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COMBATING TERRORISM POLICY AND SUPPORT

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INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you, from a policy and operational perspective, the way that the Department of Defense has organized itself to support the US Government’s combating terrorism mission and what support roles we may have in helping other government agencies in defending against these dangers both at home and abroad.

DOD SUPPORT & ACTIVITY IN COMBATING TERRORISM

The USG is working hard to deter or to prevent, and should that fail, to minimize the consequences of a terrorist incident. Many federal agencies have a role to play in the federal response to a terrorist incident. Likewise, the Department of Defense (DoD) plays an important role in providing unique resources and capabilities to support civil authorities.

DoD’s support to civil authorities is governed by the following five principles: (1) we must have absolute and public accountability of officials involved in the oversight of this process while respecting the constitutional principles and civil liberties of our system; (2) DoD must remain in a supporting role to the lead civilian agencies (DoJ domestically and the State Department overseas); (3) DoD support should emphasize our natural role, skills, and structures such as our ability to mass mobilize and provide logistical support; (4) DoD equipment and capabilities are developed and procured primarily to support our war fighting mission; and finally (5) We abide by the existing legislative authorities that govern the Department’s support to civilian agencies.

Within DoD, my office, the Deputate for Combating Terrorism Policy and Support (CTP&S), links the efforts of multiple offices across the spectrum of all combating terrorism programs. CTP&S captures six areas of effort: intelligence support; anti-terrorism; counter-terrorism; terrorism consequence management; research and development; and international cooperation. Intelligence support refers to our activities to assist the intelligence community to focus their unique efforts to the terrorist threat, in general. Anti-terrorism involves all defensive measures employed to protect personnel and facilities against a terrorist incident. Conversely, counter-terrorism refers to offensive response measures to deter, resolve, or mitigate a terrorist act. Terrorism consequence management includes a range of activities required to provide emergency assistance to alleviate damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by terrorist attacks, to protect the public health and safety with the goal of restoring essential government services. Our research and development efforts include both rapid-prototyping and longer-range technology exploration to provide enhanced capabilities to all component areas. International cooperation refers to the Department’s role in the full array of U. S. policy tools.

Within the Department, we work closely with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Offices of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I), the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (HA), the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (RA), the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (LA), the Joint Staff, the
Services, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). In my view, the Department is fully committed to combating this significant threat.

Now, I would like to say a few things in support of the comments of Dr. Horn on the nature of the threat to agriculture and our food supply.

**THE THREAT**

The terrorist threat of today is far more complex than in the past and the terrorist potential for mass disruption, destruction, and negative affectation is growing. Biological attacks against agriculture represent another horrific way to attack a nation’s people, economy and national will. As we have already seen, even natural occurrences of disease and pestilence can be inordinately costly and have a cascading effect on other often seemingly unrelated areas of the economy. A 1997 outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Taiwan resulted in a $5 billion loss and a total shutdown of swine exports. A recent outbreak in Malaysia of a new virus called the Nipah virus led to total depopulation of several million animals and the death of hundreds of people. An outbreak of BSE (Mad Cow Disease) in the UK had a disastrous effect on the British beef industry and the British government from which they are only now beginning to recover. Regrettably, a terrorist initiated event of this nature is not beyond the realm of possibility.

Some foreign countries currently support biological warfare programs that target agriculture. At least 10 biological warfare agents that could be used against agriculture have been identified. The activities of Iraq are well documented. We are concerned that this technology and/or expertise may proliferate to other states as well as to terrorist groups. We know that terrorist organizations have expressed an interest in developing a biological warfare capability. For example, anthrax while recognized primarily as an anti-personnel agent, also has application against livestock. DIA and USDA are currently involved in several initiatives to better characterize and define the nature of this Agricultural BW threat.

**DOD’S DOMESTIC ROLE IN COMBATING TERRORISM**

The battle against terrorism in a domestic context requires effective coordination among Federal, State, and local authorities, and equally important, the battle against terrorism requires a partnership between the Executive and Legislative branches. I would like to commend the Committee for recognizing the importance of this threat and how it may affect our national security.

There are three key points to make to frame this portion of the discussion. First, DoD’s combating terrorism program is part of a coordinated United States Government (USG) interagency team response. No single agency possesses the authorities, response mechanisms, and capabilities to effectively deter or resolve terrorist incidents on its own. Second, as you are all aware, the President has designated the Department of Justice (DoJ), through the FBI, as the lead Federal agency for combating terrorism in the United States. Third, the Department of Defense, as authorized by law, plays a supporting role in assisting lead federal agencies in their response to terrorist incidents. Certainly, as a major supporting agency, DoD brings many
unique assets to the effort. Domestically, DoD supports the crisis management efforts of the DoJ and the consequence management efforts of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

TERRORISM CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

With respect to consequence management, the federal government supports state and local authorities in the event of a domestic incident, and a host government in the event of an international incident. Under the Federal Response Plan, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), if requested by state and local authorities, has the lead responsibility for coordinating federal emergency assistance to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack.

Within the Department of Defense, the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) work with both DoJ and FEMA throughout these phases to ensure that appropriate DoD support is provided. For state and local first responders, it is important to remember that awareness and preparedness are the first and best defense. Bottom line -- in consequence management, a rapid response saves lives and, possibly, critical sectors of the nation’s economy.

DoD possesses a broad array of response assets that could be organized to provide support suitable for consequence management. Examples of these assets include chemical-biological technical reconnaissance and assessments, decontamination capabilities, medical support units, technical expertise, and logistics. The newly established Joint Task Force-Civil Support, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Joint Forces Command, is responsible for the operational coordination of the deployment of these DoD assets in support of the lead Federal agency.

The Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) of the Marine Corps, and the U.S. Army’s Technical Escort Unit (TEU), are examples of unique consequence management response capabilities that Title 10 forces can provide. The CBIRF is a standing, highly trained consequence management force tailored for short notice response to terrorist initiated chemical and/or biological incidents. The CBIRF provides an expert and robust decontamination capability that can augment other response capabilities by being prepositioned or quickly deployed for an incident in support of consequence management. The TEU provides worldwide escort, neutralization, disposal, and emergency response to toxic chemicals and biological agents, munitions, certain nuclear and other hazardous materials.

The TEU maintains a 24-hour a day on-call emergency response capability to respond to a chemical or biological incident with personnel trained in chemical, biological, and explosive ordnance disposal operations to perform render safe procedures, damage limitation, reconnaissance, recovery, sampling, mitigation, decontamination, and transportation. It also performs or recommends final disposition of weaponized and non-weaponized chemical or biological materials and hazards encountered.

In addition, the Chemical Biological-Rapid Response Team (CB-RRT) of the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), was established to support the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) to assist in the detection, neutralization, and disposal of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or suspected WMD. The CB-RRT, working in support of the primary
federal consequence management agencies, can also assist state and local governments in dealing with the consequences of a WMD incident.

To provide additional support to our federal, state, and local partners in dealing with the consequences of a domestic terrorist attack involving chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, the Secretary of Defense announced the establishment and locations of ten Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams. These RAID teams, comprised of twenty-two highly skilled, full-time National Guard personnel, will assist local first responders in determining the precise nature of an attack, provide medical and technical advice, and assist with the identification and arrival of other state and federal response assets. These teams are a state asset to be activated by the Governor. In order to respond to the use or threatened use of a WMD device; however, they can be federalized under recent amendments to the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) authority. In addition to the already established 10 RAID “Heavy” units, we are looking to establish an additional 17 which would give us a total of 27.

Additionally, at the direction of Congress, DoD is working to establish 39 RAID “Light” units. These units will be structured and trained to provide a modest planning and assessment capability in the states and territories where the larger RAID teams are not assigned. They will be staffed with National Guard personnel and the capabilities of these teams will be tailored to the specific needs of each state or territory.

We are also conducting research and development through the Counterterrorism Technical Support Program and the Technical Support Working Group to develop personnel protection, agent detection and identification equipment, and mitigation and decontamination equipment for use by first responders. The support provided by DoD will be based upon the resources within the Department, our immediate proximity to a situation, or the nature and scope of the situation. It is important to note again, however, that the Department of Defense remains a supporting player in the larger combined federal effort.

**DOD SUPPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE**

The Department of Defense has a long history of support to the Department of Agriculture in mitigating the effects of biological contamination to our agricultural base. In 1964, the Secretary of Defense directed DoD to provide assistance to the USDA’s Animal Disease Eradication Program, and designated the Army as action agent to assure participation by all military agencies in the program.

In 1985, the Department of Defense, the General Services Administration, the Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which the DoD agreed to assist USDA/APHIS in developing contingency plans and exercises. There is also an on-going process to review this memorandum in light of any new developments.

There are numerous examples of DoD support to USDA efforts in the field. DoD provided assistance to USDA during a 1971 outbreak of Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis in Texas where some 4,000 military personnel participated in the effort to stem the disease. In the 1971-1972 timeframe, more than four hundred military personnel took part in combating an
outbreak of Newcastle’s Disease in California and Texas. In Pennsylvania, in 1983, some 140 military personnel were called on to support a campaign against Avian Influenza.

More recently in June 1997, DoD provided the use of facilities and equipment for the USDA to conduct spraying for Medfly activity in Florida. In 1998, DoD assisted the South Dakota National Guard in contingency planning to mitigate the effects of a potential biological terrorism attack against the state’s swine population. Additionally, DoD’s United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) aided the Centers for Disease Control in their efforts to identify the causative agent for the West Nile Fever outbreak in New York. This collaboration was important to USDA since West Nile Fever affects and is transmitted to humans by mosquitoes.

Cooperative research is another area of particular importance to both departments. In 1997, in recognition of our mutual interests and concerns relating to agriculture, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two parties was signed. It provides a framework for research and aims to promote closer coordination, more efficient use of resources, and minimization of duplication of effort. In addition, the MOU provided for the coordination of projects and programs of mutual interest.

Under the agreement, new initiatives were launched. Some have broad applications that extend beyond the military to provide significant public health benefits. These include work on pest control, and the development of a technology to track the paths used by cockroaches in buildings such as warehouses or homes. This technology enables us to limit the area in which we spray insecticide and yet achieve significantly more effective insect control using less pesticide. The reduction in the amount of insecticide used is also welcome as such chemicals can be harmful to humans. For example, better control of roach infestation (a major cause of childhood asthma) would be of enormous benefit, particularly for children living in our inner cities.

Under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), another project underway is the exploration of the uses of baculoviruses against insects such as mosquitoes. This approach to mosquito control uses natural agents and offers an alternative to conventional insecticides. A third and particularly intriguing project is a new technology developed to trap mosquitoes in great volume. Using naturally occurring and powerful mosquito attractants that are not harmful to humans, the insects are drawn from great distances to a trap where they are destroyed. I understand the USDA proposed the use of this technology next summer to clear New York City’s Central Park and the Washington D.C. Mall area of mosquitoes. In light of the recent occurrences of West Nile Fever in New York City, this technology comes none to soon.

DoD supports USDA in other ways. These include but are not limited to: participation in exercises, assistance in the development of response plans, laboratory support to assist and augment the capabilities of the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS); and providing military specialists trained in foreign animal disease diagnosis, laboratory diagnosis, epidemiology, microbiology, immunology, entomology, pathology, and public health. These specialists include DoD’s Veterinary Services Support personnel.
The U.S. Army Veterinary Service is the Executive Agent for veterinary services, including animal care, food inspection, and medical research and development for all services within the Department of Defense. Veterinary Service Support personnel would play key roles in responding to biological warfare and bio-terrorism including: consultation concerning animal diseases dangerous to man; animal health surveillance; animal isolation, quarantine and destruction; food and water safety; decontamination, disinfection and infection control; and disease outbreak investigation.

The Army Veterinary Service has recognized the need to increase awareness of the vulnerability of food to terrorist attack. Consequently, the Service has initiated collaboration with other military and federal public health organizations to develop the capability to perform detailed food and water vulnerability assessments. Based on these assessments, intervention protocols will be designed and implemented. In addition, the Army Veterinary Service is pursuing the acquisition of rapid detection diagnostic tests and methodologies to screen for foodborne pathogens.

The Veterinary Service has two reference laboratories. They are located in the United States and Europe and are capable of testing for microbes (including those pathogens most closely associated with food borne disease), vector borne disease ecology, toxins, and heavy metals. The U.S. Army’s Veterinary Laboratory at Fort Sam Houston is the more robust of the two and has gas chromatography, mass spectrometry, and high perform and liquid chromatography capability that can be used to identify a large number of chemical compounds. The laboratory also has the capability for detection of pesticides and antibiotic residues. The DoD Veterinary Laboratory closely collaborates with other military, federal and state facilities, and contractors to provide services as required.

Because certain foreign animal diseases such as Rift Valley Fever can infect man, they are of critical concern to DoD. Other diseases such as foot and mouth disease, although not dangerous to man, could be used as economic bio-weapons, capable of devastating entire segments of the animal agricultural industry. To provide additional detection capabilities, more than 75 military veterinarians were trained by USDA to recognize and treat foreign animal diseases.

DoD and USDA work closely together to protect people and livestock from such diseases and pests. Our medical biological defense research program is engaged in research against diseases such as Anthrax and Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis which would be key to mitigating the effects of agricultural terrorism using such agents. In addition, the Department has collaborated with the Agricultural Research Service, USDA to develop a vaccine against Rift Valley Fever.

In September 1998, The Army Veterinary Services, SO/LIC, The US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), and other DoD and federal agencies participated in the “Combined Conference on Food and Agriculture Security.” This conference was convened to provide the public insight into the vulnerability of American agriculture and the nature of the threat. We are continuing to work to provide a responsible examination of this potential threat and the capabilities required to meet the challenge.
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

The Department of Defense is concerned that expertise, technology, and pathogens associated with the Former Soviet Union’s anti-livestock and anti-crop biological weapons programs could proliferate to terrorist groups and rogue states. Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) program, DoD is engaged in a well-coordinated interagency effort to reduce this proliferation threat at the source.

Among the interagency players are the US Department of Agriculture, which contributes unique scientific expertise and resources to this effort, and the Department of State. We support the Administration’s request to increase Department of State funding for USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) to engage Former Soviet Biological Weapons facilities in collaborative research. These biotechnology engagement programs have already proven to be an effective means of preempting rogue state efforts to acquire Former Soviet BW expertise. In addition to supporting USDA, the DoD also supports the Department of Health and Human Services, through the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) separately fund collaborative research programs that are implemented through the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC). There is a natural division of labor between CTR research projects focused on human pathogens of greatest interest to DoD’s biomedical research laboratories, and ARS research projects focused on animal and plant pathogens of critical interest to ARS research laboratories.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is developing a Biological Material Protection, Control, and Accountability (BMPC&A) program to enhance physical security at Former Soviet BW facilities that store collections of highly infectious pathogens. The intent of this program is to reduce the threat of diversion of pathogenic microorganisms to terrorist groups or rogue states. The bleak funding situation at these institutes has led to a marked deterioration of their ability to maintain an appropriate level of physical security. At one institute a CTR team found an extensive collection of anthrax and plague protected by a single unarmed guard and a skeleton key lock on a wooden door. The alarm system, which once protected the collection, was no longer operational.

Biological Material Protection, Control, and Accountability (BMPC&A) projects are planned at Former Soviet facilities that participated in the anti-human BW program and Former Soviet anti-livestock and anti-crop BW institutes that house collections of exotic animal and plant pathogens. The list of target institutes includes the Scientific Agricultural Research Institute in Otar, Kazakhstan, the All-Russia Institute of Animal Health in Vladimir, Russia, and the All-Russia Institute of Phytopathology in Golitsyno, Russia.

DoD will work closely with the Department of Agriculture in the implementation of these projects, as USDA has a unique capability to genetically characterize the strains in these collections. During the course of these projects some of the pathogens will be brought to Agricultural Research Service laboratories in the United States for further study.
CONCLUSION

DoD clearly recognizes the vulnerability of the national infrastructure, and American agriculture as one of the pillars on which American economic power rests. It represents a lucrative and vulnerable target for terrorists. Attacking the nation’s agriculture and food supply system is not a new idea. In 1915, the German’s infected some 3,500 horses purchased in the United States by the allies for the World War I war effort. During the days of the Cold War, the former Soviet Union had an ambitious bio-warfare program targeted against American agriculture. The threshold has been breached; our vulnerabilities are known.

This hearing is performing an invaluable service by providing an opportunity to educate us all as to the nature of the threat, and by offering a forum to explore the development of cooperative strategies and new efforts to provide rapid detection and effective consequence management.

Thank You.