STATEMENT BY

MR. JOHN R. LANDON

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AND THE

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ON THE

AERIAL COMMON SENSOR PROGRAM

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Chairman Weldon, Chairwoman Wilson, distinguished members of the two Subcommittees, thank you for this opportunity to speak to you about the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) program. I am John Landon, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration) for Command and Control, Communications, Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance, and Information Technology Acquisition. I am here today representing Mr. Ken Krieg, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Milestone Decision Authority for ACS. He is traveling overseas on official business and unable to attend this important hearing.

The Aerial Common Sensor program is designated a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) in accordance with Title 10 USC, and my office oversees the acquisition activities of the program in accordance with the Department’s acquisition regulations in support of Mr. Krieg. In the case of ACS, I also work closely with the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to ensure the system is delivering the desired capability.

The Department’s acquisition regulations are designed to provide a structured process through which validated capabilities are acquired, starting with early concept exploration activities, continuing through development and demonstration, and leading to a decision to produce and fully deploy the capability. My involvement in these programs is to ensure the mandates of statute and regulation are adhered to, and the programs are on a success-oriented track as they enter the system development and design phase. My office also measures the progress that programs are making as they
advance through the phases of the acquisition life cycle, with special attention to the program’s achievement of its performance, schedule, and cost goals.

I also serve as the Leader of the Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT), a group responsible for ensuring programs in the acquisition process have satisfied the necessary criteria for entering the next phase of acquisition. For a number of years, the Department has used the Integrated Product Team approach as a process for reviewing its acquisition programs. The group I lead, as well as the supporting groups, consist of subject matter experts from across the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services. These experts bring their considerable knowledge and experience to the table as we review the multiple facets of today’s acquisition programs. Our OIPT members include representatives from all parts of the Department. For example, the Joint Staff provides advice on requirements; the Defense Procurement Office assists the program office in development of the acquisition strategy; and the Program Analysis and Evaluation office is key to the development of alternatives analysis and accurate program cost estimates. Other key representatives are the Office of the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation; the Defense Research and Engineering office; the Comptroller; the Chief Information Officer; Logistics and Materiel Readiness; and the General Counsel.

Once a program completes the review process, we present the findings to the USD(AT&L) and his advisors and offer a recommendation as to whether the program is ready to proceed. With regard to ACS, we followed the process I’ve described above and collectively concluded that the program was ready to enter the system.
development and demonstration phase. The results were presented to the USD(AT&L) and his advisors during a Defense Acquisition Board and, on July 29, 2004, he approved entry into this phase of development. The decision was forwarded to the Secretary of the Army and source selection and contract award was completed by the Department of the Army.

With that said, I am here to answer any questions you may have. If I am unable to provide a concise answer today, I will respond to you as soon as possible with an answer for the record.

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in the National Security Strategy**

We are facing a turbulent and volatile world populated by a number of highly adaptive adversaries. These enemies depend on the stealth afforded them through the exploitation of illicit networks and the sanctuary of ungoverned territories to survive. Their style of warfare is transient and unpredictable, demanding that the United States and our allies rely heavily on intelligence to anticipate and deter enemy action.

The Department of Defense National Security Strategy outlines an approach to dealing with the diverse, unconventional set of global security challenges in the 21st Century. The Strategy highlights the importance of transforming the United States (U.S.) military to ensure the U.S. has the capabilities to deter attacks, secure strategic access, and retain global freedom of action. This emphasis on transformation includes redefining how the Department develops and deploys its Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, based on the premise that the U.S. cannot influence what it cannot reach, see, or hear.

The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Forces requested the Department address the concept of operations, mission description and force structure of current major National and DoD systems, their capabilities, enabling systems and follow-on replacement systems; and the DoD criteria for determining requirements and productivity of intelligence collection programs. These topics are addressed in the Department’s ISR Integration Roadmap. To support the implementation of an integrated ISR capability, and in accordance with the FY 2004 Defense Authorization Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) has established an ISR Integration Council and published a Defense ISR Integration Roadmap.

The ISR Integration Council serves as the Department’s senior deliberative body for intelligence issues. It provides a forum through which the sponsors of ISR capabilities for the Services and Agencies can routinely interact to preclude unnecessary duplication of effort. The council has met eleven times this year, reviewing Service and Agency Program Objectives Memorandums (POM), addressing cross-community issues, and exploring the implications of transformation on intelligence support. The Council’s scope includes all issues necessary to assist the Under Secretary in establishing the Department’s overall direction for ISR capabilities and identifying and advocating the capabilities required for ISR transformation.

The ISR Integration Roadmap is a guide for transforming ISR capabilities. It
articulates the Department’s vision and strategic objectives for transforming ISR capabilities and provides an approach for implementing a DoD ISR Enterprise. The ISR Enterprise will provide a federation of capabilities that, when integrated, offer U.S. military forces the joint capabilities necessary to meet future challenges.

The roadmap defines how and when the Department intends to develop, procure, and deploy transformational capabilities and how it will function as a joint enterprise that is responsive to strategic, operational, and tactical requirements anywhere, day or night. The intent of the ISR Integration Roadmap is to represent the architectural foundation that will provide warfighters unfettered access to intelligence information from a set of highly capable and accessible assets.

The ISR Integration Roadmap directly links to the goals for transforming Defense intelligence, provides an overview of the ISR integration activities of the Military Departments and DoD intelligence agencies, and develops a balanced DoD ISR investment strategy.

In order to meet the intelligence needs of decision-makers from the highest levels of command to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, as well as, the needs of other Departments and Agencies, the Department recognizes that it must use a diverse set of intelligence assets (collection, processing, and analytical elements) operating across the full spectrum of crises and conflict. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has articulated the overall Defense Intelligence goals. The intent of these goals is to have Defense Intelligence provide:

- Universal situational awareness
• Reliable strategic warning

• Agile and adaptable intelligence collection and analysis

• Support to our national strategy of forward deterrence and agility

• A capability that enables effects-based operations by our military forces

• Assurance that knowledgeable adversaries do not compromise U.S. secrets

To achieve these intelligence goals, the Department has established six strategic objectives for the ISR capabilities that establish the foundation for our Defense Intelligence capabilities. Achieving these objectives will give us the tools and resources necessary to realize the Defense Intelligence goals. These strategic objectives are:

• Converge and recapitalize DoD’s ISR capabilities

• Attain global persistent surveillance

• Achieve horizontal integration of all intelligence information

• Capitalize on a collaborative net-centric distributed operations (collection, exploitation and analysis) infrastructure

• Transform ISR management capability

• Operationalize intelligence

I will address each of these objectives separately.

**Converge and recapitalize DOD’s ISR capabilities**

The Department’s ISR collection capabilities provide the source data upon which the Defense ISR Enterprise is built. The Department needs to replace today’s aging collection systems in order to maintain that base of support. In addition to
recapitalizing existing assets, the Department must deploy enough new systems to meet its on-going steady-state and wartime surge requirements. Among airborne systems, the steady-state demand has routinely exceeded the number available for tasking. Further, DoD must ensure that as it recapitalizes its ISR capabilities, it does so with the vision of ensuring a robust, survivable architecture. Our ISR capabilities provide us an asymmetric advantage, but our increasing reliance on these assets directly increases our vulnerability when we are denied use of those systems. The Department of Defense must ensure its ISR architecture – including space, airborne, ground, and communications components – is both resilient and flexible enough to operate in all crisis environments, against all projected threats.

The Department, including those elements in the National Intelligence Program, has a robust investment strategy for collection capabilities. There are significant investments in U.S. space-based collection capabilities, which will replace aging systems and provide significant new capabilities. The Department is also confident that investments in airborne intelligence collection systems, including delivery of the MQ-1 PREDATOR-AI, MQ-9 PREDATOR-B and RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK with the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program [MP-RTIP] capability and the planned enhancements of U-2 and RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT will mitigate the current airborne ISR shortfall. Finally, the Aerial Common Sensor is a key recapitalization program for the Navy’s aging EP-3 and the Army’s RC-7 and RC-12 platforms. Deployment by 2018 will complete the recapitalization effort of the U.S.’s airborne collection capabilities.
**Attain global persistent surveillance**

The Department’s collection paradigm is evolving from periodic reconnaissance to persistent surveillance. A global persistent surveillance capability will provide the Department with timely intelligence and increase the exposure to U.S. collection capabilities on a more fleeting, dispersed set of targets. The Department defines persistent surveillance as:

*The integrated management of a diverse set of collection and processing capabilities, operated to detect and understand the activity of interest with sufficient sensor dwell, revisit rate and required quality to expeditiously assess adversary actions, predict adversary plans, deny sanctuary to an adversary, and assess results of U.S./coalition actions.*

A key point is that persistent surveillance seeks to capture activity as it occurs, rather than forensically reconstructing it after the event. This requires an ability to adjust the revisit rate of the collector suite to a level appropriate for the event of interest. If one is tracking the progress of building construction, a weekly collection cycle may be appropriate. If one is tracking an individual, a “staring” capability is most likely necessary. The proper mix of assets will depend on the problem set, and for some problems the appropriate capabilities have not yet been developed. A second key point is that “global persistent surveillance” refers to an ability to conduct targeted persistent surveillance anywhere in the world. It is not meant to imply that the U.S. can do simultaneous persistent surveillance over the entire globe. The Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community (IC) must reconcile how much capacity for persistent
surveillance (numbers/sizes of regions, revisit rate, etc.) is required and how much is affordable.

The Department has a very limited ability to conduct persistent surveillance today. In the next decade, we expect to implement a persistent surveillance capability in those areas where airborne assets are able to effectively collect. The fielding of the MQ-1/9 PREDATOR-A/B, RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK Multi-TNT and MP-RTTP capabilities, the initial deployment of the Army’s Extended Range/Multipurpose (ER/MP) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and the Army / Navy Aerial Common Sensor, as well as space system enhancements, will give the U.S. a regional persistent surveillance capability. This regional capability will be enhanced with the delivery of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV, and completion of the ACS, ER/MP, and VUAV programs. Through deployment of new overhead systems, the Department will achieve a global persistent surveillance capability in airborne sensor-denied areas.

Achieve horizontal integration of all intelligence information

Intelligence information in various stages of refinement within the Defense intelligence enterprise will be made accessible, understandable, and retrievable by all appropriate elements within the enterprise. This horizontal integration will provide sufficient controls and sanitization to protect the sources and methods used to gather the information.

The recapitalization and investment in ISR collection assets must be balanced with a corresponding investment in integrated processing and exploitation
infrastructure. The Distributed Common Ground/Surface Systems (DCGS) is the Department's primary ISR processing and exploitation program. There is a demand-driven need to expand DCGS capacity to accommodate the increased collection capacity from Global Hawk, Predator and U-2 systems. The Department’s balanced approach calls for modest growth accompanied by improved efficiency offered by horizontal integration and net-centricity.

DCGS processing, exploitation and analysis capabilities form the heart of the Department of Defense tactical (ISR) horizontal integration. DCGS as an ISR ground infrastructure is an integral and critical component of the overall DoD ISR interoperability and data integration strategy. The end result will allow collected ISR data from sensors such as Rivet Joint, Joint STARS, and Global Hawk to be processed into combat information within one of the Service’s DCGS systems and made available/discoverable to all users, regardless of Service or Agency affiliation. The ability for any user to discover, access, and understand the data are key tenets of network-centric operations which is the future of DCGS operations.

The DCGS provides fused, decision-quality intelligence information to joint, allied, and coalition battle management and command and control (C2) including planning, combat planning, operations, and assessment. It is the Department’s hub to effectively implement information sharing - horizontal integration - between the warfighters, Service intelligence components, and national intelligence agencies. The DCGS will:

- provide the exploitation and analysis capabilities for ISR collection
capabilities, with the exception of certain specialized technical functions.

- provide intelligence capabilities for all deployed military forces.
- provide a common focal point for integrating with the Combat Support Agencies and provide a two-way flow of information to and from the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency.

These capabilities make DCGS the focal point for integrating the various ISR collection capabilities into the Defense ISR Enterprise (which includes Coalition and allied systems), enabling information sharing with command and control systems, and providing a common intelligence picture.

*Capitalize on a collaborative net-centric distributed operations (collection, exploitation and analysis) infrastructure*

The Defense ISR Enterprise consists of a globally-distributed enterprise, combining deployed forces, fixed overseas locations, and Continental U.S. operations. The deployment of net-centric capabilities allows the Department to innovatively use this worldwide capability to meet its overall intelligence responsibilities. The Department will deploy a robust and secure networked ISR architecture, with sufficient capacity and capabilities to meet the intelligence needs of U.S. fighting forces across the full range of military operations and against the full range of threats – traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive. Using the power of distributed operations, the ISR enterprise will provide timely imminent threat warning and effective tactical over watch of combat forces.
An integral and critical component of the overall Department of Defense (DoD) ISR integration strategy is the Distributed Common Ground/Surface Systems (DCGS). DCGS is a family of ground and surface systems within each Service that make up the processing and exploitation component of the ISR Enterprise. Service DCGS process and exploit US and selected coalition ISR sensor data and post consumable ISR information (raw and processed ISR data, as well as exploited ISR products) within the ISR Enterprise. DCGS is optimized to support analysts, warfighters and decision makers at the Joint Task Force (JTF) level and below. However, ISR data posted by these systems will be visible, accessible and understandable by users from the tactical to the national level. The ISR Enterprise will be capable of collaborative, net-centric ISR operations that are founded on common data standards and a common enterprise infrastructure. The ability to move ISR data around the world, allowing various processing/analysis elements to exploit the data, provides a transformative multiplier to the Defense ISR Enterprise.

**Transform ISR Management Capability**

DoD is implementing organizational and process changes to improve the management of Global ISR. To maximize the utility of our DoD systems and national assets, and to meet the established intelligence priorities, Commander, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) has been assigned responsibility for planning, integrating and coordinating ISR in support of strategic and global operations. As a component of USSTRATCOM, the Joint Function Component Commander for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) will conduct planning to
employ DoD ISR resources to meet Combatant Commander, national and Departmental requirements. Furthermore, JFCC-ISR will ensure the integration and synchronization of DoD, national and our allies’ ISR capabilities and collection efforts.

On May 31, 2005, Commander JFCC-ISR declared initial operational capability. This declaration means JFCC-ISR is performing watch functions and is assuming intelligence support planning capabilities. JFCC-ISR key tasks include developing allocation strategies for DoD ISR resources, including the management of the Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations “book” process; adapting ISR strategies in response to dynamic and evolving situations; participating in adaptive planning to support Combatant Commander intelligence campaign planning efforts; conducting ISR risk analysis and optimizing risk mitigation strategies; and advocating ISR capabilities and required resources.

**Operationalizing Intelligence**

At the center of the USD(I) led Remodeling Defense Intelligence initiative is the effort to “operationalize” intelligence by including its execution in the broader construct of operational planning and assessment. Through the adaptive Intelligence Campaign Planning process (ICP), Combatant Commanders are able to plan, synchronize, manage and execute intelligence operations and better define detailed collection/production requirements for deliberate allocation between theater and national assets.

This process improves integration of operations and intelligence for planning,
crisis, war and post-conflict scenarios, and also provides the COCOMs and the Department a vehicle by which to assess and present their intelligence needs back to the DNI and Intelligence Community.

Intelligence Campaign Planning is ongoing at the COCOMs as a function of their Joint Intelligence Operations Centers/Commands (JIOCs). The organizational development, resourcing and implementation of these JIOCs is currently underway at the Strategic (Defense JIOC), Operational (COCOM JIOCs) and Tactical (JIOC-I) levels. JIOCs will place analysts and collectors in the same chain of command, often forward deployed, to improve all-source analysis and production.

Achieving these six strategic objectives will ensure the Department has the ability to operate across the full spectrum of operations and satisfy the intelligence needs from the highest levels of command to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine while simultaneously supporting the intelligence needs of those outside the Department of Defense.

In response to Committee’s request for the Department’s rationale for approving the entry of the ACS Program into System Development and Demonstration (SD&D) Phase – a Milestone B decision - was made on July 29, 2004. This decision represented the culmination of a rigorous review process that began in FY 2000. As part of that review process, subject matter experts from the OSD, Army, and Navy staffs insured that alternatives were analyzed, operational requirements were vetted and approved, program costs estimates were independently assessed, a master plan for test and evaluation and an acquisition strategy were developed, compliance with the
Clinger-Cohen regulations were verified, and most importantly, a performance, schedule, and cost baseline were established for the program during its SD&D phase. The Army/Navy Team satisfactorily completed each of these items, as was noted at the Milestone Decision Review. Risks were accounted for, most notably, the weight and power issues associated with the airframe. This issue was a topic of discussion at each pre-Milestone B program review meeting beginning in June 2003, about the same time as the FY 2003 DOT&E report commenced. At each session, the OIPT was assured that the issue was given sufficient coverage in the Army’s source selection plan, and was high on the list of risk areas to be watched. At the final milestone decision review, the power/weight issue was discussed and risk appeared manageable.

In response to the Committee’s request for a description of the impact of a two year delay in the ACS program on the intelligence collection mission, any delay in the Aerial Common Sensor program will impact the Department’s convergence and recapitalization of DoD ISR capabilities. Delays in the ACS program will force the Army and Navy to reassess their investment strategies in their legacy systems. Their assessment will need to focus on both airframes and sensors to ensure the services continue to meet critical warfighter capabilities.

In response to the Committee’s question regarding the use of outside groups and experts, the DoD personnel working within the Defense Acquisition System are well qualified to ensure the system provides what the warfighter needs in a timely and cost effective manner. However, in certain cases there is a need to pull in additional independent subject matter experts to examine particular areas of the program and
provide recommendations on a path forward. ACS is an example of a program where outside expertise could prove effective in the attempt to pair different technologies; i.e. sensors and airframes.

My initial reading of the Non-Advocacy Group’s report indicates that there are several issues that will have to be addressed in order for the program to be successful. Chief among these issues are the funding requirements and the completion schedule. The program’s stakeholders are beginning to hash these issues out, and I expect some decisions about the program in the not-to-distant future.