CHAPTER 8
INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT
TO PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

This chapter defines IEW support to PCO and describes the missions and functions of each of the intelligence disciplines and CI support in PCO.

PCO are politically sensitive military activities normally characterized by—

- Short term.
- Rapid projection or employment of forces.
- Conditions short of war.

They are undertaken in crisis avoidance or crisis management situations that require the use of military force to backup diplomacy.

Military efforts in PCO complement political and informational initiatives. PCO are usually—

- Political and time sensitive.
- Conducted by tailored forces.
- Joint or combined in scope.

They are sometimes conducted at the request of another government. Some recent examples of LIC PCO are disaster relief (San Salvador 1986, Bangladesh 1991), peacemaking (Grenada 1983 and Panama 1989), and NEO (Liberia 1990).

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

HUMINT is potentially the most important and productive intelligence discipline in support to PCO. Strategic, operational, and tactical level HUMINT collection operations provide valuable intelligence and I&W of threat operations.

HUMINT uses penetration, observation, elicitation of personnel, and exploitation of material and documents to collect information on the threat. HUMINT activities vary from controlled operations, liaison, interrogations, and document exploitation to the debriefing of reconnaissance patrols.

Your well-developed HUMINT collection effort is critical to providing intelligence support to your commander.

HUMINT collection operations provide continuous support through all phases of PCO by—

- Concentrating on collection operations that contribute to identification and analysis of the potential threat.
- Filling gaps in the commander’s intelligence requirements.
- Providing intelligence support to US forces during actual operations.
- Supporting US forces in follow-on missions, particularly in support of CAI.

Additionally, they provide intelligence which contributes to the development of changes to US doctrine and tactics.

HUMINT in a variety of forms and sources is available to the intelligence elements conducting PCO. The quality and quantity of HUMINT depends on US forces organization, operating environment, and the extent of HN support. Additional considerations are the attitudes of the belligerents and the local population.

The following are some examples of HUMINT sources available to US, HN, and allied forces conducting PCO:

- US soldiers.
- US and HN civilians.
- CA specialists.
- PSYOP specialists.
- SOF.
- CI agents.
- Enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).
- MI organizations.
- HN and allied military.
- HN and allied governmental agencies.
Information provided by HUMINT sources must be processed. The greatest danger is that received pertinent information may not be recognized as such and is ignored, discarded, or not reported. Also, you need to ensure that HUMINT analysis is fused with IMINT and SIGINT data. FM 34-60A(S), TC 34-5(S), and FM 34-52 contain details on HUMINT collection activities.

**IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE**

Imagery and imagery-derived products can be used to support some of the PCO. Reference imagery of the AO is used to support mission planning. Some operations, such as disaster relief and counter-drug, require both reference imagery and current coverage in order to monitor the AO for significant changes. These changes could include—

- New structures.
- Defenses.
- Changes in status of LOC.
- Communication activity levels.
- New or additional military equipment.

Target coverage required to support PCO, in general, include—

- LOC.
- Bridges.
- Airfields.
- Ports.
- Border areas.
- Main government centers.
- Key military installations.

**DISASTER RELIEF**

Disaster and emergency relief is provided after droughts, floods, earthquakes, and war. US forces involved in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations benefit from both reference and current imagery of the AO.

Imagery analysis provides baseline information for initial damage assessment. Progress of relief and rebuilding efforts can also be monitored by optical imagery collection. For example, before and after photographs of Bangladesh destroyed by a series of typhoons in March 1991 were used to brief representatives of US Government agencies. These agencies were involved in damage assessment and planning for rebuilding this residential area.

**SUPPORT TO COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS**

US forces can be involved in counter-drug operations. This includes the detection, disruption, interdiction, and destruction of illicit crops and the drug-trafficking infrastructure. National level imagery assets are able to obtain important information to support this mission. (See Appendix H.)

IAs must be knowledgeable about illicit drug activities. Indicators change over time as drug operators change their methods in order to avoid detection. Indicators also differ by geographic area. For example, illicit crop patterns may vary by country depending on legality of the crop’s cultivation. Analysis of reference and current imagery is done in an attempt to establish operational patterns and locations of transshipment points.

Imagery analysis also provides examples of cultivation patterns and crop sizes. Appearance of recently cleared fields or new, unexplained cultivated areas may indicate areas of illicit crop cultivation. However, such areas can be confused with legitimate farming activities. Comparative analysis, such as knowledge of how each crop appears on imagery and the growth period and harvesting cycles, aids in identifying legitimate areas.

Optical sensors are suitable for—

- Basic collection.
- Detection.
- Identification of illicit drug crops.
- Related facilities.
- LOC.
- Transshipment points.

These sensors are less effective against heavily vegetated areas.
Infrared sensors are better able to detect and identify objects day or night, except in areas of very dense vegetation and during heavy precipitation.

Radar sensors are often used for surveillance. The APG-66 radar used on the Small Airborne Surveillance System (SASS) can detect land, sea, or air targets.

Multispectral imagery (MSI) can provide information on areas, size, and possible yield of illicit crops. This analysis is usually performed by specialists at national level and some non-DOD elements. MSI can satisfy collection requirements against very large areas. Repetitive coverage of some AOS may be difficult to obtain with sensors on aerial platforms due to the size or inaccessibility of the AO.

**SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE**

SIGINT contributes to the planning and execution of PCO by providing early warning of threat intentions and surveillance of threat C³ elements. SIGINT supports the primary categories of PCO as outlined here:

- **Shows of force.** Provides information on the threat's reaction to the operation.
- **NEO.** Provides a picture of the threat’s reaction.
- **RRO.** Provides locational information.
- **Strikes and raids.** Delays and disrupts threat reaction to an operation without violating restrictive rules of engagement (ROE).
- **Peacemaking.** Contributes to the assessment of threat forces by providing the necessary data needed to conduct ESM and ECM operations.
- **UW.** Helps assess the effectiveness of UW actions.
- **SAS.** Contributes to force protection.
- **Support to US civil authorities.** Supports operations against national security such as illegal immigration and customs violations by detecting, disrupting, and interdicting the infrastructure of drug-trafficking entities.

**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE**

MDCI support to PCO focuses on the commander's mission of protecting the force. PCO missions include, but are not limited to:

- **Shows of force and demonstrations.**
- **NEO.**
- **RRO.**
- **Strikes and raids.**
- **Operations to restore order.**
- **UW.**
- **DRO.**
- **SAS.**
- **Support to US civil authorities.**
- **Counter-drug operations.**

MDCI support must be integrated into the planning process as early as possible. MI brigades (EAC) supporting the CINC's have the resources and capability to provide MDCI support to units entering the AO. They also coordinate the smooth transition of MDCI operational support to MI units assigned to the contingency force.

PCO force MI units arriving in theaters where the MI brigade (EAC) is not forward based should expect only limited MDCI support until EAC MI assets deploy. Additionally, these assets will arrive gradually in three tiers, with each tier successively increasing the capabilities and scope of support.

In PCO of short duration, deploying forces will not have the full degree of support the MI brigade (EAC) can provide. PCO forces in MI units should include this fact in their planning.

The CINC's statement of the mission, his intent, and the ROE are the basis for determining the type and scope of MDCI support required and permitted. The senior CI officer must know and understand the constraints imposed by the NCA, HN, and other countries together with the effects these constraints have on force deployments and operations. This is important where cooperation between US Army CI and HN intelligence and security service-s is one of your objectives.
See Figure C-1 for the essential tasks CI performs in support of PCO. The MDCI estimate, and other products, are integrated into the staff planning process. They support your commander’s requirements for maintaining OPSEC during all phases of the operation. MDCI products also support his deception plans.

MDCI support to force protection is consistent with the three principles unique to PCO: Coordination, balance, and planning for uncertainty.

COORDINATION

Coordination is required between CI elements of the MI brigade (EAC) supporting the CINC, and the CI elements organic to the MI brigade or battalion supporting the PCO force. A key coordination element is the need to clearly delineate the responsibility for intelligence and CI liaison between EAC intelligence support elements (ISEs), the EAC CI battalion, and the contingency force CI element.

CI liaison is important among EAC, ECB, and members of the country team in the HN. This includes CI liaison among the US Army, other government intelligence and security services, and HN security entities.

BALANCE

Balance is a factor that your MDCI support achieves by portraying to the friendly commander how he looks to the threat. This includes a thorough analysis of the HN and adversary intelligence and security system.

Your MDCI analysts may not have direct access to this information and may have to rely on other national level agencies and departments. For example, there must be a balance between political goals and the scale, intensity, and nature of military operations supporting those goals.

PLANNING

PCO require detailed, flexible planning incorporating the principles of coordination and balance. Intelligence support to planning must be comprehensive.

MDCI preparation of the PCO battlefield begins with the MI brigade (EAC) supporting the theater CINC.

PCO can transition from one type to the other. Operations to restore order transition into PKO; noncombatant operations transition to peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.

The planning and training phases of PCO may require special protection such as that afforded by the SAP.

Open sources of information such as the news media, both in the base area and the HN, should be scrutinized to determine if essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) have been compromised. Pay particular attention to political factions that are opposed to US and HN cooperation. A primary concern to the MDCI analyst is any potential for terrorist activity targeted against the US Army presence in the host country.

PCO CONSIDERATIONS

Various PCO require you to be sensitive to special needs. Not all PCO are created equal; each has its own collection of special circumstances. Each type of PCO requires separate consideration of the potential threat to the success of the mission. The MDCI analyst uses the MDCI analysis process described in Appendix C to determine the threat or friendly vulnerabilities and countermeasures.

Shows of Force and Demonstrations

Shows of force and demonstrations include—

- Forward deployment of military forces.
- Combined training exercises.
- Aircraft and ship visits.
- The introduction or buildup of military forces in a region.

These missions will provide opportunities for the threat and third-country supporters to exploit the presence of US forces to their political advantage. Such exploitation may include violence such as terrorist activities or the intelligence exploitation of US soldiers in contact with local nationals.

You must ensure that unit security education programs and SAEDA orientations are emphasized and integrated into unit training plans and programs.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

NEOS may cause hostile reactions when they involve using US forces to relocate threatened civilian noncombatants, selected HN natives, and third-country nationals. Air and ground routes of evacuation may
provide targets of opportunity for terrorist interdiction or public demonstrations that might cripple the mission.

CI element liaison and coordination with other US agencies resident in the HN and with HN intelligence, security, and LEA offices will be necessary. Your job is to ensure that the threat is properly assessed and friendly vulnerabilities have been protected.

Rescue and Recovery Operations

RRO may include the rescue of US or friendly foreign nationals and the location, identification, and recovery of sensitive equipment or materiel.

Threat forces may oppose RRO. Therefore, a thorough assessment of threat intelligence and security systems is essential for force protection. RRO maybe either clandestine or overt. Stealth, speed, surprise, and sufficient force to overcome the threat are the characteristics of RRO. MDCI supports the commander’s need for timely intelligence, extraordinary OPSEC measures, and the use of deception.

Strikes and Raids

Strikes and raids can support RRO or seize and destroy equipment and facilities which threaten US interests. They can also support counter-drug operations. Consider putting planning, organizing, training, and equipping under SAPS. Deliberate and inadvertent disclosure of the commander’s intent requires special attention.

Threat and third-country intelligence and security service collection capabilities must be thoroughly assessed. MDCI will support the commander’s OPSEC program and the deception plan. The plans will assist in disguising rehearsals through integration with routine training. The MDCI analyst should anticipate a threat all-source collection effort with national and technical assets available.

Operations to Restore Order Transitions

Operations to restore order include the unilateral employment of US forces, or a US and foreign JTF. Typically, operations to restore order PCO are undertaken at the request of the HN. ROE can be restrictive because the purpose of the force is to establish and maintain law and order. Your operations to restore order mission may rapidly transition to PKO. MDCI supports operations to restore order, which include—

- Consistent mission analysis.

- Clear C³ relationships.

- Effective communications facilities.

- Effective public diplomacy and PSYOP.

Continuity of MDCI operations is essential during all phases of the operations to restore order and transition to and during the PKO. The threat may consist of elements of the HN intelligence and security system, other FIS, or terrorist and other paramilitary or guerilla elements aligned with various political factions.

The stopping of hostilities, and the following period of negotiated settlement, is a time in which opposition factions will be maneuvering for power. US forces will be susceptible to terrorist activities and possible low-level interdiction by guerilla or paramilitary elements.

Unconventional Warfare Operations

Unconventional warfare operations (UWO) may include the use of both SOF and general purpose forces. Unlike most PCO, UWO are usually a long-term effort. Support to UWO is similar to support to insurrections. A major difference is that in UWO the emphasis is on military actions while support to an insurgency focuses on infrastructure and political development.

Disaster Relief Operations

DRO provide emergency assistance to victims of natural or manmade disasters abroad. They may include—

- Refugee assistance.

- Food programs.


- Assistance to other civilian welfare programs.

CI elements coordinate with agencies dispensing services to ensure that the situation is not being exploited by threat intelligence and security services. Coordination is between CI, MP, and CA elements supporting the operation.

Security Assistance Surges

SAS require MDCI threat assessments to determine threat intentions toward the security assistance effort. These surges are usually for a limited time. However, US forces involved in SAS may be subject to terrorists’ attempting to degrade the effectiveness of the operation.

Support to Civil Authorities
Support to US civil authority involves the use of military forces to support federal and state officials under (and limited by) the Posse Comitatus Act and other laws and regulations. US Army CI elements are guided by AR 381-10 and AR 381-20.

Counter-Drug Operations

DOD and Department of the Army (DA) policy regarding US Army CI support to DOD counter-drug operations is stated in DA letter, DAMI-CIC (381-20), Subject: Guidance for Army Counterintelligence Elements Supporting DOD Counternarcotics Missions, dated 20 September 1990.

Planning Considerations

Figure 8-1 is a functional matrix for PCO and guides MDCI support planning. This matrix was developed from FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Chapter 5.

Since Chapter 5 is not an exhaustive list of all major functions accomplished during the planning and execution of the various types of PCO, many functions are not cross-walked to a type operation with an X. This does not mean that the function is not important to a particular type PCO. Add your own X if you see a relationship not marked. (Figure 8-1 expands the CI functional steps in Figure C-1.)

The senior CI officer (commissioned, warrant, or noncommissioned officer) involved in planning MDCI support to PCO uses this matrix to identify key areas where additional support and attention are needed. PCO functional areas correlate to the four basic MDCI functions of—

• Investigation.
• Operations.
• Collection.
• Analysis and production.

HN and belligerent nation security forces include intelligence and security services and Level I and Level II threats in the area of responsibility (AOR). The MDCI database should contain a complete description of friendly and threat FISs.

Dossiers and files on key personnel in the structure should be maintained. In PCO, there may be a fine line between military, paramilitary, and LEA operations.

Terrorism, for example, is a criminal activity but requires heightened security when US military personnel, civilian noncombatants, and facilities are targets. Guerrillas, who employ terrorist tactics, may be countered by a combination of military, paramilitary, and police means.

US CI personnel must be fully apprised of the threat situation in any PCO. This attention is important because these operations can transition quickly to another level.

The senior CI officer is responsible for recommending countermeasures to protect EEFI. You must be thoroughly familiar with the mission statement, the commander’s intent, and METT-T factors. You must also understand how friendly forces will operate in the AO. Most PCO are short term and are executed swiftly. MDCI support must be front-loaded into PCO as early as possible in the contingency planning phase.

Aggressive CI liaison is a major contributor to accomplishing the MDCI mission. You are responsible for ensuring that close coordination is effected with the EACIC ISE resident in the AOR.

Intelligence liaison officers assigned to ISEs need to be trained to report information of MDCI interest. Records should be maintained of ISE liaison contacts with foreign military, paramilitary, and police personnel (sources) and organizations. Biographic data must be recorded and filed. This information will provide valuable input into the HUMINT data base in the counterintelligence analysis section (CIAS).

You must be completely familiar with the ROE and the political sensitivities that are part of each type of PCO. ROE includes constraints on the military imposed by the NCA, the US ambassador and his country team, the CINC, and caveats contained in the SOFA.

Force protection efforts may require special MDCI collection activities such as LLSO within the AOR. If LLSO are already being conducted in support of the CINC, you may want to consider augmenting the effort with additional resources or you may recommend refocusing the collection effort.

In any case, reporting from the LLSO must be incorporated into MDCI support to PCO. FM 34-60 and FM 34-60A(S) contain additional information on LLSO.
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(1) NEO can transition into operations to restore order or PKO.
(2) Strikes and raids can support RRO, counter-drug operations. CINC plans and executes.
(3) Operations to restore order may transition to PKO.

Figure 8-1. PCO functional matrix (continued).