STATEMENT OF
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Introduction

On behalf of the Joint Chiefs, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to provide an assessment of our Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (AT/FP) program and share with you the specifics of work being done to address the findings of the Crouch-Gehman Commission. The bombing of USS COLE was a tragic event and a stark reminder of the risks that our great men and women in uniform face as they carry out the many missions, day in and day out, we ask them to do on our behalf. My condolences go out to those who lost a loved one on board COLE last October. All Americans share in their heartbreaking loss.

However, no one should mistake America’s resolve. The dastardly act of terrorism against COLE will not cause this great Nation to retreat from its commitments to our allies, and it will not keep our military from performing its duties and responsibilities to defend US interests around the world. Attacks such as this reinforce the importance of improving our ability to deter and defeat terrorists who threaten our great Nation’s welfare. And we owe it to all the patriots who volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces to provide them the very best protection possible.

First, I want to acknowledge the great work the intelligence community and the FBI are doing, with the excellent cooperation of the Yemeni government, to find and deliver into justice those who were involved in this heinous act. Overcoming the pernicious threat of terrorism requires a robust and sustained interagency effort.
Let me also thank the Congress, and especially the members of this Committee, for your enduring and significant support of America’s Armed Forces and your deep concern for the safety and well-being of our great men and women in uniform.

Whether Active Duty, Reserve, or Guard, wherever our troops deploy, antiterrorism is a top priority for our commanders. The tragic bombing of the USS COLE serves as a stark reminder that the terrorists of the world can strike anywhere, and at any time. Our adversaries, unable to confront or compete with the United States militarily, spend millions of dollars each year on terrorist organizations that target U.S. citizens, property, and interests. Consequently, our Combatant Commanders-in Chief (CINCs) and the Services continue to focus on antiterrorism issues as a first order priority.

We have learned through our national tragedies that terrorists are indiscriminate killers who attack where and when their victims are most vulnerable. Most recently, on October 12, 2000, a bomb exploded along the port side of USS COLE while the ship was moored at a refueling "dolphin" in Aden, Yemen. The explosion killed 17 Sailors, wounded 42, and severely damaged the vessel. In this incident, terrorists were able to exploit access control measures and perimeter security vulnerabilities associated with waterside approaches to our ships while they are in port.

Given that many of our adversaries can’t compete with the United States militarily, they try to find and exploit perceived weaknesses, striking at us using what we call “asymmetric means” to achieve their goals. Bombings, such
as Khobar Towers, the embassy attacks in Africa in 1998, and USS COLE last October are unfortunate examples of this asymmetric threat.

Defending against this type of threat remains a top priority of the Combatant Commands, each of the Services, and commanders everywhere. Of course, we must keep in mind that terrorists are adaptive adversaries who constantly look for ways to strike where their victims are most vulnerable. While we can never fully eliminate the possibility that terrorists will strike against us, we are doing our utmost to ensure the security of our forces so that they can carry out their important missions at minimum risk. Our goal is not only to reduce the exposure of our in-transit ships and planes – a shortcoming exposed by the bombing of USS COLE – but to ensure our antiterrorism /force protection program remains dynamic, thus reducing our vulnerability to terrorists.

**Crouch-Gehman Commission**

As you know, Secretary of Defense Cohen commissioned General Crouch, USA (Retired), and Admiral Gehman, USN (Retired), to lead a review of lessons learned from the USS COLE attack. The goal of this commission was to review the processes and procedures in place within our existing force protection program. General Crouch, Admiral Gehman, and the members of their Commission are to be commended for their thoroughness, as well as the quality of their judgment, in making recommendations to improve our vital force protection program.
Their USS COLE Commission Report was quite comprehensive, containing 30 findings and 53 recommendations. The Department of Defense is now aggressively implementing those recommendations. A DoD Working Group representing both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff was formed to complete all recommendations. DoD's Antiterrorism Coordination Committee (ATCC) and ATCC Senior Steering Group meet frequently and regularly to guide Working Group actions. A majority of the recommendations were completed within 30 days of approval of the Working Group's Plan. The remaining actions have been divided into three-, six-, nine-, and twelve-month completion timelines.

**Crouch-Gehman Commission Findings and Recommendations**

The Commission’s findings and recommendations are contained in five categories: Organization; Antiterrorism/Force Protection; Intelligence; Logistics; and Training. I will briefly summarize these categorical findings and recommendations as well as DoD actions that are in progress.

In the area of "Organization," the Crouch-Gehman Commission saw the need for better "unity of effort" among the offices and agencies in DoD providing antiterrorism resources, policy, oversight, and direction involved with combating terrorism. The Commission also recommended better coordination of our engagement activities across US Government agencies, including developing the security capabilities of host nations to help protect US forces. As a result, I recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) align policy and resource responsibility under one OSD office. With regard to
host nation coordination, I have asked the Geographic CINCs to continue coordination efforts with host nation counterparts to gain increased security support. We are working closely with the State Department in developing and implementing force protection measures. Secretary of State Colin Powell has aided in this important cause by instructing all Chiefs of Mission to assist in establishing and coordinating DoD security requirements with host nations.

In "Antiterrorism/Force Protection," the Commission advocated proactive AT techniques to complement defensive actions, to better coordinate the transfer of units between theaters of operation, and to adopt a risk management model in support of AT/FP planning and execution. DoD is resolving the wide range of recommendations in this area, including revision of AT/FP procedures, resource allocation, technology development, and risk management.

As you know, the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund provides immediate assistance to our CINCs for emergent requirements that can not wait for the normal budget process. The COLE Commission strongly supported increasing the amount committed to this fund and I agree. Because of your support, this fund has been increased. In addition, we now allow the fund to cover not only initial purchase of emergent requirements, but also to include associated “next year” maintenance funding, until the Services can assume maintenance responsibility for follow-on years through the normal budget process. We are already benefiting from the additional allocation, for example: US Central Command (USCENTCOM) will be provided funding for
patrol boats for port security in Bahrain and funding for their newly organized
Country Vulnerability Assessment Team. US Southern Command
(USSOUTHCOM) will be funded for necessary bunkers to better protect their
Forward Operating Locations in support of PLAN COLOMBIA. I should also
mention that for FY 01, we increased antiterrorism funding $100 million to
$3.5 billion.

Other recent CINC initiatives are enhancing antiterrorism/force
protection. US European Command (USEUCOM) is aggressively working a
Joint Risk Assessment Management Program, which has already been highly
successful at its Air Force Component level. All CINCs will benefit from this
initiative. USSOUTHCOM’s tactics, techniques, and procedures in support of
safe passage through the Panama Canal have been adopted by the country of
Panama. Also, USCENTCOM is working closely with Egypt to provide
additional security for U.S. flag vessels transiting the Suez Canal.

For the category "Intelligence," the Commission recommended, and the
Joint Chiefs support, a reprioritization of resources for collection and analysis,
to include human intelligence and signal intelligence, against the terrorist
threat. Individual units must also be better trained and resourced to meet
appropriate requests for intelligence support. OSD is reviewing options for
reprioritizing intelligence support and has asked for comments from all
Intelligence Agencies. At the same time, geographic CINCs are evaluating a
reprioritization of intelligence assets within their Theaters and have already
provided vulnerability assessment augmentation and tailored intelligence
support for in-transit units on independent missions until additional resources become available.

Already, USCENTCOM has developed a Country Vulnerability Assessment Team concept. The concept expands assessments beyond fixed sites to include exercise areas, ports and airfields used by DoD personnel. Also, USEUCOM has established an in-transit tracking cell for ships, aircraft, and vehicles and ground forces at its Joint Analysis Center (JAC), Molesworth, UK. This cell provides these forces current intelligence and situational awareness.

With regard to Human Intelligence and Signals Intelligence, we are constantly reviewing the allocation of these important and scarce resources and have already completed some reallocation. Also, as previously mentioned, USCENTCOM will be receiving additional funding for intelligence analysts.

For the longer term, the DoD Intelligence Program Review Group is reviewing and validating the need for additional capability. I expect the review to be completed later this month.

In support of "Logistics," the Crouch-Gehman Commission concluded that the current level of Combat Logistics Force replenishment ships is sufficient. The Commission view is based on the fact that the current percentage of Combat Logistic Force ships relative to the Battle Force is 6.6 percent – within the historical range of 5.6 to 7.3 percent since 1980. The Commission did see the need for geographic CINCs to have greater logistic
flexibility to minimize exposure to threats. CINCs have incorporated this recommendation into their logistics planning.

Finally, with regard to "Training," the Commission recommended elevating Antiterrorism/Force Protection training to the same priority as their warfighting requirements training. The Commission also recommended increased emphasis in our training for Commanders and Antiterrorism Officers. Our Services are aggressively developing more comprehensive unit pre-deployment and recurring training curriculums and more comprehensive pre-command and AT Officer courses in response to this important observation. The Joint Staff also is dedicating additional funding toward improvements in “General Awareness,” AT Officer; Pre-Command; and Executive Level training support and developing the capability to better evaluate trends and lessons learned from its vulnerability assessment reports.

US Forces, Korea has developed a “Red Team” concept to better assess the antiterrorism readiness of its bases. US Pacific Command (USPACOM) incorporated a significant antiterrorism focus into its recent Reception Staging Onward- Movement Integration (RSOI) exercise. RSOI took place in multiple countries throughout the USPACOM Theater and the antiterrorism focus included the Joint Rear Areas.

I also want to add that immediately following the COLE bombing, the Geographic and Functional CINCs, and the Service Secretaries and Chiefs met with the Secretary of Defense and me to determine what actions could be taken to enhance AT/FP immediately. A majority of their recommendations were
subsequently proposed by the Crouch-Gehman Commission. Those that were not in the Commission Report were added to our plan for prompt action. These include the development of "Red Teams;" the need for vetting criteria for host nation contractors supporting our units during higher Threat Conditions; and the need to conduct Vulnerability Assessments at all ports and airfields visited by DoD units.

**Additional Antiterrorism/Force Protection Initiatives**

In all, we've made monumental progress in our AT/FP efforts in the 4½ years since the attack on Khobar Towers. I'll briefly highlight a few of our most significant initiatives.

The Joint Staff Combating Terrorism Directorate, (J-34), continues to provide superb support to our program. It provides unity of effort on the Joint Staff for all matters pertaining to combating terrorism, and assists the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs with their force protection responsibilities. To accomplish these objectives, J-34 works closely within the interagency process to integrate emerging AT/FP technologies, develop AT/FP doctrine, policy, standards, and training programs, and enhance coordination with our allies for combating terrorism. The Combating Terrorism Directorate is organized into four divisions designed to synchronize operations and intelligence, develop plans and policies, integrate programs and requirements, and coordinate training, doctrine development, and vulnerability assessments.

Our six Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) Teams continue to assess Antiterrorism/Force Protection readiness. These teams visit
designated military installations worldwide, both CONUS and OCONUS, to assess intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities, physical security measures, infrastructure support and structural vulnerabilities, and the installation’s ability to respond to a terrorist incident. Because the terrorist weapon of choice today remains a large vehicle bomb, our JSIVA Teams emphasize the importance of sound perimeter security, thorough access procedures, adequate building standoff, and comprehensive response plans for incident damage mitigation. However, because we also must anticipate the potential use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the future, we have added WMD experts to two of our teams to better prepare today for terrorist use of WMD tomorrow. We’ve completed 327 assessments since the program’s inception in 1997 and will complete an additional 96 by the end of this calendar year. Our geographic CINCs and Service Chiefs have also organized their own assessment teams to evaluate installation readiness and assist installation commanders in refining existing plans. In addition, these teams provide assessment “lessons learned” which are made available to all commands.

To enhance Antiterrorism Force Protection readiness and assist installation commanders develop viable AT/FP plans, we’ve refined our AT/FP Installation Planning Template (and Weapons of Mass Destruction Appendix), that provides the Installation Commander a step-by-step guide in developing a thorough and inclusive AT/FP plan. The Template is now available as an interactive CD-ROM.
We also place considerable emphasis on, and continue to improve AT/FP Training. The four-tiered training program consists of:

?? A basic level training curriculum for all DOD personnel and their families;

?? An advanced level curriculum to train Antiterrorism Force Protection Officers;

?? Antiterrorism Force Protection education at Commanding Officer “command pipeline” training; and

?? An executive-level seminar for senior officers & DoD civilian leadership.

Additionally, we continue to work hard to ensure the inclusion of AT/FP issues in all appropriate Department of Defense planning and policy documents. Defense planners include Combating Terrorism among their very top priorities. The Joint Service Capabilities Plan, Contingency Planning Guidance, and CINC Theater Engagement Plans now include “successfully countering terrorism” as one of their highest tier “vital objectives.” We recently updated the DoD instruction “Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence,” which provides comprehensive guidance in the development of all aspects of antiterrorism programs. We are also updating our "Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness,” a consolidation of key reference material which assists commanders in executing their AT programs.

We have made significant advances in identifying available technologies with AT/FP application, and have in place two organizations that are vital to
our “leveraging technology” efforts. The Physical Security Equipment Action Group coordinates DoD efforts in acquiring all physical security equipment, including Commercial-Off-The-Shelf technology that has AT/FP applicability. Another organization, the Technical Support Working Group, focuses on rapid prototype technologies in the AT/FP arena. The Technical Support Working Group provides support to the entire interagency team. Key technology enablers, such as threat analysis and warning, explosive device detection, and early detection of Weapons of Mass Destruction, greatly enhance our ability to protect against terrorism.

The Combating Terrorism Directorate also hosts a Force Protection Equipment Demonstration (FPED) to showcase state-of-the-art technologies possessing AT/FP applications. Over 400 vendors with over 1000 new products will be attending the May 2001 FPED at Quantico, VA. Items showcased at this demonstration are ready for evaluation and can be “in the hands” of our Service members within weeks of the FPED.

The Combating Terrorism Directorate also provides resource support to the CINCs and Services. The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund (CbT RIF) resources those emergent and emergency AT/FP requirements that can not wait for the normal Service Program Objective Memorandum process. As a result of COLE Commission findings, the fund has already been programmed to increase. Additionally, we oversee the planning, programming, and budgeting process to ensure adequate emphasis on AT/FP programs.
We are also working closely with our allies including NATO. We are currently supporting the efforts of NATO’s High Level Steering Group to enhance Antiterrorism/Force Protection for NATO forces, including our DoD personnel assigned to NATO.

Despite our accomplishments, we are always convinced we can do more. In 1999, we commissioned a six-month “Best Practices Study” to compare and assess the AT/FP practices of Israel and the United Kingdom, two countries that have lived with the terrorist threat for many years on a continuous basis. The products and concepts of this study provide a measure for comparison and the basis for future initiatives to improve the commander’s ability to shape the environment and protect our forces.

**Conclusion**

We continue to make considerable progress in our antiterrorism/force protection program and our people are better protected today than in the past. I am very proud of the efforts of our dedicated force protection professionals. Our efforts have resulted in a high level of AT readiness of our forces and at military installations—here and abroad. That same level of attention must now be--and is being--directed at reducing vulnerabilities that exist at our “seams” to include seaports and airports.

Despite our many successes, however, we face a dedicated, well-financed, and determined adversary. The question concerning terrorist attack is not “if” but “when.” Our challenge is to anticipate the threat and take appropriate countermeasures. I want to conclude by underscoring the fact
that we are being extremely proactive in our approach to reducing antiterrorism vulnerabilities. We are also preparing now should the terrorist threat evolve from explosive devices to standoff weapons or Weapons of Mass Destruction. We will continue to focus our attention to protect our people, our installations, and our national interests.