Intelligence

DIA's 30-Year Commitment To Excellence: 1961 To 1991
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Intelligence
				EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:  DIA's 30-Year Commitment to Excellence: 1961 to 1991
Author:  Robin B. Boatman, Defense Intelligence Agency
Thesis:  This paper presents a historical overview of the Defense
Intelligence Agency's service to our nation, including organizational
changes within the Agency and major world events that have influenced,
shaped, and consumed the Agency's attention
Summary:  The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) became operational In
October 1961 to improve the Defense intelligence collection and production
activities, and to reduce the considerable duplication which existed among
the military service intelligence organizations.  DIA's organization
development suggests distinct themes.  In the period of establishment and
consolidation during the 1960s, the Agency sought to achieve internal
stability and to define its role in the Department of Defense.  The second
period--of growth and maturity in the 1970s--was marked by the Agency's
search for credibility within the national Intelligence Community.  Third, the
Agency looked ahead to the 1980s and became an integral participant in
the U.S. intelligence establishment.  The 1990s have brought Operations
DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and significant changes in the world DIA studies
to include nations dissolving, boundaries changing, and governments
collapsing.  Changes will be made in the Agency to adjust to the changing
world, and new challenges present themselves for the years ahead.
	DIA'S 30-YEAR COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE: 1961 TO 1991
	                       OUTLINE
Thesis Statement:  This paper presents a historical overview of the Defense
Intelligence Agency's service to our nation, including organizational
changes within the Agency and major world events that have influenced,
shaped, and consumed the Agency's attention.
I. The Intelligence Community Prior to DIA
   A Interagency Task Force Study Results
     1. Streamline the Military Intelligence System
     2. A Need for a Unified Military Intelligence Agency
   B. Planned Formation of DIA and the Services' Reactions to It
II. The Agency's Beginnings, 1961-69
   A. Setup of DIA
   B. Important Events/Functions Established During this Period
Ill. DIA Matures and its Reputation Grows, 1970-79
   A. Reorganization
   B. Agency Concerns/Analytical Efforts
IV. The Agency Comes of Age, 1980-89
   A. Focus Turns to Intelligence Needs of Field Commanders
   B. Influencing World Events
V. Highlights, 1990-91
   A. Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM
   B. Other DIA Concerns/Changes
VI. Looking to the Future
   A. Inevitable Major Changes Due to World Events
   B. Reorganization within the Intelligence Community
   C. New Challenges to Meet
DIA'S 30-YEAR COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE:  1961 TO 1991
   The effort to coordinate military intelligence began 30 years ago with the
creation of the multi-service Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 1/  DIA was
not intended to be a merger of the intelligence branches of the armed
services, but primarily an attempt to achieve maximum coordination and
efficiency in the intelligence processes of the three services.  Thus, in
contrast to the U.S. custom in the past of letting the intelligence function die
when the war was over, intelligence has been allowed to grow to meet the
ever-widening and more complex responsibilities of time. 2/  Recently, DIA
celebrated its 30th anniversary.  This paper presents a historical overview
of the Defense Intelligence Agency's service to our nation, including
organizational changes within the agency and major world events that have
influenced, shaped, and consumed the Agency's attention.
The Intelligence Community Prior to DIA
   During the 1950s, the existence of separate military agencies was a
major barrier to producing coherent and agreed-upon military estimates.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee had become an inter-service debating
forum, with representatives from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, plus the three services, all pushing distinct estimates.
Overlapping collection programs and incoherence in estimates created
pressures for reform.  In 1960, therefore, a study was undertaken by a
special inter-agency task force, operating under the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the Central Intelligence Agency's Inspector General,
Lyman Kirkpatrick, as chairman.  The task force reported in December
1960:  In line with the centralizing trend that had begun with the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958, and which was to be accelerated during the
Kennedy Administration, the report made many recommendations directed
toward streamlining the military intelligence system in order to modernize it.
Thomas Gates, Eisenhower's last Secretary of Defense, urged these
recommendations be acted upon by his successor, Robert McNamara.
However, the incoming Administration needed little persuasion; both
Kennedy and McNamara were soon dismayed by the range of differing
estimates that faced them.  Therefore, acting along the lines set out in the
1960 report, McNamara formed the Defense Intelligence Agency with a
startup date of October 1961. 3/  The Agency's beginnings were meager.  On
its first day of operation, DIA consisted of less than 25 people borrowed
from the military services, and it was located in about 2,000 square feet of
borrowed space in the Pentagon. 4/
   The services had always opposed a unified military intelligence agency
on the grounds that they each had particular needs that could not be
adequately served by a centralized system.  The Army was totally against
the new agency, as was the Navy, although less vehemently.  The Air Force,
still a young service with fewer traditions to protect, saw in DIA an
opportunity to push its own perspectives, and, in fact, landed many of the
Agency's top management jobs.  On the civilian side, at both the CIA and
the State Department there was some ambivalence over the creation of
DIA; however, in general, the trend its creation represented was favored.
The multiplicity of military estimates, and the open competition between
them, had made life difficult for non-military agencies.  Yet, the institutional
strength of a unified military intelligence agency posed the threat of a strong
challenge to the civilian agencies. 5/  Indeed, the CIA and the DIA are
considered by many, even today, to be rivals and competitors.  Thus, in
summary, the formation of DIA, like the earlier creation of the CIA itself, was
the result of studied effort to give intelligence its proper stature in our
nation's security structure. 6/
The Agency's Beginnings, 1961-69
   A transfer of intelligence functions and resources from the services was
completed on a time-phased basis to avoid degrading the effectiveness of
defense intelligence during the transition.  It took nearly three years for DIA
to become fully functional in all assigned areas.  Specifically, DIA was
assigned the mission of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing,
integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the
Department of Defense.  Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, formerly
Inspector General of the Air Force, was named Director, and as President
George Bush recently wrote, "Since its earliest days under the direction of
Lieutenant General Joe Carroll, DIA has quietly built a reputation for
excellence by providing timely, accurate intelligence of the highest
quality." 7/  But, this reputation certainly wasn't built overnight, and the
following descriptions of events occurring in the fledgling Agency's early
years hopefully will make that clear.  Deane J. Allen, DIA's current historian,
pointed out that the Agency's history falls very neatly, almost unbelievably
so, into neat segments:  1961-69, DIA's Beginnings; 1970-79, The Agency
Matures and its Reputation Grows; and 1980--89, DIA Comes of Age. 8/  Of
course, during 1990-91, DIA efforts were concentrated on Operations
Desert Shield and Storm, and future directions for the Agency will mean
more change.
   The Defense Intelligence Agency's first major intelligence test came in
October 1962 when the Soviet missiles were detected in Cuba and the
prospect of nuclear war brought fear to Americans.  The Agency would gain
its first national recognition the following February, when analyst, John
Hughes, briefed Americans on television concerning the missile crisis.
Early organizational milestones in 1962 included the following events. In
November 1962, the Defense Intelligence School--later to become the
Defense Intelligence College--was chartered, and later formally activated in
January 1963.  The College continues to thrive in 1992.  Additionally, the
year of 1962 brought about DIA's Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy function
being incorporated into a major directorate.  Ten years later, this directorate
was established as a separate organization, that is, the Defense Mapping
Agency. 9/
   On January 1, 1963, DIA's Production Center was activated, and that
event, along with the merging of several service production elements
meant more needed space. 10/  This need was met by occupying the "A"
and "B" Building facilities at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia.  The DIA
Production Center integrated the military intelligence production activities of
the services, which included basic intelligence production entities such as
reference files, libraries, and automated data processing capabilities.  Also
in this year, on February 19, the Automated Data Processing Center was
established.  Next, and of great importance, DIA assumed the staff support
functions of the J-2, Joint Staff, on 1 July, following the disestablishment of
the J-2. 11/  All of the above were organizational milestones in DIA's
evolutionary development process.
   High lights of 1964 included starting the Intelligence Career Development
Program on February 1, establishing the Dissemination Center on March
31, and forming the Scientific and Intelligence Directorate on April 30.  DIA
analysts focused their attention on the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the
Chinese detonation of an atomic bomb, increasing unrest among African
nations, and fighting in Malaysia and Cyprus.  Moving on to 1965, DIA
assumed responsibility on July 1 for the Defense Attache System (DAS).  A
DOD directive assigned ". . . the DAS as part of DIA and it would consist of all
military personnel accredited as attaches or assistant attaches to foreign
government as well as other DOD personnel assigned to attached posts."
The Defense Attache System was a logical outgrowth of the centralization
of the military intelligence function in DIA.  However, the services initially
objected to giving up control of the attaches, primarily because protocol
was a major function of the attaches and allegedly would be lost when DIA
assumed this responsibility.  The Agency's analytical efforts during 1965
were concentrated on the following:  the start of bombing in North Vietnam
by the United States, China's launching of its cultural revolution, India and
Pakistan's war over Kashmir, and declarations of independence by
Rhodesia and Malaysia. 12/
   In 1966, DIA's first Agency-wide reorganization occurred in November. It
was undertaken in order to streamline DIA and improve the reaction time of
military intelligence production elements.  An overwhelming amount of
requirements, particularly those resulting from U.S. involvement in Vietnam,
brought about this reevaluation of DIA's internal managerial relationships.
The war in Vietnam also led to increased defense intelligence involvement
in prisoners of war and missing in action (POW/MIA) in Southeast Asia.
Prior to 1966, DIA had been assigned only limited responsibility for
POW/MIA analysis, but its role expanded in mid-year when the Agency
assumed chairmanship of the Interagency POW Intelligence Ad Hoc
Committee.  DIA would later centralize its POW/MIA activities in a special
office.  Analysts' attention was divided between U.S operations in Vietnam
and other crises around the world.  On the one hand, there were Operations
CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY in Southeast Asia, plus the stand at
Khe Sanh, while on the other hand, there was the Six-Day War between
Egypt and Israel as well as continuing troubles in Africa, particularly Nigeria.
Organizationally, the JCS delineated counterintelligence responsibilities
between DIA and the Unified and Specified Commands.  In 1968,
intelligence requirements reached an all-time high as a result of the Tet
Offensive in Vietnam, North Korea's seizure of the PUEBLO, and the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia.  Resource cutbacks threatened the Agency,
and the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel proposed structural and
managerial changes in DIA to deal with a situation in which the Agency had
"too many jobs and too many masters."  Therefore, in 1969, General
Donald V. Bennett (USA) began to realign the organization.  The rise of
Ostpolitik in Germany and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the
Mideast, U.S. space efforts that culminated in a moon landing, and growing
arms control concerns shifted DIA attention somewhat from Vietnam.13/
DIA Matures and its Reputation Grows, 1970-79
   DIA's second major reorganization took place in July 1970.  The Agency's
focus shifted to establishing itself as a credible producer of national
intelligence.  Initially, this proved difficult because sweeping manpower
decrements had reduced Agency manpower by 31 percent from 1968 to
1975, causing mission reductions and organizational restructuring. 14/
   In the post-Watergate controversy surrounding American intelligence
activities in the mid-1970's, DIA focused nonetheless on providing quality
products to national decision makers.  The Agency's reputation grew as its
products were increasingly perceived throughout the Government as
valuable to the decisionmaking process.  Contributing to this reputation, in
1970, there was a major innovation with the formation of a Directorate of
Estimates within DIA.  This was the brain-child of General Daniel Graham.
The new Directorate for Estimates (DE) was headed by Graham who had
stressed to General Bennett DE's potential worth when Bennett became
DIA's director in 1970.  The Directorate was set up with about 50 analysts,
mainly taken from DIA but with some from the CIA, and a military:civilian
ratio of about 2:1.  In order to remove it from the daily pressures of
Pentagon life it was located in Rossyln, Virginia.  Graham encouraged
independent and long-range thinking.  The consensus would appear to be
that DE made a definite improvement in the quality of DIA estimates. 15/
Time was also spent in 1970 on the monitoring of such issues as the riots in
Gdansk, Poland, civil war in Jordan and Nigeria, and the U.S. incursion into
Cambodia.
   In 1971, a position for an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
was established "to supervise Defense intelligence programs. . . and to
provide the principal point for management and policy coordination with the
Director of Central Intelligence, CIA, and other intelligence officials outside
the DOD."  In addition, the year saw President Nixon reorganizing the
Intelligence Community in general.  During 1971, DIA analysts tracked
issues such as arms control support, Idi Amin's takeover in Uganda, unrest
in Pakistan, the formation of Bangladesh, and fighting in Laos and
Cambodia, as well as in Vietnam. 16/
   VADM Vincent P. de Poix became DIA's Director in 1972.  During this
year, the Agency's analysts concentrated on Lebanon, President Nixon's
visit to China, the formation of Sri Lanka, Salvador Allende's regime in
Chile, and the POWs held in Southeast Asia.  In addition, the General
Counsel function was added to the Agency.  Then in 1973, peace-oriented
efforts--such as detente, arms control agreements, and the Peace of Paris
(Vietnam)--captured as much DIA production emphasis as Allende's
overthrow in Chile, the Yom Kippur War, global energy concerns (gasoline
lines), and troubles throughout Africa.  Next, in October of 1974, a
comprehensive overhaul of DIA's production function, organization, and
management was begun.  DIA's new Director, LTG Daniel O. Graham
(USA), was faced with the need for intelligence on coups in Ethiopia and
Portugal and independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and
Guinea-Bissau.  In 1975, intense congressional review created turbulence
in the national Intelligence Community.  The Murphy and Rockefeller
Commissions investigated charges of intelligence abuse that ultimately led
to an Executive Order modifying the overall functioning of the Intelligence
Community. 17/
   The Vietnam War produced many refugees and heightened concern for
American POWs.  The Defense Intelligence Agency coordinated the
collection of information pertaining to POWs and MIAs.  Between 1975 and
late 1980, more than 900 reports were received--largely from Indochinese
refugees--of which about 25 percent were firsthand sightings.  Each one
was investigated separately; none supplied conclusive evidence. 18/  In
1976, the issuing of Executive Order 11905 in February prompted the third
major reorganization of the Agency in July.  In the first charter change since
1964, DOD Directive 5105.21 was revised in December to recognize DIA as
the primary military intelligence authority in the production of national-level
products.  Organizationally, DOD sought to centralize its activities to cope
with pressure to reduce resources.  Thus, a Defense Intelligence board
was established and the President also set up a National Foreign
Intelligence Board.  DIA strengthened intelligence support to consumers in
OSD, JCS, and the U & S Commands.  Lt Gen Eugene F. Tighe, Jr. (USAF)
served as acting Director until the former Defense Attache to the Soviet
Union, LTG Samuel V. Wilson (USA), assumed the directorship in mid-year.
Analytical efforts centered on the death of Mao Tse-Tung, aircraft
hijackings, unrest in South Africa, and continuing Mideast dissension. 19/
   In 1977, Lt General Tighe became DIA Director.  Tighe (pronounced "tie")
had a disarming, intense smile that he often held long after the laughter had
passed. 20/  To this day, I have heard people in the Agency speak of him
with fond and respectful remembrance. 21/  Tighe's philosophy
was simple:  the more you know, the less chance of war.  The
task was to get intelligence that made it possible for the United States to act
peaceably.  He believed that the DIA was the chief line of intelligence
defense, and that the Agency's message had to be simple:  the Arabs are
going to attack or not attack; the Russians are coming or not coming; or the
Chinese, or whoever. 22/  Also, in 1977, the Director of DIA was designated
program manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program.  The
Agency concerns centered in 1977 on terrorism, technology transfer, and
internal automation and technology; in 1978, intelligence production
focused on Lebanon, China, South Africa, and still on terrorism. 23/
During 1979, an internal DIA reorganization established five major
directorates:  production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2
support.  DIA sought to improve the flow of intelligence to the Secretary of
Defense and other principal consumers.  However, the loss of intelligence
resources throughout the 1970's limited the Intelligence Community's ability
to collect and produce timely intelligence and ultimately contributed to
intelligence shortcomings in Iran, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy,
and the taking of American hostages in the American embassy in Teheran
began a long period of DIA work in these areas.  Furthermore, the
Vietnamese takeover in Phnom Penh, the China-Vietnam border war, the
overthrow of Amin in Uganda, the North-South Yemen dispute, troubles in
Pakistan, Libya-Egypt border clashes, the Sandinista takeover in
Nicarauga, and the Soviet movement of combat troops to Cuba during the
signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty II all served to increase
intelligence requirements levied on DIA. 24/
The Agency Comes of Age, 1980-89
   DIA came of age in the 1980s by focusing on the intelligence needs of
field commanders as well as national-level decisionmakers.  DIA provided
intelligence support to the newly established Rapid Deployment Force
during Operation BRIGHT STAR, while analysts were preoccupied with
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Iraq's attempts to seize Iranian oil fields and the
resulting war, the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and
civiI war in El Salvador.  In addition, several events signaled DIA's
maturation as an integral part of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
Publication of the first "Soviet Military Power" was greeted with wide
acclaim, and the long-awaited groundbreaking for the Defense Intelligence
Analysis Center (DIAC) in April was a tremendous morale boost for DIA
employees.  Budget increases were voted for DOD to support "readiness,
sustainability, and modernization."  LTG James A. Williams (USA) took over
as Director and focused on enhancing support to tactical and theater
commanders, improving capabilities to meet major wartime intelligence
requirements, and improving indications and warning. 25/
   In 1981, important world events included the following scenes:  In Latin
America, the Contras sought to wrest power from the Communist
Sandinistas in Nicaragua, while leftists in El Salvador battled government
forces, and Honduras and Nicaragua clashed at their border.  Solidarity's
birth and martial law in Poland brought Soviet warnings to the West to stay
out of Poland.  Events in the Middle East occupied DIA's attention including
the Iranian hostage release, the U.S. downing of two Iranian jets over the
Gulf of Sidra, two Iranian hijackings, and Iranian air raids on Kuwait. 26/
   Counted among the DIA highlights of 1982 was the national television
briefing provided by John Hughes of DIA and ADM Bobby Inman, Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, on deteriorating events in Nicaragua, as
DIA analysts provided extensive support to the U.S. Southern Command.
Other analysis focused on the Falkland Island War.  Then in 1983, 6,000
U.S. troops were deployed to Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY.
DIA's task force responded to numerous formal taskings for briefings,
papers, or information, and distributed a wide variety of Intelligence
Summaries to assist field commanders during the operation.  The planning
process for URGENT FURY was also greatly enhanced by several
intelligence products that had been prepared as early as 1979.  The
CINCLANT and others had high praise for DIA's support and services
during this time. 27/
   DIA's move into the DIAC on Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, DC, in
1984, consolidated major Agency functions under one roof.  The building
was dedicated on May 23, 1984.  At the same time, the concept of
intelligence as a "force multiplier in crises" became a predominant theme in
planning as DIA began structuring an all-source integrated data base to
support the U & S Commands in assessing the threat as it existed in the
field.  Analytical emphasis during 1984 was on India and Lebanon (the
embassy bombing in Beirut). 28/
   During 1985, a significantly larger number of hijackings--notably, of a TW
airliner by radical Shiites and the ACHILLE LAURO cruise ship by the
PLO. 29/  Numerous bombings, kidnappings, murders, and other acts of
terrorism led to characterizing 1985 as the "Year of the Terrorist."  In
addition, DIA supported intelligence requirements stemming from the
Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva and communist efforts to overthrow
the Aquino Government in the Philippines.  The year 1985 was also marked
by a new Director, Lt Gen Leonard H. Perroots (USAF).30/
   The Agency, in 1986, adopted the motto "Committed to Excellence in
Defense of the Nation" during its 25th anniversary.  Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger presented DIA with the Joint Meritorious Unit Award
for intelligence support during the TWA and ACHILLE LAURO
hijackings and the Philippine crisis situation.  DIA was also designated as a
"Combat Support Agency."  This was a significant result of the Goldwater-
Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.  Moreover, the Agency began
preparing joint intelligence doctrine to enhance cooperation between DIA
and the U & S Commands.
   In 1987, the DIA Persian Gulf working group tracked on a 24-hour basis
all developments in the region and provided CENTCOM with an assortment
of intelligence products.  A real enhancement for DIA in this year was the
development of the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) which
allows DIA to respond to crisis situations.  The OICC was designed to
muster production resources rapidly, "surge" on a problem, and then
convert analysis to operationally relevant products.  DIA also established at
around this time a Command Support and Plans element to more actively
involve the U.S. Commands in the defense intelligence planning,
programming, and budgeting process.  DIA played a major role in support
of INF negotiations.
   To relieve overcrowding in the DIAC, in 1988, the Agency leased a
building a 3100 Clarendon Avenue, Arlington, VA. 31/  Even at present,
some of DIA is at the Clarendon building, Including the personnel office for
the Agency.  In terms of analysis, during 1988, the Agency focused on the
shifting national security environment and other key issues including
changes within the Soviet Union, counternarcotics, warfighting capabilities
and sustainability, and low-intensity conflict (LIC).  DIA took steps to
improve the DOD-wide automated data bases and to apply additional
resources monitoring terrorist groups, illegal arms shipments, and
narcotics trafficking.  Arms control monitoring also resulted in increased
demand for intelligence support from DIA.  Other issues of importance
during 1988 included terrorist threats against the Seoul Olympics, the
Palestinian intifada and unrest in Libya, Chad, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma,
Pakistan, and the Philippines.  Analysts also prepared extensive support
packages regarding Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, Chile, Peru, Haiti, El
Salvador, and Mexico.  LTG Harry E. Soyster (USA) became the new
Director of DIA.  Construction was completed of a Patriot's Memorial for
those DIA employees killed in the line of duty and was inscribed with ... "A
Grateful Nation Recognizes Those Who Have Made the Supreme Sacrifice
While Protecting Our Freedom." 32/  It is located in the middle of the lobby
as you enter the DIAC.
   Moving to 1989, DIA played a major role in Operation JUST CAUSE in
Panama, while the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan brought to a close a
significant collection, analytical, production, and intelligence support effort
that spanned nearly 12 years.  Weapons acquisition issues became a high
priority throughout the Intelligence Community.  Also, analysts played a
critical role in monitoring events surrounding the downing of two Libyan jets,
and were also heavily involved in providing threat data on Lebanon, Syria,
Iran, and other "hot spots" throughout the Middle East and Africa.  A new
publication, "Prospects for Change" in Eurasia, provided analysis of changes
in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and to a lesser degree, Asia, and weighed
the impact of these events on the rest of the world.  New additions included
a combined intelligence operations facility, the Crisis Management Room,
designed and built adjacent to the NMIC Alert Center, and a
Counternarcotics Research Center and a Joint Tactical Intelligence Center,
formed to better manage DIA support to the counternarcotics and Latin
American issues. 33/
DIA Highlights, 1990-91
   Upon Iraq's 2 August invasion of Kuwalt, DIA immediately launched an
extensive, 24-hour intelligence effort that resulted in perhaps one of the
finest examples of intelligence support to operational forces in modern
times.  All phases of the Agency's workforce and more than 2,000 people
contributed to Operation DESERT SHIELD.  In conjunction with this effort, a
Joint Intelligence Center was established in order to integrate intelligence
produced by all sectors of the Intelligence Community.  In addition, the fall
of the Communist Party in East European countries, the reunification of
Germany, and the ongoing economic reforms in the region continued to
require intelligence support from DIA.  The coup in Liberia and ensuing civil
war also occupied considerable planning time.  Highlighting the support
given by DIA in 1991 to Operation DESERT STORM was the around-the-
clock intelligence monitoring, the deployment to the theater of nearly 100
personnel, and daily tailored intelligence products dispatched to coalition
forces.  As a result, no combat commander in history has ever had as full
and complete a view of his enemy as did U.S. and coalition field
commanders during DESERT STORM.  And, for DIA's achievements
during the crisis and conflict, the Agency received its second Joint
Meritorious Unit Award from the Secretary of Defense.  The award was
presented in an outdoor ceremony in front of the DIAC by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Colin L. Powell, on June 26, 1991.  In addition,
during 1991, the position of Deputy Director was civilianized, and,
accordingly, Mr. Dennis M. Nagy, became the first civilian Deputy Director of
the Agency.  In October 1991, DIA celebrated its 30th anniversary, and, in
the tradition of proud service, its workers now enter a fourth decade of
"excellence in defense of the Nation." 34/
Looking to the Future
   For the people who work at DIA, the past several months have brought
the chill tidings of changes.  The world that they have studied exists no
longer.  With nations dissolving, boundaries changing, and governments
collapsing, their jobs and the Agency's mission are not what they were just
two or three years ago.  The question for DIA is:  What next?  The answer is
more change, as geopolitical earthquakes are followed by reorganizations
of the U.S. intelligence effort.  Robert Gates, the new Director of Central
Intelligence, recently said, "The old verities that guided this country's
national security policy for 45 years.... have disappeared in an historical
instant."  Furthermore, Gates added,". . the very idea of change, the idea
that for years to come, change and uncertainty will dominate the
international life and the not-even-thought-about will be commonplace." 35/
   Congress is exerting pressure to revamp.  In February 1992, Dave
McCurdy and David Boren, chairmen of the intelligence committees in the
House and Senate, respectively, introduced similar bills to streamline and
consolidate intelligence operations.  Both bills would create an "intelligence
czar" who would oversee three divisions:  collections of intelligence,
analysis, and clandestine operations.  However, absent such sweeping
legislation, Gates could himself use the current upheaval as an opportunity
to assert greater control over all the intelligence agencies, including, of
course, DIA.  Such a move would give real meaning to the title of Director of
Central Intelligence, but would be difficult to achieve given the longstanding
preeminence of the Defense Department in military intelligence.  Still, Gates
is certainly acting as if he wants to assert authority and move rapidly to
reorient intelligence activities.  In this direction, he has established task
forces to examine subjects including preventing proliferation of nuclear and
chemical weapons and improving national intelligence estimates.
   President Bush has said, "The intelligence community today is being
asked to cope with issues ranging from traditional Soviet military forces to
the environment, from economic competitiveness to AIDS."  In the
aggregate, intelligence agencies were devoting about half their resources
to understanding the Soviet Union.  And in the immediate future, they must
shift their focus, Gates voiced.  Furthermore, he complained, they are too
obsessed with "long-standing structural arrangements, old habits and
vested bureaucratic interests" in the once-mighty Soviet military threat.
Already, the disappearance of the Soviet conventional military threat has
led to a reduction of analytical resources focused on the Soviet Army.  At
DIA, the number of Soviet analysts has been cut back by a much as 30
percent, and a new Office of Global Analysis has been set up "to analyze
the whole range of transnational issues that don't fit neatly into regional
analysis," said the newly appointed Director of DIA, Air Force Lt Gen James
Clapper, at a recent 1992 conference. 36/  It is clear then that the future for
DIA undoubtedly means change. . . but reflecting over the last 30 years,
change, growth, and meeting new challenges is what DIA is really all about.
Therefore, a quote from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in a
congratulatory letter to DIA on its 30th anniversary seems the perfect
summary of future issues:  "The years ahead will present an array of
different and complex intelligence challenges, but I have complete
confidence in your ability to meet all of them." 37/
                                   FOOTNOTES
1. Richard A. Stubbing, "The Defense Game" (New York:  Harper & Row
Publishers, 1986), p 5.
2. Allen Dulles, "The Craft of Intelligence" (New York:  Harper & Row
Publishers, 1963), pp. 46-47.
3. Lawrence Freedman, "U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic
Threat" (Boulder, Colorado:  Westview Press, 1977), pp. 21-22.
4. Deane J. Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency:  A 21-Year
Organization Overview", Comment Edition, September 1983, p. 56.
5. Lawrence Freedman, "U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic
Threat" (Boulder, Colorado:  Westview Press, 1977), p. 22.
6. Allen Dulles, "The Craft of Intelligence" (New York:  Harper & Row
Publishers, 1963), pp. 46-47.
7. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique"
(Washington, DC:  Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), pp. 1-4.
8. Interview with Deane J. Allen, DIA Historian, conducted by Robin
Boatman, on February 6, 1992.
9. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique"
(Washington, DC:  Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), pp. 1-4.
10. Deane J. Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency:  A 21-Year
Organization Overview" (Comment Edition), September 1983.
11. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique"
(Washington, DC:  Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), pp. 1-4.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Lawrence Freedman, "U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic
Threat" (Boulder, Colorado:  Westview Press, 1977), p. 25.
16. Deane J Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique"
(Washington, DC:  Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), pp. 1-4.
17. Ibid.
18. Steve Emerson, "Secret Warriors" (New York:  G.P. Putnam's Sons,
1988), pp. 77-78.
19. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique"
(Washington, DC:  Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991) pp. 1-4.
20. Bob Woodward, "Veil:  The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987" (New
York:  Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 97.
21. Author's (Robin Boatman's) opinion/observation.
22. See footnote number 20, p. 98.
23. See footnote number 19.
24. Ibid.
25.Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27.Ibid.
28.Ibid.
29. See footnote number 18, pp. 212-14.
30. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique"
(Washington, DC:  Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), pp. 1-4.
31.Ibid.
32.Ibid.
33.Ibid.
34.Ibid.
35. Larry Grossman, "Intelligence in a World of Change," "Government
Executive" (Washington, DC:  National Journal, Inc., March 1992), pp. 11-15.
36. Ibid.
37. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique"
(Washington, DC:  Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), p. 1.
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