design elements, including antiterrorism force protection (ATFP) and information security requirements. Unfortunately, this funding was reduced by over $400,000 due to an across-the-board reduction of all FY02 MILCON funding, creating an unexpected shortfall just as critical ATFP and information technology security requirements are being addressed.

Pacific Security Analysis Complex (PSAC) MILCON04

USPACOM needs a single shared intelligence complex on Oahu, Hawaii, that optimizes the missions and operations of both Kunia Regional Security Operations Center (KRSOC) and the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC). The current KRSOC is obsolete. The facility was built in 1945, and the last major renovation occurred in 1979. Current estimates for necessary renovations to ensure a 30-year continued use exceed $185 million, with annual operating costs of approximately $8 million. Construction costs for a new KRSOC facility, incorporating Naval Security Group Activity (NSGA) Pearl Harbor and NCPAC, are currently estimated at $220 million, with annual operating costs of $6 million. Additional savings in renovation costs to NSGA Pearl Harbor and NCPAC are estimated at $9 million. Thus, it would be less costly in the long term to build the new facility.

The JICPAC theater intelligence production facility has force protection vulnerabilities due to its location on a main civilian thoroughfare. Co-locating with KRSOC would lead to savings of roughly $30 million over 4 years in JICPAC operating costs, and enhance fusion of all-source intelligence. The PSAC presents an unprecedented opportunity for immediate in-depth collaboration between the premier signals intelligence and production centers.

USPACOM Simulation Center MILCON04

Increasing exercise activity, training complexities, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence (C4I) modernization have outgrown USPACOM’s exercise simulation infrastructure and support capabilities. This deficiency significantly reduces the ability to train USCINCPAC and Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders in crisis action readiness procedures; degrades the ability to improve combined interoperability with friends in the region; and contributes to increased operating tempo (OPTEMPO), training time and associated costs for USPACOM forces before responding to contingencies. The current facility does not support future technologies or meet force-protection requirements. The planned state-of-the-art simulation center will link with simulation centers throughout the Asia-Pacific region to train joint integrated forces, rehearse mission requirements, provide commanders with quick-reaction combat analyses, and exploit information from open sources. It will transform USPACOM through the use of advanced simulations, collaborative tools, and C4I systems in joint experiments.

Wake Island Airfield Funding

Wake Island remains critical for support of strategic deployment of forces for major theater wars (MTWs). The funding in the Air Force program is the first year of a multi-year program that must be maintained to ensure availability of this critical asset to meet wartime contingency requirements.

Mobility Infrastructure and Strategic Lift (C–17/C–5) Reliability Enhancement and Re-engine Program

USPACOM depends on continued funding of the programmed C–17 aircraft buy and the C–5 aircraft Reliability Enhancement and Re-engine Program and Avionics Modernization Program. Equally important are our efforts to exploit advanced sealift technology to reduce our dependency on premium airlift. Over the past year, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has been testing and evaluating off-island deployments using a leased High Speed Vessel (HSV). Initial analysis of the HSV suggests considerable cost savings while significantly reducing in-transit deployment time for Marine forces. Based on these encouraging initial returns, we are pursuing the HSV as a theater-lift asset in USPACOM.

Real world operations in other theaters are impacting USPACOM’s exercise program. We are beginning to face regular shortages of airlift and aerial tankage. This, in turn, makes it more difficult to train soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines that
we are depending on to execute ongoing operations. For example, to send the 3rd Wing to Red Flag to prepare them for deployment to Operation Southern Watch, we will need to contract civilian airlift at a cost of approximately $1.1 million. The original budget was $250,000 using KC–10. Overall, the PACAP exercise program has been cut $734,000 and the JCS exercise program was cut $1.2 million. Successful achievement of combat readiness training will hinge largely on sufficient funding for exercises.

Intelligence

The events of 11 September have introduced additional requirements on our already heavily tasked national and tactical intelligence systems. The demand for precise and timely intelligence has never been greater, including in-depth understanding of long-term potential adversaries, regional hotspots, and transnational threats—terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

National and tactical SIGINT systems must be modernized to meet the advances in global telecommunications technology. National Security Agency (NSA) and Service SIGINT capabilities are key to our daily operations and the execution of OPLANs and contingencies in the USPACOM AOR. They must be funded to continue modernizing tactical SIGINT collection capabilities against both modernized militaries and terrorists. Funding is also needed to replace the Kuna Regional Security Operations Center (KRSOC) and accompanying land-based collection architecture. Our support to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has exacerbated our peacetime shortage of intelligence collection aircraft. While additional aircraft are in the pipeline, we still need more in the inventory to help us reach and maintain our long-standing minimum theater requirements, and we need them soon. We encourage development of a follow-on to current manned aircraft and await availability of high altitude, long dwell, unmanned aerial vehicles. We must also upgrade the collection equipment on the aircraft. This is especially true for SIGINT, where existing collection equipment is ineffective against modern communication technology. Similar land and maritime collection capabilities also need upgrades. USPACOM fully supports integrated, joint development of the next generation signals collection tools, along with further consolidation of funding to hasten this event. Extra aircraft and new collection tools are meaningless, though, if we lack trained personnel to exploit the information. The existing shortage of linguists has worsened due to the war on terrorism. We now face regional languages and dialects never considered important before 11 September.

Imagery Analysis

Requirements for imagery continue to grow. New platforms are producing an increasing flow of data, but our ability to exploit this data has not kept pace. We are doing well on the Tasking portion of the Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED) of imagery, but insufficient communications and lack of imagery analysts hamper the remaining aspects of the process. Additional funding is needed to realize the full potential of this intelligence source. USPACOM still requires a robust theater-level intelligence gathering capability against the entire threat spectrum.

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4) Capabilities

Information technology (IT) continues to influence warfare at every turn. C4 is the unsung workhorse of any operation, requiring 24 hours a day/7 days a week reliable, timely and uncorrupted service. As evidenced by the world’s recent response to terrorist events, the need for information sharing between service, joint, and coalition partners, as well as local, state, and federal organizations, has increased exponentially. This requirement places a strain on an already antiquated and stressed communications network. Since C4 encompasses a wide spectrum, I will focus on three primary areas of continued need: 1) an end-to-end communications infrastructure, 2) information assurance, and 3) interoperability.

First, the end-to-end communications enterprise provides the foundation to electronically link garrison and forward-deployed forces to commanders at all levels. USPACOM’s vast AOR, mostly separated by ocean and encompassing countries with under-developed C4 infrastructures, requires forces to rely heavily on satellite communications (SATCOM). We continue to make great strides in many of the SATCOM programs and I thank you for your continued support. However, aging equipment and specifically, limited Ultra High Frequency (UHF) SATCOM capacity over this AOR, is fast becoming a factor in my ability to command and control forces. With the recent terrorist attacks and our ongoing efforts to root out terrorism
as a whole, SATCOM connectivity to our highly specialized forces is more critical than ever before. The new challenge is to ensure that critical SATCOM upgrades, the fielding of new satellite programs, and the launching of new satellites remain on track to replace the aging fleets currently orbiting the earth in support of warfighters.

As an inseparable partner with the space segment, we must inject similar technology advances into the base, post, camp, and station infrastructures. In the Pacific Theater, we still operate on cables and wiring installed as far back as the 1960s. These cables are no longer dependable. Coupling this condition with the ever-increasing user requirements for more and more information, we must quickly modernize to support the growing bandwidth and increased speed requirements of our intelligence gatherers, planners and warfighters. Information is truly a force multiplier.

Our second focus area is information assurance (IA). How we protect our sensitive information from potential adversaries while providing access to, and sharing it with, our coalition partners is probably the toughest challenge we face in today’s C4 environment.

Although we have made significant strides to improve IA in USPACOM, we are far from 100 percent protected. Cyber warfare never rests. Our USPACOM networks continue to receive daily cyber probes and potentially dangerous virus and hacker attacks. They can occur at any time and any place in the theater and the consequences can be severe, if we are not on guard around the clock. The payback for IA is not always as easily recognizable as with the production of new airplanes, ships, or tanks. You cannot touch and feel information protection, but a loss of critical or time-sensitive information, or a denial of service, can be far more detrimental to national security than any single weapon system. An example of the heavy IA investment needed for additional hardware is the protection afforded by current cryptographic equipment to secure networks for command and control of daily operations. Replacement parts for this aging equipment are difficult to obtain—a limiting factor as technology increases the speed, connectivity, and capacity of our networks.Cryptographic modernization programs are essential to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. Government cryptographic inventory. For example, airline flight schedules and blueprints of our embassies are simply tidbits of information. But, that information in the wrong hands may improve the enemies’ chances of producing devastating results as evidenced by recent terrorist incidents.

Ongoing IA improvements will require a continued heavy investment in equipment, training and technically skilled people. I ask for your support as we strive to implement a “defense in depth” posture into our daily information operations.

The third C4 area is interoperability. The events of 11 September have caused us to concentrate hard on interoperability, especially with civilian and coalition partners in support of global counter-terrorism efforts. We must reassess our processes in these areas.

I firmly believe we must revamp our acquisition system, especially in the area of IT. Long-term replacement programs are detached at an early stage from the dynamic reality of operations and warfare. They emerge decades later with new systems that are better than what they replace, but not as good as what they could or should be in meeting the needs of the warfighter.

Our system does not put engineers together with the operators to fix real operational problems, deal with real war plan deficiencies and emerging threats, or take advantage of real opportunities. The current system, which drives the actions of the detached bureaucracy of requirements writers, contracting officers and program managers, is only tenuously connected to what our forces need to operate and fight better.

We must integrate the engineers with the operators in a spiral development approach in which we build a little, test a little, and then build a little more. Let them see firsthand the interoperability problems that exist between civilian, joint and coalition organizations. For example, our Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders use service variants of our Global Command and Control System (GCCS), because the joint version is not as capable as the service variant and is not fully fielded across the theater. As another example, the land mobile radio systems that our police and fire departments use are not interoperable with our military systems. These incompatibilities prevent key personnel from sharing critical information in a timely fashion, and could easily lead to catastrophic results.

We can address many of these interoperability issues by using this spiral development approach, and putting engineers in the field during joint exercises, training maneuvers and technology demonstrations. Initially, this approach comes with an increased cost until we can identify capabilities in programs that we do not need.
But the timely and increased operational capabilities provided to the warfighter as result of it more than justify the initial expense.

Maintaining our leading edge in C4 technology, assuring our critical information and improving interoperability with our coalition partners are essential to protecting American security interests in the 21st century. Our command is working hard to mitigate these limitations; however, we need increased C4 funding to maintain the operational edge over our adversaries.

**Multiple Theater War Sustainment Issues (Harvest Eagle, APS–4)**

Refurbishment and reconstitution of Air Force Harvest Eagle bare base assets are key to both current operations plans (OPLANS) and USPACOM operations in support of the global war on terrorism. Harvest Eagle’s tent-based housing modules allow forward-deployed or reinforcing units to establish airfield operations where local infrastructure is austere or lacking. Degraded before their use in current operations, our deployable bare-base assets capacity will continue to be a limiting factor to executing OPLANS and contingencies without fully funding refurbishment and reconstitution.

Shortfalls in pre-positioned equipment and supplies to support combat operations in the Korean Theater of Operations are also of major concern. The Army maintains a strategic inventory of sustainment supplies as part of Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS). These stocks sustain forward-deployed and initial follow-on ground forces, and include major end items such as engines, repair parts, medical supplies, packaged petroleum products, barrier/construction materials, operations rations, and clothing required to sustain combat operations.

Additionally, we have significant shortfalls in Army APS–4 Sustainment Stocks designated to replace projected combat losses, especially critical during the early stages of a major theater war (MTW) on the Korean Peninsula. Within these sustainment stocks, Class VII (Major End Items) and Class IX (Repair Parts) have the most serious shortfalls. Finally, less than 30 percent of Joint Service Light-weight Integrated Suit Technology chemical protection suits (to support operations in a nuclear, chemical, biological environment) are available in sustainment stocks. The combination of these shortfalls degrades our ability to conduct sustained combat operations on the Korean Peninsula.

**USPACOM Force Transformation**

Our enemies and potential enemies are working hard to develop ways to defeat the U.S. Armed Forces. We cannot allow our current military dominance to lead to complacency and future defeat. Force transformation is a priority at USPACOM. We have made rapid progress over the past year in developing Joint Mission Force capabilities, in our Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) and in aligning force transformation with our Joint Training and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plans. Experimenting as we exercise and operate is becoming routine. Individual commanders are also making advances through their own initiatives, with service and USPACOM support. Examples include the High Speed Vessel (HSV) that Marine forces on Okinawa have leased to make movement within the theater faster at less expense and the development of numerous networking and decision support capabilities.

**Joint Mission Force (JMF) Objectives**

The objectives of USPACOM’s JMF concept are to enhance the speed of action, precision, and mission effectiveness of Theater Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Our vision is to create a seamless Joint/Combined Pacific Theater response force capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of missions, from a complex contingency through humanitarian assistance (HA), and serving as the leading edge during a major war. This transformation effort has moved from its concept development in war games to implementation in exercises that enhance our ability to rapidly form and deploy a JTF.

Through the JMF concept, Battle Staff Rosters supported by service components now provide tailored on-call augmentation for key billets at USPACOM’s designated JTF headquarters. These staffs are trained to provide the performance of a Standing JTF Headquarters, without incurring the overhead of a separate organization. Command relationships for designated JTF and component commands are already established and rehearsed to enable rapid activation and deployment.

Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence (C4I) baseline requirements have also been established and are routinely tested in our command and
control exercise program to ensure our ability to establish a common operating picture and theater network for collaborative planning. Our JTFs now use newly published CD-ROM based and Web-accessible standard operating procedures (SOPs) internally linked with checklists and templates. Information management serves as the foundation for the SOP, and is supported by a standardized JTF Web site that facilitates Web-centric information pull. Our primary JTFs now train to assigned missions with packaged, mission-oriented training standards, including new tasks designed to examine draft doctrine linked to technology, for integrated and synchronized fires and maneuver.

The current focus for transforming JTF capabilities are in the areas of joint fire and maneuver, battle space situational awareness and the common operational and tactical pictures, coalition force integration, force protection, and rapid JTF formation.

Based on 3 years of development, the JMF concept is our prototype standing JTF Headquarters. JMF provides greater flexibility for multiple crises, capitalizes on component core competencies, requires no additional manpower, and allows for normal service rotations and deployments. During Exercise KERNEL BLITZ (EXPERIMENTAL) in June 2001, we demonstrated Wide Area Relay Network (WARNET) technologies in the Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB) ACTD. Our follow-on JTF WARNET initiative will provide our JTFs with organic, wireless, and secure connectivity for planning and execution at the tactical level. The JTF WARNET communications network, associated applications, and interfaces support joint forces across a widely distributed battlespace to provide real-time and near real-time command and control (C2), collaboration, common tactical picture and joint fires across service boundaries. Under the technical leadership of the Office of Naval Research with substantial funding support from OSD, JTF WARNET development continues for prototype deployment with operational forces in 2004.

Coalition Involvement in Joint Mission Force (JMF) Efforts

Our JMF concept is an essential part of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). To improve regional readiness for coalition operations, we are developing a Multinational Force (MNF) SOP tailored from the JTF SOP we built last year. This more generic document will include broad operational considerations that our multinational partners can readily implement when one acts as the lead nation with the United States serving in a support role. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) serves as the instrument for MNF SOP development. The MPAT conducts collaborative development of the document over the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) and at workshops in the region. Joint Experimentation with coalition partners is coordinated in bilateral venues such as the Annual Staff Talks with Singapore and Australia. This spring, USPACOM will fully involve coalition partners by hosting a Coalition Transformation Workshop as part of our annual ACTD conference.

Joint Task Force (JTF) Joint Experimentation Program (JEP)

Our JTFJEP focuses on transforming JTF operations and is fully coordinated with the JEP of USJFCOM. Our JTFJEP includes technology insertion experiments during exercises to advance our practice of JTF operations, both in the U.S. and coalition venues. This year we have planned two major experiments. The first experiment will occur as part of our command and control exercise (C2X) series where we train for rapid formation of a JTF. Our C2Xs over the past year made significant advances in sharing common procedures and a common operational picture (COP) among JTF subordinate commanders, and in collaborative planning. We will experiment next with advanced capabilities to manage and control information flow on the JTF networks, and incorporate advanced fires management capabilities. Our second experiment will be in a coalition environment during Exercise COBRA GOLD with Thailand, Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia. By experimenting as we exercise, we provide a continuous series of field-tested warfighting improvements in joint and combined operations before we make key procurement decisions.

Advanced Technology Development

I am a strong supporter of USPACOM’s Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). They provide important near-term joint and combined warfighting capabilities. Since I last spoke with you, USPACOM has been awarded six new ACTDs, bringing the number of ACTDs involving USPACOM to 18, more than any other major command. Almost all our service Component Commanders, designated JTF Commanders, Subordinate Unified Commanders, and each of my
Staff Directors have responsibility for executing one or more ACTDs. USPACOM forces are involved in transformation across the theater.

Our six new ACTDs will provide new operational and tactical capabilities.

- The Micro Air Vehicle ACTD will provide small units enhanced situational awareness using miniaturized sensors on a man-portable unmanned air vehicle.
- The Language and Speech Exploitation Resources ACTD will reduce language barriers and improve coalition operations by providing a tool to automatically translate languages.
- The Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal—Knowledge Technology Operations Demonstration ACTD will provide Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams in the field with a portable, rapidly updateable, computerized database for safely disarming explosive devices in the field.
- The SPARTAN ACTD will provide enhanced battlespace awareness and increased force protection for surface and subsurface operations, by demonstrating the capabilities of unmanned surface vessels with modular sensor packages. SPARTAN is also the leading candidate for an improved TSC initiative involving co-development of advanced capabilities with coalition partners. The Singapore Armed Forces are interested in co-developing this system with us.
- The Thermobaric Weapon ACTD provides a standoff weapon for attacking tunnels and underground facilities. This program potentially provides two to three times the lethality over currently fielded penetrating weapons.
- The Signals Intelligence Processing ACTD provides improved capabilities to collect and process signals.

Coalition Theater Logistics

In parallel with transforming our forces, we must also bring along coalition partners. Last year, I testified that, thanks to your strong support, we were starting work on our Coalition Theater Logistics ACTD.

This is an important initiative, co-sponsored by Australia, to demonstrate how coalition logistics information can be exchanged at the national, operational and tactical levels. Over the last year, we’ve finalized operational requirements; signed a project arrangement with Australia that leverages technology from both countries, and embarked on a technical development program that puts us on the brink of providing a coalition force with a breakthrough capability—plan and execute coalition force deployment through selective information exchange between existing national logistics information systems. Continued support will ensure that we achieve all our objectives.

We have also partnered with Thailand and are beginning discussions with Singapore, Korea, and Japan to partner with them during future phases of ACTD development. In parallel with transforming our forces, we must also bring along coalition partners.

Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (JWID)

USPACOM is the designated-host Commander in Chief for the FY02 and FY03 execution of the Joint Staff J6I-sponsored JWID. Despite numerous other interoperability and transformation initiatives in progress, JWID has exceptional potential to address the real and near-term command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) interoperability challenges facing joint and coalition operations. Working with the U.S. Marine Corps, this year’s lead service, USPACOM has broadened the scope of challenges being investigated, focused the operational environment underpinning JWID to simulate demands of current military operations, expanded the list of countries participating to include Pacific Rim countries for the first time, and introduced warfighter rigor in executing the demonstration period and assessment of proposed technology solutions.

U.S. industry and government activities have responded to the call for interoperability solutions that span the C2 spectrum from strategic to tactical and that embrace new approaches to challenges in the situational awareness, common operating picture, decision support, collaboration, logistics, multi-lingual, joint and coalition fires, multi-level security, and medical arenas. For the first time, there will be incipient focus on support for humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief enablers. Due to success in our JMF program, USPACOM has introduced a Combined Task Force Web-portal interface for organizing, visualizing, and transferring the products produced by various JWID demonstrations and interoperability trials.

We have also made a concerted effort to enhance the understanding and participation by other Commanders in Chief to ensure that the results from JWID will de-
liver solutions to the C4ISR challenges that each of them confront in routine and contingency operations.

**Multi-Domain Dissemination System (MDDS)**

An unresolved challenge of furthering coalition readiness in the Pacific is the problem of multi-level security. Our intelligence-sharing relationships with our theater partners vary from country to country. Therefore, completely separate structures for passing classified information are required to interoperate with each individual country. To meet this requirement, developing and accrediting multi-level security technology, such as the MDDS, remain a high-interest item in USPACOM. Such technology and capability is imperative toward fully realizing our engagement strategy for any Pacific coalition force.

**SUMMARY STATEMENT**

In summary, the forward deployed and forward-stationed forces of the U.S. Pacific Command are making a difference in promoting American interests in security and peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region. We are relentlessly pursuing terrorists that threaten American citizens and interests. With a sustained effort and support of regional partners, we will succeed in rooting them out. U.S. Pacific Command’s priorities remain readiness, regional (theater) security cooperation, and transforming U.S. forces to achieve a revolution in military affairs. The men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command appreciate this opportunity to tell their story and the support that you give them.

Mr. Leach. Thank you very much, Admiral. I guess in terms of the most immediate philosophical issue that our country is engaged in vis-a-vis a specific other country is the Philippines today. Can you define precisely what our goals, objectives and potential strategies will be?

Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. I think it was stated most eloquently by President Arroyo, and she did it during her visit here to the United States in which she talked about a war on terrorism on the one hand and a war on poverty on the other hand.

Certainly for the situation in the southern Philippines, it is a case of handling the security problem, the threat to mostly Philippine citizens, but also those of other countries who are there on business or visiting, and also improving the general economic level of that country or that part of the country so that people feel that they can look to the government for providing a better life for them.

On the security side, the job of working against the Abu Sayyaf Group, which has historical and some current ties with international terrorism, which is a criminal organization in many ways, has fallen to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and so we in the Pacific Command have been given the job of boosting their capability to wipe out the Abu Sayyaf Group.

We sent a training team there. We sent an assessment team there last year to determine what the needs were, and the needs are primarily in the areas of training, a certain amount of equipment, primarily maintenance of existing equipment rather than a whole lot of new equipment, in the area of intelligence, as well as the process, both as well as additional intelligence. It is those needs that our task force is designed to provide.

The goal is to eliminate the Abu Sayyaf Group and then to build up the economic situation in the southern Philippines so that it does not have fertile soil to reappear. The time line we have is months, not years. It is part of our continuing relationship with our ally, the Philippines. Despite the loss of the helicopter and 10 of our comrades, we remain on track and committed to our goal.
Mr. LEACH. I appreciate that explanation. By analogy, President Arroyo spoke kind of of a two-armed approach, both economic and military. I think that is something this country is going to have to be sensitive to in relationship to much of the region that we are concerned about in Asia, but also some of the poorer parts of the world. When people lack hope, they obviously are more likely to reach out in different types of radical ways.

With regard to the country of Indonesia, as you know, in the Defense 2002 appropriations bill $17 million was appropriated for a regional defense counterterrorism fund. There is some concern in some parts of the Congress that this may or may not be a way around certain restrictions that otherwise exist on assistance to Indonesia.

Is the intent of the DOD to abide by restrictions like the Leahy amendment with regard to this fund, or is this a little more of a flexible fund?

Admiral Blair. Mr. Chairman, I have discussed both the International Military Education and Training program, the IMET program, and the new regional defense fellowship program with Members of Congress, and certainly right now within the Executive Branch, we are working out the procedures for just how that will be implemented.

What strikes me is that we all absolutely agree on the ends here. We all want American assistance to build up Armed Forces which are under tight political control following the orders of the legitimate government of their countries. We want Armed Forces who are professional, who carry out their orders correctly. We want Armed Forces who are trained not to commit human rights abuses, and when they do, there is accountability for their actions. We want Armed Forces that are properly paid, so they are not tempted to take bribes and get money other ways.

We are in violent agreement on that point. The question is, “What is the most effective way to do it?” Having worked in the area for a while, I strongly believe that the best way to do it is to take young officers and bring them to the United States to be students at our military education institutes, learn about the United States, then go back to their countries.

By and large, other Armed Forces will send their very best officers. They come back to their own countries, and then as they move up in their countries, they understand what we are about. They are people that we can work with, and it serves our countries’ interests.

There are those who believe that attendance at our military institutions should be more of a reward for reforms they have already made rather than a tool in order to get there. That is really, I think, the root of the disagreement between men and women of goodwill who look at this question.

Regarding our Regional Defense Fellowships, I know that there are certain principles that will go into their implementation. Number one, it will only be officers who do not have any suspicion or involvement in past human rights abuses. The training will be for non-lethal education. It is not going to be training on how to lay an ambush or how to conduct a particular tactical operation.
It will be education on what Armed Forces do and how they do them. It will have a large component of the common cause that we have against terrorism as part of it, so it will very much comply with the spirit of our education for all officers who come to this country to study.

It will be different from the current program of International Military Education and Training, which is called IMET, for Indonesia, but the principles will be the same.

Mr. Leach. I appreciate that. It is pretty clear that the more professional the military, the more positive it is for any society, particularly in the developing world. Sometimes the military is a great force for progressivity, as in Turkey, and sometimes it is not. How one helps it to be like the former and less the latter is a challenge for all societies. I appreciate your thinking on this subject.

There has been some discussion of new kind of security cooperations in the region. At State, the idea was floated that maybe Australia, South Korea and Japan ought to be part of a new arrangement with the United States. I do not know where we are on that. I will say that I have been one that has been at the cutting edge of wanting to bring and keep New Zealand in the mix.

I realize the philosophical umbrage to the United States Navy that New Zealand has committed by not allowing certain of our ships to come into the country, but still in the history of the last century New Zealand has been on our side in every major conflict. Sometimes culture and history are stronger than public opinion that might be exasperating to us. Would you care to comment on that?

Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. May I add one last——

Mr. Leach. Of course.

Admiral Blair [continuing]. Point to our previous discussion, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Leach. Yes.

Admiral Blair. I asked a group from the National Defense University to look at this. When military officers from other countries study in the United States, what is it that makes a difference? Is it what they learn in the classroom? Is it what they learn in the classroom? What is it?

It is interesting what they found. What they found was it is not what students from other countries learn in the classroom. It is what happens outside the classroom. Each officer that comes, and often they do bring a family, is assigned a sponsor who is another student, another American student at the Army War College or the Naval postgraduate school. He is assigned a faculty sponsor, and that family is also assigned a civilian sponsor, a citizen of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, or Montgomery, Alabama, or Newport, Rhode Island, who adopts that foreign officer and his family for that year.

When our researchers went back and talked to military officers from other countries, it was those sponsor families and what they had done outside the classroom that made the difference in their year in the United States, because it gave them an understanding of what the United States was about.

It was not that they all became Americans, but it gave them an understanding of our country, which meant that as they moved up in their Armed Forces, we could work with them in a mutually positive way. That is really why I am so passionate about the offi-
cers coming back and living in our country as part of this, and not simply getting a quick seminar on some particular subject. That is that one, sir.

On New Zealand, what you say is absolutely right. On individual operation after individual operation, American forces and New Zealand forces find that they are in the same coalition. That is true now, and it is true in Afghanistan. It was certainly true in East Timor in my part of the world, and that is true, and has been true, many times in the recent past.

We do train with the New Zealanders on those types of missions so that we can do them, we can do them better and do them more effectively. Our relations with the New Zealand officers are very, very good. Where we part company with the New Zealanders is their insistence on choosing the kinds of ships that can visit their ports and saying yes, this one can come; no, that one cannot come. It is really that insistence that has changed us from full alliance partners, that we were in the past to the sort of a la carte relationship which we now have.

The New Zealanders for their part have chosen to support the United States in some areas and not in others, and for that reason we support them in many areas, but not in others. The idea that we would have an exercise with New Zealand and that some of our ships participating in that exercise could not visit their ports, even though these are ships that are very safe which are home ported in American ports, just is not right from our point of view.

Where we are with New Zealand is that we do the things which both countries decide to do which are in both of our interests, but we do not have that extra dimension of alliance which allows us to go on to our nuclear powered warships visiting their ports, or them coming to be full participants in multilateral U.S. exercises or exercises with us in our country.

Really, until their policy on this changes, we are going to have this somewhat difficult relationship in certain areas while we can do it in others. I think that is sort of where we are with the policy of New Zealand right now, sir.

Mr. Leach. Well, it is understandable, but I think there are few countries in the world when push comes to shove that we are more likely to be with than New Zealand. That has to be borne in mind as well.

Let me turn to a country where we have the opposite problem attitudinally, and that is North Korea, which I think of all lands in the world is the one the outside world knows the least about. We all know that we have had an incredible half century of difficulty, more than half a century of difficulty with North Korea, and we all know that there have been some hopeful breakthroughs rhetorically that have not come to pass, so there is nothing like dashed expectations that make things sort of a little more awkward than otherwise.

Do you have a sense in recent weeks that tension has escalated, tension has remained the same or decreased, tension being obviously related to the possibility of the threat of military conflict?

Admiral Blair. According to the military indicators, Mr. Chairman, the tension has remained the same. There have been no significant changes in the North Korean military posture, and there
certainly have not been on our side, so we are sitting there as we were before.

You are absolutely right that North Korean behavior is not something that we have as much insight into as we would like. I can just give you just a recent small example, but it is somewhat indicative.

We'd had a successful, but small, program with North Korea where as part of our efforts to account for all of our missing in action, we were recovering remains of some of our missing in action in the Korean War. This was sort of going along in a fairly businesslike way the way it has with other countries. In our most recent set of negotiations within the last couple of months, the North Koreans have thrown up bureaucratic roadblocks, and in fact the talks ended in an impasse.

I just continue to see a very mixed picture from North Korea. President Kim of South Korea has extended proposals in many different areas which are lying there undertaken on the table. There is the railroad that has been built from South Korea to the DMZ with nothing on the other side, despite the agreement of the North Koreans.

There are some very basic military measures that were proposed a couple of years ago by South Korea which are lying there on the table, exchanges of observers, notification of exercises, just some fairly basic stuff that would take a first step toward lowering the military tension on that very tense demilitarized zone. They are sitting there. No, sir. No real changes in the military indicators, but also, no real signs from the North Koreans indicative that they are ready to move forward to take advantage of the offers in many areas which have been tendered their way.

Mr. Leach. Let me turn to another part of the Pacific, a part that the Navy probably has a greater sense for than any other part of our government, and that is the Spratly Islands, where you have over a surprisingly large region 135 or so islands that I guess six or seven countries lay claim to. Because of the commercial interest in the region from fishing to oil, there is the potential of conflict.

What is your assessment of that situation and whether there is any possibility of a technique of reaching consensus on the sovereignty issues?

Admiral Blair. Sir, the developments in the Spratlys and in fact in the South China Sea overall in recent months have been modest, but positive I would say. The most important negotiations have been negotiations on a code of conduct which would provide a certain amount of predictability, and at least commitment to principles, in the region.

That is hung up now, and my colleagues from the State Department would have to give you the latest detailed status, but when I ask about that when I travel around the region, the countries of the region think that those details will be resolved and it will be signed. That it will not be a binding agreement which adjudicates the sovereignty, but it is a commitment by all six countries that have conflicting claims of how they would proceed.

The fairly alarming series of fortifications of islands and classes of military forces which was true a couple of years ago have been
quiet in recent months, so we do not see the military confrontations that we had seen before. The primary forms of violence there have been illegal fishing, primarily Chinese fishermen coming in close to the Philippines area and then the Philippines Navy policing its waters and evicting them. There have been some rammings in that area, but the governments on both sides have then gone quickly to negotiations and have worked it out.

The news is fairly encouraging, but there certainly is not a clear path to final adjudication, which would allow for both fishing development and petroleum exploitation, which would be what would benefit all of the countries there.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Rohrabacher?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Unfortunately, as the Chairman of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee I have a lot to do with NASA, and right now they are having the hearing on NASA.

To show you how important, however, I thought your testimony is today and the subject being covered today, I am down here now to ask you a few questions and talk to you a little bit about the challenges we face in the Pacific.

First and foremost, Admiral, have you seen the Chinese maps that designate all of the South China Sea up to the coastline of the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, as Chinese waters?

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir. Not only have I see those maps, but I have seen the maps which show part of India as part of China. There are also a few of those maps which show part of Russia as part of China as well.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are you concerned about that?

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir. Cartography which includes other countries is pretty dangerous in my business.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. What the Communist Chinese have been doing is in their maps indicating to the world that the entire South China Sea is their lake and their territory.

When they asked for an apology after knocking our plane out of the sky last year, could that have something to do with trying to receive some type of an official acceptance of that map?

Admiral BLAIR. That map actually, Mr. Rohrabacher, has an 1870 date on it, but the current Government of China has republished it, as you know.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Admiral BLAIR. There is no question that the Chinese would prefer that that map become reality, and they would have a say in everything that is done in that area.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I understand your diplomacy here. Let me just put it on the record. I believe that one of the reasons why our plane was knocked out of the air and an apology was demanded by the Chinese, this was done in order to have an official recognition somewhat of claims by the Communist Chinese of the South China Sea.

You mentioned Mischief Reef. As you know, I flew over Mischief Reef. It took me a lot of wheeling and dealing to get that C-130 out of the Philippines to get over there, too. I could not help but notice the Chinese warships in the Mischief Reef area in the little lagoon there, as well as what I considered to be much more and
the Philippines considered to be much more than fishing facilities. It looked more like military fortresses there being positioned.

Have the Chinese withdrawn all of their military vessels from Mischief Reef in that area?

Admiral BLAIR. The Chinese keep a garrison there, which they upgraded in 1998. The vessels come back and forth and patrol over the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the Chinese basically have their military vessels there in Mischief Reef, they are trying to enforce this idea that they own the South China Sea, they are trying to snatch this territory, Mischief Reef, which could well have vast amounts of oil and natural gas underneath it, by use of force.

Admiral BLAIR. The Chinese make all the claims that you state, yes, sir, and they have periodic military moves to support that claim.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Recently there has been talk between Taiwan and the Philippines, and an understanding was reached that Taiwan would provide a certain number of jet aircraft to the Philippines. I think they were F5–As. Es? F5–Es which are in very good shape, but are older aircraft.

It was a deal that from this Congressman’s perspective was an incredibly good deal. There was almost no money. The Philippines are broke, as we know. I understand that CINCPAC opposed that deal.

Admiral BLAIR. I was not asked about that, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If indeed there was a chance to provide fighter aircraft to the Philippines, which they do not have any, I understand, operational fighter aircraft, and it could be done in a very cost effective way with some sort of range over the Nationalist Chinese, would you be in favor of letting our Philippine friends be able to have the weapons they need to defend themselves?

Admiral BLAIR. I mean, those are decisions for the Philippines to make, Mr. Rohrabacher. If the Philippines get ahold of fighter aircraft, that is fine. They need to protect their air sovereignty just like other countries do.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You face a major challenge, and we appreciate your service to your country. I appreciate the long hours and hard work and the dedication you have had during your career. I want to thank you.

I am sorry. I am going to have to run back now to make sure that we put NASA back on track because I am the Chairman of that Subcommittee, but I did think that your testimony and what we are talking about today is so important.

One last question. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about our goal in the Philippines? I am sure I must have missed that.

Admiral BLAIR. No, sir. I am optimistic. The Philippines, with our help, can get the job done.

If I can add just one advertisement, sir, my Naval Academy classmate, Charlie Bolden, I understand has been nominated to be an official there at NASA, and he is good people.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Admiral BLAIR. You are getting a good one there, sir.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, I, too, am optimistic about the Philippines. The Filipino people and the American people have a
history together. We are good friends. It is time for us to make sure we are standing. There was a period where there was a little uneasiness about our relationship, and I am very happy that is coming to a close.

This operation that we are having now in the Philippines I hope will lead to a cementing of that great friendship that we have had in working together.

Thank you very much, Admiral, for the good job you are doing. Admiral Blair. Yes, sir.

Mr. Leach. Thank you, Dana.

Eni?

Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to initially offer my apologies. There has been a conflict in Committee meetings and hearings.

I would like to extend my personal welcome to Admiral Blair in our joint Committee hearing this morning and certainly thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling to the attention of the Members of the Committee someone with the standing and bearing of Admiral Blair, who has tremendous responsibility with the largest U.S. military command in the world.

I do not know whether to say that I envy you, sir, or I admire you tremendously for taking up such a responsibility, which involves some 300,000 military personnel and a geographical jurisdiction of 100 million square miles, and the responsibility of having to report directly to President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld. That is awesome.

Probably no one better respects and certainly appreciates the responsibility that you bear, Admiral Blair, than I. It has been my privilege in the past months and years to know you personally and to meet with you on occasions to discuss issues affecting the Asia-Pacific region.

Mr. Rohrabacher had indicated earlier about the situation in the Philippines, and there seems to be some concern about how long are we going to be in the Philippines. Are we inviting another Vietnam? What exactly is the situation with the presence of some 600 U.S. military personnel there, besides training the Philippine forces? Are there any other considerations of the Administration than our relations with the Philippines?

You know, it was an interesting situation years ago. The Philippines did not want us. They literally told us to get out of Subic Bay. Get out of Clark Air Force Base. We can take care of ourselves. That was the end of it. We respected that.

Now I think President Arroyo has taken the initiative in asking us to come back. Is there some problem now with the Philippine Armed Forces that they cannot take care of as far as this Muslim insurgency, that is seemingly giving the Philippine Government a headache and problem?

I hope I am not being repetitive, Mr. Chairman, if maybe the question has already been raised, but I am very interested and wanted to know what our standing policy is toward the Philippines, especially with the level of assistance that we are giving as far as training the Philippine military.
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. I answered part of that question, but it is very important, and you ask it in a slightly different way, which I think is important.

First, as far as carrying out my responsibility as CINCPAC, the only way I get that done is with a lot of good help. A lot of that help is both here in the Congress, as well as in my own command. I have appreciated talking with you over the years and having your insights on our part of the world.

No officer of my generation in the Armed Forces can do anything without thinking about Vietnam and the sort of steps that we took there, and how it just did not work out; but I think that our program in the Philippines is really of an entirely different character. You are absolutely right that back in 1992, we closed the bases. Away we went. As part of that agreement, we did not even have a status of forces agreement because that was part of the base agreement, so for years we had no more than 20 people in uniform who would even be in the Philippines—no exercises, no contact of a substantial scale at all despite our mutual defense treaty. We provided no additional assistance to the Philippines, and it was a real low point in our military relations.

I think what happened was that the Philippines realized that that was not really the right situation for them. In the 3 years that I have been on the job, I saw the previous Philippine Government and many Philippine leaders work assiduously to rebuild the status of forces agreement.

The hostage situation or the law and order situation in the southern Philippines just continued to get worse. The first American involvement was back in the year 2000 when an American hostage was taken for a number of months. Although he was able to escape during a military encounter, after that we got together with the Philippines and said, “What can we do about this?”

We trained one of their companies, a light reaction company, to be more effective in hostage situations, so we were working together on problems which are both a threat to the Philippines and a threat to America and American interests.

When the attacks of 9–11 took place, there was some basis for our relationship with the Philippines. I think what we realized from our point of view was that a group like the Abu Sayyaf Group, which was founded 5 years ago with primary funding from a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden, which had had contacts in the past with the al-Qaeda group which provided rhetorical support to al-Qaeda’s and Osama bin Laden’s goals, and which had some indications of recent contact with him, was both a potential terrorist problem and an actual threat to Americans, as well as Filipinos; so it was natural that we would assist the Philippines to deal with that threat. It was a threat to them and to us.

The bounds that we put around it, though, are pretty tight. Our assistance is very carefully focused against the Abu Sayyaf Group, not against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or the Moro National Liberation Front. These are political organizations that the Philippine Government is dealing with, and we are not taking action against them. We are assisting the Philippines with action against the Abu Sayyaf Group.
It is relatively confined geographically. There is not a big outside support organization which is funneling help into a group against the Philippines. It is an indigenous group, which the Philippines has the means and the responsibility to deal with.

As I mentioned to Chairman Leach, it is not just a military problem. It is very much an economic problem. I am sure you have traveled to Mindanao and that area, and you realize that the level of economic development there is worse than it is in the rest of the country. The Philippine Government is committed to increasing that.

I think all of those factors make me think that this is not a slippery slope that we are starting down. This is a definite threat to Philippine and American security after the 11th of September, which we have the tools that we can provide to the Philippines. They have the commitment. They have success and soldiers there.

Their President is passionate on fighting this threat, and so I think we are helping them do their job, and we can do that effectively.

Mr. Faleomavaega. We know the national media has focused greatly on the situation with al-Qaeda and Afghanistan and suggesting the presence of terrorists in primarily the Middle East, but we all know that the most populous Muslim country in the world is Indonesia. A tremendous presence of Muslims also exists in Malaysia.

I am not in any way suggesting that just because you are a Muslim you are a terrorist—please, that is not what I meant—but we do have to focus on the fact that in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia there appears to be this networking of al-Qaeda. I wanted to ask, what is your best assessment on the question of international terrorism emanating from the Asia-Pacific region? How directly does it affect our security? Is it just a fantasy, or are we realistic in holding that in these three countries there is a presence there?

Admiral Blair. My best assessment is that there are organizations, loose cells, located in Southeast Asia and in South Asia which, if not card carrying members of al-Qaeda, share its goals in addition to some local goals and cooperate with al-Qaeda, and are willing to, and in some cases were actually, plan attacks against American forces and embassies and host nation institutions.

People, these groups, seem to be international in Southeast Asia, and their members and some of their citizens travel around and go back and forth among Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. They pose a threat to the United States and to these countries, and we ought to through relentless cooperation with these countries go against them and root them out, and also, as we said in the Philippines, take care of the conditions to the extent we can that bred them.

I think that Southeast Asian Islam is of a different character from the Islam that is in the Persian Gulf, that has come to terms with modernity and progress in, I think, a very positive way, which is in fact an example, and that we, therefore, have a different fundamental theological and cultural problem from the problem with the anti-Americanism and anti-progress aspects of the al-Qaeda groups elsewhere.
Nonetheless, there are organizations which are threatening to kill Americans, and we need to go against them.

Mr. Faleomavaega. There may be differing opinions among my colleagues about the situation in Japan. We know that Japan is the second most powerful economic power in the world; some $33 trillion dollars in GNP, about $3 trillion in overseas investments. From what I understand, if Japan decides to cash in its chips, the U.S. Treasury bonds and what they have invested in our own country, you are talking about $760 billion. Europe alone has some $600 billion in Japanese investments.

My question I wanted to ask you, Admiral Blair, is that Japan’s Prime Minister recently made a most dynamic move by sending Japanese forces to assist us in combating international terrorism in Afghanistan. This is a milestone.

I do not know how they were able to get around the constitutional restrictions, but I have always held the view that if Japan wants to be a key player among the five permanent members of the Security Council they should also take up responsibility for providing security. There is also apprehension about Japan’s ability if they are to take up war capability. Japan could be a nuclear superpower within a year if it wants to.

What is your military assessment of Japan’s capacity as a democracy, as an ally? Should they participate more by giving peacekeeping forces like we have been doing, sharing this tremendous burden as part of the United Nations, or should we maintain the status quo by saying it is okay to do everything else, but you cannot send military forces? Is it all right for American boys and girls to die in defense of democracy and our responsibility to the United Nations, but it is not okay for the Japanese to do the same?

I believe the Japanese should step forward and be counted, but you may have a differing opinion on this. I would like to ask you to comment on this.

Admiral Blair. Mr. Faleomavaega, I absolutely share your conviction, and I have said it in private and in public many, many times. I think that over time, deliberately in a way that does not raise the old historical fears, Japan should assume a role, a military role more befitting its status for United Nations regional operations.

I think that the government, Prime Minister Koizumi and many Japanese saw the war on terrorism as a way to take a step in that direction. As you indicated, the Prime Minister went to the Diet, and actually laws were passed so that this was the action of the entire Government of Japan, not just of the Executive Branch.

He made trips to China and then to Korea, which are two neighbors of Japan which bear the deepest historical scars of Japanese actions in the second world war. He explained it in a transparent way, and both of those governments understood what Japan was doing.

I can tell you that the actual assistance that Japan is providing, fuel to our ships that are in the North Arabian Sea, is real capability that otherwise we would have to do ourselves, so it is a real help. I think it is very much a step in the right direction.

I think it has been handled very responsibly, and I think by very carefully picking actions in which Japan can contribute militarily
to international efforts, it can move into that role which I think it should have, I think, if it does it right with its neighbors, they will accept and is in the American interest.

Mr. Faleomavaega. We are having conflicting views among the Members of the Committee about the IMET program and whether or not we should continue providing training for military personnel, especially in a country like Indonesia. Now, I know in view of the 9–11 tragedy there has been a whole change of our national policy, and I understand there has been appropriated about $17 million for counter-terrorism training to address this issue.

Does this in any way conflict with the current law and restrictions on how our country should provide training for those countries that have human rights problems like Indonesia, for example?

Admiral Blair. Sir, the actual policy implementation of the regional defense fellowship funds are being worked out now, but in the papers that I have seen as we are putting this program together the program is going to insist on checks of the personal and unit records of anybody who is educated under that program.

As the legislation in the Defense Appropriations Act says, it will be non-lethal education. It will not be things that are lethal, lethal skills. I think that bringing officers to study at American military institutions is one of the best investments that the United States can make, whether it be under IMET or under the regional defense fellowship program.

You have visited, sir, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies there in Honolulu where we have shorter courses with many military officers, ministry of defense officials and foreign affairs officials from the region. I was traveling to a country last year, and one of those officers was assigned as my escort. I had come out of a meeting with a general in that country, which is one of those meetings that you think you are in a black and white movie. I mean, it was just 40 or 50 years ago.

This young officer, as I was getting in the car, leaned over to me and said, “Admiral, I am embarrassed about what you just went through. We know what needs to be done in our country.” This was because of what he had seen in an Asia-Pacific center 12 week seminar.

I think that although there are some officers that you can cite who come out of education in the United States and try to turn it around and jam it back in our eye because of whatever beliefs they have, the overwhelming majority of those who study in our country come away with a better understanding. They are people that we do work with in their own countries to find common interests.

If it were up to me, I would bring officers from North Korea, Burma and any other country to study in our military institutions and send them back to their own countries. I think it would be a very good investment for us.

Mr. Faleomavaega. It is always good to know that that is the thinking. However, it is always easier to think in hindsight, given the problem that the Indonesian military were not exactly kind to some 100,000 West Papuans that were murdered and tortured and killed, nor to the 200,000 East Timorese that were murdered, tortured and killed in the period of Suharto’s dictatorship. You kind
of have to think well, who is to blame for this? How did we train these people to become weapons of destruction?

I think what you are saying is very positive, and I hope that that is the attitude with these training processes that we go through with the military organizations of these countries when it does take place.

I do not know if you accompanied the President on his recent trip to Japan, China and Korea.

Admiral Blair. No, sir.

Mr. Faleomavaega. I am disappointed that you did not. The President should have taken you along. He certainly wanted to find out more about the Korean Peninsula, and I am probably being repetitive on this. Maybe other Members may have already raised the question.

How serious are our efforts now being made to support reconciliation between North and South Korea, and President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine" policy? I certainly am very supportive of that policy. Unfortunately, the remarks made by the President may have slanted the view on this policy.

That North Korea is considered as an "axis of evil," to me, portends a very different image. I am not an English major, and I am still learning how to speak English, but when you describe a country as part of an "axis of evil," automatically, it brings to mind Hitler and Nazism and six million Jews being murdered and tortured.

I also do not see Iran's history in the same vein, but then as a matter of description maybe I am wrong in looking at it from that point of view. What, in your best judgement, are the positives the President has drawn from his recent trip to Asia, to Japan, Korea and China?

Admiral Blair. Sir, I do not make an extensive study of it, but North Korean rhetoric is certainly in a class all of its own. I have read some of the things they have said about me, and they do not sound like things that many other people say about me. The rhetoric around Korea is really of its own class.

What I have learned to do in Korea is to try to look at sort of facts on the ground and progress. What I have seen in the past 3 years or so is that the basic policy that really all of us who deal with Korea have come to, which is maintaining our military deterrence and letting North Korea know that certainly large scale aggression will result in the loss of their country, and that military intimidation will not be successful and that military provocation does not advance their interest is sort of one foundation that we all agree with.

The other foundation that I think we all agree with is that we should offer to North Korea ways to change its behavior, and in reward for changing its behavior, economic assistance, in addition to the fundamental humanitarian assistance that we all give, plus some diplomatic recognition will enable it to improve the lot of its citizens and end its real pariah status.

That policy and variations is what we have all been following for quite some time. The language changes and the emphasis changes, but those two fundamental things I think are what we have all come to as far as dealing with Korea goes.
There are a number of offers on the table for North Korea from South Korea, from the United States and from Japan in which North Korea could very well walk forward along that path. Right now, they do not seem to be picking them up.

Time is on our side I think with North Korea, and we can let them come along in their own interest.

Mr. Faleomavaega. Admiral, the Chairman has been very kind with extending me the time to dialogue with you. I wish every American could really have a sense of appreciation of the responsibility that you have borne for the past 3 or 4 years, Admiral.

I do not have enough words to express my deep appreciation and gratitude for the service that you render, and your leadership in this capacity, on behalf of our country. We are very grateful for what you have done in keeping the peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Leach. Thank you, Eni.

Let me just turn quickly to two final questions. One relates to the Taiwan Straits. How do you see the balance today? Do you see tension easing, or do you see an awkwardness that is going to remain with us for quite a while?

Admiral Blair. Sir, from the military point of view, I think there is more stability in the situation than you sometimes get the impression of if you read the headlines.

The fundamental situation is that the Chinese can cause a great deal of damage to Taiwan in ways that the Taiwanese Armed Forces and even the U.S. Armed Forces cannot stop—missiles that can be shot at Taiwan and damage by long range aviation and sabotage and so on. That is a reality.

The other reality is, however, that China cannot attain its stated goal of reunifying Taiwan by military force. They do not have the military capability to take and hold Taiwan. That military reality, as long as the United States follows the Taiwan Relation Act and ensures that Taiwan has sufficient defense, and as long as my forces have the orders, which they do have, to be ready to support Taiwan if ordered, that situation is not going to change.

The military reality behind individual weapons systems is in fact quite stable, and that military piece of it hopefully provides a foundation for what is the policy of the United States and in fact of Taiwan and of China, which is to achieve a peaceful resolution of those issues.

I watch the non-military aspects of it pretty closely, and I would say the most encouraging events along that line are the economic integration between—integration is the wrong word, but the increased Taiwanese investment, the increased contact economically between Taiwan and the mainland. There are huge numbers of Taiwanese living on the mainland.

I am not sort of an economic determinist that says just because countries have good economic relations they will not go to war and they will not fight. I mean, there are historical examples all over the place which belie that, but I believe that this sort of development, plus human contact, plus the removal of barriers across the Strait will lead to a way in which both Taiwan and China can reach an agreement which satisfies their needs.
In the meantime, I think we can hold the military ring to make that very unattractive for China to conduct military aggression, and we can have a good outcome for that part of the world. Nothing I see in military developments over the year—major Chinese exercises of last year, Taiwanese exercises, the actions by those countries—changes that view.

Mr. Leach. I am appreciative of that, and I am also appreciative that your view is that economic ties should be encouraged. I think that is exactly correct.

My final question relates to Korea again. It is my understanding about a year ago our combined forces command gave a dozen or so confidence building proposals to the North Koreans. Have they responded at all?

Admiral Blair. Sir, the military confidence building measures that were actually given to the North Koreans were given by the Republic of Korea during its early meetings about a year and a half ago. They were fairly rudimentary measures, which General Schwartz was part of a plan that he has worked out for how we should proceed in the confidence building area.

They have not been responded to by the North Koreans. They are sitting on the table unaddressed.

Mr. Leach. Fair enough. I want to thank you very much both for your testimony, for your career and also for the 300,000 men and women under your command and the service they provide. Thank you.

Admiral Blair. Thank you.

Mr. Leach. The Committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m. the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
QUESTION #1—U.S. FORCE POSTURE

MR. LEACH: For the past 50 years, the focus of U.S. attention has been in Northeast Asia, where the Cold War confrontation between North and South Korea continues. Today and in the future, however, U.S. interests—which include coping with an uncertain China, countering terrorism in Southeast Asia, and reducing the risks of Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry—are and will continue to be spread throughout this vast region. In this context, how should the U.S. military force posture adapt over time to support the region’s new needs?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: Developing a more capable joint warfighting force that can rapidly project power is critical for furthering U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. We have therefore implemented a number of initiatives that will achieve this goal. Many of these initiatives are delineated in my posture statement. Moreover, the Quadrennial Defense Review articulates the same vision when it calls for greater strategic agility and transformation. Even if the Cold War confrontation between North and South Korea forces should disappear tomorrow, the U.S. will require forward-stationed and deployed, combat ready forces in the Asia-Pacific to protect its interests and prosecute the global war on terrorism.

The physical presence of U.S. forces deters aggression, enables global mobility, and promotes regional security by reassuring allies and friends of U.S. resolve, and creating an environment conducive to peaceful development. Additionally, they act as a buffer between historical enemies, provide advance warning of both regional and global threats, and are our initial response force in the event of crisis or war. Forward presence enhances agility, serves as an instrument of Theater Security Cooperation, and creates opportunities for greater interoperability with our regional partners, thus bolstering our ability to decisively defeat would-be aggressors.

At this time, we have forward-based and forward-deployed forces in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Japan, Okinawa, South Korea and Diego Garcia. They have been frequently used to support U.S. operations outside of Northeast Asia. These forces currently benefit from access to facilities in Australia, Singapore, Thailand, Diego Garcia, and the Philippines.

To rapidly respond to the challenges we are likely to face in the future, we must improve the infrastructure of existing U.S. and foreign bases while expanding foreign access for over-flights and use of ports and airfields. We continue to work for access to overseas facilities that can support U.S. forces in times of crisis. Maintaining close security cooperation with our friends and allies is the means to achieving these ends. Military-to-military relationships as part of a focused Theater Security Cooperation plan can expand our deployment options throughout the vast Asia-Pacific region. The security and stability that the U.S. provides help ensure the economic prosperity of our friends and allies. With their assistance, we can develop the mechanisms and influence necessary to expand access and further strengthen regional security.
I recommend continuing to work with the South Korean and Japanese governments to improve our existing overseas basing structure. Towards this end, the Land Partnership Plan in Korea and recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa have begun processes that will increase our ability to project power while reducing local concerns associated with U.S. basing. Having forces that can quickly move to points of debarkation and with ready access to quality training areas will enhance strategic agility and combat readiness.

I believe we must continue the work to transform our military forces. As we have done in implementing our Joint Mission Force concept, experimentation should be tied to actual exercises. The acquisition process must be geared to rapidly field equipment and tactics that prove successful in these exercises. In this way, we can transform our forces in a manner that rapidly evolves our warfighting capabilities. These experiments and exercises will also assure our allies and develop their ability to support us as coalition partners. Furthermore, transformation will help dissuade and deter potential future adversaries.

In summary, I recommend continuing to support the initiatives we have begun. These will adapt our force posture for the future challenges we may face by a more capable joint warfighting force that can rapidly project power.

QUESTION #2—BASES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MR. LEACH: Over the past decade, U.S. forces in the Pacific have developed a policy of “places not bases” in Southeast Asia. After leaving the Philippines in 1992, the U.S. established bunkering, R&R, and joint exercise access to even more Southeast Asian states than were available during the Cold War. Still, the question remains in Southeast Asia about the roles U.S. forces should play either on their own or in collaboration with regional services. Could you expand on your vision for future U.S. roles in this region?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: Our strategy for U.S. forces in the Pacific clearly addresses the need to ensure our own forces are trained and equipped so that, if necessary, they can respond unilaterally to the entire range of potential contingencies projected in the Pacific. However, the more likely response to a contingency or crisis in the Pacific is as part of a coalition. Our recent U.S. military history since Operation Desert Storm is illustrative of this fact—there have been no unilateral U.S. operations during this time. The U.S. has participated as the leader of most coalitions, with Australia supplying outstanding coalition leadership during OPERATION STABILISE in East Timor.

Given this reality of multi-lateral cooperation, it is in our national interest to ensure that potential Asia-Pacific coalition partners can operate safely and effectively with one another. This is not to say that every nation should be equipped and trained for the entire range of military contingencies. Rather, as appropriate for each nation’s resources, Asia-Pacific nations would develop ground, air and support forces that could deploy and sustain themselves and operate using standardized, exercised tactics, techniques, and procedures. Our goal is to develop a pool of coalition partners with real capabilities to contribute to humanitarian crises, transnational threats and United Nations-mandated operations. By building upon patterns of cooperation, the U.S. can continue to assure—and possibly expand—the necessary access to respond to potential crisis throughout the Asia-Pacific.

QUESTION #3—MULTILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION

MR. LEACH: Arguably, a fundamental problem with alliances in the post-Cold War world is that what had been originally created to deter threats is now expected to help underwrite regional stability. Yet U.S. alliances in Asia have no dispute settlement mechanisms or confidence-building measures between Asia allies and the United States. Is there merit in promoting greater regional policy coordination, or would multilateral efforts risk diluting the primacy of America’s strong bilateral alliances in Asia?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: The end of the Cold War, economic turbulence, and new threats of violence have affected the Asia-Pacific region. These factors have worked together to change the nature of the security environment. Whether viewed as good or bad, global integration is a fact of life that requires new partnerships and approaches. Far from diluting our existing bilateral relationships, we have found that many of the challenges facing the nations of the Asia-Pacific region are more effectively addressed within a multilateral framework. Our friends and allies have been warming up to the opportunity to overcome historic mistrust and have worked hard to
find new, mutually beneficial interactions and relationships among themselves. By finding ways to cooperate, plan and practice together we can make collective responses to common transnational concerns such as illegal drug trafficking, environmental degradation, maritime piracy, and terrorist threats more effective. For instance, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, despite its shortcomings, represents solid and steady progress in the area of cooperation. In many ways, the events of 11 September have accelerated the process. Some real cooperation is taking place between the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Japan has rapidly started to become a regional player, as has the Republic of Korea.

However, a significant threat potential in the region remains and regional security cooperation advances are not a treaty or a substitute for maintaining our existing bilateral alliances. Major flash points—such as the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait and Kashmir region—represent the legacies of past wars not yet fully resolved, and violent internal conflicts persist in many countries. Our alliance with Japan remains the cornerstone of American strategy for the Asia-Pacific region, while Australia is our closest ally in the region, and the Republic of Korea is our most operationally focused alliance. These relationships are mature but must not be taken for granted.

Using our strong bilateral relationships as a foundation, we must seek to develop multilateral capabilities to handle communal violence and transnational concerns. Enhanced regional cooperation increases our effectiveness in combating transnational threats and organizing multinational responses to small-scale contingencies, and also creates the military relationships needed to hedge against a regional aggressor.

Shared, dependable expectations of peaceful change and problem solving through multilateral cooperation are in keeping with U.S. national security interests and in harmony with the consensus-based decision making of the "ASEAN way". The enhanced regional cooperation concept is very simple—willing nations finding common solutions to common problems, and in the process we develop regional partners rather than regional adversaries.

QUESTION #4—MISSILE DEFENSE

MR. LEACH: How important is developing a credible missile defense system to advancing U.S. interest in the Asia-Pacific? To what extent, if any, are U.S. alliances at risk from the growing threat of high-speed, precise cruise missiles as well as land-based ballistic missiles which can target fixed position bases and naval deployments? Would an increasingly high threat environment for the U.S. and its allies give the latter pause in joining U.S. actions and perhaps lead the U.S. to reconsider the wisdom of forward deployment in the Pacific?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: Developing an effective regional Ballistic Missile Defense System as part and parcel of the Integrated Missile Defense program is crucial for the security of the U.S. and its possessions, its forward deployed and based forces, and for its regional friends and allies.

Historic grievances, military competitions, and technology proliferation in the region provide fertile ground for the ballistic and cruise missile threat. Missile technologies continue to advance and are now available to a significant number of states. Although weapons of mass destruction are a logical choice for those seeking mass effects, missiles armed with conventional warheads are also of concern, especially as precision guided capabilities and high explosives with increased destructive power are developed. These types of weapons are a threat to existing and future U.S. infrastructure and operations/deployments. The vast Pacific region has limited U.S. basing options. Providing a credible defense against this threat protects critical strategic deployment infrastructure, assures our friends and allies, enhances our access to the region, and deters potential adversaries.

Countries possessing a ballistic missile capability or program within the region include North Korea, China, Russia, India, and Pakistan. North Korea’s missile program is well documented, but not the only source of concern in the region. China has the most purposeful and expansive ballistic missile modernization program of any country. India has also embarked on a path to produce a large family of missiles, including those capable of reaching deep targets in China. Pakistan’s ballistic missile program targets India. In addition, Russia continues to rely on ballistic missiles to compensate for weaknesses in its conventional forces.

The United States needs a missile defense system forward in Asia both to protect our forward-deployed forces and to reassure our allies. This is why I am so concerned with the cancellation of the Navy Area program. Pushing ahead with such
a program would give our country the ability to place sea-based Missile Defense (MD) assets on station in a timely manner; a capability that resides with none of our adversaries. In my opinion, cancellation of the program sends the wrong message to allies and friends who rely on the U.S. for support. Deployment of Navy Area systems, due to their self-deploying capability, would not require diversion of Air Force cargo planes from other missions before or during conflict. The benefits of sea-based defense cannot pass without being weighed heavily.

Should the U.S. reconsider our forward deployment in this region based on this emerging threat? Given existing vital U.S. economic, military, and social ties with the region, removing our forward presence would encourage potential adversaries, damage our global credibility, and foster instability. Missile defense systems should be deployed with forward-deployed U.S. forces.

QUESTION #5—MILITARY TO MILITARY EXCHANGES

MR. LEACH: I understand that you are a strong advocate of military-to-military exchange programs, including IMET. Could you explain your views to the Committee, and include why you believe it is in U.S. interests to expand military contacts with countries as diverse as China, Indonesia, North Korea, and Burma?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: The end of the Cold War affected security relations in the Asia-Pacific region less than in Europe, however a significant change in the regional security environment still occurred. This change, combined with two decades of rapid economic growth in China, economic booms and busts across the rest of Asia, and the coming to power of new generations with no personal experience in the wars of revolution and independence, has led states to review their approaches to security. While one approach envisions a multipolar world where major states represent centers of power, an alternative approach is one in which states concentrate on shared interests in peaceful development and actively promote diplomacy and negotiation to resolve disagreements.

This shared interest in peaceful development provides the foundation for building security cooperation. The process involves developing mutual trust through both dialogue and action. Dialogue provides the basis for understanding while action demands a deeper level of cooperation.

There are currently restrictions on military interactions with 12 of the 43 nations in the U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. Some are legislative, but most are executive branch decisions in recent years to use military activities as “carrots and sticks” to elicit better behavior from developing Asian nations.

Efforts to enhance regional cooperation have succeeded well over the past few years, but are at a point where some of these restrictions jeopardize further progress. As we promote ways of bringing neighbors together, it is awkward at best, and harmful to U.S. interests at worst, when we must also insist that various Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries exclude their neighbor, Indonesia, for example.

The U.S. does not want to reward “bad actors,” but suspension of all military-to-military contact activities eliminates the opportunity for dialogue and positive influence by the U.S. When military-to-military contact is totally suspended, U.S. influence is diminished.

I advocate a military-to-military contact baseline policy which, developed in consultation with the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs), and U.S. embassy country teams would set an activity baseline sustainable with all nations with whom we have diplomatic relations. Under such a policy, all nations would generally be allowed to attend international multilateral conferences, senior service schools, and institutions such as the regional Centers for Security Studies.

It is to our benefit to expose nations to democratic ideals and international norms at regional forums, especially when the message is amplified by our regional partners. The U.S. would retain leverage from the ability to adjust military-to-military contact beyond the baseline in areas beneficial to both the U.S. and the nation in question. Expansion of activity above the baseline would include events of significant military value such as Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing, port visits, military training and exercises. If a nation severely regresses in its reform efforts or violates international norms, then discretionary activities are rolled back in proportion to the severity of the event. Regardless of progress or regression, however, there should remain a place for some baseline of military-to-military contact to provide long term opportunities for dialogue and positive influence.

For example, it is to our benefit to continually expose a nation like Indonesia to democratic ideals and international norms. We benefit when U.S. and other regional
military officers engage in dialogue with the Indonesian military in multi-national forums. Since International Military Education and Training (IMET) for Indonesia has been restricted since 1991, few Indonesian officers have been exposed to our values and we are also limited in our ability to influence developments due to the scarce number of contacts developed.

It remains in our interest to maintain a baseline military-to-military relationship and face-to-face contacts with China and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It is vital to do this to help us avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations, as we operate in close proximity in the Western Pacific. It is necessary to involve the Chinese military in cooperative and constructive non-war fighting multilateral activities of common interest to all countries in the region. A proper, if not close, relationship with the PLA also serves to reassure our friends and allies of our determination to maintain a reliable, moderating presence in the region.

Burma’s human rights and anti-democracy records have resulted in strict policy limitations on military interaction. Only a handful of aging senior officers there has had U.S. training in the past. Consequently there is very little exposure to our message on the proper role of a military in society, and virtually no military counterpart contacts we could work with in dealing with an emergent humanitarian or security crisis, to include most damaging scenarios involving threats to American citizens. Political change will come to Burma at some point. It could involve a period of danger and confusion at the center. Even a few effective connections with the newer elements of the military could make a difference in our ability to ameliorate both change, and the future, in Burma.

With regard to North Korea, military-to-military contact should be pursued as an option, in concert with our government’s overarching North Korea policy. However, we must be realistic in understanding that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is unengageable less because of U.S. policy and more because they choose to be so—contact is a threat to the regime. Here, it is wise to simply keep our options open, looking for opportunities to use military-to-military contact when and where appropriate.

QUESTION #6—JEMAAH ISLAMIYA

MR. LEACH: The arrest of 15 people in Singapore last month revealed a plot by the Jemaah Islamiya organization to bomb U.S. targets in that country. Since then, more than 20 Jemaah activists have been arrested in Malaysia and the Philippines. What can you tell us about the Jemaah Islamiya organization, its ties to Al Qaida, and the threat it poses to U.S. interests in the region?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is an al-Qaida-associated terrorist organization with 200–300 members, established in the early 1990s, and operating throughout Southeast Asia. The exact structure of JI throughout the region is unknown, but at least nine different cells have been identified in Malaysia and Singapore. By date, authorities in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines have detained 37 JI cell members. Government officials estimate 60 supporters and family members remain in Singapore, with another 200 in Malaysia. We do not know if any active JI members remain in the Philippines at this time. Three Indonesian clerics (identified as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Hambali, and Abu Jibril) appear to be the key leaders in the JI umbrella network. Abu Jibril is in custody in Malaysia, Hambali is a fugitive at large, and Ba’asyir remains free in Indonesia, where he continues to preach extremist themes.

JI appears to have a very clear association with al-Qaida. The Malaysian JI organization hosted meetings and provided support to al-Qaida operatives who perpetrated the 11 September and USS Cole attacks. Additionally, a JI-produced surveillance video of a Singapore shuttle bus carrying U.S. personnel was found in the house of a senior al-Qaida leader in Afghanistan, in December 2001. Finally, at least 15 JI cell members now in custody admitted to training in al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan and stated that Hambali—the Indonesian Muslim cleric who has ties to al-Qaida dating back to 1995—arranged their training in Afghanistan.

As a group, Jemaah Islamiyah and its activities in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines have been severely disrupted, but they have not been eliminated. [DELETED]

QUESTION #7—TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MR. LEACH: Is there clear and convincing evidence that al-Qaida has current links to other local terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia, such as the Moro Islamic
Admiral Blair: [DELETED] Indigenous groups in Southeast Asia in general are clearly vulnerable to al-Qaida’s influence, owing to common ideology and goals, and are increasingly at risk of becoming al-Qaida surrogates as al-Qaida seeks to rebuild its global network.

There is no current evidence that directly links other Indonesian extremist groups, such as GAM, with al-Qaida. The recent arrest of Agus Dwikarna, a major figure in Laskar Jundullah (LJun) and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) shows a possible connection to al-Qaida through another Indonesian al-Qaida-linked individual already in Philippine custody. [DELETED]

QUESTION #8—THE PHILIPPINES—U.S. TRAINING

MR. LEACH: Although still in its early stages, has the U.S. training and cooperation with the armed forces of the Philippines resulted in any new successes on the ground? What specific capabilities are we providing them that they did not have before?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: [DELETED] The most dramatic example of the effect of U.S. assistance was on 14 April 2002, when 18 armed members of the ASG surrendered with their weapons to Philippine forces. [DELETED]

QUESTION #9—INDONESIA: COOPERATION WITH THE U.S.

MR. LEACH: How would you rate Indonesia’s cooperation with the U.S. campaign against terrorism? In your view, have Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts been hampered by a lack of operational capability, a lack of political will, or both?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: Indonesia has begun to take constructive action against some of the threats from terrorism within its borders, but much remains to be done. Their reasons for lack of more significant contributions to date are political, social and economic. [DELETED] In addition, leaders of the Muslim community have begun to speak out against the dangers of extremism. In spite of these efforts, much remains to be done. [DELETED]

QUESTION #10—INDONESIA: CIVILIAN CONTROL OF MILITARY

MR. LEACH: In Indonesia, do you believe that the civilian government has pervasive control of the military? What can the U.S. do to ensure that our assistance to and cooperation with Indonesia helps to increase civilian control of the military?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: [DELETED] In the almost four years since General Suharto stepped down from power, the civilian government has made some significant accomplishments, including a successful General Election, peaceful transfers of power between three Presidents, and one of the most ambitious decentralization programs of civil authority in the world. The military has also made significant concessions of power. The National Police has been separated from the military forces; civilians are serving as Defense Ministers (previously all military); the military Supreme Commander is non-Army for the first time; and the size of the military faction in the Legislature has been significantly reduced. [DELETED]

QUESTION #11—INDONESIA: PRODUCTIVE AREAS FOR U.S.-INDONESIA DEFENSE COOPERATION

MR. LEACH: Are there areas that you think are ripe for U.S.-Indonesia military cooperation that might pose fewer concerns from a human rights perspective, such as—for example—improving Indonesia’s anti-piracy and maritime interdiction capabilities? What specific forms of military assistance and cooperation would you like to see the United States provide to Indonesia?
ADMIRAL BLAIR: As always, U.S. interests should determine the types of support provided. But it must also be recognized that the interests of the Indonesian military (TNI) will govern to what cooperation they are willing to undertake. I think that within those two broad areas, there is enough overlap to structure a mutually beneficial program of military-to-military cooperation.

The U.S. has a continuing interest in supporting the development of effective civilian democratic institutions, civilian supremacy over the military, and military reform and professionalization. Our Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP), funded under Traditional Commander in Chief Activities (TCA) and the Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI), includes many bilateral and multilateral exchanges and conferences that contribute to these goals. Indonesia is particularly keen to enhance its image among its neighbors; co-hosting international events has proven extremely popular. In April, for instance, we will be co-hosting a United Nations-endorsed Peacekeeping Seminar which will have representatives from approximately 30 nations, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC) will be one of the topics addressed. Working in parallel with the embassy’s civilian engagement initiatives, I think we have seen significant progress made with respect to human rights in Indonesia since the fall of President Suharto and the terrible devastation in East Timor. More work needs to be done in this area, and we will continue to conduct activities that contribute to this effort.

I think some of the most useful programs would be those that enhance Indonesia’s ability to protect its territory from transnational threats, especially terrorism. Functional areas that are external, defense-oriented and maritime or air-based pose less risk of human rights abuses than internal, land-based, security-oriented functions. Besides those you mentioned, Navy and Air Force patrol and surveillance capabilities (including aircraft and radar) would be helpful.

QUESTION #12—AUSTRALIA: NEW SECURITY CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

MR. LEACH: Last year a senior State Department official, Deputy Secretary Armitage, floated the idea of a new security consultative arrangement that would embrace Australia and South Korea as well as Japan and the United States. What happened to this idea?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: The State Department continues their discussions with Japanese and Australian officials to explore the merits of the concept. For specifics, I must ask you to please inquire with the State Department for the latest status. From the U.S. Pacific Command perspective, we have various military-to-military forums with Australia. This topic has not been pursued in any of those military forums.

Australia’s Foreign Minister Downer brought up an idea for trilateral security discussions between Australia, the United States and Japan at the 2001 Australia–United States Ministerial (AUSMIN) meeting in Canberra. No military-to-military discussions have resulted on this topic however.

QUESTION #13—JAPAN: GREAT BRITAIN OF THE EAST

MR. LEACH: You suggest in your testimony that Australia is our “closest” Asian ally, even though Japan is our most important Asian ally. In this context, can you help explain what some U.S. officials mean when they speak of Japan as becoming the “England of the Far East?” Does that mean we would expect Japan to become a “special partner” of the U.S. in collective security operations, with forces deployed on the ground in zones of conflict? Or does it mean that we hope to have the same degree of close strategic rapport and military interoperability with Japan as we do with the UK? Please explain.

ADMIRAL BLAIR: During the last three years, I have seen a steady, positive trend in the military aspects of the relationship between our countries. In 1999, the Japanese Diet passed the implementing legislation for the Defense Guidelines. This landmark legislation has widened the focus of our alliance from the traditional defense of Japan to concerns with regional developments that affect Japan’s security. Since the Defense Guidelines were passed, USPACOM and the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) have steadily increased our combined planning and exercising to improve our capability to deal with threats to security in East Asia.

Expectations for a United States-Japan military relationship similar to our relations with the United Kingdom are premature. Japan’s support against terrorism
compared to the United Kingdom's is an illustration of how far Japan has come, but they still have a long way to go. Japan's constitutional restrictions regarding collective self-defense heavily restrict the Japan SDF from participating in military exercises/operations in any capacity other than non-combatant roles outside of Japan. It has long been the Japanese position that Japan, like all other members of the United Nations, has the right of collective self-defense. Japan, however, has elected not to exercise this right. The decision to change, or not to change, this self-imposed restriction is for the Japanese people and the government alone to make.

Whether more active Japanese participation in international peacekeeping or other such activities requires a reinterpretation or revision of the current constitution or just more courageous political leadership and greater national consensus is likewise for Japan to decide. However, we in USPACOM believe that Japan should over time continue to assume military responsibilities and missions commensurate with its importance in the region and the world. We believe these missions will continue to involve combined action with USPACOM forces, and that they will contribute to the common security and prosperity of our two countries and the peaceful development of the region. Whether this increased role leads to constitutional revision remains to be seen. In the mean time, we will continue to encourage the Japanese to expand their military horizons and work to ensure that the future roles and missions of our two militaries continue to provide complementary capabilities.

QUESTION #14—JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

MR. LEACH: Japan has responded superbly to the events of September 11 and the challenge of international terrorism. Among other steps, its decision to send naval vessels to the Indian Ocean to assist the U.S. marks the first time in the postwar era that Japanese forces have participated in an ongoing military campaign. And there are signs of a new awareness of a security policy outside of Japan, including revising peacekeeping legislation to the sinking of a North Korean spy ship in the Sea of Japan.

What do these developments portend for the evolution of Japan’s security policy? What outcome(s) are preferred by the U.S.?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: The 11 September terrorist attacks and Prime Minister Koizumi's historic authorization of military support for the U.S.-led antiterrorism campaign have accelerated a more comprehensive review of Japan's security needs and responsibilities. An increasing number of pro-defense politicians, led by the Prime Minister, are easing legal constraints on Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in a piecemeal fashion, authorizing less controversial security missions to establish precedents for more comprehensive future reforms. Tokyo is expanding regional military-to-military contacts, including joint training exercises, emergency relief and peacekeeping deployments, and anti-piracy patrols. Japanese leaders are no longer debating whether to strengthen Japan’s military and alliance contributions, but how much, how quickly and how autonomously to do so.

Tokyo’s willingness to enhance its military improves prospects for Japan’s gradual development into a more capable and assertive U.S. ally. The Japanese increasingly accept the United States as Japan’s most important long-term security partner and the alliance as the linchpin of Japan’s defense policy. The government of Japan wants to reinforce the credibility of U.S. regional security guarantees by expanding Japan’s own military contributions to the alliance. The military is reconfiguring its force structure and doctrine and setting operational precedents to prepare for more southern-focused missions that go beyond the Constitution’s strict “self-defense” plank, including territorial, sea lane, and missile defense. The SDF is in the process of deploying 700 military peacekeepers to East Timor and may send troops to clear mines in Afghanistan. Naval planners are aiming to establish a permanent Japanese presence in the Malacca Strait by expanding anti-piracy exercises and deployments with Southeast Asian navies. Removing the constitutional ban against collective defense would allow the SDF to better support U.S. combat operations in defense of other countries and to defend U.S. territory and troops, bolstering U.S. deterrence against China and North Korea.
QUESTION #15—HOST NATION SUPPORT AND OKINAWA

MR. LEACH: Given Japan's economic and especially its long-term fiscal challenges, what are the prospects that Japan will be able to maintain its current generous contributions to host nation support? With respect to Okinawa, how confident are we that we and Japan will be able to resolve basing and land use issues in a way that is mutually satisfactory to the U.S. and the people of Okinawa?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: Host Nation Funded Construction (HNFC) has been the mainstay for facilities in Japan, however funding levels have been dropping since the peak-funding year in 1992. The Japanese Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) has funded over $17 billion in new construction since 1979. Recent years have been on a downward trend for JFIP with fiscal year 1998 at $871 million, 1999 at $847 million, and both 2000 and 2001 at $803 million. However, we expect annual JFIP to stabilize over the next four years at about $800 million annually. Over the longer term, the Government of Japan (GOJ) may continue to seek additional reductions in JFIP support.

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) released its final report on 2 December 1996. Support by the GOJ continues to be strong for the 27 initiatives cited in the report, and 15 have already been completed. The Marine Corps Air Station Futenma relocation is the most difficult and costly initiative. However, in September 2000 the GOJ outlined a plan to gain local consensus for relocation of Futenma and the GOJ continues to press for site selection prior to summer 2002. The GOJ has also programmed $4.3 billion for the Futenma relocation, in addition to JFIP, as further evidence of their commitment to resolve issues and move forward.

QUESTION #16—PROLIFERATION OF WMD AND BALLISTIC MISSILES

MR. LEACH: Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles poses a variety of threats to Japan's military security interests. Japanese leaders closely monitor nuclear-related events in North Korea, India, and Pakistan. In this context, how advanced is the joint technical research on a theater missile defense (TMD) system and a Patriot-based ground system to counter a potential North Korean threat?

Would you agree that Japan has not been enthusiastic about U.S. invitations to link Japan’s TMD system to a proposed U.S. national missile defense system of a much larger scale? If so, why?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: The joint technical research on a theater missile defense system has been ongoing since 1999. The efforts have been focused on the Navy Theater Wide Defense System, an Aegis ship capable of destroying ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere. Japan is planning to make a decision on whether to enter the phase of development and deployment after studying whether the development and deployment are technically feasible. The eventual deployment of the Navy Theater Wide Defense System (now becoming the Sea-based Midcourse Defense Segment) would provide significant capability against a potential North Korean medium range ballistic missile threat. [DELETED]. The level of defense improves with the introduction of PATRIOT PAC-3 and Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in conjunction with the Sea-based Midcourse Defense Segment.

Japan’s level of financial commitment remains steady in support of the Sea-based Midcourse Defense Segment. Their challenges have been with the redirection of the Missile Defense Agency and the introduction of the Integrated Missile Defense approach to protecting the United States, forward deployed and based forces, and our regional friends and allies. The public cancellation of the Navy Theater Wide system caused concern. However, the recent successful test of the Sea-based Midcourse Defense Segment on 25 January 2002 eased Japan’s concerns that cooperative work is producing positive results.

QUESTION #17—CHINA'S ACQUISITION OF MILITARY POWER

MR. LEACH: In the military arena, there has been a sharp, and in some sense, unprecedented increase in China’s official military spending. Is there reason to believe that China is in the process of significantly catching up with the U.S. in overall military power? Is it likely that China will become a “peer competitor” of the U.S. in the military arena in the next 10 to 15 years?
ADMIRAL BLAIR: Although China faces significant military shortcomings that will prevent it from being a peer competitor of the U.S. in 10 or even 15 years, China has correctly identified these shortfalls and is aggressively working to remedy them. China has made significant progress towards acquiring or constructing modern weapons systems and developing appropriate doctrine and tactics. Because of its progress in these areas, China is slowly but steadily improving the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities.

China embarked on its military modernization program in the late 1970s. Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the PLA reduced and restructured its forces to develop a leaner military, focused on fighting a modern war under high tech conditions. Simultaneously, China pursued its own weapons production programs and acquired advanced foreign weaponry, much of it from Russia. Domestically, China has expanded the production and improved the performance of a wide range of weapons systems, most notably ballistic missiles, a large number of which are deployed within range of Taiwan. China currently possesses the largest army in the world, a navy whose long-range goal is the ability to detect and destroy U.S. Carrier Battle Groups beyond its littoral waters, and an air force that has acquired some of the most capable modern combat aircraft in the world. Beijing is aggressively incorporating electronic and information warfare into its military doctrine and tactics.

However, China also faces a significant problem in recruiting and training a professional officer and enlisted corps that is the backbone of a modern military force. To date, Chinese military personnel have been unable to fully leverage the capabilities of newly acquired weapons. The Chinese military also suffers from command and control deficiencies that impact on their interoperability, and their ability to conduct complex, multi-service operations like amphibious invasions. Likewise, Chinese logistics are insufficient to support large, sustained operations.

In short, although the Chinese military cannot be considered a “peer competitor” to the U.S., and will not be for the foreseeable future, its military poses a credible threat to the region and to the U.S. ability to defend its interests there.

QUESTION #18—CHINA: POWER PROJECTION

MR. LEACH: Would you agree or disagree that with the notable and important exception of missiles, and perhaps information warfare, China simply cannot project power very far from its shores, and when it can, it cannot sustain these operations from a logistical point of view, nor can it provide effective protection for those forward-deployed forces from various forms of attack, including submarines, aircraft, and missiles?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: People’s Republic of China (PRC) doctrine encourages the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to implement force projection, when necessary, beyond China’s borders for a brief but intense period. That said, the PLA is primarily a regional, not global force, focused on fighting a limited regional war. The PRC’s major concern is to repel enemy forces which would infringe on Chinese territory or maritime resources.

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) have a significant number of combat aircraft, but are essentially a defensive force which cannot project air power very far from its own coast. China’s ability to project sustained air power beyond its borders, even over the Spratly Islands, is hampered by numerous factors, but most notably a shortage of modern combat and specialized (i.e., aerial refueling, AWACS, jamming) aircraft.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) currently operates under a green water defensive strategy (up to about 400 nautical miles off the PRC coastline). This strategy, while not a direct threat to our global force disposition, does present a credible challenge to U.S. forces in the region.

In the near term, it is unlikely the PLAN would be able to sustain any significant power projection beyond its littoral waters. We assess that the PLAN is not capable of supporting an extended deployment with a formation of more than 3 or 4 major surface combatants. Likewise, with insufficient ability to transport and logistically sustain troops via air or naval assets, PLA ground forces currently are unable to perform force projection on a global scale.

In summary, the People’s Liberation Army, while posing a considerable threat to Taiwan and, subsequently, any U.S. forces in the area, is not currently a threat beyond its regional waters.
QUESTION #19—NORTH KOREAN PENINSULA

MR. LEACH: In testimony before the appropriators last year, General Schwartz stated that the North Korean military was “bigger, better, closer, and deadlier.” Does that characterization hold true this year? What is your assessment of North Korean military capability and readiness? Is that assessment shared by your South Korean counterparts?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: North Korea is an isolated state whose leadership is focused primarily on regime survival. As such, Pyongyang operates in a political environment it calls “military first.” This requires the Korean People’s Army (KPA) both to provide for national defense and participate in large-scale public works programs intended to revive a moribund economy. The KPA accomplishes these competing tasks by virtue of being the first customer in Pyongyang’s resource allocation process. However, even this privileged position cannot protect the military from the effects of 10 years of economic decline.

Kim Chong-il’s agenda to pursue a “bigger, better, closer, deadlier,” military is evidenced by the continued construction of submarines and the assembly of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM). We also know the KPA continues to conduct summer and winter training cycles and has not pulled back from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). But, despite his best efforts, Kim can do little better than equip his forces with airframes and armor that are mostly 30–60 years old, and naval vessels best suited for brown water operations. Given these constraints, we assess the KPA is able to maintain basic individual and unit skill sets, but is poorly trained to operate in a modern combat environment.

QUESTION #20—ASIAN REGIONAL FORUM

MR. LEACH: Efforts by the region’s small and medium states to both involve and constrain great power behavior in Asia account for the 1994 creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), embracing 22 member states from the region plus the EU, Russia, the United States, and Canada. What has been the agenda of the ARF and how useful has the institution been in developing habits of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: ASEAN Regional Forum’s (ARF) central agenda since its inception in 1994 has been to build security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Officially, ARF’s strategy evolves from the three stages of development: confidence building measures, a preventive diplomacy role, and political and security cooperation with an eye toward conflict resolution. Reaching ARF’s original goal of attaining political and security cooperation, however, is proving far more daunting a challenge than originally envisioned. After nearly eight years we find that ARF has barely moved beyond its confidence building stage and is still wrestling with how or if it can assume a preventive diplomacy role. We should not be surprised at this, nor should we be too quick to criticize—ARF is attempting to shape security cooperation in one of the most challenging security terrains in the world.

Ultimately, the extent of ARF success in shaping Asia-Pacific security cooperation depends on the political will of the individual nations making up ARF and their commitment to regional security—this is the ARF challenge. To put this challenge in perspective, it’s better that we view the ARF for what it really represents. Though it consists of 23 member nation-states, the more difficult reality is that ARF and its accompanying political, economic, religious and cultural differences. ARF is truly a multi-civilization forum, not simply a multinational forum: Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Orthodox, Sinic and Western civilizations are all represented at ARF.

Many have concluded that ARF is simply a “talk shop,” and that it will never realize its goal of security cooperation. It’s failure to take a leading role in any security issue in Southeast Asia seems to suggest this is the case. ARF in fact have political limits that may stymie its evolution to a response-based institution with the capability to prevent and resolve conflict. Yet I believe the continuous security dialogue that ARF provides is deserving of more credit than scorn; it’s at work striving to build the requisite trust needed to attain regional security cooperation. No other regional forum is attempting to do this complex work.

Moreover, many Asia-Pacific leaders are quick to remind me that until ARF’s creation there was no region-wide forum to openly discuss Asia-Pacific security problems. They see dialogue as progress and these leaders do in fact see ARF as a nas-
cent security organization. We would be wise to continue to monitor its development and to support it as appropriate.

Today, the ARF agenda is chock-full of security dialogues: drugs, arms smuggling; comprehensive economic security; peacekeeping; South China Seas disputes; Law of the Sea issues; piracy; and, now dialogues on specific counter terrorism issues, including finance and law enforcement matters, are becoming common place. In fact, the ARF just held a conference in Hawaii on Regional Terrorist Financing Concerns. This openness in security discussions is a necessary step toward building Asia-Pacific security cooperation and only the ARF is doing this on a region-wide official basis.

At U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), we have been aggressively supporting ARF. We work closely with the State Department to support ARF in its efforts. We have provided briefings on our regional engagement program, our Asia-Pacific Network (APAN), and we will provide briefings on the results of our Multilateral Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program and an upcoming regional United Nations/USPACOM/Indonesia Peacekeeping Seminar in Indonesia. Our demonstrated activities indicate to ARF that many of the region's militaries are now collaborating together and sharing security experiences. All of these efforts are intended to establish the habits of security cooperation needed to address security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

QUESTION #21—CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

MR. LEACH: As I understand it, the U.S. has taken no position with respect to the conflicting South China Sea claims other than to urge the parties to settle their differences peacefully. Is that correct? Are we and/or Japan prepared to take practical steps to show that we are committed to maintaining freedom of the seas in the event of hostilities in the Spratlys?

Do U.S. obligations to the Philippines under the Manila Pact extend to the defense of the Philippine Islands if attacked, but not to disputed territories? If so, what happens if Philippine forces are under attack defending disputed territory in the South China Sea? Is the U.S. then obligated to come to the aid of Manila?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: The United States policy on conflicting claims in the South China Sea and freedom of navigation was publicly announced by the State Department on 10 May 1995. The U.S. takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the various islands, reefs, atolls and cays in the South China Sea. Maintaining Freedom of Navigation is a fundamental interest of the United States. Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft in the South China Sea is essential to the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region, including the United States. This U.S. commitment to freedom of navigation is global, regardless of whether there is or is not conflict in the Spratly Islands, and whether or not any other nation chooses to enforce such a commitment.

Regarding United States relations with the Republic of the Philippines, the Mutual Defense Treaty, not the multilateral “Manila Pact” is the documentary basis of bilateral allied status and commitment. As “disputed territory,” the Philippine Island claims in conflict in the South China Sea are not covered under the Mutual Defense Treaty. An aggressive attack on the armed forces of either party is covered in the Mutual Defense Treaty. However, the Treaty does not automatically require a pre-determined response by either the Philippines or the United States to any specific security situation. Either side can call for consultations at any time. Were either side to call for consultations over an emerging situation, then bilateral response would be derived on a case by case basis.

QUESTION #22—U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES

MR. FALEOMAVAEGA: With regard to U.S. assistance to the Philippines in the campaign against Abu Sayyaf, all of the U.S. military personnel committed are U.S. Army personnel. What is the Navy’s role in this assistance program? How important is maritime surveillance and interdiction to meeting the goal of eliminating Abu Sayyaf? Given the extremely limited Philippine naval and coast guard assets, can there be an effective maritime surveillance and interdiction capability within the next two years without a more direct U.S. naval role? How quickly can Philippine capabilities be developed so that the Philippine Navy can prevent Abu Sayyaf from moving people between islands and staging long range maritime operations aimed at seizing hostages?
ADMIRAL BLAIR: U.S. Assistance to the Philippines in the campaign against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is assigned to Commander, Joint Task Force Five Ten comprised of Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel. Joint Task Force Five Ten is conducting planning assessments to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ air and naval forces.

Additionally, one Navy Public Affairs Officer and combat camera team have been assigned to support U.S. assistance to the Philippines as well.

Given the extremely limited Philippine naval and coast guard assets, it is unlikely the Philippine Navy alone can conduct fully effective maritime surveillance and interdiction. How quickly can Philippine capabilities be developed from a minimal Philippine Navy capability to prevent Abu Sayyaf from moving people between islands and staging long range maritime operations aimed at seizing hostages is a difficult question to answer. Most of the Philippine fleet is World War II era assets, and their training needs to be focused at all levels, particularly at the small unit level, to prosecute such missions effectively. Many of their weapons systems are in disrepair. More detailed assessments are necessary to accurately estimate a timeline for the entire archipelago.

QUESTION #23—MALAYSIA’S ROLE IN MARITIME SURVEILLANCE

MR. FALEOMAVAEGA: How important is Malaysia’s role in maritime surveillance in the Sulu Sea region to prevent over-water operations by Abu Sayyaf? What commitments, if any, has Malaysia made to improve maritime interdiction and surveillance? Is the Pacific Command talking to Malaysia defense officials about any U.S. assistance to the Malaysian Navy in the Sulu Sea region?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: I recently had the opportunity to travel to Sabah, the Malaysian state in eastern Borneo that borders the Sulu Sea and is the base for their efforts to control the rising tide of Filipino refugees fleeing the instability caused by Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) activities. Malaysia estimates the number of refugees to be about 500,000 people. During my visit, I was hosted by the Malaysian Chief of Defense Forces, General Zahidi, who presented a detailed briefing on current Malaysian Armed Force disposition and operations in Sabah. My visit convinced me that the Malaysians are extremely serious about security in the Sabah/Sulu Sea area. They have deployed additional troops, aircraft and naval vessels to support ongoing operations in the area.

QUESTION #24—U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PHILIPPINE MILITARY

MR. FALEOMAVAEGA: How realistic is the six-month deadline for the U.S. program of military assistance and advice to the Philippine military against Abu Sayyaf? Is this timetable based on an assessment of how long it will take to eliminate Abu Sayyaf, or is it based on other criteria and considerations?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: [DELETED]

QUESTION #25—U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PHILIPPINE MILITARY: GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS

MR. FALEOMAVAEGA: Why is the geographical role of U.S. military personnel in the southern Philippines limited to Basilan island and the area around the city of Zamboanga? If the objective of Philippine-U.S. cooperation is to eliminate Abu Sayyaf, why aren’t the functions of U.S. military personnel being extended to Jolo Island, where Abu Sayyaf strength reportedly is much greater than on Basilan?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: [DELETED]

QUESTION #26—U.S. MILITARY’S POLICY TOWARD MILF

MR. FALEOMAVAEGA: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern Philippines has admitted to past ties with al Qaeda, but it denounced the September 11 attacks and said it would not participate in a jihad against the United States. MILF units also are on Basilan Island, Jolo Island, and other areas where Abu Sayyaf operates. The Philippine military claims that the MILF aids Abu Sayyaf.
What is the U.S. military's policy toward MILF as it enters into an active role against Abu Sayyaf?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: Simply put the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is not on the United States Government's terrorist list and, in accordance with that policy, neither the U.S. Pacific Command nor Joint Task Force-510 is advising, assisting or training the Government of the Philippines or the Armed Forces of the Philippines to conduct operations against the MILF.

QUESTION #27—JEMAAH ISLAMIAH

MR. F ALEOMAVAEGA: How is the Indonesian government responding to calls from the U.S., Singapore, and Malaysian governments that it arrest Abu Bakar Baasyir for his role in the plot of Jemaah Islamiah to bomb U.S. and other foreign targets in Singapore? Given your extensive contacts with the Indonesian military, what is the view of the Indonesian military leadership regarding Baasyir?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: The Indonesian government is not responding constructively to calls to arrest Baasyir. To date Baasyir has been questioned at least three times, and promptly released. We are not aware of the nature of the interrogations, the questions Baasyir has been asked, or the responses he provided. It appears very unlikely the Indonesian government will arrest him, and even more unlikely he will be extradited. In Indonesia, Baasyir has apparently broken no Indonesian laws. [DELETED]

The Indonesian military leadership views Baasyir as a nuisance. [DELETED]

QUESTION #28—LASKAR JIHAD

MR. F ALEOMAVAEGA: There have been numerous reports that the Indonesian military supported the establishment, growth, and operations of Laskar Jihad, the extremist Muslim group that has attacked Indonesian Christians in Maluku and Sulewesi. Based on your knowledge, do you believe that these reports are accurate? How credible are the reports that Laskar Jihad has ties to al Qaeda?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: Unconfirmed reporting strongly suggests that influential Indonesian Army officers (both active and retired) provided clandestine financial support during Laskar Jihad's initial establishment and training on Java in January 2000, and provided at least a semi-permissive environment for its deployment to Maluku in May 2000. Political opponents of then-President Wahid supported the group's establishment and deployment to Maluku as a means to further destabilize the Wahid administration. [DELETED] Moreover, the establishment of Laskar Jihad as a paramilitary militia is consistent with Indonesian Armed Forces doctrine, which advocates using militias as surrogate forces to combat insurgencies. These factors likely provided the motivation for active and former military leaders to provide support for Laskar Jihad. [DELETED]. Though most of the officers reportedly supporting Laskar Jihad were retired, the strong patron-client ties characteristic of the Indonesian Armed Forces make it likely that some active duty military provided covert support at the urging of these still-influential retired officers. There is no information confirming active Armed Forces support to Laskar Jihad, but the indications of collusion by active or retired Indonesian Armed Forces leaders are sufficiently compelling to support an assessment that Laskar Jihad was aided clandestinely by the Indonesian Armed Forces. [DELETED]

QUESTION #29—REGIONAL DEFENSE COUNTER-TERRORISM INITIATIVE

MR. F ALEOMAVAEGA: The defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 2002 contains a new anti-terrorist military training program for foreign military personnel, funded by $21 million. Is it correct that the U.S. Pacific Command will have the lead role in carrying out this training? Some observers claim that the bulk of the $21 million will be used to train Indonesian military personnel; how much of it will be used to train Indonesians? How would you respond to critics who claim that this training program is an attempt by the Pentagon to circumvent congressional restrictions to U.S. relations with the Indonesian military as embodied in the Leahy amendment to current foreign operations legislation?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: The purpose of the $17.9 million Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Fund is to allow for the non-lethal training of foreign military of-
ficers at Department of Defense education facilities and regional centers for security studies. I understand it was the intent of the congressional initiators of this appropriation that the Fellowship Funding would primarily support U.S. interests within the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility. USPACOM intends to maximize the use of this fund as soon as program guidance is developed and funds are distributed.

The fellowship focus for USPACOM will be towards educational programs that encourage support for reform, allow for the establishment of more professional militaries, and enhance cooperation with Asia-Pacific nations in addressing terrorism and other transnational threats. This will be accomplished by targeting career officers for attendance at established resident courses such as staff colleges and senior Service colleges. Other more specific counter-terrorism courses will assist in the minimizing of terrorist threats within the USPACOM region, assist in severing any links between indigenous terrorist groups and global terrorist networks, develop stronger mutual security partnerships, and enable enhanced theater security cooperation. Many countries in the USPACOM region will benefit from this new program, but Indonesia is clearly a priority country and we expect to use a substantial portion of the fund to educate Indonesian officers. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently developing rules to govern the administration of the program. All Indonesian fellowship candidates will undergo thorough human rights vetting and other procedural reviews to ensure compliance with existing law and congressional intent.

We do not advocate this fellowship program as an "end around" or a "free ride" by countries to receive the benefits of our system while not conforming to the basic rules of law and human rights. It was developed in the post 9–11 world in which we now operate. It responds to an immediate need in a way that provides long term results. This program will be in the U.S. interest. Our intent is to seek out those junior and mid-grade officers, at the top of their peer groups, who are most likely to benefit from the experience of exposure to a professional, disciplined military, and carry those lessons back to their respective armed forces. These are the officers who habitually rise to positions of leadership within their ranks and are the officers to whom we should be able to reach-out in the future to further our influence and access, supporting U.S. interests as a competent coalition partner, or in a myriad of other ways. Attendance at U.S. military educational schools will expose these officers to professional excellence, and higher standards of ethics and behavior, including accountability. Some potential opportunities exist for attendance at War Colleges, Command and General Staff College, the Services’ Basic and Advance Courses, Naval Post-Graduate School, and the National Defense University.

QUESTION #30—NORTH KOREA’S PROLIFERATION OF MISSILES

MR. FALEOMAVAGEA: In enunciating North Korea’s role in the “axis of evil,” President Bush and Administration officials have stressed the importance of preventing North Korea’s proliferation of missiles to Iran and other Middle East countries. A recent CIA report asserted that North Korea made significant exports of missiles, missile components, and missile technology to these countries in 2001. If North Korea does not cease voluntarily these exports, what strategy would the United States have to prevent further exports?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: Should the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) fail to voluntarily cease shipments of missiles and missile components to the Middle East and other buyers, the United States military has the capability to track and interdict DPRK arms shipments at sea once they have been identified. [DELETED]. My response to question 31 more fully explores the option of maritime interdiction.

[DELETED].

QUESTION #31—MARITIME INTERDICTION OF NORTH KOREAN SHIPS

MR. FALEOMAVAGEA: In March 1999, a study group on North Korea headed by Richard Armitage (now Undersecretary of State) and including Paul Wolfowitz (now Deputy Secretary of Defense) issued a report, which proposed that the United States draw “red lines” around North Korean behavior and act against North Korea if it breached these red lines. One of the U.S. actions proposed was the maritime interdiction of North Korean vessels bound for the Middle East in order to prevent North Korea from shipping weapons of mass destruction to that region. Do naval forces under your command have the capabilities to implement maritime interdiction of North Korean ships if the Bush Administration ordered such a policy? What coopera-
tion would you require from Japan and South Korea in order to carry out maritime interdiction? In your view, what would be the strengths, weaknesses, and dangers of such a policy?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: The naval forces in the Pacific theater have the capabilities to track and interdict North Korean ships. [DELETED]

QUESTION #32

MR. SMITH: I remain deeply concerned about the links between many senior members of the Indonesian military—particularly the Kopassus Special Forces unit—and credible reports of human rights violations. As you know, included in the Fiscal Year 2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act are renewed restrictions on the use of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds for the Indonesian military, which were included because of the continued failure of the Indonesian government, and its military, to abide by reasonable human rights and program oversight conditions.

The human rights record of the Indonesian military (TNI) remains poor. The Department of State’s “Country Report on Human Rights Practices” for Indonesia in 2000 stated that “both the TNI and the police committed numerous serious human rights abuses throughout the year,” and that these military forces “are not fully accountable to civilian authority.” In West Papua, the Kopassus unit has been implicated in the murder of independence leader Theys Eluay. In East Timor, no senior military officer has been held accountable for the scorched-earth campaign of terror that has been waged there in recent years. Instead of a reprimand, these abusive officers are rewarded and promoted. For instance, a general who played a direct role in some of the worst human rights violations in 1998—both in Indonesia proper as well as in East Timor—has been promoted recently to military spokesman.

Given this situation, I am very concerned that the new Regional Counter-terrorism Fellowship program administered by DoD could potentially provide training for the Indonesian military in a way that would circumvent Congress’ clear intent that the U.S. withhold training and assistance for the Indonesian military until its human rights record improves.

I have not forgotten the episode in 1998 in which the Pentagon trained Indonesian military forces under the JCET program despite a Congressional ban on the use of IMET funds for this purpose. It certainly appeared to me that the use of JCET funds in 1998 was a deliberate attempt by DoD to violate Congress’ clear mandate. I am quite skeptical, naturally, to learn there is another program that appears to be almost identical to IMET, and that has the potential to once again bypass Congressional limits on the nature and type of military training to be given to the Indonesian military.

My questions, therefore, are as follows:

(1) What assurances can you provide Congress that the Regional Counter-terrorism Fellowship program will not be misused to avoid Congressional restrictions on the use of IMET funds to train the Indonesian military?

(2) How is the Regional Counter-terrorism Fellowship program fundamentally different from IMET, in both theory and practice? How would you respond to the argument that the Regional Counter-terrorism Fellowship program is substantively the same thing as IMET, but simply uses a different program name?

ADMIRAL BLAIR: We do not advocate this fellowship program as simply an “end around” or a “free ride” for countries to receive the benefits of our system while not conforming to the basic rules of law and human rights. It was developed in the post-9-11 world in which we now operate. It responds to an immediate need in a way that provides long term results. It is in our interest. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently developing rules to govern the administration of the program. All Indonesian fellowship candidates will undergo thorough human rights vetting and other procedural reviews to ensure compliance with existing law and congressional intent. Our intent is to seek out within their militaries those junior and mid-grade officers, at the top of their peer groups, who are most likely to benefit from the experience of exposure to a professional, disciplined military, and carry those lessons back to their respective units. These are the officers who habitually rise to positions of leadership within their ranks and are the officers to whom we should be able to reach out in the future to further our influence and access, supporting U.S. interests as a competent coalition partner, or in a myriad of other ways.
The Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program is complementary to the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Department of Defense funding will be used to send foreign military officers to U.S. military institutions and selected regional centers for security studies for non-lethal education. While it is focused on increasing regional cooperation in addressing counter-terrorism and other transnational threats, it is also intended to have a positive impact by encouraging military reform and professionalism. In fact, it will resemble some of the IMET curricula programs, especially in the initial applications.

IMET is a cornerstone of our Theater Security Cooperation Program. It provides education opportunities for personnel from foreign armed forces to study U.S. military doctrine and to observe U.S. commitment to the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values. The Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program provides additional funding which complements the IMET program. Additional training opportunities provided through the Fellowship Program will similarly serve to promote professionalism within foreign armed forces, and expose foreign armed forces to the principle of a military responsive to civilian control.