CHAPTER 3
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

This chapter describes the IPB process and provides IPB TTP to support LIC operations.

As in other environments, the IPB process must be an effort driven by the commander that involves his entire staff. IPB, when applied in a LIC environment, integrates threat doctrine and operational patterns with weather and terrain and political, social, and economic information. Then it relates these factors to the specific mission and situation.

IPB provides a basis for determining and evaluating the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable COA of the threat, local population, HN government, and military. It also serves as the planning basis for the commander’s concept of operations and for allocating resources. This allocation could be engineers for disaster relief, special forces for FID, or a Ranger battalion for an airfield seizure.

IPB is interdependent with the intelligence cycle and the factors of analysis. It is not a stand-alone process. It relies on the functions and steps in the intelligence cycle for information. In turn, it provides input to the factors of analysis.

Information becomes intelligent in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle. This information comes from all available sources and agencies. The information processed includes, but is not limited to, demographics, OB, weather, terrain, personality, PSYOP, NBC, air defense, aviation, transportation, and logistics data.

The process of piecing together bits of intelligence into a usable product is done during the factors of analysis process. The end products of IPB are critical because they are the building blocks for recommendations to your commander. (See Chapter 4.)

DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD PRODUCTS

IPB is formally conducted at division or higher. A more informal approach occurs below division. In LIC, the formal process may begin at any level depending upon the situation. In support of a PCO (Operation JUST CAUSE), the process would be formally conducted at each echelon. In a counterinsurgency mission (El Salvador), the formal process starts at the RIC supporting a specific brigade.

Regardless of the mission, each level of command provides IPB support and products to its subordinate elements. Subordinate elements refine and expand these IPB products based on their specific mission requirements.

Developing IPB products in LIC is labor intensive. It requires cooperation from all staff elements, the commander’s direction and planning guidance, mission focus, and the involvement of outside resources such as HN elements and US DOD and non-DOD agencies.

The commander and his mission drive IPB. The G2 or S2 is the staff IPB coordinator. The all-source production section (ASPS) and the battlefield information coordination center (BICC) assemble the threat data base, convert it to graphics, and integrate it with demographic, weather, and terrain data.

However, the critical responsibility in IPB remains with the commander who actually guides the process based on his mission, AO, and AI. The AO and AI will differ greatly in size and scope based on the force employed, echelon, and specific mission. For example, an AO may be a fairly small contained area, such as Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) mission areas within a Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA). Or it could be large enough to cover an entire country or geographic region.

The commander’s primary concerns are the mission, threat, weather, and terrain. In LIC these are expanded to include the HN population, government, and military. A commander involved in a counterinsurgency mission, where the insurgents receive external support from a third nation, expands his AI to include the supporting nation and logistical LOC. He has similar concerns in a counter-drug mission determining—

- Where precursor elements used by the producer originate.
- How and where they arrive in country.

3-1
The producer’s logistics and transportation structure.

Following the commander’s analysis of the mission, he restates the mission to his staff and provides planning guidance. The staff may be augmented by external agencies and the HN. The planning usually contains the commander’s PIR. In the event it does not, the IPB process will help identify critical gaps and assist the staff in identifying suggested PIR. An example of this is a mission where the force is assisting a HN in PCO or DRO.

The S10 briefs the staff on the current threat situation including potential threat COAS. This input becomes the basis of staff estimates. The threat differs by mission, ranging from armed insurgents to criminal gangs.

In some instances, the threat is represented by nonviolent forms such as propaganda or, possibly, elected officials within the supported government. The threat does not have to be an armed force. If something is hostile, it is a threat.

When staff estimates for all potential threat COAS have been prepared, the staff analyzes and wargames the potential friendly and threat COA and determines the most probable COA based on all known factors. The staff then develops event templates and matrices and, if possible, decision support templates (DSTs) or decision support matrices (DSMs), whichever applies.

The commander is briefed on the DST and DSM. He reviews both DST and DSM to ensure all potential threat COAS and all friendly actions and intentions have been considered. The commander then updates his PIR based on the DST and DSM and issues a decision and concept of operations. This includes updating the DST and DSM.

Graphic products are the end result of IPB. In LIC, you produce graphics not normally found in the conventional process. A portion of these LIC-oriented graphics is shown at Figure 3-1. These and others are explained in Appendix G.

**BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION**

The first step of the IPB process is battlefield area evaluation (BAE). In this step, you assess the overall nature of the HN population, friendly forces, threat, and operating environment.

This evaluation should address key areas such as significant personalities, ethnic, political, economic, or religious sectors of the populace and specific population centers. This helps you determine what information, products, and support you need to complete IPB. You can then issue IR to fill in basic information gaps.

**INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS**

Tailor these IR to the specific battlefield area and to the threat you expect to encounter within the AO and AI. This helps you determine threat capabilities in relation to the HN population, government, military, weather, terrain, and friendly mission.

In LIC, this is difficult since we usually have no threat doctrinal templates to consider when making recommendations to the commander. As a result, we create, manage, and evaluate our data base early. This assists us in developing threat operational patterns and doctrine early.

Data bases differ from mission to mission, but the basic needs remain. Data requires tailoring to apply to a specific LIC mission. For example, the threat presented in counterinsurgency is different from that presented by a drug producer. Yet they both require some of the same basic logistics to operate: food, clothing, and batteries. Your data base would be the same for logistics but would differ for threat, weapons, and tactics.

As discussed above, we have to consider support provided by outside elements when involved in any of the missions in LIC. The data base should also illuminate topographic areas and features that must be considered during the IPB effort.

**THE BATTLEFIELD**

The battlefield consists of the AO and the AI. These areas are typically viewed in terms of width, depth, height (airspace), electro-optical (E-O) factors, and time—with time being the most critical.

In LIC, these factors stay important and are evaluated along with the TTP of friendly and HN forces. To these, however, we must add the HN population, threat, and friendly mission. Typical battle frontages and formations
are not common to LIC however, they may occur in certain PCO or PKO.

**Ground Operations Areas**

As mentioned, your AO will vary in size from very small, as in the case of an ARSOF mission area (which may be located well within a denied area) to a very large area. An AO is determined by the TTP of the force, mission, population, and threat. During Operation JUST CAUSE, a light infantry brigade’s AO encompassed hundreds of square miles.

Mission planning does not end with initial success or termination of threat operations; rather, it extends through the follow-on nation building phase. With this kind of planning, the AO takes on a different perspective.

Your commander’s assigned AO is based on METT-T factors in addition to the TTP of the unit. For example, if he has the mission to pacify and control the populace in an extremely large area, his first choice may be to use an ARSOF operating detachment alpha (ODA). Yet this unit is too small and does not have the necessary transportation assets. However, by attaching an ODA to a light infantry brigade, the mission is possible.
The LIC mission commander looks at the battlefield in the conventional way and keeps an eye on those areas which are not in conflict (countries, states, regions). The primary difference in application is that in LICs the political, social, and economic characteristics of the AO are addressed in more detail.

Air Operations Areas
The air AO is similar to the ground AO because air bases, refueling points, landing zones (LZs), drop zones (DZs), and air defense weapons and radars operate within the command’s boundaries.

One major difference between air and ground operations is the height or operating ceiling (within which fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft operate and defense weapons can fire) and the enormous distances that can be covered by aircraft.

Many of the special operations aircraft (SOA) are capable of self-deploying to combat zones or conducting stealth infiltrations covering thousands of miles. The AO for SOA must cover the home base, the initial staging base (ISB), the forward staging base (FSB), and the target.

Numerous infiltration and exfiltration routes may be developed based on the mission. Infiltration routes may cross several countries or various political alignments and areas with severely different climatic conditions and must be included in the AI.

Rear Operations Areas
In most conventional operations, the rear AO differs from the forward AO (close and deep) because it includes geographical areas where higher and lower support, security, and air defense elements are conducting operations simultaneously.

Specific factors about the civil population, CI, security, PSYOP, and CA also impose special considerations. In LIC, these specific factors are considered by all units at any location and in any mission. Again, some missions of PCO or PKO can result in the unit’s having a rear operations area.

In certain PCO and PKO missions the rear operations AI may include an area as large as a theater of operations, a theater rear area, or a communications zone (COMMZ). The area must extend into threat territory, as CS and CSS units must be prepared to move into areas formerly occupied by the threat. The rear AI may overlap the AIs of other rear area commanders, as well as other rear AOs.

Most LIC operations have a 360-degree AO. Therefore, considerations normally found in a rear operations area take on added importance to the maneuver commander.

Areas of Interest
Time remains a crucial factor in many ways: Tactical, operational, and strategic concerns are all related to time. A Ranger battalion seizing an airfield is concerned with the reaction time of a response force. A theater CINC is concerned with the timeliness of a logistics flow to a country in need of disaster relief. Assistance for nation building using nationally appropriated funds may take years to complete. In LIC, time is viewed in immediate, near term, and future frames.

The G2 or S2 recommends the AI to the commander based on METT-T and the commander’s concept of the operation. It includes all threat activities that might affect the friendly force from the time the operation begins through follow-on missions.

An AI is developed based upon its importance to the threat; friendly force; the HN population, government, and military or how it corresponds tactically to other selected targets in terms of criticality and importance.

An additional factor in determining your AI may be that the area includes a portion of another country where the commander cannot interdict the threat and the G2 or S2 cannot easily gather data. When your AI includes another country, then cross-theater coordination for collection and dissemination of intelligence will be required. This increases reliance on the HN’s (or possibly a third nation’s) ability to provide detailed information that is not obtainable with organic collection assets. Combating terrorism, for example, may require the monitoring of a country that exports terrorism and is located thousands of miles from your AO.

Following the commander’s approval, the G2 or S2 forwards the boundaries of the AI to the next higher echelon, where it serves as a guide for supporting intelligence requirements. The AI will be larger than the AO and differs in size and magnitude from mission to mission. At the operational or strategic level, the AI may extend to other countries thousands of miles away if
they are seen as a source of external support to the threat encountered. Tactically, the AI will include all infiltration and exfiltration routes to be used.

The air AI is normally larger than the ground AI, primarily because of the great distances threat aircraft can rapidly cover and the speed with which they can influence friendly operations. The air AI encompasses threat airfields, refueling and rearming points, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, air defense early warning radar (EWR) locations, and ground-controlled intercept (GCI) sites.

The air AI extends upward to the maximum ceiling of threat aircraft and to the maximum effective altitudes of friendly and threat air defense systems. The AI for SOA are specific, narrowly defined target areas. In the BAE step, demographics are important for areas around the ISB or the FSB.

The G2 or S2 evaluates the demographics, terrain, weather, and threat and makes recommendations regarding the determination of subordinate unit boundaries to the G3 or S3. He uses these recommendations to suggest subordinate unit boundaries and resource allocations to the commander.

**Analyst Considerations**

When the AO and AI are defined, the analyst determines and assembles the data requirements—demographics, terrain, weather, and threat—along with materials needed to complete the IPB process. Basic requirements include maps and material to prepare templates and overlays. The data base includes current reporting and a library of finished products.

Expand your holdings to include finished products such as doctrinal and theological writings, captured manuals, open-source articles, recorded newscasts, area studies, gazetteers, and nautical almanacs. Unique products may be required such as—

- Geological surveys.
- Charts for areas prone to earthquakes (disaster relief).

**Hydrographic studies for NEO.**

- Telephone directories for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT).
- Any local gazetteer or commercial directory.

Standard military topographic products (at a scale corresponding to the echelon conducting the IPB) are essential. When available, airspace analysis may be accomplished using the standard 1:250,000 air and radar joint operations graphic (JOG) specifically designed for this purpose. For detailed analysis of an aircraft’s approach to a target, standard 1:50,000 topographic maps are useful. MOUT requires maps at scales of 1:12,500 or larger. Certain missions, especially those in support of ARSOF elements, require the use of products at a scale of 1:2,500, blueprints, floor plans, and photographs for precise collection and planning.

You may find that there is no map coverage of your AO and AI, especially at the 1:50,000 scale or larger. This requires you to collect MC&G products from DOD or non-DOD agencies. The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) maybe of some assistance; however, the best source is usually the HN you are supporting. But do not overlook sources such as The National Geographic Society, oil company road maps, and tire company touring guides.

During Operation BLAST FURNACE, HN hydrographic maps at extremely small scale had to be used as no other MC&G products were available. Commercially procured topographic satellite (LANDSAT) imagery was used for a short time until it was determined that the imagery was taken during the rainy season. This altered the look of the terrain during the time of the operation.

If you are involved in an operation where there are no HN graphics, DMA will provide whatever support it can. But you may have to exercise some local initiative to satisfy the command’s needs.

**TERRAIN ANALYSIS**

The second step of IPB is terrain analysis. This looks at the effects of terrain on military operations. In LIC, consider the military aspects of observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors (OCOKA), as you do in conventional missions. But in addition, you must also consider the local population. The impact of population on a LIC mission is critical.
When you look at population, you must evaluate HN demographics, government, and military. By evaluating these factors you will be better prepared for the diversity of LIC missions. Chapter 4 lists those demographic factors that must be included in your evaluation.

You should understand the historical development of the country. Make sure you know those precedent-setting events that evoke or inspire pro- or anti-nationalist feelings. You may find that the threat conducts operations on historically significant dates.

The population study will be diverse and in-depth. At a minimum you will want to identify pro-government, anti-government, and neutral population sectors. Categorize population by—

- Boundaries.
- Political subdivisions.
- Natural features.
- Settlement patterns.
- Structure.
- Migration patterns.
- Labor.
- Known problems.

Ethnic, language groups, and languages (subsets of the population) are critical factors in any LIC mission and require your specific attention. Evaluate the social system to determine class structure, family, kinship relations, religion, and social values.

Examine the education system in terms of—

- Literacy rates by region.
- Age.
- Government financing.
- Government view on the importance of education.
- The education system.
- Teaching profession.

The evaluation of the economy will include the economic system itself, public finance, financial institutions, agriculture, industry, foreign trade, transportation; together with domestic issues such as housing, health, and welfare.

When evaluating the HN government—

- Review the legislative and judicial structures, functions as authorized by law, and the constitutional framework.
- Look at the political structure governing the country including key personnel.
- Determine its legitimacy, dogma, beliefs, and intent.
- Evaluate each political party or faction that is active within the country.
- Examine special interest groups and their impact on local politics.
- Understand the HN foreign policies and relations.

When you evaluate the HN military, develop and evaluate the generic data base of all military organizations. Look at—

- Composition.
- Disposition.
- Strength.
- Tactics.
- Weapons.
- Equipment.
- Personalities.

Your evaluation should also include national policy and laws which govern the use of the military. Check their adherence to these laws, association with political groups (as well as external influences or support), and any division or rift within the ranks. Consider the capability of the military to accomplish the mission at hand.

In addition to the OCOKA factors described above, you must also consider—

- Strategic location.
  - Neighboring countries and boundaries.
  - Natural defense, including frontiers.
  - Points of entry and strategic routes.
- Size and dimensions.
- Relief.
- Beach data.
• Hydrography.
  – Oceans.
  – Lakes.
  – Rivers.
• Other surface water sources.
• Land use.
• Geological basics.
• Forests and vegetation.
• Water.
• Natural foods.
• Wildlife.
• Demographics.
  – Population centers.
  – Social analysis (History, Ethnics, Languages, Social system, Education).
• Living conditions.
• Cultures.
• Religions.
• Taboos.
• Grievances.
• Political analysis.
• National government.
  – Structure.
    – International orientation.
    – Degree of popular support.
• Political parties.
• Foreign dependence or alliances.
• Controls and restrictions.
• Laws (civil and religious).
• Economic analysis.
• Current value of money, wage scales.
• Financial structure, to include national or international banking system.
• Foreign dependence.
  – Assistance programs.
  – In-country business.
• Agriculture and domestic food supply.
• Natural resources and degree of self-sufficiency.
• Industry.
  – Types (base and main industries).
    – Production levels.
  – Consumer demands.
  – Unions.
• Black market and illicit trades (drugs, weapons, contraband).
• Technology.
  – Capabilities.
  – Expertise.
• Foreign trade.
  – Type.
    – Level.
    – Transportation.
• Fuels and power.
  – Locations.
    – Quality.
    – Production system.
• Mass communications.
  – Telephone.
    – Telegraph.
    – Television.
  – Radio.
  – Microwave systems.
  – Satellite and laser systems.
• Transportation.
  – Railroads.
    – Highways and roads.
    – Trails and paths.
    – Waterways.
The third step in IPB is weather analysis. Weather analysis in LIC does not differ greatly from that conducted during regular operations. However, the primary focus of weather analysis shifts to supporting the G2 or S2 on reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) capabilities. Weather effects still apply on mobility, observation, fields of fire, camouflage, helicopter LZs, and line-of-sight (LOS) radio and radar equipment. See FM 34-81-1 for details on weather effects on systems, operations, and personnel, to include—

• Climatic conditions.
• Weather effects.
• Weather forecasts.

In areas of great seasonal climatic change, terrain intelligence produced during one season may be useless in others. Therefore, weather analysis based on current observations or forecasts, together with terrain intelligence, must be reviewed and updated continuously.

Weather may have a unique impact on LIC missions and account for some unusual indicators. For example, in tropical areas during wet seasons, it is probable that it will rain at the same time every day. The G2 or S2 can usually rely on this information to predict occurrences of threat activity.

An insurgent force may time its attack to coincide with the daily tropical rain knowing that military aircraft will not respond. This also applies to counter-drug operations, as inclement weather provides excellent cover for the movement of illicit drugs.

In PKO, it may become evident that threat organizations do not conduct demonstrations or rallies during inclement weather. This allows you to put together another piece of the projected threat activity puzzle.

Weather affects PSYOP. Rain and heavy winds disrupt or stop an otherwise effective leaflet drop. Weather also impacts on CA operations; heavy rain easily disrupts construction projects or a medical and veterinary assistance program.

Another key aspect of weather is light data. For example, you may have to perform pattern analysis on freshly cut trails and related threat activities. While reviewing the data for those activities, examine the light data as well. You will probably find that the percent of illumination during each period was low, providing the threat with the greatest degree of darkness.

Consider the following weather effects:

• Subversives normally use bad weather or darkness to their advantage. These conditions reduce the effectiveness of HN surveillance, direct and indirect fire, air support, and logistics.
• Inclement weather affects the availability of food supplies.
• It is difficult for insurgents to cache supplies in frequently flooded areas.
Mass demonstrations use good weather to get maximum turnout.

Seasonal weather effects may determine if farmers or fishermen are available to participate in insurgency operations.

Bad weather further degrades poor road networks common in lesser developed countries.

For additional information on the military application of weather, see FM 34-81/AFM 105-4.

**THREAT EVALUATION**

The threat evaluation in LIC begins early. You will cover a wide range of factors in building an accurate model. These include all aspects of—

- Leadership.
- Objectives.
- Organization.
- Tactics.
- Timing.
- Environment.

Doctrinal templates developed during conventional threat evaluation are difficult to use in LIC due to a lack of defined TTP.

However, threat operational patterns are determined and templated for exploitation during threat integration.

Threat evaluation is a three-step process as shown at Figure 3-2.

**DEVELOPMENT**

The first step is the development of the threat data base. The LIC threat data base is similar to that developed for a conventional military unit with some modifications. These include—

- External training.
- External travel.
- Political and religious beliefs.
- Other support.

This data base will be further modified when applied to other LIC missions such as counter-drugs. Here you will require an organizational structure, personalities, equipment, and tactics. Modifications include—

- Specifics on the production of the drug.
- Growing season of the base plant.

- Methods of transport.
- Required precursor chemicals.
- Source and availability.

As stated earlier, LIC threat data bases are developed in much that same way as conventional threat data bases. Consequently, use OB factors to develop and evaluate LIC threat.

There are certain OB considerations unique to a threat encountered in LIC operations. Recognize the differences in types of threat, strategy, modus operandi, and tactics as well as equipment, materiel, and personnel. There are as many differences when applying OB to the phases of an insurgency as there are when analyzing looters, drug traffickers, and terrorists.

OB intelligence factors are interdependent and considered as a whole. Information on one of the elements often leads to a reevaluation or alteration of information previously received on another. Furthermore, the general rule that OB intelligence is developed and maintained down to and including two echelons below the analyst’s own level of command does not apply to LIC operations.

LIC threat requires OB intelligence to be produced in greater detail and at lower echelons than found in conventional operations. Many times you will focus down to individuals. In LIC the category personalities is added to the usual list of OB factors.

These factors, which are viewed from the same perspective as in war, include—

- Composition.
- Disposition.
- Strength.
- Tactics.
- Training.
- Logistics...
Composition
Composition is the identification of units, organizations, or possibly families involved in illicit activities such as drugs. Unit identification consists of the complete designation of a specific entity by name or number, type, relative size or strength, and subordination.

Similar information is required on organizations, families, and individuals. Often you will be dealing with a name only. Instead of a unit type, you may be dealing with a type of activity. For example, a family involved in drugs may only be a front for money laundering and never have anything to do with the actual drug production. Composition includes—

- Criminals.
  - Gangs.
  - Families.
  - Organized crime.
- Drug traffickers.
  - Families.
  - Organizations, cartels.
  - Structured similar to a military unit with staff sections responsible for specific functions, such as logistics, transportation, and security.
- Terrorists.
  - Cells.
  - Echelons, staffs.
  - Political, religious, ideological, and military aims
  - External support.

Here is a look at the activity thresholds of insurgences by phases.
During Phase I, threat activities range from being only a potential problem to frequently occurring activities displaying an organized pattern. No major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity exists. The insurgent is primarily concerned with organizing infrastructure, conducting PSYOP, and conducting limited terrorist attacks during this phase, and may include—

- Infrastructure: political, religious, and ideological.
- New organizations.
- Internal and external C².
- Operational organizations.
- Internal and external support structure.

Phase II begins when the insurgent has gained sufficient local or external support to initiate organized guerilla warfare against the government or military units, including—

- Internal and external support structure.
- New organizations.
- C³.

Phase III of an insurgency becomes primarily a conventional conflict between the organized forces of the insurgents and the established government. The insurgents may continue guerilla operations as well.

An important point to remember is that the insurgent may be operating outside the boundaries of the HN during all three phases. Geographic boundaries cannot limit collection and analysis of conventional military units, such as C³.

**Political Structure**

- Criminal. Typically not a factor; maybe motivated by oppressive regime to support insurgency or terrorism.
- Drug trafficker. Typically not a factor.
- Terrorists.
  - Political, religious, or ideological initiatives.
  - External ties.
- Insurgents.
  - Formal structure.
  - Political, religious, or ideological initiatives.

- Parallels existing government hierarchy.
- Usually forms an umbrella organization over the military arm.

**Combat Forces**

- Criminal *(may have hit squads that are responsible for enforcement).*
  - Gangs.
  - Families.
- Terrorists.
  - Assassination squads.
  - Bomb and demolition squads.
  - Attack or hit squads.
- Insurgents.
  - Maneuver units (cells, companies, battalions).
  - Special forces (assassination, demolition). All combat units should be identified by number, commander’s name, commander’s nickname, unit nickname, code designation, and name of area in which it operates.

**Disposition**

Disposition consists of the geographic location of threat elements and the manner in which they are deployed, employed, or located. Additionally, disposition includes the recent, current, and projected movements or locations of these threat elements. Disposition includes—

- Criminal.
  - Residences (impoverished or poor neighborhoods).
  - AOS (target areas; for example, high cost areas).
- Drug trafficker.
  - Residences
  - Production and growing areas of base product.
  - Areas of control.
  - Safe houses.
  - Transshipment points.
  - Manufacturing locations of synthetic drugs.
– Laboratory sites for processing base products.
– Logistics camps.
– Front organizations and companies.

• Terrorists.
  – Training camps.
  – Base camps.
  – Logistics camps (external and internal).
    Headquarters (external and internal).
  – Areas of control.

• Insurgents.
  – Training camps.
  – Base camps.
  – Logistics camps (external and internal).
  – Headquarters (external and internal).
  – Areas of control.
  – PSYOP locations (radio transmitters and printing presses).

Emphasis in rural areas compared to city areas.

Strength

Strength conventionally is described in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment. However, in LIC you augment this definition with combat forces strike teams, hit squads, political cadres or cells, and, most importantly, popular support. Popular support can range from sympathizers to assistance in conducting operations, moving logistics, or just withholding information.

Tactics

Tactics include strategy, modus operandi, and doctrine. Each refers to the threat’s accepted principles of organization and employment of forces. Tactics also involve political, military, psychological, and economic considerations.

Remember that the threat modifies its activities based on the abilities and tactics of friendly forces. A good example of this was the mine-countermine situation in El Salvador in the 1980's. The insurgent force developed a new type of mine or booby trap; the government forces countered with new tactics or detection devices; to which the insurgents replied with a different device. Tactics include—

• Criminal
  – Patterns of activity (for example, windows for operations).
  – Methods of operation (methods of entry, looting).

• Drug trafficking.
  – Growing methods.
  – Concealment methods.
  – Transportation methods.
  – Money laundering.
  – Extortion.
  – Civic actions.
  – Political endeavors.

• Terrorists.
  – Threats.
  – Sabotage.
  – Extortion.
  – Violence (bombing, assassination).
  – Civic actions.
  – PSYOP.
  – Economic targets.
  – Political and religious targets and motivators.

• Insurgents.
  – Subversive patterns.
  – Critical-cell patterns.
  – Mass-oriented patterns.
  – Traditional patterns.
  – Urban warfare.
  – Rural warfare.
  – Small-scale operations.
  – Major offensives.
  – Mines and booby traps.
  – Recruitment.
– PSYOP.
– Economic targets.
– Political and religious targets and motivators.

Training

Training is tied closely to combat force and threat tactics. Those supporting the threat receive some type of training. Persons who mix the precursor elements in the manufacture of cocaine or those that build satchel charges have to be trained. You can predict potential activities by monitoring the types and levels of threat training.

Higher education also plays a role in threat tactics and training. Some threat elements intentionally recruit university students, either to join the movement or to prepare for future leadership roles.

An example of this is Omar (Cabezas, a medical student in Nicaragua. He was recruited by the FSLN while attending medical school in Leon, Nicaragua, in the late 1960’s. His education and political convictions made him a prime recruitment target of the FSLN. By monitoring the training he received, Nicaraguan government forces were able to measure his contribution to FSLN readiness. Following are examples of threat training:

• Drug trafficking.
  – Growing cycle.
  – Production cycle.
  – Manufacturing cycle.
  – Techniques and procedures in shipping and marketing.

• Security of operations.
  – Armed forces.
  – Deception.
  – Concealment.

• Terrorists.
  – Weapons (individual and crew-served).
  – Demolitions (manufacture and placement).
  – Tactics.
  – Indoctrination and strategy (political, ideological, or religious).
  – Operations.

Logistics

As in conventional warfare, threat effectiveness in LIC depends heavily on logistics. This dependency fluctuates horizontally between the various threat groups and also vertically between levels of intensity. You also see activity trends based on logistic support or nonsupport.

For example, a resupply surge into an area controlled by an insurgent may indicate an upcoming offensive. Or the upcoming harvest of opium poppies in a specific region will indicate a resupply surge in support of the stepped up production process. These indicators, when combined with IPB, help you predict possible threat COAs.

Logistic indicators include—
Combat Effectiveness

Combat effectiveness in LIC is not the same as combat effectiveness in conventional operations. Rather, we view it from the standpoint of effectively controlling the population and the political situation. An upswing in support for a local drug lord indicates a level of effectiveness over that of the government. Government deficiencies may be economic, social, or political. Whatever the case, the drug lord fills voids the government cannot. Combat effectiveness indicators include—

- **Criminal**
  - Extortion of business owners.
  - Disrupting tourism, affecting local businesses.
  - Blackmail.
- **Drug trafficking.**
  - Support to local populace the government cannot or will not give.
  - Extortion.
  - Intimidation.
  - Corruption
- **Terrorists,**
  - Fear.
  - Intimidation.
  - Political change.
  - Popular support.
  - International support and furor.
- **Insurgents,**
  - Fear.
  - Intimidation.
  - Political change.
  - Popular support.
  - International support and furor.

Electronic Technical Data

In LIC, there is often a lack of threat signal operating instructions (S01). This impedes the development of an extensive threat electronic OB data base and an electronic technical data base.
The threat use of radar tends to be situation specific. While not playing a large role in insurgency, it cannot be completely overlooked. Threats often use high frequency (HF) shortwave or ham radio sets. Citizen band sets play a role in early threat operations. Equipment available to the threat ranges from the most primitive to the most modern.

Propaganda activities may result in threat-sponsored commercial or clandestine radio broadcasts. Covert broadcasts normally originate outside the national boundaries or from remote, inaccessible areas. Commercial radio broadcasts may use code words to control and coordinate threat operations. Television broadcasts may be used similarly.

**Personalities**

Personalities are a critical factor in LIC operations. We have to focus our attention on the individual. Through link analysis (determining relationships between personalities), we can build organizations. This applies to virtually any threat represented in LIC. Once you have determined relationships and the level of contact or knowledge the personalities have of each other, you can determine their activities.

For example: If you know that an individual is responsible for train-the-trainer missions on mortars, you would track him to see who he comes into contact with and who he trains. By doing this, you will not only determine the capabilities of the insurgents but may also help to identify cells within the faction. This, in turn, helps determine organizational structure. Personality files include, but are not limited to—

- **Criminals.**
  - Gang leaders.
  - Family leaders.
  - Nicknames.
- **Drug traffickers.**
  - Family leaders.
  - Organization, cartel leaders, and staffs.
  - Nicknames.
- **Terrorists.**
  - Leaders (political, ideological, religious, and military).
  - Staff members.
- **Insurgents.**
  - Leaders (political, ideological, religious, and military).
  - Staff members.
  - Nicknames.
  - Demolitions.
  - Weapons.
  - Assassinations.
  - Civic actions.
  - PSYOP.
  - Communications.
  - Economics.
  - Logistics.
  - Transportation.
  - Recruitment.
  - Trainers.
  - Emissaries for external support.

**Miscellaneous Data**

Miscellaneous data includes supporting information needed by analysts but not covered by an OB factor. This could include unit, organization, or family history false unit identifications (IDs), names or designator, methods of operation; political and military goals; propaganda and PSYOP; and demographics.

Propaganda and PSYOP files contain—

- Copies of leaflets, posters, and other printed material.
- Video recordings of television broadcasts.
- Audio recordings of radio broadcasts.
- Copies of speeches.
• Background material.
• Analysis of local grievances.

Reference material, such as a reference library to support your backup working files, will complete your data base. This library needs to contain at a minimum:
• Material on the area.
• Manuals or writings on threat doctrine, tactics, and methods.
• Newspapers and magazines.

**EVALUATION**

The second step of the threat evaluation process is the evaluation of threat capabilities. These capabilities are evaluated based on their impact on the battlefield and friendly mission. You determine the ability of the threat to conduct specific actions. For example, does the threat have sufficient popular support to conduct an offensive in the capital? Is the threat organized well enough to be able to kidnap a local judge without causing casualties in the immediate area? This evaluation provides the basis for doctrinal templating.

**PRODUCTION**

The final step is the production of doctrinal templates. (Generally, the templates you develop in a conventional conflict will be modified for LIC. For example, generic practices or patterns throughout all insurgences do not lend themselves to templating.

As a result, we build threat models based on our data base and fuse that with pattern analysis developed from historical incident overlays which portray threat activity. This is typical of most LIC threats: insurgents, terrorists, drug traffickers, or criminals.

**THREAT INTEGRATION**

What we determine about the battlefield through data evaluation is now integrated (fused) with the evaluation of the terrain and weather. At this point in the conventional process, we would normally develop the situation template and NAIs.

As there are no doctrinal templates available during the early stages of LIC, we base the situation template on types of activity, when and where it will occur, and the disposition of the threat to conduct the activity—not on enemy formations and movement.

In counterinsurgency, for example, we construct the situation template by layering or fusing incident overlays covering a specific period. From these you determine what preliminary movements and actions were conducted by the enemy prior to an action.

To capture data on enemy tactics used during the attack, we produce a second situation template using a large-scale map of the immediate area. You can now accurately determine patterns or practices used to conduct operations. You can then compare them to known enemy composition, disposition, training, and personnel levels at the time of the attack.

At the same time, factor in the other facets of the BAE as they were prior to and during the time of the attack. Was there a recent presidential election? Is the date of the attack a significant date in the history of the country or revolution? Was there a recent increase in foreign assistance to the government?
RESIZING THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

You can now reduce the size of the AO to likely areas of subversive concentrations by merging, the population status, concealment and cover, and logistic sustainability overlays. By determining areas that provide the support of the populace—concealment, cover, and sustenance—we can now focus on a number of small geographic areas rather than on one large country or a major city.

These likely areas of subversive concentrations are now viewed as NAIs, allowing us to efficiently task our collection assets. We then add the LOC overlay to determine the location of possible threat targets in or near the NAIs. This aids collection, R&S and analysis of the NAIs.

Due to the absence of time phaselines and other doctrinal concerns, DSTS or DSMS cannot always be produced in LIC. But you can produce supporting matrices to assist the commander. You build these using information gained from your version of the situation template and your evaluation of the AO. Once you determine the requirements and actions of an insurgent force prior to an attack, develop a matrix that reflects these key events.

In the case of counterinsurgency, you will require a separate matrix for each insurgent faction encountered. This same process applies to all facets of LIC: in counter-drugs for determining the movement of illicit drugs or the activation of a processing laboratory, and in PKO to determine preliminary activities for demonstrations or terrorist attacks. Through this analysis we develop TAIs, some of which may have been NAIs.

TARGET AREA OF INTEREST CATEGORIES

We place TAIs into two categories: point and area. Point TAIs are specific areas for fire support, EW, or possibly HUMINT assets. Or, for that matter, any system that requires a moderate degree of accuracy.

Area TAIs are generally more terrain dependent; for example, sanctuaries near international borders, areas of anti-government sentiment, and estuaries serving as resupply LOC.

TARGET VALUE ANALYSIS

Once you have identified TAIs, you can then conduct target value analysis (TVA) to determine if the threat can seize the target, attack the target, or if the target fits into his COA. You can now predict subversive intentions throughout the spectrum of LIC and hinder or deny threat success.

DISSEMINATION AND USE

As a result of IPB, you will produce a variety of—

- Templates.
- Overlays.
- Association and event matrices.
- Flow charts.

You will provide them to the commander and G3 or S3 for approval and guidance. Once approved, the G3 or S3 integrates IPB with other staff products and applies them to mission planning and execution.

Your job is to ensure that accurate products are promptly provided to consumers. You also use your IPB products internally to identify gaps in the intelligence database and provide input to the CMO to help refine his collection effort.