The SBU - The Security Service of Ukraine

Gordon Bennett

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Key Points

* Ukraine’s special services play an important role in protecting its national interests and are, with NATO and the EU moving westwards, an increasingly important part in the still loose coalition of special services combating transnational terrorism and crime.

* The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), the country’s largest and most important special service, has been a victim, occasionally willingly, of political manoeuvring and mismanagement.

* The SBU is in need of gradual and evolutionary reforms. Until recently its reforms have been neither profound enough nor focused enough, reflecting political short-termism.

* President Kuchma is ultimately responsible for their performance and their erratic reforms, although his recent remarks suggest that he has been aware of the organisation’s imperfections all along.

* Ukraine, its allies and partners can only benefit from gradual, consistent, well-focused, apolitical, and non-partisan reform of the SBU, into an institution serving national interests, not political parties or individuals.
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“It will take a long time before we form the security service we need”

(Attributed to President Kuchma, Chelovek i Zakon, No 3, 2000, http://www.sbu.gov.ua)

The Accidental Birth

The SBU (Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Ukrainy) was created by the Supreme Council (Rada) of Ukraine on 20 September 1991. The first law on the SBU was enacted on 25 March 1992. The births of all special services of the former Soviet Republics had two features in common: they were unexpected and complicated. The birth of the SBU was fraught with several particularly difficult problems. Until May 1991, when Russia set up its own republican KGB within the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian KGB was the largest and the most powerful republican Security Committee in the USSR.

There were several reasons for the enormous size of the Ukrainian KGB apparatus. The size of the republic - today the second largest European country - was one of them. The gradual and painful sovietisation of Ukraine had included Moscow-orchestrated genocidal famine in the early 1930s, implemented mainly by one of the KGB’s brutal predecessors, and the resulting enthusiastic welcome offered by an important section of the Ukrainian population to the German invaders in 1941. The German defeat brought about the final enlargement of Ukraine, when 63,000 square miles of pre-war Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania were incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

All this meant that the new territories had to be saturated by reliable security personnel, both Russian and Ukrainian, who were expected to address important problems such as:

- Reimposing Soviet power on the “old” Ukrainian territories,
- Establishing Soviet rule in the new Ukrainian territories,
- Hunting down German collaborators,
- Destroying nationalist formations fighting for Ukraine’s sovereignty,
- Eliminating foreign influence in the republic,
- Assisting Moscow in penetrating Ukrainian anti-Soviet organizations abroad and
- Protecting Moscow’s interests.

The common element linking all the above tasks was Ukrainian nationalism. It has comparatively short historical roots and its ruling groups and individuals usually looked for inspiration in Moscow and occasionally in Warsaw. The interwar and
WWII activities of nationalist organizations were characterized by extreme brutalities – admittedly often committed against exceptionally brutal adversaries - and alliances which at best could be described as unfortunate. For Ukraine’s glorious and independent past one would have to look deep into history.

These were some of the reasons why the Soviet authorities had no problems with recruitment and retention of Ukrainian personnel in security organs. And yet the battle of sovietisation and denationalisation was long and periodically very brutal. Those who fought on the victorious Soviet side were trusted and rewarded with top positions in the Ukrainian Republic and in All-Union organs. The leaders of the post WWII Ukrainian security forces were regarded as politically trustworthy. They were usually rewarded with important posts in Moscow at the later stage of their careers.

### Heads of the Ukrainian Security Structures 1943-1989 & Their Subsequent Careers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Positions and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAVCHENKO Sergey Romanovich</td>
<td>7 May 1943 - 24 August 1949</td>
<td>Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOVALCHUK Nikolay Kuzmich</td>
<td>24 August 1949 - 6 September 1952</td>
<td>Minister of Internal Affairs of Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In 1954 charged with abuse of power and reduced in rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STROKACH Timofey Amvrosyevich</td>
<td>19 March 1953 - 31 May 1956</td>
<td>(The crime fighting and security tasks of the security organs were divided on 10 February 1954.) Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIKITICHERNO Vitaliy Fedotovich</td>
<td>6 April 1954 - 16 July 1970</td>
<td>Commandant of the F E Dzerzhinskiy Higher KGB School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDORCHUK Vitaliy Vasilevich</td>
<td>16 July 1970 - May 1982</td>
<td>1982 (May-December) – Chairman of the USSR KGB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1982-1986 – Minister of Internal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUKHA Stepan Nesterovich</td>
<td>3 June 1982 - 21 May 1987</td>
<td>At disposal of the KGB USSR; retired</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The officials in the Ukrainian KGB and its predecessors were expected to be de facto anti-Ukrainian as one of their main tasks was to combat any form of real or perceived nationalism. The departments and sections of the KGB responsible for combating nationalism in the republic were therefore exceptionally large. By the
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1970s the central apparatus of the Ukrainian KGB alone employed 12,000 people. The Ukrainian KGB was particularly keen on preventive measures. Between 1970-1982 its officers apprehended 15,000 nationalists, charging 80 of them with specific transgressions against the Soviet Union. Other particularly well developed republican KGB structures were those responsible for security and counterintelligence work in large centres of the Ukrainian defence industry, the military counterintelligence structures monitoring the military districts on the republic’s territory, and the numerous secret defence enterprises. When the Soviet Union ceased to be, the Ukrainian KGB thus had overdeveloped counterintelligence capacities and assets, performing duties conducted in democracies by law enforcement organizations, military police, customs and frontier control bodies and tax offices.

The Ukrainian reaction to the slow break-up of the USSR was to set up a new, parallel security service. In mid 1991, the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada - Supreme Council) created the National Security Service of Ukraine (NSSU), a toothless body, which by a quirk of history ended up supervising security reforms in the republic. When the USSR was no more, the republican intelligence and counterintelligence departments, which in the Soviet era were run from Moscow, were upgraded in the new SBU. The members of the Ukrainian Supreme Council did not want to leave the new organisation with too much power and originally considered setting up a separate organisation to conduct investigations. The NSSU became briefly a mechanism which helped the new leaders in Kiev to restructure the central administration of the republican KGB and its regional outposts around the country. Many members of the republican KGB could not accept the fragmentation of the USSR and refused to work for the new leadership in Kiev. They moved out of Ukraine or found new jobs. About 50% of the SBU personnel left the service in the first few years of its existence. In 1994 alone more than 800 officers left the organisation.

Simultaneously, the leaders of the SBU had to build new structures or profoundly reinforce and reform the old ones, such as the intelligence, military counterintelligence, cryptographic and electronic communications sections. The organisation responsible for electronic communications of the republican KGB was subordinated to the Ukrainian Supreme Council after the August 1991 putsch in Moscow. The guard service was independent for several years but was later incorporated into the SBU, retaining almost unlimited operational freedom. The process of forming the skeleton of the SBU took four to five months and saw the departure of 17 KGB generals and 1,500 colonels.

In theory there was no shortage of potentially suitable employees, as many Ukrainians working in the security system all over the USSR were happy to return home, either because they were not wanted in non-Slavic republics or because they thought they had better career prospects in Ukraine.

The Leaders & Shakers

The first head of the SBU, Nikolay Holushko, had been head of the republican KGB from 1987 and after the August 1991 coup retained his position as caretaker of the service until November 1991. General Holushko was then called to Moscow to lead the Russian Security Ministry, the largest component of the dismantled KGB, and later became Director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation.
The first real head of the SBU was Yevhen Kyrylovych Marchuk, who, like his predecessor, made his career in the Fifth Department of the Ukrainian KGB, responsible for combating the Soviet Union’s internal enemies; serious criminals and harmless dissidents alike. General Marchuk survived political storms, steering the SBU away from many controversies and scandals, but was not able to stop a deluge of corruption and high profile killings, many of which are yet to be solved. He even accepted responsibility for losing a videotape on which a security officer spoke about a murder of a political activist by a special police squad. The most politically durable and nimble of all the SBU’s heads, in July 1994 General Marchuk became First Deputy Prime Minister and subsequently Prime Minister with one or two brief intermissions has remained at the top of the political power pyramid in Ukraine. Ambitious and cautious at the same time, Yevhen Marchuk accepted in 2003 a formidable challenge and potentially a poisoned chalice, the post of Defence Minister.

After Marchuk’s departure from the SBU, his first deputy and the head of the counterintelligence directorate, Valeriy Vasylovich Malikov – not a man able to conduct the necessary reforms - replaced him. General Malikov survived at the top of the SBU for one year. In July 1995, when the need for reforms in the organization had become more urgent and political connections increasingly to matter, he was replaced by Vlodymyr Ivanovych Radchenko, a popular professional, supported in his earlier career by Yevhen Marchuk but regarded also as one of president Kuchma’s men. When President Kuchma came to power Vlodymyr Radchenko was transferred from the SBU and nominated as Minister of Internal Affairs. He returned to head the SBU in July 1995 and remained in that post until April 1998, when he was sent to the National Security and Defence Council to control arms exports. The principal reason for the shift of the popular and apolitical Radchenko was his reluctance to politicize the service.

Leonid Vasylovich Derkach, who took over from General Radchenko in April 1998, had particularly strong links with President Kuchma. He began his career in the missile producing Pivdenmash enterprise, in which young Leonid Kuchma began his career, becoming later its General Director and the Secretary of the local Communist Party cell. In 1992 Leonid Derkach was appointed the first chairman of the Ukrainian State Service for Technical Protection of Information – built on the skeleton of the republican KGB technical surveillance and communications assets - an organization with a promising future and excellent contacts in Moscow. Leonid Derkach survived almost three years as the head of the SBU, in spite of several events for which he was not to blame, but his damage limitation efforts ranged from clumsy to crass. Certain of his powers and presidential support, Leonid Derkach failed to develop political sensitivities but improved his talents in alienating his
opponents, even within the SBU - the reforms of the service implemented by him in 1998 resulted in major structural changes and in 3,000 redundancies.\textsuperscript{13}

Known for his strong views, Derkach showed extraordinary lack of interest and knowledge when commenting on Semyon Mogylevich, one of the world’s most controversial businessmen.\textsuperscript{14} When some members of Parliament called for his resignation as a result, Derkach made himself more unpopular by publishing, in March 2000, the names of six people’s deputies suspected by the SBU of corruption.\textsuperscript{15}

He was also accused of too close contacts with Russia, an easy accusation to make considering the early official alliance of the Ukrainian State Service for Technical Protection of Information, headed by him, and its powerful Russian counterpart FAPSI, and that under his leadership the SBU intelligence directorate reduced its contacts with other countries, but not with Russia.\textsuperscript{16} Leonid Derkach’s detractors pointed out that at the time when he became the head of the Ukrainian State Service for Technical Protection of Information, his son Andrey – today a member of the Ukrainian parliament and successful businessman – was studying at the Russian Academy of the Security Ministry, the former KGB school.\textsuperscript{17}

General Derkach was also unpopular with a section of the military, when he opposed the new law on military intelligence services, which would give the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defence, GUR, a legal role in the Ukrainian intelligence community dominated by the SBU (see below).\textsuperscript{18}

The most damaging episode was the disappearance of a little known journalist Georgy Gongadze, who wrote an article highly critical of President Kuchma. The Gongadze case triggered Derkach’s downfall when a former presidential guard Mykola Melnychenko left Ukraine for Germany and publicized, through the Socialist MP Oleksandr Moroz, alleged secret recordings made in Kuchma’s office. The recording proved beyond reasonable doubt only two things; that Gen Derkach used the SBU as a tool of political struggle\textsuperscript{19} and that President Kuchma has a foul temper. During the affair, Leonid Derkach waddled into the debate with clumsy statements and veiled threats: “To put it openly, for the first time in my life I wanted to put my uniform aside and act like when I was young, do what real men do with villains and instigators – excuse my emotions”.\textsuperscript{20} In the end, President Kuchma felt obliged to ask for his resignation in February 2001.\textsuperscript{21}

General Radchenko who left the service in 1998, refusing to take part in the political involvement of the SBU, returned to lead the service. Derkach was let off lightly, and became a people’s deputy, having enlisted the support of the pro-government For a United Ukraine bloc.\textsuperscript{22} A popular insider, Radchenko brought back stability and some degree of respectability into the SBU, but in the post 9/11 world the organisation needed fundamental changes and President Kuchma evidently did not believe that Radchenko was the right man to make them. He was promoted sideways. On 2 September 2003, President Kuchma signed a decree appointing him Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council.\textsuperscript{23}

Lieutenant-General Ihor Petrovich Smeshko, the new head of the SBU\textsuperscript{24} was its first leader who did not start his career in the KGB and who had served abroad. An expert on precision weapons guidance systems, Colonel Smeshko entered the mysterious world of intelligence services and foreign affairs in 1992 when he became the first Defence Attaché of Ukraine in the USA. There were other more experienced candidates for the position, but Ihor Smeshko did not carry the
baggage of a KGB or military intelligence past, spoke fluent Ukrainian and his 
expert knowledge will have been of considerable interest to his American hosts. His 
work in the USA must have been highly appreciated because immediately after his 
return, in 1995, he was promoted and appointed head of the Presidential 
Intelligence Committee and then, until 2000, the head of the Main Intelligence 
Directorate of the Ministry of Defence (GUR). In 2000, he was asked to leave his 
post. His resignation was mainly the result of the pressure put on Leonid Kuchma 
by those who opposed the law on foreign intelligence and his determination to 
reform the service.\textsuperscript{25} The same year General Smeshko obtained a law degree from 
Kiev State University and was appointed Military Attaché in Switzerland and 
Ukraine’s military representative at the international organizations in Geneva. In 
2002, after his return to Ukraine, Smeshko became head of the Presidential Military 
Technical Cooperation and Export Control Committee and in 2003, deputy and 
then First Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council. In 
September 2003, President Kuchma appointed Smeshko head of the SBU.

Ihor Smeshko had several difficult tasks to accomplish, including fundamental 
reforms of the service, making it apolitical (as long as it suited the president) and 
improving its performance. All this in an atmosphere of hostility from the 
organization in which he was treated as an outsider ready to ruin a whole myriad of 
cosy relationships which had been tolerated by his predecessors. On 22 January 
2004, President Kuchma signed a decree giving General Smeshko the rank of 
ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, giving him additional protection 
abroad, in case someone should request his arrest in legally globalized Europe, and 
also giving him access to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Structure & Principal Tasks of SBU Central Organs

In theory the chief of the SBU is appointed by the Verkhovna Rada on the 
recommendation of the president of Ukraine. In reality the president can appoint 
and dismiss the head of the service as he wishes. He also appoints the head’s first 
deputies and deputies and is their main strategic task master and ultimate 
reporting officer. The National Security and Defence Council, staffed by former and 
future high-ranking SBU and GUR officials, coordinates and monitors all power 
structures as does, in its own field, the Committee for Military-Technical 
Cooperation and Export Control. Both organisations are accountable only to the 
president, as is the Presidential Intelligence Council. According to unconfirmed 
reports, the council was disbanded at the end of the last decade. However the 
council was mention by the UNIAN news agency on 2 September 2003.

The number of deputy heads of the SBU had reached nine by the beginning of 
2000. In March 2000 they were reduced to six. One of the “redundant” deputies, 
Vasyl Krutov, was sent to Moscow to take part in organising the CIS anti-terrorist 
centre and serve as a liaison with the FSB.\textsuperscript{26}

The head of the SBU now has two first deputies and six deputies. Of the two First 
Deputies, General Zemlyanskiy is responsible for the Antiterrorist Centre and 
corresponding tasks and the other, Vlodymyr Satsyuk, the only civilian at the top of 
the SBU, is expected to be the political liaison and troubleshooter for the service.\textsuperscript{27}
The SBU Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of the SBU</td>
<td>Lt-Gen Ihor Petrovych Smeshko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Deputy Head</td>
<td>Col-Gen Yurii Vlodymyr Zemlyanskiy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Deputy Head</td>
<td>Vlodymyr Mykolovych Satsyuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Head</td>
<td>Lt-Gen Anatoliy Pavlovych Gerasymov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Head</td>
<td>Lt-Gen Ihor Vasylovych Drizhchany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Head</td>
<td>Lt-Gen Mykola Serhiyovych Obykhod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Head</td>
<td>Maj-Gen Yevhen Vlodymyrovych Serhyenko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Head</td>
<td>Maj-Gen Serhey Ivanovych Tuz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Head</td>
<td>Lt-Gen Vlodymyr Vlodymyrovych Sheremeta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SBU’s central organs are divided into departments, main directorates, directorates and divisions, in this order of importance. The regional organs are subordinate to the central administration organs with the exception of Crimea, because of the sensitive nature of the region, Kiev and Kiev region. The Kiev SBU was originally divided into six regions. In the 1990s the Kiev and Kiev directorates were merged, to be separated again in October 2001.

The SBU receives between 900 and 1,000 conscripts from two annual call ups. This represents a little more than 1% of the annual conscription intake in Ukraine.

The principal central organs of the SBU are:

**Information Support & Operations Management Department**
(Departament Informatsyonnogo Zabezpechennya ta Upravlennya Operativno-Sluzhboyu Diyalinistyu – DIU)

The Department, responsible for strategic planning of SBU operations, provides all relevant information and operational analysis. It also serves as an operational legal watchdog, writes internal regulations and acts as the SBU operational lawyer - but does not represent the service in court - organises the storage and use of SBU files in the state archives, provides analysis in internal publications and acts as the supporting cast in contacts with foreign partners.

**Counterintelligence Department**
(Departament Kontrozvidki – DKR)

Established on 20 September 1991, the DKR is divided into two Main Directorates: the Main Counterintelligence Directorate divided in turn into two directorates, one dealing with counterintelligence tasks, and the other with economic security. The other Main Directorate is responsible for military counterintelligence.

**Main Directorate of Military Counterintelligence**

A Ukrainian joke describes members of various professions, unable to cope with their tasks, crying as they wait for their commuter bus in the morning. God decides to help them and appears at the bus stop as a wise old man, giving each of them words of wisdom and encouragement and helping them to solve their problems. One day he meets a crying middle-aged man and asks about his profession. The man answers that he is an officer of the Ukrainian military counterintelligence department of the SBU. God sits next to him and begins to cry.

As in the USSR and Russia, the Ukrainian military counterintelligence system is not subordinate to the Minister of Defence or the Chief of General Staff but to the Security Service. Because Moscow paid close attention to monitoring its armed
forces, the republics had little to say about military counterintelligence activities on their territory and after their independence had to build their system from scratch. Ukrainian military counterintelligence officers faced a whole set of impossible tasks. One of them, in contrast with other less industrialised, militarised or smaller republics, was that there was so much to be stolen, from many military formations, highly sensitive military enterprises, depots, research institutes and test ranges.

On 18 December 1991 the Ukrainian presidential edict “On Counterintelligence Provision of Military Formations” started the formation of military counterintelligence structures in the Ukrainian armed forces. The new organization was first controlled by the Ukrainian KGB and then by the SBU. In its early years, Ukrainian military counterintelligence officers had to watch old and new foreign adversaries; an increasing contingent of frustrated military who had problems with their new allegiances; and Russian officers who wanted to take as much as they could back to Russia, including heavy weapons. Many Ukrainians and other citizens of the former USSR, now regarded as foreigners, were happy to steal and sell anything they could lay their hands on. By 1993 Ukrainian military counterintelligence had frustrated more than 70 attempts at direct interference, by officials of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the Russian Ministry of Defence, in reorganization of the Ukrainian armed forces. It had prevented the theft of 50 combat aircraft and 201 vehicles, several hundred aircraft engines, other equipment and precious metals. The SBU’s military counterintelligence operates in all military formations, including Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, border guards, state close protection teams, civil defence forces and Ukrainian units operating abroad. Most of what the Military Counterintelligence Directorate has to deal with, however, are petty crime and disciplinary problems. The present head of the military counterintelligence department is Vitaliy Romanchenko.

On 2 April 2002, President Kuchma signed the law “On the Military Law and Order Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine”. The new law had been adopted by parliament on 7 March 2002. It envisaged the creation of a special section of the Ukrainian armed forces to ensure law and order and military discipline in the armed forces.

The new service is to conduct investigations, provide security for military facilities, provide patrols and control of road traffic in the armed forces. The completion of the formation of military police units is to be achieved in three stages by 2006. The plan envisages six directorates: the main directorate, responsible for running the service, with its own guard platoon and five territorial directorates, Kiev City, Kiev Region, Western, Southern, Northern and Crimean, with the Kievan regions having at their disposal a separate battalion each. Every directorate is to be in charge of 12 territorial departments and 16 departments with special military police units, which will also have their own area of activity in a region or a garrison. There is also a plan to create special purpose units in territorial directorates in Kiev, Odessa, Lviv, Chernihiv, Sevastopol, Vinnysya and several other garrisons to tackle especially dangerous crimes perpetrated by men in uniform who pose a real threat to life and health of civilians and military personnel. In addition, when a state of emergency is declared, these special forces units will search for deserters, fight sabotage and foreign intelligence groups, escort and guard prisoners of war and enforce curfews in garrisons.

The service will consist of 4,697 persons although some 12,476 people are currently employed in providing these functions. The size of the service is to be determined by the Ukrainian defence minister, though it cannot exceed 1.5% of the total size of
the Ukrainian armed forces. The new organization is bound to step on many toes in the Ukrainian MVD, the prison service, the military prosecutor's office and the SBU. The Security Service, however, is determined to retain control over all security aspects in the armed forces.

**Department of Counterintelligence Protection of the National Economy**  
(Departament Kontrrazviduvalnogo Zakhistu Ekonomiki Derzhavi – DKZED)  
The DKZED was established in 1998. It is a younger brother of the Counterintelligence Department and still shares some of its tasks. It specialises in protecting the state’s military-economic and other strategic economic secrets and interests, as well as strategically important industries. The department also combats the shadow economy and looks carefully at the process of privatisation of state enterprises.36

**State Protection & Counterterrorism Department**  
(Departament Zakhistu Natsionalnoy Derzhavnosti I Borotbi z Terrorismom – DZND)

The department, set up on 16 March 1994, is responsible for protecting constitutional order without interfering in politics. “The Directorate and its regional divisions can be involved in operations only with the permission of the chief of the Security Service of Ukraine and only with the approval of senior state officials in cases when conducting especially complicated operations can adversely affect international relations or the political situation in the country.”37

In December 1998 President Kuchma created the Antiterrorist Centre of the SBU (Antiteroristichniy Tsentr pri Sluzhbi Bezpeki Ukrayny - ATTs). The centre consists of an Interdepartmental Coordinating Commission with a central HQ and coordinating groups and HQs in SBU regional offices. It coordinates all antiterrorist efforts of all security and law enforcement organs of Ukraine.38 Colonel General Yuriy Zemlyanskiy, First Deputy Head of the SBU, was put in charge of the centre. The centre is well funded and well connected in the CIS countries. Between 2001 and 2003 it organized 250 antiterrorist exercises. The ATTs has particularly close contacts with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).39

The head of the Antiterrorist Centre and the members of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Commission have to be approved by the President of Ukraine on the submission of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The regions covered by coordinating groups include the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In Crimea the membership of the coordinating council is to be approved by the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic, the chairmen of the oblast state administrations and the chairmen of the executive organs of the Kiev and Sevastopol city councils.40

The ATTS controls the best special forces team in Ukraine, Main Directorate A, known also as “Alfa”. In the Soviet era the KGB had special A teams in several main cities. After Ukraine proclaimed sovereignty the original A team in Kiev was disbanded. In May 1992, Ukraine established its own rapid reaction team called Service S. The “Alfa” team was resurrected in accordance with a presidential decree of 23 June 1994. Since its inception, it has conducted over 3,400 special operations including 980 preventions of dangerous crimes, arrests of armed criminals, and liberations of hostages.41

The Ukrainian Supreme Council approved a law on combating terrorism on 29 March 2003. The law charged the Cabinet of Ministers with organizing the fight
against terrorism and with providing the necessary resources, men and equipment. The law defined the SBU as the central body of the state system for combating terrorism and as the body coordinating the efforts of other organisations authorised to combat terrorism within the limits of their competence.\textsuperscript{42}

**Special Telecommunication Systems & Information Protection Department**  
(\textit{Departament Spetsialnikh Telekomunikatsiykh Sistem ta Zakhistu Informatsii – DSTSZI})

The department, originally called the Government Telecommunications Directorate, was set up as a separate organisation on 25 August 1991, i.e. the day after Ukraine declared its independence. The directorate was incorporated into the SBU in October 1992. For the first several years it relied heavily on the Russian Government Communication Committee (KPS) renamed later the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAPSI). The directorate, promoted in the meantime to a Main Directorate, acquired its present name and tasks in August 1998. In September 1999 the DSTSZI was charged by President Kuchma with implementing state policies in the area of technical protection of information. In short, the DSTSZI is a much smaller but all-embracing version of the US NSA or the British GCHQ, with some of the characteristics of the Russian FAPSI.\textsuperscript{43} The department is responsible for the newly introduced programme of Internet monitoring. According to unconfirmed reports, by 2001 the SBU had recruited 3,000 people to monitor the Internet on the territory of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{44}

**Logistics & Maintenance Support Department**  
(\textit{Departament Zabezpechennya Operativno-Sluzhbovoy Diyalnosti – DZ})

The DZ provides logistical and administrative support for other departments and directorates, including military logistics and the medical service, audits SBU’s financial activities and protects its facilities.\textsuperscript{45}

**Main Intelligence Directorate**  
(\textit{Golovne Upravlinnaya Rozvidki/Departament Upravlinnya Rozvidki – GUR [SBU]})

Established on 29 December 1991, that is almost immediately after the official demise of the USSR, the GUR SBU has been kept small because of a shortage of funds and because the Ukrainian political establishment could not, until recently, find a proper role for it, although its tasks include combating international organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking. The HQ of the GUR SBU is located in Bilhorodka, away from the main facilities of the service.\textsuperscript{46}

The law on intelligence bodies defines three organisations authorised to carry out intelligence activities: the SBU Main Intelligence Directorate, the MOD Main Intelligence Directorate and the Operational Search Directorate of the State Border Committee. The last is authorized to conduct its activities in the border areas only. The president coordinates intelligence organs through the National Security and Defence Council. They provide reports for the Ukrainian president, the chairman of the Supreme Council and the prime minister. The funds for each of the intelligence organisations are allocated in a separate article in the state budget.\textsuperscript{47} The head of the SBU Ihor Smeshko announced in April 2004 that Ukrainian intelligence will focus exclusively on information gathering abroad.\textsuperscript{48} In recent years the directorate has been upgraded to a department.

**Main Analytical & Forecasting Directorate**  
(\textit{Golovne Upravlinnaya Analizu I Prognozuvannaya – GUAP})

GUAP serves as the threat assessment centre for the SBU and state authorities and gives recommendations on how to deal with threats, including ecological ones.
Main Directorate for Combating Corruption & Organized Crime
(Golovne Upravlinnaya Boroti z Koruptsiyoyu I Organizovanoyu Zlochinnistyu – GUBKOZ or “K”)
Established on 8 June 1992, GUBKOZ targeted organized crime attempting to profit from the post-Soviet chaos and economic liberalisation. The Directorate is now the main element of the SBU responsible for combating drug trafficking and large scale smuggling. The head of the K directorate had at the beginning of 1997 850 subordinates; 7,000 policemen work in the Service of Combating Crime in the Interior Ministry.

State Secrets Protection Department
(Upravlinnaya Okhoroni Derzhavnoy Taemnitsi – UODT)
The UODT is Ukraine’s main protector of state secrets at every level, including in industry.

Personnel Directorate
(Upravlinnaya Raboti z Osobovim Skladom - URLS)
The directorate is responsible for all personnel policies, including the SBU educational system and physical training of SBU personnel.

Internal Security Department
(Upravlinnaya Vnutrishnoy Bezpeki – UVP)
One of the most powerful and secretive departments of the SBU, the UVP has to keep its employees on the straight and narrow, which gives it unparalleled powers to monitor every part of the SBU. The UVP works closely with the Personnel Directorate.49

Treaties & Legal Department
(Dgovorno-Pravovye Upravlinnaya – DPU)
Another element of the SBU set up immediately after the break up of the Soviet Union, the DPU was established on 31 December 1991. It provides the SBU with legal support and is responsible for the legal aspects of its co-operative contacts with foreign special services, law enforcement bodies and other international organisations. It also represents the SBU in courts.

Investigation Directorate
(Slidche Upravlinnaya – SU)
The SU was established on 29 November 1991, by the head of the SBU, not by the president of Ukraine. It is based on the Investigation Division of the former Ukrainian KGB, subordinated to the Second Main Directorate, responsible for counterintelligence and security in the USSR. The SU investigates especially grave crimes which threaten vital national interests. It also enforces compensation payments and investigates illegal arrests.50

Scientific & Technical Directorate
(Naukovo-Tekhnichne Upravlinnaya – NTU)
Established on 6 November 2002, the NTU is the most recently created SBU directorate. The directorate is responsible for all scientific and technical matters necessary to guarantee the smooth running of the SBU, including relevant licensing and purchases and ensures that the service is technically compatible with national and foreign organizations with which it has to work.
State Archives of the SBU  
(Derzhavniy Arkhiv - SBU)  
The SBU archives were set up in April 1994 by the Council of Ministers. They are divided into the Division of Archival Records Acquisition and Logistic Support, the Research Division and the Information Division. The SBU archives go far beyond the SBU’s interests and represent an alternative to the National Archives. It has its own research and publication components.  

Military-Medical Directorate  
(Vyyskovo-Medichne Upravlinnya - VMU)  
The VMU assures medical protection for SBU personnel and their families.

The SBU Educational System

The mainstay of the Ukrainian Security Service educational system is the SBU National Academy established in January 1992, originally as the SBU Institute, on the basis of the KGB Cadres Advanced Training Institute, on 22 Trutenko Street, Kiev. In 1995 the institute obtained the status of Academy and on 2 August 1999 it was given by President Kuchma the rank of a National Academy. The academy offers a full-time five-year programme, and post-graduate and extramural courses, including post secondary school level short technical courses. Five-year courses cost about 72,000 hryvnas, including uniforms and three meals a day. All costs are paid by the SBU.

In 1997 the academy opened a new faculty to train legal experts, but the basic legal training, including that of SBU investigators, is run at a special faculty of the Yaroslav Mudry National Judicial Academy. The Yaroslav Mudry Academy also trains legal experts for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The commandant of the SBU academy, Major General Vlodymyr Stepanovych Sydak, interviewed about its activities in 1995, said that only male candidates were accepted by the institute, as it was then. Five years later Lieutenant General Sydak said that women were accepted by the academy, but only as student linguists. Thirty young women were accepted by the SBU in 2000. The academy has an agreement with the Linguistic University where the SBU linguists study for the first four years and are then transferred for the final year to the SBU academy. In 1995 the SBU linguists studied English, French and German but plans were in hand to teach more exotic languages in 1996.

Between its creation and the end of 2000, the academy educated and trained more than 7,500 specialists, including 170 students who completed their specialised extramural secondary education. The age limit for candidates from secondary schools is 24 years and for university graduates 30 years. All candidates must pass academic and physical tests. In 2000 the academy had 7 faculties and 32 departments. Its intake for that year was 140 men. No women were admitted. In 2004, there were 1,500 students. Their large number can be explained by the length of the principal course and the number of outside customers. The Academy trains border guards, military counterintelligence specialists, State Protection Service and GUR personnel.
At the end of the last decade, the SBU academy ran a five-month course for GUR officers and planned to offer the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence a full five-year programme. This should not clash with the programme of the intelligence faculty at the Ukrainian Defence Academy, set up on 8 November 1993.

For understandable reasons the Ukrainians are particularly discreet about the training of SBU technical intelligence officers and cryptographers, not only because of the sensitive nature of these professions but also because, until quite recently, for their training Ukraine had to rely on Russia. The SBU Academy is in a unique position as the only security educational heavyweight in the country.

The discretion with which the Ukrainian security officials treat the statistics about the number of candidates wishing to join the SBU may suggest that the job opportunities in the service do not appeal to young Ukrainians. The most patriotic element in Ukrainian society is also the most radically nationalist and alien to most Ukrainian politicians and security bosses. The SBU educators cannot rely on patriotism based on their country’s short history of independence or their service’s long and inspiring traditions.

Many young Ukrainians wrongly see the SBU as Leonid Kuchma’s political tool. Others, as in many democracies, are put off by professional restrictions imposed on security or intelligence officers, especially in still insecure societies and state administrative systems, and by the modest salaries. On the other hand, the 9/11 events changed the attitudes of many young people and convinced many governments that they had to invest in their country’s security. The salaries in the SBU might not be impressive by the standards of rich countries, but a major of the Ukrainian Security Service receives a wage equal to a division commander of the Armed Forces; the salary of a lieutenant colonel of the SBU corresponds to that of a corps commander, and the wage of a department chief of the SBU is allegedly equal to the defence minister’s salary. If correct, this comparison reflects only the extremely low salaries in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The salaries offered by the SBU to its personnel are generally not competitive. For the same reasons the academy must experience problems with recruitment and retention of suitable teaching staff. The experience of Russia and its former Warsaw Treaty allies shows that the operational competence of older intelligence and security lecturers is often not matched by their understanding of wider issues and international affairs. Experienced and highly professional instructors occasionally have difficulties in understanding that the world has changed, not necessarily for the better, and the knowledge they have to offer is usually based on their experience acquired when working against Western democracies. The result is frequently disappointing. Their students often have difficulties in distinguishing real and imaginary threats, see conspiracies where there are none and are difficult to work with as new security partners.

The Legal Base

The Law on the SBU was adopted on 25 March 1992. It was followed by several others relevant to counterintelligence operations - both military and civilian, operational procedures, operational investigative procedures and combating terrorism. The SBU leaders and their supporters in the parliament and the presidential administration resisted fiercely, and for many years successfully, the introduction of a law on intelligence bodies, as this would have given a legal role to the GUR in the intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination process and
would give it a leading role in some aspects of technical intelligence operations. After a long struggle, the law on intelligence was signed by Leonid Kuchma in March 2001.

On a smaller scale there was a similar problem with the law "On Counterintelligence Activity", finally approved by President Kuchma on 26 December 2002, which in its Article 8 makes the SBU’s Central Administration responsible for the organization and coordination of counterintelligence activity but allows, in Article 5, certain counterintelligence operations to be conducted by intelligence agencies of Ukraine and the Administration for the State Protection of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{65}

As the struggle for new modern laws on intelligence and security bodies gathered momentum, President Kuchma reinforced his legal control of these organisations. In October 1998, he signed a decree which considerably reinforced presidential control over the activity of the Ukrainian Security Service. The new law provides for a presidential appointee to exercise constant supervision over the activity of the SBU. Vlodymyr Buyalsky was selected by the president to study all legislative acts drawn up by the SBU before they are put on the government list of the legislative acts.\textsuperscript{66}

\textbf{The SBU & GUR}

The SBU and the Military Intelligence Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence have an uneasy and complex relationship. The SBU was born with a powerful counterintelligence element, including the military one, and only modest intelligence capabilities, and it had to set up several new branches. It was present in every district and was therefore indispensable for whoever ran the country. At the beginning, Ukrainian Military Intelligence existed only on paper. Both SBU and GUR had their historical and operational archives, analytical services, most schools and personnel files in Russia. Notwithstanding their different tasks both organizations had many problems in common. The running of the new organizations was not helped by the “Soviet” mindset of the people at the top of the new Ukrainian power structures. When the Ukrainian armed forces were formed, General Georgiy Vladimirovich Zhyvytsa, acting chief of staff of the Ukrainian armed forces, predicted that the size of its intelligence component would be small and that Ukraine would receive intelligence summaries from the Russian GRU and train its own GUR officers in Moscow. The GRU kept sending requests to Ukraine for the names of Ukrainian intelligence officers and their agents.\textsuperscript{67} The Main Staff of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry began to form its own tactical intelligence service at a very early stage. It was briefly headed by Colonel Kuzmin and later, equally briefly, by Colonel Vydanov and then by General Lehominov. On 7 September 1992, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry set up, with a presidential decree, a parallel organisation, the Strategic Intelligence Service of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry. The two services merged in October 1993 into the Main Military Intelligence directorate (GUR).\textsuperscript{68}

At the beginning both the SBU and the GUR could not function without Russian support. However, if the first SBU bosses could have been seen by outside observers as political chameleons, Lieutenant General Oleksander Skipalskiy, the “father” of the GUR, was a maverick by any standards. An experienced KGB military counterintelligence officer, General Skipalskiy resigned his membership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1990, that is, long before it was a safe
or beneficial move for one's career. He was a straight talking Ukrainian patriot, determined to make his service independent, as much as it was possible in the circumstances. He was given seven men to assist him in setting up the new military intelligence service. Colonel S Horbatovsky, former head of the human intelligence department of the GRU office in the Transcaucasus Military District, became General Skipalskiy’s assistant and co-author of GUR’s strategy.  

General Skipalskiy headed the GUR from October 1992 to January 1997 when General Vlodymyr Lehominov replaced him. Almost immediately after his departure from the GUR General Skipalskiy was appointed by President Kuchma as deputy head of the SBU. He was not welcomed by most of his new colleagues because the relations between the two services had never been warm and they remembered Oleksandr Skipalskiy saying, when referring to GUR’s relationship with the SBU, “I am not interested in what the SBU intelligence service is doing, and it, in turn, should not be interested in what I am doing”. Skipalskiy became even less popular when he began to advocate the detachment of the intelligence directorate from the SBU and criticised the decision to task the SBU with economic and social issues, which according to him, the Ukrainian law enforcement bodies should have been able to address. Neither the SBU leadership nor President Kuchma were ready for such reforms, especially given that the Ukrainian law enforcement bodies needed a dramatic overhaul. They were not part of the solution; they were part of a problem.

General Lehominov, Skipalskiy’s replacement in the GUR, lasted six months. GUR was accused in June 1997 of running intelligence operations against the USA. Lehominov argued that it was not the case because the leaked papers which were to serve as evidence against his organisation were in Russian - since the establishment of the GUR all documents had been written only in Ukrainian. This prompted speculation that the GUR was subcontracting for Moscow. President Kuchma replaced Lehominov with General Ihor Smeshko, the present head of the SBU, who at that time headed the presidential intelligence committee. Lehominov became Smeshko’s first deputy. Smeshko began his work by purging the organization. He fired his deputy directors Major General Anatoliy Magalyas and Gen Lehominov. Colonel V Vyskrebentsov, responsible in the GUR for rear services, died in a mysterious explosion of his car. Colonel P Hrabarchuk, chief of the financial directorate, died when approaching his apartment. Colonel Shafikov, responsible for GUR's publications, committed suicide in his study and Captain 1st Class Yu Lago, appointed by Smeshko head of human intelligence operations, was discovered to have faked his KGB Academy diploma.

Smeshko’s work in the USA and in the presidential intelligence committee made him in theory an ideal person to head GUR but the old generation of the KGB trained officers in the SBU saw him as a dangerously effective reformist. The animosity against the head of GUR within the SBU was so intense that its head, General Derkach, either ordered or authorized a physical search of General Smeshko at Borispol airport when he was coming back from one of his official trips abroad. After a long campaign, his enemies convinced President Kuchma that he should find Smeshko other employment.

Smeshko was dismissed on 22 September 2000 and replaced by Lieutenant General Viktor Paliy. Paliy’s complete lack of qualifications or experience to run an intelligence service did not seem to bother Smeshko’s detractors. His previous posts included commandant of the National Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Chief of Staff in the Transcarpathian Military District. Paliy began his
new job with another wave of purges, this time by medical examination. More than 120 officers and NCOs failed their medical in 2001 - in 2000 only 7 officers and NCOs had been ordered to undergo medical tests. General Paliy was replaced on 13 March 2003 by General Oleksander Halaka, deputy secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council, who had been Defence Attaché to the USA between 1996-1999. Born in June 1954, Halaka served more than 20 years in the Soviet and Ukrainian armies, studied at the NATO Defence College in Italy and the Netherlands Defence College, worked in the Ukrainian embassy in Belgium and in the state arms trading company Ukrspetsexport.

The changes at the top of the SBU and the GUR were well timed. Both current incumbents have considerable foreign experience and both have experience working with the president. They do not indulge in adversarial competition and are able to communicate with their foreign partners in one or two languages used in Europe and North America. President Kuchma understood the need in the new, unsafe, world to have apolitical, modern special services run by professionals. He also understood that their credibility on the international arena, where Ukraine is beginning to play an increasingly important role in peace enforcing and peacekeeping operations, enhances his prestige also.

His and parliament’s willingness to spend more money on intelligence structures reflects this awareness. A week after 9/11, on 18 September 2001, the Ukrainian parliament increased the funding of the Ukrainian intelligence community by 15-20%. Most of the money was destined for the SBU. On 12 September 2003, President Kuchma signed a decree allocating 208.8m hryvnyas (about $39m) to military intelligence for 2004. The draft military budget for 2004 originally envisaged expenditure on military intelligence to be 84.382m hryvnyas ($15.8m). The expenditure on the GUR in 2003 was said to be 77m hryvnyas (more than $14.4m). Vladimir Horbulin, the chairman of the National Centre for EuroAtlantic integration, presidential security adviser and former secretary of the National Security and Defence Committee, explained the increase by saying that the role of monitoring the military-political situation in the world is of increasing importance.

The Defection of Major Mykola Melnychenko

Among the most embarrassing occurrences in the SBU’s short history were the defections of General Kravchenko and Major Mykola Melnychenko. Melnychenko, a 34-year-old security officer working in the technical section of the presidential guard service, left Ukraine on 26 November 2000, on what seemed to be a tourist trip to Germany. Two days later the leader of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, Oleksandr Moroz, announced that President Leonid Kuchma had ordered the killing of journalist Georgy Gongadze, who disappeared on 16 September 2000. Moroz presented an audio recording of an alleged conversation between the president, the interior minister and the head of the presidential administration. Melnychenko, from Germany, fully supported the accusation, claiming he decided to record what was said in the presidential office after he “discovered who rules the country and what orders are given and fulfilled”. The recording was highly embarrassing for the president. In the recording made public, the voice of someone sounding exactly like him, using a wide range of expletives, demanded that something very unpleasant must be done to Gongadze, who dared to criticize the head of state in print. The officials talking to the president sounded genuine.
The Gongadze Case

Gongadze disappeared on 16 September 2000. An unidentified body was found in the forest near Tarashcha in Kiev Region on 2 November 2000. Only then did the SBU appeal to the public for any information about him, offering the equivalent of $18,000. The SBU was probably responsible for misinforming the Prosecutor General’s Office that Gongadze was seen later in the Czech Republic. On 28 November 2000 the leader of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, Oleksandr Moroz, publicized the first recording provided by Major Melnychenko. On 18 December Gongadze’s wife recognized ornaments on her husband’s body found near Tarashcha. On 17 February Russian experts estimated the probability that the body from Tarashcha belonged to Gongadze at 99.9 per cent. Gongadze’s body was kept unattended in the morgue for a fortnight and it was moved away, without record of transfer and acceptance. The investigation was a monument to chaos and obfuscation.

The death of Georgy Gongadze galvanised the opposition and certain section of the media hoping to destroy Leonid Kuchma’s career or at least wound him politically. The number of high profile individuals in Ukraine who were either murdered or died in mysterious circumstances is disturbing and their deaths not always investigated with sufficient determination and professionalism. Lieutenant Colonel of Militia (Redt) Igor Honcharov, possibly the most important witness in the Gongadze case, died in police custody. Nationalist leader Vyacheslav Chornovil died in a suspicious car crash, as did Anatoliy Yermak, former SBU employee and former people’s deputy, after exposing irregularities in the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVS). Generals Dahayev and Podzihun of the MVS also died suddenly, in not entirely explained circumstances. Former chief of the Ukrainian state arms exporter Valeriy Malyev and former chairman of the National bank Vadym Getman were murdered. Journalist Ihor Oleksandrov was beaten to death outside his office.

The presidential office and the SBU went into overdrive, conducting a relentless campaign to blacken Melnychenko’s name, challenging the results of the voice tests of the smuggled tape conducted in the USA; allowing, but not helping, the company Kroll Associates, New York, to investigate the accusation against the president - Kroll’s investigators were brought to Ukraine by the pro-presidential Working Ukraine Party. On the basis of extensive but incomplete investigation Kroll’s experts concluded that "neither the circumstances of Gongadze’s disappearance nor the records provide grounds to speak about the president’s involvement". The conclusions of the Kroll report have been widely publicized in Ukraine by the Working Ukraine Party leaders and Ukrainian representatives in the Council of Europe, but they have not been made available in their entirety. In the flurry of accusations and counteraccusations the real issue, what actually happened, was buried by Kuchma’s opponents’ insistence that he ordered the journalist’s killing and by the presidential team’s clumsy defence.

Although President’s behaviour in the recorded telephone conversations was not something he could ever be proud of, the tape provided by Melnychenko shows clearly that President Kuchma did not ask to have the journalist killed. He merely suggested to have him expelled, kidnapped and then ransomed: Episode 4. [Kuchma] “I am telling you, drive him out, throw out. Give him to the Chechens (undecipherable) and then a ransom." By accusing the president of ordering the killing of Gongadze, as if his outrageous statements, admittedly spoken in anger, were not enough, his opponents allowed him and his defenders to argue, quite correctly, that he did not do so. On the other hand, by denying that the tape was genuine, the presidential team could not use the potentially most powerful
argument, that anyone wanting to destroy Leonid Kuchma’s career and having the technical capability to manufacture such a recording, would have “made” the president give orders to kill Gongadze, not “lend” him to the Chechens and then ransom him. The Gongadze case was muddled further by the possible involvement of some power structures, not the SBU, in Gongadze’s murder or, at best, their criminal incompetence.

An issue ignored by President Kuchma’s supporters and enemies alike was who exactly made the recording. Melnychenko’s claim that he acted alone and placed a digital Toshiba recorder under a sofa in the presidential office, recording between 1999 and 2000 about 100 hours seems far fetched. Even a voice-activated high capacity digital recorder would probably run out of energy, even with special batteries. After all, it is very unlikely that the noise activator was tuned only to the presidential voice and would therefore react to every other noise, including vacuum cleaners, floor polishing machines and sounds made by president, his entourage and supporting staff. A deputy head of the presidential guard service, Oleh Hryhorovych Piserenko, who admitted that Melnychenko worked in a technical section of the service as a member of the listening devices sweeping team, insisted that the recorder would have been under the sofa for only three days and nights.

Even a high quality listening device planted under the sofa would not be able to record both sides of a telephone conversation unless the president used a hands-off telephone system with loudspeakers. The question of what a single member of the debugging team was doing in the presidential office without any accompanying personnel or supervision has not been addressed. The digital recorder used by Melnychenko was purchased for the SBU. Who authorised its use, who signed for it? The presidential guard service is in theory part of the SBU. In reality the service is operationally independent. If Melnychenko was dismissed, what was the reason for his departure and why was he not watched carefully after he applied for a passport? It is also surprising that the SBU was not forced to investigate some of the leads, even when on 15 May 2001 Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Yuriy Smyrnov said that the Gongadze killers had died and there were no organizers because their act was spontaneous. The minister said that a criminal boss called Tsyklop was somehow linked to the case. This is especially confusing because the head of the MVS criminal intelligence department was briefly arrested for destroying material pertinent to Gongadze’s surveillance operation and quickly released by a court in Kiev.

There is no reason to believe that the Ukrainian president was in any way involved in the killing of Gongadze, as asserted by some of his opponents. However as the head of state, with wide constitutional and executive powers over the law enforcement and security bodies, he must be partly to blame for the sheer incompetence and partisanship of the people under his command.

The Defection of General Kravchenko

The other defection which shook the SBU to the core was the disappearance of its official liaison officer in Germany. On 18 February 2004 a man who identified himself as Major General Valeriy Maksymovich Kravchenko, an official SBU liaison officer at the Ukrainian embassy in Berlin, walked into the Berlin studio of the German radio station Deutsche Welle and asked to make a statement accusing the head of the SBU Ihor Petrovych Smeshko and the head of the SBU Main Intelligence Directorate Oleh Hryhorovych Synyanskiy of ordering their subordinates, in violation of the Ukrainian constitution, to spy on the opposition MPs and
government members. Kravchenko insisted that he was not approached by the German special services but his seemingly instant access to tightly controlled state radio leaves many questions unanswered.

General Kravchenko denied that his dramatic gesture was a defection and insisted that the reason why he decided to make the statement was solely because of his concerns about President Kuchma’s misuse of the SBU for his own political gains. He was vague as to his plans, counting perhaps that his “revelations” would irrevocably damage President Kuchma and the SBU leadership. Kravchenko made his accusations just before President Kuchma visited Germany. Kravchenko’s self-imposed exile, dramatic statements and suddenly discovered concern about the state of democracy in his country began to sound hollow under closer scrutiny. On 11 February, a week before his dramatic interview, Kravchenko had been recalled to Kiev, to discuss Kuchma’s visit to Germany, an unusual request since consultations of this type are conducted several weeks before meetings. Warned in advance that he was about to be prematurely recalled and probably pensioned, he refused to return and on 16 February was replaced by another officer. Even if his bosses were not planning to retire him after his return, his refusal to comply with their order guaranteed the most serious consequences. His decision to stay and to go public practically guaranteed that his likely application for refugee status could not be rejected by the German authorities, if his absconding was truly spontaneous.

Born in 1945 in Novocherkassk, in Rostov Region, Valeriy Kravchenko had joined the KGB in the mid 1960s, in the early Brezhnev era - the Soviet era of relative plenty. Between 1974 and 1980 officer Kravchenko worked for the 5th department of the Ukrainian KGB in Kiev, responsible for combating anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. In 1980 he moved to the First, Intelligence, Chief Directorate of the KGB for what was to become a long career as a security officer within the directorate. In 1982 Kravchenko went to Afghanistan where he served two years in Gwohr Province and was then moved for three years to Kabul. He returned to the USSR in 1987 and was sent to Ukraine. When the USSR collapsed he chose to stay in Ukraine. Russia had no shortage of intelligence officers with security and counterintelligence experience abroad. Ukraine had a serious shortage and Kravchenko accepted a position in the SBU. In 1996, he was sent to the Ukrainian embassy in Bonn and then Berlin as security officer. He returned to Kiev in 2000 and became first deputy to the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the SBU, Oleksandr Vyktorovych Cherevan. He returned for a second tour in Germany in April 2003, as the Ukrainian embassy security officer.

This was an unprecedented example of a jobs-for-the-boys scheme in Kravchenko’s pre-retirement period. Five months later the leadership of the SBU changed and so did the head of its main intelligence directorate, Kravchenko’s immediate boss. Oleh Synyanskiy, 25 years his junior, replaced Oleksandr Cherevan. The question of what a one star security SBU general was doing in Berlin must have been asked then. The immediate answer was simple. Kravchenko was earning in Berlin about 2000 euros, more than five times what he was receiving in Kiev. His case was not helped by his reluctance to monitor a group of Ukrainian opposition politicians visiting Berlin in May at the invitation of the German Social Democratic Party. He was also allegedly asked to prevent a programme being screened on the German ZDF TV channel showing Ukraine in a less than favourable light.

In spite of his protestations in the post defection campaign, the orders from his bosses in Kiev, leaked by him, were neither particularly intrusive nor illegal by the standards and laws of the region. His case in Kiev was probably not helped by the
unorthodox attempt made by the SBU to force the German special services to upgrade the security arrangements for President Kuchma during his stay in Baden-Baden at the end of December 2003 and the beginning of January 2004. The Ukrainians discovered a sudden, unspecified threat to the president’s life and Kravchenko, responsible for liaising with the German law and order and security organisations and who had to serve as the messenger for the request, clashed with President Kuchma’s security team.

These events may have contributed to Kravchenko’s recall but the main reason was probably the profound reforms conducted by Synyanskiy and the new SBU boss Ihor Smeshko, who according to Kravchenko suspended or retired up to 40% of the SBU’s managers.100

**Enemies, Opponents & Passers By**

Lieutenant General Oleksandr Skipalskiy, the first chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, and later a deputy chief of the SBU, said once that “Ukraine is of great interest for intelligence services as a country in transition”.101 What General Skipalskiy could not say was that Ukraine was a country in chaotic transition with much to offer to those who wanted to steal its secrets. The “shopping list” of several intelligence services, foreign military procurement organizations, terrorists and international tradesmen of dubious reputation was long and included military equipment, heavy weapons, small arms, military and scientific know-how, political information and information useful for international drug and human traffickers. Those ready to test the Ukrainian security system have been numerous and persistent, allowing the SBU to conduct some skilful counterintelligence operations and clumsy self-promotion campaigns sprinkled with dubious and often contradictory statistics, often using the wooden and imprecise language of their Russian counterparts of the Yeltsin era.

Summing up the SBU’s counterintelligence efforts during the first ten years of its existence, First Deputy Chairman of the SBU Petro Shatkovskiy said that during that period the SBU uncovered 70 Ukrainian citizens recruited by foreign intelligence services.102 Major General Vlodymyr Kuntsevskiy, director of the SBU regional office in Sevastopol, said that 16 individuals regarded as intelligence officers were spotted in Sevastopol in 1996, though he did not explain how this assessment was made. Kuntsevskiy appears to have included members of foreign delegations who visited the area officially without breaking any local laws.103

Lieutenant General Vlodymyr Slobodyenyuk, head of the Dnepropetrovsk directorate of the SBU, announced in December 1993 that between February and December 1993, his subordinates apprehended four individuals working for foreign intelligence services. The region was regularly visited by 20 foreign intelligence agents and up to 100 people were suspected of cooperation with foreign intelligence services.104 He did not say whether the alleged intelligence visitors came from distant industrialised countries, or poor countries with radical minorities which represented a real threat for Ukraine, or were retired members of the KGB living in former Soviet republics visiting their Ukrainian in-laws.

The collegium of the SBU announced in January 1999 that in 1998, 12 foreign spies were “put out of business” in Ukraine and that the SBU stopped 14 attempts by Ukrainian citizens to pass “sensitive political, scientific, technical and economic information to employees of foreign embassies”.105 As the collegium described their
officers’ achievements as “put out of business” - a frequent and not incorrect translation of the Russian “peresecheniye” - it is difficult for an average Ukrainian reader to understand whether the foreign spies were arrested or detained, or their tyres were preventively slashed when they parked their cars too close to military facilities.

Lieutenant General Petro Shatkovskiy, the head of the SBU counterintelligence department, said that in 1999 his subordinates stopped 10 Ukrainian nationals from collaborating with foreign intelligence services but only one was charged. It is not clear whether the employees of foreign embassies were aware that someone had tried to pass on to them any sensitive information. A Ukrainian spotted taking secret papers from his office and intercepted heading towards one of the foreign embassies in Kiev may have a case to answer, but it does not mean that any foreign national was involved in his undertaking.

When presenting their annual statistics about the achievements of their service, SBU officials are usually vague as to the citizenship of the individuals apprehended or under surveillance. The activities of the Russian special services are usually played down and those of other CIS services barely acknowledged. More specific statistics provided by the SBU leadership are occasionally accompanied by hyper-optimistic calculations - expressed usually in US dollars - as to the financial benefits brought about by the service’s achievements. In a speech to the Ukrainian parliament in November 2002, chairman of the SBU Vlodymyr Radchenko noted that the revenues from the activities of the Ukrainian Security Service exceeded $130m, without explaining how these benefits were calculated.

However, the SBU achieved several well-publicized successes and experienced several failures, usually publicized by their opponents. The best known SBU operation was the Bublik case against the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND). The Germans were seen as ignoring a public warning in 1997, when Vlodymyr Vorobyev, deputy head of the SBU for Kiev and Lviv Region, warned that Kiev had become a base for German special services operations in the CIS, and partly because one of the German weeklies described some aspects of the operation.

The Bublik Case

Taras Hryhorovych Bublik was allegedly recruited in 1992, by Hans Linder, an officer of the German BND, while serving in the Soviet Western Group of Forces in Germany. He continued passing secrets to his controllers after he returned to Ukraine and swore allegiance to his new country. Having returned to Ukraine to a post in the HQ of a military district, Taras Bublik was asked to gather information about weapons and military hardware supplies to the district’s forces, which he did for at least three years, until his retirement. He was arrested in October 2001, several years after his retirement. The SBU investigators found out that between 1993 and 1995, the colonel had given several cryptograms and 10 films containing classified information to his contact stationed in Ukraine. Money for his services was remitted to several accounts in foreign banks. However, the Ukrainian investigators were not able to track down the colonel’s bank accounts, which suggests that they were not as successful as they have claimed to be and that the colonel was not as cooperative as the officially leaked reports imply.

In spite of the efforts to play down his importance, Colonel Bublik was a most valuable catch to his handlers. When he was recruited in 1992, there must have been very little the forty-something officer did not know about Soviet chemical warfare. According to his official biography, in 1972 Bublik graduated from the civilian institute of chemical technology in Dnepropetrovsk. He was then conscripted and decided to stay in the armed forces. He later graduated from the prestigious military academy of chemical defence troops in Moscow and
served in the Soviet forces in Germany. This suggests that Bublik either graduated with flying colours, which allowed him to choose his next posting, or was well connected, as service in Germany was regarded as one of the most interesting and financially rewarding inside the Warsaw Treaty. He spent two years in Afghanistan, where he was awarded the order of the Red Star.

He appears to have lived in Germany for several months after his retirement but his German handlers insisted that he should return to Ukraine and continue working for them, suspecting maybe that he had been turned around by the Ukrainians.

According to the SBU, Colonel Bublik did not follow his handlers’ suggested emergency procedures and was caught with a briefcase containing a secret compartment, a camera and “other spy tools”. Those who caught him understandably hid why and how he was caught, trying to tarnish the professional credibility of their opponents who after all had extremely good mileage out of their agent.

The Bublik case has two elements which make it more than just another spy affair. The first is the official story of his arrest. In the second half of the 1990s, three German special services officers were brought to a German court accused of embezzlement. Although their names were not publicly mentioned, the Ukrainians claim that one of them was Hans Linder, one of Bublic’s alleged handlers. To prove that Linder was innocent, the BND had allegedly supplied the Munich prosecutor’s office with the names of agents handled by him. If any part of this is more than just a disinformation ploy, overly transparent or leaky legal systems may in the future have a serious negative impact on even the most timid attempts to coordinate the struggle against organized crime, drug running and other scourges in Europe. The other interesting issue is whether the SBU found their man without assistance or were helped by the stay-behind network left by the Soviets after the reunification of Germany. Russia has never ceased to be near the top of the premier league of world intelligence services. Ukraine began to build its own service relatively recently. Potential Russian intelligence assets in unified Germany must be enormous, but the Ukrainians, like most other intelligence services, may only count on an occasional lucky dip.

Colonel Bublik received a seven-year sentence in February 2002. Another retired Ukrainian officer, Oleksandr Molchanov, was sentenced to five years for treason by a court in Sevastopol at the end of 2002. Major Molchanov served in the topographical service of the Ukrainian armed forces until September 1996. In 2002 he was caught with secret documents, which he was prepared to sell to a specific foreign national.

Other reported SBU successes against foreigners range from standard to embarrassing. In April 1994 the SBU arrested and expelled Swedish national Erik Olaf Estensson for attempting to obtain nuclear warhead components from Ukraine. No charges were brought against him. In November 1995, two Polish Roman Catholic priests, Piotr Buk and Jozef Trela, were accused of showing too much interest in the military units in Western Ukraine and were expelled to Poland. In spite of excellent diplomatic relations between Kiev and Warsaw the special services of the two countries watch each other with suspicion. The Ukrainians are apprehensive about Polish influences in Western Ukraine and Poland’s pro-active role in NATO, although this may actually benefit Ukraine. The Poles look at Ukraine with a degree of arrogance, suspecting the SBU and the GUR of much closer links with their Russian counterparts than they are willing to admit. The relations between the two countries improved considerably in the decade since Major Anatoliy Lysenko, a Ukrainian intelligence officer, was arrested in August.
1992 by the Polish security organs and accused of recruiting a 22 year old construction worker.\textsuperscript{118} He was subsequently released due to lack of evidence.

In January 1996 the SBU expelled three Chinese experts working at the Pivdenmash plant in Dnepropetrovsk without prior consultations with Kiev.\textsuperscript{119} The expulsion was embarrassing for the Ukrainian leadership because the Chinese experts were officially invited, Pivdenmash is a highly sensitive enterprise producing missiles, and it has close links with Russia. The local SBU officials reacted to what they saw as a wilful violation of the enterprise security rules, without recognising the exceptional nature of the case. The secretary of the Ukrainian National Security Council reminded the SBU that the political leadership alone is responsible for such decisions as expulsions of sensitive guests. As a result two senior officials of the SBU in Dnepropetrovsk were dismissed and several other were reprimanded.\textsuperscript{120}

On 20 March 2002, Ukraine expelled a US diplomat for receiving classified information from a Ukrainian. In a tit-for-tat gesture the US expelled a security officer at the Ukrainian consulate in New York. At the request of the US, the impending visit of an SBU first deputy chief, the man probably responsible for the operation against the expelled diplomat, was postponed indefinitely.\textsuperscript{121}

In September 2002 The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry denied media reports that the SBU had successfully bugged the embassies of Turkey and Spain in Kiev.\textsuperscript{122}

The SBU has been aware of increasing threat from international terrorism long before 9/11. In May 1999 the SBU arrested a group of suspected Tamil Tiger radicals living illegally in Kiev’s Vatutin district.\textsuperscript{123} In September 1999, Deputy Head of the SBU Yuriy Zemlyanskiy warned that a number of Chechens had begun buying and renting apartments in Kiev for fighters leaving Chechnya, but described it only as a possible “worsening of the criminal situation in Ukraine”.\textsuperscript{124} In February 2000, Colonel General Zemlyanskiy said in a newspaper interview that members of more than 10 terrorist organizations and groups from several countries had been living in Ukraine permanently or temporarily.\textsuperscript{125} In June 2003, at the end of the Azov Antiterror exercise, Colonel General Zemlyanskiy, promoted to First Deputy Chief of the SBU, said that at the moment Ukraine faced no “real threats” of substantial terrorist actions, adding that future terrorist acts might come from abroad.\textsuperscript{126}

In May 2004 the SBU detained two citizens of Morocco who had tried to buy arms in Kiev. The Moroccans arrived in March, apparently at the invitation of a private company. The SBU established that the invitations were fake and the inviting firm did not exist. The guests were trying to find out where they could buy arms in Ukraine and how to ship them to Western Europe. Both were sent to Morocco and have been banned from entering Ukraine for five years.\textsuperscript{127}

\section*{The SBU & Russia}

\textit{Oblomov: You would better say, where are you coming from.}

\textit{Stoltz: From Kiev. In about two weeks I will go abroad.}

I A Goncharov, Oblomov, Chapter 3

A Ukrainian diplomat, asked for a brief historical resume of Russo-Ukrainian relations, compared them to the coexistence of a knight and a horse, with Ukraine
playing role of the horse. This was certainly the case in the relations between the KGB USSR and the KGB of Ukraine in the Soviet period. When Ukraine became independent its special services could not do without the Moscow knight in spite of their best intentions. Certain elements of a security system, such as intelligence or cryptographic services simply did not exist; many Ukrainian security and military officers felt Soviet first and only then Ukrainian, and their whole KGB training was anti-nationalist. Their friends, colleagues and commanding officers were in Moscow, not in Kiev. The separation of the two services was a long and laborious process, much longer and more difficult than both sides would have us believe, and its completion is not always clearly visible to outside observers. At the beginning of the process the Russian special service openly regarded Ukraine as its playground, mainly because problems concerning disputed territories, military and industrial assets, common borders and coastal waters were resolved slowly. In the mid 1990s the Ukrainians announced a couple of arrests of Russian passport holders on suspicion of spying. The SBU's Main Intelligence and Counterintelligence Directorates and their Russian counterparts concluded agreements renouncing reciprocal intelligence activities on their territory only at the beginning of 1997. In August 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement on cooperation between the military intelligence services of the two countries. The agreement was ratified by the Ukrainian parliament five years later, on 7 February 2002, and was accepted by President Kuchma on 3 March 2003.

In February 1998 members of the Parliament's Committee on Fighting Organised Crime and Corruption announced that among foreign intelligence networks operating in Ukraine, Russia was particularly active, especially in Sevastopol and in the Black Sea Fleet. Lieutenant General Oleksandr Skipalskiy, the father of Ukrainian military intelligence, was quoted three years later as saying that there are many spies in Ukraine from Europe, the USA and Israel but the most successful and those with access to high ranking officials are Russian intelligence officers.

This one sided semi-confrontational relationship was accompanied by a parallel cooperation side. In July 1992 Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement “On Cooperation and Coordination between the Ukrainian Security Service and the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation”. This was the period when Kiev voluntarily renounced its nuclear weapons, and the security services of both countries were involved in the security aspects of their transport back to Russia and storage.

From 1999 on, the special services of Ukraine and Russia signed several cooperation agreements. In July 1999, the head of the SBU, Leonid Derkach, suggested that the SBU and the FSB should hold a joint session of their collegiums. Vladimir Putin, in charge of the FSB, was given a go-ahead from President Yeltsin. In June 2000 the heads of the FSB, Nikolay Patrushev, and the SBU, Leonid Derkach, signed in Kiev a number of agreements on cooperation in combating organized crime, international terrorism, smuggling and ensuring economic security of the two countries. The FSB and the Ukrainian SBU signed another cooperation agreement on 27 February 2001. The specific nature of this agreement has not been disclosed.

At the beginning of September 2002, the heads of investigative departments of the SBU and the Russian FSB met in Kiev to discuss prospects for cooperation. The meeting covered the standard subjects such as terrorist activities, money laundering, illegal migration, smuggling, computer-related crimes and divulging state secrets, but also pre-trial investigation, investigating treason, and exchanging
experience in criminal investigations. Both sides agreed to continue regular working meetings.  

The chief of the FSB, Nikolay Patrushev, and the chief of the SBU, Vlodymyr Radchenko, met again in February 2003, in the border town of Belgorod, to discuss cooperation between the two organizations. Maryna Ostapenko, the press secretary of the SBU, announced that that parties discussed measures aimed at fighting international terrorism, illegal drugs trafficking and contraband passing through the joint border of the two countries.

Officers from investigative directorates of the FSB and the SBU again discussed cooperation in pre-trial investigation of crimes during their meeting in Moscow in September 2003. They also shared experience of investigating terrorist acts, economic crimes in Russia and Ukraine as well as fighting illegal migration. Unspecified agreements were reached and documents signed on further cooperation between the two investigative departments.

The SBU and GUR’s closer cooperation with their Russian partners may be beneficial to both sides, but in this newly discovered friendship Ukraine is a minority partner. The are few secrets which Russia would want enough to risk elaborate intelligence operations against Ukraine. Moscow’s contacts among Ukrainian politicians, industrialists and law enforcement officers are good enough. The Russian special services need Kiev’s cooperation for tracking down people wanted by Moscow; to ensure that Russia’s enemies will not be able to mount operations against her or her interests from Ukrainian territory, and because of the old Soviet satellite stations on Ukraine’s territory. The Russian special services are able to help defend Ukraine’s interests abroad, at least until Kiev builds up its own viable intelligence system. Russia has also training facilities and international contacts Ukraine which can only dream of.

The downside of this cooperation, as far as Kiev is concerned, is that it will be much more difficult for Ukraine to convince its interlocutors among NATO and EU members that Ukraine is a reliable and a leak-proof partner. In some cases they may decide to communicate with the perceived organ grinder in Moscow, rather than the monkey in Kiev.

**International Cooperation**

Ukraine has been working on improving other relationships too. Already by 1996 the SBU was cooperating with 30 foreign special services in combating terrorists and translational criminal groups. By April 2004, the SBU had formed partnerships with the special services of 63 countries.

The SBU developed particularly good relations with some of its smaller neighbours. In December 1998 it signed an agreement on combating organized crime with Romanian and Moldovan intelligence services. The SBU developed especially close contacts with the Moldovan Information and Security Service (ISS). On 19 February 2002, the Moldovan and Ukrainian security services signed five bilateral agreements aimed at deepening cooperation between the two organizations in combating transborder crime, smuggling, illegal migration and the exchange of information on internal and external threats to both countries. The head of the SBU, Vlodymyr Radchenko, and the head of the ISS, Ion Ursu, also discussed the settlement of the conflict in Transnistria. In February 2004 both services
strengthened their ties further when the two countries signed in Kiev an agreement on mutual protection of secret information.\textsuperscript{144}

One of the first international agreements on cooperation and interaction signed by the SBU was with the Kazakh Committee for National Security. The two sides signed the agreement on 6 November 1992 and pledged to cooperate in defending their economic interests, fighting all forms of crime and international terrorism.\textsuperscript{145}

In March 1993 the Ukrainian and Polish special services signed a cooperation agreement. The heads of the SBU and the Polish State Protection Office met again in Kiev in February 1995 to discuss further cooperation.\textsuperscript{146} The Defence Ministries of the two countries work well together but distrust each other on security issues.

Ukraine has not joined the CIS Collective Security Treaty, but is a member of the information and coordination council of the representatives of CIS special services. Between 12 and 14 March 2003, the council held a meeting at the Kharkiv Regional directorate of the SBU. The participants discussed creating and further developing a system of regional databases on narcotics and psychotropic substances and improving coordination in combating drug trafficking.

Some of the SBU’s partners prefer discreet cooperation agreements on combating organised crime, drug trafficking, corruption and terrorism, such as the one with Azerbaijan, announced in March 1999, to be signed a month later.\textsuperscript{147}

Ukrainian politicians and security chiefs accepted late that their country serves not only as a drug route to more affluent parts of Europe, but also that, like every European country, it has become a developing drug market. Most of the bilateral security agreements signed by the SBU in the recent years include a programme on joint combat of drug trafficking. In June 2003, the SBU and the Tajik Drug Control Agency signed such an agreement in Kiev.\textsuperscript{148}

The heads of the SBU have also begun to be less shy about their international visits. In November 2000, General Derkach, the head of the SBU, on his way to NATO, attended a working meeting with specialists from the Netherlands and Luxemburg to discuss cooperation in combating illegal arms trade, terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{149} Less than a week later General Derkach headed the SBU delegation to China.\textsuperscript{150} In January 2003, the head of the SBU accompanied Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma on a six-day official visit to Gulf states.\textsuperscript{151}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Like every large, industrialized, reasonably modern country and member of the increasingly chaotic and dangerous global village, Ukraine needs effective, democratically accountable and moderately transparent special services. If President Kuchma is indeed the author of the quotation attributed to him that “the task of creating a truly new and civilized security service of an independent country has not been fully realized”,\textsuperscript{152} he is probably aware that he is partly to blame for the present state of affairs in the Ukrainian special services. A plan to fundamentally reform the SBU was unveiled in April 2001, when the SBU head, General Radchenko, said that his organisation should be reformed to be an information collecting organisation, without arresting rights, adding that a draft plan to reform the SBU by 2005 was being worked on.\textsuperscript{153}
Immediately after nominating General Smeshko to his new post, President Kuchma announced that the new chairman would have to step up work to ensure Ukraine’s security, protect democracy, fight corruption; that he expected the SBU to improve its counterintelligence work and that the service should stop dealing with minor problems and duplicating police work. Leonid Kuchma’s supporters and enemies alike were entitled to ask then “What took you so long?”

The radical changes announced by General Smeshko will be resisted by part of the security establishment and those politicians who are afraid that the change could weaken their position. According to General Smeshko, the law-enforcement functions absorb only about 20% of the SBU work. In the future, the SBU is not to be involved in arrests, detentions and case investigations. Gathering and analyzing information would be its core activity. If the SBU is to lose its police functions, Ukrainian lawmakers will have to look carefully at the organizations which retain them. The most important of these, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVS) needs a major overhaul before it is ready to assume any of the SBU’s duties. Major and honest changes in the MVS could in turn unearth problems which would bring back some of the most unpleasant facets of the Gongadze affair and weaken President Kuchma’s position. The opponents of the separation of intelligence and the SBU would resist it on financial grounds, although the two organizations are already located in separate parts of Kiev and the separation has already began. The new intelligence service is to include an electronic intelligence component, which is bound to upset other organizations.

The strategic priorities of the future intelligence service are expected to be based on a global approach and the process of information gathering is to be better focused. Its priorities are combating international terrorism and organized crime, illegal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, illegal trade in conventional arms and illegal trafficking in drugs and people.

However, the introduction of too many restrictive laws and decrees could limit the efficiency of the special services where it is needed most. One such step in these uncharted waters was the presidential decree “On additional measures regarding further democratization of society and strengthening civilian control of the activity of law-enforcement and intelligence agencies of Ukraine”, which forbids seconding operational staff from these agencies to relevant bodies of public administration with the aim of carrying out operational research. It is one thing to allow public bodies to refuse the SBU demands to place its officers and another to allow it to try to come to an arrangement beneficial for both sides and the Ukrainian state. If the law also covers the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the lawmakers in Kiev could learn from a similar painful experience introduced briefly by Boris Pankin, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the post August 1991 Soviet Union.

Even the reformer Ihor Smeshko’s understanding of foreign societies and foreign special services seems to leave something to be desired, in spite of his extensive foreign experience. In a recent interview given in Kiev, Smeshko said that every citizen of such states as, for example, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland considers it his civic duty to inform the police or security agencies of even insignificant breaches of the law. In the same interview he allowed himself not to answer a suggestion that the Canadian intelligence service [sic] “one of the most democratic so to speak” could in some respects serve as a model for the future Ukrainian intelligence service. Like many reformers with “foreign experience” Gen Smeshko wants to use experience of the special services of other countries, but in his case this also includes the KGB.
He plans to start a balanced renewal of the personnel of the SBU. This may not be easy considering that around 80% of the SBU staff joined the service in the last twelve years and the age of an average operational officer is not more than 35. Another wave of renewal may be a good idea when it comes to older SBU personnel, but it will be very expensive, as General Smeshko speaks of renewal not reductions. The SBU still experiences problems in recruiting qualified personnel. Many experienced officers, unable to provide for their families, have left the service for better paid jobs. According to Smeshko, to attract suitable candidates its rank-and-file operatives would have to earn no less than $1,000 a month. This is more than twice what they earn at the moment.

It is in the interest of all Ukraine’s partners and neighbours that the reforms of the SBU should be successful, especially now that both NATO and the EU are Ukraine’s neighbours. The changes in the SBU are difficult to implement because neither the Ukrainian economy, nor political life and society have changed sufficiently. In spite, or maybe because, of the SBU’s still little-reformed image, a 2002 opinion poll conducted by Ukraine’s Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Research showed that of all bodies of state power, the people of Ukraine supported primarily the army (25.7%) and the security services (19%). All other bodies of state power were much less respected. If the new, progressive changes in the SBU and a lack of reforms in other power structures in Ukraine result in more chaos and even more corruption, President Kuchma may decide to go back to the old security model or look for a place to retire.

ENDNOTES

2. The RSFSR KGB came about as a result of Boris Yeltsin’s relentless push for his own administrative empire in the RSFSR and Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts to placate his internal adversaries. The protocol on the creation of the RSFSR KGB was signed by Gorbachev and Yeltsin on 6 May 1991.
3. [www.fsb.ru/history](http://www.fsb.ru/history).
5. Ibid.
7. Ukrayna Molodaya, 10 December 1996, FBIS.
8. Molod Ukrainy, 13 April 1995, FBIS.
11. On 21 September 1999, the daily “Den”, supporting Yevzhen Marchuk, attempted to soften his image by describing his role in the arrest and subsequent release of Irina Ratushynska, a Kiev writer of avant-garde poetry. She was arrested on 17 September 1982 for challenging the human rights track record of the Soviet state and writing “subversive” pieces. When she was released, before the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykavik, Marchuk took her home in his car and in 1992, when Ms Ratushynska gave birth to twins in London, Marchuk phoned to congratulate her.
12. Glavred Info, 23 May 2004, FBIS.
15. STB TV, 24 March 2000, FBIS.
17. Hal'yts'kyi Kontrakty, No 10, 2004, FBIS.
19. Two SBU officers were detained in the parliament building on 2 February 2000 taking video footage. The SBU denied that the two men were members of the SBU or that
they had worked for the SBU but failed to investigate the affair. DINAU, 2 February 2000, BBC Monitoring Service (hereafter BBC).

20 Stolichnye Novosti, 19 December 2000, BBC.
22 Leonid Derkach was dismissed on 10 February 2001. On the same day President Kuchma dismissed the head of the State Guard Directorate Vlodymyr Shepel and replaced him with Valeriy Strohov. Ukrainian TV 1, 10 February 2001, BBC.

23 UNIAN, 2 September 2003.
24 According to unconfirmed reports Gen Yuriy Zemlyanskiy, first deputy chief of the SBU, briefly ran the organisation before Gen Smeshko was appointed (Kiyevskiy Telegraph, 8 September 2003, FBIS). Other sources claimed that Gen Petro Shatkovskiy was the acting head of the SBU in August 2003 (Ukrayna Molodaya, 15 August 2003, FBIS).

25 Segodnya, 7 November 2000, FBIS. It is also evident that the Ukrainian media and some politicians occasionally prefer not to distinguish between SBU officers and impostors.

26 DINAU, 24 March 2000, BBC.

31 www.sbu.gov.ua.
32 Demokratychyna Ukraina, 16 June 1993, FBIS.
34 Narodnaya Armia, 4 March 2003, FBIS.
35 UNIAN, 2 April 2002; Narodnaya Armiya, 25 July 2002, FBIS; Svoboda, 27 May 2003, FBIS.
36 www.sbu.gov.ua.
37 www.sbu.gov.ua.
38 Holos Ukrainy, 22 April 2003, FBIS.
40 Holos Ukrainy, 22 April 2003, FBIS.
41 Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No 12, 2-8 April 2004, p7.
42 Interfax-Ukraine, 29 March 2003.

44 Ukrainska Prawda, 17 April 2001 quoting an unspecified issue of Ukraina Moloda, FBIS.
45 Ibid.
48 Vseukrainskiye Vedomosty, 6 March 1997, FBIS.
49 www.sbu.gov.ua.
50 President Kuchma issued on 24 April 1997 a decree “On establishing the National Bureau of Investigation of Ukraine” to combat organised crime and corruption. The Bureau seems to be vegetating on a small budget. Ukrayna Molodaya, 22 April 1997, FBIS.
51 www.sbu.gov.ua.
52 www.sbu.gov.ua.
55 Holos Ukrainy, 3 September 1992, FBIS.
56 Kiyevskiy Novosti, 21 July 1995, FBIS.
58 Kiyevskiy Novosti, 21 July 1995, FBIS.
Gen Paliy will be remembered by Ukrainian military intelligence as the man who ordered the construction of the Cossacks' chapel on the territory of the Intelligence Main Directorate.


Aleksandr Halaka head of GUR, appointed in March 2003, and Gen Smeshko, in his capacity as First Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, visited the US in July 2003. Ukraine's Pravda, 21 July 2003, FBIS.

Other sources suggested the increase in the GUR budget would be far more modest and would not exceed 15m hryvnyas. Zerkalo Nedeli, 30 November 2003, BBC.

People impersonating SBU officers were usually treated by the media as SBU officers.

UNIAN, 11 & 12 December 2000. People impersonating SBU officers were usually treated by the media as SBU officers.

Novyi Kanal TV, 28 November 2000, FBIS.

UNIAN, 12 December 2000.

Ukrinform, 17 December 2000, BBC.

Holos Ukrayiny, 9 January 2002, FBIS.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Fakty i Komentariy, 15 December 2002, BBC.

Vecherniy Kiyv, 22 August 2003, FBIS; Donetsk Ostrov, 13 October 2003, FBIS.

Interfax-Ukraine 12 February 2003, BBC.

Holos Ukrayiny, 9 January 2002, FBIS.

Ukraynska Pravda, 29 November 2000, FBIS.

UNIAN, 12 December 2000.

Fakty i Komentariy, 16 December 2000, FBIS.

Zerkalo Nedeli, 6 January 2001, BBC.


Kiev Korrespondent, 18 February 2004, FBIS.


Interfax-Ukraine, 18 February 2004.


Segodnya, 7 November 2000.

UT1, 22 August 2001, FBIS.

Interfax, 28 March 1996.

UNIAN, 4 December 1993.


UNIAN, 18 March 2000. The SBU claimed also that in 2003/04 in Volyn Region alone there were 20 attempts to recruit inhabitants of the region by foreign intelligence services. (Interfax-Ukraine, 23 March 2004).
The term “nationality” used in the former republics of the USSR means “ethnic origin” not nationality/citizenship as it is usually understood in Western Europe and North America.

ITAR-TASS, 29 November 2002.


Novyy Kanal television, 19 February 2002.

Kievskiye Vedomosti, 19 June 2002, FBIS; Trud, 13 March 2002, FBIS.

Kievskiye Vedomosti, 19 June 2002, FBIS.

Trud, 13 March 2002, FBIS.

Versya; 1 July 2002.

STB TV, 16 December 2002, BBC.

UNIAN, 15 April 1994. Some reports suggest that some individuals apprehended by the SBU were ready to sell secret information but they were caught before they were able to find someone willing to buy it. This could be the case with A Tkachenko, former soldier, charged with the theft of military documents and attempting to pass them to foreign nationals and G Sarkisyan – a stateless individual charged with espionage and other crimes. An inhabitant of Kharkiv was arrested in July 2003 and accused of trying to sell classified scientific information obtained from local scientists. (Kiev Inter TV, 23 July 2003, FBIS).


UNIAN, 13 February 1996.

UNIAN, 13 February 1996.

Zerkalo Nedeli, 27 April 2002, BBC.

Interfax-Ukraine, 3 September 2002.

STB TV, 3 May 1999, FBIS.

DINAU, 29 September 1999, FBIS.

Segodnya, Kiev, 9 February 2000, BBC.

Interfax-Ukraine, 10 June 2003.

TV5 Kiev, 14 May 2004, BBC.

It is not the author’s intention to comment on wider aspects of historical and current political events.

Russian passport holder Valeriy Bayatter was arrested for spying and then deported from Ukraine. He claimed to have been working for an Egyptian businessman (Uryadoviy Kuryer, 20 June 1995, FBIS). A Russian intelligence officer was arrested in Ukraine for handling classified technical specifications of an amphibious warfare ship (NTV, 5 June 1995, FBIS).

Den, 12 March 1997, FBIS.

Interfax, 3 March 2002.

Intelnnews in English, 16 February 1998.

Segodnya, 7 November 2000, FBIS.

Nezavisimost, 27 December 1996, FBIS.


DINAU, 16 June 2000, BBC.

Noviy Kanal, 27 February 2001, FBIS.

Interfax-Ukraine, 4 September 2002.


Ukrayna Molodaya, 10 December 1996, FBIS.

2000, 30 April 2004, BBC.

Molod Ukrayniy, 8 December 1998, FBIS.

Interfax-Ukraine, 19 February 2002, BBC.


UT TV, 6 November 1992, FBIS.

Uryadoviy Kuryer, 23 February 1995, FBIS.

Turan in Russian, 5 March 1999, FBIS.

ITAR-TASS, 26 June 2003, BBC.

UT 1, 15 November 2000, FBIS.

UNIAN, 20 November 2000.

Interfax-Ukraine, 17 January 2003, BBC.

2000, 30 April 2004, BBC.
UNIAN, 3 April 2001.
2000, 30 April 2004, BBC.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Interfax, 15 July 2002. The poll was conducted in 24 regions of Ukraine, the Crimea and Kiev on 17-25 June 2002 with 2,006 respondents aged over 18.
Appendix

HOLUSHKO Nikolay Mykhaylovich (Colonel General)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Graduated from the Law Faculty of Tomsk University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-1963</td>
<td>Investigator in the Prosecutor’s Office in Kemerovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1971</td>
<td>Joined the KGB. Case officer, promoted to senior case officer in the counterintelligence department of the Kemerovo oblast KGB USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1974</td>
<td>Head of a section then a deputy head of the 5th Department, responsible for combating alien ideological currents, of the Kemerovo oblast KGB USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1978</td>
<td>Head the First Section of the Second Department (combating nationalism) of the 5th Directorate of the KGB USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1983</td>
<td>Head of the Second Section of the 5th Directorate of the KGB USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td>Head of the Fifth section then a deputy head of 5th Directorate of the KGB USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1987</td>
<td>First Deputy head of the secretariat of the KGB USSR, head of the KGB duty service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1991</td>
<td>Chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic KGB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 (Aug-Nov)</td>
<td>Acting Chairman of the National Security Service of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991(Nov)-1992 (Jan)</td>
<td>The head of the Secretariat of the KGB USSR*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 (Jan-Jun)</td>
<td>Deputy Security Minister of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 (Jun-Dec)</td>
<td>First Deputy Security Minister of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 (Aug-Dec)</td>
<td>Acting Security Minister of the Russian Federation and from 18 September Minister of Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As at that stage the KGB of the USSR had ceased to exist, Gen Holushko was probably a general caretaker of administrative issues between the new security organization set up in Russia and in the republics.
MARCHUK Yevhen Kyrylovich (Army General)

Date of Birth 28 January 1941
Place of Birth Dolynivka village in the Kirovohrad region.

1963 Graduated from the Kirovohrad Pedagogical Institute with a degree in Ukrainian language and literature and German. Joined the KGB.
1963-1965 Worked as a case officer of the Ukrainian KGB in Kirovohrad Oblast
1965 Moved to KGB central apparatus in Kiev. Worked as a senior case officer. Deputy head of a department
Head of the 5th Department of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic KGB. Head of the Ukrainian KGB Inspectorate
1988 Head of the KGB Poltava region office
1990 First deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic KGB
1991 (Jun-Nov) Head of the Ukraine Ministry of Defence, National Security and Emergencies
1991 (Nov)-1994 (Jul) Head of the SBU
1993 (Jul) Sent on a special diplomatic mission to Transnistria
1994 (Jul) Deputy Prime Minister
1994 (Sep) Appointed by President Kuchma as temporary presidential plenipotentiary in Crimea
1994 (Oct) First Deputy Prime Minister
1994 (Nov-Dec) Headed the Ukrainian delegation to Moscow for talks on nuclear disarmament
1995 (Jan) Head of the Council Coordinating Combat Against Corruption and Organised Crime
1995 (Mar) Acting Prime Minister
1995 (Jun)-1996 (May) Prime Minister
1999 (Nov)-2003 (Jun) Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council
2003 (25 Jun) Defence Minister
MALIKOV Valeriy Vasylovych (Colonel General)

Date of Birth 30 March 1942
Place of Birth Zhdanov (renamed Mariupol), Donetsk Oblast

Graduated from Kharkov University

1984 - Deputy head of Personnel Department of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic KGB
1988 - Head of the KGB Cherkassy regional office
1991 - Head of the of the SBU Kiev Region
1992 - First Deputy Chairman of the SBU – Head of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate
1994 (Jul)- 1995 (Jul) Head of the SBU
1995 - Adviser to Prime Minister Marchuk
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 October 1948</td>
<td><strong>Date of Birth</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td><strong>Place of Birth</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>joined the KGB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>completed higher counterintelligence course at the KGB School in Minsk. Promoted gradually from a case officer to head of a department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>graduated from the Red Banner KGB Higher School.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Chief of the USSR KGB Directorate of Rivne Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Head of the SBU Ternopil Oblast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 (Mar)</td>
<td>Head of the Department of Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime – Deputy Head of the SBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 (Jul)</td>
<td>Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 (Jul)</td>
<td>Head of the SBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>joined the National Security and Defence Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 (Apr)</td>
<td>Dismissed from the SBU. Became First Deputy Secretary of the National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 (Feb)</td>
<td>Head of the SBU. Also headed the council for intelligence matters under the president of Ukraine, member of anti-crisis centre, national council for coordinating the activities of national and regional bodies and local authorities, a member of the coordinating committee for combating corruption and organised crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 (Sep)</td>
<td>Dismissed from the SBU. Appointed Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**DERKACH Leonid Vasylovych (Army General)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Graduated from Dnepropetrovsk University with a degree in mechanical engineering. Worked in Pivdenmash, once the Soviet producer of ballistic missiles (where President Kuchma started his career in the 1960s) and became Director General and Secretary of the Communist Party cell at the enterprise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 (Mar)</td>
<td>Joined the KGB. Case officer promoted gradually to head of the KGB Pavlograd office, then a Deputy Head of Dnepropetrovsk KGB office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 (Sep)</td>
<td>First Deputy Head of the SBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 (Jul)</td>
<td>Head of the Customs Office of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 (Apr)</td>
<td>Head of the SBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 (Feb)</td>
<td>Dismissed. Elected to the Ukrainian parliament.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SMESHKO Ihor Petrovych (Lieutenant General)

Date of Birth       17 August 1955
Place of Birth      Khrystynyvka, Cherkaska Oblast

                     His specialization was guidance systems of guided missiles and
                     high-precision weapons
Until 1991          Worked as a military lecturer and a scientific researcher
1992-1995           First Ukrainian Defence Attaché in the USA
1995-1998           Head of the Presidential Intelligence Committee
1997-2000           Head of the HUR of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry
2000                Graduated from The National Defence Academy in Kiev.
2000-2002           Military attaché to Switzerland and representative of the
                     Ukrainian MoD at the international organizations in Geneva
2002                Graduated from Taras Shevchenko Kiev State University
                     with a law degree
2002-2003           Head of the Presidential Military Technical Cooperation and
                     Export Control Committee
2003                Deputy and then First Deputy Secretary of the National
                     Security and Defence Council
2003 (Sep)          Chairman of the SBU
2004 (22 Jan)       Granted the rank of ambassador extraordinary and
                     plenipotentiary

General Smeshko has a doctorate in military cybernetics and was a professor of
systems analysis. His wife has a law degree. They have two sons, 12 and 8.
Want to Know More …?

See: Jacques Baud, "Encyclopedie du renseignement et des services secrets", Lavauzelle, 2002

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Genovefa Etienne & Claude Moniquet, "Histoire de l’espionnage mondiale", (Ed) Luc Pire, 1999

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