Congressional Research Service: Issue Brief October 20, 1993 -ti- Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress By Shirley A. Kan, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division CONTENTS: SUMMARY MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Why Target China? Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation Possible Motives and Policy Constraints Missile and Related Technology Transfers CSS-2 IRBM M-9 SRBM M-11 SRBM Nuclear Technology Transfers Pakistan Algeria Iran Iraq Syria Nonproliferation Cooperation and Compliance MTCR Guidelines Compliance with the MTCR The NPT and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Policy Issues for Congress Unilateral Policies No Nonproliferation Conditions on MFN M-11s and MTCR-Related Sanctions Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act Bilateral Approach Resuming Security Dialogue Multilateral Options International Lending Five Power Talks and F-16s for Taiwan Nonproliferation Regimes LEGISLATION Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation SUMMARY The Pentagon's Sept. 1,1993 Bottom- Up Review listed proliferation as the top new danger faced by the U.S. One problem has been Chinese sales, with China supplying CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran and Iraq, and ballistic missile technology to Pakistan and perhaps others. China developed for export the mobile, solid-fuel M-9 and M-11 short range ballistic missiles that violate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), reportedly with Pakistan, Syria, and Iran as interested buyers. China also has nuclear cooperation deals with Pakistan and Iran. Since 1991, facing international criticism of its proliferation activities, U.S. sanctions, and possible conditions on low MFN tariffs, China has responded with greater willingness to acknowledge its missile and nuclear transfers and to join international agreements. China acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on March 9, 1992. Beijing also promised in November 1991 to abide by the MTCR (when in June 1991 U.S. sanctions for missile related transfers to Pakistan were lifted). Washington effectively waived the sanctions on Mar. 23, 1992, explaining that the step was warranted by China's agreement to abide by the MTCR and to apply it specifically to the M-9s and M-11s. Questions arose, however, about Chinese compliance with the MTCR, violations of which trigger U.S. sanctions as required by law. On Aug. 24, 1993, the Administration determined that China in 1992 transferred M-11 missile related equipment to Pakistan, and imposed sanctions on missile-related trade with Chinese and Pakistani arms sales entities. Many are concerned that transfers of missile-related materials, equipment, technology, and personnel training -- if not complete missiles -- may be contributing to local production or improvement of ballistic missiles in Pakistan, Syria, and Iran. Such transfers are difficult to prove and make indigenous programs more self-sustaining. Another question is China's cooperation with international nonproliferation regimes. Despite China's accession to and apparent compliance with the NPT, concerns remain about (1) its long-term programs of nuclear energy cooperation with Iran and Pakistan (which are suspected of providing civilian covers for weapons programs there); (2) its suspected continued cooperation with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program; and (3) its failure to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group and require full-scope safeguards that strengthen the NPT/IAEA safeguards (which failed in Iraq). Bill Clinton had criticized former Presi- dent Bush for rejecting human rights, trade, and nonproliferation conditionality for China's MFN status. Although Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell introduced MFN conditionality bills (H.R. 1890; S. 806), they supported President Clinton's May 28, 1993, Executive Order to renew MFN in 1993 with human rights considerations for an MFN renewal in 1994, but address proliferation separately. Other unilateral tools include the just imposed MTCR-related sanctions; targeted export bans on supercomputers or satellites; or other sanctions (S. 1172 (McCain/Lieberman); S. 1064 (Glenn)/H.R. 2358 (Lantos)). A bilateral approach would resume the security dialogue. Multilateral options may affect international lending; the Perm Five talks (H.R. 2333 (Hamilton)); and nonproliferation regimes (H.R. 2076 (Stark)). Strengthening IAEA safeguards is one example of such efforts. MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS On Aug 24, 1993, the Administration determined that China transferred M-11 missile related equipment (not missiles) to Pakistan (in violation of the MTCR). It also imposed limited Category II sanctions on missile technology trade with 1 Pakistani and 11 Chinese arms exporting entities, as required by law. However, the Oct. 20, 1993 Washington Post reported that the National Security Council has been reviewing the decision to implement the sanctions, due to industry objections. The net impact on U.S. businesses is uncertain. China's response has been limited to a threat to end its commitment to the MTCR. The primary effect of the sanctions is on the export of U.S. (e.g., Hughes and Martin Marietta) and foreign satellites (containing U.S. components) to China for launch before sanctions are lifted, as satellite components are in the MTCR Annex. (China has three contracts to launch U.S.-built satellites in 1994-95.) However U.S. commercial launch service providers (e.g, McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics) may benefit from a lack of Chinese competition. Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord indicated on Aug. 31, 1993 that Washington is ready to negotiate a waiver for the sanctions, which might require a more formal commitment by Beijing to the MTCR. Meanwhile, the Pentagon's Sept. 1, 1993 Bottom-Up Review listed proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the top new danger facing the United States. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Throughout the 19808, Chinese arms sales practices, especially in nuclear exports, were troubling to U.S. policymakers. Chinese assurances also were vague and unsatisfactory. Washington was less critical of Beijing in part due to its strategic importance in counterbalancing Moscow. However, the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, the end of the Cold War, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War changed perceptions. First, the decline of China's strategic importance has supported arguments for a tougher U.S. policy toward China. Also, revelations about Iraq's missile, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs after the Persian Gulf War heightened concerns that international nonproliferation regimes may be inadequate in restricting the spread of weapons technology, especially dual-use supplies. Third, new disclosures in 1991 about Chinese missile and nuclear technology transfers to Pakistan and the Middle East further added impetus to criticisms of the Bush Administration's approach toward China. Why Target China? China and North Korea are currently the main concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Since the early 1980s, the United States has urged Chinese restraint in missile sales and un-safeguarded nuclear exports (reportedly to Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, North Korea, India, and Pakistan). The United States considers China's transfers of dangerous technology contrary to U.S. nonproliferation and regional stability interests. After the June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown that spoiled China's image, Beijing showed greater willingness to acknowledge its missile and nuclear transfers, and to join international nonproliferation regimes. In 1992, China signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and agreed to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Nevertheless, Chinese arms sales are still troubling for several reasons: 1) Sales of Ballistic Missiles to Contentious Regions. China has shown both willingness and capability to transfer ballistic missiles that can be fitted with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads to increase their utility as terror weapons. China is the only supplier to have transferred intermediate range ballistic missiles to a developing country (Saudi Arabia). Also, China's list of interested missile buyers includes countries in the contentious Middle East and South Asia regions with suspected nuclear arms programs. Ballistic missiles are considered destabilizing weapons, because potential target countries generally lack defenses against missiles and may launch preemptive strikes against enemy missiles or seek their own missiles. 2) Transfers of Military and Dual-Use Technology. Beijing has also shown the willingness and capability to supply materials and technology (reportedly including personnel training) to states believed to be pursuing covert missile and nuclear weapons projects. These transfers are more troubling because of their contribution to indigenous missile manufacturing capability, thus lessening dependence on foreign assistance. It is also difficult to confirm that a dual-use item is being used for a weapons program, because technology, once transferred, would become part of the indigenous weapons production capability of a country. Chinese leaders may be seeking to transfer dual-use missile and nuclear technology and know-how (as opposed i;o actual weapons) as an effort to lessen the chance of Western reprisals. Sensitive technology transfers are especially worrisome since International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections found that Iraq built up its extensive nuclear weapons program even while a party to the NPT with Iraqi declared nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards. Also, analysts are concerned about inadequate international controls on dual-use technology that allowed Iraq to acquire dual-use nuclear equipment before the Persian Gulf War. Moreover, some experts miscalculated that in early 1991 Iran was at least 5 to 10 years from producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. LAEA inspectors in September 1991 found that the timetable was probably 12 to 18 months. 3) Record of Secrecy. Although China, after media disclosures, provided details about its nuclear transfers, experts find Chinese transfers troubling because of their secrecy and association with suspected nuclear bomb programs. During the Iran-Iraq War, China covertly sold Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran and Iraq, while issuing official denials. Since the 19808, China's Foreign Affairs Ministry has issued vague -- and perhaps uninformed -- assurances of responsible arms exports and denials of wrongdoing only to later contradict them with admissions and elaborations. Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation Possible Mothres and Policy Constraints. Many analysts believe that sensitive Chinese arms sales are controlled by only a few very influential military and political officials in the Central Military Commission and Politburo -- and not the weaker Foreign Ministry from whom the Department of State has sought assurances. Diminished military-to-military ties since the Tiananmen crackdown have reduced U.S. ability to exchange views with key Chinese officials. It is also believed that in addition to national defense, intelligence, and foreign policy interests, Chinese arms sales policy reflects personal interests of the top leaders' family members who oversee arms sales companies. Since the early 19808, China has been expanding its missile and nuclear related sales, including deals for nuclear power projects in developing countries. This policy suggests a Chinese effort in part to earn foreign exchange and to make up for lost arms sales earnings with the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. During the 1980s, China emerged among the top five arms suppliers to the Third World, becoming Iran's single largest arms supplier. There are strong economic motives for realizing the nationalistic goal of modernization, especially in defense. In addition, Chinese sales indicate a pattern wherein countries denied preferred Western assistance due to export controls turn to China as a willing and capable supplier of sensitive technology. This position may provide greater Chinese strategic political influence in the Middle East and South Asia, and serve Beijing's foreign policy goals of asserting independent clout and checking U.S. influence on domestic and international forces. Other possible Chinese interests include balance of power concerns in South Asia and the Middle East, cheaper oil supplies, and Islamic influences over ethnic minorities in northwestern China. Moreover, in some cases, China is reportedly supplying technology and personnel training while not transferring complete weapons. It is uncertain whether Beijing shares Western nonproliferation interests. The Chinese may be trying to satisfy missile contracts despite its nonproliferation agreements. Finally, observers have pointed to inherent problems that dual-use technology transfers pose for effective national and multilateral export controls, and the weaknesses of the IAEA safeguards system and the informal MTCR. Missile and Related Technology Transfers CSS-2 IRBM. In 1987, during the Iran-Iraq War, China secretly sold an estimated 36 CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) to Saudi Arabia with a price tag believed to be $3-3.5 billion, according to published reports. The range of the Saudi CSS-2s is considered to be about 2,800 km (1,740 miles) -- enough to reach Iran, Iraq, and Israel. The Saudis reportedly approached China for missiles after the Reagan Administration failed to persuade Congress to lift the limit of 60 F-15 fighters that could be sold to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh said it acquired the missiles as deterrence against possible missile attacks from Tehran. The missiles are named DF-3 by the Chinese ("DF" for Dong Feng, or East Wind) and designated CSS-2 by the United States ("CSS" for Chinese Surface-to-Surface). According to Jane's, the CSS-2 IRBM is a single-stage missile using storable liquid fuel, first deployed by the Chinese in 1971, with a range between 2,500-3,000 km (1,553- 1,863 miles). While the Chinese designed the CSS-2 missiles to carry nuclear warheads, Saudi Prince Bandar (Saudi ambassador to Washington who secretly negotiated the deal in Beijing) assured the United States that the Chinese had modified the missile to carry a large conventional warhead. The Chinese also issued similar assurances. Then- Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian on Apr. 6,1988, confirmed that China sold "some non-nuclear, conventional surface-to-surface missiles" to Saudi Arabia and said that "the Saudi government made a commitment to us of no transfer, no first use of these missiles, and to use these missiles entirely for defensive purposes." While insisting that the missiles contributed to peace and stability, Wu also said that China supported Arab states against any threat of a preemptive Israeli attack on the new missiles, thus admitting that the missiles could be destabilizing. Indeed, in early 1988, Israel threatened a preemptive strike against the CSS-2s, recalling the Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981. The CSS-2 sale was negotiated in 1985 and the missiles were first delivered to Saudi Arabia in late 1987, with much deception to avoid discovery by Western intelligence, according to a Mar. 29, 1988, Washington Post report. The Chinese allegedly shipped the CSS-2s to Saudi Arabia along with other weapons bound for Iraq. U.S. intelligence discovered the IRBMs in January 1988 when trucks carrying some of the weapons supposedly destined for Iraq were seen traveling south, instead of north, from Saudi ports. China may have been primarily motivated by both the enormous profits from this unique missile deal and greater political influence in the Middle East. Beijing's diplomatic rivalry with the Taipei government may also have motivated the sale, as Saudi Arabia had been one of the few remaining countries to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The CSS-2 deal signaled the development of increasingly friendly Sino-Saudi ties, which culminated in the establishment of diplomatic relations on July 21,1990, with Taiwan losing Saudi recognition. M-9 SRBM. For several years, Washington has been concerned about reported Chinese attempts to sell Syria (or other countries, such as Iran) the M-9 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). Syria is believed to have signed a contract and paid a deposit for the M-9s in 1988. The M-9 is estimated to have a range of 600 km (375 miles) and exceeds the Category I range and payload limits of the MTCR guidelines (300 km and 500 kg). A June 23,1988, Washington Post report said that Syria may have turned to the Chinese after failing to obtain Soviet SS-23 ballistic missiles that were subject to elimination under the U.S-U.S.S.R. INF Treaty. The June 11,1991, Washington Post revealed that U.S. concern stems from intelligence that: Syria and Pakistan provided financial support for the M-series missiles, sightings of Syrian and Pakistani military officials at missile development and testing sites, and recent acceleration in Chinese missile flight tests. The Far Eastern Economic Review reported on Aug. 22, 1991, that Western intelligence had recently sighted up to 24 transporter-erector-launcher trucks (TELs) for the M-9 missile in Syria, and that Syria provided much of the research and development funds for the M-9s. (See Compliance with the MTCR.) M-9 flight tests reportedly began in June 1988. The M-9 SRBM is reported by Jane's to be a single-stage missile with an inertial (not terminal) guidance system, which means the missile is programmed before launch and receives no external guidance after launch. According to the 1988 SIPRI Yearbook, the M-9 is also China's first solid fuel land-based ballistic missile -- a considerable technical improvement over liquid- fueled missiles that are more dangerous and time-consuming to operate. The M-9 is supposedly fully mobile (using TELs), and is advertised as having a rapid reaction time (just 30 minutes to prepare for operation). The M-9 is considered conventional or nuclear capable, and more accurate (circular error probable (CEP) of about 650 meters) than the modified Scud-B ballistic missiles launched by Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, reported the Apr. 8, 1991, Defense News. China has developed the M-9 missile for export, with China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) -- one of the two Chinese companies targeted by U.S. sanctions from June 1991 to March 1992 -- marketing the missile abroad. M-11 SRBM. The United States has been concerned about the possible Chinese sale of the M-11 SRBM to Pakistan. Reports also name Iran as an interested buyer. President Bush, in October 1990, suspended economic and military aid to Pakistan because he could no longer certify to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device. Many are concerned about a potential nuclear-armed clash between Pakistan and India (with its own missiles) over the Kashmir area. On Apr. 5, 1991, the Wall Street Journal reported that China was in the process of selling Pakistan a new missile with a range of about 180 miles (290 km) and capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Evidence indicating a Chinese sale of M-11 SRBMs to Pakistan was U.S. intelligence sighting of TELs for the M-11s inside Pakistan, according to the next day's Washington Post. The Chinese may have also delivered dummy missile frames for practice launches. On June 25,1991 and again on Aug. 24, 1993, Washington determined that Chinese arms sales companies transferred missile technology to Pakistan in violation of the MTCR and imposed U.S. sanctions as required by law. (See M- 11s and MTCR-Related Sanctions.) Transfers of the M-11s or related equipment violate the MTCR. A CPMIEC marketing brochure reportedly said that the M-11 is a 31-foot-long missile capable of carrying an 800 kg warhead up to 180 miles (290 km). The Chinese first revealed the M-11 SRBM in 1988 and reportedly successfully flight-tested it in 1990. Jane's Defence Weekly reported on Apr. 9,1988, that the M-11 missile is a single-stage, solid-propellant missile with an inertial mid-course (not terminal) guidance system. The M-11 is also fully mobile and can be reloaded and ready for firing in about 45 minutes by a crew of fewer than 10 people. Nuclear Technology Transfers Pakistan. Pakistan, which has not signed the NPT, is believed to be pursuing a nuclear weapons development program that includes Chinese technical assistance. On Feb. 6, 1992, the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan admitted that his country now has the components and know-how to build "at least one" nuclear explosive device. On Dec. 1, 1992, "NBC News" reported that Pakistan can assemble and drop "at least seven" nuclear weapons within hours. On Feb. 24, 1993, CIA Director James Woolsey testified that, prior to joining the NPT in 1992, China "probably provided some nuclear weapons related assistance to Islamabad," and that "it's unclear whether Beijing has broken off contact with elements associated with Pakistan's weapons programs." On July 28, 1993, Woolsey testified that China's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is "of greater concern" than that with Iran. The Reagan Administration had convincing evidence that China was helping Pakistan to operate its Kahuta uranium-enrichment plant and had given Pakistan a nuclear bomb design, the June 22 and 23,1984, New York Times reported. The Aug. 9, 1990 Nucleonics Week disclosed that China designed the nuclear system for a Pakistani research reactor (Parr-2), added in 1989, which uses highly enriched uranium fuel. Also, according to the San Jose Mercury-News of Nov. 21, 1990 and the New York Times of Nov. 22, 1990, the FBI conducted a counter-intelligence investigation that began about 1986 into Chinese theft at Lawrence Livermore national laboratory, with China subsequently using the stolen information to build a nuclear device (which some published sources identified as an experimental neutron bomb that was detonated in September 1988) and transferring some of the secrets to Pakistan. China also assisted in fuel fabrication for the rebuilt and upgraded Parr-1 research reactor, whose capacity was doubled from five to ten megawatts in 1991, the Jan. 24,1991, Nucleonics Week said. Moreover, China has given Pakistan enough weapons-grade uranium to fuel two nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control specialists Gary Milhollin and Gerard White wrote in the May 12,1991, Washington Post. They also stated that Chinese scientists have been sighted at the Kahuta complex (in which gas centrifuges are used to produce weapons-grade uranium), and that, in 1986, China sold Pakistan tritium (used to achieve fusion in hydrogen bombs and to increase the yield of tritium boosted nuclear bombs). China is also believed by Western intelligence to have given a design for a 25- Kt solid-core implosion device to Pakistan, Nucleonics Week reported May 23,1991. On Dec. 31, 1991, China signed a contract to build a 300-MW nuclear power reactor for Pakistan. The project will cost Pakistan the below-market price of $500 million (with Pakistan paying for local spending and China providing foreign exchange), and China will also transfer nuclear technology, according to the Jan. 23, 1992, Far Eastern Economic Review. Japan, Germany, and France have reportedly denied supporting systems and components, according to Nuclear Suppliers Group policy. In 1990 and 1991, Germany and France (which has declined to sell Pakistan a reactor) began to require full-scope safeguards (IAEA inspections not only of transferred materials, but also of all other declared nuclear facilities of the recipient country). China, in contrast, does not require full-scope safeguards. Pakistan has refused IAEA safeguards on its nuclear fuel cycle program, but requested IAEA safeguards for the Chinese reactor. Chinese officials claim construction can be completed (in about 7 years) despite the Western ban on supplies. Work reportedly started on Aug. 1, 1993. Algeria. In contrast to long-suspected nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, China's program to help Algeria (not a party to the NPT) build a nuclear reactor was secret until April 1991. The Washington Times on Apr. 11, 1991, first reported about the Chinese construction of a nuclear reactor in Algeria as part of a weapons program, generating renewed concerns about covert nuclear technology transfers to the Middle East. U.S. intelligence found that the nuclear reactor under construction may be used potentially to produce nuclear bomb fuel, according to the Apr. 20, 1991 Washington Post. The report further stated that intelligence experts were suspicious about the military nature of the reactor because: it is believed to be larger than the size required for nuclear research, there are no electrical power generation facilities, a Soviet-made surface-to-air missile battery is nearby, and the facility is located at a remote site (at Ain Oussera about 155 miles south of Algiers in the Sahara Desert south of the Atlas Mountains). According to Nucleonics Week of Apr. 18, 1991, some U.S. intelligence estimates of the size of the cooling towers suggest a possible upgraded power level as great as 60 megawatts. Algeria said Apr. 30, 1991 that the reactor would only generate electrical power and produce radioactive isotopes for medical research, would be fueled by low-enriched uranium, and would have a maximum thermal output of 15 megawatts. The Chinese initially did not admit to their nuclear assistance to Algeria. On Apr. 14,1991, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denied the Washington Times report without reference to a nuclear reactor. Then on Apr. 30, the Chinese issued a revised response, saying that the agreement on nuclear cooperation for China to provide a nuclear reactor to Algeria had been signed in 1983 and that the reactor would be used only for peaceful purposes since its power would be 10-16 megawatts. The statement also claimed that since China did not join the IAEA until 1984, it did not have to seek IAEA safeguards on the deal with Algeria. In fact, China applied to join the IAEA in September 1983. Observers are concerned about the covert nature of the deal from 1983 until the public disclosure and other suspicious aspects of the reactor site. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration did not express great concern about the Chinese reactor in Algeria, especially since Algeria promised to request IAEA safeguards. The State Department said, in April 1991, that it was aware of the cooperation but had no reason to conclude that the assistance was knowingly part of a weapons program. Iran. According to published reports and Chinese admissions, China -- Iran's largest single arms supplier during the Iran-Iraq War -- concluded covert agreements in 1989 and 1991 with Iran to provide nuclear technology. Iran also is believed to have substantial nuclear collaboration with Pakistan, long a recipient of Chinese nuclear assistance. Moreover, Iran and Syria agreed to establish joint military industries and to develop surface-to-surface missiles, according to Middle East Today of Oct. 3, 1991. CIA Director James Woolsey testified on July 28, 1993 that as "Iran's principal nuclear supplier," China has provided nuclear technology that have been consistent with the NPT, but "of concern" nevertheless because of Iran's nuclear weapons program. There had been reports of Chinese-Iranian nuclear cooperation coupled with public denials. Nucleonics Week of May 2, 1991 reported that U.S. and European intelligence found that since 1988,15 Iranian nuclear engineers from Iran's nuclear research center at Isfahan have been secretly trained in China; that a secret Iranian-Chinese nuclear cooperation agreement dates from after 1986; and that China transferred technology for reactor construction and other projects at Isfahan. On June 26,1991, a similar account appeared in the Washington Post about "Beijing's Tehran Connection." The Chinese embassy on July 2 responded that "China has struck no nuclear deals with Iran." The Washington Times reported on Oct. 16,1991 that China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation experts were building a nuclear reactor in Iran as part of a secret weapons program. The Chinese, on October 21, denied the story as "groundless." In early July 1991, Chinese Premier Li Peng not only visited Tehran, but especially stopped at Isfahan, China officially announced. An Arabic newspaper in London reported on July 11,1991, that Li promised nuclear cooperation and went to Isfahan to visit Chinese nuclear scientists and the military complexes there. In February 1992, an IAEA team visited Iran and found that a Chinese-supplied calutron (electromagnetic isotope separation equipment) and small nuclear reactor were not part of an Iranian weapons program as reported by the press in October 1991. The IAEA mission (on a pre-arranged and limited visit, not a special inspection) looked at six Iranian sites - with the Chinese calutron and reactor -- and found no proof there, at the time, that any Iranian nuclear activity violated peaceful principles. The team found that the Chinese-supplied calutron is different from the calutrons used by Iraq to enrich uranium. The one in Iran was found to be a standard electromagnetic separator configured for natural zinc and used to produce stable isotopes, with no enrichment capability (at the time). The inspectors also said that the mini neutron reactor is still under construction, although the fuel has been supplied, and the LAEA will be implementing safeguards. Nonetheless, skeptics point out that: (1) Iran could still evade international discovery of any hidden nuclear weapons activity as Iraq had done extensively; and (2) Iraq had started out with a small calutron and then developed numerous and larger ones. The Iranians reportedly said that they reluctantly turned to China after failing to obtain preferred Western assistance due to export controls. The LAEA visit was prompted by an Oct. 30, 1991, Washington Post report saying that Iran is trying to build a nuclear bomb and that China is secretly providing a calutron for uranium enrichment, a nuclear reactor to be located at Isfahan, and training for Iranian nuclear engineers. On the same day, Senators Cranston and Biden expressed concern that Bush Administration officials in June 1991 had testified that they have "no reason to conclude that the Chinese are assisting Iran in developing nuclear weapons." The Oct. 31, 1991 Washington Post, however, alleged that U.S. intelligence had warned about China's nuclear technology transfers to Iran before June. On Nov. 4, 1991, China admitted that Chinese and Iranian companies signed "commercial" contracts in 1989 and 1991 to transfer respectively an electromagnetic isotope separator (calutron) and a small nuclear reactor, for "peaceful purposes." China also plans to export two 300-MVV nuclear reactors to Iran that would include technical training. Iran has asked that Germany or another Western country resume construction of two nuclear reactors at Bushehr damaged by Iraqi air attacks in 1987 and 1988. Western countries, suspecting a civilian cover for a weapons program, have refused. On Sept. 10,1992, China and Iran finalized an agreement on "nuclear energy cooperation," when Iranian President Rafsanjani visited Beijing accompanied by top-level military and atomic energy officials. China estimates that the projects will take 10 years to complete, but, as with the Chinese nuclear reactor for Pakistan, supporting Western components and equipment are being denied to Iran. Iran, an NPT-signatory, has an IAEA safeguards agreement to submit all declared nuclear materials to inspections. However, Iraq had shown the weaknesses of the IAEA safeguards system. The United States suspects a tenacious, long-term Iranian nuclear weapons program and opposes even dual-use nuclear technology transfers to Iran. Suspicions arise partly from: (1) oil- and gas-rich Iran does not need nuclear power plants; (2) it is allegedly engaged in a $2 billion-a-year military buildup including the nuclear program; and (3) Iran in 1991-1992 sought and almost acquired for plutonium production a large, completely-Chinese nuclear research reactor (25-30 MW) together with key fuel cycle facilities from Argentina, revealed Nucleonics Week (Sept. 24, 1992). U.S. pressure halted these shipments -- which are unnecessary for a peaceful nuclear program, with MFN status for China a factor, said Nucleonics Week (Oct. 1, 1992). The May 27, 1993, New York Times reported that the Clinton Administration plans a new approach to isolate Iran, including trying to persuade China to cancel nuclear deals. Iraq. China, already a major arms supplier to Iraq, reportedly also transferred dual-use nuclear technology and know-how to that country. China helped Iraq build sophisticated magnets for stabilizing uranium enrichment centrifuges, according to Middle East Markets (a Financial Times newsletter), the Washington Times reported on Dec. 14, 1989. Iraq reportedly sought Chinese assistance only after failing to obtain the special magnets from British sources. China also sold Iraq low-enriched uranium from a Chinese military reprocessing plant in the late 19708, according to Nucleonics Week (May 9, 1991). The Nuclear Control Institute obtained a declassified U.S. intelligence document released on July 1, 1991, showing that China during 1984-1986 conducted for Iraq a feasibility study on building a clandestine nuclear reactor. Chinese aid was apparently limited (perhaps due to Iraq's success in obtaining Western technology before Desert Shield/Storm), but with international sanctions since late 1990, Iraq may give more consideration to Chinese technology. Syria. On Nov. 29, 1991, China explained that it plans to sell a small (30-kilowatt) nuclear reactor to Syria as an IAEA technical assistance program. The IAEA first denied the Syrian request because Syria, though a party to the NPT, refused to sign a safeguards agreement. In February 1992, however, the IAEA said Syria agreed to allow IAEA inspections of all nuclear facilities. Since May 1992, the IAEA has had a safeguards agreement for the Chinese-supplied reactor and fuel. Nonproliferation Cooperation and Compliance MTCR Guidelines. In April 1987, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States established the MTCR as a set of guidelines to control the export of equipment and technology that could contribute to a missile system capable of delivering nuclear weapons (i.e., a missile capable of delivering a 500 kg (1,100 lb) warhead to 300 km (186 miles)). "Membership" has expanded to 23 countries. The United States originally sought the cooperation of its allies in recognition of the limited effectiveness of unilateral American restraint. The Soviet Union and China were not approached to speed the negotiation process. The MTCR is not a treaty or executive agreement, and has no organization that monitors compliance or coordinates activities (like the IAEA). U.S. statutes on sanctions in part enforce the MTCR. States adhering to the MTCR have agreed to use the guidelines in deciding whether to export a specified set of items. The guidelines apply to certain items and technologies listed in the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex. Category I of the Annex covers the most sensitive items and technologies, including complete missile systems capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km, their complete subsystems, and related production facilities and equipment. Category II lists usable components, equipment, material, and technology (such as for propulsion and guidance). On Jan. 7, 1993, MTCR members issued new guidelines to cover delivery systems (except manned aircraft) capable of delivering all weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons). The MTCR now strongly calls for denying transfers of Category I items, and any missiles (regardless of payload capable of a maximum range of at least 300 km) and Category II items judged to be intended for delivering any weapon of mass destruction. Without that judgement, the MTCR calls for restraint in Category II transfers. China has not promised to adhere to the new guidelines; nevertheless, the old guidelines cover the M-9 and M-11 missiles. Compliance with the MTCR. In Beijing in November 1991, then-Secretary of State James Baker said the Chinese agreed to observe the MTCR guidelines and parameters, and that the Americans "understand that this applies to the M-9 and M-11 missiles." As part of the bargain, China required that the United States lifts the June 1991 sanctions. The Chinese Foreign Minister sent a written message (requested letter received on Feb. 1, 1992, but not yet made public) to Baker, reportedly confirming the commitment to the MTCR and to not transfer the M-9s and M-11s. China promised to abide by the MTCR, but is not a "member" or formal "adherent." Nonetheless, at issue is China's compliance with the MTCR, since any violation would still require U.S. sanctions under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Export Administration Act (EAA). On Aug. 24, 1993, the Clinton Administration determined that China violated the MTCR by transferring M-11 components to Pakistan. (See M-11s and MTCR-Related Sanctions.) Before that, there were reports of transfers that raised concern among some analysts that China has circumvented its agreement to abide by the MTCR, by shipping components, technology, and materials that directly or indirectly contribute to covert, local missile production programs in Iran (e.g., Tondar-68), Syria (e.g., Scuds), Pakistan (e.g., Hatf-3s), and perhaps other countries -- instead of delivering complete missiles. In addition, there is a concern that China could aid the improvement of missiles, including modifications of parts of M-series missiles for longer-range missiles and conversions from surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) into SRBMs (e.g., the 8610). Recently, a new concern has arisen over possible Chinese retransfers of anti-ballistic missile systems, with Beijing's purchase of Russian S-300 systems and reported acquisition of U.S. Patriot missile technologies. On Jan. 15, 1992, Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates testified that Iran has turned to China for battlefield and cruise missiles. Gates has also testified that Saudi Arabia is expanding its CSS-2 support facilities and that Egypt could begin operations at a missile production facility at any time. (Sino-Egyptian military ties date to 1976.) On Jan. 31,1992, the New York Times, citing senior Administration officials, revealed that U.S. intelligence reports indicated that China recently delivered to Syria 30 tons of chemicals needed to build a solid-fuel missile and planned to transfer 60 tons more in March or April. The same reports also said intelligence analysts found China had already delivered to Pakistan guidance units that could be used to control the flight of the M-11 missile. Jane's Defence Weekly (Feb. 1, 1992) reported that China has helped Iran to develop a new version of the M-11 missile called Tondar-68 with a range of 1,000 km (621 miles). According to the Feb. 22, 1992, Washington Post, an intelligence briefing on Capitol Hill (prompting Senator Biden to call for a closed session of the full Senate) disclosed that China has contracts to sell missile and nuclear related technology worth over $1 billion to Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and other countries in the Middle East, including a recent contract to sell to Iran components that could be used to develop a medium-range ballistic missile. On Mar. 5,1992, William Safire wrote in the New York Times that Chinese engineers are suspected to be in Syria covertly helping Syria to build missiles locally. China "recently" transferred to Iran sensitive gyroscopes "used in" missile guidance systems, according to an intelligence report cited by the Wall Street Journal on Mar. 18, 1992. The May 19, 1993, Flight International, citing Israeli intelligence sources, reported that Iran is developing a medium to long range solid-fuel missile believed to be based on the Chinese M-9 program, with Iranian funds (according to a signed agreement). The NPT and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Since 1984, China has said that it does not advocate, encourage, or engage itself in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that it requests IAEA safeguards as a condition for its nuclear exports since joining the IAEA in 1984. Nevertheless, China made secret, un-safeguarded nuclear transfers. China also refused to sign the NPT, calling it "discriminatory." With China shunned by Western countries after the June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, however, Premier Li Peng personally announced on Aug. 10, 1991 (when then-Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu made the first visit to China by a Group of Seven leader since the crackdown), that China "has in principle" agreed to sign the NPT. Chinese officials promised then-Secretary of State Baker in Beijing in November 1991 that China would sign the NPT by April 1992. China acceded to the NPT on Mar. 9, 1992. On Feb. 24,1993, CIA Director James Woolsey testified that Chinese nuclear deals with Algeria and Syria appear consistent with NPT obligations. On July 28, 1993, Woolsey testified that China's nuclear cooperation with kan is NPT-consistent but "of concern," and the nuclear relationship with Pakistan is "of greater concern." Moreover, China does not require full-scope safeguards (IAEA inspections of all other declared nuclear materials and facilities in addition to the imported supplies). Also, China does not belong to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multilateral effort to harmonize and strengthen the export controls of supplier countries on all (including dual-we) nuclear technology. With 27 members, including Russia, the NSG agrees on up-to-date international norms to supplement the limited IAEA safeguards on fissile materials. Policy Issues for Congress While China in 1992 signed the NPT and promised to abide by the MTCR, concerns remain about Chinese (1) compliance with current commitments and (2) cooperation with international nonproliferation regimes. The U.S. policy response has been crucial but controversial -- with trade interests at times conflicting with security concerns about missile and nuclear proliferation. Unilateral Policies No Nonproliferation Conditions on MFN. The United States continues the longstanding policy of engagement with China, including normal MFN trade treatment. Responding partly to congressional pressures, the Bush Administration in 1991 had imposed targeted sanctions in response to Chinese MTCR-violations, while keeping the MFN status to preserve U.S. leverage and promote economic and political reform in China. Bill Clinton had criticized former President Bush for rejecting legislative efforts to link renewal of China's MFN tariff treatment to human rights, trade, and nuclear and missile nonproliferation. On May 28, 1993, President Clinton (in renewing China's MFN status) issued a Report to Congress and an Executive Order (E.O.) that specified human rights conditions for renewal of MFN in 1994, but called for continuing to address weapons proliferation (and trade) issues separate from MFN. The E.O. stated that the Administration shall pursue other legislative and executive actions to ensure that China adheres to the NPT, MTCR, and other nonproliferation commitments. On May 28,1993, Senator Mitchell and Representative Pelosi supported the White House's E.O., instead of their legislation for conditions on human rights, trade, and nonproliferation (S. 806 and H.R. 1890). On May 28 and June 8, 1993, Senator DeConcini and Representative Solomon introduced S. 1066 and H.J.Res. 208 to deny China MFN status. The House rejected (105-318) H.J.Res. 208 on July 21,1993. M-11s and MTCR-Related Sanctions. After months of policy debate, the Administration on Aug. 24, 1993 determined that China shipped M-11 related equipment (not missiles) to Pakistan and imposed so-called Category II sanctions. However, the Oct. 20, 1993 Washington Post reported that the National Security Council has been reviewing the decision to implement the sanctions, due to industry objections. Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord indicated on Aug. 31, 1993 that Washington is ready to negotiate a waiver for the sanctions, which might require a new Chinese commitment to the MTCR, perhaps as a "formal adherent." (An opportunity may be President Clinton's meeting with the Chinese president at the November meeting of APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation) in Seattle.) U.S. law requires sanctions for 2 years, but the President may waive the sanctions if it is "essential" to U.S. national security. An advantage of granting China "membership" may be greater Chinese commitment to missile nonproliferation. Disadvantages of this step may include inapplicability of sanctions to MTCR adherents and information sharing. However, a more formal Chinese commitment without member status might entail a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the MTCR, specifying a denial of certain missiles and technology, such as the U.S.-Russian agreement signed Sept. 2,1993. The Dec. 4, 1992, Los Angeles Times and Washington Post first reported that intelligence analysts sighted Chinese M-11 SRBMs in Pakistan "within the last two weeks," but intelligence officials differ on whether the unconfirmed missile or missile component delivery violated the MTCR. However, the New York Times of May 6, 1993, reported that in the first four months of 1993, the intelligence community collected new "compelling evidence" that China has violated the MTCR by shipping M-11 missiles or missile equipment to Pakistan. On May 14,1993, intelligence officials briefed Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on new evidence they judged to be "strongly" suggesting that China transferred M-11 missiles or missile equipment to Pakistan in violation of the MTCR, reported the Washington Post on May 18, 1993. The President's May 28,1993, Report to Congress specifically cited reports that "China in November 1992 transferred MTCR-class M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan." (Emphasis added.) The Administration said in August 1993 that evidence of a missile equipment transfer is "unambiguous," but evidence on a missile shipment is ambiguous. Some observers have questioned whether there are misunderstandings on the Chinese commitment to the MTCR, but the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said on Sept. 2,1993, that "China understands well the commitments it has made." With the MTCR depending on national legislation for legal validity and enforcement, Section 73(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629) and Section 11B of the Export Administration Act (EAA) (P.L. 96-72) require U.S. sanctions if the President determined that a foreign entity, after Nov. 5, 1990, knowingly "exports, transfers, or otherwise engages in the trade of any MTCR equipment or technology that contributes to the acquisition, design, development, or production of missiles in a country that is not an MTCR adherent..." "MTCR equipment or technology refers to items listed in Category I or Category II of the MTCR Annex. Category I sanctions (for missile shipments) would deny all U.S. Government contracts and export licenses for Munitions List and EAA-controlled items, and may also ban imports of the sanctioned entities' products into the U.S. market (if the transfer "substantially contributed to the design, development, or production of missiles). The Aug. 24, 1993, Category II sanctions on 1 Pakistani and 11 Chinese arms exporting entities are limited to the denial for 2 years of U.S. Government contracts and export licenses for missile equipment or technology (MTCR Annex items). The net impact on U.S. businesses is uncertain. China's response has been limited to a threat to end its commitment to the MTCR. The primary effect of the sanctions is on the export of U.S. (e.g., Hughes and Martin Marietta) and foreign satellites (containing U.S. components) to China for launch before sanctions are lifted, as satellite components are in the MTCR Annex. (China has 3 contracts to launch U.S.-built satellites in 1994-95.) However, U.S. commercial launch service providers (e.g., McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics) may benefit from a lack of Chinese competition. While U.S., European, and Russian companies provide launch services in addition to the Chinese, China depends on satellite launching for money as well as prestige. A 1989 U.S.-China agreement allows the China Great Wall Industry Corporation to launch nine U.S.-built satellites until 1994 and requires China to charge prices "on par" with Western competitors (about $40-50 million per geostationary orbit launch). The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 1990-91 (P.L. 101-246) has banned the export of Munitions List items and U.S.-built satellites for Chinese launch (in response to the June 1989 Tiananmen massacre), but the President may waive the ban. The Aug. 24, 1993, sanctions on MTCR Annex items were imposed on China under the so-called "Helms amendment" to the AECA (enacted by the 102nd Congress). The language applies missile proliferation sanctions under the AECA in the case of countries with non-market economies (but excluding the former Warsaw Pact countries) to all activities of the government relating to development or production of missile equipment or technology, space systems or equipment, military aircraft, and electronics. While narrowing "aircraft" to "military aircraft," the amendment left "electronics" in original, broad terms. Nonetheless, in introducing the amendment on July 29, 1991, Senator Helms specified the intention to sanction all "arms exporting' entities. Previously, in June 1991, then-President Bush had imposed these MTCR-related sanctions on two Chinese arms trading companies as well as targeted sanctions on exports of high-speed computers and satellites for Chinese launch, after Chinese missile technology transfers to Pakistan. These sanctions affected China Great Wall Industry Corporation (which has offered satellite launch services since 1986) and China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (which has marketed the M-series missiles abroad). The imposition of the sanctions also reflected national security and proliferation concerns about high technology transfers to China. According to the Bush Administration, the June 1991 sanctions were effectively lifted on Mar. 23,1992, after they successfully led the Chinese to agree to abide by the MTCR. Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act. In the FY1993 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 102-484), Congress enacted the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act. It requires sanctions against countries that transfer to Iran or Iraq any goods or technology (including dual-use items and training or information) that "could" contribute to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The required sanctions include suspension of economic and military assistance, and nuclear cooperation (less relevant for China); and AECA and EAA MTCR-related sanctions. On June 29, 1993, Senators McCain and Lieberman introduced S. 1172 to expand mandatory and discretionary sanctions that would be imposed against foreign suppliers helping Iran or Iraq to acquire weapons of mass destruction or the means of their delivery. Additional mandatory sanctions include suspension of U.S. and multilateral bank assistance; co-development, co-production, military, and dual-use technical exchange agreements; and transfer of Munitions List items. Meanwhile, S. 1064 (Glenn)/H.R. 2368 (Lantos) would require certain sanctions (e.g., affecting arms exports and Eximbank loans) on any foreign or U.S. person assisting a foreign country in acquiring a nuclear weapon or unsafeguarded nuclear material. Bilateral Approach Resuming Security Dialogue. After the June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the Bush Administration suspended military exchanges and arms sales with China, among other sanctions. Congress, in P.L. 101-246, also imposed sanctions, including a suspension of export licenses for Munitions List items, crime control and detection equipment, and satellites. Some, however, advocate that Washington restart a dialogue with Beijing and especially the Chinese military on security issues, like proliferation. Multilateral Options International Lending. Congress may restrict only U.S. support for multilateral development bank (MDB) loans. For example, U.S. law requires anti-narcotics cooperation for U.S. support for MDB loans to certain countries. After the violent suppression of protests, the United States since early 1990 has supported only MDB loans to China for basic human needs. U.S. influence is limited, however, and the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have resumed and increased substantial lending to China. In H.Rept. 103-126 (Obey) on H.R. 2295, the FY1994 foreign aid appropriations bill, the House Committee on Appropriations recommended that the Secretary of the Treasury develop a reform agenda for G-7 discussion aimed at denying funds from international financial institutions to countries that have not signed international agreements on nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and missiles. S. 1064 (Glenn)/E.R. 2358 (Lantos) would seek to prevent the use of IFI funds for nuclear weapons acquisition. Five Power Talks and F-16s for Taiwan. The Administration may also pressure Beijing to resume arms control talks with Paris, Moscow, London, and Washington. In his Jan. 13, 1993 nomination hearing, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stressed a multilateral approach to the Chinese proliferation problem, citing the Five Power talks. The President's May 28, 1993, report to Congress on renewal of MFN for China stated that China has a special responsibility to continue these talks. H.R. 2333 (Hamilton), the FY1994-95 State Department Authorization Act, states that the President should restart the Perm Five talks, even without China. However, the Sept. 2,1992, U.S. decision to sell Taiwan 150 F-16A/B fighters has complicated the Sino-U.S. dialogue on nonproliferation. China suspended its participation in the Arms Control in the Middle East (ACME), or Permanent Five, talks, arguing that Washington violated the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique of Aug. 17, 1982, on reducing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Some analysts believe some Chinese officials would increase proliferation activities in retaliation for the F-16 sale or actual deliveries. China had agreed, during the June 1991 bid for MFN, to join in President Bush's initiative for the Five Power talks that were to include bans on nuclear bomb materials and ballistic missiles in the Middle East. At the third meeting in May 1992, China refused to include missiles and missile technology in the guidelines on weapons of mass destruction. Multilateral pressures are believed by many observers to be more effective than unilateral U.S. actions, such as in trade or export control policy. U.S. leadership to press China to participate fully in strengthening international nonproliferation regimes would capitalize on China's desire to be treated as a "great power" and perceived as a responsible world leader. Nonproliferation Regimes. Recognizing limits to the effectiveness of the NPT/IAEA safeguards system -- as shown by Iraq's advanced nuclear weapons program, the U.N. Security Council has tried to strengthen the LAEA's verification authority, particularly in Iraq. Section 161 of H.R. 2333 (Hamilton) directs the President to urge the IAEA to continue to improve its effectiveness. H.R. 2076 (Stark) was introduced to seek a comprehensive U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. In addition, U.S., Japanese, and European officials together may urge China to also commit to the NSG and Australia Group (on chemical and biological weapons). Chinese participation is also required for regional arms control groups, such as the five- country talks proposed for South Asia by Pakistan in June 1991. The FY1993 foreign assistance appropriations act (P.L. 102-391) required a report on nuclear non- proliferation efforts in South Asia and nuclear and missile programs of China, India, and Pakistan. The State Department submitted that report on Apr. 29,1993, stating that "concerns remain about whether China has terminated its links to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and about its missile export policies." Kenneth Adelman has urged advancing a new international norm by expansion of the 1987 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty into a worldwide treaty to ban ballistic missiles and missile testings. Another forum is the new Cocom. At a November 1992 meeting, Cocom was transformed into a 42-member Cocom Cooperation Forum that includes former Soviet-bloc countries, refocusing export control from communist to proliferation threats. Russian cooperation is important as Russia is now selling China advanced weapons, and missile and nuclear technology, which worry U.S. officials because of China's enhanced capability to develop weapons for export, testified CIA Director James Woolsey on Feb. 24,1993. On Dec. 18,1992, Russia and China signed an agreement on the sale of Russian nuclear reactors, raising concern about re-transfer of technology to Iran and Pakistan. LEGISLATION H.R. 1890 (supersedes H.R. 1835) (Pelosi) Extends to the People's Republic of China renewal of nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) treatment provided certain conditions are met. Introduced Apr. 28, 1993; referred to Committees on Ways and Means, and Rules. Referred to Subcommittee on Trade on May 6,1993. H.R. 2076 (Stark) Establishes a policy of the United States with respect to nuclear nonproliferation. Introduced May 11, 1993; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs. Referred on May 25, 1993, to Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East; Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment; Asia and the Pacific; and International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights. H.R. 2333 (Hamilton) Authorizes appropriations for State Department, USIA, and related agencies. Referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 8,1993. Reported to House (H.Rept. 103-126), June 11,1993. Passed House (273-144), June 22,1993. Referred to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 29,1993. (Also see S. 1281 (Pell).) S. 806 (Mitchell) Extends to the People's Republic of China renewal of nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) treatment provided certain conditions are met. Introduced Apr. 22,1993; referred to Committee on Finance. S. 1054 (Glenn)/H.R. 2358 (Lantos) Imposes sanctions against any foreign or U.S. person that assists a foreign country in acquiring a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded nuclear material, and for other purposes. Referred to Committee on Foreign Relations, May 27, 1993. S. 1065 (DeConcini) Denies the People's Republic of China most-favored-nation trade treatment. Introduced May 28,1993; referred to Committee on Finance. S. 1172 (McCain/Lieberman) Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Amendments of 1993. Introduced June 29, 1993; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.
