Advance Questions for General Richard B. Myers
Nominee for the Position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Defense Reforms

Almost 15 years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have previously answered the Committee’s policy questions on this subject in connection with your nominations to be Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified on October 27, 1999?

No. My views have not changed. I still believe that the defense reforms initiated by Goldwater-Nichols were the appropriate antidote. Today, the reforms have strengthened the warfighting capabilities of our combatant commands by facilitating our evolution into a truly joint force.

Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national security strategy? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

I believe Goldwater-Nichols has provided the necessary flexibility to allow us to conduct business the way we should -- jointly. There are some necessary mechanical issues related to joint officer management and joint professional military education that must be addressed.

Based upon your experience as Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, do you believe that the roles of the combatant commanders and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation are appropriate and that the policies and procedures in existence allow those roles to be fulfilled?

Yes.
**Duties**

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and National Security Council (NSC), as established by Title 10. The Chairman is just that - the principal military advisor - and not, according to the law, in the chain of command that runs from the NCA directly to each combatant commander. The law allows the President to direct that communications between the NCA and the Combatant commanders be transmitted through the Chairman. The current Unified Command Plan (UCP) directs this method of communication, as have all the UCPs since Goldwater-Nichols was enacted. This method of transmission of information ensures that the Chairman is fully involved so that he can provide the NCA with his best military advice.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

The United States military has fully prepared me for this position through myriad duty assignments working with the greatest soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen in the world. During my career, I have commanded at the squadron, weapons school, wing, numbered air force, major, subunified, and unified command levels. I served as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where I gained an even greater understanding of Washington's interagency processes. And, of course, during the last year and a half I have served as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working under the superb leadership and guidance of Hugh Shelton, and dealing with the full spectrum of issues and crises I can expect to face should I be confirmed as the Chairman.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

No.
Do you expect the President to continue to direct that communications to the combatant commanders be transmitted through you, if you are confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

This time-tested method of communication is critical to the Chairman’s ability to fulfill his statutory role and responsibilities as principal military advisor to the NCA and NSC. The Chairman must be kept informed and this is the most effective way to do it. This communications process is equally critical to the Chairman’s ability to perform other NCA-assigned responsibilities such as assisting the NCA in the performance of their command functions, overseeing the activities of the combatant commands, and serving as spokesman for the combatant commanders especially on the operational requirements of their commands.

Do you expect the Secretary of Defense to continue to assign responsibilities for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands to you, if you are confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

This is a critical role and is provided for in current DOD directives.

Relationships

Section 151(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships.

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:

a. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Chairman to the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.
b. The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Title 10, United States Code, and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. In discharging their responsibilities, the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. They may also obtain reports and information necessary to carry out their functions. As with other communications between the NCA and combatant commanders, communications between the Under Secretaries and combatant commanders should be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for C3I, Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and Intelligence Oversight, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. This means any relationship with an Assistant Secretary of Defense would be through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer). Since the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for C3I, Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs are the Secretary’s principal staff assistants and advisors for matters within their functional areas, relations between the Chairman and ASD(C3I), ASD(PA) and ASD(LA) would be conducted along the same lines as those discussed above regarding relations with the various Under Secretaries of Defense.

d. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Title 10, United States Code, section 154(c) states that the Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as those duties prescribed by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I do not foresee making significant changes to the duties currently carried out by the Vice Chairman. In addition to the duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman serves on the Chairman’s behalf as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and is his representative to the National Security Council Deputies Committee. Further, the Vice Chairman has the responsibility to stay abreast of ongoing operations and policy deliberations, so that he is able to provide appropriate military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC and also act as Chairman in the Chairman’s absence.
e. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Title 10, United States Code, section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces they have assigned to combatant commands. The Chairman, or the Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the combatant commands.

f. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. They now have two significant roles. First and foremost, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Service. With the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, the Combatant commanders can ensure the preparedness of assigned forces for missions directed by the NCA. Next, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a legal obligation to provide military advice. Individually and collectively, the Joint Chiefs are a source of experience and judgment for the Chairman, the combatant commanders and the NCA. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely and meet routinely with the Service Chiefs as we work together to fulfill the warfighters' requirements.

g. The Combatant Commanders.

The combatant commanders are the warfighters. By law and to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the combatant commanders and is charged with overseeing their activities. He provides a vital linkage between the combatant commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will have frequent dialogue with the CINCs and serve as their advocate and spokesman.
**Transformation**

If confirmed, you will be assuming your duties as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a time of great expectations for the transformation of our armed forces to meet new and emerging threats.

Please explain what the term “transformation” means to you and the role that technology and experimentation, including joint experimentation, should play in transforming our armed forces?

Transformation is an on-going process for conceptualizing, developing and fielding new combinations of operational concepts, capabilities, organizational arrangements and training regimens that provide U.S. joint forces with advantages that fundamentally change our own, or render less effective others, ways of waging war. It is usually evolutionary but can be revolutionary. Technology and material-based solutions are only one element of transformation. True transformation can only occur through a co-evolution of change recommendations within all the critical joint force considerations of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). A comprehensive DOTMLPF approach is necessary to field and employ future capabilities that fundamentally change and improve our operational and warfighting effectiveness.

A key feature for the achieving joint transformation will be the clear identification and delineation of the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Combatant Commands, the Services, JFCOM and the Joint Staff to ensure unity of effort under the Secretary of Defense.

Joint Transformation also requires changes within the three supporting processes of requirements generation, acquisition and the planning, programming, and budgeting system processes. Over the past year, the military has made significant strides in the improvement of the requirements generation process through the evolving strategic integration role of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The Requirements Generation System (RGS) process was shifted from a threat-based system to a joint operational concept and capabilities-based system. Additionally, the process was adapted to enable the introduction and consideration of transformation initiatives from a variety of sources, to include Joint and Service experimentation. The Secretary of Defense is working hard to streamline the acquisition and PPBS systems to facilitate transformation. Further, modernization is a key part in the transformation equation.
Are you confident that the defense review process, now concluding, will outline a clear vision for transformation within the Department and understandable mechanisms for measuring progress toward accomplishing stated transformation goals?

The Secretary of Defense has received a comprehensive overview of current transformation efforts and processes underway within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commands, JROC, JFCOM and the Services as a frame of reference. Significant process reform has already been accomplished and the mechanisms to nurture develop and eventually field new joint operational concepts and capabilities are in place.

The defense review process does provide a solid foundation for pursuing and achieving the joint and Service transformation desires of the Administration, Congress and the military Services. One of the many challenges is the development of a comprehensive DOD strategy for the transformation of the Defense Agencies and the military Services. Unity of effort is essential with clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities within all the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Service, Combatant Command, Joint Staff and JFCOM initiatives to insure the development of a more integrated and highly effective joint force.

Transformation is a long-term effort within an organizing construct that defines the joint operational concepts, capabilities and process metrics that will focus our efforts and enable us to measure progress.

**Joint Force**

Retired Air Force General James McCarthy, who headed a study on Defense Transformation for Secretary Rumsfeld, recently stated that “Today we do not have a truly joint force” and “The problem is we have not identified a way to organize, train and equip joint forces.”

How would you respond to those statements?

We have come a long way since 1985, but we still are not where we need to be. The Services need to field truly ‘plug and play’ forces while JFCOM develops a functional, standardized joint force headquarters so we all can work as a true joint team. Equipment needs to be interoperable so we can share information and act decisively on that information as a true joint team. And, we need to better integrate Service specific training and joint command and control so we can train as a true joint team like we fight. Of course, the military view of jointness is not the absence of
Service uniqueness. Instead the approach to jointness within the U.S. military emphasizes the following key elements:

- it leverages service core competencies to produce a comprehensive joint capability;
- it relies on the integration of the active and reserve components for a total joint force;
- it is focused at the strategic and operational levels of war;
- it retains necessary redundancy with minimal duplication of capability in Service provided forces;
- it effectively operates within the interagency and multinational environments.

The current law and force planning development system uses the military Services to organize, train, equip and provide joint-capable forces to combatant commanders. The core competencies of each Service reflect their unique capabilities and ensure continuation of both the ethos and the means for future operational and warfighting success. As we seek to transform the armed forces, we do not want to lose the characteristics that have produced the world’s premier warfighting Services in their operational dimension. Our challenge is to develop a future joint force with joint core competencies that enable, integrate and employ Service, interagency and multinational core competencies for the achievement of desired effects and outcomes.

The development of complementary joint and Service core competencies will provide a basis for fielding a more capable, effective and integrated future joint force from Service force providers. In that effort we are also addressing joint processes and standards across the critical joint force development considerations of doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.

**Anthrax Vaccination**

DOD officials have testified that anthrax is the greatest biological weapon threat to our military force because it is highly lethal, easy to produce in large quantities, and remains viable over long periods of time. The anthrax vaccination program has been curtailed because of limited quantities of FDA-approved vaccine.

Do you continue to support the policy of vaccinating our service men and women to immunize them against the use of weaponized anthrax?

I strongly support any policy protecting our service members against anything that puts them at risk. As you stated in the question, and as was recently re-confirmed with our war fighting commanders, anthrax is the agent of highest concern in biological
warfare. The pre-exposure vaccination program is the safest and most effective countermeasure in existence today and is the medical cornerstone of our integrated defense strategy to counter this very real threat.

If confirmed, will you support full implementation of the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program if sufficient supplies of FDA-approved anthrax vaccine become available?

Yes. The protection of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines is a top priority. The vaccine is a safe and effective medical pre-exposure countermeasure to anthrax. It's the right thing to do.

The difficulty the Department has experienced in procuring a reliable source of FDA-approved anthrax vaccine has resulted in the Department examining alternative sources of the vaccine, including the establishment of a government-owned, contractor-operated production facility; a contractor-owned, contractor-operated production facility; and other options.

If confirmed, would you support establishment of an additional dedicated vaccine production facility (whether a GOCO or private industry source)?

I support establishing a long-term, reliable national vaccine production capability. The Department of Defense has a long term need for reliable sources of FDA-approved vaccines for any biological health threat that may impact our soldiers, sailors, airman, and marines now and in the future. How it is done is a policy decision.

Paradigm Shift

During Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s August 8th and August 16th press conferences in which you participated, he referred to a consensus on a “very significant paradigm shift,” which appears to relate to changes in strategy, risk assessment, and war-fighting requirements.

Would you describe the elements of this “very significant paradigm shift” and indicate the areas, such as force structure, that could be impacted by it?

In the past, DOD focused on building a force capable of defeating the threat posed by two, nearly simultaneous major theater wars while also handling smaller scale contingencies. We essentially sized our force to fight two very distant foes, Iraq and
North Korea. This approach has been overshadowed by the uncertainties of the changing strategic landscape, and contributed to an imbalance between our previous strategy and the force structure to execute that strategy. The world continues to grow more dangerous and more complex, limiting our ability to forecast who might be possible adversaries. This set of circumstances requires the “paradigm shift” that the Deputy Secretary of Defense referred to in his remarks. The Department will, I believe, be recommending a new, broader strategy to address not only the need to fight and decisively win major theater war, but also the growing need to defend our territory. It will also account for myriad other tasks, including small-scale contingencies, we have asked our forces to do. These small-scale contingencies have been driving up the tempo of our people and equipment. This also drives us to transition from a near term, threat-based approach to a capabilities-based approach required to execute a wider range of possible missions in the mid- and long-term. This paradigm shift requires we address not only the warfighting requirements for today, but simultaneously set the stage for building a force that can deal with possible future scenarios that are not in our current planning set. We must then carefully balance between modernizing our current fleets of aging weapons systems and selectively transforming the Department in ways that will allow us to successfully address an entirely new set of threats in the future.

Science and Technology

The fiscal year 2002 budget request remains short of the Department’s stated 3 percent goal for defense science and technology.

Do you believe that the request of $8.8 billion is adequate to meet the military’s need for innovative technologies?

To meet the 3 percent objective in FY 2002 would have required a total of $9.9 billion. The current program of $8.8 billion represents 2.7 percent of the total DOD budget. It reflects the priorities established in the President’s Blueprint Budget by providing emphasis on rotorcraft technologies; unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) research; unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) development; exploration of technologies in support of the Next Generation Bomber (NGB) for the Air Force and the Future Combat System (FCS) for the Army; development of foliage penetration radar; support of an accelerated Joint Experimentation schedule; chem-bio defense modeling and standoff detection; and high speed sealift development.
Use of Military Force

If confirmed, you will be responsible for providing military advice on the use of military force and the other instruments of U.S. power.

What factors do you believe should be considered when contemplating the use of force?

The National Command Authorities (NCA) will decide when U.S. Armed Forces are employed in a given situation. In consultation with the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders, and based on a clear definition of the mission and interagency and multinational resources available, I expect to advise the NCA in a number of areas. Among them are the effectiveness of the military instrument to achieve the desired national security objectives, employment options and expected costs, and the potential impact on the force's ability to respond to other requirements. I would also provide an assessment of any long-term effects on operations and personnel tempo.

Space

What are your views on weapons in space?

U.S. Space Command has a "Force Application" mission that requires them to plan for and conduct research and development of space-based systems as insurance should the nature of threats and opportunities significantly change. I believe this is a sound approach.

Do you support placing offensive weapons in space?

Placing weapons in space is a policy decision of the NCA. Consistent with national laws, policy and international treaty commitments, I support research and development into weapons options, should we one day be directed to deploy such capabilities.

Under what circumstances and for what purposes would you place offensive weapons in space?

It's difficult to say under what specific circumstances and for what purposes we would do that. However, if it were determined that offensive weapons in space were the appropriate means to protect our national security interests then the NCA should consider them.
Describe your understanding of the current U.S. military space doctrine as it pertains to the deployment of weapons in space.

The placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth, and use of the moon or other celestial bodies for military purposes are clearly prohibited. Space Doctrine, Joint Publication 3-14, addresses space control and generally addresses force application; however, no such weapons exist. Therefore, the specific deployment of weapons in space is not addressed.

Do you support current U.S. space doctrine as it relates to space control?

Yes. Our space control doctrine is consistent with our long-standing air and sea doctrines - to ensure freedom of action for ourselves and our allies, and to deny it, where appropriate, to potential adversaries.

Do you believe that achieving control of space will require deploying offensive weapons in space?

Not necessarily. The easiest way to ensure space control is to interdict satellite ground stations or their communications links.

Describe your understanding of other methods and weapons systems that might be used to achieve space control objectives.

We use four primary methods for space control: surveillance, protection, prevention, and negation. Tactics vary from attacks with conventional munitions on ground sites or electronic warfare attacks on their links, to encryption, to fielding redundancy in our systems, to our ground-based space surveillance systems. Any weapons system that can be used in these tactics are appropriate to achieve space control objectives.
Do you support increased funding and focus on improving space situational awareness? How would you increase situational awareness?

Situational awareness is key to operating effectively in any medium. Modernization of our space surveillance capabilities is key to increasing our situational awareness.

Is such an increased awareness a prerequisite to placing offensive weapons in space?

Space situational awareness is much more than an enabler for offensive weapons in space. The foundation of all space missions is space control.

Do you believe that threats to our space assets are increasing?

Yes, just like any other technological advancement throughout history, we can expect an increasing challenge for what to us is a key warfighting capability.

Do you agree with the Space Commission assessment that the United States is “an attractive candidate for a ‘space Pearl Harbor’”?

I think the Space Commission did the nation a service by bringing such a possibility into the national debate about the future of space. The lesson we learned from Pearl Harbor is that the only way we can avoid repeating that experience is if we anticipate its possibility again, and are ready for the challenge.

Do you believe that improved space surveillance and space situational awareness can reduce the vulnerability of our space assets?

Yes.

Do you believe that there is a need to establish an international framework that would be intended to ensure continued access to space for peaceful purposes?

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 provides such a framework. It has been the bedrock of the peaceful use of space. I do not currently see the need for any new treaty or international agreement that would address military uses of space.
What are your views on legislative implementation of the recommendations of the Space Commission?

The Secretary of Defense is currently reviewing S.1368, dealing with the recommendations of the Space Commission. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on it until this review is complete.

**Nuclear Force Structure**

Do you believe that the Strategic Triad should be maintained, or that we should consider eliminating any portion of the triad?

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is examining the role of the TRIAD and will make recommendations on its composition. The TRIAD has been the foundation of our nuclear deterrent force posture for over thirty years. The inherent capabilities of a robust TRIAD ensure against a catastrophic failure of any one leg of our forces, thereby assuring that the U.S. is always capable of responding to any potential threat. The NPR is examining the unique contributions of each leg.

Do you believe that the United States can make reductions in nuclear weapons below those levels included in START II and still meet current nuclear deterrence guidance?

Nuclear weapons levels as outlined in the START II treaty were agreed to in the context of bilateral arms control with the former Soviet Union. The START II treaty has not entered into force due to conditions added by them during their ratification (April 2000). The ongoing Nuclear Posture Review mandated by Congress is currently examining the strategy and scope of potential reductions. Therefore, it is premature to state at this time what level of reductions can be made.

Can the targeting requirements derived from current nuclear deterrence guidance be met at a level of 2,000-2,500 warheads?

It is prudent to complete the examination of our national strategy and nuclear deterrent posture prior to committing to a specific warhead band. This is currently being examined in the Nuclear Posture Review.
Do reductions below the level of 2,000-2,500 warheads require revisions to current nuclear deterrence guidance?

The President has committed to “achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible numbers of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs including our obligations to our allies.” The Congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review that the Secretary of Defense has undertaken is examining U.S. deterrence strategy to achieve the President’s objective.

Do you support revisions to current nuclear deterrence guidance that would allow reductions below the level of 2,000-2,500 warheads?

I support the President’s call for a reduction of nuclear forces to the lowest possible numbers of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs. I also support revisions to U.S. strategy which accurately reflect the challenges and opportunities of the new international strategic environment. Deterrence will continue to be the primary role of our nuclear forces particularly against potential adversaries that may consider the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons or other WMD. This question is a critical component of the ongoing Congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review; therefore, it is premature to comment while the review is still in progress.

Do you support dismantlement of retired nuclear warheads?

Today the United States no longer has the ability to manufacture some key nuclear weapons components. We have placed in storage a number of weapons components from previously retired weapons that can be used to assemble weapons in times of emergency. We can only address dismantlement on a case-by-case basis until we restore our ability to manufacture new weapons.

In your view, what should be the minimum number of strategic nuclear warhead designs included in the inactive and active inventories of U.S. nuclear weapons?

Currently, the United States retains the ability to design and assemble new warheads if the required components are available. While no minimum number of designs can be specified, a sufficient amount must be retained as a hedge against weapons failures and emergency weapons re-manufacturing requirements. The question is currently being examined in the ongoing Congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review.
Would you support a return to nuclear weapons testing in the absence of a significant stockpile related problem?

Today, we can certify the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile without testing. The Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to improve our understanding of complex weapons performance issues. Our future capability to certify our stockpile is uncertain. The requirement for testing is evaluated annually and reported to the President. However, we need to retain our ability to conduct nuclear testing in case of unforeseen technical issues.

Under what conditions would you support a resumption of nuclear weapons testing?

Currently, there is no need for a resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing as science-based tools and an aggressive surveillance program have proven effective thus far in maintaining a safe and reliable stockpile. However, if unforeseen problems arise with weapons in our stockpile, we may need to recommend that nuclear testing be resumed to reestablish confidence in our nuclear arsenal.

If DOD eventually requires a new nuclear weapon design, will the existing science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program allow us to develop a new, safe, and reliable nuclear weapon without testing?

I must defer to the experts at DOE for this answer.

Do you support development of new low yield nuclear weapons? If so, what requirement would such a weapon meet? Under what circumstances would you support using such a weapon? Does such a weapon have any deterrent value?

This area is currently being examined in the Nuclear Posture Review. Moreover, we already have a number of low-yield weapons in the current stockpile. It would be premature to speculate on the need for a new weapon.
Do you support the development of a new weapon design in an effort to make sure our experienced weapon designers are maintaining their skills and transferring their expertise to the new generation of designers?

We currently have no military requirements for a new weapon design, but we support DOE’s efforts to sustain the skills and expertise as they see fit.

Do you believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program can maintain the necessary skills to maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile?

The skill sets in question reside in DOE. I must defer to their experts for the answer.

If a new design requirement were forthcoming, are you confident our weapon designers could develop the new weapon design, especially if they are not allowed to test such a weapon?

I must again defer to the DOE experts for the answer. I would rely on their judgement.

Would your confidence remain the same if the new weapon design was primarily developed by designers who never had the opportunity to test a nuclear weapon?

I understand NNSA is expending significant resources to ensure this new generation benefits from the experience of our current scientists and engineers before they retire. I would defer to NNSA on this issue.

As our experienced nuclear weapons designers continue to reach retirement age, are you concerned that without the development of a new weapon design, their skills, experience, and expertise may be lost forever?

NNSA is aggressively pursuing programs to ensure that this will not happen, but I would defer to them on this issue.
Is there any requirement for any new nuclear weapon, and under what circumstances would you support development of a new nuclear weapon?

No, there is currently no military requirement for a new nuclear weapon, but this issue is also being examined as part of the Congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review.

**Nuclear Testing**

Former Secretary of Defense and Energy James Schlesinger stated that the United States will have to retain the option of testing nuclear devices on an as-needed basis. He further stated that limitations on testing have already changed the way weapons planners go about their business and that we have had to forego development of new nuclear systems, such as those designed to attack hardened or dispersed targets, to live within the bounds of the self-imposed testing moratorium.

Do you agree with his assessment, and, if not, why not?

Again, there is currently no military requirement for a new design nuclear weapon. As part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, however, DOE has retained an ability to resume underground nuclear testing in two to three years if required.

**Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs**

Do you support the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program?

Yes. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) helps the Former Soviet Union eliminate strategic offensive arms consistent with their treaty obligations; prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems, materials and expertise; and pursue military reductions and reform. All of this serves to enhance U.S. security. Given their fiscal austerity, it is not at all clear that countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazkahstan and Uzbekistan would eliminate their strategic arms and be able to comply with their treaty obligations without the CTR program of assistance. Moreover, leaving those systems in place makes them vulnerable to theft or sale to other state or transnational groups.
In your view, does the CTR program support national security through its strategic forces dismantlement and other efforts and should it continue to be a DOD program?

Yes. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) does support national security. What’s important is not where the program resides as long as we continue to execute it effectively and reap the benefits of fewer weapons of mass destruction.

**Ballistic Missile Defense**

The Clinton Administration established four criteria for determining whether to deploy ballistic missile defense systems to defend the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks:

1) The threat should warrant deployment;
2) The system should be cost-effective and affordable;
3) The system should be operationally effective; and
4) Deployment should make us more rather than less secure.

Do you believe these criteria should continue to be used for considering whether to deploy missile defenses against limited long-range missile attacks? Please indicate the reasons for your answer.

Militarily, these criteria make sense for any weapons system under consideration. Missile defense is an essential component for deterring the emerging ballistic missile threat. It is part of a broader security approach that encompasses non-proliferation and counter-proliferation.

The Bush Administration has proposed a large missile defense research and development program for fiscal year 2002, including efforts in boost-phase, midcourse and terminal defenses for land-based, sea-based, air-based and space-based systems.

How do you believe we should determine the proper level of effort and resource allocation to ballistic missile defense relative to other defense needs?

We balance program needs through the Department’s programming and budget review process. The Department initiated several major reviews at the outset of the new Administration and the defense strategy review is still in progress. Any major defense program changes will await the outcome of that review.
Today, our forward deployed military forces face current and growing threats from short-range and medium-range theater ballistic missiles.

How high a priority do you believe that fielding operationally effective theater missile defense systems should be for our military?

The President has stated we will deploy defenses capable of defending the U.S., our allies, and friends. The Department has already signaled its intention to stop differentiating between “national” and “theater” missile defense systems. We are pursuing a layered defensive system, capable of intercepting missiles of any range at every stage of flight – boost, mid-course, and terminal. Since the Gulf War and the casualties we suffered due to a missile attack, protecting our troops against such a missile attack is a top priority.

**Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MI RV)**

Certain Russian officials have indicated that if the U.S. withdraws from the ABM treaty, Russia may not de-MI RV its land-based ICBMs as required by treaty and may re-MI RV or newly MI RV other land-based systems.

The START II Treaty is not in force. It is the only treaty requiring elimination of MIRVed ICBMs. The START I Treaty is in force and allows for retention of MIRVed ICBMs by both Russia and the U.S.

**Do you believe that it is in the U.S. national security interest that all land-based ICBMs be de-MI RVed?**

There are no significant military advantages to the elimination of MIRVed land-based ICBMs. From the U.S. perspective, the recent budget submission reflects future retirement of all U.S. Peacekeeper MIRVed ICBMs, and the U.S. is downloading one of three wings of MIRVed Minuteman III ICBMs to a single reentry vehicle. These actions reflect the military conclusion that these MIRVed systems are no longer required for national security.

**Do you believe that it is in the U.S. national security interest to deploy a ballistic missile defense system to defend the United States against limited ballistic missile attack and to defend U.S. troops deployed abroad and U.S. allies from such attack?**

Yes. We should take all measures possible to defend U.S. and allied interests.
Military-to-Military Contacts

This Committee has been a strong supporter of military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that are designed to encourage a democratic orientation of the defense establishments and military forces of other countries.

What is your view of the value of military-to-military contacts?

They are absolutely essential to the execution of our National Military Strategy. They are fundamental to our ability to enhance the national security of the United States, and our interoperability with allies in securing theirs. Military-to-military contacts range from senior officer visits, counterpart visits, ship port visits, bilateral and multilateral staff talks, personnel exchange programs, unit exchange programs, formal military contacts programs, and State Partnership for Peace activities. They are essential for enhancing the U.S. military's ability to operate with coalition and partner nations through interactions with foreign military personnel, equipment, and culture. The experiences and relationships developed by military-to-military contact significantly enhance the operational flexibility and cohesiveness of future coalition operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The trust, goodwill, and influence our military gains with those of other nations are invaluable. By promoting democratic ideals among militaries worldwide provides, we also enhance regional security, ensure U.S. access, and increase coalition interoperability.

National Military Strategy

The last National Military Strategy document was issued in September 1997, shortly after the completion of the last Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Although there is no statutory requirement for such a document, if confirmed, would you prepare and issue a National Military Strategy in the aftermath of the completion of the 2001 QDR?

The National Military Strategy (NMS) and Joint Vision are key documents used by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fulfill his Title 10 responsibility of assisting the President and Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. If confirmed, I intend to issue a new NMS. It will be developed in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, and convey my
advice in implementing the Secretary of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review, and any additional guidance contained in the President’s National Security Strategy.

**Colombia**

U.S. military personnel have been involved in the training and equipping of Colombian military forces involved in counter-drug operations. U.S. military personnel, however, do not participate in or accompany Colombian counter-drug or counter-insurgency forces on field operations in Colombia.

Do you favor continuation of this limited role for U.S. military personnel in Colombia?

Yes, in accordance with current law and Secretary of Defense directives. Any proposed increase in role or scope of military actions in Colombia is a matter of policy.

**Quadrennial Defense Review**

Section 118(e) of title 10, United States Code, provides for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense the Chairman’s assessment of the QDR, including the Chairman’s assessment of risk. The Secretary, in turn, is required to submit the Chairman’s assessment, with the Secretary’s comments, in the report in its entirety, when the report is submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives. If the QDR is not complete by the end of the current Chairman’s term, the preparation and submission of the Chairman’s assessment of the QDR, including the Chairman’s assessment of risk, will be the responsibility of the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If confirmed, are you committed to making a comprehensive and straightforward assessment of the report, including an assessment of risk, even if that assessment differs from the view of the Secretary of Defense?

Yes.
**Priorities**

General Shelton has established asymmetrical warfare, joint readiness, information operations and force protection as priorities and readiness, modernization and core compensation elements as enduring priorities.

If confirmed, what would be your priorities?

I agree with General Shelton. I think they’re all enduring priorities, and will continue to demand our attention for quite some time. If confirmed, my initial priorities will be closely related to them. First, joint warfighting is fundamental. The Armed Forces must continue to enhance our joint warfighting capabilities. Second we must find the proper balance between, and find resources for modernization and transformation. Third, we need to continue our efforts to make the JROC more strategically focused. Fourth, we should better define the military’s role in homeland security. Fifth, we must find ways to enhance Joint Forces Command’s role in experimentation and transformation. Sustaining our quality force and taking care of our people first are, of course, the ultimate means of accomplishing all of this.

**Lessons Learned**

What are the most important lessons that you have learned as Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Those experiences were invaluable. And the lessons I took from them only confirmed what I have learned throughout the 36 years of my uniformed service to the nation.

First, the armed forces aren’t made up of people, rather that the people are the armed forces. Sometimes we lose that focus. The issue isn't the Services or the gadgets they bring to the fight, but rather that the people who, regardless of the tools they use or the uniform they wear, are the key to achieving our national security objectives. They're the real source of our Armed Forces power.

Second, all efforts of those in our Armed Forces must be geared toward one thing -- warfighting. Every effort made, from the smallest field detachment to the loftiest offices in the Pentagon should be focused on that one idea.

Third, there must be unity of effort with DOD as we work through our modernization and transformation activities.

Finally, Service competition can often be a good thing as competition breeds excellence. But in the end, all efforts must be focused on the contribution to the joint fight.
During your tenure as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), there has been a shift in the JROC’s focus to a more strategic level and an initiative to better integrate Joint Forces Command’s joint experimentation efforts into the JROC and other DOD decision-making processes.

Would you describe the reasoning behind and the impact of these changes?

In April 2000, I appeared before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee to discuss the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and its evolving role in supporting our Armed Forces. My concern was centered on improving the JROC’s ability to provide the strategic guidance necessary to advance future joint warfighting. The JROC needed to provide the up-front guidance necessary for requirements integration and joint interoperability.

A critical key to achieving joint interoperability rests in establishing a framework from which to assess increasingly complex systems. This framework consists of joint operational concepts and joint operational architectures that drive development of materiel and non-materiel solutions. We view this as a crucial component of DOD-wide transformation. Operational architectures are the key to system interoperability because they establish the interoperability requirements that give us the ability to make the necessary system and technical architecture decisions.

The impact of these changes has been significant. It is my view that the JROC has been working to establish a process that supports institutional transformation. First, the JROC is leading the ongoing development of joint operational concepts and architectures, which it will use to provide discrete standards that ensure systems are “born” joint interoperable. Second, the JROC is now integrating joint doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTLPF), with the materiel (system) solutions. Third, the JROC is continuing to work very closely with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to integrate its experimentation efforts in support of operational concept and architecture development.

Finally, I would like to comment on three specific initiatives the JROC is working. First is our standup of the Joint Interoperability and Integration (JI&I) organization at JFCOM. This organization’s function is to act as the transformation engine for joint interoperability requirements of future and legacy systems and provide operationally prioritized recommendations regarding joint doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities. Second, is our Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) System Engineer effort, which is focused on recommending system level fixes to the
JROC for existing Joint Distributive Network deficiencies with the goal of delivering fused, near-real-time and real-time data from multiple sensors to produce a common, continuous and unambiguous air picture. And third, our commitment to develop a Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures (FIOP) will provide an all-source picture of the battle space containing actionable, decision-quality information to the warfighter through a fusion of existing databases. I would solicit your continued support for all of these important initiatives.

**If confirmed, would you intend to make any other changes in the JROC's role or process?**

I am confident we're on the right track. We need to continue our current efforts to develop operational concepts and architectures that will drive future system development. In fact, I am looking at ways to accelerate these efforts. I am also committed to continuing our work with Joint Forces Command to fully integrate its joint experimentation efforts. It's going to take us some time to work our way through the development of these joint operational concepts and architectures that will form the basis of future JROC guidance and requirement integration.

**Excess Infrastructure**

**How high a priority would you place on the closure of excess Department of Defense installations and why?**

I share the Secretary's view. According to the April 1998 DOD BRAC report, we currently have 23% excess infrastructure capacity, a situation that directly impacts the ability of the Service Chiefs to provide, train, maintain, and equip today's force. By removing excess capacity, we could save significant resources in the long-term -- money needed to fix infrastructure in remaining bases. We also need a sustained period of increased funding for infrastructure to develop and properly maintain what's needed to support the next generation of weapon systems. The Services should be relieved of the burden of maintaining sites with limited military use.

**Encroachment**

On November 27, 2000, the Senior Readiness Oversight Council identified several "encroachment" problems confronting the Department of Defense including protection of endangered species, unexploded ordnance and other constituents, commercial demand for bandwidth and frequency, sustainability of the maritime environment, demand for use of airspace, protection of air quality, abatement of airborne noise, and growth of urban
areas. At a March 20, 2001, hearing before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, representatives of the military services expressed concern that this encroachment was hindering their Title 10 responsibility to train the forces.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to address these problems?

Based on the testimony provided by the services at the Readiness Subcommittee hearing on March 20, 2001, it appears that the time is ripe for the development and implementation of a comprehensive strategy that addresses both the individual and the cumulative effects of environmental encroachment issues.

If confirmed, how would you propose to facilitate the development and implementation of a comprehensive strategy intended to address readiness concerns related to these encroachment issues?

Training is critical to the readiness of combat forces and encroachment is a serious issue with national security implications. The training of the Armed Forces is a Service responsibility, and the Services are working hard not only to maintain their training facilities, but to improve their stewardship of the environment, while strengthening their relationships with local communities.

There is a collaborative Departmental effort to address encroachment issues. We have draft action plans for the various aspects of encroachment. We are working a community outreach program to minimize the impact of encroachment by fostering a dialogue with local leadership, discussing work-around initiatives, and developing potential technology solutions to provide a similar level of training.

This is a solid and prudent approach for resolving the encroachment issues. If confirmed, I’ll continue to support these efforts.

Readiness Reporting System

The systems that the military services use to measure their readiness have been criticized as outdated and inappropriate for a military of the 21st Century. Some of the specific criticisms raised have been that they measure past readiness rather than future readiness, and they measure the readiness of the forces to perform a major theater war mission rather than the mission to which they are currently assigned.
Do you agree with these criticisms and, if confirmed, what actions would you take to change the systems?

As Vice Chairman I have been involved in the readiness of the force, the assessment process, and in identifying solutions to our shortfalls. The Joint Staff hosts annual CINC/Service conferences on readiness, and based on the CINC/Service's feedback, I believe our focus on joint warfighting is the proper emphasis, and is also in accordance with Title 10, U. S. Code, Section 117. Units are designed—manned, armed, equipped, and trained—to conduct wartime missions. But I also recognize the necessity to assess our readiness for missions other than war. Less than two years ago we created a reporting mechanism within the Global Status of Resources and Training System to do this. While this was a good first effort, expansion and/or refinement of this reporting mechanism needs to be explored. As set forth in the DPG, the Services and Chairman must recommend to the Secretary of Defense a comprehensive readiness reporting system. If confirmed I will continue to further enhance the timeliness, accuracy, and usefulness of the readiness reporting system.

**CINC-Identified Readiness Deficiencies**

Over the last several years the Quarterly Readiness Reports that the Department prepares for the Congress have outlined a number of CINC-identified readiness related deficiencies. Many of these are listed as Category I deficiencies which entail significant warfighting risk to execution of the National Military Strategy. Although these deficiencies have been reported for the past several years, they have not as yet been effectively addressed. This has raised concerns that the requirements of the warfighting CINCs are not being incorporated into the military services budgets and the Department's acquisition process.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that these requirements are understood and funded within the Department's budget?

If confirmed, I will continue to report the combatant commanders' identified readiness deficiencies. I will also make assessments and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding the effectiveness of the Services' budgets and the acquisition process to solve these deficiencies.
Commercial vs Military Requirements for Frequency Spectrum

The Federal Government is trying to identify a band of frequencies that can be used for the operation of 3rd Generation Wireless Communications devices. As a part of this overall effort, the Department of Defense conducted a study to determine the cost and operational impact that would result if the military services were to surrender the use of the 1755 - 1850 MHZ band of frequencies upon which they currently operate their equipment. That study found that it would take at least $4.3 billion and 17 years to vacate the band if a suitable band of alternative frequencies were identified for the Department’s use. The Secretary of Defense and General Shelton recently signed a letter to members of Congress that outlined the importance of spectrum availability, and this band in particular, for the Department’s operations.

What is your view of this assessment?

I fully support the position of the Secretary of Defense and General Shelton. Spectrum access is vital to combat operations and training. Guaranteed access to spectrum is a cornerstone of information superiority and our warfighting abilities. Without this access, the ability of the Department to use current and planned weapon systems, employ new technologies, and effectively command and control conventional and nuclear forces is seriously compromised. The 1755-1850 MHz frequency band supports over a $100 billion investment in key satellite, air combat training, precision weapons guidance and battlefield communications systems. These systems provide commanders and their forces real-time intelligence, voice, data, and video information and precision strike ability necessary for a leaner, more agile and more flexible force to meet global mission requirements. Competition for spectrum, nationally and internationally, is increasing and the Department's growth and need for spectrum parallels commercial industry's needs. We must ensure any spectrum decision carefully considers national security, the needs of commercial interests, and other important national interests.

I agree with the conclusions of the Department’s report on the 1755-1850 MHz band. We simply cannot afford to lose the capabilities the systems in this band provide the warfighters. The report concluded we cannot share the band with 3rd generation systems and vacating the band cannot occur prior to 2017 without potentially compromising critical capabilities and support. Also, spectrum that is comparable in terms of technical characteristics and regulatory protections in which to relocate our systems must be identified, DOD must receive full and timely reimbursement of any relocation costs, and we require adequate time to transition to new spectrum. We are
working with the White House, Department of Commerce, and the Federal Communications Commission to explore different scenarios for 3rd generation systems.

We are fully committed to cooperating with Congress and the Federal Communications Commission and within the Administration in finding solutions for 3rd generation implementation that meets commercial needs while protecting essential national security capabilities.

**Combating Terrorism**

Chairman Shelton recently recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the Antiterrorism/Force Protection functions of the Joint Staff be transferred to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity conflict.

**What are your views on this recommendation?**

I agree with General Shelton's recommendation and rationale to transfer the Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) functions of the Joint Staff to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)).

ASD(SO/LIC) and J-34 perform many overlapping functions. Therefore, to eliminate redundancies, it is appropriate to consolidate AT/FP functions under ASD(SO/LIC) and return the J-34 military billets to the Services and return the two civilian billets to the Washington Headquarters Service.

**Africa**

The Defense Department is currently involved in a number of initiatives in Africa to help certain nations be better prepared to provide their own regional peacekeeping forces and humanitarian missions.

**In your view, is it in our national security interest to continue such programs as the African Crisis Response Initiative, which are aimed at helping African nations to be better prepared to respond to a regional crisis?**

The U.S. has a number of important interests in Sub-Saharan Africa to include:

- Deterrence/response to transnational threats (terrorism, weapons proliferation, organized crime, narcotics trafficking, & diseases (HIV))
- Secure strategic lines of communication
- Prevention/response to humanitarian crisis
Conflict resolution

Access to bases/facilities for U.S. operations

Support for U.S. allies

Protection of U.S. citizens.

In the previous decade the majority of our material resources have been utilized to support our allies, both European and African in responding to conflicts and humanitarian crises. U.S. personnel have seen service all over the continent in the conduct of Non-Combatant Evacuations (NEO) and humanitarian relief operations. Current initiatives, including ACRI are designed to not only enable African nations and institutions to address these issues on their own but also to prevent such occurrences. ACRI has provided a base of knowledge on peacekeeping, humanitarian crisis response, multi-national military operations and protection of human rights. Specifically, ACRI and our other engagement efforts, such as African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) and IMET seek to encourage shaping of African militaries to:

- Develop the proper size, budget, and capability for legitimate security requirements
- Support initiatives to encourage regional approaches to African problems
- Support structuring of militaries to emphasize defensive capabilities, peacekeeping and humanitarian response
- Support efforts to foster a regional conflict prevention and resolution capability
- Support democratic principles and respect the rules of law and promotion of human rights.

Command and Control

Despite significant investment in military service, national and combatant commander command and control systems, more than one of the recently convened defense review panels concluded that U.S. forces do not have a deployable, joint command and control system that can immediately be placed into operation to coordinate the efforts of U.S. and coalition forces.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure the rapid development of such an important capability?

This is an absolutely critical capability and we do have deficiencies in addressing the full command and control interoperability required by a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters. The current DPG calls for plans to establish standing JTF headquarters
and recommends improvements to operating procedures and capabilities, to include addressing rapidly deployable interoperable command and control. This will be a major part of the experimentation in JFCOM’s Millennium Challenge ’02 exercise. Additionally, Joint Forces Command will take the lead to identify and fix current mission critical JTF C2 legacy interoperability issues. Further, I fully support the criticality of development and fielding of rapidly deployable, interoperable, command and control systems. If confirmed, I will ensure the Vice Chairman, in his delegated role as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council along with the Service Vice Chiefs, provide the necessary senior military perspective to achieve an interoperable joint command and control capability.

**Information Operations**

**Joint Vision 2020 and various defense reviews have highlighted the importance of information operations in future warfare.**

What role and what obstacles do you see for information operations as an integral part of U.S. joint military operations?

Information operations are a means to ensuring decision superiority -- the key to successful military operations in the future. But we're faced with three challenges: planning and executing these activities the same way we would any wartime campaign; integrating the military's efforts with those of other U.S. Government agencies; identifying and removing unintended effects while keeping up with rapidly changing information technologies. We can meet these challenges.

Are you satisfied that there is unity of effort within the Department of Defense in the development of information operations capabilities?

Emerging computer network attack and defense capabilities represent an important aspect of information operations. We have been working hard to enhance the security of DOD computer networks and to defend those networks from unauthorized activity (e.g., exploitation of data or attack). Recognizing that the threat to our networked systems is real and increasing, we established the Joint Task Force - Computer Network Defense in December 1998, and assigned responsibility for that mission to U.S. Space Command in 1999. We have incorporated intrusion detection software in many of our networks, erected firewalls, and increased awareness training for our personnel through our information assurance program.

In October 2000, we designated the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Space Command, as the military lead for computer network attack as well, and charged U.S. Space Command with overseeing the development of capabilities and procedures for this
aspect of offensive information operations. In April 2001, U.S. Space Command redesignated the Joint Task Force - Computer Network Defense as the Joint Task Force - Computer Network Operations to reflect this new mission. The Services also cooperate with other Defense and Intelligence Community agencies in efforts to defend the networks that are vital to our national security.

As you have indicated, the Services, Defense Agencies, and combatant commanders are all devoting a great deal of effort to this area. I believe we have the structures and procedures in place to keep duplication of effort to a minimum and ensure the broadest diffusion of advances in information operations capabilities across the Department.

**Major Challenges and Problems**

**In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

If I am confirmed, my first priority will be to ensure our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen are ready to meet the near-term challenges of executing the tasks that support our defense strategy. We have to make sure they are organized, trained, equipped, and supported with the tools required to protect our nation’s security interests – at home and abroad. Second, we must have the proper force structure to exercise our military strategy. Third, we must make the investment to modernize, recapitalize, and transform our forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century. And finally, we must adopt knowledge and decision based warfare to enable us to win in the joint battlespace of the future.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

If confirmed, I’ll work with the Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, and Service Chiefs to ensure we focus on readiness issues for the near-term challenges while implementing programs in concert with the Secretary’s Defense Planning Guidance to transform and modernize the force.

**What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

The most important function of the Chairman is to provide military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Currently there are no major problems in performing this function. But, recent exercises demonstrate
the need to enhance the Chairman’s ability to communicate with military organizations around the globe on a real time basis.

If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

If confirmed, my first priority would be to better equip our staffs to enable swift, accurate information flow. Our information and decision capabilities are critical to providing accurate and timely advice to the NCA. We must ensure that these systems are state of the art and interoperable. We must further ensure that our transformation efforts enhance joint command and control throughout DOD. Initiatives such as the Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters will ensure these efforts provide timely and accurate information in warfighting headquarters as well as other higher headquarters.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Yes.
Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.