

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000

28 September 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U/FOUO) Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 30 June 2011 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and thus should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended.

(U//FOUO) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. These activities and other data requested by the Board or members of the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) are described in the enclosure.

GEORGE ELLARD

PATRICK J. REYNOLDS Acting General Counsel

(U//FOUO)—I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

KEITH B. ALEXANDER General, U. S. Army Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:

Quarterly Report

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Approved for Release by NSA on 12-22-2014, FOIA Case # 70809 (Litigation)

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- I. (U) Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Intelligence -Related Activities that Violated Law, Regulation, or Policy and Were Substantiated during the Quarter, as well as Actions Taken as a Result of the Violations
- A. (U) Intelligence Activities Conducted under Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 Authority
- (U) Unintentional Collection against United States Persons (USPs) or Foreign Persons in the United States

(U//FOUO) During the second quarter of calendar year 2011 (CY2011), signals intelligence (SIGINT) analysts in instances inadvertently targeted or collected communications to, from, or about USPs while pursuing foreign intelligence tasking. Unless otherwise specified, all intercepts and reports have been deleted or destroyed as required by United States SIGINT Directive (USSID) SP0018.	36
1. (U) Targeting	
(U//FOUO) during a review of tasked selectors, an NSA analyst discovered that selectors had been tasked for foreign intelligence targets located in the United States. The error occurred and were entered into a database containing selectors that should not be tasked. No collection occurred.	
(U//FOUO) NSA analysts learned that the selectors tasked on behalf of an Intelligence Community (IC) customer were associated with a USP. The error occurred because NSA analysts did not research/the selectors before submitting them for tasking. The selectors were detasked and all collection was purged from the IC customer's databases.	
(U// FOUO) On occasions NSA analysts learned that selectors for valid foreign intelligence targets remained on task while the targets were in the United States. The selectors were detasked in all instances except for which the targets had already departed the United States. No collection occurred.	
-(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) On occasions between associated with a U.S military installation had been targeted. All data collected was deleted by and no reports were issued.	
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst learned that the selectors for valid foreign intelligence targets remained on task while the targets were in the United States The selectors were detasked and no reports	
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52	

(b) (3) - P.L. 86 - 36

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	were issued.
	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst learned that the selector for a valid foreign intelligence target remained on task while the target was in the United States from The analyst overlooked the selector while detasking The selector was detasked collection was deleted and no reports were issued. (U//FOUO) an NSA analyst learned that a USP had been targeted. The error occurred because the tasking analyst was unaware of the target's USP status. The selector was detasked The amount of collection No reports were issued.
	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) analysts discovered that selectors for valid foreign intelligence targets remained on task after the targets had traveled to the United States. The targets' selectors under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act Section 702 (FAA §702) authority had been detasked
b)(1) b)(3)-P.L. 8	Collection resulted from one of the selectors. The selectors were detasked, and no reports were issued. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst targeted the e-mail (th)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) telephone selectors of a foreign
	in accordance with USSID SP0018. The error was caused by the analyst's confusion about SIGINT authorities. No collection occurred. The analyst also incorrectly targeted See a related incident under "Reverse Targeting" on page 9.
	(U// FOUO) an NSA analyst discovered that USPs had been targeted and that their identities were contained in a presentation. Analysts detasked the selectors and removed the USP information from the presentation slides
	(U//FOUO) an NSA analyst discovered that selectors for a valid (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 foreign intelligence target remained on task while the target was in the United States from No detasking occurred because the target had already left the United States when the incident was discovered. No reports were produced from the data collected while the target was in the United States.
	2. (U) Database Queries
ı	(S//REL-TO USA: FVEY)

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

_	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Onoccasions during this quarter, analysts performed
	proad or poorly constructed database queries that potentially targeted USPs. These
queries	
L	that produced imprecise results. On of those
	ns, the queries returned results from the database. The query results were deleted, and no were issued. Analysts who performed these queries were counseled by their
manage	ment
manag e	(b)(1) (b)(2) D L 96 36 (b)(1)
(U)	Procedural errors contributed to the following incidents. (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an analyst pursuing information on a valid
Г	foreign intelligence target attempted to confirm
广	The query and results were deleted, and no reports
	were issued.
_	(III/FOLIO)
	(U/ FOUO) an NSA analyst queried a raw traffic database as a query term. The query and results were deleted and no reports
	were issued.
• -	(U/ /FOUO) an NSA analyst discovered that
<u></u>	when it was determined to be associated with a USP. The analyst was
L	not aware that, in addition to the selector being detasked,
Γ	The query and results were deleted, and no reports
_	were issued.
	(U// FOUO) NSA analysts performed (b)(1)
	queries in raw traffic databases without first performing the required research on the (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	selectors. queries returned results, which were deleted, and no reports were issued.
_	(C//DEL TO LICA EVEVA
• -	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) a database auditor discovered that an NSA analyst queried selectors associated with a FISA §705(b) target for which the Foreign
	Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Order had expired The error
	occurred because a previous analyst had created a query for valid FAA §705(b) targets
	using an outdated list of selectors. A new analyst ran the query
,	without verifying the selectors; the query returned no results.
• _	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst queried
	in a raw traffic database. The error occurred because the analyst did not use
	available tools before performing the query. No traffic was
	retained from the queries. another NSA analyst queried
L	The analyst deleted the results without viewing them. No reports were issued from the data. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst ran queries in a raw traffic database
,	containing E.O. 12333 collection, using selectors associated with foreign
L	

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86- (b)(3)-50 USC	TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
	The queries and results were deleted , and no reports were issued.
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY), an NSA analyst queried the name of a valid foreign intelligence target while the target was in the United States from While performing research the United States, the analyst performed the query in a raw traffic database The error was identified the same day, and query results were deleted. No selectors were tasked or queried, and no reports were issued.
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	an NSA analyst queried a selector for a valid foreign intelligence target while the target was in the United States. The query result was deleted
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	(S//REL-TO-USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst queried in a raw traffic database. The error occurred because the analyst, who was unfamiliar with the database. No results were returned by the two queries.
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an analyst-in-training performed a query on U.S. telephone selectors in a raw traffic database. The error occurred because the analyst had not been fully trained to validate the selectors before submitting queries to raw traffic databases. The results were deleted, and no reports were issued.
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	(S// REL TO USA, FVEY)
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) a SIGINT analyst queried a raw traffic (b)(1) database The analyst, who did not (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 recognize initially that pf the selectors subsequently deleted the results and modified the query on No reports were issued.
	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) database auditor discovered that associated with a U.S. territory were included on a list of selectors that were queried in a raw traffic database.
• ,	The results were deleted, and no reports were issued. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that the e-mail

selector had been removed from a query after the target traveled to the United States, the selector (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

selector associated with a USP had been queried in a raw traffic database. Although the

(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(1)(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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	2011, an NSA analys query and results we	st mistakenly ere deleted, and no reports were issued.	The
(b)(3)-P.L. 8	raw traffic database of that the targeting of the USP No reports were issu 3. (U) Overcollection	that should. The release of a new version of the tool ha	courred despite the fact I have prevented the s resolved the problem. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	(S//REL TO USA, F overcollection of E.O. 12333 been installed.	, and a second s	(b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) after an upgrade had
	4. (U) Detasking Delays		
		,	ion to determine whether (b)(1)
	analyst, selectors	during a meeting warget had been in the United States since had detasked However, selector remained of on or reporting on the target between	ith IC personnel, an Another NSA on task until
	remained on task detask the selector.	gn intelligence target who had traveled to the even though the analyst had All intercept collected	submitted a request to from the target's arrival
	and no reports were issued.	(the date of the last co	ollection) was deleted, (b)(1)
	5. (U) System Errors (S//REL TO USA, F session for a development sy	while participating ystem, an NSA analyst performed a search for	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 in a test and evaluation
(b) (4)			(b)(1)

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

DOCID	: 4165278 TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	The analyst submitted a request to the system developer to correct the protified other test and evaluation participants of the software error. The analyst diresults.	
	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst performed a traffic database that returned U.S. data. The error was caused by a software feature.	
	immediately recognized the mistake and reported the system error to the database. The query returned results that have aged off. No reports were produced. The so is under review by the developers. (b)(1)	ftware problem (b)(1)
	6. (U) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	7. (U) Data-Handling Errors	
	(U// FOUO) an NSA analyst disseminated to an IC ager SIGINT containing the identities of USPs. The analyst verified recall of the	
	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered to a USP, requiring all collection being shared with an IC agency to cease, The data shared with a like the shared with an IC agency to cease,	/
76\/1\	terminated the same day. The IC agency confirmed that all information received was purged	on the target (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(1) (b)(3)-18 USC	798 (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst learned selector cited in an NSA/CSS report and used in a raw traffic database query was	
A	A destruction waiver is being r	equested.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

the communication as of

IC agency analyst and an NSA analyst containing the identity of a U.S. company without going through proper identity release procedures. Both the IC and NSA analysts confirmed deletion of

There was no targeting or collection.

an NSA analyst forwarded an e-mail to an

B. (U) Dissemination of U.S. Identities

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The NSA/CSS enterprise issued SIGINT product (b)(1) reports during the second quarter of CY2011. In those reports, SIGINT analysts included (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 information that identified USPs or U.S. entities on occasions while pursuing foreign intelligence tasking. In SIGINT products, such disseminations were found to be improper, and the reports were canceled as NSA/CSS analysts learned of USPs, U.S. organizations, or U.S. entities named without authorization. All data in the canceled reports was deleted as required, and the reports were not reissued or were reissued with proper minimization. It should be noted that the majority of the U.S. entities' names identified were those of Internet service providers in e-mail selectors.
C. (U) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
1. (U) NSA/CSS Title I FISA
a. (U) Tasking Error
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA/CSS determined that a FISC Order contained an incorrect telephone number for a targeted entity. The error occurred because the source of the information was inaccurate. The telephone number was detasked was deleted, and no reports were issued.
b. (U) Detasking Delays (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered an e-mail The e-mail selector for this FISC-authorized target remained on task after the target had left the United States. The selector was detasked documented this as an instance of overcollection. Data that was collected and retained data was purged while the incident was under discussion with oversight personnel. No reports were issued.
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA database auditor discovered that the selectors for foreign targets authorized under FISC Orders remained on task after the targets departed the United States. of the targets had departed on 2 March 2011, and no collection occurred. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst learned that the selector for a FISC-approved target remained on task after the target United States Improved procedures for tracking the target selectors have been formulated. The selector was detasked has been purged. No reports were issued.
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that the selectors for foreign targets authorized under FISC Orders had remained on task after the (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

			c from
)(1)	selectors collected after the targets'		
o)(3)-P.L. 86-36 se	ector for a FISC-authorized target hat United States on or about Collection from the e-mail select	an NSA analyst learned that the end remained on task after the target had left The e-mail selector was detasked on tor has been marked for purging.	-mail
re: se	nained on task after the targets' depa	on task three days after the target's departure from	f targets The
co	lected from	was purged, and no reports were issued	
C.	(U) Data-Handling Errors		(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
FI	O. 12333 database. Within three hou	iles containing FISA records were downloaded in irs of the download, the error was discovered, an tabase. No FISA records were accessed during to	d the
	(U/1 2-0 UU), a	SIGINT analyst posted FISA information to a c SA data. The analyst notified his overseers of his	
d.	(U) Unauthorized Data Retentio	on 	
sy		system developers discovered system errors that ning FISA data after the one-year retention period automated script was implemented	
un	ntain FISA data from der expired FISC Orders. Although t	that was no longer approved for reto the data was authorized under FISC Orders when etained in the database after the Orders had expir and no reports were issued.	ention n it was
2.	(U)		(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(U) Nothing to report		.,,,
3.	(TS//SI//NF)-Business Records	(BR) Order	
	(U) Nothing to report		

(TS:/SI/NF) 5. (U) FISA Amendments Act (FAA) a. (U) Section 702 (U/FOUG) Note: As previously reported in the 2010 Second Quarter Report, NSA CSS has implemented a new process to ensure the purging of FAA \$702 collection that is required to be purged from NSA CSS databases. A In identify noncomplicant data that should be purged. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA/CSS detasked a selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target after it was determined that the target was in the United States. The selector was initially tasked The error occurred because the analyst overlooked information that the target had arrived in the United States sometime after detasking, ensuring removal of all data from Agency databases) was quarantined, pending approval of a destruction waiver. No reports were issued. (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that the e-mail the United States was in the United States was pending approval of a destruction waiver. No reports were issued. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	4. (TS//SI/NF) Pen Register/Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Order (D)(3)-50 USC 3024(1) (TS//SI/NF) 5. (U) FISA Amendments Act (FAA) a. (U) Section 702 (U/FBUO) Note: As previously reported in the 2010 Second Quarter Report, NSA/CSS has implemented a new process to ensure the purging of FAA 8702 collection that is required to be purged from NSA/CSS databases. A Ito Identify noncompit and data that should be purged. (U) Unauthorized Targeting (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA/CSS detasked a selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target after it was determined that the target was in the United States. The selector was initially tasked the traffic from detasking, ensuring removal of all data from Agency databases) was quarantined, pending approval of a destruction waiver. No reports were issued. (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that the e-mail account associated with a valid foreign intelligence target file (b)(1)-P.L. 86-36 (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that the e-mail account associated with a valid foreign intelligence target [b)(1)-P.L. 86-36	-TOP SECRE	ET//SI//NOFORN	(b)(1)
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account associated with a valid foreign intelligence target the United States. (p)(1)	account associated with a valid foreign intelligence target the United (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	approval of a destruction waiver. Two reports v	VCIC ISSUCU.	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
account associated with a valid foreign intelligence target the United States. (p)(1)	account associated with a valid foreign intelligence target the United States. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)	an NSA analyst discov	rered that the e-mail
States. (p)(1)	States. (p)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	account associated with a valid foreign intellig		
	(b)(3)-18 USC 798			(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798

D (0)(1) D: 4165278 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798

	The selector was detasked on
and collection from	had been marked for purging. No reports
were issued	
ii. (U) Reverse Targeting (b)(1) (b)(3)-P	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS I	earned of an instance of reverse targeting. For
the purpose of collecting information on a foreign	located in the United States,
an analyst targeted selectors associated with the tar	
independent foreign intelligence interest in the fam	
were detaske	
associated with the selectors were deleted FAA §702 selectors has been marked for purging.	Collection resulting from the
TAA 9/02 selectors has been marked for purging.	No reports were issued.
iii. (U) Tasking Errors	
(U/ /FOUO) On occasions from	NSA analysts discovered
that incorrect e-mail selectors had been tasked beca	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
were detasked, and all noncompliant collection was	s marked for purging.
(U// FOUO) an NSA analy	st discovered that a previously tasked selector
	gone through the required pre-tasking
approval process. The selector was not detasked, b	
the tasking was re-approved Colle	ection for the period
was purged	
(II/FOLIO)	
	yst discovered that a selector had been tasked rtification. The incorrect tasking was
corrected and all results were pur	
(U/ /FOUO) On occasions from	NSA analysts tasked
selectors without providing sufficient proof that the	
States. All selectors were detasked. On occasi	
has been marked for purging. No reports were issu	ed.
(U// FOUO) selectors	were tasked under FAA §702 authority in
error as part of a Procedures for	
review, so the error was not discovered before tasks	71 1
	702 collection the same day. Collection was
purged and no reports were issued	l.
(U// FOUO) an NSA anal	yst discovered that a selector had been tasked
without having gone through the required pre-tasking	
because the target's selector was similar to one that	
detasked, but was updated and approved	Collection
has been marked for purging. No repo	

(U// FOUO) a selector w	as erroneously included in a list of selectors (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
being processed for transfer to another NSA analy	st. The selector was ineligible for tasking
under FAA §702 because of outdated information	about the target's location. The selector was
detasked There were no results.	
(S//REL TO USA; FVEY)	an NSA analyst incorrectly tasked an e-mail
selector. The selector was detasked	when the correct selector was tasked. All
collection has bee	en marked for purging.
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) selectors for FAA §702 collection incorrectly task collection to an IC customer. While FAA §702 m	
routed to other IC members, this is not true of all s	
detasked Collection	has been marked for
purging.	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
iv. (U) Database Queries	(5)(5)-1 .2. 55 55
(U// FOUO) On occasions from selectors for valid foreign intelligence targets in a the required research on the selectors. The queries with USPs. The query results were deleted	
(U// FOUO) Or occasions from overly broad queries that could potentially return data. The query results were deleted, and no report	
query in the FAA §702 raw traffic day associated with the U.S. government. The error of the account was associated with the U.S. government.	an NSA analyst performed a atabase using the e-mail selector for a USP occurred because the analyst was not aware that ent. No results were returned by the query.
had queried FAA §702 data using selectors associately the guery results were deleted (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)	a database auditor discovered that an analyst ated with FAA §704 and FAA §705(b) targets. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U// FOUO) a database a erroneously queried an FAA §704 selector in the I The query and results were deleted.	uditor discovered that an NSA analyst had FAA §702 raw traffic database.
v. (U) Detasking Delays	
task after a detask request had been issued collection system processed the detasking requests collection. The selector was removed from collect system patch updated the collection system to prevent collected for the selector	tion a

-(S//NF)-
(U/ /FOUO) it was discovered that an NSA analyst failed to detask the
selectors for a valid foreign intelligence target after receiving instructions to
detask because The selector was detasked was marked for purging No reports
were issued. was marked for purging. No reports where issued. was marked for purging. No reports (b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Because of a communication error, information collected on
regarding the United States was missed, and the selector was not detasked until Collection from has
and the selector was not detasked until Collection from has been marked for purging. No reports were issued.
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a selector
remained on task for routing to an IC customer even though it had been detasked by NSA/CSS because the United States The
selector was completely detasked on Collection from (the date the
target entered the United States) to has been marked for purging
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
vi. (U) Data-Handling Errors (D)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U// FOUO) On occasions from FAA §702 data was forwarded
by fax and e-mail to personnel not authorized to receive FAA §702 data. The recipients
confirmed that the data was not further disseminated and that the faxes and e-mails had been
destroyed. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-3
(U/ FOUO) an NSA analyst raised concerns about the appropriateness
of sharing FAA §702 traffic with an NSA analyst who was detailed to another IC agency and
was not cleared for FAA §702. The sharing arrangement began in 2009. The agreement on the
sharing activity with the IC agency did not cover sharing FAA-derived information.
The analyst ceased information-sharing until appropriate authorization could be obtained. The analysts confirmed that at no time had source information for the FAA-
derived information been shared. As of NSA/CSS had not created a new memo
on sharing information with the IC agency.
(U/ FOUO) an NSA analyst forwarded unminimized USP information
in FAA §702 traffic to a ecipient. The traffic was destroyed, and no reports were issued.
issued.
vii. (U) Overcollection
(TS//SI//NF)
(15//51//N1)
h
(b)(1)
(5)(1)

b (II) Section 704	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
i. (U) Unauthorized Dissemination (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	\\
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA software engineer discove the identities of various USPs collected under FAA §704 and FAA §705(b) had been shall IC agency analysts The software revimplemented on Recall of the information from the IC agency was not fee because of its volume and lack of unique identifiers for the FAA records.	ision was
D. (U) Other	
1. (U) Unauthorized Access	
(U//FOUO) an NSA analyst detailed to an IC agency accessed NSA/CSS tool and ran queries using an NSA/CSS account instead of an IC agency as required by an agreement between NSA/CSS and the IC agency. The accounts for N employees accessing NSA/CSS databases at the IC agency were to have been de-activated NSA/CSS and and activated by the IC agency No data from improper access of the tool was used in reports.	account, SA/CSS ted by
2. (U) Consensual Collection	
(U//FOUO) an NSA analyst requested that a selector for a US detasked because the target had rescinded consent for monitoring selector was detasked	The behalf of
(U//FOUO) an NSA analyst discovered that targeting of a USP continued beyond the period approved by a consensual agreement. The error occurred the selectors for the target had been incorrectly tasked and had not been removed the agreement expired. No collection occurred between the time of expiration and the tremoval, and no reports were issued.	because when ime of (b)(1)
3. (U) Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(TS//SI//NF)	

-(TS//SI//NF)	

	E. (U) Counterintelligence Activities	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
	(U) Nothing to report.	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	F. (U) Intelligence -Related Activities (S//SI//NF) To reduce the risk of unauthorized telephony collection and prevent	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i
	violations, NSA/CSS instituted a process that gives analysts greater and faster insight i target's location.	1 1 1
		,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
	data was purged from NSA/CSS's principal raw traffic repositories where required.	Collected
	(S//SI//NF)	
	NSA analysts found e-mail selectors this quarter. Collected data purged from NSA/CSS's principal raw traffic repositories where required.	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	(U//FOUO) In instances, database access was not terminated when access longer required. Although not violations of E.O 12333 or related directives, the access terminated. In addition, there were instances of unauthorized access to raw SIGIN account sharing during the quarter.	es were
3)-P.L. 8	II. (U) NSA/CSS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Intelligence Oversig Inspections, Investigations, and Special Studies	ht (IO)
	(U//FOUO) During the first quarter of CY2011, the OIG reviewed various NSA intelligence activities to determine whether they had been conducted in accordance wit Executive Orders, Attorney General procedures, and Department of Defense and intern directives. With few exceptions, the problems uncovered were routine and showed that operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.	h statutes, al
	A. (U) Expeditionary Operations Reviews (EORs)	
\	the NSA/CSS OIG and the NSA/CSS Represer proposed EORs of forward cryptologic elements to enhance cryptologic elements e	

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

	operations and provide Agency leadership an independent, on-site assessment of in-theater operations. A review was conducted of mission operations and IO performed by Cryptologic Services Groups and Cryptologic Support Teams
	The IO review highlighted the need for development of IO guides that detail IO procedures and for better guidance on IO functions for Officers in Charge.
	B. (U// FOUO) (6)(3)-P.L. 86-3
	(C//REL TO USA, FVEY) As part of the joint IG inspection of the IO
	inspection team reviewed the IO program, IO training, and the application of IO standards in the SIGINT mission activities performed at the two sites. The IO programs at are included under the IO Program and are managed by the IO
	Program Manager (IOPM), who also serves as the IO Officer (IOO) The IO programs at both sites are well documented and sustainable. The Program is healthy, and inspectors
г	highlighted as an area of strength the IOO's commitment to adherence to compliance standards. mission-related IO training is timely, appropriate, and responsive to needs of personnel. The IOPM has worked with the IOPM and the IOO to
L	raise IO awareness at (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	C. (U) Misuse of the U.S. SIGINT System (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS learned that a SIGINT analyst at a collection
	site used the U.S. SIGINT System to target a foreign national analyst tasked the telephone selector of the
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P:L. 86 (b)(3)-50 US(The incident is under investigation by the OIG's Office of Investigation. The analyst has been removed from the site.
	(TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS learned that a SIGINT analyst at a collection site performed a query in a raw traffic database using a personal U.S. telephone number and the telephone number of a foreign national The analyst viewed the (b)(1)
	metadata results returned by the query. No tasking, collection, or dissemination occurred during(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 this incident. The incident, is under investigation by the OIG's Office of Investigation.
	analyst had queried the U.S. telephone number of the son of a personal acquaintance in a raw traffic database The query results were deleted
	The analyst has been barred from the secured work area and has had clearances suspended. An investigation of the incident is being launched by The OIG's Office of Investigation will also investigate this incident.
	D. (U) Congressional and IO Board Notifications (b)(1)
	(TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS notified the Congressional intelligence committees of a matter involving the NSA/CSS "upstream" collection under FAA §702. In

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addition to acquiring Internet communications under FAA §702 to or from a felectronic communications account from U.S. companies that maintain such a acquires Internet communications to, from, or about a foreign target	oreign target) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	1
Th	ese collection
methods sometimes acquire multiple, logically separate Internet communication	ons that cannot be
divided by technical means	***************************************
This matter has been described to the FISC, which exabout upstream collection. This matter also surfaced during the Court's considerable applications for renewal of all FAA \$702 Certifications, which were to exaugust.	deration of
-(TS://SI://NF) The FISC granted a requested extension of all of the certifications until 20 September 2011 to permit time for the FISC to complete Government's responses to questions and issue orders on this matter.	(b)(1)
E. (U) Other Notifications	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(S//NF) NSA/CSS has notified the Attorney General of consensual intelligence-related collection activities for USP hostage and detainee cases.	and nonconsensual
III. (U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS IO Program	(b)(1)
A. (U) Database Access Control Tool	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U// FOUO) NSA/CSS is creating a tailored data management tool to me control of SIGINT data in registered repositories. In the future, NSA/CSS hop supply more precise information about repositories, users, and the number of e given quarter.	pes to be able to
B. (U) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	
(U/FOUO) NSA's Director of Compliance and the I town meeting to introduce the new designed to process of submitting mission compliance incident reports across the worldwide enterprise. The will become the Agency's central tool for reporting all percompliance incidents and will provide such benefits as a streamlined managemental repository, and metrics data to support root cause identification and tree is expected to be implemented in and fully operational	automate the de NSA/CSS otential mission nent process, a end analysis. The

IV. (U) Changes to NSA/CSS Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence -Related Activities and the Reason for the Changes

(U) Nothing to report.

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V. (U) Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect USP (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to IO Programs

(U) Nothing to report.