Testimony of Dr. Susan Koch
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COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Introduction

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it left behind a huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and associated delivery systems, materials and infrastructure. The Nunn-Lugar Act of 1991 (i.e., the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act) charged DoD with establishing a program to assist the Soviet Union and any successor states to destroy, safeguard and prevent the proliferation of WMD.

Over the past ten years, the resulting $3.6 billion CTR program has proven effective in pursuing these objectives. CTR assistance helped Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine become nuclear free and accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by 1996. The CTR program also has assisted in the deactivation of 5,586 nuclear warheads and elimination of 740 ballistic missile launchers, 87 heavy bombers, 20 ballistic missile submarines and 645 ballistic missiles. Additionally, CTR assistance has reduced the likelihood that sensitive materials, technology, expertise, and equipment may fall into the wrong hands.

Beyond this, CTR assistance is working to improve the accountability for warheads, enhancing safe storage of WMD and related materials, and reducing the opportunities for unauthorized acquisition of nuclear weapons and materials, related systems and technology.

The Administration is completing a review of all nonproliferation assistance programs to Russia. One area of concern is that we do not want U.S. investment in the CTR program to become a means by which Russia frees up resources to finance its strategic modernization programs. In this regard, the CTR program does not provide funds directly to the Russian government. Instead, DoD contracts with entities that provide specific, measurable deliverables related to weapon elimination, transportation, and security services. It is not clear the Russians would eliminate their weapons without the CTR program of assistance. Leaving them in place makes them vulnerable to theft or sale to other countries or groups.
FY 2002 CTR Program

DoD's overall Fiscal Year 2002 budget request for CTR is $403.0 million. As noted earlier, the Administration’s review of nonproliferation assistance to Russia is not yet complete, and DoD’s budget request for CTR for Fiscal Year 2002 and the description I will give today of the projects that would be pursued under that request remain subject to the conclusion of that review.

Under CTR’s Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program area in Russia ($133.4 million), the U.S. will seek to accelerate the elimination of nuclear delivery systems and missile launchers. We hope to eliminate SLBM launchers and dismantle the associated SSBNs. We will transport, dismantle and eliminate 117 liquid fueled SLBMs, 16 liquid fueled ICBMs and 70 solid fueled ICBMs and SLBMs. Also, we will continue to construct a solid propellant disposition facility, continue to operate and maintain liquid propellant disposition systems and eliminate 48 mobile ICBM launchers.

Under the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program area in Russia ($56.0 million), we hope to enhance the security, control and accounting of nuclear weapons and their storage. We will continue to test, integrate and train at the Security and Assessment Training Center and procure 10 suites of security equipment to be deployed at nuclear warhead storage sites. Additionally, we will continue site renovation and installation of five suites of security enhancement equipment, procured with FY01 funds, at nuclear warhead storage sites. In addition, we plan to install 31 kilometers of perimeter security systems at MOD nuclear weapons storage sites; procure communications and other safety, support and heavy duty equipment for site security operations; continue to procure additional portable drug and alcohol testing equipment to ensure personnel reliability; and continue maintenance and life cycle support for the Automated Inventory Control and Management System for tracking nuclear weapons scheduled for dismantlement.

Also, the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security program area ($9.5 million) will facilitate warhead movements from alert systems to secure storage and dismantlement facilities in Russia. More specifically, this project will fund transportation services for deactivated nuclear warheads to move from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities.
The Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production project ($41.7 million) originated in 1997 when the U.S. and Russia agreed to convert the cores of the three remaining Russian reactors (two at Seversk and one at Zheleznegorsk) that produce weapons-grade plutonium to eliminate this production capability. The U.S. agreed that the reactors could not be shut down because they serve the energy needs of the local regions. By early 2000, however, it became clear that the reactor cores could not be converted safely. DoD notified Congress of the need to explore an energy alternative to supply the local needs. The results of these studies determined a fossil alternative is the most effective and efficient means to stop weapons-grade plutonium production. It has the added benefits of being low risk since it uses well known technologies and it permits the complete shutdown of these three Chernobyl-type reactors.

In Ukraine, the Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE) program area ($51.5 million) will sustain joint efforts to eliminate SS-24 ICBMs to include continued storage of 163 solid rocket motors, completion of construction of a solid propellant disposition facility, removal of propellant and elimination of 66 missile motors. Under the WMD Infrastructure Elimination (WMDIE) program area in Ukraine ($6.0 million), we also hope to eliminate ICBM liquid propellant facilities, strategic airbase infrastructure and nuclear weapons storage facilities. The WMDIE program area in Kazakhstan ($6.0 million) will continue securing fissile and radioactive materials and initiate elimination of strategic airbase infrastructure and ICBM liquid fuel storage facilities in FY 2002.

With regard to the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) at Shchuch'ye, the Russian Government allocated $100 million in 2001 for Chemical Weapons Convention compliance including $25 million to support the CWDF at Shchuch’ye. This project will enable the destruction of a nerve agent stockpile of 5,460 metric tons in highly portable artillery and missile munitions, and will provide an opportunity for more international assistance. The U.S. has encouraged other countries to assist with the Shchuch’ye project. Canada has provided $70,000 for infrastructure design and plans to provide an additional $180,000 this year. Italy recently agreed to provide $7.15 million in assistance for Shchuch’ye. The European Union also has committed $1.8 million to this project. The United Kingdom is considering providing up to $18 million for Shchuch’ye infrastructure projects. Other countries have expressed interest in supporting these kinds of projects at the indicated approximate funding levels: Netherlands $2 million; Norway $1.0 million, Sweden $700,000, and Switzerland a significant portion of $20 to 30 million. These offers are contingent upon resumption of the project by
the U.S. The FY 2002 budget includes $35.0 million for the CWDF and $15.0 million for dismantlement of former CW production facilities.

Under the Biological Weapons (BW) Proliferation Prevention program area ($17.0 million), we will continue to seek enhanced safety and security for dangerous pathogen collections, consolidation and dismantlement of infrastructure associated with BW production and research facilities, and collaborative research projects with former Soviet BW scientists.

The CTR program also provides funding ($18.7 million in FY 2002) for a wide range of defense and military contacts between DoD and FSU defense establishments. Overall, the objectives of the Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) program are to encourage denuclearization and nonproliferation, to enhance stability by regular exchanges on issues of mutual concern, to encourage and assist the restructuring and downsizing of FSU defense establishments, and to encourage support for democratic reform. In short, while this component of the program helps reduce the risk of weapons of mass destruction in a way that is less direct and less quantifiable, it is no less important to addressing the larger threat.

Funding for program management, administrative support, audits and examinations and other assessments, or "overhead" are 3.3 percent of the total FY 2002 budget ($13.2 million), reflecting the fact that this is an efficient enterprise.

Challenges

At the program implementation level, our biggest challenges are transparency across the board, and access to facilities. Despite their generally sincere interest in achieving program objectives, the Russians are reluctant to give us visibility into sensitive military processes and access to sensitive facilities. One example of this is the continuing struggle to include a measure of weapons origin and complete a transparency regime for the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility. Visibility and access are critically important, not only to conduct agreed activities, but to conduct required audits and examinations that help ensure that CTR resources continue to be used for the intended purposes.

Conclusion

CTR contributions to national security include the elimination of START-accountable nuclear weapon delivery systems and warheads; efforts to reduce the threat from the use or proliferation of chemical and biological weapons through the
Chemical/Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention Program; the relationships formed through professional exchanges foster greater mutual understanding, increase confidence, encourage denuclearization, nonproliferation, and enhance stability through the regular exchange of views on issues of mutual concern. Additionally, CTR programs inhibit the transfer into the wrong hands of sensitive materials, technology, expertise and equipment.

Continued Congressional support is important to the future success of CTR’s nonproliferation efforts and its role in enhancing U.S. national security vis-à-vis the Former Soviet Union.