APPENDICES
APPENDIX

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON
INTELLIGENCE

AND

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON
INTELLIGENCE

INITIAL SCOPE OF JOINT INQUIRY

PREAMBLE

To reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks; to honor the memories of the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks by conducting a thorough search for facts to answer the many questions that their families and many Americans have raised; and to lay a basis for assessing the accountability of institutions and officials of government:

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

ADOPT THIS

INITIAL SCOPE OF JOINT INQUIRY

Pursuant to section 5(a)(1) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress, Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Rule XI(1)(b) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the two Committees have authorized an investigation, to be conducted as a Joint Inquiry, into the Intelligence Community’s activities before and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The Committees have undertaken this Joint Inquiry pursuant to their responsibility to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government and all other authority vested in the Committees.

The purpose of this Joint Inquiry is —

(a) to conduct an investigation into, and study of, all matters that may have any tendency to reveal the full facts about —

(1) the evolution of the international terrorist threat to the United States, the response of the United States Government including that of the Intelligence Community to international terrorism, from the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence’s Counterterrorist Center in 1986 to the present, and what the Intelligence Community had, has, or should have learned from all sources of information, including any terrorist attacks or attempted ones, about the international terrorist threat to the United States;
(2) what the Intelligence Community knew prior to September 11 about the scope and nature of any possible attacks against the United States or United States interests by international terrorists, including by any of the hijackers or their associates, and what was done with that information;

(3) what the Intelligence Community has learned since the events of September 11 about the persons associated with those events, and whether any of that information suggests actions that could or should have been taken to learn of, or prevent, those events;

(4) whether any information developed before or after September 11 indicates systemic problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community from learning of or preventing the attacks in advance, or that, if remedied, could help the Community identify and prevent such attacks in the future;

(5) how and to what degree the elements of the Intelligence Community have interacted with each other, as well as other parts of federal, state, and local governments with respect to identifying, tracking, assessing, and coping with international terrorist threats; as well as biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear threats, whatever their source (such as the Anthrax attack of 2001);

(6) the ways in which the Intelligence Community’s responses to past intelligence problems and challenges, whether or not related to international terrorism, have affected its counterterrorism efforts; and

(7) any other information that would enable the Joint Inquiry, and the Committees in the performance of their continuing responsibilities, to make such recommendations, including recommendations for new or amended legislation and any administrative or structural changes, or other actions, as they determine to be necessary or desirable to improve the ability of the Intelligence Community to learn of, and prevent, future international terrorist attacks; and

(b) to fulfill the Constitutional oversight and informing functions of the Congress with regard to the matters examined in the Joint Inquiry.
APPENDIX

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON
INTELLIGENCE

AND

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON
INTELLIGENCE

SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT INQUIRY RULES


HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT INQUIRY RULES

In connection with the Joint Inquiry with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence into the events of September 11, 2001, authorized by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ("HPSCI") pursuant to Rule XI(1)(b) of the Rules of the House of Representatives and Rule 9 of HPSCI's Rules of Procedure, and pursuant to Rule XI(2)(a) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, HPSCI adopts the following Joint Inquiry Rules to supplement HPSCI's Rules for purposes of the Joint Inquiry only:

JOINT INQUIRY RULE 1. JOINT PROCEEDINGS

1.1. HPSCI may conduct hearings jointly with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All joint hearings shall be considered hearings of both Committees.

1.2. The Rules of Procedure of HPSCI and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence shall apply in all hearings and other proceedings of this Joint Inquiry, except where superseded by these Joint Inquiry Rules, provided that, at any joint hearing, if any rules of the two Committees are inconsistent, the rules of that Committee whose Chairman or his designee is presiding shall apply.

1.3. For the purposes of the proceedings of this Joint Inquiry, all employees on the staff of either Committee working on the Joint Inquiry shall be considered to be acting on behalf of both Committees.

JOINT INQUIRY RULE 2. HEARINGS

2.1. All testimony at hearings shall be taken under oath or affirmation.

JOINT INQUIRY RULE 3. DEPOSITIONS

3.1. All testimony taken, and all documents, records, or other materials produced, at a deposition of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence shall be considered part of the record of both Committees.
SE frae Cae cl Session Committee on Intel li ence Supplemen tal Joint Inquiry Rules

In connection with the Joint Inquiry with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence into the events of September 11, 2001, authorized by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("SSCI") pursuant to section 5(a)(1) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress, and Rule 6 of the SSCI's Rules of Procedure, and pursuant to Rule XXVI.2 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the SSCI adopts the following Joint Inquiry Rules to supplement the SSCI's Rules of Procedure for purposes of the Joint Inquiry only:

JOINT INQUIRY RULE 1. JOINT PROCEEDINGS

1.1. The SSCI may conduct hearings jointly with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. All joint hearings shall be considered hearings of both Committees.

1.2. The Rules of Procedure of both the SSCI and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence shall apply in all hearings and other proceedings of this Joint Inquiry, except where superseded by these Joint Inquiry Rules, provided that, at any joint hearing, if any rules of the two Committees are inconsistent, the rules of that Committee whose Chairman or his designee is presiding shall apply.

1.3. For the purposes of the proceedings of this Joint Inquiry, all employees on the staff of either Committee working on the Joint Inquiry shall be considered to be acting on behalf of both Committees.

JOINT INQUIRY RULE 2. HEARINGS

2.1. All testimony at hearings shall be taken under oath or affirmation.

2.2. Subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses, or the production of documents, records, or other materials, at hearings may be authorized by vote of the SSCI pursuant to SSCI Rule 2, or by the SSCI's Chairman and Vice Chairman, acting jointly.

JOINT INQUIRY RULE 3. DEPOSITIONS

3.1. All testimony taken, and all documents, records, or other materials produced, at a deposition of the SSCI shall be considered part of the record of both Committees.

3.2. Subpoenas for depositions and notices for the taking of depositions may be authorized by vote of the SSCI pursuant to SSCI Rule 2, or by the SSCI's Chairman and Vice Chairman, acting jointly, and shall be issued and served as provided in SSCI Rule 7. Deposition notices shall specify a time and place of examination and the name or names of Committee members or staff who will take the deposition. Depositions shall be in private and shall, for purposes of the rules of both Committees, be deemed to be testimony given before the Committees in executive session.

3.3. Witnesses shall be examined upon oath administered by a member of the SSCI or by an individual authorized by local law to administer oaths. Questions may be propounded by members or staff of either Committee. If a witness objects to a question and refuses to testify, the Committee members or staff present may proceed with the deposition, or may, at that time or subsequently, seek a ruling on the objection from the Chairman of the SSCI or any member of the SSCI designated by the Chairman. The SSCI shall not initiate procedures leading to civil or criminal enforcement unless the witness refuses to testify after having been ordered and directed to answer by the Chairman or a member designated by the Chairman.

3.4. Procedures for the attendance of counsel for witnesses at, and for the inspection, correction, and filing of transcripts of, depositions shall be as provided in SSCI Rules 8.4 and 8.7.
APPENDIX

JOINT INQUIRY HEARINGS
## JOINT INQUIRY HEARINGS

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| Oct 17 | Lt. General Michael Hayden  
Director, National Security Agency | Open         |
|        | Robert Mueller  
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation |             |
|        | George Tenet  
Director of Central Intelligence |             |
| Dec 10 | Business Meeting | Closed     |
APPENDIX

LIST OF HEARING WITNESSES
List of Hearing Witnesses

The following is a list of witnesses who appeared before Joint Inquiry hearings conducted by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in open or closed session. Affiliations listed are as of the date of appearance.

**June 4, 2002**  
Business Meeting (No Witnesses)

**June 5, 2002**  
Alonzo Robertson, Joint Inquiry Staff  
John Keefe, Joint Inquiry Staff

**June 6, 2002**  
Eleanor Hill, Director, Joint Inquiry Staff  
Alonzo Robertson, Joint Inquiry Staff  
John Keefe, Joint Inquiry Staff

**June 11, 2002**  

**June 12, 2002**  
Miles Kara, Joint Inquiry Staff  
Patti Litman, Joint Inquiry Staff  
Michael Jacobson, Joint Inquiry Staff

**June 18, 2002**  
George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence  
Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, USAF, Director, National Security Agency

**June 19, 2002**  
George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence  
Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, USAF, Director, National Security Agency

**July 16, 2002**  
Robert Rosenwald, Joint Inquiry Staff
Patti Litman, Joint Inquiry Staff

July 18, 2002
Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, USAF, Director, National Security Agency
Dr. Donald Kerr, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Science and Technology
James Caruso, Deputy Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation

July 23, 2002
David Aufhauser, General Counsel, Department of Treasury
James Sloan, Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
Richard Newcomb, Office of Foreign Assets Control
Dennis Lormel, Section Chief, Financial Review Group, Federal Bureau of Investigation

July 25, 2002
Central Intelligence Agency Officer
Defense Intelligence Agency Officer
National Security Agency Officer
Federal Bureau of Investigation Supervisor
Central Intelligence Agency Officer

Sept. 12, 2002
Counterterrorist Center Officers, Central Intelligence Agency
Cofer Black, Former Chief, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

Sept. 18, 2002
Eleanor Hill, Director, Joint Inquiry Staff
Kristin Breitweiser, Co-Founder of September 11th Advocates
Stephen Push, Co-Founder and Treasurer of Families of September 11th

Sept. 19, 2002
Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.) National Security Advisor, Ford Administration and George H.W. Bush Administration
Samuel Berger, National Security Advisor, Clinton Administration, Second Term

Sept. 20, 2002
Eleanor Hill, Director, Joint Inquiry Staff
CIA Officer
FBI Special Agent
Michael Rolince, Special Agent-in-Charge, Washington Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Christopher Kojm, Deputy for Intelligence Policy and Coordination, Bureau of intelligence and Research, Department of State

**Sept. 24, 2002**
Eleanor Hill, Director, Joint Inquiry Staff  
FBI Special Agent, Minneapolis Field Office  
FBI Special Agent, Phoenix Field Office  
FBI Supervisor, FBI Headquarters

**Sept. 26, 2002**
Cofer Black, Former Chief, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency  
Dale Watson, Former Executive Director, Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
FBI Special Agent, Minneapolis Field Office  
FBI Special Agent, Phoenix Field Office  
FBI Supervisor, FBI Headquarters  
Michael Rolince, Special Agent-in-Charge, Washington Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
M. E. Bowman, Deputy General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation

**Oct 1, 2002**
Eleanor Hill, Director, Joint Inquiry Staff  
James S. Gilmore, III, Former Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorism  
Amb. Francis X. Taylor, Counterterrorism Coordinator, Department of State  
Claudio Manno, Acting Associate Under Secretary for Intelligence, Transportation Security Agency  
Joseph B. Greene, Assistant Commissioner for Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service  
Louis E. Andre, Special Assistant to the Director for Intelligence, J-2, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Edward T. Norris, Police Commissioner, City of Baltimore, MD

**Oct 3, 2002**
Eleanor Hill, Director, Joint Inquiry Staff  
Lee Hamilton, Former Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars  
Judge William Webster, Former Director of Central Intelligence and Former Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Lieutenant General William Odom, USA (Ret.), Former Director, National Security Agency  
Frederick Hitz, Former Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency

**Oct 8, 2002**
Eleanor Hill, Director, Joint Inquiry Staff  
Warren Rudman, Former U.S. Senator
Judge Louis Freeh, Former Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mary Jo White, Former U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York
Paul Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for Near East/South Africa, Central Intelligence Agency

Oct 9, 2002
Pasquale D’Amuro, FBI Executive Assistant Director
CIA Official
FBI Special Agent

Oct 10, 2002
George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence
Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Oct 17, 2002
Eleanor Hill, Director, Joint Inquiry Staff
George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence
Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, USAF, Director, National Security Agency
APPENDIX

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
IN THE COURSE
OF
THE JOINT INQUIRY
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
IN THE
COURSE OF
THE JOINT INQUIRY *

[__________], Assistant Legal Attache, Paris, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[__________], Program Manager, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[__________], Inspection Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[__________], Assistant General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[__________], Directorate of Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency

Maj. Gen. Keith Alexander, Intelligence and Security Command, Land Information Warfare Agency

[__________], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

Charles E. Allen, Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Collection

[__________], Special Agent, Newark Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[__________], Special Agent, Washington Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[__________], Associate Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff

[__________], New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[__________], New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[__________], Headquarters, Defense Intelligence Agency

* Note: This is only a partial list of persons from whom the Joint Inquiry acquired information. It includes persons who were present for group discussions, as well as those who were interviewed individually. Foreign government officials are not included. Interviewee affiliations are as of the date of interview. Names have been redacted for both national security and privacy reasons.
John Arriza, Director, TIPOFF Watchlist Program, Department of State

[—————], National Security Agency Representative to Counterterrorist Center

Maureen Baginski, Director, Signals Intelligence Directorate, National Security Agency

James Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Department of Justice

[—————], New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[—————], Assistant Legal Attache, Singapore, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[—————], New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[—————], Defense Attaché, U.S. Army, Tel Aviv, Israel

[—————], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

Samuel "Sandy" Berger, Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Richard Betts, Professor, Columbia University

[—————], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[—————], Special Agent, Oklahoma City Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Joe Billy, Special Agent In-Charge, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[—————], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

Cofer Black, Former Chief, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[—————], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

William Black, Deputy Director, National Security Agency

[—————], Defense Intelligence Agency

[—————], [—————], [—————], Central Intelligence Agency
[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Section Chief, Counterintelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Office of General Counsel, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

Marion E. (Spike) Bowman, Deputy General Counsel for National Security Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Former NSA Detailee to Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Chief of Language School, Central Intelligence Agency

John Brennan, Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], [———], [———], Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Private Citizen

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Robert Bryant, Former Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

Jeffrey Builta, Defense Intelligence Agency

[———], [———], [———], Central Intelligence Agency
[———], Joint Counterintelligence Assessment Group, Department of Defense

[———], Former Special Agent, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Counterterrorism Office, National Security Unit, Immigration and Naturalization Service

[———], Senior Science Advisor, Joint Chiefs of Staff

[———], Headquarters, Defense Intelligence Agency

[———], Central Intelligence Agency

Lt. Gen. Michael Canavan, U.S. Army (Ret), Former Commander, Joint Special Operations Command

[———], Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Amb. Timothy Carney, Former US Ambassador to Sudan

[———], Former Chief, CIA Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Supervisory Special Agent, FBI Representative to Department of State

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

James T. Caruso, FBI Deputy Executive Assistant Director for Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

Ed Chase, Office of Management and Budget

[———], Supervisory Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Supervisory Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], National Security Agency Representative to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Richard Clarke, Former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Clinton and Bush Administrations

[------------], Boston Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[------------], Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[------------], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[------------], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency (Retired)

[------------], Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[------------], Headquarters, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[------------], Civil Aviation Security Field Office, Minneapolis Airport, Department of Transportation

Jay Corcoran, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Customs Service

[------------], Information Operation Specialist, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[------------], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[------------], [------------], [------------], Central Intelligence Agency

[------------], National Security Agency

Roger Cressey, National Security Counsel

William P. Crowell, Former Deputy Director, National Security Agency

[------------], Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[------------], National Security Agency

[------------], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

Pasquale D'Amuro, Assistant Director, Counterterrorist Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

John Deutch, Former Director of Central Intelligence

Patrick Duecy, Director, Joint Intelligence Task Force, Defense Intelligence Agency
[———], U.S. Customs Service

[———], Legal Attaché, Brussels and The Hague, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Supervisory Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Supervisory Special Agent, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Office of General Counsel, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

Louis J. Freeh, Former Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Vice Adm. Scott Fry, Commander, 6th Fleet, Former Deputy Director of Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff

[———], Former Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent

[———], Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], National Security Agency

[———], Portland Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Supervisory Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Federal Bureau of Investigation Representative to Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Special Agent, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Acting Legal Attaché, Tel Aviv, Israel, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Language Specialist, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Special Agent, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation
SECRET

[—], Counterterrorist Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[—], Private Citizen

[—], Legal Attaché, Berlin, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[—], Central Intelligence Agency

[—], Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[—], [—], Central Intelligence Agency

[—], [—], [—], Central Intelligence Agency

William Gore, Special Agent In-Charge, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Brig. Gen. Scott Gration, Former Deputy Director Information Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff

[—], Counterterrorist Referent, [—], Central Intelligence Agency

[—], [—], Central Intelligence Agency

[—], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[—], Chief, Language Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[—], Former [—] Division Chief of Operations, [—], Central Intelligence Agency

[—], National Security Agency

Carol Haave, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security and Information Operations

[—], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[—], Special Agent, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[—], National Imagery and Mapping Agency

SECRET
Lee Hamilton, Former House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman, Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Director, Center on Congress at Indiana University

[———], Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation

John Hamre, Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Former Comptroller, Department of Defense

[———], Associate Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Operations for Resources, Plans and Policy

[———], Special Agent, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Former Supervisory Special Agent, Phoenix Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], National Imagery and Mapping Agency

[———], Headquarters, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Immigration and Naturalization Service

[———], Special Agent, Phoenix Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation Retiree)

Richard Haver, Special Assistant for Intelligence, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen Michael Hayden, Director, National Security Agency

Christine Healey, Minority Counsel, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

[———], Booz Allen & Hamilton

[———], General Accounting Office

Frederick Hitz, Former Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], National Security Agency

[———], [———], Division Chief, Central Intelligence Agency
Karl Inderfurth, Former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia

Robert Jervis, Professor, Columbia University

Rear Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff
[———], Defense Intelligence Agency

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], National Security Agency Representative to Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Directorate for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Former Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

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Capt. Michael Kuhn, U.S. Navy

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[———], Supervisory Special Agent, Phoenix Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Thomas Kuster, Director of Counterterrorism Policy, Department of Defense

[———], Assistant Special Agent In-Charge, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Supervisory Special Agent, Boston Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Language Specialist, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Supervisory Special Agent, Headquarters, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Matthew Levitt, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

[———], Supervisory Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Supervisory Special Agent, Headquarters, Federal Bureau of Investigation
MARK LOWENTHAL, Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production

CLAUDIO MANNO, Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security Administration
Mary McCarthy, Former Senior Director for Intelligence Programs, National Security Council

Steven McCraw, Special Agent In-Charge, San Antonio Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Barbara McNamara, Former Deputy Director, National Security Agency

Mark Miller, Central Intelligence Agency Representative to Federal Bureau of Investigation

Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minihan, Former Director, National Security Agency
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[———], Division Chief, National Security Agency

[———], [———], [———], Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Former Analyst, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency

**Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold,** Former Director of Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff

[———], Central Intelligence Agency

**Glenn Nordin,** Assistant Director of Intelligence Policy (Language), Department of Defense

[———], Immigration and Naturalization Service

[———], Defense Intelligence Agency

[———], Headquarters, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Former Chief, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Central Intelligence Agency Analyst, [———]

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency

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[———], Headquarters, Federal Bureau of Investigation
James Pavit, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Operations
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[-----------------], Central Intelligence Agency Representative to FBI New York Field Office
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[-----------------], Assistant General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation
[-----------------], Unit Chief, Federal Bureau of Investigation
[-----------------], Deputy Director, Office of Budget, Central Intelligence Agency
[-----------------], Office of General Counsel, National Security Agency
[-----------------], Assistant Special Agent In-Charge, Boston Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation
[-----------------], National Security Agency
[-----------------], Analyst, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency
[-----------------], [-----------------], [-----------------], Central Intelligence Agency
COL Richard G. Reynolds, Defense Attaché, Amman, Jordan

Keith Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Center for Technology and Engineering, General Accounting Office

Susan Rice, Former Senior Director for African Affairs, National Security Council

[———], Analyst, [———], Central Intelligence Agency

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[———], U. S. Customs Service

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Michael Rolince, Headquarters, Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Mary Ryan, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs

[———], Office of General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Federal Aviation Administration Representative to Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Special Agent, Minneapolis Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Jerry Savage, Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense

[———], Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency
[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency
[———], Central Intelligence Agency, [———]
[———], Central Intelligence Agency
[———], Central Intelligence Agency

**John Schuhart**, Director, Resource Management Office, Community Management Staff

[———], Special Agent, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation
[———], National Security Agency Representative to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
[———], [———], [———], Central Intelligence Agency
[———], Oklahoma City Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation
[———], Directorate of Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency
[———], National Security Agency
[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency
[———], National Security Agency
[———], Special Agent, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

**Michael Sheehan**, Ambassador to the UN, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State

**Michael Sheehy**, Minority Staff Director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

**Gen. Hugh Shelton**, Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

[———], Director, Office of the Budget, Central Intelligence Agency
[———], Defense Intelligence Agency
[———], Central Intelligence Agency, [———], [———]
[———], Deputy Counsel for Operations, Department of Justice

[———], Special Agent, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Special Agent, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

**James Sloan**, Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Department of Treasury

[———], National Security Agency

[———], Immigration and Naturalization Representative to CIA Counterterrorist Center

[———], Special Agent, Kansas City Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Department of State

[———], Special Agent, New York City Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], National Security Agency

[———], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Headquarters Analyst, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Counterterrorist Center Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], National Security Agency

**Roy Surrett**, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Customs Service

[———], Supervisory Special Agent San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Language Specialist, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Special Agent, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

**Francis X. Taylor**, Ambassador at Large for Coordination and Implementation of Government-wide U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, Department of State

**Richard Taylor**, Former Deputy Director of Operations, National Security Agency
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[----------], Headquarters Analyst, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[----------], National Security Agency

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[----------], Supervisory Special Agent, San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

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[----------], Central Intelligence Agency

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[----------], Boston Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[----------], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[----------], Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[----------], Headquarters Analyst, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[----------], Analyst, National Security Agency

[----------], Chicago Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Retired)

[----------], [----------], [----------], Central Intelligence Agency

[----------], Defense Intelligence Agency
[———], Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Counterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Chief of Operations, [———], Central Intelligence Agency

Maj. Gen. Ward, U.S. Army, Vice Director of Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff

[———], Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense

[———], Directorate for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency

Dale Watson, Executive Assistant Director for Counterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation

William Webster, Former Director of Central Intelligence, Former Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], [———], [———], [———], National Security Agency

[———], Financial Review Group, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Counterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Counterrorist Center Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency

Linton Wells, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), Department of Defense

[———], Central Intelligence Agency

[———], [———], [———], Central Intelligence Agency

Mary Jo White, Former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York

[———], Counterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency

[———], Former Special Agent, Milwaukee Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[———], Special Agent, Phoenix Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SECRET
[__________], Central Intelligence Agency

[__________], Central Intelligence Agency Representative to Federal Bureau of Investigation

[__________], [__________], [__________], [__________], National Security Agency

Vice Adm. Thomas Wilson (Ret), Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

[__________], Boston Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[__________], National Security Law Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[__________], Finance Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

James Woolsey, Former Director of Central Intelligence

[__________], Former Special Agent, Chicago Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Austin Yamada, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Department of Defense

[__________], Special Agent, Oklahoma City Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Wayne Zaidemann, Legal Attaché, Amman, Jordan, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SECRET
APPENDIX

COUNTERTERRORISM ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
COUNTERTERRORISM ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
(As of December 31, 2002)

The U.S. Intelligence Community currently consists of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, other specialized offices within the Department of Defense, the intelligence elements of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and the Coast Guard.

PRIMARY COUNTERTERRORISM AGENCIES

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

The Counterterrorist Center (CTC) is the CIA’s primary counterterrorism component. In 1993, a special unit was established within the CTC, the Bin Ladin Issue Station, with personnel from CIA, NSA, FBI and other agencies to develop intelligence on Bin Ladin and his organization. The CIA worked alone and with friendly foreign intelligence services to disrupt Bin Ladin, degrade his ability to engage in terrorism, and bring him to justice.

[Within CTC, several units focus on al-Qa’ida:

- The [——] Extremist CT Operations Group, the CTC operational arm, tracks al-Qa’ida and other [——] radical groups. In 1996, the CTC created [the Bin Ladin Issue] Station to target Bin Ladin and his network, [——]. The CTC’s [——] Extremist Branch also follows a range of radical [——] groups, which are not part of al-Qa’ida, but often share personnel, provide logistical support, or otherwise assist it.

- The Office of Terrorism Analysis, the CTC’s analytic arm, is responsible for providing analytical products on terrorism. OTA now has approximately [——] analysts. Before September 11, its [——] analysts were part of the smaller Assessments and Information Group, which was organized into five branches, only one of which focused (partially) on Bin Ladin.
• [The Renditions Group (formerly the Renditions Branch)]. From 1986 to September 2001, the Renditions Branch was involved in several dozen renditions.

• [The Financial Operations Group, which was established after September 11, grew out of the Bin Ladin Station’s efforts to track Bin Ladin’s financial activities].

The CIA developed an operational strategy, referred to as “the Plan,” so that CTC could react quickly to operational opportunities, renditions, and analysis to disrupt and capture Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants.

To execute its plan against Bin Ladin, CTC developed a program to train and position personnel and move experienced operations officers into the Center to identify, vet, and hire qualified personnel for counterterrorism assignments. They sought fluency in Mid-East and South-Asian languages, combined with police, military, business, technical, or academic expertise, and established an eight week advanced counterterrorism operations course.

From 1999 to September 11, human intelligence sources against terrorism grew by more than fifty percent. Working across agencies, and in some cases with foreign services, the CIA designed and built for specific use against Al-Qa’ida inside Afghanistan. By September 11, sufficient collection programs and human networks were in place to cover almost all of Afghanistan.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The FBI within the Department of Justice is the principal law-enforcement arm of the government and the lead agency responsible for counterterrorism in the United States.

In 1999, the Counterterrorism Division was established in FBI Headquarters, incorporating the International Terrorism Operations Division, the Domestic Terrorism Division, the National Domestic Preparedness Office, and the National Infrastructure Protection Center. The Radical Fundamentalist Unit and the Bin Ladin Unit became operational units within the International Terrorism Operations Section. These units advise field offices on Attorney General Guidelines and coordinate field terrorism investigations.

Since the 1980s, the FBI’s New York Field Office has had the principal role in the FBI’s counterterrorism effort. It has been the lead field office for Bin Ladin investigations and was the first to establish a Joint Terrorism Task Force.
A reorganization of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division was announced in May 2002, which includes:

- Headquarters centralization of counterterrorism programs
- Joint Terrorism Task Forces in all field offices and a National JTTF at Headquarters
- Flying Squads to support field operations
- Enhanced counterterrorism and analytical training
- Shifting 518 field agents from criminal investigations to counterterrorism

National Security Agency (NSA)

Within NSA, a Department of Defense entity, responsibility for collecting, processing, analyzing, and reporting signals intelligence (SIGINT) is centered principally within the Signals Intelligence Directorate created in February 2001. Within SID, the Counterterrorism Product Line has the lead for SIGINT production on counterterrorism targets. CT Product Line personnel increased from approximately [—] before September 11 to about [——] in April 2002.

A portion of NSA’s counterterrorism SIGINT reports comes from other product lines within SID:

- [—].
- [—].
- [—].
- [—].

Department of State

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the intelligence arm of the Department of State, has three units involved in counterterrorism: the Office of Analysis for Terrorism, Narcotics and Crime, the Office of Intelligence Coordination, and the Office of Intelligence Operations. Outside INR, a Coordinator for Counterterrorism is responsible for developing counterterrorism policy.

The State Department also works closely with the Justice Department’s Immigration and Naturalization Service to prevent terrorist suspects from entering the United States. To this end, the State Department maintains two key counter-terrorism databases:
TIPOFF, a classified database within INR containing the names of foreigners who are not allowed to enter the United States because of ties to terrorism and other illegal activities and

The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), an unclassified database designed to assist in visa processing.

Information in TIPOFF and CLASS is derived from the Intelligence Community and other sources, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Customs Service, and the Federal Aviation Authority. All consular officers must use the CLASS system before issuing visas.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

DIA is the Department of Defense element that produces and manages intelligence for the Secretary of Defense. Within DIA, the offices principally responsible for counterterrorism include the Defense Human Intelligence Service and the Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism.

Since July 2001, the Joint Terrorism Task Force – Counterterrorism (JITF-CT) has been the focal point for all DIA counterterrorism analysis and production. The JITF-CT provides warnings, threat assessments, and all-source analysis and production and serves as a counterterrorism knowledge base within the Department of Defense.

Department of Transportation (DoT)

Within DoT, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration play a role in the government’s counterterrorism mission. Pursuant to the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002, the Coast Guard has become an Intelligence Community member. After September 11, DoT established the Transportation Security Administration, within which the Transportation Security Intelligence Service coordinates intelligence support and provides current and strategic warnings on threats to U.S. transportation.

Department of Treasury

Within Treasury, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is responsible for assisting U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies in tracking the movement of terrorist funds.
APPENDIX

EVOLUTION
OF THE TERRORIST THREAT
AND THE
U.S. RESPONSE

1983 – 2001

## The Building Threat: Pre-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>“Big picture” view</th>
<th>Selected, major terrorist events</th>
<th>U.S. institutional responses to terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Lebanese civil war already underway.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
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<td>First FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force established in NY City.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Events</td>
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<td>14 Jun. TWA 847 hijacked by Hezbollah terrorists.</td>
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<td>23 Nov. Egypt Air flight from Athens to Malta carrying several U.S. citizens hijacked by Abu Nidal Group.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feb/Mar. CIA establishes CTC.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>30 Mar. Palestinian splinter group detonated a bomb as TWA 840 approached Athens, killing four U.S. citizens.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5 Apr. Bombing of La Belle disco in Berlin, Germany, killing two U.S. servicemen and one Turkish civilian. 200 wounded. Traced to Libyan perpetrators.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring. Directive signed that authorizes CIA to conduct certain counterterrorism activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Sep. Rendition of Fawaz Yunis, wanted for hijacking Royal Jordanian</td>
<td>Rendition of Fawaz Yunis, wanted for hijacking Royal Jordanian airliner in which 6 Americans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>airliner in which 6 Americans killed. [__________________________].</td>
<td>killed. [__________________________].</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 Apr. Organization of Jihad Brigades exploded a car bomb outside a</td>
<td>14 Apr. Organization of Jihad Brigades exploded a car bomb outside a USO club in Naples, Italy,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USO club in Naples, Italy, killing one U.S. sailor.</td>
<td>killing one U.S. sailor.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1991
- **Jan-Mar.** Operation Desert Storm expels Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
- **Apr.** Operation Provide Comfort. Safe havens for Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. This operation eventually becomes enforcement of no-fly zones over northern/southern Iraq, operations which continue to this day and resulted in a large, semi-permanent U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region.
- **Jan/Feb.** CTC thwarts Iraqi agents’ plans worldwide.
- **18-19 Jan.** Iraqi agents planted bombs at the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia’s residence and at the USIS library in Manila.

### 1992
- **Rise of jihadist movement.**
- **Dec.** U.S. Operation Restore Hope to provide humanitarian relief to Somalia.
- **Dec.** Attack on Aden hotel housing U.S. service members for the operation in Somalia. Possibly the first attack by UBL's network.
# The Hunt for bin Ladin, 1993-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>“Big picture” developments</th>
<th>Terrorist attacks and “tactical” counterterrorist actions</th>
<th>U.S. “strategic” responses to the terrorist threat</th>
<th>Other intelligence actions and issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Bin Ladin in Sudan.</td>
<td>26 Feb. World Trade Center bombing.</td>
<td>2 Apr. [CIA paper characterizes UBL as “independent actor [who] sometimes works with other individuals or governments [——] [——] [to] promote militant Islamic causes throughout the region…” [His group almost certainly played a role in an earlier bombing directed against U.S. interests].</td>
<td>20 Apr. NID: [Hundreds of Islamic militants received training during the past year at military camps in Afghanistan. [——] [——] [——] [——] [——]].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23 Mar. Rendition of Abu Halima, suspect in World Trade Center bombing [ ] to FBI custody.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>14 Apr. Iraqi Intelligence Service attempt to assassinate former President Bush in Kuwait thwarted.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26 Apr. [Intelligence warns that [———] is increasingly convinced that U.S. is working for its overthrow, and may be preparing to sponsor terrorist attacks against U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
24 Jun. Arrest of 8 subjects—
including 5 Sudanese—plotting to
bomb NY City landmarks—U.N.
building, 26 Federal Plaza, and
Lincoln/Holland tunnels.

2 Jul. Shaykh Abdel Rahman is
detained by FBI in connection with
the World Trade Center bombing.

25 Aug. Shaykh Rahman is
indicted. Rahman is the spiritual
leader of both Gama’at al-Islamiya
and Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

Sep. CIA file summary
prepared on UBL reports that

Sep. CIA HQ sends
requirements to overseas
stations to assess vulnerability
of UBL network

30 Nov. Identification of
intelligence targets
associated with UBL and
terrorist-related activities.
### 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug.</td>
<td>Sudan hands over Carlos the Jackal to France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall.</td>
<td>Taliban movement established in Kandahar, Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May.</td>
<td>CIA Office of Inspector General inspection of CIA’s Counterterrorist Center finds that threats posed by some state-sponsored and leftwing terrorist groups have declined while threats from radical religious, ethnic, and...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Dec.</td>
<td>Members of the Armed Islamic Group seized an Air France flight to Algeria; they apparently intended to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. The four terrorists were killed during a rescue effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>non-government terrorist groups have increased... Biggest weakness was limited ability to warn of impending attack. Difficulty of penetrating terrorist groups caused this weakness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Jan. Philippine police discover Ramzi Yousef’s bombmaking lab and arrest accomplice Abdul Hakim Murad. Captured materials revealed Yousef’s plot to blow up the Pope, U.S., and Israeli embassies in Manila, United Airlines aircraft flying Asian routes, and to crash a plane into CIA HQ. Murad also tells Philippine authorities that Yousef was involved in the World Trade Center bombing and planted bomb on the Philippine airliner in Dec 94.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 Feb. Ramzi Yousef extradition from Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 Apr. Bombing of Murrah Federal Bldg in Oklahoma City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 Jan. CTC briefs NSC. [______]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Mar. President signs Presidential Decision Directive 35 providing overarching intelligence guidance. Terrorism is a Tier 1B issue. Intelligence requirements: collection information on plans/intentions inside terrorist circles, increase Near East, South Asia, and Islamic cultural and language expertise, expansion of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring. [<strong><strong><strong><strong>] provides most significant reporting on UBL to date. [</strong></strong></strong></strong>]</td>
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<td>[________]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

[ ] Jun. [______________________]
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[______________________]
[______________________]
[______________________].

[ ] Jul. [______________________]
[______________________]
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[______________________]
[______________________].

analytic cadre.

21 Jun. Presidential Decision Directive 39 supersedes NSDD-207. Calls for reducing terrorist capabilities; aggressive IC program, including covert action; return of indicted terrorist to U.S., including by force if necessary, as a matter of highest priority. Also confirmed and clarified FBI’s role in counter-terrorism.

Jul. National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism. Judges that foreign terrorists will attempt an attack in the U.S. in the next year or two. Bombing of World Trade Center crossed a threshold to more large-scale attacks. Most likely threat of attack in the U.S. would be from transient groupings of individuals similar to that drawn together by Ramzi Yousef. Threat also from established groups: Hezbollah, Gama’at al-Islamiya, Hamas, and Jama’a al-Fuqra. (Neither UBL nor al-Qa’ida mentioned. UBL is mentioned as a terrorist financier in a Mar 95 finished intelligence report from CIA’s [______] office)

[ ] Aug. [______________________]
[______________________]
[______________________].

[ ] Late 1995. [______________________]
[______________________]
[______________________]
[______________________]
[______________________]
[______________________]
[______________________]
[______________________].
13 Nov. Office of Personnel Management/Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh bombed. Five Americans killed in this incident. Information eventually suggests UBL and CDLR were responsible.

[[-] Dec. Ramzi Yousef associate and al-Qaida lieutenant Wali Khan Amin Shah is captured. He is deported to the United States and convicted on terrorism charges.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Spring 1996.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Jan.</td>
<td>[UBL] station established in CTC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Apr.</td>
<td>Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Directs Secretary of State, in conjunction with Attorney General and Secretary of Treasury to designate any organization that meets certain criteria as a foreign terrorist organization (criteria: must engage in terrorist activity that threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jun.</td>
<td>Khobar Towers bombing. 19 U.S. service members killed. [A June 2001 U.S. indictment charged that the Saudi Hezbollah, with support from Iran, carried out the attack. According to the indictment, Iran and its surrogate, the Lebanese Hezbollah, recruited and trained the bombers, helped direct their surveillance, and assisted in planning the attack].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1996.</td>
<td>A volunteer claimed that [UBL] station established in CTC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Apr.</td>
<td>Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Directs Secretary of State, in conjunction with Attorney General and Secretary of Treasury to designate any organization that meets certain criteria as a foreign terrorist organization (criteria: must engage in terrorist activity that threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jun.</td>
<td>Khobar Towers bombing. 19 U.S. service members killed. [A June 2001 U.S. indictment charged that the Saudi Hezbollah, with support from Iran, carried out the attack. According to the indictment, Iran and its surrogate, the Lebanese Hezbollah, recruited and trained the bombers, helped direct their surveillance, and assisted in planning the attack].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1996.</td>
<td>A volunteer claimed that [UBL] station established in CTC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug.</td>
<td>UBL issues a “fatwa” authorizing attacks against Western military targets in the Arabian Peninsula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Aug.</td>
<td>DCI briefs Democratic leaders: the terrorist threat is increasing, it is a national security issue and human intelligence is at the heart of the effort against terrorism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summer 1996. 

Summer 1996.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 Sep.</td>
<td>Egyptian government issues an arrest warrant for UBL. Based on UBL’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>longtime support of Egyptian terrorist groups like EGI and EIJ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.</td>
<td>Taliban comes to power in Afghanistan; takes Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Late 1996. [<em><strong><strong>] reports [</strong></strong></em>] indicate that UBL is much more of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a terrorist—rather than just a terrorist financier—than the CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>has previously thought. Reporting provides significant new details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>about UBL and his terrorist support infrastructure known as “Al Qaeda.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Note: first reference to Al Qaeda].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Oct.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Late 1996. Bin Ladin Unit develops most detailed information yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>regarding UBL’s intentions].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1997</td>
<td>One number in Kenya is associated with significant UBL-related activities and individuals, including Wadi el-Hage, one of UBL’s most important lieutenants. El-Hage is a dual U.S.-Lebanese citizen. Early 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan.</td>
<td>CTC has identified Muhammed Atef as UBL’s key lieutenant. Alias Abu Hafs al-Masri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1997</td>
<td>[-]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1997</td>
<td>[-]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10 Apr. [DDO briefs SSCI on covert action. UBL unit is running operations. It is focusing these operations to collect data that can be used to build target packages, which, in turn, can be used in future contingencies to render UBL and/or dismantle the ability of his organization to wage terrorism. [—].]

**Early 1997.** [———]

<p>| Spring 1997. [———] |
| Spring 1997. [———] |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Saudi government extends formal recognition of the Taliban government of Afghanistan. The decision immediately follows reports that the Taliban have extended their control into northern Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct</td>
<td>Kenyan authorities arrest and later deport [<strong><strong><strong><strong><strong>] [</strong></strong></strong></strong></strong>] [__________] reportedly connected to a terrorist plot against the U.S. embassy in Nairobi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring 1997. Foreign liaison service says it is studying the early 1997 proposal for a joint operation [__________].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring 1997. [<strong><strong><strong><strong><strong>] [</strong></strong></strong></strong></strong>].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. Secretary Albright trip to South Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Fall 1997. [<strong><strong><strong><strong><strong>] [</strong></strong></strong></strong></strong>] [__________]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 Feb.</td>
<td>Bin Ladin fatwa calling for jihad against U.S. military and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Jun.</td>
<td>[____________________]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan.</td>
<td>DCI Worldwide Threat Brief. “… issues range from the proliferation of WMD to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>international terrorism, drug trafficking.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Late 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 Feb. Bin Ladin fatwa calling for jihad against U.S. military and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-Jun. [____________________]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28 Jan. DCI Worldwide Threat Brief. “… issues range from the proliferation of WMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Mar.</td>
<td>Letter sent from UBL to Egyptian press complaining about U.S. occupation of the Arabian Peninsula. “Let them rest assured of the weakness and cowardice of American soldiers. They are fastest to fail and least persevering in the fire of war. We will never forget how they disappeared in the wake of Riyadh and Khobar incidents.”</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May.</td>
<td>UBL press conference. UBL declared his supporters would strike U.S. targets in the Gulf. Indicated the results of his jihad would be information warfare, and international financial turmoil…” “In addition to traditional terrorist groups, the U.S. faces an increasing threat from transnational groups, such as UBL’s organization…”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Mar.</td>
<td>C/CTC, et al, brief Congressional staff on the CTC strategic plan for FY98….”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mar.</td>
<td>C/CTC briefs SSCI staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|            | }
"visible" within weeks. He also talked about "bringing the war home to America." [Note: this is possibly a call for attacks in the U.S.]

12 Jun. In an interview with a U.S. journalist, UBL indicates he may attack a U.S. military passenger aircraft using antiaircraft missiles. At a press conference in the previous month, he indicated the results of his jihad would be “visible” within weeks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 May</td>
<td>President signs PDD-62 on counter-terror and PDD-63 on infrastructure protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDD-63 establishes the National Infrastructure Protection Center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jun.</td>
<td>UBL indicted by federal grand jury, Southern District of New York.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sealed indictment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conspiracy to destroy national defense utilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Summer]</td>
<td>Suggest UBL is planning attacks in the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Says plans are to attack in NY and Washington. Information mentions an attack in Washington probably against public places. UBL probably places a high priority on conducting attacks in the U.S.…. CIA has little information about UBL’s operatives in the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1998</td>
<td>[_________]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[_________]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[_________]</td>
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<td>[_________]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

May. Police in Europe arrest 60 members of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) to pre-empt threats to the coming World Cup in Paris.

Jun. Officers [_________]
[_________]
raids homes and NGO offices of Mustafa Majid and Mohammed Fouda, [_________]
linked to UBL. [_________]
[_________].

Summer 1998. Liaison service captured [_________]
a member of a UBL cell in Europe. [_________]
[_________]
[_________].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>UBL remains in Afghanistan, changing his location frequently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Unconfirmed reporting] claimed UBL was considering attacks in the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-23 Aug</td>
<td>[Media reports concerning UBL electronic communications].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Aug</td>
<td>UBL bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. 224 killed, 5000 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug</td>
<td>U.S. military strike against UBL terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and pharmaceutical plant in Sudan suspected of producing chemical weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall 1998</td>
<td>[Information indicates that UBL is interested in publicity and attacks involving mass casualties].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Jul</td>
<td>CTC warns of possible Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) attack by UBL.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
21 Aug. [Recap: DCI eight committee briefing regarding why CIA concluded that UBL was responsible for the bombings in Africa. DCI noted large number of renditions of UBL supporters].

2 Sep. DCI testimony to SSCI/HPSCI. “Key elements of CIA’s offensive strategy against UBL include: hit UBL’s infrastructure; work with liaison to break up cells and carry out arrests; disrupt and weaken bin Ladin’s businesses and finances; [_____] [__________]; recruit or expose his operatives; … pressure on the Taliban; and enhancing unilateral capability to capture him.

[-] Sep. [__________] [______], Abu Hajer, who is head of UBL’s computer operations and weapons procurement, was arrested abroad. Hajer is the most senior-level UBL operative arrested to date.

18 Sep. DCI briefs members of Congress on bombings. [______]

[______] DCI noted that the FBI is following 3 or 4 Bin Ladin operatives in the U.S.

[______]. The near-term threat to Americans is greater in Europe, where UBL’s infrastructure is better established.

[Fall 1998. [______] claimed that UBL’s next target would possibly involve flying an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and detonating it].

Fall 1998. [Information indicates al-Qa’ida is trying to establish an operative cell within CONUS to strike at the heart of U.S. interests and [______] [_______________________]}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Dec.</th>
<th>4 Nov.</th>
<th>Fall 1998.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bin Ladin and Mohammed Atef indicted in Southern District of New York. Also announcement made of reward for the two under State Department rewards program.</td>
<td>Fall 1998. [Collection against UBL satellite phone ends, following media leaks].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fall 1998. [UAE UBL cell is attempting to recruit a group of 5 to 7 young men from the United States to travel to the Middle East for training. This is in conjunction with planning to strike U.S. domestic targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Intelligence Community assessment of UBL… “UBL is actively planning against U.S. targets and already may have positioned operatives for at least one operation… Multiple reports indicate UBL is keenly interested in striking the U.S. on its own soil. According to [__________], Al Qaeda is recruiting operatives for attacks in the U.S. but has not yet identified potential targets.”


Late Dec. “It is a religious duty to acquire weapons of mass destruction to defend Muslims,” according to a UBL interview in Christmas 1998. UBL has been seeking CBRN materials, expertise and other resources since the early 1990s.

4 Dec. DCI memo. “We are at war… I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community.”

The report also mentions UBL affiliates in major U.S. cities.

Fall 1998. Several reports note that UBL is considering a new attack, using biological toxins in food, water, or ventilation systems of U.S. embassies. [—][——][——][——].

[] Dec. [———] reports member of UBL was planning operations against U.S. targets. Plans to hijack U.S. aircraft proceeding well. Two individuals [———] had successfully evaded checkpoints in a dry run at a NY airport. [———][———].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>[_____] the Taliban’s fear of airstrikes had led the group to press UBL to act more discreetly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>[_____], UBL supporters in Afghanistan are experimenting with enhancing conventional explosives with radioactive material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun.</td>
<td>[_____] began staging first operation to attack a... (remaining details obscured).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>[Arrests [_______], including 2 senior operatives, have provided leads to potential targets. Information indicates U.S. naval facility was the principal target. Some terrorist planning continues, including one operation abroad and another in connection with associates in a foreign country. Another report states that [_____] plans an attack soon].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>State Department demarches Taliban for supporting UBL. [_<strong><strong>] [</strong></strong>__].</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>[<em><strong><strong>] [</strong></strong></em>] [______].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun.</td>
<td>[_____] began staging first operation to attack a... (remaining details obscured).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 Jun.</td>
<td>Eight Iraqis tied to al-Qaida arrested in Amman based on tip.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Jun.</td>
<td>Director FBI puts Bin Ladin on FBI’s “10 Most Wanted List.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May.</td>
<td>[<em><strong><strong>] [</strong></strong></em>] [______].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 Jun.</td>
<td>DCI at SSCI hearing: “… We have seen numerous... (remaining details obscured).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jan. | Counterterrorism supplemental enables NSA to initiate development [______] [______]. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul.</td>
<td>[ ] the Taliban leadership reaffirmed its commitment not to oust UBL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul.</td>
<td>[ ] reports that bin Laden and his associates are planning terrorist attacks against U.S. officials and facilities in a variety of locations, including in the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul.</td>
<td>Tashkent diplomatic efforts on Afghanistan to influence Taliban, persuade it to expel UBL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul.</td>
<td>CTC rethinking disruption operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- [ ] July
- [ ] July
- [ ] July
- [ ] July
- [ ] July
- [ ] July
- [ ] July
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event / Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>Al Qaeda's capabilities have suffered from arrests of key operatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>Bin Ladin's organization has decided to target high-ranking U.S. officials, including the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the Director of Central Intelligence, though no particular plans have been made or approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>A cooperating witness in the Africa bombings case mentioned that a former U.S. Special Forces member from California, Ali Mohammed, provided training to UBL operatives in Africa and a bombing suspect in Haroun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.</td>
<td>CTC has engaged with SOCOM and JSOC in capture discussions. JSOC has been tasked to begin planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.</td>
<td>CTC conference on UBL. “We are at war with UBL. We have been working against UBL for over four years... during this period, we...”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12 Oct. Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Musharraf ousts Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless military coup.

have been able to:
- Stop at least two UBL attacks against U.S. interests abroad
- Render over 30 foreign nationals abroad
- Significantly damage UBL’s infrastructure
- Put doubt in UBL’s mind about security of his operations and operatives

Oct 8. State Department designates Al Qaeda a foreign terrorist organization. Current state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, Cuba.

15 Oct. UN deplores provision of safe haven to UBL and demands his rendering to some country. On 14 Nov 99, sanctions are to begin which ban most foreign flights of Ariana except for humanitarian need and the Hajj. Freezes funds for Taliban except on humanitarian groups.
Late 1999. Al-Mihdhar at UBL camp in Afghanistan.


Dec. Senior al-Qaida operatives detained based on CIA information.

21 Nov. FBI elevates counter-terrorism to a standing division within FBI HQ separate from the National Security Division. FBI has 26 JTTFs in operation.

26 Oct. CTC’s priorities are disrupting UBL operations and recruiting penetrations;

8 Dec. According to CTC, accepting the theory that UBL wants to inflict maximum casualties, cause massive panic, and score a psychological victory, then UBL may be seeking to attack between 5 and 15 targets on the Millennium. “Because the U.S. is UBL’s ultimate goal… we must assume that several of these targets will be in the U.S.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec 14.</td>
<td>Ahmed Ressam arrested at U.S.-Canadian border with bomb-making chemicals and detonator components. Intended target was Los Angeles International Airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[-] Dec.</td>
<td>Disruption operations:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Dec.</td>
<td>[DCI sends report on Millennium threat to all liaison services. The item describes arrest of Algerian in Seattle and mounting evidence that UBL and other extremists intend to launch attacks against U.S. interests abroad and at home].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Jan. Bombing of USS The Sullivans aborted. An explosives-laden boat sank as it was launched in Aden harbor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan. Al-Qaida operative [_____] detained at CIA behest. He is deported and admits he has received training at Al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. [_____]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Mar. [_____]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Jan. DCI announces Abu Zubaida the #1 terrorist target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. [_____]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mar. [_____]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1 Jul. Atta and al-Shehhi begin flight training at Huffman Aviation and Jones Flying Service.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top Secret</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Sep. Taliban issued press statement on unknown aircraft seen over Kandahar allegedly looking for UBL.</td>
<td>16 Jul. CTC briefing to House Committee on Government Operations and Reform. C/CTC lists accomplishments, i.e., [——] disruptions of terrorists’ organizational planning over the past two years. Helped render more than 30 terrorists in other countries since [———], more than half of whom were associates of UBL’s Al Qaeda.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
[•] Oct. [Four foreign extremists with links to UBL arrested abroad and then released due to insufficient evidence].


[•] Oct. [UBL reportedly forced to postpone bombing of [•••] U.S. embassies. Still planning attacks in several locations [•••]. Targets include U.S. facility abroad].

Sep. [•••].

Fall 2000. [•••].

Oct. [•••].

Oct. [•••].

Nov. [•••].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 Dec.</td>
<td>Hijackers Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi receive their pilots’ licenses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Nov.</td>
<td>FBI rendition of al-Qaida operative based in Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall 2000.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Dec.</td>
<td>Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1333 strongly condemning use of Afghanistan under control of Taliban for sheltering and training terrorists and demands its cessation. Also demands, per UNSCR 1267 (1999) that Taliban turn over UBL to appropriate country where he is indicted, etc., and close all terrorist camps under Taliban control. Issues list of sanctions including arms embargo, freezing of UBL and Al Qaeda assets, and other economic sanctions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Early 2001. [----------].


[-] Jan. [----------].

[-] Jan. [----------].

[-] Jan. [----------].
6 Feb. DCI classified worldwide threat brief: "...this year the thrust of terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities and interests come to the forefront... UBL, his associates remain most immediate and serious threat. UBL's commitment to striking against the U.S. undiminished... strong indications panning new operations... capable of mounting multiple attacks with little or no warning."

6 Feb. Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB): The discovery of multiple terrorist plots since October shows an energized international "jihad movement" is raising the threat to U.S. interests, particularly in the Middle East and Europe. Most significant spike in activity since the time of the Millennium. Stems in part from changes in bin Ladin's practices. To avoid implicating himself and his Taliban hosts, he has allowed cells in his network to plan attacks more independently.

29 Jan. CTC briefing on al-Qaeda to SSCI: [redacted]. Some 70,000 to 120,000 people trained in the camps in Afghanistan since 1979.

9 Feb. As a result of an evaluation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Feb.</td>
<td>Recap: Since May 98, more than [———] terrorists captured and delivered to U.S. or foreign law enforcement. Since summer 2000, these have included: [———].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Feb.</td>
<td>Four persons associated with UBL network arrested in Frankfurt, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[—] 1 Feb.</td>
<td>[———] confirms press accounts of two arrests in Yemen regarding USS Cole. [———].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[—] Feb.</td>
<td>[———].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[———],</td>
<td>a liaison service identified, and invited CIA to participate in tasking, a sensitive asset with [———].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
extremist tied to Ahmed Ressam, had been arrested.

Apr.

19 Apr. [Bin Ladin organization is assessed to be in the throes of advanced preparations for a major attack, most probably on an American or Israeli target. The information does not mention the target of the attacks, nor the venue or dates. At the hub of activity is an al-Qa’ida figure. Target and date uncertain. The information implies a bomb against a major target].

23 Apr. The second wave of 9-11 hijackers arrives throughout the eastern seaboard between late April and late Jun 2001.

May. [extensive efforts to get a videotape of UBL the widest public airing. Just before East Africa bombings, UBL used media to predict news to].

Spring 2001. [].

10 May. DCI tells Senate Appropriations Committee hearing terrorism is on the rise especially against the U.S. Eighty percent increase since 1998. Strategic initiative is to pre-empt terrorist plans, and it is paying off with disruptions that include [s] and bin Laden plots. Despite successes, limits to what we can do. Generally not have specific time-and-place warning of attacks. Likely to be attack against U.S. interests over the next year.
[–] May. [Foreign authorities seize terrorist suspect. Links to Ressam Millennium cell].

May. UK law enforcement officials released all of the Algerian extremists who were recently arrested in London. [———]. [———]. One [———]. [———]. was immediately re-arrested on a French warrant. The leader of the cell [———] also was re-arrested on immigration charges pending possible deportation. Both individuals had prior knowledge of Ressam’s abortive attack on LAX.

[–] May. [Spanish police arrested Frankfurt terrorist cell member].

[–] May. [———].
5 Jun. DC/CTC briefing for HPSCI: “What worries me is that we’re on the verge of more attacks that are larger and more deadly—not necessarily CBRN, but could go that way also.”


28 Jun. “Based on a review of all-source reporting over the last five months, we believe that UBL will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will
indicated operatives linked to UBL’s organization expect their near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences such as destabilizing governments or causing major casualties.

4 Jul. Mihdhar enters U.S. at JFK Airport.

Jul. Extremists associated with UBL [_________] continued to expect imminent attacks on U.S. interest but operational delays may persist, probably in response to enhanced U.S. security measures.

Jul. [Reports indicate UBL planning unspecified attacks on U.S. facilities abroad].

Jul. [Over the last [_____] weeks, there have been over 25 reports alluding to an impending attack. Never before has the Intelligence Community seen so many indicators].

who [_________ are members of Al Qaeda organization and were planning to bomb the U.S. embassy and other U.S. facilities [_________].

Jul. British re-arrest Algerian [_________]

[_________] knew of Ressam’s terrorist plans. Ressam said UBL was aware of his terrorist plans and intentions in the U.S.

Jul. [_________]

[_________] a cell of international Islamic extremists [_____] [_________] involved in anti-U.S. terrorist planning. Even with the arrests, attacks may still be planned [_________] [_________].

Jul. [_________]

[_________] be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning. They are waiting us out, looking for a vulnerability.”
Aug. Clandestine [________] [_______] and media reports indicate UBL has wanted to conduct attacks in the U.S. since 1997... Al-Qa’ida members—

30 Jul. U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1363. Stresses obligation of U.N. member states to comply with UNSCRs 1267 and 1333, respectively, which calls on Taliban to cease its support of terrorists in the territory it controls and the turning over of UBL to appropriate authorities. Offers assistance to states including those bordering on Afghanistan to increase their capability to implement measures imposed by above resolutions, which include an arms embargo and freezing of UBL assets.

1 Aug. CIA Inspector General report on CTC: “well-managed, fulfilling interagency responsibilities for DCI, made progress on problems previously identified,
including some who are U.S.
citizens—have resided in or
traveled to the U.S. for years,
and the group apparently
maintains a support structure
that could aid attacks.

3 Aug. The IC continues to
estimate that [———]
extremists associated with Al
Qaeda are now prepared to
conduct one or more terrorist
attacks at any time. The IC
continues to believe that the
most likely locales for such
attacks are on the Arabian
Peninsula, the Middle East and
Europe.

particularly relationship with FBI.
Customers did identify gaps—plans
and intentions of key terrorist
groups and timely, specific warning
of attack.

Summer 2001. [———]
[———].

[-] Aug. [———]
[———]
[———]
[———]
[———]
[———]
[———]
[———].
TOP SECRET


Aug. [ ]

16 Aug. Zacarias Moussaoui detained by INS.

Aug. [ ]

Aug. [ ]

16 Aug. CTC Assessment: for every UBL operative that we stop, an estimated 50 operatives slip through our loose net undetected. Based on recent arrest, it is clear that UBL is building up a worldwide infrastructure which will allow him to launch multiple and simultaneous attacks with little or no warning.

9 Sep. Assassination of Afghan Northern Alliance leader Masood by Al Qaeda operatives posing as journalists.

10 Sep. In the hours just prior to the 9/11 attacks, NSA obtains two pieces of information suggesting that individuals with terrorist connections believed something significant would happen on September 11. No specific indication of time, place, or type of expected event. Because of the nature of the processes involved, NSA is unable to report the information until September 12.

11 Sep. World Trade Center/Pentagon/Stony Creek attacks.
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APPENDIX

SELECTED EVENTS IN THE CHRONOLOGY OF TERRORISM

1982 – 2001
Selected events in the chronology of terrorism, 1982-2001

- Terrorist incident
- Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States
- Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to use airplanes as weapons
- Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States using airplanes as weapons
- Communications intercepts suggesting possible imminent terrorist activities


Apr 12. Restaurant bombing near Torrejon Airbase, Spain.


Nov 23. Hijacking of EgyptAir flight.
Mar 30. TWA 840 bombing.
Apr 5. LaBelle Disco bombing, Germany.

Spring 1986. President authorizes counterterrorist activities.
Feb/Mar. DCI’s Counterterrorist Center established.
Jan 20. President signs policy directive on terrorism.

Feb 15. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Circa 1989. Al Qa'ida founded.


Feb 23. Bombing of World Trade Center, New York City.


Apr. CIA paper refers to bin Ladin as a supporter of militant Islamic causes.


Jun 24. FBI arrests eight individuals. Attacks on New York City landmarks thwarted.


Dec 23. Algerian extremists hijack plane and threaten to crash it into the Eiffel Tower.

Feb 10. Ramzi Yousef arrested and extradited to U.S.

Jun. Attempted assassination of Egyptian President Mubarak, Ethiopia.


1994


1995


1996


Circa Apr. Saudi Arabia revokes bin Ladin’s citizenship.

Aug 23. Bin Ladin issues a *fatwa* authorizing attacks on Western military targets in the Arabian Peninsula.


Jan. CIA creates special unit to focus on bin Ladin.
Aug 20. U.S. cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan. Intelligence Community makes bin Ladin a top priority.


Summer/winter 1998. Two authorizations for counterterrorism activities.


May 26. In a press conference, bin Ladin discusses “bringing the war home to America.”

May 22. President signs policy documents on counterterrorism and national infrastructure protection.

Circa summer/fall 1998. Intelligence Community begins to acquire information that bin Ladin operatives may be planning attacks in the U.S.

- **Terrorist incident**
- Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States
- Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to use airplanes as weapons
- Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States using airplanes as weapons
Circa late 1998 to Spring 2000. Hijackers Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah are together in Hamburg, Germany.


On three separate occasions during the year, the President authorizes counterterrorism activities.

1999

Jun 7. FBI puts bin Ladin on “Ten Most Wanted” list.

Jun 1999. Chief of the Counterterrorist Center testifies before intelligence committees that bin Ladin and associates are planning attacks in the U.S.


Jan 5-8. Meeting of Al Qa'ida operatives in Malaysia.

Jan 15. Two individuals from the Malaysia meeting – al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi – enter the U.S. Over the next several months, they take flight lessons in San Diego but abandon that effort.


Mar. CIA receives information that al-Hazmi entered the U.S. on Jan 15.

Spring/summer/fall 2000. Hijackers Atta, al-Shehhi, Jarrah enter the U.S. and take flight lessons in Florida.


Jan 4. One of the individuals at the Malaysia meeting is identified as a principal *Cole* plotter.

May-Aug. Intelligence Community receives numerous reports indicating an impending terrorist attack. The volume of reports drops off in July and August. Circa Jun-Aug, CIA officers again review information from the Malaysia meeting.

Feb-May. Hani Hanjour receives additional flight training in the U.S.

Spring. Arrival of second wave of hijackers in the U.S.

July 10. Electronic communication from FBI Phoenix field office to FBI HQ.


Aug 23. CIA requests State, Customs, and INS add al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi to their watchlists. Both are already in the U.S. FBI initiates a search.


Jan-Sep. New Administration conducting terrorism policy review. New policy ready for President’s consideration on Sep. 10.