South Korea Special Weapons
Nuclear Weapons
South Korea began a nuclear weapons program in 1970, in response to the Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on self-defense for Asian allies. Following the withdrawal of 26,000 American troops, the South Korean government established a Weapons Exploitation Committee, which decided to pursue nuclear weapons. By 1975 the US had pressured France into not delivering a reprocessing facility, effectiely ending attempts to develop nuclear weapons. Under pressure from the United States, Korea ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 23 April 1975. Although President Park Chung-Hee said in 1977 that South Korea would not develop nuclear weapons, he continued a clandestine program that only ended with his assassination in October 1979.
South Korea may have had plans in the 1980s to develop nuclear weapons to deter an attack by the North. The plans were reported to have been dropped under US pressure. However, the reports seem to have emanated in the form of hearsay from a South Korean opposition legislator, with no confirmation from US or South Korean officials, or independent sources. The United States remained concerned, as indicated by the "special" inspections that the US conducts at the center of Seoul's nuclear research, the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) located at Daeduk, near the city of Taejon. The United States maintains a ban on plutonium being supplied to the South Korea.
Nuclear Safeguards
In connection with the NPT, the Safeguards Agreement between Korea and the IAEA has been in force since 14 November 1975. In 1975, only 2 nuclear facilities, TRIGA II and III research reactors, were under IAEA safeguards. However, because of the active nuclear power program in Korea, 33 facilities are now under IAEA safeguards.
As an active measure to maintain the increase use of nuclear material and facilities, a national inspection system was introduced to respond to all international obligations and to ensure international transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in Korea.
The Technology Center for Nuclear Control (TCNC) was established at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute in 1994 to develop safeguards technology and to provide technical assistance to the Government. In 1996, MOST authorized TCNC at KAERI as the technical assistant agency for national safeguards implementation.
In addition, each nuclear facility or installation has designated a person in charge of safeguards, which was strongly recommended by the Government to strengthen the State's System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC). Even though the Government is at the top and the center of the Korean SSAC in terms of hierarchy, it is the close cooperation amongest organizations and institutions that has made safeguards implementation succeed in Korea.
National inspection were performed for 7 facilities in 1997 on a trial basis and were carried out for 13 facilities in 1998 as an intermediate step before full implementation. During these periods, necessary elements such as inspection criteria and procedures, inspection equipment, and inspection information management system were developed for full scope national inspection.
In 2001, the full scope national inspection was performed for 33 facilities. Although the national inspection system in Korea needs to be further developed, its benefit is already foreseen. Advanced inspection equipment have been developed for efficient and effective inspection both for the IAEA and Korea. Since 1999, Korea has accomplished 95% of the IAEA safeguards inspection goal attainment. In October 2001, Korea and the IAEA signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the implementation of enhanced cooperation for light water reactors.
As of October 2002, a total of 17 nuclear power units were in operation, and three units are under construction. A further eight units are to be constructed from 2003. Korea has around 15 GW of nuclear power capacity, which accounts for 28.0% of its total electric power capacity. To enhance the safety and to cut the costs of nuclear power plants, Korea has developed an advanced power reactor with a capacity of 1,400MWe, called APR1400, on the basis of technological self-reliance of the 1,000MWe Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP) in 1995. Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Company(KHNP), the sole consumer of nuclear fuel in Korea, has a basic guideline to ensure the nuclear fuel supply and to pursues the economic efficiency at the same time by applying an international open bid.
Nuclear Enrichment
South Korea admitted to embarrassment but not to wrongdoing as international inspectors investigated the secret enrichment of uranium at government-run nuclear facilities. The government said it was fully cooperating with a team of inspectors from the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that departed after concluding a week-long inspection. Revelations that scientists in South Korea had engaged in clandestine uranium enrichment in 2000, albeit in microscopic quantities, emerged at a time when Seoul was playing a leading role in efforts to end North Korea's nuclear weapons drive.
These experiments were done by a small group of scientists for research purposes on a laboratory scale and without the knowledge or authorization of the government of the Republic of Korea. The head of the research institute admitted that the uranium enrichment experiment by South Korean government scientists was conducted three times in 2000 with his approval. And the government of the Republic of Korea did not have an enrichment or reprocessing program at all, and do not have and will not have that enrichment or reprocessing facilities.
One of these conversion activities, which took place at three facilities that had not been declared to the Agency, involved the production of about 150 kilograms of natural uranium metal, a small amount of which, according to the ROK, was later used in the AVLIS experiments. The ROK authorities have pointed out that the uranium enrichment experiments took place in the context of a broader experimental effort to apply AVLIS techniques to a wide range of stable isotopes. According to the ROK, only about 200 milligrams of enriched uranium were produced.
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors visited three previously undeclared facilities in South Korea. The inspection team visited another facility for which the results of environmental samples had revealed the presence of slightly irradiated depleted uranium with associated plutonium. The ROK authorities informed the Agency that, in the early 1980s, a laboratory scale experiment had been performed at this facility to irradiate 2.5 kilograms of depleted uranium and separate a small amount of plutonium.
News of the experiment prompted nervous reaction from Japan.
The Korean government will take measures to avoid a recurrence of this issue by creating a national center for controlling nuclear material, and educating scientists to remind them of their safeguard obligation; and safeguard agreements mean that even minute amounts of nuclear material must be reported to the IAEA.
Nuclear Reprocessing
South Korean scientists extracted plutonium in 1982 without reporting it. A week after admitting government scientists enriched uranium in a clandestine experiment four years earlier, South Korea revealed it also engaged in plutonium research more than 20 years ago. South Korean officials confirmed that several milligrams of plutonium were extracted in a 1982 experiment at the country's nuclear energy research institute. South Korean diplomats insisted the experiments were extremely limited and conducted purely for scientific research.
Under the NPT, South Korea is allowed to conduct experiments with nuclear material. But all such experiments have to be reported to the IAEA so it can verify that none of the material involved is being used for military purposes. So the experiments themselves are not illegal. But carrying them out without declaring them to the appropriate international agency is illegal.
South Korea started the initial stages of a clandestine nuclear weapons program during the early 1980s, when the future of its security relationship with the United States was in doubt. That was after Washington announced possible plans to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea: "The United States learned of this nuclear activity and through political pressure and persuasion was able to end the program at a very early stage.
After the end of its nuclear weapon program, by the late 1980s South Korea retained interest in reprocessing spent fuel from its civilian nuclear power program, hoping that plutonium recycling would reduce dependence on imported uranium. The United States consistently opposed South Korean reprocessing initiatives, citing weapons proliferation concerns.
British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) had sought to obtain reprocessing contracts with South Korea, similar to the arrangements in place with Japan. An export licence was granted on 11 November 1997 for the export of up to 50kg of recycled low enriched uranium powder to the Republic of Korea for research and development on nuclear fuel. A shipment of 43.7kg of nuclear fuel containing reprocessed uranium was exported under this licence by BNFL to South Korea for use in the Hanaro research reactor at Daeduk in 1998.
In November 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported, in a confidential report, that quantities of nuclear material produced over a 20-year period by South Korea as part of nuclear experiments were not significant by that the activities and the failure by South Korea to declare them were, however.
Missiles
Under an agreement with Washington in 1972, Seoul agreed to set its missile range ceiling at 180 km in exchange for US missile technology. Through reverse-engineering of US-supplied missiles, South Korea produced two versions of a two-stage, solid-fuel SSM based on the US Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile: NHK-1 (180 km/500 kg) and NHK-2 (260 kn/450 kg). (1) South Korea also produces a variant of the Honest John heavy artillery rocket (37 km/500 kg). (2)
Unlike the systematic and ambitious missile development of North Korea, South Korea has proceeded with the support and under the control of the US. South Korea’s missile development started during the later years of former President Park Chung-Hee with an aim to reduce the gap in missile capability between the both Koreas.
Nike-Hercules, the American missile deployed in South Korea, was used as a model for development. With poor foundation in industrial technologies, South Korea requested US support for related equipment and technology, but could not get the agreement of the US Department of State. This forced South Korea to seek a different route to import missile technology. Recognizing the intention of South Korea, the US urged the South Korean government to sign a written agreement that South Korea should not develop missiles over a certain range. Considering the important relationship between South Korea and the US, the South Korean government agreed to restraints on the range and payload of missiles when developing the first South Korean ground-to-ground missile called Paekgom. Since then, the US has applied stricter restraints (180 km/500 kg) than the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on South Korea. The Paekgom was test-launched successfully in 1978, but was never deployed in actual service at to the request of the US.
Seoul spent 390 billion won ($298 million) on the purchase of ATACMS Block 1 missile systems with a range of 145 km in October 1997 as part of its surface-to-surface missile procurement project.
North Korea test-fired its Taepodong-1 missile, with an estimated range of more than 1,300 km in August 1998. Subsequently, in 1999 Seoul asked Washington to agree to extend South Korea's missile range to 300km for deployment and to 500 km for scientific research and development.
South Korea aroused American concerns in April 1999 when it test-fired a missile that flew just 50 kilometers off the South Korean west coast. The missile, launched from a newly built test station, was believed to have been capable of flying 10 times as far - but was sent on only a short flight in deference to US concerns. The South Korean Defense Ministry, however, is believed to have stepped up the pace of research and development of the missile even though it has not conducted a new test.
In November 1999 it was reported that spy-satellite photos had revealed that South Korea had built a rocket motor test station in 1998 without notifying the United States. The station, which includes a large concrete or tempered steel cradle in which rocket motors are locked for firing tests, appeared to have been built secretly as part of a larger South Korean ballistic missile program. South Korean officials said privately that Seoul had acquired technology for a longer-range missile from European countries and is developing its ''next-generation'' missile.
The US and ROK governments agreed in principle in November 1999 to extend Seoul's deployment range to 300km, though additional details required clarification in subsequent negotiations. The ROK Defense Ministry requested the ATACMS Block 1A missiles in December 1999, but negotiations the US continued to delay talks on allowing South Korea to deploy missiles with a range of up to 300km.
On 17 January 2001 the South Korean government announced it would develop and deploy missiles with a range of up to 187 miles and a payload of up to 1,100 pounds. The South previously had been bound by a 1979 agreement with Washington not to build missiles with a range greater than 112 miles. "By adopting the new guideline, our government will be able to develop and possess missiles with enough range capabilities to meet our security needs," said a Foreign Ministry statement. In an apparent attempt to dispel concerns over a possible arms race on the Korean Peninsula, the government also pledged to join the global Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). South Korea is set to join the MTCR at a March 2001 meeting of 32 signers of the treaty.
On 04 December 2001 Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control announced that it had received an $80.7 million contract to produce 111 Army Tactical Missile System (Army TACMS) Block IA missiles for the Republic of Korea. The contract represented the second purchase of the Army TACMS system by Korea and the first international sale of the Army TACMS Block IA system. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract included 110 Army TACMS FMS Block IAs and one ATACMS FMS Block IA for testing, and 29 multiple rocket launchers. The contract with South Korea had a total value of 400 billion won ($307 million).
South Korea began deploying US-made missiles in December 2003 that can strike most of North Korea. The Army Tactical Missile System Block 1A missiles are being deployed near the Demilitarized Zone. South Korea deployed 110 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of up to 300 km (187 miles) by April 2004. This marks the first time that South Korea will deploy 300-km medium-range missiles, which are capable of striking Pyongyang and other key North Korean cities.
Chemical Weapons
South Korea ratified the CWC treaty in 1997 and declared its chemical weapon stockpile and a production facility. The details of this declaration do not have to be made public. According TO various sources, the South Korean military currently is devising methods to destroy CW munitions at a disposal site in Yongdong-kun, North Ch’ungch’ong Province. It should also be noted that South Korea has the infrastructure and technical capability to build chemical weapons fairly easily.
