Revised Advance Questions for Linton F. Brooks  
Nominee for the Position of Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

The fundamental responsibility of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is to enhance U.S. national security by promoting nuclear nonproliferation, reducing global danger from weapons of mass destruction, advancing international nuclear safeguards and eliminating inventories of surplus fissile materials usable for nuclear weapons.

If confirmed, my most significant functions will be: to develop DOE/NNSA policies regarding arms control and nonproliferation; to direct research and development for treaty monitoring and for reducing the threats from nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; to implement a cooperative international program to promote worldwide nuclear safety; to lead international materials and weapons protection programs, including those involving the Russian Federation; and to coordinate the development of policy regarding surplus fissile materials and manage the U.S. and Russian programs for disposition of excess weapons plutonium.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I have a broad understanding of national security policy, especially arms control and nonproliferation policy, from my service in the State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council Staff. My service as START negotiator and as supervisor of cooperative programs with Russia at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) has made me familiar with security issues and current political conditions in the Russian Federation. My NSC and OSD assignments and my recent service on advisory panels have made me familiar with the culture and capabilities of the national laboratories. Finally, from running a bureau at ACDA and a division at CNA, as well as from my Navy service, I am used to leading national security professionals and shaping a comprehensive, mission-oriented vision for a national security organization.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Yes. I need to deepen my knowledge of the details of the programs for which I will be responsible if I am confirmed. I also need to build collegial working relationships with my counterparts in other agencies. I have already begun both actions in preparing for confirmation.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration would prescribe for you?

In addition to the duties associated with my position, the Administrator will expect me to work with the other Deputy and Associate Administrators through his newly established Management Council to help with corporate functions and to help him make the NNSA a coherent, effective, efficient and respected organization.

If confirmed, how would you work with the following:

1. Other Deputies in the NNSA.

   I expect to establish a close working relationship with my colleagues. Formally, this will be through the Administrator’s recently established Management Council. Informally, I will work with both Deputy and Associate Administrators in NNSA as a routine part of my day-to-day duties.

2. The Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.

   Because responsibility for facilities will not, in general, be part of my portfolio, I anticipate that my interactions with the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management will be relatively limited. The one exception concerns plutonium disposition, where I expect to work closely with the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management in creating the necessary infrastructure at Savannah River.

3. Other Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Energy.

   Because of the semi-autonomous nature of the National Nuclear Security Administration, I anticipate much of my interaction with other Assistant Secretaries will be via NNSA. Where appropriate, I will work to establish collegial relations with other parts of the Department of Energy.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
The major substantive challenge I will confront if confirmed will be ensuring that the many nonproliferation programs for which I will be responsible are consistent and coherent, both within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and with other U.S. government programs. An important near term task will be helping devise a program for plutonium disposition that meets our nonproliferation goals and that can be supported both politically and fiscally.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues to ensure that I provide the necessary strategic direction to ensure a coherent nonproliferation program. In addition, I will devote considerable personal attention to the recently initiated review of plutonium disposition.

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

The three most serious management problems I expect to face are (1) maintaining an adequate and responsible budget for the various programs under my cognizance, (2) improving coordination with other agencies of the U.S. government and with the national laboratories, and (3) retaining high-performing, experienced staff while attracting bright young professionals into government service.

If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

I will support the NNSA Administrator in his attempts to establish a formal Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System within NNSA. Such a system will aid in managing the long-term funding needs that are inherent in many of the programs for which I will be responsible. In addition, I will devote personal attention to building on recent efforts to improve coordination and working relationships. I have not yet identified specific actions I will take on recruiting and retention.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Should I be confirmed, my broad priorities will be working to ensure that the many nonproliferation programs for which I will be responsible are consistent and coherent, especially with respect to Russia, and working to improve coordination and working relations within my office, with other agencies of the U.S. government, and with the national laboratories.

Baker Cutler Report

The Baker Cutler Task Force of the Secretary of Energy’s Advisory Board described the tasks of the Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation as key to meeting the largest unmet national security threat currently facing the United States.

What is your view of the findings and recommendations of the Baker Cutler report?

I believe the Baker Cutler report is generally correct, especially in its conclusion that the problem of securing Russian weapons and material is urgent and requires both adequate funding and a long-term vision. If confirmed I will work toward such a vision as a vehicle for securing adequate funding. At the same time, the Baker Cutler Task Force was not asked to assess overall administration fiscal priorities. Thus I believe the recommendations for massive budget increases should be taken as an indication of the importance of the problem, but not as a realistic guide to budget preparation.

Nuclear Cities

The Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) program has been criticized for being ineffective, lacking clear and measurable milestones, having weak management and changing program goals.

Do you agree with this view? If so, how would you improve the program?

My initial review of the program suggests that some criticisms are valid, while some are not. Rather than focus on the past, if confirmed I plan to work to restructure the program so that it will command support consistent with the importance of its goal of reducing the Russian weapons complex.

Do you have a view as to how you would focus the Nuclear Cities program and the goals that you would establish for the program to achieve?

A management review is now in progress within the Administration to determine how to restructure and refocus the Nuclear Cities program to respond to past criticisms while retaining the program’s unique focus on transforming the former Soviet weapons complex. If confirmed, I intend to
devote immediate, personal attention to that review. Pending its completion, I have not yet come to any firm conclusions about how the program should be transformed.

Do you support implementation of the NCI project at Avangard?

Yes, provided the Department of Energy is able to satisfy current Congressional concerns. As I understand it, the current DOE/NNSA plan is to focus its efforts on the city of Sarov and the conversion of the Avangard weapons plant. This appears to me to be a sound strategy and I plan to support it if confirmed.

What do you see as the distinguishing factors between the NCI program and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and, if confirmed, how would you work to improve the coordination between the two programs?

The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program focuses on individual scientists, engineers, and technicians, while the NCI program focuses on conversion of the nuclear weapons complex itself. In my view a sound program requires both components. If confirmed, I will give immediate attention to a management review now under way to devise an approach to ensuring effective coordination while preserving the good features of both programs.

According to a May 2001 GAO report, 70 percent of the funds expended for the Nuclear Cities Initiative were expended in the United States, with the bulk of the costs utilized by the U.S. national laboratories to implement the program. The GAO report further states that “officials from the Ministry of Atomic Energy told [GAO] that they are dissatisfied with the amount of program funds that have been spent in Russia and that if the Department [of Energy] is serious about creating jobs for Russian weapons scientists, more funds must be spent in Russia.”

If confirmed, how would you address the issues raised in the GAO report?

I understand that management controls have already been put in place to ensure that at least 51 percent of program funds for FY2001 and 60 percent of program funds for FY2002 are spent in Russia. If confirmed I will monitor the progress of these improvements and take additional corrective action if the DOE is failing to meet its goal.

According to the May 2001 GAO report, the NCI and IPP programs are “very similar programs in Russia’s nuclear cities” that have “caused duplication of effort.” Consequently, GAO recommends that the “Department evaluate all of the NCI projects, particularly community development activities, and eliminate those that do not meet the program’s basic objectives of creating jobs and assisting with the downsizing of Russia’s nuclear weapons complex.” The GAO report goes further by recommending, “that the Department determine whether the NCI and IPP should be consolidated into one effort in order to achieve potential cost savings and other efficiencies.”
If confirmed, would you support these GAO recommendations, including the re-evaluation of NCI projects to ensure that these projects met the program’s basic objectives?

If you do not support consolidation, how would you work to coordinate the programs, if confirmed?

A management review is now in progress within the Administration to determine how to restructure and refocus the Nuclear Cities program to respond to past criticisms and to improve synergy with the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, while retaining a focus on transforming the former Soviet weapons complex. If confirmed, I intend to devote immediate, personal attention to that review. Pending completion of the review, I have not yet come to any firm conclusions about how the program’s management should be transformed.

Research and Engineering Funding

The NNSA nonproliferation research and engineering budget request for fiscal year 2002 is $40 million lower than the fiscal year 2001 appropriated amount and may be lower than what is required to meet current requirements and to sustain key unique research capabilities.

If confirmed, how would you propose to address this issue?

I strongly support nonproliferation research and engineering and believe additional funds are needed to address an increasing number of technical and global proliferation challenges. I share the Committee’s concern that reduced funding will result in some technologies becoming operational later than originally scheduled and some technology development being slowed. If confirmed I intend to give significant attention to this area. At the same time, I recognize that I will be required to balance these requirements against other important programs within a constrained budget environment.

Former Biological Weapons Scientists

The Department of Defense and the Department of State (DOS) each work with former biological weapons scientists through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and the International Security and Training Center (ISTC). The Department of Energy also conducts similar work that is coordinated with the Departments of Defense and State through the Interagency Working Group.

In your view, what role, if any, should DOE have in the future with respect to scientists that were involved in the former Soviet Union biological weapons programs?

If the NNSA were to participate in this work, would you recommend working through existing programs in the DOD and DOS to leverage existing programmatic management
structures and to ensure the greatest level of cooperation?

Curbing the spread of knowledge concerning biological weapons is an important—though very difficult—U.S. policy objective. As I understand it, the NNSA/DOE efforts in the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program already include efforts to redirect former Soviet biological weapons scientists to civilian pursuits. I understand current DOE efforts are carefully coordinated with State and DOD; if confirmed, I would insist that this be true for future efforts as well. I am not yet in a position to make specific recommendations with respect to an expanded DOE role or on specific aspects of program management.

Expanded Cooperation

In your view, is there an opportunity to expand the cooperative programs between NNSA and the States of the Former Soviet Union, other than Russia, such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine?

Almost certainly the answer is yes, subject to budget constraints. There may be steps we can take to reduce the proliferation threat from diversion of highly-enriched uranium, for example, or to expand use of the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program to help scientists in Ukraine or Kazakhstan redirect their efforts to civilian pursuits. I have not, however, reached the stage of having specific proposals to offer.

If so, what threat reduction goals should such expanded cooperative programs have?

The goals should be the same as existing programs: to ensure the security of nuclear material against possible diversion and to shift technical workers and scientists away from weapons work and toward civilian pursuits.

Need for Management Improvements

If confirmed, what management initiatives would you propose?

I have no specific initiatives to propose at this time. I believe my most important near-term management task will be to help ensure the smooth implementation of the October 1 NNSA reorganization.

Fissile Materials Disposition

The fiscal year 2002 budget request and the Administration’s review of the nonproliferation programs have raised concerns about the fissile materials disposition program. The near term issue is whether the DOE will be able to transport plutonium and plutonium residues from Rocky Flats to Savannah River.
Do you believe that there is an adequate plan in place for disposing of plutonium and plutonium residues after they reach the Savannah River site?

I believe the current plans are technically adequate assuming they are properly funded. The current program has not, however, gained the necessary policy and political support within and outside the Administration.

Will you commit to give this program your full and immediate attention if confirmed?

I am committed to ensuring a thorough review is undertaken in order to ensure a program that will garner the necessary support. As noted above, I plan to devote immediate, personal attention to this area if confirmed.

Export Controls

According to the CIA’s Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, "increasingly rigorous and effective export controls and cooperation among supplier countries have led other foreign WMD programs to look elsewhere for many controlled dual-use goods.”

If confirmed, would you examine the role that the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation’s Export Control Program has in cooperating with supplier states on developing rigorous export controls and examine additional opportunities for greater cooperation with these supplier states?

Yes.

Russian Cost Share

According to a recent National Security Council staff review of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation programs, Russia may be capable of assuming more of the costs of implementing these programs.

In your view, what DOE nonproliferation programs do you believe should require greater Russian cost share?

Do you believe these programs would be more or less effective with greater Russian cost sharing?

I believe we should constantly review all cooperative programs to ensure adequate Russian support, both to provide wise use of U.S. resources and to give Russia a greater stake in sustaining these programs. I have not reached any conclusions on specific programs. I believe it is important to recall that the United States engages in nonproliferation efforts with Russia because it is in
the U.S. interest, not as a favor to the Russian Federation.

Russia and Iran

In December 2000, Secretary Cohen met with then Russian defense minister Igor Sergeyev to discuss U.S. concern over Moscow’s continued arms sales and proliferation activities with Iran. While this meeting and subsequent State Department meetings were considered upbeat, the United States did not receive concrete assurances from Russia that these proliferation activities would cease.

What is your view of the current level of Russian arms sales and nuclear technology efforts with Iran?

Based on the briefings I have received to date, I believe that there is an unacceptably high level of cooperation between Russia and Iran in nuclear issues and that international stability and U.S. security would be improved by reducing that cooperation.

As Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, what policy options would you propose to address proliferation activities of Russia with Iran?

In your view, are there any DOE nonproliferation programs with Russia that could or should be used to leverage a desired policy outcome with respect to curbing or eliminating Russian secondary proliferation activities?

I believe the U.S. approach to Iran must be a coordinated one that goes beyond the responsibilities of a single department. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues throughout government to devise such an approach. At the same time, our programs with Russia are not conducted as a “favor” to the Russia Federation, but because they are in U.S. interest. Thus using these programs to provide policy leverage should only be done after very careful consideration of the potential cost to our nonproliferation objectives.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this
Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

Yes

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees in a timely manner?

Yes