STATEMENT OF
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BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS & CAPABILITIES
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Introduction

The National Guard routinely contributes to the national mission for civil support by activating a state-level military response in 50 states, 3 territories and the District of Columbia. The National Guard is proud to provide a geographically dispersed, community-based response to combat the varying types of asymmetric threats which directly challenge the security of the homeland. In this role, the National Guard leverages the inherent capability within each state’s National Guard for emergency management, response, and recovery operations for any emergency.

Emerging asymmetric threats, such as single or multiple weapons of mass destruction terrorism attacks within the United States, present the high-end of terrorism that clearly challenges the safety of this nation, and warrants a unified response by the Department of Defense (DoD) in support of the civil authority.

In response to these emerging threats, the National Command Authority has directed the establishment of dedicated, mission-tasked organized forces within the DoD to support the civil authority in preparing for and conducting consequence management operations.
The National Guard welcomes the opportunity to continue its historical role in homeland defense when we were given the mission to support civil authorities in managing the consequences of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event. We appreciate the trust of the Congress and the American people in asking us to form the civil support teams (CSTs). Once again, when our nation called, the National Guard willingly stepped forward.

In light of a recent DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) Audit Report, my comments will focus on the National Guard Civil Support Teams, and the National Guard’s role in support of an incident commander during and after a domestic emergency resulting from a Weapons of Mass Destruction event. With respect to the issues, we are confident that our first 10 National Guard CSTs have met all established training requirements, are competent, capable, and have been supplied with the appropriate equipment. However, there remain concerns with the mobile analytical laboratory.

Whenever safety related concerns are raised, we have addressed these findings to ensure a continuous process of improvement is followed. For example, the safety of the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS) was an issue raised in the audit. To address the viability and safety of the MALS we have asked the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to conduct an independent assessment of the system, and we are working with the U.S. Army Soldier Biological Chemical Command to do just that.

Our overall perspective on the issues discussed within the DoD Audit Report is that the audit helps us clarify and focus upon key issues that are critical
to the successful fielding of the CSTs. For the past two years, the National Guard has embarked upon an aggressive program to organize, man, train, equip, and exercise teams in WMD consequence management operations. We have done so at an extremely rapid pace and with substantial high-level oversight. This has been a collaborative effort. We have successfully fulfilled our mandate by leveraging the experience, knowledge, and lessons learned from hundreds of organizations, and from subject matter experts within the DoD and the civilian community.

We envision the National Guard CSTs mission to have operational authority, operational readiness and sustainability. The CST mission is: to *assess* a suspected WMD event in support of a local incident commander, to *advise* civilian responders regarding appropriate actions, and to *facilitate* the arrival of additional state and federal military forces to support validated requests for assistance. Our task is to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage. Today we are manned, trained, and equipped to perform this mission (with 10 initial teams, each consisting of 22 highly skilled, full-time members of the Army and Air National Guard).

With respect to our detailed analysis of the DoD IG Audit Report, we categorized issues into six clear-cut areas concerning the National Guard’s CST initiatives: program management, doctrine, certification, training, equipment/safety, and standardization. All of the issues noted have received our full attention and have been satisfactorily addressed. A brief overview of each area will provide insight into particular issues within each.
Civil Support Team Program Management

The issue of program management of the CSTs must be viewed in the context of the dynamic process that the Army and the National Guard undertook to establish a new, congressionally mandated capability, and have it fully operational in less than two years. The development and management of the program along with the subsequent capabilities of the CSTs, enables the National Guard to execute its stated civil support mission. Many programmatic issues have been and are still being resolved with regard to the proper institutional placement of the CST management requirements; however, the teams have been and continue to be managed in a manner that allows them to execute the mission for which they were designed.

With the design, implementation, and institutionalization of a DoD program as unique and complex as the CSTs, a distinct historical record has evolved. In this instance, the history indicates the dynamic nature of the establishment of the CSTs; the high level of interest from the executive and legislative branches of government, and the relatively recent desire to institutionalize the functions initially assigned to the Army's Consequence Management/Program Integration Office. As the CSTs are further integrated into the DoD infrastructure, the National Guard will continue to provide the program management functions that make the CSTs a mission capable consequence management asset to first responders.

Operational management issues mentioned in the audit are complex as they follow our concept of a tiered response in employing local, state, and federal
response forces. These forces deter, prepare for, respond to, and manage the consequences of a mass casualty event, attack, or situation. Our CSTs have a unique state-federal relationship. While all CSTs receive federal funds and are trained and evaluated to federal standards, each remains, first and foremost, a state asset, under the command and control of the governor of the state in which they are located. It is this very unique state-oriented capability of the CSTs that is often misunderstood, considered unnecessary, and perceived as a duplication of efforts to other U.S. military rapid response units. We believe the dual relationship is a strength that enables the CSTs to provide a vital link between the local civilian first responders, with whom they know and train, and the federal response force.

Civil Support Team Doctrine

A compressed method of doctrine development and concurrent CST fielding was employed to meet the congressional intent of fielding the teams in a short period of time.

Doctrinal issues will continue to evolve as we implement a management structure within the National Guard to execute DoD policy relative to our civil support mission. The National Guard Civil Support Program does have doctrine relating to the CSTs. Initially, an express method of doctrine development was employed concurrent with CST fielding. This was done to meet the congressional intent of fielding the CSTs as quickly as possible.
Early in this process, we sought and received assistance from state and local agencies and organizations representing first response groups. Experts from these organizations provided assistance in developing operational concepts, refining requirements, writing doctrine, determining equipment sets, and developing and delivering training to the CSTs. We are collaborating with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on this issue. The final CST doctrine handbook was developed following the Army’s DTLOMS model. It also complies with Chapter 5 of *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 1997-1998*.

The CST doctrine handbook has been approved by TRADOC and, in the near future will be placed in their digital library for public access. We have provided input regarding CST doctrine for the revision of Joint Publication 3-07.7, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations*, which has been submitted to the J-3 staff for approval. Both of these documents include guidance to the proponents for both joint and service doctrine that will ensure the dual state and federal nature of the CST mission is adequately addressed.

The NGB will continue to be actively involved in the development of CST-related doctrine in coordination with the appropriate joint agencies. We will work with the Army’s Joint Task Force-Civil Support to identify operational concepts and plans as a part of the development process.
Civil Support Team Certification

Based on the certification process/criteria developed and approved by the Army, the CST commanders have equipped and trained the units to the established standards. Certification standards were directed in a December 22, 1999 and subsequent February 11, 2000, messages from the Army’s Director of Military Support (DOMS). The three operational criteria for CST certification are:

?? An overall readiness level of C-1 in all reportable areas (IAW AR 220-1).

?? An evaluation administered by the First or Fifth Army that will be used by the state adjutant general in determining his or her intent to request unit certification.

?? A commander’s subjective assessment that indicates the unit’s ability to perform its mission (assess, advise, and facilitate).

To accomplish this, the commanders have outfitted their units according to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army approved table of distribution and allowance and have outlined their training according to the mission training plan and the Fiscal Year 2001 training requirements list. Currently, seven of the original 10 CSTs have a USR readiness rating of C-1 and the other three have a USR readiness rating of C-2.

All 10 units have successfully completed their external evaluations, and all 10 commanders have assessed their units and deemed them operationally ready to complete their mission. As I noted earlier, there are some unresolved
concerns with the mobile analytical laboratory systems (MALS). As a result, there is a degradation of the teams’ ability to accomplish a few mission tasks. These tasks, specifically related to the biological assess component of their mission, do not hinder the teams’ ability to perform the critical functions of planning, preparing, and coordinating for a weapon of mass destruction event.

Additionally, the external evaluations are the accepted method used to assist commanders in assessing the level of training and proficiency in their units. The NGB believes that training is the responsibility of the unit commander. It is the commander who is responsible, and must attest to the unit’s readiness.

?? Individual annual refresher training is required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations in order to maintain and update training certificates.

?? Individual annual refresher training is required in order to maintain and update training certificates awarded in TRADOC programs.

These types of refresher training are in addition to external evaluations that will be conducted as deemed necessary by the respective unit commander.

**Civil Support Team Training**

Drawing upon the collective knowledge and expertise of organizations involved in providing trained expertise in fields related to the CSTs mission, a deliberate process was used to identify and develop a comprehensive training program for the CSTs. The training strategy (developed by the CoMPIO and
approved by Director of Military Support (DOMS)) was developed in consultation with subject matter experts in both the military and civilian communities. These subject matter experts were drawn from the agencies listed in the Army’s response. All were key organizations involved in developing and presenting training to the CSTs.

The Director of Military Support provided individual and collective training guidance to the Commander, U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the CSTs in a memorandum dated September 14, 1998. It was designed to allow the CST commanders flexibility in meeting the unique training needs of their teams, while providing a basis for the commitment of resources. Selection of training curriculum involved evaluating the U.S. Army Soldiers and Biological Chemical Command’s (SBCCOM) compendium of WMD courses and programs of instruction to leverage existing courses to the greatest extent possible. Over 300 courses were examined. As new equipment and additional capabilities are developed for the CSTs, additional training will be developed.

The CST training program is very comprehensive, with each member receiving an average 600 hours of initial individual instruction beyond basic MOS qualification. The training program consists of three phases: institutional (which focuses on individual training such as branch qualification and specialty training and includes the 600 hours mentioned above), collective (which focuses on collective mission essential tasks and the conduct of training exercises), and sustainment training (includes advanced courses, refresher training, and team training).
The first 10 CSTs have exercised with all of their equipment and have submitted requests for certification, which at this time, have not been granted. The Army’s Maneuver Support Center and FORSCOM conducted lanes training (at Fort Leonard Wood, MO) for all of the initial 10 CSTs. This training was conducted at the request of the TRADOC Commanding General and at the direction of the DOMS. The training course is the result of a formal training review of the initial 10 teams’ institutional training, which recommended combining three of the already completed courses into one course, The WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection Course (EADC). Five iterations of this course were conducted for the 17 Fiscal Year 2000 CSTs and newly hired members of the original 10 teams at Fort Leonard Wood, MO during the summer of 2000.

*Military Occupational Specialty Qualification*

Approximately 65 CST-assigned personnel received some of their training from the USACMLS compressed three-week Nuclear, Chemical and Biological (NBC) noncommissioned officer course instead of the standard 16-week NBC noncommissioned officer course. The USACMLS does not award certification of MOS qualification because personnel did not attend the 16-week course.

Members of the CSTs receive structured individual and collective training. Each member is assigned to a position as specified by a paragraph and line number in the unit’s table of distribution and allowance. Required training courses relative to each of these positions have been established. Each CST
fields two survey teams consisting of three members each. Survey team members must be MOS 54B or 3E9 (the Air Force qualification code equivalent) qualified and can obtain that qualification by attending the 54B 20/30-R course taught by the Army school system battalion or by attending the course taught by the USACMLS.

There are not enough 54B/3E9 MOS qualified personnel in the labor market to meet the hiring needs of the CSTs. Approximately 35 otherwise qualified applicants were hired for the survey team member positions that had to attend 54B/3E9 training. These individuals attended a specifically developed 54B 20/30-R (Reclassification Course) during November and December 1999. This particular program of instruction was taught at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, and consisted of courses taught by an Army school system battalion. The main difference was that the instructors used for this program of instruction were certified instructors from the USACMLS and the CSTs, not from the Army school system battalion. The instructors used were at least as well qualified as those habitually used for the standard and abbreviated courses taught by the Army school system battalion. This course had the prior approval of the USACMLS, and the students were issued certificates of completion by the USACMLS Assistant Commandant, which indicates they received the equivalent of the 54B 20/30 course taught by the Army school system battalion. No team member is less qualified than if he or she had a MOS issued by the USACMLS.

During December 2000 and January 2001, a series of three more courses were taught at Fort Leonard Wood, MO for approximately 70 personnel.
However, these courses only provided individual skill training (54B MOS, Phase 1) for new CST members. These personnel will receive hands-on equipment training (54B MOS, Phase 2) from the Army school systems battalions, from May to September 2001, which will complete their MOS training.

Course Development

A new three-week course, WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection Course (EADC), required of all CST personnel, is a DoD and TRADOC approved course, developed in cooperation with USACMLS because MOS qualification courses did not cover CST specific equipment. The EADC combined new equipment training, the NBC Recon/Survey course and the initial portion of lane training into one course. Additionally, simulated training scenarios, guidance on specific tasks, and task sequencing were incorporated into the EADC course.

Training Equipment and Training Aids

The NGB is aware that insufficient cross training could degrade capability, therefore, cross training is accommodated at every opportunity. It is embedded in every exercise a team conducts, both unilaterally and in conjunction with the first responder community. Additionally, team training occurs as part of CST day-to-day operations. Team members learn their individual roles as they relate to the section in which they are assigned and to the team’s overall mission. The CST members are not traditional Guardsmen, because of their mission; they are in a full-time, active-duty status and are on-call around the clock for 365 days a year. The CSTs are the only units in the National Guard with this capability and
commitment. WMD specific training is obtained from a variety of sources including formal classroom training, distance learning technology, and practical application at federal and state proponent schools.

The training CSTs received complies with Army standards. Cross training of team members occurs during lane training where individual and institutional training are integrated for the entire team. Lane training is conducted at Fort Leonard Wood, MO. The training regime has been finalized and approved; however, the regime continues to evolve as lessons learned are incorporated. As funding is programmed, training will be handed off to the proponents and it will be fully institutionalized. The institutionalization of training is dependent on adequate programmed funding.

Civil Support Team Equipment and Safety

Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS)

The NGB has been continuously working to ensure that the MALS performs successfully. The MALS, designed and developed by SBCCOM, has undergone test plans, quality assurance procedures, and peer review and independent reviews. It adequately accommodates the mission need for a functional laboratory by providing the CSTs with an analytical platform for performing identification of chemical, biological, and radiological materials. The NGB is continuously working to ensure MALS performance. An operational test of the complete system is being conducted by the ATEC under the auspices of SBCCOM.
Information System Accreditation

The National Security Agency through the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) provides accreditation for the system in accordance with the Defense Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process and established Army policy. Interim accreditation has been in place since the UCS was fielded. A message from the Commander of INSCOM, dated, March 12, 2001, gives all the CSTs interim approval to operate the UCS through June 11, 2001. Permanent accreditation is expected on June 1, 2001.

Reachback Infrastructure

The reachback system has been repeatedly demonstrated and works to specification. The CST reachback system was developed by the (DTRA). This system is fully capable. DTRA can provide both automated tools and a 24-hour, 7-day a week operations center for support the CSTs. This system is accepted and regularly used by many organizations throughout DoD.

The NGB continues to work with DTRA and Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division to improve communication protocols and take full advantage of the reachback capabilities of the CSTs. Currently, the CSTs are specifically trained in communications protocol, to include reachback functions with DTRA.

Radio Frequency Assignment
It has been noted that the radio frequencies assigned to the CSTs has insufficient range for conducting operations. This issue has been resolved. The CSTs currently have three frequencies assigned in UHF. National wide frequencies were granted to the CSTs on 28 March 2000. The teams work with their state chain-of-command to establish standard procedures, as they do during normal disaster response operations. The frequencies are standardized among the teams with a permanent 5kHz TACSAT channel available for domestic consequence management response. There are two national high frequency radio networks and a 24-hour, on-call frequency manager in place to support the CSTs.

**Standardization of Equipment**

We are in the process of establishing a lessons-learned system to support the Civil Support Team mission. The National Guard Civil Support Team has established a number of working groups to address numerous issues. The Civil Support Team mission support has an Equipment Technical Working Group, which is a technical body consisting of civil support team members, National Guard Bureau, and acquisition specialists. The Equipment Technical Working Group is also involved with equipment standardization issues. It provides management oversight and gives direction to equipment acquisition recommendations. Modifications and ideas must be presented to the working group before they are reviewed or funded. This is a centralized process that the states are top follow before making any equipment modifications. Equipment
standardization and interoperability are ongoing issues that are continuously worked by the National Guard Bureau Civil Support Office.

Summary

As the National Guard fulfills its Homeland Security role, four important considerations must be addressed. The first is that while the National Guard may lead on certain homeland security mission areas, we must not separate the National Guard from our traditional war-fighting missions.

Second, from its inception, the National Guard has always had a federal and a state mission. We have always accepted and executed our responsibilities for either of these missions, but we must grant the same stature to the defense of the homeland, as the support we provide to combatant commanders.

Next, “calling out the National Guard” brings with it the will of the American people. Our ties with the states and communities across our country are binding, and we must not fail in our mandate to defend this country from our enemies, both foreign and domestic.

Finally, the men and women serving on our CSTs are fully trained and capable of performing their mission. They have proven themselves ready through extensive training, and comprehensive exercises and evaluations. We all want to take the next steps and move this program forward for the American people.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with the committee on this most critical subject. We welcome the opportunity to return and report on our progress at the earliest convenience of the committee. Thank you for your interest.