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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

**Iran's Nuclear Weapons Capability and
Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022—Assessment
Regarding the Nuclear Activity of the Islamic
Republic of Iran**

November 2024

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In accordance with Section 5593(e)(1) of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023* (Pub. L. No. 117-263; the Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022; 22 U.S.C. § 8701 note), this assessment and classified annex is provided by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and examines Iran's efforts and advancements in its nuclear program and any information related to potential weaponization and delivery systems.

IRAN'S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE ACTIVITY

The Intelligence Community continues to assess that as of 26 September 2024, Iran is not building a nuclear weapon. Tehran has, however, undertaken activities that better position it to produce one, if it so chooses. Since our last update in July 2024, Iran has continued to increase its stockpiles of 20-percent and 60-percent enriched uranium, manufacture and operate an increasing number of advanced centrifuges, and publicly discuss the utility of nuclear weapons.

- Iran uses its nuclear program, particularly its uranium enrichment capabilities, for negotiation leverage and to deter and respond to perceived international pressure. Since Israeli strikes in April, Iranian national security officials and pundits have publicly discussed the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, reflecting both the erosion of a decades-long taboo of such discussions in public and a perception that Iran needs to rectify a strategic imbalance with its adversaries. This debate risks emboldening nuclear weapons advocates within Iran's decision-making apparatus and shifting the thinking of current and future Iranian elites about the utility of nuclear weapons.
- Tehran has the infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium at multiple underground facilities, if it so chooses. Iranian leaders recognize that this bolsters the credibility of threats to develop nuclear weapons. Iran's 20-percent and 60-percent enriched uranium stockpiles are far greater than needed for what it claims it will use the uranium for and Iran could produce more than a dozen nuclear weapons if its total uranium stockpile were further enriched.
- In response to additional sanctions, attacks, or censure against its nuclear program, Iran probably will consider installing or operating more advanced centrifuges, further increasing its enriched uranium stockpile, enriching uranium up to 90 percent, or threatening to withdraw from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region and continues to emphasize improving the accuracy, lethality, and reliability of these systems. Iran almost certainly is incorporating lessons learned from its missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack against Israel in April and from Russia's operational use of Iranian UAVs against Ukraine. The IC expects Tehran will incorporate performance data from the close-range ballistic missiles it transferred to Russia once they are used in operational conditions. Meanwhile, Iran's work on multiple space-launch vehicles with foreign assistance probably would shorten the timeline to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile, if it decided to develop one, because the systems use similar technologies.