Advance Questions for Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr.
Nominee for the Position of Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command

Defense Reforms

Almost 15 years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms.

1. Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

   ANSWER: Yes, I strongly support the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. They have definitely strengthened our Armed Forces and the effectiveness of our combatant commanders.

2. What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

   ANSWER: I believe the Department of Defense has vigorously and successfully pursued implementation of these important reforms.

3. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

   ANSWER: The most positive aspect is the overall improvement in our military operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has resulted in much needed improvements in joint doctrine, joint professional military education, and joint strategic planning. Another important element is clarity in the chain of command from the National Command Authorities to the combatant commanders and unambiguous responsibility placed upon each CINC for execution of mission and preparedness of assigned forces.

   The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

4. Do you agree with these goals?

   ANSWER: Yes. The law gives combatant commanders sufficient authority they need to carry out their assigned missions. This has been well demonstrated through the many complex joint operations conducted since the legislation was enacted, including the strategic deterrence mission of USSTRATCOM.
5. **Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national security strategy? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

**ANSWER:** It is clear that the Goldwater-Nichols Act has profoundly improved the performance and capabilities of the American military establishment. We have significantly improved our ability to conduct combat operations, manage defense resources, streamline management practices, and address organizational issues within the Department of Defense. The Goldwater-Nichols Act remains an important and effective piece of legislation; as a result, I do not believe any major revisions are required at this time.

6. **Based upon your experience as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and that the policies and procedures in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?**

**ANSWER:** Yes. Unity of command, input into resource allocation, and most importantly, the imperative of combatant commanders to plan and fight in a joint environment are all provided for while empowering the Department of the Navy in its role of organizing, training, and equipping naval forces.

**Duties**

7. **What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command?**

**ANSWER:** The Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command (CINCSTRAT) has responsibility and control for all strategic forces in support of the national security objective of strategic deterrence. CINCSTRAT also exercises combatant command (COCOM) over the organization and operation of all assigned forces and headquarters in accordance with public law and the policies established by the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, he is a primary advisor to the Secretary of Defense on strategic issues.

8. **What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?**

**ANSWER:** Thirty-two years of service in the United States military have fully prepared me for this position through Navy and Joint Assignments, in peace, crisis and conflict, alongside the finest Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen in the world. I have commanded an aviation squadron, a deep draft flagship, a nuclear aircraft carrier, a carrier battle group, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe and Allied Forces Southern Europe in the NATO Alliance. I have been privileged to serve on six occasions in Joint Task Forces (JTF’s) around
the world and have been assigned overseas in the Middle East, Asia and, now, Europe. I have been privileged to fill several Washington staff positions including the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations and in the Navy’s Office of Legislative Affairs. My career has included qualification as a fighter pilot, test pilot, nuclear weapon delivery pilot, and ship’s captain as well as graduate-level education in both aerospace and nuclear engineering.

9. What are the most important lessons that you have learned as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe?

ANSWER: This assignment has reaffirmed for me the importance of the current readiness of our military forces and the important role of their presence around the world. I have seen the unique capabilities of our joint forces used both in support of national interests and in concert with our allies. Finally, in addition to inter-service cooperation, I have learned the value of an innovative, integrated, cross-sector, interagency and interdisciplinary approach to our national security challenges.

10. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command?

ANSWER: I certainly have much to learn. Not only are we in a period of strategic transition, but I have not worked regularly with the many organizations that contribute to the success of USSTRATCOM (Congress, National Security Council, Nuclear Weapons Council, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Energy, and others). If confirmed, I will make it a priority to become more familiar with these organizations and the contributions they make to the success of our missions.

Relationships

11. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, to the following officials:

a. The Secretary of Defense

ANSWER: In accordance with Title 10, United States Code, section 164, the Commander of US Strategic Command (CINCSTRAT) performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. He is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of the command and the ability to carry out missions assigned to the command.

b. The Deputy Secretary of Defense

ANSWER: In accordance with Title 10, United States Code, section 132, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense will perform duties and exercise powers as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, and in the absence of the Secretary of Defense, perform his duties. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Deputy Secretary on all strategic matters.

c. The Under Secretaries of Defense

ANSWER: Title 10, United States Code, and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. In discharging their responsibilities, the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive-type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. They may also obtain reports and information necessary to carry out their functions. As with other communications between the NCA and combatant commanders, communications between the Under Secretaries and combatant commanders are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

ANSWER: With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for C3I, Legislative Affairs, and Public Affairs, all Assistant Secretaries are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. This means any relationship USSTRATCOM would require with any Assistant Secretary of Defense would be through the appropriate Under Secretary of Defense. Since the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for C3I, Legislative Affairs, and Public Affairs are the Secretary of Defense’s principal deputies for overall supervision of C3I, legislative matters, and public affairs, respectively, any relations required between USSTRATCOM and ASD (C3I), ASD (LA), or ASD (PA) would be conducted along the same lines as those discussed above regarding relations with the various Under Secretaries of Defense.

e. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

ANSWER: The Chairman is clearly established by Title 10, United States Code, as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. He serves as an advisor and is not in the chain of command that runs from the National Command Authorities (NCA) directly to each combatant commander. The law does allow the President to direct that communications between the NCA and the combatant commanders be transmitted through the Chairman. This action keeps the Chairman fully involved so that he can execute his other responsibilities. By law and to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the combatant commanders and is charged with overseeing their activities. He provides a vital linkage between the combatant commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense. While the legal duties of the Chairman are many and they require either his
representation or personal participation in a wide range of issues, if confirmed, I will also have an obligation in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, to keep the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which he may hold me personally accountable. If confirmed, I will work with and through the Chairman in the execution of my duties.

f. The Secretaries of the Military Departments

**ANSWER:** Title 10, United States Code, section 165, provides that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the authority of combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces they have assigned to combatant commands. The authority exercised by a combatant commander over Service components is quite clear, but requires close coordination with each Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful responsibilities a Service Secretary alone may discharge.

g. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

**ANSWER:** As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. They now have two significant roles. Their primary function is to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces to perform a role -- to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission. Additionally, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. Individually and collectively, the Service Chiefs are a source of experience and judgment every combatant commander can and should call upon. If confirmed, I would work closely and confer regularly with the Service Chiefs.

h. The Combatant Commanders

**ANSWER:** CINCSTRAT fully supports other combatant commanders as directed in the Unified Command Plan. USSTRATCOM provides theater nuclear and counterproliferation support to combatant commanders to assist them in developing tailored annexes designed to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD). USSTRATCOM also provides specialized planning and consequence analysis, when requested by other combatant commanders. Additionally, CINCSTRAT works closely with other combatant commanders to initiate crisis action procedures contained in the Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. In crisis situations, when assigned as a supporting CINC, CINCSTRAT supports planning and execution of military operations for the combatant commander.

i. The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration

**ANSWER:** In accordance with title 32, section 3212, of the National Nuclear Security Act of 1999, the Administrator is responsible to the Secretary of Energy for all Department of Energy programs and activities involving the production, safety, and security of nuclear
energy and nuclear weapons – including the stockpile stewardship program. Though the Administrator is outside the DoD chain of command, these issues are of concern to CINCSTRAT as well, and if confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Administrator.

j. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration

ANSWER: The Deputy Administrator is responsible to the Administrator to oversee programs and efforts to prevent the spread of materials, technology, and expertise relating to weapons of mass destruction (WMD); detect the proliferation of WMD; eliminate inventories of surplus fissile materials; provide for international nuclear safety. These are strategic issues of concern to USSTRATCOM as well, and if confirmed, my staff and I will work closely and confer regularly with the Deputy Administrator on these issues.

Major Challenges and Problems

12. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command?

ANSWER: I believe there are four major challenges:

?? Maintaining effective, credible, and secure strategic deterrent forces.
?? Shaping a solid and stable environment and foundation for any future arms reductions and promoting the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
?? Ensuring a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile.
?? Taking care of our people.

13. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

ANSWER: If confirmed:

?? I will ensure our strategic force reductions are managed in a way that maintains a viable deterrent for the Nation and enhances strategic stability.
?? I would also continue to build on the work of Admiral Mies and his predecessors in ensuring we strike the right balance in our resource allocation and force sizing efforts and in fostering productive military-to-military contacts which further our threat reduction and confidence-building activities.
?? In parallel with responsible management of our relationship with Russia, I will work to strengthen our capabilities to adapt to strategic challenges in South Asia or elsewhere.
?? I will build on the cooperation which USSTRATCOM already enjoys with other combatant CINCs to promote improved planning, intelligence, exercises, resource management, information security, force protection, and command and control so that the nation is better prepared to respond appropriately to a variety of potential contingencies.
14. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command?

**ANSWER:** USSTRATCOM's challenge is to continue to ensure a viable deterrent for the nation and enhance strategic stability while working towards the President’s goal of a force structure at the lowest levels consistent with the Nation’s security needs. There are no new weapons or platforms in development and the ones we have are well beyond their initial design lives and need to be sustained. Critical to this sustainment effort is our industrial base and retention of our people with critical skills.

15. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

**ANSWER:** If confirmed, I would promptly:

?? Meet with each of the USSTRATCOM Task Force Commanders, and the Service Chiefs of the Air Force and Navy, and the Strategic Advisory Group to ensure I am completely familiar with the status of our strategic deterrent forces and their command and control.

?? Visit the Department of Energy, each of the nuclear laboratories, the Strategic Advisory Group, and other agencies associated with USSTRATCOM to ensure our plans and policies affecting stockpile stewardship, threat reduction, and confidence building measures are closely aligned.

?? Verify our military-to-military contact program aggressively supports our national policy and enhances the stability of our strategic relationships.

?? Work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to implement requirements resulting from the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review.

**Priorities**

16. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command?

**ANSWER:** In the wake of recent events, my first priority will be the protection of facilities and forces, at home or deployed. Second, I will examine the implications of the soon-to-be-completed Nuclear Posture Review. Third, since there are no new weapons in development, we must continue to examine sustainment of our current forces. And of course, taking care of our people, both military and civilian, will be key to accomplishing all these tasks.

**Deterrence and Missile Defense**
17. Do you believe that a national missile defense system deployed by the United States would jeopardize or enhance strategic stability?

**ANSWER:** The missile defense system that is proposed is designed as a limited system to defend against rogue states with ballistic missile technology. Such a system should have limited impact on overall strategic stability.

18. Do you believe that a national missile defense system deployed by the United States would jeopardize existing strategic arms control agreements or enhance the prospects for future strategic arms reductions? Please explain.

**ANSWER:** The U.S. is currently engaged in dialogue with Russia about missile defense and its affect on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The outcome of these talks will give us a better idea of our future prospects in this regard.

19. What are your views on the relationship between national missile defense - defenses against long-range ballistic missiles - and nuclear deterrence?

**ANSWER:** At the height of the Cold War offensive based strategic deterrence worked well. This deterrent, which was used in a bi-polar environment, may need to adapt to a multi-polar environment. A more comprehensive framework, including missile defense, can integrate additional elements of military strategy to complement offensive nuclear forces to assure sustainment of a deterrent capability.

20. In your view, is there a connection between the number of U.S. strategic delivery platforms and strategic warheads on the one hand and the type of missile defense systems on the other? If so, what is your view of that relationship?

**ANSWER:** Yes. The mix of offensive and defensive forces should be combined to form a defensive capability coupled with a timely offensive response posture that provides defense against small attacks from ballistic missiles and a guaranteed retaliatory capability against larger attacks, the result of and combination of which remains totally unacceptable to any aggressor. The challenge is to develop a well defined relationship between the offensive and defensive force.

21. Do you believe that the effectiveness of Russian or Chinese deterrent forces would be diminished in any meaningful way by United States deployment of a limited defense against long-range missiles?
ANSWER: The overall effectiveness of Russian deterrent forces would not be significantly diminished by U.S. deployment of a limited missile defense. A limited U.S. missile defense system would affect the deterrent value of China’s current strategic ballistic missile force. However, that impact will lessen if, as expected, China increases strategic nuclear arms over the next decade.

22. Do you believe that the effectiveness of Russian or Chinese deterrent forces would be diminished in any meaningful way by United States deployment of a layered defense capable of intercepting long-range missiles from land, sea, air and space-based platforms in the boost, midcourse and terminal phases of their flight?

ANSWER: Without the benefit of classified analysis and modeling against a specific layered system, it’s hard to say. Generally, however, the more effective a U.S. missile defense system is in diminishing retaliatory capability of Russian and Chinese deterrent forces the greater the incentive for expansion of these forces to maintain their perceived deterrent effect. The more a U.S. missile defense is capable of dealing with significant numbers of sophisticated ballistic missiles, the greater the perceived U.S. capability to conduct a pre-emptive attack on strategic deterrent forces and defend against the residual retaliatory strike.

Russian Strategic Doctrine

23. In your view, what is the current Russian approach to strategic nuclear weapons, and if Russia has a launch on warning doctrine, what challenge does this pose for USSTRATCOM?

ANSWER: Russia has increasingly relied on its strategic nuclear forces to maintain its great power status and to protect itself from potential military aggression worldwide. (DELETED) (DELETED)

24. In your view, how do the Russian nuclear doctrines for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons relate to U.S. force structure size and the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal?

ANSWER: While demonstrating an increased reliance on its nuclear arsenal, Russian leaders have openly discussed their intent to reduce nuclear stockpiles. Russian policies and stockpile size, however, are not the sole factors for determining US force structure needs. US strategic force structure and policies must consider, among other things, a more uncertain post-Cold War strategic environment and the emergence of new, promising strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. Again, this is an issue that the NPR is carefully considering.
De-alerting Strategic Forces

25. What is your view of the comparative safety and security of U.S. and Russian strategic forces?

ANSWER:
US: The level of safety and security of US strategic forces is at a high level. The Nuclear Command and Control System End to End Review led by (Retired) General Scowcroft has identified areas where we can continue to evaluate our already significant safety and security posture for strategic forces. Continuous evaluation of these areas, and implementation of enhancements as recommended by the End To End study groups will maintain the safety and security of our strategic forces for the foreseeable future.

Russian: (DELETED)

26. In your view, what is the likelihood of either an accidental or unauthorized launch of either a Russian or U.S. ICBM or SLBM?

ANSWER:
US: United States nuclear forces are subject to numerous procedural and technical safeguards to guard against accidental or inadvertent launch.

Russian: (DELETED)

27. In your view, do U.S. ICBMs or SLBMs maintain a “hair trigger alert?”

ANSWER: No, they do not. “Hair trigger” is an inaccurate assessment. Multiple stringent procedural and technical safeguards have been in place and will remain in place to guard against accidental or inadvertent launch. These safeguards exist to ensure the highest level of nuclear weapons safety, security, reliability, and command and control. We can not launch without Presidential direction.

28. How do you define “hair trigger alert?”

ANSWER: It is any alert status that would allow the launching of nuclear weapons in a less than deliberate manner—without the stringent procedural and technical safeguards.
29. In your view, should the U.S. reduce the alert status of its ICBMs or SLBMs?

**ANSWER:** Reducing the alert status of our forces, in isolation, can diminish the credibility and survivability of our deterrent forces. However, if a de-alerting initiative does not degrade/curtail our strategic capability/mission I would consider supporting it. In general, de-alerting initiatives should not be adopted unless they are reciprocative, verifiable, and, most importantly, stabilizing.

30. Do you support reducing the alert status or deactivating ICBMs and SLBMs other than in the context of implementing the protocol to the START II Treaty that extends the deadline for destruction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles?

**ANSWER:** I do not support reducing the alert status of ICBMs and SLBMs unless the actions are reciprocative, verifiable, and most importantly stabilizing. As for deactivating ICBMs and SLBMs outside of the START II framework, the ongoing NPR analysis will determine if any systems should be deactivated and removed from strategic service, and if other reductions are possible. I am committed to following the President’s guidance to reduce our nuclear forces to the lowest level commensurate with national security requirements.

**Strategic Modernization**

31. In your view, are the modernization and life extension initiatives for ICBMs and SLBMs sufficient to retain their reliability and effectiveness in the Strategic Triad?

**ANSWER:** As our Nation comes to rely on a smaller strategic force, the imperative for modernizing and sustaining that force becomes even more critical to ensure a continued viable deterrent.

In order to continue the reliability and effectiveness of our ICBM force, we have commenced a decade-long effort to extend the MINUTEMAN III service life for another 20 years. Strong Congressional support of these ongoing efforts is essential to the success of these programs and the future viability of our ICBM leg of the Triad.

In the SLBM arena, we have commenced the conversion of our strategic submarine force, with Congressional approval, from an 18 SSBN force composed of both TRIDENT I (C4) and TRIDENT II (D5) missiles to a 14 boat TRIDENT II only force.

Continued Congressional support for the TRIDENT II missile conversion program remains essential to ensure a reliable sea-based deterrent well into the 21st century.

32. Do you believe that the current Air Force bomber roadmap is an adequate plan to...
sustain the bomber force as an effective part of the Strategic Triad?

**ANSWER:** The bomber roadmap details many of the programs required to maintain the bomber force as an effective part of the Strategic Triad. To that end, we fully support current Air Force programs designed to meet critical sustainment and modernization shortfalls. Continued Congressional support for our strategic bomber and nuclear cruise missile initiatives remains critical to the future viability of our bomber force.

**U.S. Strategic Force Posture Beyond START II**

During the Helsinki Summit meeting of March 1997, the United States agreed to begin negotiations on START III once START II enters into force. The START III framework would have limited the sides to between 2,000 and 2,500 deployed strategic warheads.

33. If the United States and Russia reduce deployed strategic warheads to between 2,000 and 2,500, how would you recommend that the U.S. strategic force posture be adjusted?

**ANSWER:** The on-going Nuclear Posture Review is examining this question in great detail; as such it would be premature to postulate specific force posture adjustments.

Currently, the U.S. Navy is planning to backfit four older Trident submarines with D-5 missiles in order to support a START II force of 14 Trident submarines equipped with the D-5 missile.

34. Do you believe that a 14 Trident submarine fleet will still be required if the United States reduces to 2,000 to 2,500 strategic warheads?

**ANSWER:** Yes. Trident submarines will continue to carry the largest portion of our strategic nuclear warheads under any 2,000 to 2,500 strategic warhead force structure. Our SSBN force is the most survivable leg of the Triad. Thus, the US must preserve a large enough SSBN force to enable two-ocean operations with sufficient assets at sea to ensure a survivable, responsive retaliatory force capable of dissuading any potential adversary.

35. In your view, is there a scenario where the U.S. would not need 14 Trident submarines if the U.S. reduced below 2,000 strategic warheads?

**ANSWER:** Possible reductions below 2,000 may create a situation where 14 SSBNs are no longer numerically required. I would seek to maximize combat capability by maintaining sufficient platforms to maintain maximum operational flexibility. The need for survivable submarines at sea will be necessary under any scenario. Fourteen Trident submarines allow a credible, two-ocean, strategic deterrent presence with our projected maintenance cycle and operating environment.
36. What kind of warhead loading would be required to remain within a 2,000 to 2,500 strategic warhead level?

**ANSWER:** Based on preliminary analysis, warhead downloading is a possible option, although it is premature to speculate on the force composition until the NPR is complete. The issues and variables are complex; but, if confirmed, I would explore options that make fiscal sense and do not reduce the credibility of our strategic deterrent.

37. What changes to the ICBM and bomber forces would you have to make in order to remain within a 2,000 to 2,500 strategic warhead level?

**ANSWER:** Based on preliminary analysis, a reduction in ICBM and bomber force structure is possible, although it is premature to speculate on the force composition until the NPR is complete. If confirmed, I would support only those options that would continue to maximize our operational flexibility and stability.

38. Do you favor reductions in strategic nuclear delivery systems beyond the 2,000 to 2,500 strategic warhead level?

**ANSWER:** The NPR is examining the appropriate force structure/warhead level and the SecDef will provide a formal report to Congress on the force structure. Stability is the most important criterion as we proceed down the glide path to lower numbers of nuclear weapons. Control of the glide path is critical - the journey is just as or even more important than the destination. Any reductions must allow a hedge capability by avoiding the elimination of platforms while preserving nuclear infrastructure and technical skills.

39. Do you believe that there is a minimum number of nuclear weapons or delivery systems that the United States should maintain under any scenario?

**ANSWER:** No, I do not believe there is a “hard and fast” minimum number. The manner in which reductions are contemplated and carried out is critical. The most important criterion in assessing prospective arms control measures or unilateral reductions is stability. As we reduce our strategic delivery systems to lower numbers, issues such as disparity in non-strategic nuclear forces, transparency, irreversibility, production capacity, aggregate warhead inventories, and verifiability become more complex and sensitive.

40. Do you believe that the U.S. will need to retain a Strategic Triad under any future agreements or unilateral reductions?

**ANSWER:** I support maintaining a Triad. Each component provides unique attributes that enhance deterrence and reduce risk; submarines provide survivability, bombers provide
flexibility, and intercontinental ballistic missiles provide prompt response. Together, they provide a stable deterrent and complicate an adversary’s offensive and defensive planning.

41. In your view, what is the minimum number of strategic nuclear warheads that should be deployed in the inactive and active inventories of U.S. nuclear weapons? On what strategy are these numbers based?

**ANSWER:** The ongoing Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is studying this topic and as such it is somewhat premature to postulate an active and inactive inventory level. The NPR is developing the strategy for the current/future strategic environment. This will then support appropriate force structure numbers and active/inactive inventory levels.

42. In your view, what should be the minimum number of strategic nuclear warhead designs included in the inactive and active inventories of U.S. nuclear weapons? On what strategy are these numbers based?

**ANSWER:** Again, the ongoing NPR will provide the details to these answers. With the exception of the one type of warhead currently slated for retirement, I believe we should retain all current designs in the active and inactive stockpile. These designs provide a ready hedge for an uncertain future strategic environment.

43. In computing this force structure, do you assume ratification of START II?

**ANSWER:** No. The NPR process is reviewing our strategy and policy to ascertain the force structure requirements that are consistent with our National security needs. In this context, we assume the US will comply with the START I Treaty requirements and START II is not ratified.

**Strategic Force Industrial Base**

44. From your perspective, are there key sectors of the U.S. industrial base that must be protected in order to sustain U.S. strategic forces for the foreseeable future?

**ANSWER:** It is my personal conviction that the support and sustainment of our strategic systems are absolutely essential to ensure a continued, viable deterrent. Our Nation has in hand, or is near the end of production of, all of its major strategic systems. Since there are no follow-on systems in development, the existing systems must be maintained for an unforeseeable length of time. Therefore, it is crucial for us to ensure continued support for key strategic components and systems unique to our strategic forces. The Strategic Advisory Group that advises CINCSTRAT has studied the industrial base and continues to assess areas of concern. Some of the key ballistic missile sectors they have identified that must be protected to sustain our ICBM/SLBM forces include ballistic missile propulsion production capability, re-entry
vehicle technology, guidance systems, and component vulnerability to electromagnetic pulse. If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts to sustain our industrial base.

45. In your view, are the ongoing efforts in this area adequate?

**ANSWER:** It is my understanding that USSTRATCOM, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services, is pursuing industrial capability sustainment initiatives which support space-based communication and sensor systems, strategic missile guidance technology, propellant technology, and reentry vehicle design capability. The Radiation Hardened Micro-Electronics Oversight Council, under the auspices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) is an example of how present concerns are being addressed. Additionally, the Strategic Advisory Group’s Industrial Base Special Study Group is studying future industrial base concerns. Supporting crucial technologies and systems is key to keeping our strategic forces robust, reliable, and modern/credible.

**Nuclear Weapons Complex**

46. In your view, are there opportunities to downsize and modernize the nuclear weapons manufacturing complex?

**ANSWER:** The nuclear weapons manufacturing complex has no redundancy built into the system. Each piece of the complex is unique and irreplaceable. I don’t feel there is room for further downsizing of the manufacturing complex especially with the number of refurbishments that will be scheduled to maintain the enduring stockpile over the next 20 years. The complex is old and there are many areas where modernization would significantly enhance capabilities and throughput for the manufacturing complex.

47. If confirmed, would you support modernization of the manufacturing complex?

**ANSWER:** Yes, if confirmed I would fully support modernization efforts. The National Nuclear Security Administration has a plan and is implementing the plan to modernize many aspects of the manufacturing complex. I fully agree with their efforts and hope the funding will be maintained to ensure the modernization programs are fully implemented.

48. Does downsizing provide cost savings that could help defray the cost of modernizing the manufacturing complex?

**ANSWER:** No. With the demanding refurbishment schedule planned for the various warheads in the enduring stockpile, I don’t believe there would be any savings in downsizing and that it could adversely affect the maintenance of the enduring stockpile.
Nuclear Posture Review

49. What is your understanding of your role, if confirmed, in the Nuclear Posture Review?

ANSWER: While OSD and the Joint Staff are co-leads for the NPR, USSTRATCOM has remained an integral player in all aspects of the NPR. USSTRATCOM brings unique capabilities that should be integrated within the NPR process.

Role of Strategic Command

50. Please describe the role you intend to play, if confirmed, in assessing and participating in the Department of Energy’s science-based stockpile stewardship and management program.

ANSWER: USSTRATCOM is an active participant in the development of the overall strategy and plan. The US must ensure its nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. I recognize CINCSTRAT has specific responsibility in that regard. The Stockpile Assessment Team is now holding an annual stockpile stewardship conference and reports the results to CINCSTRAT. If confirmed, I intend to continue to carefully monitor DOE progress in developing a viable stockpile stewardship and management program.

51. What is your view as to the role USSTRATCOM should play with respect to tactical nuclear weapons?

ANSWER: USSTRATCOM has a unique planning capability for tactical weapons that we can and do provide to theater CINCs. We should continue, and expand this role, when appropriate.

52. Should tactical nuclear weapons be brought under the auspices of USSTRATCOM?

ANSWER: Currently, theater CINCs maintain responsibility, authority, and operational control. Any change to this arrangement would have to be carefully studied and evaluated for impact on our strategies, forces, and international relationships.

Warhead Certification

53. Are you confident in our ability to identify and fix potential problems in all weapons expected to be included in the enduring stockpile?

ANSWER: My confidence in the ability to identify problems rests on the projected success of the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program. This will depend on fully supporting the NNSA program, and how successful we are in the years ahead in developing the complex technological tools and maintaining the necessary expertise in our people. It is imperative as we move forward that we develop the tools necessary to predict problems in the stockpile before they jeopardize safety or reliability.
54. What do you believe to be our biggest challenges in maintaining the nuclear weapons expected to be in the enduring stockpile?

**ANSWER:** Two critical challenges are aging and the certification of modifications to weapons. The answer depends on the success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. NNSA is required to certify the reliability and safety of the Nation’s nuclear stockpile. CINCSTRAT is charged with reporting on his confidence in the safety and reliability as part of an annual assessment process. The certification process is more difficult without nuclear testing, and the national laboratory experts report there are issues that cannot be addressed with current tools, although none currently are severe enough to warrant an underground test. Funding levels must be maintained so that new tools can be delivered on schedule.

**Annual Warhead Certification Process**

The administrative process for certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile requires the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Command and the three nuclear weapons laboratory directors to report annually to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy who in turn certify to the President the continued safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

55. If confirmed, would you provide Congress a copy of your annual certification?

**ANSWER:** CINCSTRAT does not certify the stockpile. NNSA is responsible for certifying the safety and reliability of the stockpile. CINCSTRAT is charged with providing an assessment of the safety and reliability of the stockpile as part of an annual certification process directed by the President. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy co-sign the annual certification and are responsible for the control of the certification document. If confirmed, and if requested, I would provide my views to Congress.

**Limited Life Components**

56. How confident are you in the Department of Energy’s ability to manufacture limited life components for the enduring stockpile?

**ANSWER:** I am confident the Department of Energy will meet DoD needs in maintaining the required stockpile levels. If confirmed, I will closely monitor the process. Given the importance of the issue and the uncertainties about the future, their plans must stay on track.

**Pit Manufacturing Capability**

57. In your view, what is the annual requirement for pit production, by weapons type, for which DOE should size a pit production facility? Would this number change if the U.S. reduced the number of warheads to a level of 2,000 to 2,500 or below?
ANSWER: The number depends on several factors including pit lifetime and the size and composition of the enduring stockpile. NNSA is currently studying the effects of aging on special nuclear materials. The results of this effort will help establish functional pit lifetimes.

**Maintaining Nuclear Weapons Expertise in the Military**

58. **If confirmed, what actions would you propose to take as CINCSTRAT to ensure that nuclear-related jobs are not viewed as career limited and that nuclear programs continue to attract top quality officers and enlisted personnel?**

ANSWER: I fully support Service programs that are vital to ensure we have the highest quality of men and women needed for our nuclear forces. This includes initiatives to identify and track those personnel with nuclear experience. If confirmed as CINCSTRAT and the lead spokesman for our strategic forces, I will ensure the word gets out on our successes. Officer and enlisted personnel are being promoted at the highest rate since the stand up of USSTRATCOM and members completing duties are receiving assignments that enhance their professional development. I believe it is critical that we continue to communicate the challenging opportunities and the successes of the men and women assigned to our strategic nuclear forces.

**Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty**

59. **Do you believe that the U.S. can maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?**

ANSWER: If the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship and management Program proceeds as designed it should be possible to maintain a safe reliable stockpile. This requires full program funding and the successful development of new technology. I am greatly concerned between the widening gap between stockpile program requirements and available resources. The delays in many high-priority stockpile stewardship programs because of aging infrastructure and inadequate funding must be addressed with greater urgency. The planned tools are designed to give us a degree of confidence in the stockpile that would not otherwise be possible without nuclear testing. Until those tools are operational, some degradation in the reliability of the stockpile is possible, but I cannot judge its significance at this time. Within the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Safeguard F provides that the U.S. may resume testing if it is in the supreme national interest of the Nation. In that regard, CINCSTRAT is charged with reporting on his confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile as part of an annual certification process directed by the President. For the past six years, USSTRATCOM has conducted an examination of each strategic nuclear weapon type in the stockpile. In conducting that assessment, no issues were found which would warrant the resumption of nuclear testing. While no-one can guarantee that the SSP will allow us to certify the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile indefinitely in the absence of testing, a judgment that testing is required would not necessarily mean that SSP had failed.
60. Do you support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as currently drafted? If not, what specific changes would be needed to gain your support?

ANSWER: I support the philosophy of CTBT as component of an overall arms control and stability framework. While there are genuine concerns with the treaty and verification requirements, the philosophy is consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

61. Do you believe that the CTBT is verifiable, as currently drafted?

ANSWER: According to GEN Shalikashvili’s recommendations to Congress on CTBT, the treaty will give the US access to the international monitoring system. “The IMS primary seismic system will provide three-station 90% detection thresholds below 500 tons and below 200 tons for all historic test sites in the Northern Hemisphere.” It should be noted that is not possible to verify a true zero-yield test ban without additional measures that are not currently provided for in the CTBT. However, even a true zero-yield test ban would allow experiments that provide useful information for weapon designers.

62. In your view, will the planned science-based Stockpiled Stewardship Program, as it is currently being developed, allow us to continue to certify our nuclear weapons stockpile as safe and reliable indefinitely without testing?

ANSWER: The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) must be fully funded in order to have all the needed tools delivered on schedule. Ultimately, the SSP may uncover unanticipated problems in the stockpile. Since we don’t know what we don’t know, SSP does not guarantee a test will never be required. In fact, an important obligation of SSP is to ensure that we maintain the ability to test.

63. In your view, will the planned science-based Stockpiled Stewardship Program, as it is currently being developed, allow us to continue to meet the DOD’s requirements for our nuclear weapons stockpile without future testing?

ANSWER: Our current stockpile was developed for the Cold War. We need to be able to adapt our current arsenal to add or improve capabilities in order to meet emerging threats. As these new capabilities are added, it will be up to NNSA and the National Labs to certify the weapons. The adaptations currently envisioned appear possible to accomplish without underground testing.

64. If the DOD eventually requires a new nuclear weapon design, will the planned science-based Stockpiled Stewardship Program allow us to develop a new, safe, and reliable nuclear weapon without testing?

ANSWER: NNSA and the National Labs are required to certify any new designs developed.
They will have to determine if an underground test is required for any new weapon design.

**Nuclear Weapons Council**

65. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with the DOE, and with the Nuclear Weapons Council?

**ANSWER:** A close, cooperative relationship with both the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Weapons Council, as well as other organizations such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, is vital to address the challenges of ensuring a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, building a stable foundation for the implementation of arms control agreements, and helping shape the international environment to promote the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed, I will continue to foster a strong partnership with each of these organizations and frequently seek their counsel to address those challenges.

66. Do you support an active Nuclear Weapons Council, to include regularly scheduled meetings?

**ANSWER:** Yes. With the many actions taking place within the nuclear weapons complex and the many ongoing refurbishment programs or soon to be going on, an active Nuclear Weapons Council is imperative. Their guidance will be necessary to ensure programs continue on track and any issues are resolved in a timely manner to preclude unnecessary delays in programs.

**Trident Submarine Conversions and START Accounting**

67. If the Navy continues on a path to convert either two or four of the Trident submarines to be decommissioned to an SSGN configuration that is treaty accountable, at what point would "phantom" warheads ascribed to these boats limit USSTRATCOM's ability to maintain sufficient warheads to execute the National Military Strategy?

**ANSWER:** Under START I Accountability Rules and Limits, converting four Trident submarines to SSGNs presents no “phantom warhead” counting issues. If we move to lower limits within a treaty framework and the accounting rules are not modified we cannot afford the numbers lost to phantom warheads.

**Cooperative Threat Reduction Program**

68. Do you support the Cooperative Threat Reduction program?

**ANSWER:** I strongly support Cooperative Threat Reduction. It has proven itself to be an invaluable part of a broadened definition of deterrence, as a cost-effective means to aid in the “denuclearization” of former Soviet states, to continue to promote stockpile safety and security in Russia, and help stem the proliferation of weapons.
Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

69. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

ANSWER: Yes. If confirmed, it is my duty to keep you, the representatives of the people, informed of the status of our strategic deterrent forces.

70. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

ANSWER: Yes. It is my responsibility to provide the best military advice regardless of the Administration's views.

71. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command?

ANSWER: Yes. If confirmed, I will make myself available to this committee or designated members whenever requested.

72. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

ANSWER: Yes. I will be forthcoming with all information requested.