EA-0812; Environmental Assessment for Interim Storage of Plutonium Components at Pantex and

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DOE/EA-0812
Environmental Assessment for Interim Storage of Plutonium Components at Pantex
and
Department of Energy Response to Comments Received from the State of Texas
Volume I
January 1994
U.S. Department of Energy
Albuquerque Operations Office
Amarillo Area Office
Pantex Plant
P.O. Box 30030
Amarillo, Texas 79120
ABBREVIATIONS
ft foot (feet)
ft/s feet per second
ft/s2 feet per second per second
gpm gallons per minute
in/hr inch per hour
ksi kilopounds per square inch
km kilometer
lb(s) pound(s)
mg milligram
mg/L milligram per Liter
mi mile
uCi microCurie
uCi/m2 microCuries per square meter
mph miles per hour
mrem millirem
pH (pouvoir hydrogine) - term to describe the acidity or alkalinity of a solution
psi pounds per square inch
psf pounds per square foot
rem Roentgen equivalent man
U.S. United States
yr year

Section I Environmental Assessments

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The primary mission of the Department of Energy Pantex Plant is the assembly and disassembly
of nuclear weapons. Historically, weapons were returned to the Pantex Plant from the Department
of Defense, disassembled, and the plutonium components (pits) were temporarily held (staged)
at the Pantex Plant until they were recycled to make new weapons. The Department is now
proposing to expand the capability to hold pits at Pantex and to store them there on an interim
basis pending implementation of decisions on long-term storage and disposition.
This Environmental Assessment evaluates the environmental impacts of additional interim storage
of pits at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas. Two factors combine to create the need for
increased interim storage of pits. First, pits are no longer being shipped to the Rocky Flats Plant
from Pantex to be recycled. This function was temporarily halted at the Rocky Flats Plant in 1989
to make improvements in the operations and facilities. In January 1992, pit recycle operations
were suspended indefinitely. Subsequently, the Department has decided to no longer maintain
a nuclear component production capability at Rocky Flats Plant.
Second, decisions to reduce the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile have accelerated the
accumulation of pits. These pits need to be stored on an interim basis until decisions can be
implemented on the long-term storage of plutonium required for national security purposes and
on the disposition of surplus plutonium. Long-term storage is being considered in the Nuclear
Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, currently in
preparation. The Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement will analyze environmental
impacts, costs and technical considerations of the various alternatives. In addition, the
Department will prepare a new site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Pantex site to
update the information and analysis contained in the 1983 Pantex Site statement. This
Environmental Impact Statement will examine all aspects of current and foreseeable operations
at the Pantex Plant. This will include all dismantlement and storage-related issues at the Pantex
Plant.
In regard to the disposition of plutonium, on September 27, 1993, President Clinton established
an interagency task force to determine the disposition of plutonium surplus to national defense
requirements. This task force is being led by the National Security Council and the Office of
Science and Technology Policy. The Department is committed to prepare an EIS to underpin its
implementation of actions it proposes to take in conjunction with the task force recommendations
on the disposition of surplus plutonium.
The proposed action analyzed in this Environmental Assessment is to provide additional storage
beyond the present pit storage capacity (6,800 pits) for up to 20,000 pits for an interim time
period. The number of pits that could be held within each of the 18 Modified-Richmond
magazines (western portion of Zone 4) would increase from approximately 370 to a maximum of
440. In addition, each of the existing 42 Steel Arch Construction magazines, also located in the
western portion of Zone 4, could be used to hold up to 392 pits. The increase in storage capacity
for each Modified-Richmond magazine involves utilizing a multiple stacking configuration of the
pits within the magazine. Steel Arch Construction magazines have not been used previously for
holding pits, and the multiple stacking configuration has not been used previously in Steel Arch
Construction or Modified-Richmond magazines. Eighteen Modified-Richmond and 42 Steel Arch
Construction magazines (in either multiple- or single-layer storage configuration) could be used
for pit storage. However, some of these will continue to be used for assembled weapon and
component staging activities. The practice of segregating weapons from components will
continue. Pits stored on an interim basis will be segregated from other stored weapon
components.
The proposed action is immediately available, would not require new facility construction or
demolition of existing structures, and would result in negligible additional generation or
management of wastes. Environmental impacts of the proposed action from routine operations
would be limited to radiation exposure of workers which would be controlled, as currently is done,
with procedures and personnel monitoring to ensure that the Department of Energy's "As Low
As Reasonably Achievable" objectives are achieved and the current worker dose limits maintained.
Therefore, no adverse health effects among workers would be expected. There would be no
measurable increase in direct radiation above natural background radiation at the Pantex Plant
boundary. The potential for plutonium release from various types of accidents and abnormal
events (including aircraft crashes) was examined. The analysis concluded that the initiating
events were so improbable that they are not credible. Additionally, it was determined from the
analysis of potential accidents that no significant plutonium release would occur.
A number of alternatives to increased interim pit storage at the Pantex Plant were considered.
These included interim storage at other Department of Energy facilities (the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, the Savannah River Site, and the Hanford Plant) and Department of Defense sites
as well as a No-Action Alternative. None of the alternatives (alone or in combination) has been
shown to meet the programmatic objective to provide sufficient increased interim storage capacity
while continuing disassembly operations at the anticipated rate.
The No-Action Alternative does not meet the weapon disassembly goals in support of weapons
reduction initiatives and would negatively affect ongoing efforts by the Department of Defense to
streamline its operations and to meet its commitments to receive and store munitions and
equipment currently outside the continental United States. The benefits of totally dismantling the
weapon, eliminating the potential for accidental or unauthorized detonation and reducing the
number of highly attractive terrorist targets, would also not be realized.
For each of the other alternatives there would be additional costs, transportation requirements,
potential requirements for facility modifications (for pit storage, support structures or security
enhancements), and additional time would be required to establish the infrastructure in order to
implement interim storage at an alternative site. Impacts of the Proposed Action were found to
be limited to worker exposures to radiation. No environmental benefit would be gained in
packaging and shipping some or all of the pits to any other location for interim storage purposes
and there would be increased worker exposure due to the additional handling that would be
required.
The Department of Energy provided a Pre-Approval copy of the Environmental Assessment to the
State of Texas in Texas in December 1992. Subsequently, the State provided the Pre-Approval
Environmental Assessment to interested and affected members of the public. State and public
comments were submitted to the Department for consideration during February and March, 1993.
In response to these comments, the Department reviewed and revised the Environmental
Assessment, adding a Comment Response Document (See Volume I, Section II, Response to
Comments on the Pre-Approval Environmental Assessment Received From the State of Texas).
The revised Pre-Approval Environmental Assessment was issued on November 11, 1993.
The Department then held a public meeting on December 6, 1993 in Amarillo, Texas to review the
revised Environmental Assessment and Comment Response Document. Following the public
meeting, the Department accepted written comments beginning December 6, 1993 and
concluding December 20, 1993. The Environmental Assessment was expanded to include the
Department's response to the comments received during the two-week period (See Volume I,
YSection III, Response to Comments on the Revised Pre-Approval Environmental Assessment and
Public Meeting).

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In three recent nuclear weapons policy declarations (September 27,
1991, January 28, 1992, and June 16, 1992), the United States'
initiated efforts to reduce its nuclear weapons arsenal. These
reductions, made possible by the end of the Cold War and the
associated changes in United States national security needs, were
defined and directed through joint Department of Energy/ Department
of Defense actions.  The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memoranda and
corresponding Planning and Production Documents direct the
retirement of, and establish retirement rates for, weapons held in
the custody of the Department of Defense.  The Department of Energy
establishes a schedule for the return and dismantlement of weapons
in support of these retirement rates.  The outcome of the three
policy declarations is the commitment to reduce the nuclear weapons
stockpile from more than 20,000 warheads to fewer than 10,000
warheads before the end of the century.  To meet this stockpile
reduction initiative, the Department of Energy has established a
goal of maintaining a disassembly rate of 2,000 weapons per year for
the near-term.  This level of activity at the Pantex Plant for
weapons disassembly would be similar to that experienced in the past
for all assembly/disassembly operations.
Historically, the Department of Energy's national security mission
has included the assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons.  A
nuclear weapon is comprised of a physics package, containing special
nuclear material (i.e., plutonium or highly enriched uranium) and
other materials and components.  Most nuclear weapon physics
packages contain a primary assembly that consists of a detonator
system and a ball-shaped composite of either high explosive or
insensitive high explosive surrounding a component called a pit. 
The pit is comprised of a hermetically sealed metallic outer shell
and an inner shell of solid plutonium metal.
The primary mission of the Pantex Plant is the assembly and
disassembly of nuclear weapons. The Pantex Plant has conducted
these activities in a safe and responsible fashion for more than 40
years.  Newly assembled weapons are transported and transferred to
the Department of Defense for deployment.  Retired weapons are
returned to the Pantex Plant for disassembly.  The pits from the
disassembled weapons were typically staged at the Pantex Plant.
Until 1989, Pantex Plant activities were closely coupled to the
operations at the Rocky Flats Plant near Denver, Colorado.  Two of
the Rocky Flats Plant's primary missions were:  1) manufacture of
pits which were eventually transported to the Pantex Plant for
final assembly into nuclear weapons, and 2) receipt of pits from
the Pantex Plant from disassembled weapons for recovery,
reprocessing, and fabrication of the special nuclear material into
new pits.
In December 1989, plutonium processing and pit fabrication
operations at the Rocky Flats Plant were curtailed by the
Department of Energy pending resolution of safety and environmental
issues.  The Pantex Plant continued to disassemble weapons, but
shipments of pits from dismantled weapons between the Pantex Plant
and Rocky Flats Plant were suspended.  The pits from those weapons
were staged in Zone 4 for later shipment to the Rocky Flats Plant. 
The Department of Energy had anticipated that shipments of pits to
the Rocky Flats Plant would be reinitiated when processing
activities in support of new weapons programs were resumed. 
Efforts to restart plutonium processing operations continued until
January 1992 when they were terminated by the Department of Energy
because of reduced requirements for nuclear weapons production in
support of the national defense. Consequently, pits from weapons
disassembled at the Pantex Plant have been placed in interim
storage in Zone 4.
The activities necessary to carry out the Pantex assembly and
disassembly mission (including staging of pits) were analyzed in
the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Pantex Plant Site
(DOE/EIS-0098, October 1983).  The Department of Energy has
prepared this Environmental Assessment to focus on the proposed
activities necessary to accommodate the interim storage of the pits
from the weapons disassembled as a result of the arms reduction
commitments discussed above.  The Department also will prepare a
new site-wide environmental impact statement to update the 1983
document.

2.0 PURPOSE AND NEED FOR THE PROPOSED ACTION

The proposed action is to provide interim storage of pits removed
from nuclear weapons in response to recent nuclear weapons
reduction initiatives.  The proposed action is required to enable
these reductions, and it also maintains the benefits that accrue
from dismantling weapons, which is to eliminate the potential for
accidental or unauthorized detonation.  Further, it reduces the
number of highly attractive terrorist targets, and it permits more
cost-effective operations for the Department of Defense.
The proposed action analyzed in this document has evolved as a
result of recent developments in the areas of national security and
foreign policy.  As originally envisioned, the proposed action was
to provide additional storage for up to 20,000 pits at Pantex for
a period of approximately six to ten years.  The anticipated
duration of the interim storage was based on the December 1994
expected completion of the Department's Reconfiguration
Programmatic EIS, allowing  sufficient time to implement the
decision regarding the future nuclear weapons complex that would be
made on the basis of that Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement.  lt was expected that one of the elements of the future
weapons complex would be a new long-term storage facility, to be
constructed within the six to ten year time frame.
President Clinton, on September 27, 1993 established an interagency
task force to determine the disposition of plutonium surplus to
national defense requirements.  This task force is being led by the
National Security Council and the Office of Science and Technology
Policy with the participation of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Management
and Budget, and the Departments of State, Defense and Energy.  The
public and certain foreign nations will also be invited to
participate in the task force.  The results and implementation of
its recommendations are likely to have significant impact on both
the number of pits requiring long-term storage, and the duration of
any storage period.  It is likely that a substantial majority of
the pits proposed to be stored at Pantex, which are surplus to the
nation's defense needs, will be affected by decisions resulting
from the work of the task force.  Because the task force was so
recently chartered, however, it is impossible to now predict the
timing of its recommendations or their implementation.
In addition to its participation in this task force, the Department
is conducting or will shortly commence the following National
Environmental Policy Act reviews which also will address the
storage of plutonium:
First, as noted above, the Reconfiguration Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement is examining the alternatives for
the long-term storage of all Department of Energy owned plutonium. 
The alternatives being considered for long-term storage include
"no-action," which, if selected in the Record of Decision on that
Environmental Impact Statement, would continue the storage of the
pits at Pantex in the existing facilities.  Another alternative
being considered is to upgrade the existing facilities.  If this
alternative is selected in the Record of Decision, upgrades to the
existing storage facilities, including Pantex, would occur
following a likely additional project specific review under the
National Environmental Policy Act.  The final alternative under
consideration is the siting and construction of a new consolidated
________________________________________________
3 President Bush's remark's to the Nation from the Oval Office on September 27, 
  1991: "I am therefore directing that the United States eliminate its entire 
  worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range, that is, threaten nuclear 
  weapons. We will bring home and destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells 
  and short-range ballistic missile warheads."
* Many of these land and sea-based warheads will be dismantled and distroyed.
  Those remaining will be secured in central areas where they would be available
  if necessary in a future crisis."
________________________________________________________________________________
long-term storage facility which, if selected in the Record of
Decision, would result in the pits stored at Pantex being moved to
that facility, at 1 of 5 candidate sites.  The Record of Decision
is expected to be issued in 1995.  It should be noted that the
Pantex site is among five sites under consideration for the
location of a new long-term storage facility.
Second, the Department is commencing the preparation of a new site-
wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Pantex site.  This
Environmental Impact Statement will examine all aspects of current
and foreseeable activities and operations of the Pantex Plant,
including all dismantlement and storage-related issues.  This
Environmental Impact Statement will include analysis of measures to
further mitigate the impacts of Pantex operations.  While the scope
of the Environmental Impact Statement cannot be defined precisely
until the public scoping process has been completed, the Department
of Energy expects that alternatives to the continued storage of
pits at Pantex will be considered.  This review will take 2-3 years
to complete.  The public will be invited to help both scope the
appropriate review and provide comments on the draft Environmental
Impact Statement when completed.
Third, the Department is committed to include in an Environmental
Impact Statement appropriate major federal actions it proposes to
take in conjunction with the task force on the disposition of
surplus plutonium.  This will help ensure meaningful public
involvement in the examination of alternative means of disposition.
The resolution of all these uncertainties and the preparation of
these documents will require time, making it less likely to site
and construct a new long-term storage facility on the schedule
previously indicated and which would have led to storage relief at
Pantex in six to ten years.  Because of the national security and
foreign policy considerations previously described, which
highlights the importance of the  continued disassembly of nuclear
weapons and the consequent interim storage of the fissile material
they contain, the Department cannot wait for these longer-term
programmatic decisions.  If the proposed action is not adopted,
shipment of nuclear weapons to Pantex for dismantlement will likely
cease in the first quarter of 1994 and actual dismantlement will
cease shortly thereafter, given the current disassembly rate.
Accordingly, the Department is proposing to provide storage for up
to 20,000 pits in the Pantex facility on an interim basis until the
longer-term decisions on storage/disposition are made and
implemented.  The Department is now contemplating that the new
site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Pantex site will
consider the environmental impacts for a period of 5-10 years
associated with continued operation of the Pantex Facility,
including storage.  The long-term decisions regarding the
storage/disposition of plutonium will be made following the
completion of the Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement now scheduled for late 1994, and the work of the task
force on plutonium disposition.  These decisions will be made on
the basis of the various activities and analyses described above.
The proposed action is consistent with storage activities currently
conducted at the Pantex Plant site, but will result in:
 1.   An increase in pit storage capacity, from 6,800 to a
maximum of 20,000;
___________________________
 4.   The 6,800 value is based on the maximum packing configuration in Modified-
  Richmond magazines. This configuration is not currently the operationally
  preferred configuration, but serves to provide the most conservative
  bounding parameters for the safety and environmental analyses.
__________________________________________________________________________
 2.   A reallocation of the number and type of magazines to be
      employed for interim storage; and
 3.   A change in the historical staging/storage configuration
      to allow increased operational flexibility and efficiency
      (multiple stacking);
Unless interim storage capacity is increased in the near-term, the
Department of Energy will likely be forced to cease disassembly
activities in the first quarter of 1994, given the current
disassembly rate.  (Figure 2.1).
Figure (Page 2-4 Figure 2.1 Near-Term Projected Storage Capacity Requirements)

3.0 PROPOSED ACTION

The proposed action is to provide interim storage for up to 20,000
pits in the Pantex facility until decisions can be implemented on
the long-term storage of plutonium required for national security
purposes and on the disposition of surplus plutonium. These
decisions will be made on the basis of the various activities and
analyses described in Section 2.0.
Implementation of the proposed action requires an increase in the
interim storage capacity of the Pantex Plant. This increase in
capacity would involve an increase in both the number of storage
magazines allocated for storing pits and the number of pits stored
within each magazine. Currently, up to 6,800 pits could be held in
18 Modified-Richmond magazines located in the western portion of
Zone 4 (Figures 3.1 and 3.5). However, to facilitate measures to
reduce worker exposures to radiation during safeguards and security
activities, an alternative storage configuration (Figure 3.2) is
being employed. This storage configuration permits storage of a
nominal 6,000 pits.
Under the proposed action, the number of pits held within each of
the 18 Modified-Richmond magazines would increase from 378 pits to
a maximum of 440. This is accomplished by using a horizontal
palletized multiple stacking configuration. In addition, each of
the existing 42 Steel Arch Construction magazines also located in
the western portion of Zone 4 could be used to hold up to 384 or
392 pits, using the single-layer vertical or horizontal palletized
multiple stacking configurations respectively. Steel Arch
Construction magazines have not been used previously for holding
pits, and the horizontal palletized multiple stacking configuration
has not been utilized previously in either Modified-Richmond or
Steel Arch Construction magazines. (See Table 3-1.) Although
designation of 18 Modified-Richmond and 42 Steel Arch Construction
magazines for storage (in either multiple or single-layer storage
configuration) would provide for more than 20,000 storage spaces,
this designation allows for operational flexibility and facilitates
security and safeguards by not specifying specific magazines.
Furthermore, some Steel Arch Construction magazines would be
reserved for assembled weapon and component staging activities that
have historically taken place, and will continue to take place, in
these facilities. The practice of segregating weapons from
components would continue, and interim stored pits would be
segregated from other staged weapon components.
The Department of Energy Orders and procedures for ensuring safe
and secure storage of the pits would continue to be followed
rigorously. The majority of the pits in Zone 4 will continue to be
packaged in AL-R8 containers (RFE-8801, 1988), but other approved
containers such as Type B containers may be used. Type B
containers are certified for off-site transportation of pits under
the Department of Energy performance criteria adopted from Title 10
Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 whereas the AL-R8 container is
not. While both container types adequately meet the design safety
requirements necessary for interim storage of plutonium components,
pits packaged in the AL-R8 container would have to be repackaged
into a certified shipping container for shipment off-site. The AL-
R8 container utilizes the pit structure for containment whereas a
Type B certified shipping container has two independent seals for
containment. The AL-R8 container is constructed of 18-gauge carbon
steel, and the container is internally lined with Celotex-
fiberboard to provide impact and thermal protection wherein the pit
is suspended within the fiberboard using a steel clamping device.
The outer containment of a Type B shipping container is 16-gauge
stainless steel and the inner containment drum (within which the
__________________
5 The steel Arch Construction magazine operational limit for pits
stored in the vertical single-layer configuration. actual maximum
packed capacity of 406 pits/Steel Arch Construction magazine will
not be considered for use.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
pit is located) is constructed of 12-gauge stainless steel.
Celotex- packaging material is used between the inner and outer
containment drums and also around the pit inside the inner
containment drum.
Table (Page 3-2 Table 3-1 - Pit Storage Capacity)
In either type of magazine, the pit, in its approved container,
would be stored in one of two configurations: multiple stacking of
containers placed horizontally on pallets (Figures 3.3 and 3.4),
and/or a single layer of containers placed vertically on the floor
(Figures 3.5 and 3.6). The pallets for the multiple stacking
configuration have been designed to ensure structural integrity
and stability. Final Safety Analysis Report, Pantex Plant Zone 4
Magazines (Issue D, April 1993) concluded that the multiple
stacking configuration would be stable in a maximum credible
earthquake scenario. These two configurations represent the
bounding cases for the numbers of pits that would be held in a
single Modified-Richmond or Steel Arch Construction magazine.
Variations and/or a combination of these arrangements may be used.
Individual pit containers could rest on casters rather than on the
concrete floor of magazines, and aisles may also be used. This
would facilitate inventory operations, ensure worker safety, and
accommodate operational needs.
An electric forklift with shielding for radiation protection would
be used for storage, retrieval, and inventory operations for
palletized stacking configurations or individual container
handling. The shielded forklift will have a passive guidance
system (e.g., rail guides, wire guides, etc.) for the palletized
stacking configuration that will prevent the forklift from veering
from the aisle. The forklift will be equipped with a lateral
motion, turret-type fork assembly that allows palletized pit
containers to be stacked and retrieved without having the forklift
itself turn. The shielded forklift system is an example of the
emphasis at the Pantex Plant to reduce and then maintain worker
radiation exposure. Efforts are currently under way to develop
Automated Guided Vehicles that could be used both to place pits in
magazines and to assist in taking inventories using barcode
readers. The use of Automated Guided Vehicles could further reduce
worker exposure to external radiation associated with pit interim
storage and inventory activities. Only the shielded forklift
operator will be inside the magazine during the operations.
Shielding on the forklift should provide a dose reduction factor of
at least 20 over current inventory methods.
Implementation of the proposed action would not involve new
facility construction, demolition, additional generation or
management of wastes, uncontained plutonium handling or processing,
long-term or permanent storage, or disposal of plutonium components
at the Pantex Plant.
Figure (Page 3-3 Figure 3.1 - Layout of Zone 4 West and 18 Modified-Richmond Magazines)
Figure (Page 3-4 Figure 3.2 - Modified-Richmond Magazine Vertical Single-Layer Configuration)
Figure (Page 3-5 Figure 3.3 - Modified-Richmond Magazine Proposed Horizontal Palletized Multiple Stacking Configuration)
Figure (Page 3-6 Figure 3.4 - Steel Arch Construction Magazine Proposed Horizontal Palletized Multiple Stacking Configuration)
Figure (Page 3-7 Figure 3.5 - Modified-Richmond Magazine Vertical Single-Layer Configuration)
Figure (Page 3-8 Figure 3.6 - Steel Arch Construction Magazine Vertical Single-Layer Configuration)

4.0 ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED ACTION

Alternatives to the Proposed Action are described in the following
subsections.  None of the alternatives have been shown to meet the
programmatic goal of providing sufficient increased interim storage
capacity for pits while continuing disassembly operations at the
anticipated rate.  Also none would meet the other programmatic
objective; namely, an approach that is timely, cost-effective, and
utilizes to the maximum extent practicable existing facilities and
infrastructure taking into account protection of the environment
along with worker and public's health and safety.  These
alternatives include consideration of Department of Defense
installations and assessing availability of storage facilities at
Department of Energy facilities such as the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, the Savannah River Site, and the Hanford Plant.  The
No-Action Alternative does not meet the weapons disassembly goals
in support of weapons reduction initiatives.  For the other
alternatives, in each case there were additional costs,
transportation requirements, and facility modifications or
infrastructure requirements that precluded the alternatives
availability to meet the programmatic goal.  The only potential
environmental impacts associated with implementation of the
proposed action are worker exposures.  There is no environmental
benefit while radiation exposures could increase as a result of
packaging and shipping some or all of the pits to any other
location for interim storage purposes.  Table 4-1 compares the
proposed action to the alternatives described below.

4.1 No-Action

The No-Action Alternative would preserve the present practice of
receiving and disassembling weapons and the interim storage of
plutonium components in the 18 Modified-Richmond magazines located
in Zone 4. Only configurations involving a single layer of
vertical containers would be utilized. These configurations are
bounded by the maximum packing arrangement discussed in Section 3
and illustrated in Figure 3.5. The capacity of this alternative
would provide interim storage for 6,800 pits. Actual best
management practice to facilitate required safeguards and security
activities and reduce worker exposure to radiation could dictate
use of other storage configurations that would provide less pit
storage capacity. One such configuration is shown in Figure 3.2
and allows for interim storage of a nominal 6,000 pits. Once
capacity is reached, dismantlement activities at Pantex would
cease. In order for weapon dismantlement to resume, additional pit
storage facilities would have to be identified, approved, and made
operational. In addition, the weapons already in Department of
Energy custody at the Pantex Plant would remain staged in Zone 4,
and weapons in Department of Defense custody would remain at
Department of Defense facilities. This particular result,
deferring dismantlement and holding weapons in Department of
Defense facilities, is not as sound as continued dismantlement,
principally, because it maintains the potential for accidental or
unauthorized detonations; and it does not reduce the number of
highly attractive terrorist targets. Additionally, deferring
dismantlement and holding weapons in Department of Defense
facilities forecloses opportunities for streamlining Department of
Defense operations. The Army and the Navy would be forced to
maintain nuclear weapons storage capacity currently planned for
alternative uses or scheduled to be closed. In the case of the
Army, nuclear weapons storage capacity slated to be used for the
storage of conventional munitions and equipment returning from
Europe and the Persian Gulf would be required to be maintained for
nuclear weapons storage. This change in plans would cost the Army
approximately $28 million per year beginning in July 1995, the date
beyond which Army nuclear depot operations was not planned. For
________________________
6 The 6800 value is based on the maximum packing configuration. This configuration is not currently
the operationally preferred configuration, but serves to provide the most conservative bounding
parameters for the safety and environmental analysis.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
the Navy, holding weapons in lieu of dismantlement will mean
postponement of the closure of a weapons storage facility currently
slated for September, 1994 at a cost of $21 million per year. Also
deferring dismantlement and holding weapons in Department of
Defense facilities will affect current planning regarding actions
to be taken to meet START I and START II objectives. Specifically,
Air Force Material Command would have to exercise an existing
Memorandum of Agreement with Air Combat Command to convert an
existing weapons storage area into a weapons storage depot. This
conversion can be done at small cost. The only significant cost to
the Air Force, which cannot be quantified at this time, would be
the cost of relocating the munitions currently stored in this
facility.
The START accords, while not yet ratified, represent the direction
the past and present United States leadership wishes to take with
regards to arms control. This intent has been further codified
with the January 19, 1993 issuance of a Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
Plan. In this Plan, only those stockpile levels which support the
intent of the START accords were approved. A new stockpile plan is
currently in the final stages of development. This Plan is slated
for submission for the President's approval late 1993. This Plan
also complies with the stockpile levels specified by the START
accords.

4.2 Combination of Proposed Action Storage at Pantex with Storage at Other Department of Energy Sites

Potential pit storage capability has been identified at three
Department of Energy sites: the Savannah River Site, the Los
Alamos National Laboratory, and the Hanford Plant. The Rocky Flats
Plant was not considered because there is no additional storage
space for pits. Because sufficient pit storage capacity at these
three sites would not provide the needed capacity in a timely
manner, this alternative would require utilizing the proposed
storage configuration and facilities for near-term needs at the
Pantex Plant. The Department of Energy would need to further
evaluate use of existing or potential pit storage capacity at these
other Department of Energy sites. If such evaluation demonstrated
that decentralized interim pit storage would provide additional
environmental and programmatic benefit, actions to provide funding,
modify facilities (if required), conduct safety evaluations, etc.,
would have to be completed before shipment of pits to the other
Department of Energy site(s).
The following is a brief description of relevant features of the
Savannah River Site, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the
Hanford Plant:
The Savannah River Site, located near Aiken, South Carolina,
has five vaults that have the capacity to store plutonium.
The 235-F and 247-F vaults and the Plutonium Storage Facility
are able to store pits in AL-R8 storage containers. They
could accommodate about 1,100 AL-R8 pit storage containers.
The 247-F vault is expected to become available later in
Fiscal Year 1993 or early Fiscal Year 1994. The Plutonium
Storage Facility is expected to become operational in Fiscal
Year 1995. Currently, two vaults (309 and 410) are used to
store in-process plutonium in cans and five-gallon canisters.
The 309 and 410 vaults do not have the drum storage capability
to store pits. While some of these facilities may be suitable
for pit storage, the Savannah River Site has various
quantities of plutonium compounds within its own processing
facilities that will be stored in the aforementioned vaults.
The Los Alamos National Laboratory is located in Los Alamos,
New Mexico. Pits have been stored at TA-41 and TA-55. TA-55
is at approximately 90 percent capacity and over committed for
Los Alamos National Laboratory's stated pit storage needs.
The total storage capacity can accommodate approximately 60
pits. The facility at TA-41 is inactive because it does not
meet current Department of Energy requirements for
environment, safety and health, security, and conduct of
operations. Furthermore, Los Alamos National Laboratory's
programmatic requirements did not justify the costs required
to make needed changes to maintain TA-41. A third facility,
the Nuclear Materials Storage Facility which is under
construction, is not operational. If funding is provided by
the Department of Energy, this facility could be operational
in 1997 and with current planned design modifications could
provide storage for up to 200 pits.
The Hanford Plant is located in south-central Washington
State, near the city of Richland. The primary mission at the
Hanford Plant is environmental restoration. Several studies
have considered pit storage capabilities for the Hanford
Plant. Special Nuclear Material is stored in vaults and
vault-type rooms located within the Plutonium Finishing Plant.
Many of the storage positions located in these areas are not
suitable for pit storage because they are configured to accept
smaller storage containers. Facility enhancements to maximize
pit storage within the Plutonium Finishing Plant were
estimated to cost approximately $7 million. These
modifications would allow suitable storage of approximately
3,000 pits, some in their shipping containers and others in
storage containers. Additional storage space is available
within the Fuel and Materials Examination Facility.
Construction of this facility was completed in 1984 and was
intended to support the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor
Program. However, it has not yet been involved in any hot-
cell operations or any plutonium processing operations. The
Fuel and Materials Examination Facility consists of six
levels, comprised of process cells, rooms, and one Special
Nuclear Material vault. The vault, one process cell, and four
other rooms have been evaluated for pit storage. It is
estimated that more than 7,000 pits could be stored if
appropriate modifications were made to these areas. Facility
modifications include plugging cell penetrations, moving
doors, installing vault doors, and electronic equipment.
These modifications were estimated in 1989 to cost
approximately $20 million. The nuclear weapons complex
mission at the Hanford Plant was terminated by the Department
of Energy in 1989. The site was transitioned to the Office of
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management and dedicated
to environmental restoration activities. Given the
termination of the defense mission and the commitment of
Department of Energy to clean up of the site, the
reintroduction of a Defense Programs mission would not be
reasonable or appropriate.
The Rocky Flats Plant is not included in this alternative
because there is no additional storage capacity for pits
received from other sites. The Rocky Flats Plant currently
stores pits that were awaiting reprocessing when operations
were curtailed. The Rocky Flats Plant is consolidating all
pits and other Special Nuclear Material from Buildings 991 and
996 tunnel (Corridor C) and other plant locations to vault-
type storage in Building 371. This action is necessary due to
facility aging, the structural uncertainties of Buildings 991
and 996, and a desire to reduce the safeguards and security
requirements for other portions of the plant where Special
Nuclear Material is currently stored. Special Nuclear
Material would be consolidated for interim storage pending the
implementation of the Record of Decision of the Nuclear
Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement. Capacity limits in Building 371 would be
reached when all Special Nuclear Material at the Rocky Flats
Plant has been consolidated.
In summary, this alternative to the proposed action considers the
possibility of combining the storage capacity at Pantex with
storage capacity at other Department of Energy sites in the near-
term. Additional requirements for environmental, safety, and pre-
operational documentation, staffing, and training would delay
making these facilities available in the near-term.
In addition, the following would have to be considered:
a) The nuclear weapons complex is undergoing numerous
changes to include environmental restoration and
consolidation of its nuclear material to facilitate
restoration and to enhance safeguards and security. The
complex has limited storage capacity, and each site's
capability to store material (pits and Special Nuclear
Material in various other forms) must be maximized.
There are many ongoing programs under which the storage
capability at the above sites is currently being
assessed. Consolidation of material and subsequent
inventory reduction at the Rocky Flats Plant, reduction
of the inventory at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, and clean out of processing canyons at the
Savannah River Site are a few that vie for the existing
or potential storage capacity at the Savannah River Site,
the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Hanford
Plant. Cleanup of most sites will increase the amount of
material to be stored. Efficient use of resources would
require evaluation of competing storage requirements for
other plutonium material at the candidate site as well as
from other sites before a decision can be made to ship
pits for interim storage. For example, uniqueness of
facilities makes it inappropriate to send other Special
Nuclear Material forms (e.g., plutonium oxide) to Pantex
for storage where currently only pits can be stored
safely. Likewise, storing pits at a facility designed to
accommodate other Special Nuclear Material forms would be
prudent only if the benefits derived justify such use.
b) Interim storage of pits would be subject to subsequent
Department of Energy complex-wide evaluations regarding
long-term storage or disposition of plutonium surplus to
national security needs. These evaluations are being
pursued in the ongoing Nuclear Weapons Complex
Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement activities, implementation actions derived from
the task force on the disposition of surplus plutonium,
and the new site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for
the Pantex site.
c) On the basis of the analyses presented in this
Environmental Assessment, the environmental impacts of
the proposed action were determined to be limited
principally to radiation exposure of workers. This
suggests that no environmental benefit would be derived
by storing pits at up to four separate facilities (the
Pantex Plant, the Savannah River Site, the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, and the Hanford Plant).
Decentralization of storage could effect a net increase
in the expected radiological worker exposure over the
proposed action by reducing the efficiency afforded in a
large scale interim storage operation versus several
smaller scale storage operations. Additional personnel
exposure would be expected if the pits were packaged in
containers (Type B) certified for shipment and then
repackaged for storage in the more readily available and
more inexpensive AL-R8 containers, which are suitable for
storage but not certified for shipping. The exposure
from the repackaging operation is estimated to range from
0.014 to 0.051 person-rem per container for robotic and
_______________________
7 The type B container is certified for off-site transportation of pits under the Department of Energy
performance criteria adopted from Nuclear Regulatory Commission criteria found in Title 10 Code of
Federal Regulations Part 71 whereas the AL-R8 container is not so certified.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
manual repackaging respectively. Therefore, total dose
to repackage 2,000 pit containers, a year's work of
dismantlement, would range from 28 to 102 person-rem
total cumulative dose. This additional dose could be
avoided if pits were stored in the Type B shipping
container. A sufficient inventory of Type B containers
should be able to be procured/purchased and available for
use as storage containers in 1995.

4.3 Supplement No-Action Alternative Storage Capacity with Storage at Other Department of Energy Sites

This alternative is to supplement the No-Action Alternative at
Pantex with storage at the Savannah River Site, the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, and the Hanford Plant.  The existing capacity
at the Pantex Plant would be reached between during the first
quarter 1994.  Assuming that a total of approximately 1,100 pits
could be stored at the Savannah River Site in the near-term,
capacity at the Pantex Plant and the Savannah River Site would be
approximately 7,100 to 7,900.  This would result in a storage
deficit of approximately one year, assuming disassembly rates that
met stockpile reduction initiatives (see Figure 4.1).  Disassembly
would have to cease until other interim or a permanent storage
facility could be made available.  Because of the reasons stated in
Section 4.2 above, and because these facilities must be available
even earlier for this alternative, it cannot be assured that this
alternative could  meet the need for near-term interim storage.

4.4 Interim Storage at a Department of Defense Facility

As an alternative to the Proposed Action, interim storage of pits
at a Department of Defense facility was assessed.  Candidate sites
were identified and then the analysis focused on potential impacts,
timing, and resource requirements.  Department of Energy staff has
been working with the staff of the Department of Defense/Department
of Energy Nuclear Weapons Council to consider the feasibility and
practicality of interim storage at a Department of Defense
facility.  The potential for retention of weapons by Department of
Defense, instead of dismantlement and the required storage of pits,
is discussed as part of the No Action Alternative.
Background
The Department of Defense is in the process of restructuring its
forces to reflect troop reductions and base closures.  Some
Department of Defense bases are being configured to accommodate
only conventional forces and their weapons, which are being moved
from overseas bases and United States facilities designated for
closure.  The requirement for additional continental United States
storage capacity at Department of Defense sites is further
complicated by consolidation of active nuclear weapon storage and
the backlog of retired weapons.  Several factors were considered
for identifying potential candidate interim storage sites at
Department of Defense facilities.  To be considered as a candidate
for an alternative interim storage site for pits, a Department of
Defense site must:
      1)    have existing storage facilities that meet all Department
            of Energy Special Nuclear Material storage requirements
            with minimal modification; and
      2)    offer potential for transfer to or sharing of the site
            with Department of Energy.  (If the site is to be shared,
            the Department of Defense mission should be compatible
            with the Department of Energy's mission for interim
            storage of pits.)
A preliminary candidate list of potentially available Department of
Defense storage facilities was prepared by the Department of
Defense.  As a matter of Department of Defense policy, the presence
of nuclear weapons at specific sites cannot be confirmed or denied
for security reasons.  Therefore, a discussion of specific
Department of Defense sites is not presented in this document.  The
facilities fall into the following categories:
      .     active Department of Defense nuclear weapons storage
            facilities;
      .     inactive (currently or in the near future) Department of
            Defense nuclear weapons storage facilities; and
      .     inactive (currently or in the near future) conventional
            weapon storage facilities.
The following information provides an overview of potential
environmental and operational impacts, the time required for
implementation, and resource and cost requirements for interim
storage of pits at a Department of Defense facility.  These
requirements would be dependent on the facility category.
Environmental and Operational Impacts
Environmental impacts from use of any Department of Defense
facility for interim storage are similar to  those identified for
the Proposed Action.  However, additional personnel radiation
exposure would be expected if the pits were packaged in containers
certified9 (Type B) for shipment and then repackaged for storage in
the more readily available and more inexpensive AL-R8 containers,
which are suitable for storage but not certified for shipping.  The
exposure from the repackaging operation is estimated to range from
0.014 to 0.051 person-rem per container for robotic and manual
repackaging10 respectively.  Therefore, total dose to repackage
2,000 pit containers, a year's worth of dismantlement, would range
from 28 to 102 person-rem total cumulative dose.  This additional
dose could be avoided if pits were stored in the Type B shipping
container.  A sufficient inventory of Type B containers should be
able to be procured/purchased and available for use as storage
containers in 1995.
_______________________
9  It is not practical to consider Department of Defence sites that do not have existing munitions 
   storage facilities capable of being modified and upgraded to meet Department of Energy storage requirements
   for Special Nuclear Materials, because of the time needed to construct those facilities, the additional
   environmental impacts, and the extra cost compared to that needed to modify existing facilities.
10 Only one facility has been identified in the Department of Defense draft candidate list.
11 Active conventional weapons storage facilities are not reasonable because the Department of Defence
   mission would not be compatible with Department of Energy's mission.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
There is potential for some added environmental impacts at the
candidate Department of Defense sites for construction or facility
modification that could be required to support safety, security and
operational requirements.  The magnitude of these impacts would
depend on the extent of the modification or construction required. 
For example, impacts from the construction of high security
fencing, guard towers, and barriers would be expected if an
inactive conventional weapons storage facilities were to be
selected.  Alternatively, minimal impacts would be expected from
the utilization of the existing facilities at an active nuclear
weapons storage facility.
Transportation of the pits to a Department of Defense facility
would result in minor added energy costs and some added, although
minimal, risk inherent in the transportation of Special Nuclear
Material.  Pit containers must be transported by Safe-Secure
Trailer.  Using an authorized convoy configuration, 45 trips would
be required per year to transport 2,000 pits annually from Pantex
to an alternative interim storage site.
Timing
Any proposal to use a portion of a site's capacity for interim
storage of pits would require negotiation of site-sharing or
transfer agreements for space and support accommodations consistent
with the Department of Defense mission and requirements for the
facility.  Since restructuring of Department of Defense forces and
base closures could take several years, not all the candidate sites
would be immediately available.  In addition, planning (including
National Environmental Policy Act requirements) and identification
of necessary modifications and acquisition of appropriate resources
would have to be completed, which would require additional time. 
Before any Department of Defense site could receive any pits, at a
minimum the following would need to be accomplished:
      1)    completed facility modifications (if required) for
            security (i.e., security fencing, vehicle barriers, guard
            towers, intrusion detection devices), support facilities
            (for shipping/receiving, repackaging, or surveillance
            inspection), or operations (i.e., shielded forklift, pit
            surveillance instrumentation);
      2)    acquisition of a trained and qualified staff to conduct
            interim storage operations; and
      3)    a validated readiness posture that would include safety
            analysis reports, operations procedures, training and
            qualification program.
An optimistic estimate of the timing required to set up interim
storage at a Department of Defense facility is illustrated in the
following timeline.
Active       Site Utilization                Equipment       Operations          
Nuclear      Decision-Making & Negotiation   Procurement &   Certification 
Weapons                                      Staffing 
Storage   |--------------------------------|---------------|--------------|
Facilities   2 years                         1 year          6 months
Inactive     Site Utilization                Modifications, Equipment                   Operations 
Nuclear      Decision-Making &               Procurement & Staffing                     Certification 
Weapons      Negotiation(14)   
Storage   |--------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------|
Facilities   2 years                         2 years                                     6 months
                                                 
Inactive      Site Utilization                Modifications, Equipment Procurement &          Operations 
Conventiona   Decision-Making &               Staffing                                       
l Weapons     Negotiation14                                                                   Certification 
Storage   |--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------|
Facilities    2 years                         3 years                                         6 months
Resource Requirements and Cost
Resources and costs associated with use of the three Department of
Defense site categories (i.e., active nuclear weapons storage
facility, inactive nuclear weapons storage facilities, and inactive
conventional weapons storage facilities) were estimated.  Use of
such Department of Defense site categories provides a basis for the
assumptions used to estimate modification and operational
requirements necessary to permit interim pit storage.  Table 4-2
provides a breakdown of estimated costs (recurring as well as one-
time) for implementing interim storage at a Department of Defense
facility.
Environmental impacts (radiation dose) and costs related to using
a Department of Defense site would be minimized by using storage
facilities at an active nuclear weapons storage facilities and
storing the pits in the Type B shipping containers.  This option
could result in an estimated additional expenditure of $7.5 million
per year to conduct interim storage operations at a Department of
Defense site instead of at Pantex, slightly less than if AL-R8
storage containers are used.  These reduced impacts and costs would
be somewhat offset by the $36 million needed to purchase the extra
Type B containers to accommodate all of the pits during the period
of interim storage.  Additionally, a one-time cost of approximately
one million dollars for equipment necessary for monitoring,
surveillance and calibration would be required.  The one time costs
do not include the administrative costs associated with preparing
the necessary environmental, safety analysis and operational
procedures documentation nor the cost of training qualified staff.
In summary, implementation of this alternative instead of interim
storage at Pantex:
     .    offers no environmental benefit;
     .    is not as timely; and
     .    would cost more.
___________________________
12 Negotiations with Department of Defense regarding site utilization would involve formulation of appropriate
   memorandum of Understanding/Memorandum of Agreement. Decision-making regarding site utilization includes
   National Environmental Policy Act analysis and preliminary safety analysis considerations. Because the 
   National Environmental Policy Act analysis would have to be a jointly sponsored by Department of Energy and
   Department of Defence, the time required to coordinate completion of the analyses could be more lengthy.
13 Lower bound of $4 million assumes procurement of 2000 Type B Model HE-400A shipping containers (at $2,00 each),
   which would be used for transporting pits to interim or long-term storage. The upper bound of $40 million 
   assumes all 20,000 pits require Type B shipping containers for interim or long-term storage.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table 4-1  -  Comparison of Proposed and Alternative Actions 
              Sectio Site for Storage/                        Capacity        Specific           Stacking        Comments 
              n      Potential Pit Capacity                   (meets          Facilities         Configuration 
                                                              goals) 
Proposed Act- 3.0    Pantex Plant        up to 20,000         Yes             - 18 Modified-     Multiple-        
ion                                                                           Richmond           Layer and/or 
                                                                              - up to 42 Steel   Single-Layer 
                                                                              Arch 
                                                                                Construction 
No-Action     4.1    Pantex Plant        *6,000-6,800         No              - 18 Modified-     Single-Layer    Does not meet 
                                                                              Richmond                           President's 
                                                                                                                 dismantlement 
                                                                                                                 objectives 
Combination of4.2    Pantex Plant        up to 20,000         Yes             - 18 Modified-     Proposed        . Resolution of 
Proposed Action                                                               Richmond           Action            programmatic & 
Storage at                               Depending on Availability            - up to 42 Steel   configuration     institutional 
Pantex with          of:                                                      Arch               at Pantex and     issues required. 
Storage at                                                                      Construction     configuration   . Requirement for 
other                Savannah River      1,100                                - Savannah River   at other          environmental, 
Department of        Hanford (Potential) 10,000+                              Site               sites TBD         safety, pre-
Energy Sites         Los Alamos (Potential) 200                               - Hanford                          operational 
                                                                              - Los Alamos                         documentation, & 
                                                                              National                             for modifications 
                                                                                Laboratory                         could delay 
                                                                                                                   availability in the 
                                                                                                                   near-term 
Supplement No-4.3    Pantex Plant        *6,000-6,800         No              - 18 Modified-     No-Action       Does not meet 
Action                                                                        Richmond           Alternative     President's weapons 
Alternative          Savannah River      1,100                                - Savannah River   configuration   reduction initiatives 
Storage with         Hanford (Potential) 10,000+                              Site               at Pantex and 
Storage at           Los Alamos (Potential) 200                               - Hanford          configuration 
other                                                                         - Los Alamos       at other 
Department of                                                                 National           sites TBD 
Energy sites                                                                    Laboratory 
Interim Storag4.4    Department of Defense                    No              None Currently     Not             No acceptable 
at a Department      Facilities                                               Available          Applicable      Department of Defense 
of Defense                                                                                                       facility is currently 
Facility                                                                                                         available for use as 
                                                                                                                 an interim storage 
                                                                                                                 facility
* 6,800 is the maximum magazine capacity value used to provide bounding parameters for the safety and environmental analyses. 
  The actual maximum magazine capacity could be less based on a best management practice decision to use an alternate (less
  dense) storage configuration (nominal 6,000).

Table 4-2 - Resource/Facility/Equipment Requirements and Estimated Costs (in millions)
               for Interim Storage at a Department of Defense Site.
                                                               Active Nuclear Weapons Storage                Inactive Nuclear Weapons Storage                      Inactive Conventional Weapons 
                                                               Facilities                                    Facilities                                            Storage Facilities 
                                                               AL-R8                            Type B       AL-R8 Storage                      Type B             AL-R8 Storage                   Type B  
                                                               Storage                          Shipping     Container                          Shipping           Container                       Shipping 
                                                               Container                        Container                                       Container                                          Container 
RECURRING COSTS 
Transportation                                                 2.4                              2.4          2.4                                2.4                2.4                             2.4 
Receiving & Packaging Operations                               0.1                              0            0.1                                0                  0.1                             0 
Operations                                                     4.1                              4.1          5.4                                5.4                5.4                             5.4 
Management/Administration                                      1.0                              1.0          1.0                                1.0                1.0                             1.0 
                                     TOTAL ANNUAL OPERATING COS7.60                             7.50         8.90                               8.80               8.90                            8.80 
ONE-TIME COSTS 
Modification                                                   0.0                              0.0          3.3                                3.3                16.5                            16.5 
Additional Type B Containers                                   4.0                              40.0         4.0                                40.0               4.0                             40.0 
Equipment                                                      1.0                              1.0          1.0                                1.0                1.0                             1.0 
                                     ONE-TIME "SET-UP" COSTS   5.00                             41.00        8.3                                44.3               21.5                            57.5
                                     (not including maintenance)
       Assumptions:
       General: - Dismantlement rate -- 2,000 weapons per year
                - 6,800 pits will remain at Pantex -- the current authorized capacity
       Modifications:
       -        No modifications needed for storage magazines
                - Modifications at inactive nuclear weapons storage facilities and Conventional Weapons Storage Facilities
                  to upgrade receiving and pit handling area (for repackaging and pit/container
                  surveillance program)
                - Active nuclear weapons storage facilities need no security upgrades and assumes that security personnel
                  provided by Department of Defense
                - Inactive nuclear weapons storage facilities needs refurbished or upgraded security systems
                - Type B Shipping Containers (model HE-400A) costed at $2,000 each
                - Inactive conventional weapons storage facilities needs completely new security system (fencing and
                  upgrades)
       Transportation:
       -        45 pits moved per Safe-Secure Trailer convoy trip; to move 2,000 pits requires 45 trips; cost per 1,000
                mile trip calculated at $54/mile
       Operations: - 100 persons needed to operate facility (includes security, materials handling, inventory, materials
                     control/accountability, surveillance testing, environment, safety, and health personnel,
                  other support) -- for Active Nuclear Weapons Storage Facility, assumes security personnel provide by
Department of Defense
                - Receiving/Packaging Operations assumes 3 persons needed
                - Equipment to be procured includes:
                  2 shielded forklifts, gamma spectrometer, radiation inspection/monitoring, equipment calibration
Figure 4.1 - Near-Term Projected Storage Capacity Requirements
Figure (Page 4-11 Figure 4.1 - Near-Term Projected Storage Capacity Requirements)

5.0 EXISTING ENVIRONMENT

The proposed action would involve use of existing facilities and no
new construction would be required.  Consequently, the description
of the existing environment is focused on those aspects of the
environment which potentially may be affected by the proposed
action.  Additional information on the Pantex Plant and its
existing environment may be found in the Final Environmental Impact
Statement, Pantex Plant Site (Department of Energy, 1983) and in
the Pantex Plant Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 1990
(Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., 1991).

5.1 Environment

The Pantex Plant is located in Carson County, about 17 miles
northeast of Amarillo, Texas, and central to the panhandle of Texas
(Figures 5.1 and 5.2).  There are 18 Modified-Richmond magazines
located in the western portion of Zone 4 of the Pantex Plant
(Figure 3.1) that are used for holding assembled weapons and other
components.  Assembled weapons and pits are not co-located in the
same magazine.  Each of the Modified-Richmond magazines consists of
an earth covered, concrete box-like structure (Figures 5.3 and
5.4).  To access these facilities, a forklift/tractor is used to
remove the concrete security blocks in front of each door.  These
blocks are in place whenever a magazine is not being accessed.  The
42 Steel Arch Construction magazines located in the western portion
of Zone 4 (Figure 5.5) are used for staging assembled weapons and
some components.  Currently, no pits are stored in any of the Steel
Arch Construction magazines.  Each of the Steel Arch Construction
magazines consists of an earth covered, steel-arch structure
(Figures 5.6 and 5.7).  Access to these facilities also requires a
forklift/tractor to remove concrete security blocks in front of
each door.  The only utility system that serves either the
Modified-Richmond or the Steel Arch Construction magazines is
electricity for security-related purposes.  Natural ventilation for
both types of magazines is provided through a steel pipe in the
ceiling of each magazine and small vents in the front wall on
either side of the magazine doors.
The Pantex Plant is situated in an area that has a semi-arid
continental climate.  Prevailing wind direction is from the south-
southwest with an average wind speed of 14 mph with occasional
gusts of up to 70 mph.  (Figure 5.8).  The Plant site is in
compliance with all applicable air emission standards.  The plant
lies within Zone 1 on the Seismic Risk Map.  This means that a Zone
1 earthquake may cause some minor damage (e.g., broken windows,
falling plaster, disturbance of tall objects).
The nearest major surface water source is the Canadian River,
approximately 14 miles north of the site.  The Canadian River flows
eastward into Lake Meredith, approximately 25 miles north of the
plant (Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc. 1991).  There are
several playas (natural land depressions) on the Plant site which
affect local drainage.  Surface runoff flows across the flat
terrain into these playas during periods of rainfall and forms
ephemeral lakes that dissipate through infiltration into the ground
or through evaporation enhanced by low humidity.  Playas 1, 2, and
3 (Figure 5.9) are on Department of Energy-owned property and
Playas 4 and 5 are on property leased by Department of Energy from
Texas Tech University.  Under unusual flooding conditions, storm
water runoff from the extreme northeastern section of the Pantex
Plant has the potential to flow off-site towards a playa north of
the site.  However, the northeastern section is mechanically pumped
to an on-site playa to retain and control potential off-site
runoff.  The United States Army Corps of Engineers has determined
that playas at the Pantex Plant site are "jurisdictional wetlands"
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and subject to the
provisions of the Act.  There are no areas on the Pantex Plant site
within a 100 year or 500 year floodplain.
There are two principal water-bearing units beneath the Pantex
Plant site and adjacent areas; the Ogallala Aquifer and the Dockum
Group Aquifer.  The unsaturated zone from the ground surface to the
Ogallala Aquifer consists of up to 460 feet of sediments.  A
perched water zone occurs discontinuously above the main zone of
saturation approximately in the middle of the Ogallala Formation. 
The city of Amarillo, Texas, has a municipal well field located
approximately 1 mile northeast of the Pantex Plant's well field. 
Both well fields access the Ogallala.  Water from the Ogallala
Aquifer is mixed with water from Lake Meredith and used for
municipal and industrial supplies in the area.  Water chemistry in
the Ogallala Aquifer and in the unsaturated zone beneath playas is
generally quite good, typically a mixed-cation/bicarbonate water
with 200-500 mg/L total dissolved solids and a pH of about 7.5. 
The Dockum Group Aquifer lies under the Ogallala Formation and is
believed to be semi-confined with respect to the overlying Ogallala
Aquifer.  The Dockum Group Aquifer, which has generally poor water
quality, supplies domestic and livestock wells south and southeast
of the Pantex Plant.

5.2 Radiological Environment

Radiation at the Pantex Plant consists of both natural background
radiation and radiation from plant operations.  Personnel exposure
to radiation at the Pantex Plant is maintained in accordance with
the principles of As Low As Reasonably Achievable.  The annual
whole body dose limit mandated by Federal regulations (52 Federal
Register 2822, January 27, 1987) and enforced by the Department of
Energy is 5 rem.  Time, distance and shielding are key elements in
the As Low As Reasonably Achievable program used to reduce
radiation exposure.  A personnel dosimetry program measures
radiation exposure and plant management uses the data to ensure
limits are not exceeded.
Collective worker dose from penetrating radiation for all Pantex
workers has varied over the years.  For instance, from January 1982
to December 1986, the annual collective dose averaged 115 person-
rem.  More recently, from January 1987 to December 1991, the annual
collective dose averaged 28 person-rem, a marked improvement. 
Naturally occurring radiation contributes to an average individual
dose of approximately 300 mrem/yr (National Council on Radiation
Protection, 1987).  Operations associated with the Pantex Plant
account for an average individual radiation worker dose of
approximately 70 mrem/yr additional dose.  The maximum radiation
dose to any Pantex Plant radiation worker was 0.53 rem in 1991
(Martin, J., 1992), well below the Pantex Plant administrative
operating limit of 1 rem/yr (established annually), and
substantially below the Federal limit of 5 rem/yr for occupational
workers.  The average radiation exposure for all other workers was
less than 10 mrem per person for calendar year 1991.  The
postulated dose to the maximally exposed off-site individual at the
fence line in 1990 was 0.16 mrem (Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,
Inc., 1991).  Such a dose is considered insignificant and no health
effects are expected.
Figure (Page 5-3 Figure 5.1 - Pantex Plant Location)
Figure 5.1 - Pantex Plant Location
Figure (Page 5-4 Figure 5.2 - Principal Features of the Pantex Plant)
Figure 5.2 - Principal Features of the Pantex Plant
Figure (Page 5-5 Figure 5.3 - Modified-Richmond Magazine Layout (Top View))
Figure 5.3 - Modified-Richmond Magazine Layout (Top View)
Figure (Page 5-6 Figure 5.4 - Modified-Richmond Magazine Layout (Front View))
Figure 5.4 - Modified-Richmond Magazine Layout (Front View)
(Security Blocks Omitted for Clarity)
Figure (Page 5-7 Figure 5.5 - Layout of Zone 4 West and 42 Steel Arch Construction Magazines)
Figure 5.5 - Layout of Zone 4 West and 42 Steel Arch Construction Magazines
Figure (Page 5-8 Figure 5.6 - Steel Arch Construction Magazine Layout (Top View))
Figure 5.6 - Steel Arch Construction Magazine Layout (Top View)
Figure (Page 5-9 Figure 5.7 - Steel Arch Construction Magazine Layout (Front View))
Figure 5.7 - Steel Arch Construction Magazine Layout (Front View)
(Security Barriers Omitted for Clarity)
Figure (Page 5-10 Figure 5.8 - Average Annual Wind Rose for Pantex Area)
Figure 5.8 - Average Annual Wind Rose for Pantex Area
Figure (Page 5-11 Figure 5.9 - Land Utilization Map - Pantex Plant Layout)
Figure 5.9 - Land Utilization Map - Pantex Plant Layout

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

6.1 Routine Operating Conditions

Potential environmental impacts associated with the Proposed Action
and the No-Action Alternative during routine operations are
discussed in the following subsections.
Because the proposed action would not require any construction
activities and because any facility modification would be inside
existing facilities, impacts to the natural environment would be
minimal.  Under normal operating conditions, there would be minor
releases of air pollutants associated with equipment engines and a
minor increase in particulate (dust) associated with operation of
forklifts used to move the security blocks and transport the pits
to the magazines.  There would be no impact to water resources,
flood plains, wetlands, cultural resources or other site features. 
Routine operations of the No-Action Alternative are similar to
those for the proposed action, differing only in the quantity of
materials held and number of magazines authorized for pit storage. 
The horizontal palletized multiple stacking configuration allows
the use of a forklift to lift and manipulate a group of containers
in a way that facilitates and speeds inspections.  In the vertical
configuration, the drums must be individually handled for the
inspection process.  This difference in how the drums must be
handled for inspection activities accounts for the difference in
inspection time between the No Action Alternative and the Proposed
Action configurations.

6.1.1 Radiological Impacts

The pit is comprised of a hermetically sealed metallic outer shell
and an inner shell of solid plutonium metal.  Each pit is clamped
in a holding fixture and inserted in a storage container comprised
of a carbon or stainless steel drum lined with a nominal three
inches of insulating and cushioning material.  No radiological
releases are associated with routine staging/ interim storage
operations for either the Proposed Action or the No-Action
Alternative.

6.1.1.1 Radiological Exposure to Workers Associated with the Proposed Action

Radiological impacts of routine operations would consist
principally of radiation exposure (neutron and gamma) to workers
involved in placement of pits into storage and periodic inspections
and inventories of pits stored on an interim basis.  Periodic
inspections and inventories are planned every 18 months, based upon
permanent variance to the prior requirement for a bimonthly
physical inventory for each Modified-Richmond or Steel Arch
Construction interim storage magazine.  Workers are required to
wear protective clothing (e.g., lead aprons), as directed by the
Radiation Safety Department at Pantex, when handling containerized
pits or when entering magazines.
Appendix F provides a detailed analysis for cumulative worker doses
attributed to the proposed interim storage activities.  A high
level of conservatism is used through dose rates and durations of
exposures; in addition, no credit is currently taken for personnel
shielding, i.e., lead aprons, remote inventorying equipment, or
other equipment shielding used or planned for future use.  Specific
assumptions used are tabulated in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1 - Assumptions Used to Calculate Radiological Exposure to
Workers Associated with the Proposed Action
Inventory Process:      
 Vertical Single-      Two people, 70 minutes for each side of a Modified-
Layer                  Richmond magazine.  Also assumes 140 minutes per Steel 
 Configuration         Arch Construction magazine.  Inventory of per each 
                       magazine once every 18 months (40 magazines/yr). 
 Horizontal            Two people, 45 minutes for each side of a Modified-
 Palletized            Richmond, and 1 person 90 minutes for each Steel Arch 
 Multiple Stacking     Construction magazine.  Inventory of each magazine once 
 Configuration         every 18 months (40 magazines/yr). 
Corrosion              100 percent container corrosion inspection for each 
Inspections:           magazine every 18 months (vertical single-layer 
                       configuration only).  Assume 1 minute per container for 
                       surveillance operations, 2 workers (100 percent 
                       inspection). 
Miscellaneous          One Steel Arch Construction magazine and one Modified-
Operations:            Richmond magazine opened every workday for 2 hours with 2 
                       workers. 
Magazine Capacities:   For the vertical single-layer configuration, 384 
                       containers is the operational maximum for Steel Arch 
                       Construction magazines and is used for both magazine types 
                       in the calculations.  For horizontal palletized stacking 
                       configuration, the maximum capacity is 440 containers in 
                       Modified-Richmond and 392 containers for Steel Arch 
                       Construction magazines. 
Radiation Dose         525 mrem/hr for the vertical single-layer configuration 
Rates:                 inventory process.  250 mrem/hr for the horizontal 
                       palletized stacking configuration inventory process.  60 
                       mrem/hr for corrosion inspection activities.  30 mrem/hr 
                       for miscellaneous operations.
The predicted cumulative worker doses are dependent on the amount
of americium in a plutonium pit, which varies with the age of a
pit.  Americium, the decay product of a plutonium isotope found in
weapons grade plutonium, reaches its maximum content in a pit in
approximately 73 years.  After this time, the americium content
decreases through  radioactive decay.  During decay, americium
emits alpha and gamma radiation.  The gamma radiation produced by
the decay of americium is more energetic than the radiation
produced by the plutonium present in fully aged pits (greater than
45 years from manufacture).  The resultant expected increase in
radiation field has been included in calculations presented in
Appendix F.  The exposure rates in the magazines will be at the
highest levels when the americium reaches equilibrium with the
plutonium, in approximately 45 years.  However, personnel exposure
will be mitigated through the use of the shielded forklift, the
self shielding attributed to the proposed horizontal storage and
use of personnel protective equipment such as lead aprons.  A more
detailed discussion of the effects of americium is found in the
Final Safety Analysis Report for Pantex Plant Zone 4 Magazines.
The annual collective dose attributed to the bounding case where
use of the single-layer vertical configuration is used, is
projected to be from 100 to 200 person-rem.  This range of exposure
is related to maintaining 60 magazines containing a total of up to
20,000 pits.  The annual collective dose attributed to the bounding
case where use of the horizontal palletized multiple stacking
configuration is used, is projected to be from 50 to 100 person-
rem.
In addition to individuals taking personal precautions such as the
mandatory use of lead aprons, shielded forklifts and Automated
Guided Vehicles (in the future) would be used both to place pits in
magazines and to assist in taking inventories using barcode
readers.  The use of such vehicles would further reduce worker
exposure to external radiation associated with pit storage and
inventory activities.  The typical individual worker radiation
doses would be maintained below the established Pantex annual
administrative operating limit (1 rem/yr for 1992).  Using a Latent
Cancer Fatality Rate of 4 to 5 fatal cancers per 10,000 person-rem,
a 1 rem exposure results in about 0.08 percent increased risk.  The
natural incidence of fatal cancer in the total population is about
20 percent.

6.1.1.2 Radiological Impacts Associated with the No-Action Alternative

A high level of conservatism is used as detailed in Appendix F.
Specific assumptions used to calculate the annual collective dose
for the No-Action Alternative are tabulated in Table 6-2.

Table 6-2 - Assumptions Used to Calculate Radiological Exposure to
Workers Associated with the No-Action Alternative
Inventory Process:
Vertical Single- Two people, 70 minutes for each side of a Modified-
Layer Richmond magazine. Inventory 2 sides each month.
Configuration Frequency is in accordance with current operations.
Corrosion 100 percent container corrosion inspection for each
Inspections: Modified-Richmond magazine every 18 months. Assume 1
minute per container for surveillance operations, 2
workers (100% inspection of 12 magazines/yr).
Miscellaneous One Modified-Richmond opened every workday for 2 hours
Operations: with 2 workers. Loading, unloading, use of forklifts,
continuous close exposure is limited.
Magazine Capacities: For the vertical single-layer configuration 384 containers
is used in the calculations.
Radiation Dose 525 mrem/hr for the vertical single-layer configuration
Rates: inventory process. 60 mrem/hr for corrosion inspection
activities. 30 mrem/hr for miscellaneous operations.
The annual collective dose attributed to the bounding case where
the use of single-layer vertical configuration is projected to be
from 50 to 100 person-rem. This range of exposure is related to
maintaining 18 Modified-Richmond magazines in the maximum packing
configuration containing up to 6,800 pits and is considered to be
conservative; for perspective, current dosimetry records for both
1991 and 1992 indicate that the collective dose rate for personnel
associated with all Zone 4 operations is less than 10 person-rem
per year. Lower individual and collective worker dose rates would
be expected from differing numbers of pits (i.e., use of preferred
storage configurations) in Zone 4 in comparison to the proposed
action.
The typical individual worker radiation doses would be maintained
below the established Pantex annual administrative operating limit
(1 rem/yr for 1992). Using a Latent Cancer Fatality Rate of 4 to
5 fatal cancers per 10,000 person-rem, a 1 rem exposure results in
about 0.08 percent increased risk. The natural incidence of fatal
cancer in the total population is about 20 percent. Under the No-
Action Alternative, the transportation of weapons for dismantlement
would diminish or cease entirely, eliminating the corresponding
potential exposure as documented in the Final Environmental Impact
Statement for the Pantex Plant.

6.1.2 Radiological Exposure to Public

For either the Proposed Action or the No-Action Alternative, the
expected level of penetrating radiation would result in no
measurable effect or exposure to an individual occupying a position
for an entire year at the nearest Pantex site boundary.  Such a
level would be indistinguishable from natural background radiation. 
No adverse health effects would be expected among the general
public as a result of normal operations from this action.

6.1.3 Cumulative Impacts for the Proposed Action

The only potential impact of the proposed action would be increased
worker radiation exposure.  For all operations at the Pantex Plant,
worker radiation doses are maintained below the annually
established Pantex administrative operating limit (1 rem/yr for
1992).  This limit is significantly below the Department of Energy
mandated limit of 5 rem/yr.  The Pantex personnel dosimetry program
measures radiation exposure, and plant management uses the data to
ensure limits are not exceeded.  Although the annual collective
worker dose may increase, the Federal individual worker exposure
limit would not be exceeded by the proposed action.

6.2 Abnormal Events/Accidents Associated with the Proposed Action

A series of potential accident initiating events were analyzed for
operations in Zone 4 (Department of Energy, 1992).  Impacts from
abnormal events having a probability greater than one in a million
(1 x 10-6), occurring as a result of implementing the proposed
action, are presented in this section (Department of Energy, 1988). 
The definitions of various events including an incredible event are
based upon a deliberate process of comparison between events having
various societal risks.  Ultimately the definition of an incredible
event is based upon the expectation that the event has a
sufficiently small likelihood of occurrence such that it need not
be further assessed.  In particular, it need not be further
assessed relative to other societal risks.
All events that are quantified are typically stated in efficiency
terms of annual probability of occurrence.  It is the standard
practice for consistency, efficiency and because it provides a
standard timeframe from which judgements on the acceptability of
risks originating from different events.
Facilities included in the analysis were the Modified-Richmond and
Steel Arch Construction magazines.  Results of these accidents are
summarized in Tables 6-3, 6-4A, and 6-4B.
Detailed discussions are provided in the appendices as follows:
      Screening of Potential Accident-Initiating Events Appendix A
      Blast Calculations                                Appendix B
      Structural Analysis                               Appendix C
      Forklift Operational Analysis                     Appendix D
      Aircraft Hazard Analysis                          Appendix E

6.2.1 Screening of Potential Accident Initiating Events

A list of potential accident-initiating events was prepared and a
qualitative assessment made to eliminate from further consideration
any event that posed little or no hazard to the magazines or their
contents.  This list and a brief statement of findings from the
assessment are provided in Appendix A.  Events that required a more
structured assessment were those initiated by earthquakes, external
explosions, missiles, tornados, forklift accident and aircraft
crash.

6.2.2 Potential Blast Hazards

An analysis was made of the effects that blasts from explosions
occurring in nearby facilities might have on the interim storage
facilities or their contents.  This analysis is described in
Appendix B.  Department of Energy determined that missiles could be
generated by a high explosive blast that could reach the magazines. 
The consequences, as described in Appendix C, were such that the
magazines and their contents would not be affected.

6.2.3 Structural Analysis

An analysis (summarized at Appendix C) was made of the effect
earthquakes would have on the magazines, and Department of Energy
concluded that no significant effect would occur.  An analysis was
also made of the effect of tornados and missiles propelled by
tornados or explosions on the magazines.  It was determined that no
significant effect would occur.

6.2.4 Forklift Operational Accident

In this analysis (see Appendix D), the single boom on a specially
designed forklift, traveling at 5 mph, strikes and punctures an
AL-R8 container.  The boom then crushes the pit within the
container and packing material, expelling plutonium dust. 
Essentially, all of the 20 mg of available plutonium dust becomes
airborne within the AL-R8 container; however, calculations, using
conservative assumptions, show that only 0.57 mg of the plutonium
actually escapes to the outside air.
The total activity released by 45-year old weapons grade plutonium,
which maximizes resultant activity levels, in the above accident is
calculated to be 92 -Ci.  Assuming that the plutonium is dispersed
uniformly and instantaneously, a worker present would receive
0.02 -Ci.  This is equivalent to the 50-year committed effective
dose equivalent (Committed Effective Dose Equivalent) for lungs of
24 rem, and the 50-year Committed Effective Dose Equivalent whole
body dose of 6.6 rem.  There would be no immediate or long-term
health effect to the worker as a result of an accident of this
type.  Workers in the immediate vicinity of the accident site could
receive a marginal radiation dose; negligible consequences to the
public or the environment are anticipated.

6.2.5 Aircraft Hazard Analysis

Appendix E, "Aircraft Hazard Analysis," presents a quantitative
analysis of the likelihood of any class (e.g., air carrier,
military) of aircraft striking a Modified-Richmond or Steel Arch
Construction magazine.  The results of the analysis (summarized by
aircraft class) are as follows:
Aircraft Class       Crash 
                     Probability/Year 
Air Carrier          2.78 x 10E-8 
Military             2.50 x 10E-7 
Aviation
General Aviation     1.52 x 10E-6 
Aerial               5.42 x 10E-8 
Application
TOTAL                1.86 x 10E-6
The analysis indicates that the likelihood of any class of
aircraft impacting into any of the 60 Zone 4 magazines
(regardless of the magnitude of that impact) is approximately
1.9 x 10-6 per year.  The overall estimated probability of impact
is greater than one in a million (1 x 10-6) per year.  However, it
must be observed that this estimate is dominated by the results for
general aviation in that approximately 82 percent of the total
probability comes from that source.  This arises from the fact that
general aviation clearly dominates the air traffic in the Amarillo
area.  As indicated in the Safety Analysis Report for Zone 4, 62
percent of the total traffic count is general aviation.  Given this
situation, and the fact that these single-engine aircraft are

Table 6-3 - Summary of Accident Analysis Results - Modified-
Richmond and Steel Arch Construction Magazines
Accident      Annual   Effect      Effect on   Effect on    Dollar Loss    Program    Risk 
Scenario      Probabil on          Environme    Plant       (2)            Interru    Leve 
              ity(1)    General    nt(2)       Workers(2)                  ption(2)   l(3) 
                       Public(2) 
Aircraft      Extremel Negligib    Negligibl   Negligible   Marginal -     Negligi    IV-C 
Crash(4)      .        le          e           (no          (minor         ble         
(General      Unlikely (no         (no         effect)      cracking of    (no 
Aviation,     (1.2E-6) effect)     effect)                  concrete)      effect) 
Single                              
Engine)
Design        Unlikely Negligib    Negligibl   Negligible   Marginal -     Negligi    IV-B 
Basis(4)      (1.0E-3) le          e           (no          (minor         ble 
Earthquakes            (no         (no         effect)      cracking or    (no 
(0.10g)                effect)     effect)                  spalling of    effect) 
                                                            concrete) 
Maximum       Extremel Negligib    Negligibl   Negligible   Marginal -     Negligi    IV-C 
Credible(4)   .        le          e           (no          (minor         ble 
Earthquakes   Unlikely (no         (no         effect)      cracking or    (no 
(0.33g)       (1.5E-5) effect)     effect)                  spalling of    effect) 
                                                            concrete) 
External      Unlikely Negligib    Negligibl   Marginal -   Negligible -   Negligi    III-
Explosion(5)  (1.7E-4) le          e           (personnel   (no dollar     ble        B 
(5.2psi                (no         (no         near Zone    loss)          (no 
overpressure;          effect)     effect)     4 MAA                       effect) 
Zone 4 East                                    magazines 
magazines)                                     slightly  
                                               injured) 
External      Likely   Negligib    Negligibl   Negligible   Marginal -     Negligi    IV-A 
Fires(5)      (2.5E-2) le          e           (no          (minor         ble 
(diesel fuel           (no         (no         effect)      damage to      (no 
fire)                  effect)     effect)                  doors and      effect) 
                                                            concrete 
                                                            front wall, 
                                                            loss of 
                                                            forklift) 
Missiles(5)   Extremel Negligib    Negligibl   Critical -   Marginal -     Negligi    II-C 
 (Explosion-  .        le          e           (personnel   (minor         ble 
Generated -   Unlikely (no         (no         near Zone    damage to      (no 
 40 lbs., 778  (1.6E-  effect)     effect)     4 MAA        security       effect) 
ft/sec)       6)                               magazines    barrier) 
                                               severely  
                                               injured) 
Missiles(4)   Extremel Negligib    Negligibl   Negligible   Negligible -   Negligi    IV-C 
(Tornado-     .        le          e           (no          (slight        ble 
Driven)       Unlikely (no         (no         effect)      damage to      (no 
              (2.0E-5) effect)     effect)                  security       effect) 
                                                            barrier) 
Design        Extremel Negligib    Negligibl   Negligible   Marginal -     Negligi    IV-C 
Basis(4)      .        le          e           (no          (minor         ble 
Tornados      Unlikely (no         (no         effect)      cracking  or   (no 
 (150 mph)    (2.0E-5) effect)     effect)                  spalling of    effect) 
                                                            concrete) 
Maximum(4)    Extremel Negligib    Negligibl   Negligible   Marginal -     Negligi    IV-C 
Credible      .        le          e           (no          (minor         ble 
Tornados (220 Unlikely (no         (no         effect)      cracking or    (no 
mph)          (1.0E-6) effect)     effect)                  spalling of    effect) 
                                                            concrete) 
Operational   Likely   Negligib    Negligibl   Marginal -   Marginal -     Negligi    III-
Accident(5) - (>1.0E-  le          e           (whole       (from          ble        A
(forklift     2)       (no         (no         body 50      decontaminat   (no 
puncture of            effect)     effect)     year CEDE    ion            effect) 
pit                                            <7 rem)      proceedings) 
container)
NOTES:
1.  Probability estimates are based on quantitative analysis or the qualitative
    description provided in the Zone 4 Safety Analysis Report.
2.  Consequence estimates are based on quantitative analysis and the qualitative
    description provided in the
    Zone 4 Safety Analysis Report.
3.  Risk is defined as the combination of the annual probability and the worst of
    the effects the event could produce on the general public, the plant workers,
    or the environment.  See Tables 6-4A and 6-4B.
4.  Tornado, Earthquake, and Aircraft Crash probabilities are for all Zone 4
    magazines.
5.  Fire, Explosion, and Operational Accident probabilities are for individual
    magazines.
 lightweight and fly at low speeds compared to the air carriers and
military aircraft, the vulnerability of the magazines in Zone 4 to impacts
from general aviation aircraft was examined.
Analysis (detailed in Appendix C) indicates that light aircraft (i.e.,
single-engine aircraft) moving at typical speeds will not penetrate or
collapse a Zone 4 magazine structure.  This analysis is summarized in
Appendix E.  Therefore, it is considered reasonable to exclude single-
engine aircraft from further consideration in the accident analysis and
to focus attention on those aircraft that have some potential for
penetration or destruction impact.  When th

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)