Improving The Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG)
AUTHOR Major Richard B. Pellish, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Manpower
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: IMPROVING THE SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE,
INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SRIG)
Introduction: The Marine Corps needs to understand the
complex nature of joint/combined operations when analyzing
surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence operations.
Especially, when considering the support that will be
received or the support that will be requested to enhance
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force's (MAGTF) warfighting
capability. This support will come from the Joint Task Force
(JTF), national, theater assets or in the case of Desert
Shield/ Desert Storm in Southwest Asia (SWA) the Commander
in Chief of Central Command (CINCCENTCOM).
Part One: For the first time, in the recent history of the
Fleet Marine Force, the Marine Corps committed one of the
newest organizations to combat, the Surveillance,
Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG). The SRIG had a
very challenging situation in SWA due to the recent
establishment of the organization and lack of training as a
command responsible for providing the Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) Commander with a tailored intelligence product.
Part Two: The SRIG is the focus point for the tactical
exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP) in the MEF.
However, this capability is exploited through the chain of
command on a priority bases. This highlights the fact
the MAGTF must use its organic collection assets to its
fullest capability when trying to satisfy the informational
requirements of the MEF and its subordinate elements.
The SRIG relies primarily on its internal organization to
accomplish its mission. It includes a Radio Battalion,
Remotely Piloted Vehicle Company, Force Reconnaissance
Company, and Intelligence Company. Numerous lessons have
been learned in the employment of these organizations in
combat. In addition, plenty of equipment limitations will
need to be improved for future battlefields.
Part Three: Other organizations in the MAGTF are required
to satisfy the collection requirements of the MAGTF Command
Element, established by the Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Center (SARC). The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is the
principle subordinate element that has to provide
aerial reconnaissance and surveillance support. For the SRIG
and the MAGTF, as a whole, to be successful in combat.
Summary: The Marine Corps must continue to improve its
overall surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence
functions across the spectrum of the MAGTF. The SRIG
being its lead organization with primary responsibility
in this area. All Marines must continue to identify
deficiencies in functional areas. Then appropriate commands
and authority will be able to improve the capability of
this warfighting organization.
IMPROVING THE SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE
GROUP (SRIG)
Thesis statement: The Marine Corps should capitalize on
its unique Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence
Group (SRIG) and realize the SRIG will have to continue
to improve its capabilities for future battlefields.
I. Prior to any conventional war involving
the United States the U.S. Intelligence Community should
explore all possible options to stop armed conflict
and recommend those options to National Command
Authorities.
A. All national intelligence agencies have
representation at the unified command level.
B. Theater and national assets are tasked
to support operational level commanders
when their organic assets cannot efficiently
collect in their area of interest.
C. Operational commanders definitely have
to control their area of influence with a very
aggressive tactical intelligence collection
plan, in order to survive on the modern
battlefield.
II. The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated that
intelligence drives operations.
A. Presently employed in Saudi Arabia is
one of the newest organizations the Fleet
Marine Force has established in recent years:
the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence
Group.
B. The following is a listing of requirements
that the SRIG would have to address for 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to be
successful in combat operations.
1. Will Iraqi units conduct espionage,
sabotage, subversion, or terrorist
operations against Marine forces in Saudi
Arabia? If so where, when and in what
strength?
2. Will Iraqi forces attack Saudi Arabia?
If so where, when, how and in what strength?
3. How, where and in what strength will
Iraqi forces defend Kuwait?
4. Where, when and what type of mines,
barriers and obstacles will Iraqi forces
employ?
5. Will the Iraqi forces employ chemical
munitions?
6. What targets will cause the greatest
amount of damage to Iraqi forces in Kuwait?
III. U.S. armed forces conducted a strategic
bombing phase in the campaign plan, however Marine
forces were contemplating the issues of conducting
offensive ground operations. This presented the
SRIG with very challenging issuses.
A. Tactical exploitation of national intelligence
capabilities must be tasked by military commanders
to satisfy information requirements deemed necessary
to achieve success on the battlefield. The U.S.
intelligence community has considerable capability,
however their primary mission is to support National
Command Authorities.
B. The organic collection assets of the SRIG will
have to provide specific information to satisfy
standing intelligence requirements of the 1st MEF.
This was not be an easy task when considering what
the MEF commander was authorized to do in a
joint/combined operation.
1. The Radio Battalion had to play
a major role in electronic warfare operations
specifically in regards to electronic support
measures (ESM) for the MEF commander to be
successful on the battlefield.
2. The Remotely Piloted Vehicle Company
had to concern itself primarily with
battlefield surveillance and target acquistion.
3. The Force Reconnaissance Company most
likely was limited in performing its
primary mission of deep reconnaissance
prior to appropriate authorization to
conduct clandestine intelligence gathering
missions in denied areas of Kuwait and
Iraq.
4. Counterintelligence Teams primarily
concerned with counterespionage, countersabotage,
countersubversion and counterterrorism operations
will be limited in what they can do based on
authorization from the CINC.
5. Interrogation Translation Teams are
primarily concerned with the exploitation
of refugees and prisoners of war in order
to glean information that will be of importance
to the MEF and subordinate commanders of the
MAGTF. In addition to providing support to the
Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) and Joint
Translation Facility (JTF).
IV. Other organizations of the MAGTF will be required
to become team players in satisfying the collection
requirements established by the Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Center (SARC) of the MEF Command Element.
A. The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) will have to
provide aerial visual reconnaissance and surveillance
operations to fill the gap of remotely piloted
vechicles (RPVs).
B. The ACE will also have to provide appropriate
airborne electronic warfare support to attack
and assault elements but also to the MEF
commander's intelligence collection effort.
The United States Marine Corps' Fleet Marine Force is
a force in readiness. It is prepared to go to war on a
moments notice. Normally there is a threat/intelligence
build-up prior to any conventional war involving the United
States. This gives the United States intelligence community
an opportunity to explore possible options to prevent or
stop armed conflict and recommend those options to National
Command Authorities. Recently, we experienced such a
situation in the Middle East. However, when President Bush
saw sanctions would not cause Saddam Hussain to leave
Kuwait, he was left with only the military option.
At this point the U.S. intelligence community had to
assume the responsibility of supporting the Commander in
Chief of Central Command (CINCCENTCOM) General Norman
Schwarzkopt. All national intelligence agencies are
represented at the unified command level. This includes
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security
Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).
The entire world is aware of the difficulty the U.S.
had in targeting Iraqi mobile SCUD missiles in Iraq and
Kuwait. This intelligence limitation not only impacted on
General Schwarzkopt but on every component commander in
theater to include General Boomer, Commanding General, 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force, a Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) Commander.
Marine officers must understand the tasking of national
theater, and joint intelligence/operational collection
platforms to support Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs).
They need to have an appreciation of the capabilities and
limitations of these platforms so they are not surprised
with their results in time of war.
Theater and national assets are tasked to support
operational level commanders when their organic assets
cannot efficiently collect in their "area of interest."
Doctrinal guidance in OH 3-20, Commander's Guide to
Intelligence states:
Intelligence assets and collection capabilities
at the national and theater levels may enhance
organic MAGTF collection means. The national
intelligence structure orients on satisfying
strategic intelligence requirements in support
of national objectives. However, much of the
intelligence collected and produced at this level
is of value to tactical units.... The Joint
Service Tactical Exploitation of National Systems
manual contains valuable information on these
systems. Theater intelligence architecture plans
provide specific information on how the systems
would tie together for a particular theater.
(16:para 2006A)
Why should a Marine officer care about understanding
intelligence, reconnaissance, or surveillance. First,
understanding the scope of the battlefield will enable the
officer to shape the battlefield efficiently. As defined in
the Tri- MEF SOP for Field Intelligence Operations, the
"area of interest" is the area of concern to the commander,
including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and
have us extending into enemy territory to the objective of
current or planned operations. The MEF area of interest will
normally extend 96 hours ahead and 310 miles (500 km) or
more from the MEF center of mass.(18:par 01005) Apply
this formula to the Gulf War, the MEF's area of interest
extended to all of Kuwait and southern portions of Iraq
including Al Basrah, the home of the elite "Republican
Guards." While closely monitoring the enemy situation
within the area of influence/interest of major subordinate
elements, the MEF Command Element Intelligence Section
normally concentrates its assets and attention on the enemy
forces and activities that could affect the operation up to
96 hours in the future.
Operational commanders have to control their "area of
influence" with a very aggressive tactical intelligence
collection plan, in order to survive on the modern
battlefield. As stated in the Tri-MEF SOP for Field
Intelligence Operations, the "area of influence" is a
geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of
infuencing operations by the maneuver and employment of fire
support systems normally under his command or control. In
terms of time and space the MEF area of influence normally
extends 72 hours in advance and 200 miles (320 km) from the
MEF center of mass.(18:par 01003) Hypothetically, if this
definition is applied to operation Desert Storm the MEF's
center of mass was at the port of entry, Al Jubayl,
Saudi Arabia and its northern limit included Kuwait City,
Kuwait. Its southern limit included the airfields located
in Bahrain and Ad Dawhah, Qatar.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated that
intelligence drives operations. In fact intelligence-
specifically combat intelligence- is a command
responsibility. Commanders and staff officers who understand
warfighting focus on the acquisition of strategic,
tactical, and combat intelligence to complete successfully
any assigned mission. Their search will normally encompass
surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence operations
across the spectrum of national, theater, and tactical
collection assets. Those who do not understand the
appropriate tasking procedures or do not have command
emphasis will be doomed to providing an inadequate picture
of the battlefield.
One of the newest organizations in the Marine Corps
being employed in Southwest Asia (SWA) is the Surveillance,
Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG). It was
created by the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)-
convened Force Structure Study, conducted in January 1988.
The intent of the SRIG was to rationalize the intelligence
structure and consolidate most of the specialized
intelligence and some other organizations resident in MEFs
under one commander.
The SRIG consists of an H&S Company, Radio Battalion,
Communications Battalion, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
(ANGLICO), Force Reconnaissance Company, Remotely Piloted
Vehicle (RPV) Company and Intelligence Company. The
Intelligence Company consists of several specialized
intelligence units, such as Counterintelligence Teams (CIT),
Interrogator-Translator Platoon, Force Imagery
Interpretation Unit (FIIU), Topographic (TOPO) Platoon,
Marine Air Ground Task Force All-Source Fusion Center
(MAFC), Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP) and
the Tactical Deception (TAC-D) Platoon.
The Marine Corps should capitalize on its unique
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG)
and realize the SRIG will have to continue to improve its
capabilities for future battlefields. Recent lessons learned
in SWA will have to be closely analyzed and addressed at the
highest levels in the Marine Corps for this philosophy to be
effective. For the reader's benefit a numerous amount of
lessons learned have been extracted from the Marine Corps
Lessons Learned System (MCLLS) which will be discussd in the
remainder of the text.
To put everything in context, in SWA, the SRIG would
have to satisfy some basic essential elements of information
(EEIs) to be effective. This is not an easy task, however it
is one that had to be accomplished for efficient operational
planning and execution of combat operations. The following
is a listing of requirements that the SRIG should of
address for I MEF to be successful in combat.
1. Will Iraqi units conduct espionage, sabotage,
subversion, or terrorist operations against Marine
forces in Saudi Arabia? If so where, when and in what
strength?
2. Will Iraqi forces attack Saudi Arabia? If so where,
when, how, and in what strength?
3. How, where and in what strength will Iraqi forces
defend Kuwait?
4. Where, when and what type of mines, barriers and
obstacles will Iraqi forces employ?
5. Will the Iraqi forces employ chemical munitions?
6. What targets will cause the greatest amount of
damage to Iraqi forces in Kuwait?
Operation Desert Storm included a strategic bombing
phase to destroy the industrial infra-structure of Iraq's
war production capability. This was followed by a theater
bombing phase to weaken the Iraqi Army in the Kuwait Theater
of Operation (KTO). During this portion of the campaign
plan, I MEF was contemplating the issues of conducting
offensive ground operations in the KTO. Realizing the
importance of the stated intelligence requirements in the
previous paragraph; the SRIG was faced with some very
challenging issues.
Tactical exploitation of national intelligence
capabilities (TENCAP) must be tasked by military commanders
to satisfy information requirements deemed necessary to
achieve success on the battlefield. It is important to note,
that the SRIG would be the focal point for this tasking in
support of the entire MAGTF. The national intelligence
community has considerable capability; however, Marines must
realize their primary mission is to support National Command
Authorities (NCA).
Observations from representatives from Marine Aviation
Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) in SWA stated the
following:
Many Marines seem to be unaware of the tactical
exploitation capabilities of certain national assets.
This hinders the Marine Corps from taking advantage of
assets that may be available, especially when operating
in a joint operation. Marines have an inherent distrust
of anything that is not fielded and controlled by
other Marines. This feeling is usually justified, based
on historical evidence. However, this should not be
allowed to become the de facto doctrinal approach to
TENCAP. By not taking advantage of assets that are
available, Marines are depriving themselves of valuable
battlefield tools that can play a significant role in
tactical success. Before these tools can be properly
used, though, the Marines involved must be made aware
of their existence, and trained on the tasking and
employment of these assets. In too many circumstances,
knowledge of these assets is assumed to be the
exclusive domain of certain Military Occupational
Specially (MOS) individuals, while in fact the
knowledge of what these systems can provide should be
part of all Marines' knowledge involved in planning
combat operations. (12:1)
Obviously, the corrective action for this problem is proper
training at Marine Corps formal schools and in the Fleet
Marine Force (FMF).
In addition to national assets, the SRIG commander must
advise the MAGTF commander on the availability of theater
collection assets to aid in the satisfying of information
requirements. These include systems like the Grumman E-8
Joint Surveillance Targeting Attack Radar System (JSTARS),
the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the
Lockheed TR-1 Theater Reconnaissance aircraft and the
RC-135 Theater Communication Intelligence aircraft just too
mention a few. It was reported that at least one of the two
E-8s in theater is in the air "every night" and the
information they are providing on Iraqi troop movements is
valuable to allied planning.(8:19)
The need for a more rapid tactical intelligence
capability is among the early lessons learned from Desert
Storm. Aviation Week and Space Technology reported that
Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, Central Command's air
component commander stated:
.... there is a "big BDA (bomb damage assessment) flap"
within the defense community which "would indicate we
may have been overly entranced with some forms of
intelligence collection." This is an apparent reference
to the decision to abandon such systems as the U.S.
Air Force/Lockheed SR-71 and to rely instead on low-
flying satellites. (8:18)
These are just some of the issues that are being talked
about in the defense community that will have an immediate
impact on MAGTF operations in a joint/combined operation in
the future.
Realizing the MAGTF may or may not have the priority to
satisfy its information requirements with national or
theater intelligence collection assets the MAGTF must be
prepared to satisfy MAGTF its requirements with organic
collection assets of the SRIG and MAGTF. This will not be an
easy task considering the range and limitations of organic
collection assets.
Combat intelligence is that knowledge of the enemy,
weather, and geographic features required by the command in
the planning and conduct of combat operations. The combat
intelligence a commander receives greatly affects the degree
of success he achieves. If the commander has sufficient
combat intelligence, then it can be used to minimize
uncertainty concerning effects of enemy, weather, and
terrain on the accomplishment of the mission. However,
conditions of combat change continually, and timeliness may
require that decisions be based on incomplete combat
intelligence. Select combat information may or may not
modify combat intelligence. Combat intelligence contributes
to the needs of the battle being planned to be fought in the
future. It has little, if any, application to the battle in
process. Many Marine officers do not have an appreciation
of this.
The Light Armored Battalion, specific aviation units
VMO, VMAQ-2, and the VMFA squadrons which will be equipped
with the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System
(ATARS) must be included in the MAGTF tactical collection
plan. MAGTF planners must understand all elements of the
MAGTF must be active participants in the intelligence effort
or valuable information necessary to make sound tactical
decisions may not be entered into the information flow.
The SRIG does not have operational control of all of the
MAGTF's organic collection assets necessary to support the
MAGTF commander for optimum results: specifically, the
Aviation Combat Element's (ACE) aircraft and radars.
Therefore, all subordinate elements of the MAGTF must
the planning and conduct of combat operations. The combat
intelligence a commander receives greatly affects the degree
of success he achieves. If the commander has sufficient
combat intelligence, then it can be used to minimize
uncertainty concerning effects of enemy, weather, and
terrain on the accomplishment of the mission. However,
conditions of combat change continually, and timeliness may
require that decisions be based on incomplete combat
intelligence. Select combat information may or may not
modify combat intelligence. Combat intelligence contributes
to the needs of the battle being planned to be fought in the
future. It has little, if any, application to the battle in
process. Many Marine officers do not have an appreciation
of this.
The Light Armored Battalion, specific aviation units
VMO, VMAQ-2, and the VMFA squadrons which will be equipped
with the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System
(ATARS) must be included in the MAGTF tactical collection
plan. MAGTF planners must understand all elements of the
MAGTF must be active participants in the intelligence effort
or valuable information necessary to make sound tactical
decisions may not be entered into the information flow.
The SRIG does not have operational control of all of the
MAGTF's organic collection assets necessary to support the
MAGTF commander for optimum results: specifically, the
Aviation Combat Element's (ACE) aircraft and radars.
Therefore, all subordinate elements of the MAGTF must
support the overall collection plan. Marines must
comprehend the MAGTF has a tremendous capability to
collect information of the battlefield in comparison to the
majority of threat forces it will face. However, each MAGTF
organization that has an intelligence collection mission
functions differently and requires different considerations
and concerns on the battlefield.
One key organization the SRIG commander has under
direct control to exploit the enemy's electromagnetic
spectrum is the Radio Battalion. The mission of Radio
Battalion as stated in FMFM 3-22, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG) is as follows:
The radio battalion is organized and equipped to
conduct tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT), ground
electronic warfare (EW), and communications security
(COMSEC) monitoring/analysis in direct support of the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and other Marine
Corps elements.(19:par 4002)
Recent lessons learned in the MCLLS from SWA have
stated that the Marine Corps does not have a High Frequency
Direction Finding (HFDF) capability. HF radios are a primary
means of communicating over the vast areas in the desert.
The Marine Corps does not have a HFDF capability for either
set frequency or hopping frequency HF transmitters. A
tunable frequency HFDF system is available. It was
recommended that an off-the-shelf system be procured and be
sent to SWA for evaluation.
Another observation from SWA stated that, the Radio
Battalion Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System (MEWSS)
Detachment has no mobile direction finding capabilities.
This begins to defeat the purpose of mounting an electronic
warfare platform on a Light Armored Vehicle (LAV). The
MEWSS currently employs the PRD-10 Direction Finding (DF)
unit, which requires 20-30 minutes to erect the ground
mounted antenna. As a result, MEWSS has been operating
solely with Light Armored Infantry Battalions (LAI Bns),
which move fast and often. The MEWSS crews often do not have
time to set up the PRD-10 antenna.
A direction finding system, that remains vechicle
mounted and can be used on the move, is necessary in order
to increase the effectiveness of the MEWSS. It has been
recommended that a system such as the OAR-3045 or the
EB-100 be adapted to the MEWSS, which will give a mobile
DF capability.
During Alpine Warrior-89 and Cold-89, the Radio
Reconnaissance Teams (RRTs) were inserted and extracted by
the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), but all
mission preparation and planning was done by the detachment,
Radio Battalion (Det Rad Bn). It became apparent that
despite their best intentions, Det Rad Bn did not have the
time, resources or expertise to properly prepare their
teams. The SARC is manned by Marines who are familiar with
reconnaissance, counterintelligence, communications and
would ensure adequate rehearsal, contingency planning and
logistical support. Additionally, the information gathered
by RRT does not need to be passed over the Special
Intelligence (SI) nets, as it was in both exercises. The
Reconnaissance Net is the logical net for RRTs. This also
decreases response time to emergency situations, especially
extracts.
It is recommended that in future operations, the RRTs
be under the operational control (OPCON) of the SARC and
they utilize the Reconnaissance Net as their primary net.
Additionally the SARC should be responsible for RRT mission
planning and coordination.
These are just a few of the improvements that need to
be looked at in the Radio Battalion. Realizing that all
organizations of the MAGTF that participate in the
intelligence cycle and support the MAGTF commander's overall
intelligence effort need to be evaluated for improvement.
The next organization I would like to analyze in the
SRIG is the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Company. FMFM
3-22, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group
(SRIG) states the mission of the RPV Company as follows:
The mission of the RPV Company is to conduct day
and night RPV operations in support of a MAGTF. Tasks
included in the mission are to:
1. Detect, recognize, identify, and locate targets in
support of the MAGTF.
2. Assist in the adjustment of indirect fire weapons.
3. Conduct real-time reconnaissance, surveillance, and
intelligence collection.
4. Provide support for rear area security.
5. Assist in search and rescue helicopter route and
landing zone reconnaissance, and bomb damage
assessment (BDA).
6. Provide airborne radio-relay capability.
7. Identify follow-on requirements and develop RPV
tactics and techiques.(19:par 7002)
Initial reports from SWA have nothing but outstanding
remarks in regard to the performance of RPVs in operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The U.S. deployed virtually
all unmanned vehicles it owned -Pioneers and Pointers- to
the Persian Gulf area. Aero Vironment Inc. developed
Pointer, a hand-launched, 9 lb., battery powered UAV. The
Army and Marine Corps each have two systems consisting of
ground control and monitoring stations and an unspecified
number of air vehicles. Pointer data links transmit imagery
from a video camera. With a video link range of 5.6 km
(3.5 mi.) Pointer's main value is to allow ground troops to
look over a ridge.(14:24)
Pioneer, developed in Israel and produced in the U.S.
by AAI Corporation, is the other RPV deployed with U.S.
forces. Both the Navy and Marine Corps have the RPV, whose
missions include reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
spotting in addition to battle damage assessment. The Navy
has deployed Pioneer on the battleships Wisconsin and
Missouri, where it could also be used for naval gunfire
spotting.(14:24) A Pioneer system has similar components to
Pointer, with the addition of launch and recovery systems.
A typical Pioneer system includes about five RPVs.
Sensors include television and Forward Looking Infra-Red
(FLIR). Although the Pioneer's 5-hour endurance and 100
nautical mile data link range make it a better BDA platform
than Pointer, the services need a longer-range RPV for that
mission. This includes the Marine Corps and its SRIGs.
The Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program
office has defined a vehicle as the medium-range UAV.
Officials have said it should have a 650 km (295 mi.)
radius of action and speed of 550 knots, but the
requirements for that vehicle are still being refined,
Gary Dillion, director of the JPO, said.(14:24)
It is important to remember the employment of any
reconnaissance and surveillance assets in a denied area must
be approved at the Commander in Chief (CINC) level prior to
armed hostilities. The Force Reconnaissance Company most
conceivably was limited in performing its primary mission of
deep reconnaissance prior to appropriate authorization to
conduct clandestine intelligence gathering missions in
denied areas of Kuwait and Iraq. This most likely prohibited
the SRIG in the early employment of one of its most capable
assets in determining the enemy's locations and most
probable courses of action.
There is a general misunderstanding in the Marine Corps
in the use of ground reconnaissance assets. Proper use of
combat intelligence provided by ground reconnaissance
assets, i.e., Force Reconnaissance Company, Reconnaissance
Battalion, and the Light Armored Infantry, is key to any
MAGTF planner in shaping the battlefield and making sound
decisions. However, all too often in peacetime operations
the planning and execution of reconnaissance and
surveillance missions do not receive the appropriate amount
of emphasis. MAGTF planners do not utilize these assets
because they are all too familiar with the terrain at Camp
Pendleton and 29 Palms.
This all changes when faced with real-world operations
as we faced in SWA. National and theater intelligence
agencies, and the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) produce
terrain analysis data in the form of GO/NO GO graphics on a
1:250,000 scale for operational planning. Nevertheless, they
are not detailed enough for tactical MAGTF planners, and
this is where extensive consideration must be given to
ground reconnaissance, engineer reconnaissance and the
topographic platoon of the MAGTF.
The term reconnaissance is defined by the JCS
Publication 1-02 as "a mission undertaken to obtain, by
visual observation or other detection methods, information
about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential
enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological,
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular
area. "(19:par 8003A)
Reconnaissance information is gathered by commanders
at all echelons and is used to prevent surprise, permit the
timely maneuver of ground forces, and to facilitate the
prompt and effective use of supporting arms. At the platoon,
company, and battalion levels, commanders use forward
elements of their own force to perform "close
reconnaissance" which is normally conducted in the area
immediately forward of the line of contact or the forward
edge of the battle area. At the regimental and division
level, elements of the reconnaissance battalion perform
"distant reconnaissance" which is usually conducted in the
outermost edge of the commander's "area of influence" and is
oriented toward the rearward elements of the opposing enemy
forward committed units. At the highest level of a committed
MAGTF, the Force Reconnaissance Company of the SRIG is
employed to perform "deep reconnaissance" which is conducted
in the commander's "area of interest" and is oriented toward
determining the location, disposition, and movement of enemy
reinforcements, combat support, and combat service support
units. The Marines who serve with the reconnaissance
battalions and the force reconnaissance companies of the
Marine Corps perform an extremely specialized and
challenging mission which is critical to the success of any
operation.
This was displayed many times in SWA. The first example
was the battle for Khafiji, were force reconnaissance assets
of 1st SRIG reported elements of a Iraqi armored force
moving into the city. Subsequently, they engaged these units
with supporting arms. Another example was the reconnoitering
of barriers, obstacles, and minefields for the initial
breaching efforts prior to the attacks of 1st and 2nd Marine
Divisions into Kuwait.
How do we capitalize on improving the capabilities of
the Force Reconnaissance Company in the SRIG and other units
in the MAGTF assigned with distant or deep reconnaissance
missions. I would like to mention tactical satellite
communications and the use of the global positioning system
(GPS). The employment of Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Tactical
Satellites (TACSAT) by the ground combat element (GCE) both
as a station on the MEF net and as a link between the G-2
and reconnaissance elements has proven highly successful in
2nd Marine Division. The use of AN/PSC-3 terminals in
support of the GCE during operations over extended distances
greatly aids both the MEF and GCE commanders in
communicating with widely separated elements, gathering
intelligence, and in command and control. In some cases,
this may be the only reliable means of communication. I
submit the SRIGs employ UHF TACSAT more extensively.
MAGELLAN I000M Global Positioning System (GPS) was
effectively used as navigational aid for insertion of Force
Reconnaissance during Team Spirit 1990. Force Reconnaissance
used the handheld MAGELLAN I000M GPS to confirm the Landing
Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Insert Point (IP) and the course
from the IP to the Beach Landing Site (BLS). Because the
insert time corresponded to GPS satellite windows, Force
Reconnaissance was able to accurately navigate from IP to
BLS. This capability is particularly important for Over-The-
Horizon (OTH) inserts to unfamiliar beaches that have little
or no coastal navigation aids, and in real-world
contingencies, would allow insertion without risk of ITG
requirements.
The MAGELLAN I000M, handheld GPS is a highly capable
navigational aid for Force Reconnaissance and Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC)
small boat operations. Increased emphasis must be placed on
funding handheld GPS in order to improve MEU (SOC) small
boat operations.
These are just a few things to think about when
contemplating improvements for the SRIG's ground
reconnaissance units. Nevertheless, the primary tool for
quality improvement is a challenging training program for
the personnel who have already gone through a pipeline of
military qualification training.
Going back to the beginning of the paper, you will
remember there was a listing of requirements. The first
requirement dealt with the identification of Iraqi units
that would conduct espionage, sabotage, subversion, or
terriorist operations against Marine forces in Saudi Arabia.
Resident in the Intelligence Company of the SRIG are
Counterintelligence Teams (CITs). These teams have the
primary mission of accomplishing this task, in coordination
with other forces of the MAGTF. Counterintelligence Teams
were limited in what they were authorized to do, based on
official authorization from the CINC in SWA. Marine
officers must understand that counterintelligence special
operations are coordinated at the highest levels of the
military command structure and with host nation cooperation.
FMFM 3-22, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group
(SRIG) states the mission of Counterintelligence Teams as
follows:
Plan and recommend the implementation of measures
designed to discover, neutralize, and/or destory the
effectiveness of actual or potential hostile
intelligence, sabotage, terrorism, and subersive
activities. Additionally, Marine Corps
counterintelligence recommends measures necessary
for the protection of information against espionage,
personnel against subversive activities and terriorism
and material against sabotage. In addition to the above
classical missions, Marine Corps counterintelligence
maintains a human resources intelligence and technical
collection capability to support the Marine Corps
tactical mission, maintains a Technical Surveillance
Countermeasures (TSCM) capability to support FMF
tactical and garrison missions and provide resources
in support of the overall DOD Human Resources
Intelligence (HUMINT) program. (19:par 9008B)
Generally speaking, the tactical concept of operations
is for CITs to operate in depth. They are usually deployed
to cover an area, but not necessarily a combat unit's area
of operations. A CIT would continue to operate in an area
even though tactical or support units have changed. This
concept allows the CIT to focus on the enemy's intelligence
organization and activities and not become restricted by
tactical areas of responsibility. The area coverage concept
also provides continuity of CI operations and allows CI
personnel to become thoroughly familiar with the area, enemy
intelligence organization and operations, and CI targets.
CITs work very closely with interrogation-translator
teams (ITT), military police, civil affairs, and
pyschological operations units, and with tactical and
service support units. A joint ITT/CI interrogation center
is usually set up near a centralized prisoner of war
compound and refugee control point.
Interrogation-Translator Teams (ITT) are primarily
concerned with the exploitation of refugees and prisoners
of war in order to glean information that will be of
importance to the MEF and subordinate commanders of the
MAGTF. In addition to providing support to the Joint
Interrogation Facility (JIF) and Document Exploitation
Center (DEC).
ITTs are normally retained under centralized control
of the MAGTF SRI/SRI DET. This permits greater flexibility
in their use. For example, if the MAGTF retains control of
its assigned ITT, they can readily be sent forward to a
regimental enemy prisoner of war (EPW) collection point to
commence interrogation. If the SRIG had previously attached
its ITT assets to subordinate units, this flexibility would
have been lost. In the event that subordinate elements of
the MAGTF are in widely separated areas, it may be
advantageous to attach a subteam to those elements to
facilitate timely interrogations.
Other organizations of the MAGTF will be required to
become team players in satisfying collection requirements
established by the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center
(SARC) of the MAGTF Command Element. However, before moving
outside of the SRIG, lets examine other functions and
organizations of the SRIG. Solid Shield observations,
mentioned the SARC was an integral agency within the MEF
intelligence section and functioned under the Collections
Unit of the Intelligence Operations Branch. The SARC must
be manned 24 hours per day and must consist of the following
elements:
1. Control Element
2. Force Reconnaissance Element
3. Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Element
4. Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP)
Element
5. Radio Battalion Element
6. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Element
During Solid Shield 1989, only two elements were
present in the SARC; RPV and Force Reconnaissance. Only
because the Commanding Officer was designated the Officer in
Charge of the SARC. The SARC could not be effectively manned
24 hours per day due to lack of personnel, and the requisite
expertise to operate a SARC was not there. As outlined in
the Tri-MEF Field Intelligence SOP, the Control Element is
to perform eight functions; none of those were accomplished.
Finally, a collection plan was never published,
disseminated, nor employed throughout the operation.
In future operations, the SARC must be staffed properly
with organic personnel and representation from the other
four agencies to be effective.(6:1)
During three Combined Arms Operation (CAO-89) planning
conferences, the concepts for employment of each MEF
collection asset were formulated and discussed.
Nevertheless, a MEF collection plan based on these concepts
was not issued. This situation precluded completion of the
necessary coordination of the MEF and GCE ground
reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. The result was
confusion over which assets were doing what, in which areas,
and during which time periods.
It has been recommended, based on the MEF and major
subordinate element commander's requirements, the MEF G-2
must ensure coordinated development of a comprehensive
collection plan and publish that plan in a timely fashion.
(5:1)
It is totally unsatisfactory that situations like this
continue to be documented in the MCLLS. There are stacks
and stacks of published doctrine that states the proper
procedures to establish a SARC in addition to preparing and
executing a proper collection plan. Again, I feel the lack
of knowledge in regards to understanding surveillance,
reconnaissance, and intelligence operations rests with
the officer corps. Proper training and education
would aid in correcting this deficiency.
The ACE has to provide aerial reconnaissance and
surveillance operations for the MAGTF to be successful
on the modern battlefield. This will include armed
reconnaissance, aerial imagery collection, and pre-planned
on-call reconnaissance and surveillance missions. Until
1990, the function of tactical aerial reconnaissance was
accomplished by the RF-4B. Since the loss of the RF-4B,
there is no other aircraft currently in the Marine Corps
that has the capability to produce intelligence imagery that
it provided. Its multisensor imagery capability--
photographic, infrared, and Side Looking and Ranging (SLAR)
radar--made it unique in its performance. It allowed MAGTF
planners to shape the battlefield and reduced the risk for
the MAGTF. This remains the major issue facing the ACE,
SRIG, and the MAGTF when discussing aerial reconnaissance
and surveillance capabilities and limitations.
The Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS)
is to be the next generation Marine Corps system, as well as
being the sensor suite for the medium-range UAV. ATARS is
to replace cameras and film with three sensors-two using
electro-otic charge coupled device (CCD) sensors in the
visual spectrum, and one IR line scanner for night. Images
are to be data linked to ground stations. The first ATARS
is supposed to be installed in an F/A-18 for Marine Corps
tests this summer.
The ACE will also have to provide appropriate airborne
electronic warfare support not only to attack and assault
elements but also to the MAGTF commander's intelligence
collection effort. The ACE is a key player in the overall
reconnaissance and surveillance effort of the MAGTF and the
efficiency of the SRIG. The responsiveness of the ACE to the
SRIG, is as critical as the ACE to the GCE.
In summary, it is crucial for all Marine officers to
understand the complexity of surveillance, reconnaissance,
and intelligence operations in a MAGTF. Realizing this
paper mostly focused on the operations of a MEF, the
principles and functions apply to Marine Expeditionary
Brigades (MEBs) and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) as
well. The complexity of operations cross the spectrum
of highly classified technical satellites to foot mobile
light infantry conducting close reconnaissance operations.
MAGTF Commanders rate having the best possible intelligence
to enhance their operational combat power. It is the
responsibility of the Marine Corps Intelligence Corps to
educate and train as many Marines as possible in the types
of operations that the SRIG conducts in combat.
Furthermore, all Marines should continue to identify
operational deficiencies in the surveillance,
reconnaissance, intelligence capabilities of the MAGTF.
It is to high a cost, to lose a Marine's life in combat due
to faulty intelligence. Which could of been corrected by a
hard working, conscientious group of Marines that believed
it is better to identify problems and limitations to
improve the MAGTF, instead of remaining quiet and looking
good.
The Marine Corps needs to move forward and capitalize
on the SRIG. All Marine officers, of all military
occupational specialty must contribute to the improvement
of the Marine Corps' overall surveillance, reconnaissance,
and intelligence capability across the spectrum of the
MAGTF.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Bright, Capt, USMC. "Global Positioning System (GPS)."
Pohang, South Korea. Report in Marine Corps Lessons
Learned System of 22 March 1990.
2. CG, 2d MARDIV, "Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Tactical
Satellite (TACSAT) Communications." Camp Lejeune, NC.
Report in Marine Corps Lessons Learned System of
3 November 1988.
3. CG, MCCDC, "Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and
Intelligence Group Concept." Quantico, VA. Ltr 3900
over WF 10B of 10 Oct 1990.
4. CG, 4th MEB, "Employment of the Radio Reconnaissance
Team (RRT)." Norfolk, VA. Report in Marine Corps
Lessons Learned System of 15 June 1989.
5. CG, II MEF, "Intelligence Collection Planning and
Coordination." Camp Lejeune, NC. Report in Marine Corps
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Marine Corps Lessons Learned System of 19 May 1989.
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Technology, February 4, 1991, 25-26.
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Technology, February 11, 1991, 18-19.
9. Hendrickson, Col, USMC. "High Frequency Direction
Finding (HFDF)." Quantico, VA. Report in Marine Corps
Lessons Learned System of 1 November 1990.
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for Mobile Electronic Warfare System (MEWSS)."
Quantico, VA. Report in Marine Corps Lessons Learned
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11. McKinney, Franklin D., Capt, USMC. "Remotely Piloted
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Awareness (TENCAP)." Quantico, VA. Report in Marine
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Aviation Week and Space Technology,
February 11, 1991, 25-26.
15. Ryan, Brendan, Maj, USMC. "MAGTF All-Source Fusion
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Quantico, 1990.
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Quantico, 1980.
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