No-dong-B
On 12 September 2003 it was reported that North Korea was working on a new missile, is based on the Soviet SS-N-6 submarine-launched missile. The North was thought to have acquired the technology sometime between 1992 and 1998. According to an un-named US Government official, "We've had hints of this for several years, but it's only within the last year that we've been able to confirm that this did exist and it's derived from Russian technology."
No-Dong-B/Mirim IRBM
The official US Government nomenclature associated with this system is not known. The Nodong-1 designator derives from the standard US Government practice of naming a weapon systems after the most proximate placename associated with the site at which the system was first identified. Over time, the terminology Nodong-2 became associated with a lightweight version of the Nodong-1, and Nodong-3 and Nodong-4 were applied to systems subsequently designated Taep’o-dong-1 and Taep’o-dong-2. If the appearance at Mirin Airbase was the first time this SS-N-6 derivative was sighted by US intelligence, the new missile might be designated "Mirin-1" -- but for sake of simplicity we have allocated a provisional "Nodong-B" designator to this system. This would operate under the principle that single stage missiles derived from Soviet SLBM technology are of the class "Nodong" while multi-stage missiles are Taep’o-dong.
In May 2004 it was reported that prior to the Foundation Day parades on 09 September 2003, as many as ten of the missiles and five launchers were to Mirim Airbase, the preparation site for the parades. Although the missiles were not featured in the celebrations, they were noticed by Western intelligence, which prompted the news reports a few days later.
In early May 2004 South Korean newspapers reported that that in late 2003 and early 2004 US intelligence had identified construction of two new missile bases in North Korea. One facility is at Yangdok, 80 km [50 miles] east of Pyongyang, and the other base at Hochon in North Hamgyong province. By May 2004 the new bases were reportedly 70 percent to 80 percent complete.
Testifying before the parliament's National Defense Committee, ROK Defense Minister Cho Young-kil said 07 July 2004 that North Korea had deployed this new missile with a 1,860-2,500 mile range.
The missiles and mobile launchers at the sites were reportedly consistent with the new design, different from North Korea's Nodong missiles. The new system is apparently different from the North's Scud and Nodong families of missiles. According to one report, the new missile is 12 meters long and 1.5 meters in diameter. Although slightly smaller than the deployed Nodong missiles [which are variously estimated at 12.4 to 15 meters long and 1.3 meters in diameter], it has a longer range and can be launched from a mobile launcher. The new missile was assessed as having a range of between 2,750 km to 4,000 km [1,800 to 2,500 miles], thus capable of targeting American bases in Guam and Okinawa. The construction of the two facilities was taken to indicate that North Korea was sufficiently confident of the performance of the new missile to begin preparations to deploy it.
The reported 1.5 meter diameter is indeed consistent with that of the SS-N-6, but the reported length of 12 meters is a bit puzzling at first. The SS-N-6 had a total length of 9.65 meters, and a total length without warhead of 7.1 meters. It appears that the Nodong-B configuration incorates a 1.5 meter diameter engine compartment and propellant tank from the SS-N-6 configuration, and the 12 meter [length overall] results from adding the Nodong-1 reentry vehicle and interstage element. Variants of the SS-N-6 had ranges of 2,400 km and 3,200, consistent with the lower end of the reported range of the Nodong-B. It is plausible that another 1,000 km of range might have been achieved in the Nodong-B as a result of a longer propellant tank, though at the price of lower thrust-to-weight ratio and slower acceleration.
The intended role of the Nodong-B is unclear. While the Nodong-1/2 could target American facilities on Okinawa, these facilities are on Japanese territory. If the reported range of up to 4,000 kilometers is correct, the system could be used to target American facilties in Guam. Guam is an American posession, and thus the Nodong-B would give the North the potential to directly target American territory. Over-eager headline writers searching for a local angle notwithstanding, there seems little prospect that a single-stage Nodong-B could reach Hawaii, much less Los Angeles. Alternately, the Nodong-B might be intended for use with a [presumably] heavier uranium bomb design, maintaining the range coverage of the Nodong-1/2 which was presumably designed with a lighter plutonium bomb design.
The Soviet SS-N-6 was originally designed to be fired from a submarine. The Soviets also evaluated firing missiles of this class from surface ships that would be designed to blend in with normal commercial shipping. The US Government is evidently concerned that the North Koreans may intend to launch this missile from small commercial vessels that have approached the coastlines of the United States.
The Near Term Containerized Ballistic Missile Threat?
By © Charles P. Vick, 2004-6, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Disclaimer
The opinions and evaluations stated here in are only the author’s and cannot be construed to reflect those of any Government agency, company, institute or association. It is based on public information, circumstantial evidence, informed speculation, declassified U.S. intelligence community documents, official Iranian, Pakistani and North Korean government documents and histories, oral histories, interviews and engineering analysis. As with all data regarding the Iranian, Pakistani and North Korean strategic space and ballistic missile programs, this analysis is subject to revision--and represents a work in progress.
05-20-06— 03-09-07
Introduction
Several seemingly unrelated bits of information reveals a potential new developing strategic threat from Iran and North Korea . For years it has been suggested that surface ship based ballistic missiles could threaten Western national security interest. The strategic advantage of such concepts is that the ship based systems could stand off from countries on the open ocean and not be seen or easily identified due to their stealth-ness commercial looks. Now the first evidence of hardware testing appears to indicate the early development of the required proof of concept technology to make this a reality from Iran and perhaps North Korea . When North Korea introduced the No-dong-B into its land mobile strategic systems inventory in 2003 it was the first of several events that suggested such a concept might come into being via the cooperative efforts of North Korea and Iran . Now Iran has introduced the first hadware testing with North Korean assistance.
Pending Container Ship Scud Threat?
It has been revealed that intelligence sources think North Korea may have helped Iran to successfully demonstrate a proof of principle test flight of a Scud-B from an Iranian container cargo ship container in 2006. This is possibly relating to the eventual deployment of a ship container based Scud-B or more probable ship container based No-dong-B IRBM. Exactly where and when this Scud-B flight test was demonstrated remains unclear. (31) and http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nd-b.htmWhether the Scud-B or the No-dong-B are the ultimate intent is unclear at this juncture but the subsequent discussion may reveal the final intent. (31)
The Near TermContainerixed No-dong-B, Shahab-4 Ballistic Missile Threat?
The critical point noted by John Pike is that “this new missile has the advantage that it fits inside a standard 40 foot shipping container, which would be really hard to detect on container ship on the open ocean.” This author notes that is it would be easier if the warhead is interchangeable or unattached. That in fact appears to not be the case for this potential strategic application. This autonomous concept could be applicable to ship based containers, land based container trucks and is known to be based on the North Korean and new Iranian, transporter erector launcher (TEL) designs. The fact that the North Korean No-dong-B, the new Iranian Shahab-4 missile is designed and installed on a land mobile transporter erector launcher for selected pre-surveyed launch sites some what confines its applications. The whole erector system some what modified from the No-dong-A heritage packaging mobile unit can perhaps without its transporter and full pad structure be placed in the container on a palate tray and erected trough a top hatch of the container. That hatch would automatically open up with hydraulic jacks for launch as a self contained automated operation. The palate tray carries the supporting controls, instrumentation, electronics, batteries, auxiliary power unit (APU) power system and pneumatic electro hydraulic mechanical systems for erection the launch pad with the missile to carry out the launch operations. The missile is believed to be pre-fueled at the factory and armed with a nuclear warhead as a packaged unit. This game could conceivably be played by both Iran and North Korea. Pike further points out “that the small cargo ships can call in the North Korea or Iran port, get containers loaded with a missiles loaded on board, and roam the oceans waiting to fire it when the orders are received by preset on-board mother board command and control (CC) system.” As Pike notes, "Such a basing mode could be attractive to North Korea because under many scenarios it would under-fly the missile defense system currently being deployed by the United States. It would also require less complex technology than the unflown Taepodong-2 ICBM." CPV
In 1998 the Rumsfeld Commission argued that the community needs to look at alternative deployment schemes. "Sea launch of shorter range ballistic missiles is another possibility. This could enable a country to pose a direct territorial threat to the U.S. sooner than it could by waiting to develop an ICBM for launch from its own territory. Sea launching could also permit it to target a larger area of the U.S. than would a missile fired from its home territory." [SOURCE]
Steven J. Zaloga ["Sea Scorpion: A Poor Man's ICBM?" Jane's Intelligence Review, Nov 01, 1998, pp 5-7] proposed that the Soviet-era Sea Scorpion missile could make such a scenario extremely likely. Under the Soviet regime, the Scorpion missile was deployed on ships to increase the number of missiles while not interfering with submarine based missile development. Zaloga proposed that North Korea, Iran, Iraq and other countries could deploy less sophisticated versions of the Sea Scorpion, albeit with problems of accuracy and distance. By moving the launch vehicle -- the ship -- close in, distance (and to a lesser extent, accuracy) problems are mitigated.
This was further examined by Richard Fisher, jr. of http://www.strategycenter.net/ on Sept. 20, 2004 in his paper “ North Korea ’s New Missiles”. He suggested through his artist conceptual illustrations that such a ship based threat using the No-dong-B could be accomplished by using one or two stacked standardized shipping containers. Literally the containers would be broken apart and lifted vertically into position for launch. This was an interesting study but it was flawed because it had not considered the equipment interference, clearance and mass issues that are involved. While developing this study I considered variations on this study called concept-II.
On 09 December 2002 the 3,500-ton North Korean cargo vessel, So San, was stopped and boarded about 600 miles off the coast of Yemen. This happened during maritime interception operations (MIO) in the Arabian Sea conducted by two Spanish Navy ships, the Santa Maria-class Frigate Navarra (F-85) accompanied by the replenishment ship Patino (A-14). When signaled to stop, So San attempted to evade capture, forcing Navarra to fire warning shots across its bow. Spanish Special Forces troops then conducted a hostile boarding by helicopter and small boat. The boarding team later found 15 disassembled Scud missiles concealed by bags of cement, bound for Yemen. US military experts deployed in the area were called in to further examine the cargo. US Intelligence sources had been tracking the vessel since it departed its home port of Nampo in North Korean in mid-November 2002. US officials feared the vessel was heading for Iraq or another rogue state. After urgent talks between US and Yemeni diplomats, it was allowed to deliver the weapons.
The ship was flying no flag at the time it was stopped and the missiles were concealed underneath a shipment of cement. The ship was being tracked by the United States since leaving North Korea and was apparently stopped by the Spanish at the behest of the US government. After determining a lack of legal authority to cease the missiles, the ship was allowed to continue on to its destination. The Yemeni government, which initially denied knowledge of the ship, promised that there would be no transfer of the missiles to another country or non-state actor. Also, Yemen had cultivated closer ties with the US in recent years by cooperating in the Global War On Terrorism. The incident raises the question of what US actions would be in the event of some kind of blockade aimed at preventing a North Korean merchant vessel equipped with a missile, such as the Nodong-B, from attacking the United States.
The North Korean ship that transported Scud missiles to Yemen in 2002 was also used to carry chemical weapons material to North Korea. The Sosan delivered several tons of sodium cyanide, an agent used in making nerve gas, for use by Kim Jong-Il's regime. The Sosan sparked an international incident when it was stopped by US and Spanish warships in December 2002 close to Yemen. The Sosan later went on to Germany, where it picked up the chemical cargo before returning to the west Korean seaport of Nampo in February 2003.
The Proliferation Security Initiative announced in May 2003, and the Pacific Command's Regional Maritime Security Initiative announced in March 2004, both appear to be aimed at providing the United States with the legal authority and practical ability to board and search ships at sea. This might entail a close quasi-blockade of North Korea, or it might entail enforcing an exclusion zone around the continental United States. This could entail monitoring very large stretches of open ocean, given the range of this missile, and it could entail monitoring very large numbers of ships, given the relatively compact size of this missile.
The Near Term Containerized Ballistic Missile Threat?
Concept-II for No-dong-B, Shahab-4
Concept-II appears to offer very little room if any at all for a missile canister which this analyst dropped early on as excess mass not required but continued to reconsider it as a part of the erected container design. The erection of the canister for the missile was finally dropped because of the mass added that was not required. Erecting the container with out the canister with the missile held by the erector leaving the floor below in its foot print still requires a geared pin track to keep the rear end within the 40 foot by 8 foot area and the missile on its ring pad which still has to be raised some 6-8 feet with some mechanism. This concept adds to much mass load to the erector hydraulics of on the order of approximately 28,000 kgs verses the 19,000-21,000 kgs for the missile. A canister would add mass when there are only 5,740-7,740 kgs for all the added equipment including the erector various pneumatic electro hydraulic mechanical systems and the ground support equipment and pad elements. Further the container absolutely would interfere with the launch of the missile that almost certainly would collide with it during the first few unguided seconds of launch. Regardless of what design is developed it is a very tight tolerance design not leaving any room for excess mass or extra parts not needed. It must by necessity be a Spartan design stripped down to the bear essentials for certainty of feasible operability.
Soviet Heritage Logistic SystemsThe former Soviet Unions logistic equipment for the SS-N-6, SS-NX-13 derivations was also studied. It was found that there are some related systems that are applicable for “palate tray” design transport and missile replenishment but that the Soviet hardware for the logistic for the SS-N-6 was done differently for different reasons making them essentially inoperable for this application.
Concept-I for No-dong-B, Shahab-4There were detailed technical problems with the analysis of the launcher erector system that was only resolved with the bear bones Concept-1. It must be remember that this launcher must remain within the foot print of the individual container and not interfere with other surrounding containers for it to be a viable operational system. This design is quite tight on its tolerance requirements to remain with in the 40 foot container. Otherwise this concept would not all together be viable. Study was conducted on the probable North Korean pad/TEL design which was seen separately by US imagery with the No-dong-B missiles. The missile was perhaps being separately transported on a Soviet heritage trolley or truck drawn system for its expected parading that did not take place. It is suspect that the TEL is a foreshortened variant on the No-dong-A concept seen in the flatbed truck package of Pakistan Ghauri-II missile TEL. It is clear that these factory pre-fueled fully loaded, armed and sealed missiles require a lot of support structurally until erected vertically on a pad or lowered into a underground tunnel silo canister facility in North Korea or Iran .
Concept-I erects the missile by opening the top of the container hydraulically like a big door. The erector on its geared pin tracks is used to raise first the nose of the missile out of the container then raised the rear of the missile and its ring pad and pull the missile forward and vertically then the erector kicks in a second time arching straight up until the pad ring and struts have locked the pad into the containers walls structures with its gas jet flame deflector below. The missile is raised some 6-8 feet with the pneumatic electro hydraulic mechanisms on both sides of the missile pad. All of this is placed on a palate tray to place it in the container. This meets the bear bones mass requirements within the equipments 5,740-7,740 kgs mass schedule limits. No other concept meets this design requirement. It is assumed that the North Korean TEL uses this erector truncated design with a foreshortened TEL design similar to that seen in the Pakistani Ghauri-II/No-dong-A TEL design.
In both cases the missile can not just be arched up to a vertical position but must be both arched up pulled forward and then have its rear raised by some 6-8 feet to the pad position clear requirements and only then can the erector raise the missile to the vertical position. All of the autonomous ground equipment instrumentation, electronics, APU power and fuel, batteries and hydraulics and its reservoirs are placed near the nose of the missile or under it or to its sides firmly attached to the base frame package palate tray. With both designs you have to remove the erector by lowering it part way to launch the missile. This all makes it possible to divert the gas jet down the lengthy of the container and all over everything. They may ultimately throw the container overboard after the launch but there would be burn marks as well as contaminates detectable from aircraft after a launch. The container can hold 26,740 kg of cargo with a maximum gross load of 30,480 kg with the container weighing 3,740 kg that leaves 7,740 - 5,740 kg for added equipment with a missile mass of 19,000 - 20,654 - 21,000 kg mass. Although a steel supported container on a railroad car can carry a total mass including itself of 120,000 kg this is not possible without special lifting support equipment because the container will break or crumble in the center of mass. Concepts are nice but until the details are worked out it is not real as this vividly illustrates.
Container Ship Launch Platform for No-dong-B, Shahab-4The conceptual small minimum class containerized ship considered for this threat analysis is of common Liberian registry with a length of 348 feet with a breadth of 48.5 feet and a depth of 27.9 feet utilizing a draft of 23.1 feet. The ship can reach as much as 12 Knots over 6,000 nautical miles range. It Gross registered mass is about 3,493 tons with a cargo capacity of 4,800 DWT, costing around $895,000.00. This is a conceptual composite design revision reflecting several design features of this class of container transport ships. Up to five missiles along the ships centerline could be launched from this container arrangement. With up to 6 ships distributed evenly in the Atlantic , Pacific and Gulf areas could launch as many as 30 warheads in a single salvo period followed by more if the containers used are dumped overboard. Three missiles are shown but up to five are possible with this design per ship. This is a potential substantial threat to the United States .
If the North Koreans and Iranians very carefully place the containers in certain positions this operational threat becomes technologically conceivable. Further both North Korea and Iran have had time enough to work this out and to have prepared if not completed its initial preparation for potential near term deployment. Whether this has happened is uncertain but it is a potential strategic threat of the near term possibility.
References:
1-31 . North Korea May Have Helped Iran Test Sea-Going Scud, By Andre Pachter, China Confidential, July 25, 2006
North Korea May have Displayed the No-dong-B/Mirim the Shahab-4 Deployed both in Iran & North Korea
05-17-07
By Charles P. Vick © All Rights Reserved 2007
Senior Analyst, Globalsecurity.org
Apparently North Korea displayed the No-dong-B/Mirim IRBM for the first time in its celebratory 75 th anniversary of the Korean Peoples Army military parade on April 25, 2007 which was attended by its honored leader Chairman Kim Jong-Ill according to the May 12, 2007, Asahi Shimbun daily. It was sighting reports of briefings by the United States to Japanese and South Korean Government officials on the intelligence collected on the military parade by national means. The Korean Peoples Army No-dong-B is derived from the Soviet era Makayev OKB, Zyb SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 technology received from the former Soviet Union in 1987-88 during the Gorbachev era. It was first deployed in North Korea in 2003 and subsequently introduced in Iran in December 2005. At least the center of one military emblem on prominent display in the surrounding square seems to resemble the expected No-dong-B design. Careful review of the military parade missiles video and still photos displayed did not show the No-dong-B or No-dong-A but that does not mean it was not displayed but not shown on video or still photos from North Korea . The TV feed from North Korea was not live and was delayed and the imagery repeatedly cut back to show Kim Jong-Ill interrupting the missile imagery available. Today the available TV video only shows the theater marching soldier formations not the hardware. This theater performance by North Korea was precisely orchestrated for external consumption revealing essentially nothing except for the home consumption. So the mystery remains unresolved.
The North Korean’s only displayed on TV the Korean Peoples Army NK-02 (SS-21/Scarab) deployed flight test tactical ballistic missile along with the SAM-5, AG-1 anti ship derived Silkworm class, Scud-C and the redesigned Scud-Bnot No-dong-B of the total of five or more new types of missiles confirmed as paraded. Reports that only four types of missiles were paraded are confirmed wrong from the imagery. There was a Scud that looks like a shortened Scud-C with a body diameter that is similar to the standard Scud-C, .88 meters but definitely under 1.3 meters of the No-dong-A. It has a flared base skirt covering steering vanes with side tail fins and a curved nose section very similar to a modernized Scud-B i.e. the known second stage of the Taep’o-dong-1. It is no where near the No-dong-B, 1.5 meter diameter. So the Scud-B modernized and totally redesign is confirmed. The Scud’s all used the same Russian design Maz-543 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). There was no indication of the Scud-ER, No-dong-A, No-dong-B and Taep’o-dong-2C/3 being paraded which was looked for unless it was not shown by North Korean TV images available. Three new types of missiles were said to have been displayed among the 48 missiles paraded in varying number groups. These missiles may have been identified by US intelligence imagery means such as by reconnaissance satellite or stealth UAV in the parade marshalling areas leaving the question open publicly. The information released from unidentified sources in Japan and South Korea was very guarded. Suggestions that North Korea has not tested the No-dong-B are incorrect. It was apparently test out of Iran on January 17, 2006 and perhaps also July 4/5, 2006 out of North Korea . The three countries USA , Japan and South Korea intelligence communities continue to argue about this.
Earlier on January 29, 2007 the US government acknowledged for the first time the existence of several new Iranian and North Korean missiles under development through a speech by the deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency of the Pentagon Army Brig. General Patrick O’Reilly before the George C. Marshall Institute. In that speech he described in his slides presentation to show that the 12 meter long, liquid propellant No-dong-B/Mirim has a demonstrated out of Iran range of 2,000 miles or 3,218 kilometers (3,000 kilometers) when it is known to be capable of flying (2,485 miles) or 4,000 kilometers. (1) The No-dong-B was described as “a qualitative improvement in the performance” from earlier North Korean missile systems. He also described the two stage Taep’o-dong-2C/3 as having a range of (6,200 Miles) 9,975.8 kilometers and the three stage version with a range of (9,300 miles) 14,963.7 kilometers with a 200-250 kg warhead.
References,
1. http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20070130-122437-6559r.htm Gertz, Bill, How the “axis” seeks the killer missile, The Washington Times, January 30, 2007
2. http://www.spacewar.com/2006/070513024111.e67d4qqe.html, NKorea unveiled new ballistic missile: report, TOKYO , May 13 (AFP) May 13, 2007
ADDITIONAL IMAGERY REFERENCES
http://community.travelchinaguide.com/forum2.asp?i=37087 for SA-5
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18305217/ For Scud-C
http://www.snappedshot.com/archives/794-Daily-Dictator.html For scud-B redesigned
scud-C and SS-21
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1823141/posts For parade video partial
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,268224,00.html For the SS-21 NK-02
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=1973 For AG-1 image
http://www.france24.com/france24Public/en/administration/afp-news.html?id=070513032333.k3q51sfy&cat=null For SS-21 image
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/04/25/koreas.nuclear.ap/index.html
for military parade but not complete
http://www.france24.com/france24Public/en/administration/afp-news.html?id=070513032333.k3q51sfy For SS-21
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QUTTLE5nIkQ five part military parade
Totally Orchestrated Deception Was North Korea ’s Flight Testing Game
At Variance Intelligence Assessment Question
By © Charles P. Vick, 2007 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
04-12-07
Disclaimer
The opinions and evaluations stated here in are only the author’s and cannot be construed to reflect those of any Government agency, company, institute or association. It is based on public information, circumstantial evidence, informed speculation, declassified U.S. intelligence community documents, official Iranian, Pakistani and North Korean government documents and histories, oral histories, interviews and engineering analysis. As with all data regarding the Iranian, Pakistani and North Korean strategic space and ballistic missile programs, this analysis is subject to revision—and represents a work in progress.
Introduction
Was the deception by North Korea and Iran so well orchestrated that at least one of the last two of seven flight tests by North Korea on July 4-5, 2006 may possible have been a No-dong-B flown inside a No-dong-A flight profile. The missile in question was possibly transmitting on the No-dong-A, A1 telemetry format while possibly doing a simulated ICBM warhead re-entry test by powering the warhead thrusting downward while remaining inside the No-dong-A performance envelop? If there was no telemetry monitored it came back in the recoverable re-entry vehicle package similar to the Chinese way to recover data from their strategic ballistic missile systems flight tests. If North Korean “bi-static intercept” radar deception operations were still being conducted they could have masqueraded the operation even more to the allies. This question continues to linger on whether North Korea carried out such a test in addition to many other unanswered questions on these flight tests.
Trends Suggested At Variance Intelligence Assessment
Preliminary indications are assuming that if one of the last two flight test were the No-dong-B from North Korea suggested by South Korea and the previous No-dong-B flight test out of Iran may have proven the common Iranian, North Korean ICBM “re-entry vehicle” and “warhead fusing mechanisms” viability with two or three apparently successful flight tests in a row. Newly re-reviewed evidence appears to suggest that the last two missiles flight tested July 5, 2006 thought to initially be Scud-ER variants now appear to be potentially the second and third flight test of the Shahab-4/No-dong-B/Mirim 3,000-4,000 kilometers range IRBM or No-dong-A flights. (23) The last two of seven test flights were in the final report tentatively assessed as being No-dong-A flight test pending further review of the information still on going through 2006 and early 2007. All the data released so far indicates real problems on the part of all three communities even when combining all the all source data available in analyzing the flights flown and identifying the vehicles flown.
Trend Suggested At Variance Analysis
Several US government officials along with the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld have stated that the North Koreans have not successfully tested an ICBM to full range with a warhead. This is true but the North Koreans do not have a traditional fully instrumented ICBM range as does Russia and the U. S. in order to evaluate the “re-entry vehicle” performance and it’s “warhead fusing mechanisms”. But the DPRK does have shorter ranges that have already been used. If it is assumed that the last two missile flight tests of North Korea seven flights were the No-dong-B of three suspected flights. If this is correct then they have now run the reentry test three times utilizing the No-dong-B with the last two flown off the DPRK coast on steep ballistic trajectories rising perhaps as much as between 1,000-2,000 kilometers high and powered return over a 420 kilometers range ground track. The Iranian, North Korean first No-dong-B suspected flight test on January 17, 2006 went some 3,000-3,218 kilometers down range into the Indian Ocean and could have gone 4,000 kilometers. “The USAF used a similar approach for Re-entry Vehicle (RV) and fusing mechanisms development flight from Green River, Utah to White Sands Missile Range, NM and from Wallops FF, VA out in the Atlantic. Like the Air Force launches they could achieve ICBM-like re-entry conditions by pointing the vehicle back down while still under thrust.” (30) There should be little wonder why the North Koreans and Iranians are reportedly satisfied with the flight test results in spite of the launch failure of the Taep’o-dong-2 class booster satellite launch.
Presumably the ICBM re-entry vehicle and fusing mechanisms flight testing was the precise purpose of those last two or three flight test of the No-dong-B by North Korea with the Common Iranian, North Korean re-entry warhead design configuration indicating how far they have perhaps advanced.
Common North Korean, Iranian Re-entry Vehicle Design Heritage Trends
The North Korean’s certainly got the plan form for the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 missile from MIASS and greatly improved it but also got the plan form for the re-entry vehicle but not necessarily the warhead device type. There are definite differences in the present RV from older design SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 reflecting the more advanced RV designs of the Soviets/Russians that the sanctioned NIIGRAFIT, Grafit Research Institute – The State Scientific Research Institute of Graphite, company of Moscow were involved. They were involved in providing the ablative asbestos graphite composite board coatings materials and forming manufacturing technology for the new Icononic re-entry vehicle seen deployed and flight test on the Iranian Shahab-3B/ER MRBM.. Developing the conventional none nuclear proximity fused firecracker warhead with the provided RV is easy verse the nuclear gun type much less the plutonium implosion type nuclear warhead which is a whole different ball of wax to sculpt. The Makayev OKB, MIASS was not privy to the nuclear device design except for the interface, mass & cabling design requirements of the RV. That was ultimately handled by a separate Soviet/Russian nuclear industry organization in the area with only the RV/missile interface requirements being provided by MIASS. The policy at the time was not to provide nuclear weapons design but the North Koreans got at least nine nuclear scientists which could have seriously impacted that area of the technology transfer besides the in excess of seventeen rocket scientists.
However based on open sources analysis which is fully documented it is apparent that the telemetry seen received or captured from the Shahab-3B launches and the Shahab-4/No-dong-B launches appear to be of the same format indicating they are using the same equipment guidance, accelerometers, command control data processors and that it is extremely difficult to separate which missile is which. The only way to separate them is through the radar tracking performance, if they really perform to full capability, but that is not two data points that is only one in both cases which leaves a large area of uncertainty. Further that is subject to deception IE make Shahab-4 perform like the Shahab-3B/ER or No-dong-A fore shorting or redirecting its true performance capability. The Shahab-4/No-dong-B flight test out of Iran of January 17, 2006 is the only flight test yet to be identified as having taken place based on the 3,000 kilometer performance which far exceeded the Shahab-3B/ER 2,000 kilometer capability. Some of those flights in July 2006 out of North Korea may literally have gone off the scope so you are left with the realization that they could have done a propulsion driven ICBM like re-entry test like the US conducted with in the No-dong-A performance parameters. The exception being that if we know the potential nominal performance of the suggested missile how would one do a reentry test using that propulsion IE the time between the radar loss of the target to its reacquisition of the vehicle could indicate the ballistic profile for a No-dong-A test but may have been a No-dong-B propulsion driven re-entry test that we totally missed. This could also apply to a Scud–C or Scud-ER test disguise for this case but less likely. Whether the intelligence people of the US-(USN & NSA and USAF, Army) much less the South Koreans or the Japanese intelligence organizations have the information to check this if they even recognize this potential deception is uncertain to say the least and this is why I remain unsatisfied and very suspicious with the present end product analysis of all sides involved.
Although No-dong-A of Iran and Pakistan carried the conical Chinese heritage nuclear warhead re-entry vehicle (RV) design received from China by technology transfer to Pakistan it was not the RV design of choice for accuracy. This is why we see the second generation Shahab-3B/ER RV is so significant besides the long range nuclear suggestion. The late 2003 earlier 2004 observation of the No-dong-B, Re-entry Vehicle (RV) with its “top of a baby bottle-neck” nose cone design description which allowed the U. S intelligence community to recognize the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 origin of the new IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile system. This along with the subsequent appearance of the Iranian Shahab-3B/ER with its “baby bottle-neck” nose cone design reflected a commonality not immediately anticipated. The facts that both countries had their RV’s designs described separately in the same way profoundly suggest that their tested, operational nuclear weapon system is one and the same. When applying the known Shahab-3B/ER, RV design to the No-dong-B it was found that it fitted with the known propulsion performance design constraints of the rocket stage. Circumstantially this result can not be ignored much less dismissed.
The current indicated mass of 650 kilograms is based on the Soviet era heritage SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 capability for both the No-dong-B and Shahab-3B/ER which appear to have the same nuclear warhead prototype RV design. Believing the RV is a nuclear warhead prototype and proving it are two very different worlds. The design of the No-dong-B and Shahab-3B/ER, RV certainly indicates the expected standardized nuclear warhead design. It also indicates that they have mastered the technology for reducing the size of the nuclear device with in the RV’s airframe but does not prove that it is a nuclear warhead. Proving the RV’s potential nuclear lethality is no easy task requiring radiation sensing as well as atmospheric sampling of the emitted gaseous vapors. The question is why develop such a RV but for a nuclear warhead as all previous nations have done that possess nuclear weapons technology for weapons production? The Missile and RV programs have outpaced the warhead fuel program but not the warhead nuclear device design program which is in hand and has been for some time now. Countries do not produce missiles to travel over thousands of kilometers to deliver mere “Fire Cracker” conventional high energy explosive warhead weapons unless they are intended to carry primarily nuclear, or chemical, biological weapons. The advances in the missile launch vehicle and re-entry vehicle program do mirror the advances in the parallel nuclear weapons program of the larger total weapons program. Generally speaking no country makes the investment up to the threshold of actually having nuclear weapons with out completing the process.
References:
1-23. http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200607/200607180002.html, N. Korea May Have Tested New Longer-Range Missiles, Digital Chosun Ilbo , July.18, 2006 08:33 KST
2-30. Private correspondence between C. P. Vick & Wayne Eleazer, Cape Canaveral , FL Friday, July 28, 2006, 3:57 PM, and Friday, July 28, 2006 8:42 PM , Subject: Re: Taepodong Launch.
