2005 Reports
- STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE Edward A. Corcoran 29 November 2005 - This paper examines the utility of strategic nuclear weapons. These weapons, a legacy of the Cold War, were developed to deter Soviet actions which would threaten vital interests or the survival of the United States. Such strategic deterrence seeks to convince adversaries that the benefits of hostile actions would be far outweighed by the consequences. More recently, as the Soviet threat has all but disappeared, emerging nuclear threats from proliferation and terrorism reinforce the need for deterrence. Nevertheless, the usefulness of nuclear weapons in general and strategic nuclear weapons in particular has drastically declined.
- Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran Edited by: Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, Mr. Patrick Clawson Publication Date: November 2005 As Iran edges closer to acquiring a nuclear bomb and its missiles extend an ever darker diplomatic shadow over the Middle East and Europe, Iran is likely to pose three threats. First, Iran could dramatically up the price of oil by interfering with the free passage of vessels in and through the Persian Gulf as it did during the l980s or by threatening to use terrorist proxies to target other states’ oil facilities. Second, it could diminish American influence in the Gulf and Middle East by increasing the pace and scope of terrorist activities against Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, Israel, and other perceived supporters of the United States. Finally, it could become a nuclear proliferation model for the world and its neighbors (including many states that otherwise would be more dependent on the United States for their security) by continuing to insist that it has a right to make nuclear fuel under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and then withdrawing once it decides to get a bomb.
- GOV/2005/87: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran International Atomic Energy Agency 18 Nov 2005 --Report by the Director General
- GOV/2005/77: 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran' International Atomic Energy Agency 24 Sep 2005 -- Resolution adopted on September 24, 2005, IAEA Board of Governors
- Questioning Iran's Pursuit of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle - Iran’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities: A Pattern of Peaceful Intent US Department of State Sep 2005 -- Briefing slides presendted by the US to foreign diplomats in Vienna [PDF 2.6 MB]
- GOV/2005/67: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran International Atomic Energy Agency 02 Sep 2005 -- Report by the Director General [PDF Version]
- Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments Bureau of Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State 30 Aug 2005 -- This Noncompliance Report (NCR) is submitted pursuant to Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2593) which requires a Report by the President on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.
- Draft Final Report of the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force: Recommendations for the Nuclear Weapons Complex of the Future Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, U.S. Department of Energy 13 Jul 2005 [PDF 911 KB]
- Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD [PDF]
- REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 31 Mar 2005 -- "With this letter, we transmit the report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Our unanimous report is based on a lengthy investigation, during which we interviewed hundreds of experts from inside and outside the Intelligence Community and reviewed thousands of documents. Our report offers 74 recommendations for improving the U.S. Intelligence Community (all but a handhl of which we believe can be implemented without statutory change). / This unclassified report is derived from a 692-page classified report that was delivered to the President on March 31, 2005." [PDF Version 3.3MB]
- International Conference On Nuclear Technology and Sustainable Development 5-6 March 2005, Sponsored by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Ministry of Science, Research and Technology
- About the perspectives of the Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear field. Political Aspects. By Sevak Sarukhanyan
- The unquestionable answer for sustainable development: The use of nuclear energy. By Professeur André Maïsseu President
- NPT and New International Security Environment.By Nasser Saghafi-Ameri
- The E3/EU - Iran negotiations and prospects for resolving the Iranian nuclear issue: a European perspective. Remarks by Philippe Errera
- Nonproliferation and International Cooperation for Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy: The Role of the IAEA. By George Perkovich
- Uses and Abuses of Article 4 Rights under the NPT. By MUSTAFA KIBAROGLU, Ph.D.
- On the Iranian Nuclear Issue: Facts and Recommendations. LNCV General Secretariat, Como, Italy.
- A WMD-FZ in the Middle East: Policy Agenda for a New Regional Security System. By Jeffrey Boutwell, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- PERSPECTIVES OF WORLD NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.
By Sh. N. Movsumov - Synthesizing Security measures in Jordan: a New Narrative Paradigm of Israel's Nuclear Reactor “Dimona” Threats. By: Dr. Ra’Ed QaQish, MP, Jordan
- A New Non-Proliferation Strategy. Joseph Cirincione, Director for Non-Proliferation Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces National Intelligence Council Dec 2004, Released Mar 2005 -- Congress has directed the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to submit to the Congressional leadership and intelligence committees an annual, unclassified report assessing the safety and security of the nuclear facilities and military forces in Russia.
- Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency INFCIRC/640 Date: 22 February 2005 - The non-proliferation value of a multilateral arrangement is measured by the various proliferation risks associated with a nuclear facility, whether national or multilateral. These risks include the diversion of materials from an MNA (reduced through the presence of a multinational team), the theft of fissile materials, the diffusion of proscribed or sensitive technologies from MNAs to unauthorised entities, the development of clandestine parallel programmes and the breakout scenario. The latter refers to the case of the host country “breaking out”, for example, by expelling multinational staff, withdrawing from the NPT (and thereby terminating its safeguards agreement), and operating the multilateral facility without international control.
- GOV/2005/9: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt International Atomic Energy Agency 14 Feb 2005 -- Report by the Director General [PDF 148 Kb]
- Iran’s Nuclear Programme: A Collection of Documents UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs January 2005 [PDF 2.56 Mb]
